

Joint Publication 4-0



Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations



6 April 2000



As long as our Armed Forces continue to be committed around the globe, our ability to deploy and sustain them will remain a top priority. We must continue to integrate the unique logistic capabilities of all our Services in the most efficient manner possible. Limited resources dictate that the Services must adjust the size of their inventories to take advantage of improved business practices and information technology. Doing this will reduce storage and handling costs while improving overall responsiveness and force readiness. As logistics migrate from a supply-based to a distribution-based system, it is vitally important that we capitalize on new and developing technologies to enhance responsiveness, visibility, and access to logistic resources.

Thus, while we continue to refine our current logistic doctrine, this revision of Joint Publication 4-0 makes the first reference to *focused logistics*. This is in recognition of the fact that a transformation in how we conduct logistics is underway. More importantly, some of the focused logistic elements are already being implemented. The route of sustainment — from point of supply to user — is the lifeblood of our combat power.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Henry H. Shelton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the logistic support of joint operations series. It provides doctrine for logistic support of joint and multinational (allied and coalition) operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Covers Authorities and Responsibilities for Logistic Operations**
 - **Provides Logistic Principles and Considerations**
 - **Discusses Logistic Planning**
 - **Gives Guidance on Logistics at the Theater Level**
-

General Logistic Overview

Logistics is the process of planning and executing the projection, movement and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of operating forces in the execution of national security policy.

The **science of logistics** concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations.

Logistic functions include:

Supply

Maintenance

Transportation

Civil engineering

Health services

Other services

Supply is the function of acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing the materiel required by forces. **Maintenance** includes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition or to upgrade its capability. **Transportation** is the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to the final destination. **Civil engineering** provides the construction, operation, maintenance, damage repair, and reconstitution of facilities, roads, and utilities and logistic infrastructure. **Health services** includes medical evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, and dental services. **Other services** are nonmaterial support activities provided by Service personnel and the logistic community that are essential to force support. For each of the above functional areas, the combatant commander should consider these four elements of the joint theater logistic process: **procurement and contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition and disposal.**

Responsibilities for Joint Theater Logistics

Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics.

The exercise of **directive authority for logistics** by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders. Combatant commanders exercise **combatant command (command authority) (COCOM)** over assigned forces. **COCOM includes directive authority for logistics**, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater. This directive authority ensures the effective execution of approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of the operation, and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary facility duplication and overlapping functions. It also promotes synchronization of effort and builds cohesion among the Service component commands in supporting the combatant commander.

Services and Service components implement.

Implementation and execution of logistic functions remain the responsibility of the Services and the Service component commanders.

Services provide own logistic support.

Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its **own forces**, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing.

Combatant commanders establish priorities.

The combatant commander will **review requirements** of the Service component commands and **establish priorities** through the approved deliberate and crisis action planning processes to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively.

Subordinate joint forces will normally follow single-Service logistic support channels.

Logistic responsibilities for subordinate forces to the combatant command will follow **single-Service command channels**, except when specifically directed otherwise either by the authority assigning those subordinate forces to the combatant command or by the Secretary of Defense; when common, joint, cross-servicing, or inter-servicing agreements and procedures provide other responsibilities; or when the geographic combatant commander gives the commander of a subordinate joint force directive authority for a common support capability within that subordinate commander's joint operations area.

Combatant commanders coordinate supply support between Service components.

Combatant commanders are responsible for **allocating critical resources, coordinating supply support** among the Service components, establishing **supply buildup rates**, and authorizing **theater stockage levels**.

Commanders of Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces.

Subject to combatant commanders' responsibility and authority, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for **logistic support of their forces** and direct communication with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters.

Multinational (allied and coalition) forces often require some support beyond their organic capabilities.

Although **nations are ultimately responsible for providing logistic support for their own forces**, the capability of participating nations' forces to support themselves organically will vary widely in multinational (allied and coalition) operations. Substantial non-organic support may be supplied by contractors, host nations, or other participating nations, but such logistic needs must be identified during the planning phase. The capability of allies and coalition partners to logistically support a multinational operation must be carefully considered, since they may serve as both a source and a competing demand for logistic support. Combatant commanders must be attuned to this, and should strive to negotiate, conclude and integrate the use of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and associated implementing arrangements for use in time of crisis.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for supplies for civilians.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for **provision of supplies for Department of Defense civilians** in occupied areas in accordance with current directives, obligations, and treaties the United States recognizes.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for a distribution network, maintenance, salvage, construction facilities engineering, base development, coordinating health services, and other services.

The geographic combatant commanders are responsible for maintaining an **effective distribution network** and exercising visibility and positive control of personnel, materiel, and services. The combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating **maintenance and salvage**; establishing **bases**; coordinating **real estate requirements**; and planning, constructing, and maintaining **roads, bridges, utilities, and facilities**. Geographic combatant commanders are also responsible for coordinating and integrating **health service support** and the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of **deceased personnel** within their theaters. The **Services** are normally responsible for **facility acquisition** funding and support. In contingency operations, one Service or agent is normally assigned base operations support responsibility for all Services in a particular area or base; thus they are responsible for facility acquisition funding for all Services.

The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command provides strategic common-user air, land, and sea transportation and terminal services.

The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) has the mission to provide **common-user air, land, and sea transportation and terminal services** to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces in order to meet national security objectives throughout the range of military operations. Combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCTRANS. Geographic combatant commanders retain command of Service component transportation assigned or attached to the theater.

Joint Logistic Planning

The combatant commanders' operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels.

Proper logistic deliberate planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Supported combatant commanders, in coordination with United States Transportation Command, balance the transportation flow of the joint force through effective employment planning. Balance is primarily a function of force composition and transportation flow, but planned theater distribution and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration capabilities must also be considered. Logistic planners must focus on seamless deployment, distribution, and sustainment in order to properly enable the employment concept of the mission or task.

Logistic planning should be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The combatant commander's strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operational locations where operational logistic concepts are employed. Tactical planning is done primarily by the Service components.

Special logistic planning considerations include demands of an expanding force, critical items, bottlenecks, movement control, and civilian supply sources.

Planners must identify and assess **critical or key issues** unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an **expanding force; critical supply items**; flow or process **constraints**; control of **all means of transportation** (including those provided by allies and host nations); **critical infrastructure protection** and the **resourcing of supplies and services** from civilian, coalition, and allied sources.

The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully **integrate operational and logistic capabilities**. The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

The logistic system integrates intertheater and intratheater transportation.

The logistic system includes projection, movement, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces. Key areas to address during planning include **lines of communications, the theater transportation network, specialized units, allied and coalition support, support and movement of displaced civilians, and host-nation support.** Considerations in developing a logistic system include logistics sourcing, distribution, geography, weather, transportation, logistic capability, asset visibility, logistic enhancements, logistic resources within the theater, availability of existing logistic facilities and options for purchase, lease, or construction of other facilities, logistic infrastructure protection, echelon of support, contracted support, assignment of responsibility, and availability of host-nation support.

The theater strategic logistic concept is derived from the estimate of logistics supportability of one or more of the courses of action.

The theater logistic concept should derive from the **estimate of logistic supportability** of one or more courses of action. It is the coordinated assessment by logistic planners in which the capabilities and resources of the combatant commander's components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, health, and engineering services.

CONCLUSION

Logistics is the foundation of combat power. Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics. This includes the authority to issue subordinate commanders directives (including peacetime measures) necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Directives also address the effectiveness and economy of operation, the prevention or elimination of unnecessary facility duplication, overlapping of functions among the Service component commands, and the acceptance of operational risk of foregoing logistic implications. The logistic implications of a combatant commander's operation plan must be continuously updated and coordinated at all levels, through all phases of operation, and take into account prospective allies, coalition partners, and international organizations.

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CHAPTER I

AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

“Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management.”

Lt Col George C. Thorpe
Pure Logistics, 1917

1. General

a. **Logistics.** Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. Major logistic areas of responsibility are shown in Figure I-1. The science of logistics concerns **integration of the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts**, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative **combat power** that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy **is enabled by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel** to the required points of application across the range of military operations. A nation’s capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a **major factor** in military operations. **Mobilization** may serve as an enabler to projecting combat power by assembling or making available manpower, industrial and economic, military, or legal resources, using a graduated response process.



Figure I-1. Major Logistic Areas

Refer to JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

b. **Levels of Logistic Support.** Joint doctrine states that there are **three interrelated levels of war** — **strategic, operational, and tactical**. These same levels apply to operations in war and peace. The Joint Staff and Service staffs concentrate on strategic logistics matters. Serving as supported commanders, the geographic combatant commanders as well as supporting commands and agencies link strategic and operational level logistics to support their assigned missions. Subordinate commanders blend operational logistic and tactical support to accomplish tasks assigned by the commander of a combatant command (CINC). The efforts of logisticians at each level form a single, integrated logistic system connecting the nation's economy to its warfighting forces. Figure I-2 shows a battlefield framework for this organization. All levels of support affect the sustainability of forces operating at the tactical level of war.

c. **Logistic Functions.** Logistic support requirements involve **six broad functional areas**: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services (see Figure I-3).

- **Supply** includes actions to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel required by the operating forces to equip and sustain the force from deployment through combat operations and their redeployment.
- **Maintenance** includes actions taken to keep materiel and equipment in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its capability.
- **Transportation** is the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to the




Figure I-2. Strategic and Operational Logistic Concepts



Figure I-3. Logistic Support Requirements Functional Areas

final destination and redeployment upon completion of the mission or as directed. This includes the expeditious retrograde of reparable materiel for repair.

- **Civil engineering** provides construction, damage repair, operation, and maintenance of roads and facilities, and logistics enhancements required by the CINC in order to sustain military operations. Examples of civil engineering products include: shelter, warehouses, supply routes, terminals, hospitals, water, electric power, sewage treatment, and water and fuel storage and distribution. Within Service limitations, civil engineers may also conduct environmental support operations, provide fire protection, and conduct explosive ordnance disposal, provide water purification and disposal, conduct engineer reconnaissance, and provide force protection construction support.

Additional guidance is found in JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

- **Health services** include patient movement, primary care, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, force health protection services, veterinary services, dental services, preventive health care, and the required command, control, and communications.

Additional guidance is found in the JP 4-02 series of publications.

- **Other services** are associated with nonmaterial support activities and consist of various functions and tasks provided by Service personnel and the logistic community that are essential to the technical management and support of a force. Included in this category of support are: food service, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, laundry and shower, postal, finance, personnel administration, religious, and mortuary affairs. The Marine Corps categorizes laundry and shower as "engineering" and light textile repair as "maintenance."

d. Joint Support Responsibilities and Requirements. CINCs exercise **combatant command (command authority) (COCOM)** over assigned forces. **COCOM includes directive authority for logistics**, giving the CINC the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater. **COCOM gives the supported or supporting CINC the statutory authority, whether over assigned forces or forces designated by the Secretary of Defense, to direct all aspects of logistics necessary in order to accomplish a mission.** Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) and Service component commanders. JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," gives an explanation of COCOM and the other command relationships of operational



The airlift element of the strategic mobility triad provides rapid global force projection.

control, tactical control, and support. A CINC's authority does not diminish the Services' responsibilities to provide support to their own forces. While a CINC's authority is generally confined to the theater, logistic support beyond the theater is usually a Service responsibility. In war **the CINC may direct, when circumstances dictate, that materiel or equipment be transferred between Service components.** This transfer will normally be accomplished on a reimbursement basis, but the reimbursement process will not delay directed transfers. The CINC's directive authority for logistics underscores the need for accurate and well coordinated prior planning between the supported command, Services, supporting agencies, and allies. **Support**, which often involves logistics, is the action of a force that **aids, protects, complements, or sustains** another force and may involve the provision of **services, resources, and combat power**, but does not involve the transfer of forces or units. Support is characterized as mutual support, general support, direct support, and close support. JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," also provides descriptions of the concepts of coordinating authority, administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

e. **Unique Aspects of Multinational (Allied and Coalition) Logistics.** CINC's cannot enter into multinational relationships that are contrary to US policy without National Command Authorities (NCA) direction. US participation in future multinational operations will vary considerably in terms of missions, leadership, command and control (C2), mutual support, contract, and funding arrangements. More detailed consideration of the effect of these differing characteristics is provided in JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations." The inherent national sovereignty issues of participating multinational partners will complicate the establishment of C2 arrangements in the logistic support area. Formal C2 arrangements must be established and clearly identified in operation and supporting plans. Successful logistic support during any multinational operation will be characterized by a high degree of planning, coordination, communication, and cooperation. Existing joint and combined relationships may serve as an entry point for the United States to expand multinational logistic support relations. In the case of regional alliances, existing alliance policies and practices will guide US participation. Even participation

in a long-established alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not ensure that formal operational C2 relationships have been clearly defined or accepted by all members. Commanders must be cognizant of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) security issues which may hamper logistics integration with coalition or allied nations in multinational operations. Providing or arranging for the logistic support of its forces in a multinational operation is the responsibility of each participating nation. However, many nations do not have the capability to fully support their deployed forces with logistic assets. To assist such nations, as well as to achieve economies of effort and increased effectiveness for the entire force, several support options exist. These include cross-servicing agreements, role specialized nation and/or lead nation designation or pooling of resources. Establishment of an overall logistic support coordinator during the planning phase will facilitate development of such logistic arrangements. In the absence of appropriate agreements, no authority exists for CINCs to provide for or accept logistic support from allied or coalition forces. It is incumbent upon CINCs to aggressively seek approval to negotiate and conclude, in coordination with the Department of State, appropriate international support agreements. To the extent that impediments may exist that either hinder or preclude receiving or providing support to allies, combatant commanders will notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and recommend options for providing necessary support. Successful multinational operations are characterized by tact, diplomacy, knowledge of allied and coalition forces' doctrine and capabilities, and generally good personal relations with allied and coalition commanders and political leaders. Key ingredients for success in the multinational environment are clear and common understanding, mutual respect, and common goals among supporting allies.

f. **Elements of the Logistic Process.** In determining requirements for each of the functional areas listed in paragraph 1c above, the geographic combatant commander should consider the four elements of the logistic process: procurement and contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition. These elements apply to planning and implementation across the full range of military operations, including multinational operations. At the theater strategic level, specific considerations include the determination of logistic resources necessary to move and sustain combat forces, the procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner, the process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands, and the establishment and maintenance of the distribution system necessary to achieve the optimum mission effectiveness (see Figure I-4). At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources. Geographic combatant commanders and their Service components should understand that these functions will vary in definition and application. Efforts should be made to standardize these functions without inhibiting operations. Logistic functions should use existing Service component policies and procedures whenever possible. If it is not possible to use existing policies and procedures of the Service components, CINCs must identify and resolve differences with Service commanders early in the planning process to determine logistic support in the theater. Geographic combatant commanders may resolve logistic issues by designating a Service component to act as executive agent for the other Services. The CINC may also appoint a theater logistic management and coordination element to ensure interoperable standardized procedures. These procedures apply across the range of military operations. Ideally, prior deliberate planning and testing of

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AT THE THEATER STRATEGIC LEVEL

- Logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations.
- The procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner.
- The process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands.
- The distribution system necessary to achieve optimum mission effectiveness.

Figure I-4. Specific Considerations at the Theater Strategic Level

these modifications in joint exercises should be conducted to ensure adequate logistic support for anticipated joint operations.

2. Responsibilities

"I don't know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."

**Fleet Admiral E.J. King
To a staff officer, 1942**

a. Authority and Control

- **CINCs may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).** The exercise of directive authority for logistics over assigned forces by a CINC includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders. These directives, which include peacetime measures, should be **necessary to ensure the following.**
 - Effective execution of approved operation plans (OPLANs).
 - Effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operation.

- Limitation or mitigation of operational risk.
- Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.
- **This authorization of directive authority is not intended to:**
 - Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support;
 - Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or
 - Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.
- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the **Military Departments and Services** will continue to have responsibility for the **logistic and administrative support** of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance.
 - **Under peacetime conditions,** the scope of the logistic and administrative

responsibilities exercised by the CINC will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, Department of Defense (DOD) policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a CINC's directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the CINC, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the CINC, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

•• **Under crisis action, wartime conditions**, or where **critical situations** make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of CINCs enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.

- A **CINC will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs** (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command's area of responsibility (AOR) that will have **significant effects on operational capability or sustainability**. When the CINC does not concur in a proposed Service logistic program, and action and coordination between the CINC and the Service chief fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the CINC may forward the issue through the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

b. **Implementation and Execution.**

Implementation and execution of logistic functions remains the responsibility of the Services, US Special Operations Command (for special operations [SO]-peculiar logistics), and the Service component commanders. The supported CINC will **direct logistic support to synchronize support operations** to the joint force.

- A CINC will give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- In exercising the authority to delineate functional responsibilities for logistics, the supported combatant commander will **evaluate the logistic capability of deploying forces in the operational area and host-nation or multinational support**, as well as available contracted contractor support.

c. **Single-Service Logistic Support.** Each Service **is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces**. This Service responsibility extends into the theater, but may be modified when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies or by CINC assignment of common, joint, or cross-servicing responsibility. The CINC may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated operational area. If so, the CINC may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user. Service components will identify and validate support requirements in both the

deliberate and crisis planning process, then provide these requirements to the supporting Service component as soon as possible.

d. **Special Operations Forces (SOF)**

Logistic Support. The logistic support of SOF units is **the responsibility of the parent Service**, except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives, or as noted in the following. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the theater special operations command, joint force SO component commander, joint special operations task force, joint psychological operations task force, or a joint civil-military operations task force. SOF logistic support includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, facilities, and services. The Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) is responsible for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via US Special Operations Command Service component logistics infrastructure and in coordination with theater Service components.

For additional discussion of SOF logistic support, see JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

e. **Transfer of Functions and Facilities**

Among Services. CINCs should give their components appropriate guidance for transferring forces and rendering support. Under wartime or crisis conditions, a CINC may direct transfer of functions as necessary. This authorization of directive authority is not intended to abrogate Service

responsibility for logistic support. Every effort will be made to obtain the Service’s concurrence through coordination with Service component commands or directly to the headquarters of the appropriate Service. Under all conditions, the implementation of such a directed transfer, including administrative, reimbursement, and procedural aspects, is the responsibility of the Service component commanders involved. The CINC retains the responsibility for overseeing and resolving issues.

f. **Forces Subordinate to Combatant Commands**

- Logistic responsibilities for forces subordinate to the combatant command will follow single-Service command channels, except for the following.
 - When specifically directed otherwise either by the authority assigning those subordinate forces to the combatant command or by the Secretary of Defense.
 - When common, joint or cross-servicing agreements and procedures provide other responsibilities.
- The geographic combatant commander **may delegate to a subordinate JFC directive authority** for a common support capability within that subordinate commander’s operational area.

3. **Functions of Logistics**

a. **Supply**

- **Common-User Logistics.** The CINC and planning staff should assess the categories of supply and services that may be considered for common-user support. While designation of common-user support does not relieve components of providing Service-peculiar supplies

and services, the staff assessment will identify economies resulting from consolidating resources or tasking one or more components to provide common-user support to the remainder of the joint force. In some instances, this support may also be provided to, or by, governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In addition to Service responsibility, these options may include functional tasking, executive agency, and dominant-user.

JP 4-07, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations," describes the options available to the CINC and planning staff when assessing the need for common-user logistic support.

- **Coordinating Supply Support.** Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for **effectively coordinating supply support** between the Service

components, **establishing supply buildup rates, and determining theater stockage levels.** Included in this responsibility is the provision of supplies for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) as requested by and coordinated with the Department of State. When practical to improve economy of effort, common-item support may be assigned to a Service component command, normally the dominant-user. Geographic combatant commanders are also responsible for the **allocation of critical logistic resources** within their theaters. They must ensure that **statements of the requirements** of assigned forces (including mutual support arrangements and associated inter-Service support agreements) are prepared and submitted in accordance with existing directives of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Chiefs of the Services (see Figure I-5).

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUPPLY

- Coordinating supply support
- Establishing supply buildup rates
- Determining theater stockage levels
- Allocating critical logistic resources
- Reviewing statements of requirements
- Providing supplies to civilians
- Recommending the priority of the phased buildup and cutback
- Maintaining visibility over common-user materiel
- Returning reparables to the source of repair

Figure I-5. Geographic Combatant Commanders' Responsibilities for Supply

- **Commanders of Service Component Commands.** Subject to CINCs' responsibility and authority as outlined above, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for **logistic support of their forces and direct communication with appropriate headquarters** on all supply matters and related requirements, such as the deployment of supplies, materiel, and equipment into the operational area. Commanders of component commands will keep the geographic combatant commander informed of the status of supply matters affecting readiness of their forces.
- **Commanders of Subordinate Commands.** Commanders of subordinate commands may be assigned the responsibility for providing **supply support** to elements or individuals of other Services within the theater or designated joint operations area (JOA).
- **Supplies for Civilians.** The geographic combatant commander is responsible for **provision of supplies to civilians** in occupied areas in accordance with current directives, obligations, and treaties that the United States recognizes.
- **Security Assistance.** CINCs will identify materiel requirements for regional minimum-essential security assistance and consolidate and prioritize wartime requirements within their theaters.
- **Priority of Phased Buildup and Cutback.** The geographic combatant commander is responsible for recommending to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the priority of the phased buildup and reduction of supplies, installations, and organizations essential to the mission.

b. Maintenance and Salvage. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for **coordination of maintenance and salvage** within the theater. Where practical, **maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use** should be established and inter-Service use of salvage assets should be emphasized. However, Service-peculiar item maintenance support should remain the responsibility of Service component commanders. Current Service doctrine and business practices may emphasize velocity of the logistic pipeline in place of in-theater maintenance and stocks. Retrograde movement of items must be planned for, relying on an effective and efficient distribution network to meet time definite maintenance and repair requirements. **Maintenance priorities** should emphasize mission-essential weapon systems that may be rapidly returned to mission readiness. An **effective maintenance program** that emphasizes preventive maintenance can minimize retrograde and supply needs for major end-items and enhance battle damage repair efforts.

c. Transportation

- **Strategic Transportation.** The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) has the mission to provide strategic common-user air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces to meet national security objectives across the range of military operations. Further, USCINCTRANS normally functions as the supporting command to the geographic combatant commander and serves as the single manager for common-user ports. In this role, intertheater airlift and sealift assets are not normally transferred to the operational control of the geographic combatant commander, but retained by

USCINCTRANS. Other combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCTRANS in conjunction with the transportation component commands (TCCs) Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), which provide a complete movement system from origin to port of debarkation (POD). This system includes the effective and efficient use of military and commercial assets. From the initial in-theater destination, the transportation system must then interface efficiently with the theater joint or combined distribution network. The theater distribution network will utilize the transportation resources that are assigned or attached to the theater Service components. Upon request of the CINC, USCINCTRANS has the ability to operate dedicated express transportation to in-theater destinations other than initial entry nodes (sites), using either military or commercial resources for high priority sustainment items that require assured, rapid movement. Finally, USCINCTRANS has

the authority to procure commercial transportation services through component commands (within legal constraints) and to activate, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Ready Reserve Force (RRF), Sealift Readiness Program, and Contingency Response Program.

Refer to JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System."

•• **Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Facilities and Supplies.**

Transportation facilities and supplies of AMC, MSC, and MTMC not assigned to the geographic combatant commander are normally exempt from the logistic authority of the geographic combatant commander. CINCs should communicate their requirements and priorities for modification of existing facilities and establishment of new transportation facilities to Service component commanders and USCINCTRANS.

•• **Air and Sea Ports.** US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), through



The sealift element of the Strategic Mobility Triad (airlift, sealift, pre-positioning) provides logistic support with almost unlimited capacity.

its TCCs, will normally serve as the single port manager for all common-user air and sea ports of embarkation (POEs) and/or PODs for DOD operations and contingencies. Air and seaports may be owned and operated by AMC, MTMC, a Service, a CINC, or commercial or host nation (HN) authorities. They may be either sophisticated fixed locations or heavily dependent on deployable mission support forces or joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) assets to accomplish that mission. During wartime, each Service has primary responsibility for supporting the loading and unloading of its military equipment from common-user air and sealift using MTMC contract, organic, or theater-arranged resources (e.g., cargo handling units). The responsibilities of AMC and individual units moving via AMC or AMC-controlled aircraft are contained in multi-Service publications.

For more information on JLOTS, refer to JP 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).”

- **Deployment and Redeployment.**

Combatant and supporting commanders begin the deployment process with situational awareness and planning resulting in an NCA directive to accomplish a mission requiring movement of forces into a designated JOA. This movement may be from the continental United States (CONUS), from another theater, or from the theater base of the supported CINC. The deployment process ends when a unit has reached its prescribed location and is ready, as determined by the CINC, to conduct operations. The joint deployment process encompasses a broad range of complex strategic deployment activities that must be synchronized during the four phases of deployment (pre-deployment activities;

movement to and activities at the POE; movement to the POD; and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration [JRSOI]) to ensure a seamless deployment of forces and equipment. When a unit has completed the mission it may return to home station or deploy to another JOA either inside or outside the theater. There are also four phases to this redeployment of forces: recovery and reconstitution and predeployment activities; movement to and activities at the POE; movement to the POD; and JRSOI.

For more information on deployment and redeployment, refer to JP 3-35, “Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.” For more information on JRSOI, refer to JP 4-01.8, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.”

- d. **Civil Engineering.** Civil engineering plays an important role in logistic planning and operations. It is an integral part of the joint operation planning process. Civil engineering planning should be conducted within the joint planning and execution community as part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Civil engineering planning identifies requirements for base development; essential facilities and force beddown; real estate; and establishes the requisite civil engineering capabilities needed to support commitment of military forces. Additional essential civil engineer support within Service-specified constraints include environmental support operations, fire protection, explosive ordnance disposal, water purification and distribution, and force protection construction support. These essential civil engineering requirements are captured in the Civil Engineering Support Plan of OPLANs prepared by CINCs. When their full range of capabilities are employed, civil engineers

may be a significant force multiplier in execution of the overall logistic and operation plans. In addition to support of JOPES, civil engineering supports the joint commander in the maintaining and disposal of base facilities. To the most practical extent possible, civil engineering incorporates environmental considerations in supporting mission accomplishment.

- **Base Development.** Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for identifying requirements for any base development necessary to accomplish the mission.
- **Facilities and Force Beddown Requirements.** Civil engineering support optimizes facility and force beddown resources consistent with expected operational requirements, duration of need, and forces to be supported. Included in force beddown analysis is the need to provide power generation and other utility support for organizations not possessing this organic capability.
- **Facilities Construction and Base Maintenance.** CINCs are responsible for prioritizing, planning, and coordinating the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, utilities, and facilities necessary to support their mission. The supported CINC's staff engineer and Logistics Directorate (J-4) collaborate in recommending priorities for theater logistic infrastructure development. Overseas contingency construction project requests require geographic combatant commander validation and prioritization.
- **Real Estate Requirements.** Civil engineering encompasses real estate management from acquisition of real property to final turnover of land and facilities upon completion of an operation. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordination of real estate requirements within the theater. Inter-Service use of real estate should be encouraged to the maximum extent possible. Geographic combatant commanders will resolve conflicting requirements for additional real estate and incompatible use of existing real estate.
- **Assignment of Facilities.** The Services are normally responsible for facility acquisition funding and support. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure that minimum essential engineering capabilities and facilities required to support theater operational and tactical requirements are assigned to the Service components. Based on mission requirements, the CINC may direct temporary transfer between Service components. To conserve limited engineering resources, the use of HN facilities should be optimized, especially in occupied areas.
- **Environmental Support Operations.** To the extent practicable, the combatant commander is responsible for environmental protection for military operations in the AOR. Within specific Service limitations, civil engineers are responsible for environmental support to the combatant commander. Significant environmental issues for logisticians include procurement, transportation, storage, distribution, and disposal of hazardous materials (HM) and hazardous waste (HW). Appropriate consideration must be given to applicable US laws and regulations, DOD regulations, international and HN laws, international treaties and conventions (such as Basel), status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), and possible remediation of contaminated sites upon termination of

military use. Environmental considerations are an integral part of planning and decision making.

For more information on civil engineering support, refer to JP 3-34, "Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations," and JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

e. **Health Services.** Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating and integrating **health service support (HSS)** within their theaters. Where practical, **joint use of available medical assets** will be accomplished to support the warfighting strategy and concept of operations. CINC's should ensure that planning for essential life saving stabilization care in-theater, along with the evacuation of stabilized patients to definitive medical care outside the theater, is conducted.

For more information on health services, refer to the JP 4-02 series.

f. **Mortuary Affairs.** Based upon the guidance and direction of the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance and policy to the combatant commands. CINC's develop implementation plans based on the CJCS policy and doctrine. In addition, CINC's are responsible for the **search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel** within their theaters. The responsibility extends to deceased personnel of US forces. In appropriate circumstances, it also may extend to allied, US contractors in support of US forces, third country, and enemy dead. For humanitarian, health, or morale reasons, the CINC may also provide mortuary services to the local populace when coordinated with the NCA and Department of State. CINC's are responsible for **controlling and coordinating mortuary affairs operations** within their

theaters. This responsibility also pertains to peacetime mass fatality incidents.

Refer to JP 4-06, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations."

g. **Other Services.** Other support services are provided by Service component commanders to personnel under their command. Included in this category of support are food service, exchange, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, laundry and shower, religious, postal, and finance.

4. Elements of the Logistic Process

a. **Procurement and Contracting.** Logistic procurement is generally a **national, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Service responsibility**. Currently, CINC's have only indirect influence on Service procurement. The combatant commands use a series of reports and messages to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, or Defense Programming Resources Board (such as the integrated priority lists, critical item lists, and Defense budget issues) to influence the acquisition and budget cycles. The CINC does have a **significant role in contracting for supplies and services** in the operational area.

- **Contracting for Supplies and Services.** The trend of world events suggests that US forces will deploy, in joint operations, supporting contingencies in theaters without an established logistic support structure. For deployments to contested JOAs, or where combat action is deemed likely, the CINC will normally call for maximum combat power in the initial phase. When possible, satisfying requirements for supplies and services by contracting may improve response time during the critical early stage of a deployment, and make airlift and sealift

available for other priority needs. Contracting may bridge gaps that may occur when sufficient organic support is not available in the operational area. It is also valuable where no host-nation support (HNS) agreements exist, or where HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies and/or services required. The emerging trend is to use contractors to augment active military combat service support and assist them in meeting major theater war or other mission requirements that may arise simultaneously with the contingency operation.

- **Contingency Contracting.** Contingency contracting is often performed in support of an operation in an overseas location. The contracting process follows the policies and procedures outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulatory System. Contingency contracting may be **an effective force multiplier for deployed forces** in providing supplies, services, and construction support to augment organic capabilities. Each Service component has the capability to initiate contracts for needed support. However, the CINC may elect to employ the Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) element or establish a contract clearing house to ensure that Service components are not bidding against each other for the same commodity or service. Contracting may provide initial deployment, sustainment, and redeployment supplies and services such as the following.

- **Supplies:** Class I — bottled water and food items. Class II — selected items of organizational equipment and clothing, expendable office and field supplies. Class III — petroleum, oils, lubricants (POL). Class IV — construction. Class V — ammunition. Class VI — troop support. Class VII —

major equipment. Class VIII — medical supplies. Class IX — repair parts. Class X — material to support nonmilitary programs.

- **Services:** Laundry, food service, transportation, billeting, utilities, maintenance and repair, and sanitation services.

- **Construction:** Construction, alteration or repair of buildings, structures, or other real property.

b. **Distribution.** Distribution is **the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system** to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the CINC. Distribution management is the function of synchronizing and coordinating a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and functional components (supply, transportation, maintenance, and logistics management) to achieve responsive, customized solutions to warfighter requirements.

- **Global distribution** is the process of providing materiel from the source of supply to the point of consumption. It integrates the elements of supply chain management: requirements determination, acquisition, supply, transportation, maintenance, and retrograde and disposal processes from the strategic through the tactical level to support joint force operations.
- **Theater distribution** is the sub-set of global distribution that focuses on the flow of personnel and materiel within the theater to meet the CINC’s mission.

Refer to JP 4-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution,” and JP 4-09, “Joint Doctrine for Global

Distribution,” for more information on the distribution process.

c. **Sustainment.** Sustainment is **defined as: “The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support** required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or the national objective” (JP 1-02). It includes the supplies and services needed to support the initial execution of approved OPLANs, an intermediate level of supplies to support the force until resupply is available, and the replenishment stocks necessary to maintain and conclude operations. The **sustaining function**, particularly sourcing and distribution of common-user items, may require a combatant command to apply a JTLM approach or technique to synchronize, integrate, and coordinate sustainment operations based on the commander’s priorities. The manner in which a CINC may apply JTLM will vary widely based on the mission and conditions affecting the operation. Theater sustainment management should emphasize velocity and time-definite delivery from CONUS and other sources outside the theater rather than large in-place inventories.

See Appendix B, “Organization and Functions of Combatant Command J-4 and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards,” for more information on JTLM.

d. **Disposition and Disposal**

- **Worldwide DOD Property Disposal.** The DLA provides worldwide disposal of DOD property through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Service (DRMS). DLA support to the CINCs, Services, and Service component commands includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in a theater. The DRMS element in-theater will establish **theater-specific procedures for the reuse,**

demilitarization (less ammunition), sale, or ultimate disposal of facilities, equipment, and supplies, to include hazardous materiel and waste. Disposal operations will be part of **the CINC’s disposal plan developed in coordination with DLA.** DLA will outline disposal procedures in its Combat Support Agency supporting plan during deliberate or crisis action planning.

Additional information on disposal operations can be found in JP 4-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.”

- **Environmental Planning and Hazardous Waste Management.** Environmental planning and hazardous waste management involve nearly every element of a CINC’s staff and component commands. Logistic support must be planned and conducted with **appropriate knowledge of the potential environmental impact of planned operations.** US environmental laws, policies, regulations, applicable international treaties and conventions, SOFAs, HN agreements, and respect for HN environmental laws will have varying degrees of impact on operation planning and execution. Operation planners and logisticians have a significant role in **environmental planning, hazardous materials handling, and hazardous waste management.** Similarly, civil engineers assisting the JFC ensure compliance, as the mission and circumstances permit, with all applicable international, federal, state, local, and HN environmental treaties, conventions, laws, and agreements when planning and executing construction and facility support projects. Early planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate **environmental management reviews**

(including HW) have been completed prior to initiating logistic support activities. Important environmental requirements should be captured in Annex L, “Planning Guidance — Environmental Considerations” in combatant command OPLANs. Annex L should include guidance for ensuring pollution prevention, environmental protection, and compliance consistent with achieving the combatant command mission. The guidance should cover maritime, amphibious, land, and air operations.

5. Critical Logistic Enablers

a. **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support.** Effective C4I and counterintelligence support is vital to planning, initiating, conducting, sustaining, and protecting a successful joint operation. Logistic, operational, and intelligence functions all depend on responsive C4I, the combination of architecture, facilities, organizations, and information tying together all aspects of joint operations and allowing CINCs and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, question, and manage. Integrating logistics and operational C4 systems is essential. Additionally, it is critical to ensure that an adequate number of trained operators exist to operate these systems. Logistic C4 needs must be included in the operation’s C4I system plans.

b. **Logistic Information Systems.** Implementation of end-to-end combat support capability by **integrating existing information technologies (IT), logistic automated information systems (AIS), and joint decision support and visualization tools** is paramount for today’s joint warfighter in order to obtain critical combat support information. The overall objective is to **“operationalize”** the Joint Vision 2020 concept for focused logistics and, more

specifically, to implement capabilities that meet the focused logistics information fusion challenge. These IT capabilities include the following.

- **Using automatic identification technology (AIT)** and existing and emerging DOD supply and transportation systems to capture timely and **accurate source data about personnel, units, and materiel.** AIT enables and facilitates data collection and transmission to AIS that improve the collection of initial source data, reducing processing times, and improving data accuracy. AIT provides timely visibility of all logistic assets, whether in-process (being procured or repaired), in-storage (being stored as inventory), or in-transit (being shipped to another location).
- **Feeding accurate information** from AIT devices is accomplished by several AIS. One critical feed is to the **Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II).** TC-AIMS II is used to provide data for in-transit visibility (ITV) and control over cargo and passenger movement transportation data. **TC-AIMS II** is the primary **feeder system** of accurate source data to **JOPES** via the Joint Force Requirements Generator-II system.
- Employing national level systems such as **Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) and the Global Transportation Network (GTN)** to transform that data into information and share it globally.
- Employing the **common operational picture-combat support enabled (COP-CSE)** to incorporate combat support information into battlespace situational awareness to benefit the CINC, joint task force (JTF), and staff.

- Employing select **joint decision support tools** and common services to improve the CINC and JTF overall decision making abilities to conduct “what-if” analysis.

c. **Global Combat Support System (GCSS)**. GCSS provides **integration and interoperability** between combat support functions and command and control to support the operational needs of the warfighter. It directly supports C4I for the warfighter and CJCS Joint Vision 2020. Using the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and/or common operating environment (COE) as well as the shared data environment, it ensures rapid integration of combat support applications, providing a seamless flow of operational and sustaining base information to the warfighter. GCSS provides accurate and near real time total asset visibility for the NCA, CINCs, and Service components vital to the deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of joint combat assets or resources. Fielded GCSS capabilities include the following.

- **Global Command and Control System (GCCS) COP-CSE**. The common operational picture (COP) within the GCCS is a graphical depiction of warfighting information available in any AOR. It is a key tool for commanders in planning and conducting joint operations. The COP enhances the flow of information between the NCA, Joint Staff and commanders by amplifying situation reports (SITREPs), operational reports (OPREPs), and other key reports. The real value of the COP is in displaying battlespace information in a graphical manner that links to detailed information that similar reports such as SITREPs and OPREPs are unable to display. The **COP-CSE provides** the user interface to access combat and **combat service support** applications such as GTN and JTAV. The COP-CSE

provides direct combat support (e.g., logistic, transportation, medical, personnel) **information to warfighters**.

- The **GCSS portal** includes basic **internet web services**, collaboration, search and index, segment distribution, and service management including help desk services. All of these services are implemented by tailoring or configuring DII and/or COE segments for GCSS use. The **GCSS portal is a web-based** online query capability to **access fused and integrated combat support data**. It also consists of a set of applications, each of which may be used by itself and that will also be accessible directly from the COP-CSE. Current combat support applications on the GCSS portal are accessible via a unilateral log-on feature through public key infrastructure technology. These include the following.

- **Global Transportation Network and Joint Total Asset Visibility.**

Among the joint automated systems that will enable GCSS are GTN and JTAV. The GTN is a global command and control information repository designed to track DOD unit and non-unit cargo and passengers while in transit. JTAV integrates in-process, in storage, or ITV. GTN provides the ITV that is integrated with JTAV.

- **Joint Decision Support Tools (JDSTs)**.

JDSTs provide the warfighters and logisticians with the ability to access support force capabilities in order to perform mission tasks, develop and evaluate logistic operational support plans, monitor logistic operations, and react to deviations from project support. The JDSTs are available via a web-based, client-server environment that complies with DII and COE architecture standards and requirements.

- **Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support.** Critical to logistic operations is an **accurate picture of the threat** through which the theater logistic forces must travel. Intelligence and counterintelligence support is critical to preparation of the logistic estimate and plan feasibility analysis. **Hostile activities** may impede forward movement, destroy logistic stockpiles, close airports and seaports, and destroy prime movers of critical logistic elements. **Hostile actions** may invalidate logistic support assumptions made during deliberate planning. The CINC's dissemination of **intelligence and counterintelligence** concerning the potential threat (including terrorism, hostile SOF, refugees, and other aspects, as appropriate) **is critical to the logistic effort.** Intelligence and counterintelligence provide threat assessments, effect liaison with HN security and intelligence services, and conduct operations and investigations to identify and/or neutralize the threat.
 - **Service agreements (ACSAs)** are flexible bilateral agreements that may be used for the purpose of obtaining HNS (or support from other coalition countries). ACSAs provide CINC's with an alternative, potentially more **efficient sources of logistic support** to US forces during joint exercises, deployments, and contingency operations. They have been successfully employed during deployments such as DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR.
 - **Support from Host Nations.** Existing multilateral support plans may serve as useful tools in identifying committed support capabilities of the host nation. Assistance sought from host nations may include, but is not limited to: POL, transportation, telecommunications, food service, civilian labor, rear area protection, facilities, equipment, supplies, HSS, and other services (see Figure I-6). Clinical medical support must be equivalent to US standards of care or acceptable to the CINC.
 - **Coordinating HNS.** CINC's should **ensure that effective HN coordination is quickly established** to support specific and implied missions. Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs), SOFAs, and technical agreements (including transit agreements) must be negotiated ahead of time and include the status of civilian contractors accompanying the force. The staff performing this coordination function minimally requires the involvement of US personnel who have had language and cultural training working with HN counterparts. **HN coordination should be centralized** as much as possible in order to effectively use the assistance provided by the HN and other nations. This avoids duplication
- d. **Host-Nation Support**
 - **US and HN Bilateral Agreements.** HN resources may play a **critical role in reducing the logistic footprint** required to support geographic combatant commanders. CINC's should become knowledgeable of all bilateral agreements for mutual support, and exercise these agreements to the maximum extent possible. If the necessary agreements are not in place, commanders must obtain authority to negotiate (through the Joint Staff) and then actively seek bilateral agreements to support the joint reception, staging, and onward movement of forces, equipment, and supplies.
 - **Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements.** Acquisition and cross-

ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FROM HOST NATIONS

Can include, but is not limited to:

Transportation	Telecommunications
Civilian Labor	Supplies
Services	Health Services Support
Rear Area Protection	Facilities
Contracting	Petroleum
Oils	Lubricants
Acquisition of Equipment	Food
Airlift	Communications
Use of Facilities	Storage Services
Port Services	Billeting
Clothing	Medical Services
Base Operations Support	Maintenance Services
Calibration Services	Construction Equipment

Figure I-6. Assistance Sought from Host Nations

of effort and the potential of competing for scarce resources. If necessary, the CINC should use mobile teams to obtain additional information from the requesters regarding capabilities and requirements.

e. Critical Infrastructure Protection.

The protection of the logistics infrastructure is critical to the effective support to the CINC. Planning considerations must include the following.

- Identify infrastructure assets critical to the plan.

- Ensure that qualitative vulnerability and interdependency analyses are performed on all identified assets. Asset ownership (public sector, private sector, US, foreign, multinational,) will not be a factor in the selection process.
- Conduct risk management assessments on all critical assets and implement justifiable security enhancement measures.
- Apply risk management principles to each critical asset in order to determine the proper course of action (COA) for enhancing asset security.

CHAPTER II

LOGISTIC PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

"In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements."

Frederick the Great
Instructions for His Generals, ii, 1747

1. General

a. **The principles of logistics complement the principles of war.** This chapter provides logistic principles and considerations that historically have been proven important. These principles and considerations serve as a guide to CINCs and their staffs for planning and executing logistic support for joint operations.

b. To support the national military strategy, logistics must be **responsive** in and **capable** of meeting military personnel, equipment, mobility, medical readiness, infrastructure, and sustainment requirements of the Armed Forces of the United States across the full range of military operations. Logistics must **integrate the national and theater effort** to mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, reconstitute, redeploy, and demobilize the forces assigned and attached to a combatant commander. Logistic principles are both fundamental and interrelated and form a synergy that contributes to the successful conduct of logistic operations. Identifying those principles that have priority in a specific situation is essential to establishing **effective support**. The application of these principles to a specific mission and situation dictates the concept of logistic support. The principles of logistic support are not a checklist, but rather a **guide** for analytical thinking and prudent planning. All logistic efforts must first ensure effectiveness and strive for

efficiency to best utilize scarce resources and successfully complete tasks and missions.

2. Principles of Logistics

Figure II-1 shows the principles of logistics.

"Logistics is the bridge between the national economy and the combat forces, and logistics thus operates as 'military economics' in the fullest sense of the word. Therefore logistics must be seen from two viewpoints. Logistics has its root in the national economy. In this area it is dominated by civilian influences and civilian authority. In this area the major criterion of logistics is production efficiency. On the other hand, the end product of logistics lies in the operations of combat forces. There logistics is dominated by military influence and by military authority. In this area the major criterion of logistics is its effectiveness in creating and sustaining combat forces in action against an enemy."

Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense, 1959

a. **Responsiveness.** Responsiveness is the **right support in the right quantity in the right place at the right time**. Among the logistic principles, responsiveness is the **keystone**; all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.

b. **Simplicity.** Simplicity reflects the need to **reduce complexity** and often fosters




Figure II-1. Principles of Logistics

efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations. **Mission-type orders and standardized, interoperable procedures** contribute to simplicity. **Establishment of priorities and pre-allocation of supplies and services** by the supported unit may simplify logistic support operations.

c. **Flexibility.** Flexibility is the **ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation.** Logistic plans and operations must be flexible in order to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The commander must retain **positive C2** over subordinate organizations to maintain flexibility. The principle of flexibility also includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized operations. This principle is a guide for strategic thinking and forms the template for

synchronized and coordinated joint logistic planning.

d. **Economy.** Logistic economy is achieved when effective support is provided **using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within acceptable levels of risk.** At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the CINC must continuously consider economy and optimize use of resources to ensure effectiveness and mission success while supporting every effort toward achieving efficiency.

e. **Attainability.** Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The commander's logistic staff develops the concept of logistic support, completes the logistic estimate, and initiates resource identification based on the supported commander's requirements, priorities, and



The C-9 is the mainstay of the Aeromedical Evacuation system.

apportionment. An operation should not begin until actions are taken to mitigate risk and minimum essential levels of support are on hand.

f. **Sustainability.** Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander's attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.

g. **Survivability.** Survivability is the **capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction.** Examples of military objectives selected for their effect on logistics and subsequent theater operational capability include industrial centers, airfields, seaports, railheads, supply points and depots, line of communications (LOC), shipping, rail and road bridges, and intersections. Logistic units and installations are also **high-value targets** that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. **Active**

measures must include a defense plan for logistics with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. **Passive measures** include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size of an installation to what is essential for the mission. Although the physical environment will most often only degrade logistic capabilities rather than destroy them, it must be considered when planning. Logistic operations are particularly vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that deny or restrict the use of critical infrastructure. **Survivability will dictate planning for dispersion and the allocation of protective forces at critical nodes of the logistic infrastructure – particularly within the theater.** Decentralization and redundancy are critical to the safety of the logistic system supporting the CINC. Planners must also consider alternate aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) in the event that WMD use denies access to the primary sites. Additionally, WMD use on ports may effect the ability and willingness of civilian flagged carriers, (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and CRAF) to use these ports. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to

survivability. All force protection initiatives for symmetrical and asymmetrical threats must emphasize security of logistic support. These concepts are related to logistic indicators. (See Appendix C, “Logistic Indicators and Checklist for OPLANs and CONPLANs.”)

3. Logistic Considerations

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”

**Jomini
Précis de l’ Art de la Guerre, 1838**

a. **Employment planning considerations directly impact the projection or deployment of forces.** From employment planning decisions, the CINC identifies: force requirements; intent for the deployment operation; the time-phased arrival of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in-theater; sustainment requirements; and the closure of forces required to execute decisive operations. Equally important to the successful conclusion of joint operations will be effective reconstitution and redeployment planning performed to either return a unit to home station or deploy it to another mission area.

b. **Logistics as a Factor in Determining Objectives.** Depending on the theater operations and logistic concepts that a geographic combatant commander employs in a campaign, logistic factors will almost always affect a theater campaign and exert different constraints. Logistics is a positive enabler to the execution of successful operations. Good logistic synchronization is a combat multiplier. **Strategically**, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or CINC. **Operationally**, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate

of strategic buildup or theater onward movement, overall composition of the combat force, and the depth, tempo, and duration of combat operations. **Tactically**, the logistic initiatives at the strategic and operational levels must be focused on ensuring that the engaged mission forces have the right support at the right place at the right time.

c. **Coordination of Logistic Planning with Operation Planning.** Operations and logistics are inseparable facets of war. Although logistic plans are derived from operational goals, neither can claim primacy; each is integral to the other. **Integration** of the operations and logistic planners’ efforts is **necessary** throughout the planning and execution phases. Although obvious, such integration does not occur automatically. Command emphasis at all levels is essential. It is imperative that logistic support and operations planning occur simultaneously for multinational (allied and coalition) operations. Nations are often reluctant to (and sometimes prohibited from) sharing national OPLANs with potential allies or coalition partners because of their highly sensitive nature. Nonetheless, the effort should be made to share integrated operations and logistic support plans during the plan development stage and rapidly adjust them as required during execution.

d. **Forward Impetus.** Forward impetus **derived from the synergy of information and logistic resources** is required to provide rapid, continuous, and responsive support to the CINC. This includes delivery, tracking, and shifting of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies (even while en route) in order to optimize support to the warfighter.

e. **Balance Between Combat Forces and Logistic Forces**

- The aim of any military organization is to produce the **greatest possible combat power in a combat environment with**

the resources available. CINC's must determine the **proper balance** of combat forces and logistic forces based on the differences between various logistic and operations concepts. Efforts to enhance combat power by arbitrarily shifting logistic manpower into combat units may achieve the opposite result. Each campaign or operation demands its own analysis of the proper balance between combat and logistic forces. The **requisite strength** of logistic elements depends on many factors such as the **gross requirements** for logistic resources and where and when they are needed, the **adequacy of available transportation networks and assets**, the **length of the LOC**, the **availability of local labor**, and the **types of operations** being supported. Caution should especially be exercised when assuming local labor will provide augmentation during operations.

- The **balance between logistics and combat forces at the beginning of hostilities** is important. Overall, planning must be based on the mission ranging from major theater war to military operations other than war (MOOTW) and the CINC's intent. Fully trained and equipped logistic elements must be available and deployed in adequate numbers to render immediate sustained support to the combat troops. A combat force without logistic support is **not sustainable and may not be fully capable of mission success**. For sustained combat, CINC's should give serious consideration to the **availability, capability, state of organization, and limitations** of logistic forces allocated to them for wartime operations. This is critical when the US logistic force structure has been reduced in anticipation of the availability of HN assets. **Mobilization** requires particularly **close coordination** of effort among the Department of Defense, combatant

commands, and Service headquarters and between the supporting agencies and operating forces. Determining when logistic elements should be mobilized is based on the concept of employment for the combat forces they will support. This might require that logistic forces be mobilized or deployed **at the same time as, or even before, combat forces**.

f. Command and Control of Logistics

- **Unity of command** is essential to coordinate national and theater logistic operations. Logistics is a function of command. This principle is met through the CINC's directive authority for logistics, which gives the CINC authority to direct logistic actions and resources necessary to meet mission and operational taskings assigned to the command. To exercise control at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, subordinate joint force and theater level Service component commanders must also exercise **control over their respective logistic resources subject to the directive authority of the CINC**.
- **In multinational operations**, unity of command may be more difficult to achieve because of the reluctance of nations to relinquish control over their logistic resources and national legal restrictions regarding the use or transfer of logistic resources to other nations. During the operational planning phase, every effort should be made to clarify the C2 of logistic resources. If established, the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of an overall logistic support coordinator and/or command should be clearly defined.

See JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations," for the unique considerations associated with planning logistic support for multinational operations.

- **Sound logistic planning** forms the foundation for strategic, operational, and tactical **flexibility** and **mobility**. To influence the relative combat power of the force, the CINC must have **adequate control** of the command's logistic support capability.
- The **logistic support system** must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a **single command authority**. Wherever feasible, peacetime chains of command and staffs should be **organized during peacetime just as they would be in wartime to avoid reorganization during war**. This includes Reserve component forces (US and HN) that may be assigned specific theater missions. Commanders must be able to use the systems they rely on in peacetime to call forward, in a timely manner, those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.

g. Apportionment and Allocations

- **Apportionment** involves distribution for planning of limited resources among

competing requirements, whereas **allocation** involves distribution of limited resources among competing requirements **for employment**.

- The **senior commander** will usually attain the best results by apportioning and allocating **reasonably expected and available resources** among subordinate commanders based on the concept of operations and the subordinate commanders' stated requirements. **Allocations may be less than the amounts requested** by, or apportioned to, some of the subordinate commanders, due to the limited availability of logistic assets.
- **Failure to maintain a system of apportionments and allocations** may cause an inflation of priorities, the ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and the senior commander's loss of control over the logistic system. Strategic and operational apportionment and allocation issues should first be addressed during the deliberate or crisis action planning process, and subsequently through either the Joint



The C-17 provides rapid response to strategic logistic requirements in sometimes austere environments.

Staff or CINCs use of a **Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB)** as outlined in Appendix B, “Organization and Functions of Combatant Command J-4 and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards.”

- **Threat distribution and phase duration** are useful tools for determining the allocation of resources. Using **threat distribution**, the CINC will assign destruction of a portion of the enemy’s total combat capability (i.e., forces, installations, organizations) to Service or functional component commands. An example of threat distribution would be to assign destruction of a certain percentage of enemy mechanized, armor, follow-on-forces, and artillery forces during an air operations phase among the Services and/or functional components. The remaining percentage of the threat, increased intentionally to provide a deliberate total overlap, would be distributed among the Service and/or functional components during the ground maneuver operations phases. **Phase duration** is the CINC’s projection of how long a specific phase of an operation is expected to last. Two examples of phase duration are the air operation that lasts a certain number of days (time oriented) or the air operation that lasts until a certain percentage of enemy or type of enemy centers of gravity are destroyed (objective oriented). Threat distribution and phase duration help identify where the weight of the campaign will fall during various phases in order to prevent unnecessary duplication of support to different components.

Refer to JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

h. Accommodation for Wartime Requirements. The ideal logistic

organization within the nation’s economy and the military **does not require a fundamental change to manage the transition from peace to war** in order to meet an emergency. Although civilian and military leaders may be prevented from attaining the ideal, they should strive to come as close to it as possible. If they do not create and train an organization in peacetime that will work in war, the leadership will be burdened with urgent reorganization and training requirements at a time when they should be free to focus on the employment of that organization.

i. Logistic Discipline

- **Logistic resources should be optimized.** At the **strategic theater level**, there may be limitations such as fiscal constraints or the unavailability of materiel, industrial facilities, and skilled labor and long lead times for mobilization and deployment that may affect the strategic concentration of forces and supplies within the theater. At the **operational and tactical levels**, common limitations are attributed to: inadequate transportation means, port capacities, and throughput capabilities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and critical spare parts; the lack of trained logistic personnel; and the failure to plan for adequate, interoperable C4 systems. Unwise use of logistic resources may result in combat forces being deprived of adequate manpower, equipment, supplies, and training, and constitutes a disregard for economy of force.
- True **economy of supply** requires the **careful planning and buildup of levels** to provide those resources and combat facilities (based on threat distribution and phase duration) that are essential to initiate and sustain combat operations. At the same time, planners should avoid

building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks waste resources, decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny sustainment to other areas.

- In all cases, the **cost** of any military operation **must be considered**. Logistic support should be the most **efficient** means consistent with ensuring successful execution of the concept of operations.

j. **Movement Control.** Deployment planning begins when situation awareness prompts COA planning. Deployment execution is directed and/or specified in appropriate orders. The supported commander is responsible for movement control into and through the geographical AOR. USTRANSCOM monitors and provides movement summaries of AMC, MSC, and MTMC assets from departure to arrival in the theater. USTRANSCOM also maintains the transportation portion of the JOPES data base and provides analysis to the Joint Staff, supported combatant command, and others. This analysis includes **progress reports, status, problems, port workloads, daily movement statistics**, and resolution of **force closure** problems encountered in the common-user transportation system. **In transportation operations, force closure is the process of a unit arriving at a specific location.** It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location (e.g., POE or POD), intermediate stops, or final destination and ends when the last element does likewise. **In deployment and redeployment operations, force closure** is when the CINC determines that the deploying force has completed movement to the specified operational area with sufficient resources and is ready to conduct its assigned mission. It normally coincides with the integration phase of JRSOI. JOPES and the **Joint Planning and Execution Community** provide the CINC with a capability to change or delete

requirements during main force deployment. **The geographic combatant commander** is responsible for the **integration of the required intratheater movement and the strategic concentration of forces and logistics.** Inadequate control of movement, whether into or within the theater, results in waste, reduced logistic effectiveness and efficiency and, consequently, a loss of potential combat power.

k. **Deployment Information Flow.** **Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective logistic planning, coordinating unit movements, and sustainment operations.** It is as important to know where units and supplies are as it is to have them physically present. OPLANs are published in JOPES format. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities. JOPES supports national, theater-level, and supporting structures in peacetime and wartime. JOPES and GTN are currently the tools used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported and supporting CINCs, and the Services to monitor and update deployment information. **Access to JOPES via GCCS is critical** to deploying and supporting forces. During planning and execution, the supported and supporting CINCs will, in most cases, make decisions concerning priority of forces and allocation of scarce airlift and sealift based on the situation they are facing and information available through multiple systems that include GCCS, JOPES, GTN, and JTAV.

l. **Logistic Reserves.** **Logistics may be a pacing factor** at the operational level of war when it determines how quickly a campaign can proceed. Just as strategic and operational reserves are necessary to exploit tactical or operational success or respond to unanticipated contingencies, it is necessary to **establish reserves of logistic resources** that can be committed only by the geographic combatant commander. Examples of logistic

reserves are **materiel** and **unexploited HN resources**. This should include an analysis of established agreements with foreign nations.

m. **Pre-positioning.** CINCs and Service component commanders planning for combat operations and MOOTW in undeveloped theaters of operations must give adequate consideration to available **pre-positioned equipment and sustainment within their operational areas**. The Services have established both **afloat and shore-based pre-positioning** of unit equipment and sustainment to meet force closure requirements and offset the competing demand for strategic lift by the early deploying joint force.

n. **Industrial Base Requirements.** CINCs, Service component commanders, and their staff planners must factor in administrative lead time, production time, and distribution time when determining logistic response time for the industrial base. Definite DOD plans to support a combatant command, with appropriate investment strategies and offsets, must be in place prior to the start of any contingency to ensure timely response from the Services, DLA, and industry. Although the greatest demand occurs within the first 30 to 60 days of a contingency, industrial surge to meet demands requires significant time to build to maximum output. The Department of Defense will frequently compete with private sector customers for a manufacturer's industrial capacity and inventories. To ensure appropriate industrial surge planning for troop support items and spares, critical items must be identified and communicated through the appropriate inventory control point and DLA to the industrial base.

o. **Contracting for Supplies and Services.** There are basically three sources of supplies and services for US forces deployed in a contingency operation. They are: US force structure, HNS, and contracting. Within each of these categories, factors and considerations are as follows.

- **Organic US force structure (active and reserve).** Factors: mobilization authority troop callup ceiling, unit availability, troop ceiling, lift availability, operational costs, and ability to deploy units to a major theater war.
- **Host-nation support.** Factors: the availability of agreements and capability of the HN to provide reliable levels of support.
- **Contracting.** Considerations: Can this be done either through direct contracting with local sources or existing contingency contracts such as the Army's logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP), the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP), and the Navy's construction capabilities contracts (CONCAP) or through contingency clauses of systems contracts? Can adequate protection against hostile actions be provided to the contractor personnel? In addition, are the status of contractor personnel specified in SOFAs?

See Chapter V, "Contractors in the Theater," for a more in depth discussion on the use of contractors performing mission-essential services.

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CHAPTER III

JOINT LOGISTIC PLANNING

“Logistics sets the campaign’s operational limits. The lead time needed to arrange logistics support and resolve logistics concerns requires continuous integration of logistic considerations into the operational planning process. This is especially critical when available planning time is short. Constant coordination and cooperation between the combatant command and component staffs — and with other combatant commands — is a prerequisite for ensuring timely command awareness and oversight of deployment, readiness, and sustainment issues in the theater of war.”

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States



Logistics over-the-shore operations where fixed-port facilities are not available.

1. General

a. **Joint logistics** is a complex, interdependent concept that may apply leverage (plus or minus) to a CINC’s combat power. An understanding of the CINC’s concept of operations and early involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities. **Logistic planning considerations** aid the CINC in providing guidance to staff planners and assessing the adequacy and feasibility of campaign and operation plans. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,” discusses **sustainment planning**

that is directed toward **providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables** required to sustain the planned levels of activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Special considerations must be made for operations in less developed countries where infrastructure support (communications, transportation, port facilities, aircraft materials handling equipment [MHE] and industrial capability) are limited. An advanced party should visit these locations prior to deployment in order to determine availability of adequate infrastructure to support operations.

b. **Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the CINCs** in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies. CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),” requires a **logistic feasibility estimate** of the OPLAN summary and detailed analysis relative to logistic support in the OPLAN’s Annex D. In this publication, Appendix A, “Logistic Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense,” and Appendix B, “Organization and Functions of Combatant Command J-4 and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards,” provide pertinent organizational guidance and alternatives to joint logistic planners.

2. Importance of Logistic Planning

The CINCs’ campaign and operation plans must have **logistic implications coordinated at all levels**: multinational, national, Service, theater, Service and functional component, as well as supporting command.

a. **Adaptability.** Plans should make **provisions for changes** to the concept of operations. These changes could include the need for creation of logistic support sites, additional security forces, more transportation, expanded port capacity, logistics over-the-shore sites, improvements to main supply routes and numerous other increases in logistic overhead. Plans should be written to anticipate changes and to adapt and integrate adjusted requirements or priorities.

b. **Benefits of Adequate Logistic Plans.** Proper logistic planning will **reduce the need for emergency measures and logistics improvisations**, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and supporting commands.

c. **Equivalence of Deployment and Employment Planning.** Deployment planning is a key element in the force projection process. Deployment planning is comprehensive, deliberate, and methodical. The entire process lends itself to automated data processing support. Logistic planners must **focus on the seamless deployment distribution and sustainment process to properly enable the employment concept of the campaign.** Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should not be neglected or delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by **thorough and concurrent consideration of deployment** as well as **employment** facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate feasible logistic plans. Specifically, nonunit sustainment cargo must be integrated into the deployment planning to better support employment requirements.

3. Integrating Logistic Plans

Logistic plans must be integrated with a CINC’s OPLAN annexes and with plans of other commands and organizations within the Department of Defense. Additionally, external departments and agencies and HNs that will be supporting the CINCs should be considered and included. Appendix C, “Logistic Indicators and Checklist for OPLANs and CONPLANs,” contains a generic list of issues or questions that a logistic planning staff should consider when attempting to integrate the activities and plans necessary for a successful OPLAN.

4. Levels of Logistic Planning

Logistic planning must be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

a. **Strategic and Operational Logistic Support Concepts.** The CINC’s strategic

logistic concept will focus on the ability to **generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operating locations**, where operational logistic concepts are employed. With the transportation and distribution systems in mind, planners must determine the basic but broad mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and retrograde requirements of the CINC's concept of operations. The combatant commander and staff must plan to optimize the use of JRSOI, theater distribution, and common-user logistic operations. In today's constrained resource environment, it is critical to maintain the ability to incorporate all Services' resources.

For more information on JRSOI, theater distribution, and joint theater logistics operations, see JP 4-01.4, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution;" JP 4-01.8, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration;" and JP 4-07, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations."

b. Tactical Logistic Support Concepts. This planning is done primarily by the **Service components**. It includes **line-item planning** and involves the **detailed application** of the best planning factors available from historical usage data, analysis, or exercise experience. Also, planners determine the **size** and **precise location** of logistic facilities and units. CINCs and their staffs should examine the Service components' methods, assumptions, and factors to **determine their validity** and **to guard against duplication of effort** and any tendency to establish unnecessarily high safety margins or standards of living.

c. The supported commander ensures that strategic, operational, and tactical logistic planning are integrated and complementary to ensure effective support

and optimize efficiency to the extent possible.

5. Theater Organization

The area organization that evolves from the geographic combatant commander's concept of logistic support **will influence subordinate theater-level logistic decisions** on the items shown in Figure III-1.

a. Organization of an Operational Area. When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. In time of war, the NCA or geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the CINC's AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is or may become directly involved in the conduct of war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operation. A theater of operation is defined as that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separated and focused on different enemy forces. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, the CINC may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, CINCs may designate the following operational areas: JOA, joint special operations area, joint rear area, amphibious objective area, area of operation, and area of interest.

b. Communications Zone. CINCs may establish **combat zones** and **communications**

AREA ORGANIZATION INFLUENCE ON LOGISTIC DECISIONS

- Responsibilities for providing common or joint service for maintenance, medical, salvage, transportation, and mortuary affairs.
- Locations and functions suitable for contractor support.
- Contingency plans to respond to destruction or damage to theater infrastructure.
- Requirements for long lead-time special projects.
- Requirements for wartime host-nation support.
- Items suitable for common supply support in specific areas: subsistence, selected petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and selected munitions, Class IV (field fortification and construction material), Class VI (personnel support items), Class VIIIA/B (medical supplies and blood), and selected Class IX (repair parts).

Figure III-1. Area Organization Influence on Logistic Decisions

zones (COMMZs). The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. **The COMMZ contains those theater LOCs, organizations, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces.** The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or a supporting CINC's AOR. The COMMZ includes air and sea ports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone, but may be connected only by fragile LOC in very fluid, dynamic situations.

c. **Logistic Base.** In smaller-scale operations or MOOTW, the JFC may establish a logistic base from which operations are projected and supported. The logistic base

will provide support tailored to fit the mission and situation. Most, if not all, of the support capability located in the COMMZ of large-scale operations will be found with a reduced footprint at the logistic base. Similarly, a logistic base may be established in large-scale operations when support forward of the COMMZ is required.

6. Special Planning Considerations

Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to a specific joint OPLAN they must support. Special planning considerations are shown in Figure III-2 and are discussed below.

a. **Demands of an Expanding Force.** Execution of an operation order (OPORD) or campaign plan or response to a crisis may be accompanied by **general expansion** of the Armed Forces of the United States.

SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Demands of an
Expanding Force

Critical Items

Constraints

Movement Control

Balancing Push versus
Pull Resupply

Logistic Outsourcing

Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations

Figure III-2. Special Planning Considerations

Historically, demand for items increases faster than the supply system can provide, and **special management actions** might become necessary. To anticipate campaign priorities, planners must: **provide instructions or guidance for redistributing assets** from low- to high-priority organizations within the command; **obtain assets from external sources** with lower priority needs; **control the allocation of new assets** in short supply; and **provide efficient means** to retrograde, repair, and then reissue critical items.

b. **Critical Items.** Critical supplies and materiel must be identified early in the planning process. Critical items are **supplies vital** to the support of operations that are in **short supply** or are expected to be in short supply. Critical items may also be selected

mission-essential items that are available but require intense management to ensure rapid resupply for mission success. Special handling of requisitions or requests for transportation of critical items may be required.

"Mobility is the true test of a supply system."

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

c. **Constraints.** Logistic planners must understand the constraining factors affecting all phases of the deployment, sustainment, and retrograde plans. Intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movements may encounter constraints that **limit or degrade the ability to support a campaign or operation plan**. Identifying constraints en route to or within the theater is the first step in coordinating activities to avoid overloading LOCs. Traditionally, limited unloading capacities at ports and airfields, lack of asset visibility, and limited inland transportation have constrained the operational reach of combat forces. Logistic planners must anticipate congestion and seek solutions to constraints. Finally, if multinational operations are planned, the impact of multinational land, naval, and air forces competing for real estate, ship berthing and unloading facilities, transportation, labor, and construction materials on US force deployment and employment plans must be assessed. Planners must evaluate the impact of using SPODs, APODs, and/or JLOTS when preparing for operations.

d. **Movement Control.** Movement control must **coordinate** transportation assets of all modes — terminals, services, commands, and HNs — to support the CINCs' concept of operations. As the Department of Defense's single manager for common-user transportation, **USCINCTRANS** will provide for proper liaison with the CINC for movement of personnel and materiel **into the theater during peacetime and**



Movement of heavy units by rail.

contingencies. The **geographic combatant commander will exercise control over intratheater movement**, although detailed coordination may be required to accommodate HN or allied requirements. Whatever unique circumstances prevail in a theater, logistic plans must provide CINC's with **the highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement.** Operational planners should anticipate exploiting an operational success and coordinate the probability of high-speed pursuit with logistic planners to ensure that the operational forces do not overreach the timely support of logistic resupply.

e. Balancing Push and Pull Resupply. Automatic (push) resupply works best for commodities and classes of materiel with valid usage rates. It is particularly useful for establishing and maintaining the stocks of common-user items, which may then be distributed within the theater. Requisitioning (pull) is preferable for variable usage rate requirements. Properly used and regulated, a combination of push and pull resupply will minimize transportation requirements and the logistic footprint in-theater. Current logistic

initiatives are designed to further reduce the logistic footprint, increase the velocity and visibility of resupply, and emphasize pull resupply for maximum efficiency. In this regard, planners must realize that for certain commodities such as repair parts and major end-items, the Services have oriented their logistic system to a pull system, heavily reliant on information systems and a rapid, time-definite distribution system. Whether a push or pull system is employed, planners must determine planning factors based on the mission and environment and maintain the flexibility to adjust planning factors and resupply methods as circumstances dictate.

f. Logistic Outsourcing. Planning should identify sources of supplies and services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational requirements. Existing contingency contracts consist of planning for worldwide and country-specific logistic support and execution of the logistic support plans during contingencies. The types of support provided by contracted logistics include: construction and maintenance of facilities; receiving, storing, issuing, and inventory of supplies; food service;

transportation; maintenance; sewage and waste removal; water production; and shower and laundry.

g. **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.** Conducting NEO in conjunction with combat

operations may place unexpected demands against the supply and services and transportation capabilities of the CINC. NEO requirements must be identified early in the planning process and included in overall assessments of plan feasibility.

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CHAPTER IV

JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS

"The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation . . . It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there."

General A. C. P. Wavell, quoted in Martin Van Creveld's Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 1977

1. General

Joint theater logistics applies logistic resources to **generate** and **support** theater combat power. This chapter focuses on the **CINC's theater logistic concepts**, including balancing objectives, scheme of maneuver, and operations timing. It discusses the concept of **extending operational reach** and concludes with a number of **specific logistic applications** that apply to the theater. CINCs must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate **operational and logistic capabilities**. The CINCs must maintain an interrelationship between operations and logistics by insisting on **close cooperation** and **early-on understanding** of the missions assigned to subordinate commanders. The influence of the CINC is essential in bridging any operational-logistic gap.

2. CINC's Logistic Concept

Although the Service component commanders provide logistic resources, **the CINCs** are responsible for ensuring that the **overall plan** for using these resources **supports** their theater concept of operations.

a. **The Logistic System.** A critical element of a theater logistic system is **timely integration of intertheater and intratheater transportation** of personnel, equipment, and materiel in the theater distribution system. The means to move people and equipment forward and to evacuate them to the rear is

fundamental to successful theater operations. As previously depicted in Figure I-2, the logistic system ranges from CONUS or the deployed support base through a theater POE and on to the forward areas of the theater. **Key elements of the logistic system** are illustrated in Figure IV-1. **Considerations in developing a logistic system** (see Figure IV-2) are as follows.

- **Geography.** The planner must examine the impact of topography, climate, and external factors affecting the logistic system, especially the impact on the various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail systems, roads, pipelines (petroleum, natural gas, water), and airways.

"Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."

Winston Churchill
The River War, vii, 1899

- **Transportation.** Many factors influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements. For example, sealift is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; however, airlift is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of essential equipment and supplies when time is critical. This is particularly important when considering transportation requirements for rapid,

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOC.

UNITS

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

HOST NATION, ALLIED, AND COALITION SUPPORT

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

Contracting performed in support of a contingency in an overseas location pursuant to the policies and procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory system. Contractor support may be provided in the areas of facilities, supplies, services, maintenance, transportation, and quality of life support.

Figure IV-1. Key Elements of the Logistic System

time-definite delivery of critical high priority items. On land, rail (for bulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks.

- **Logistic Capability.** In today's environment of smaller inventories, the logistic capability must be considered from the manufacturer (the industrial base) down to the DLA, Services, and combatant command infrastructure. The logistic planner must know to what level supply production may surge during a crisis, what avenues are available to fulfill the initial demands, what the transportation system can support, how retrograde will be handled, and what special requirements or procedures need to be put in place. The ability of the theater infrastructure to receive,

warehouse, and issue logistic resources must also be understood. All these factors influence the efficiency of the entire logistic system and may limit the force size that may be supported.

- **Logistic Enhancements.** Plans must include or consider means to reduce the impact of logistic constraints. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking aprons, additional MHE, and expedient airfield matting. Improved use of commercial International Organization for Standardization containers vice breakbulk may also aid in port clearance and theater distribution of sustainment. Planners should recognize that container distribution operations will require handling equipment, particularly in many



Figure IV-2. Considerations in Developing a Logistic System

austere port and inland transshipment points. Asset visibility also provides the opportunity to divert forces and sustainment around constraints.

- **Logistic Infrastructure Protection.** Provisions must be made for security of the logistic system because it is integral in the sustainment of any mission.

Specific discussion of protection of logistic infrastructure and LOCs, to include the designation of a joint rear area, is provided in JP 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

- **Echelon of Support.** The logistic system must be responsive to the needs of the most forward combat forces. It must start from CONUS and extend to the forward operational areas, providing

supplies and services when and where they are needed.

- **Assignment of Responsibility.** In coordination with USCINCTRANS, CINCs should assign responsibility for operating the seaports, bases, and airports to the Service components (or HNs, if applicable).
- **Availability of Host-Nation and Multinational Support.** The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that may be provided by host, allied, and coalition nations affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be devoted to initial movement of combat forces or sustainment. ACSA and implementing arrangement (IA) to DCAs are a simplified method of receiving or providing resources and services in a multinational environment.

b. Theater Concept of Logistic Support.

The concept of logistic support must be derived from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more COAs developed during the commander’s estimate phase of planning. The CINC’s J-4 prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA, along with the logistic system framework considerations outlined above, may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

- The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the **capabilities** and resources of the combatant command Service components will be employed to **provide supply and services, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and health services.** It is the organization of capabilities and

resources into an overall theater support concept.

- The concept of logistic support needs to **specify how operations will be supported**. It should give special attention to the **major LOC** to be developed, as well as **support** to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a COMMZ to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out. **Supporting paragraphs** should cover any topics the CINC believes are necessary and **may include the following**.

- **Logistic Authority and Control of Logistic Flow.** Figure IV-3 lists some of the responsibilities assigned by DOD directives (DODDs) or discussed in joint publications.

- **Guidance on Harmonization.** Multiple Military Services (US and allied nations) may operate simultaneously within the theater and the LOC approaching the theater. Coordination of functions among all affected commands, nations, and agencies is essential in order to avoid confusion, congestion of LOC nodes, and unnecessary duplication. The CINC should provide general guidance, by function and area, wherever needed to ensure unity of effort.

- **C4I Systems in Support of Logistics.** In addition to standing operating procedures for C4I systems, consideration should be given to backup plans or manual procedures in the event of possible C4I system outages or incompatible interfaces during combined operations.

- **Logistic Infrastructure In-theater.** Planning consideration must address

existing infrastructure within the operational area to support JRSOI, theater distribution, and base development in consonance with the CINC's concept of operations.

- **Intratheater Support.** Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander may assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater common-user land transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).

3. Extending Operational Reach

- a. Operational reach is the **distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively**. At the strategic level, the CINC's focus primarily on **defeating the enemy's strategy and will, and on gaining strategic depth, initiative, and advantage** by proper strategic concentration of forces and logistics. The CINC's direct the operating forces to accomplish these tasks. The operating forces' view of operational reach centers on the range at which commanders **may mass and employ forces decisively for war or MOOTW**. It goes beyond merely conducting reconnaissance or strike operations at a distance. Operational reach is influenced by the length, efficiency, and security of the distribution system and LOCs. Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment. The CINC may seek to extend operational reach (with associated increase in risk) by **deploying combat forces ahead of support forces**. The logistician must use all available assets to provide **a sufficient level**

LOGISTIC AREA REFERENCES

<u>Function</u>	<u>References</u>
Special Operations Logistic Support	JP 3-05
Theater Airlift Operations	JP 3-17
Joint Deployment/ Redeployment Operations	JP 3-35
Mobility Systems	JP 4-01
Airlift Support	JP 4-01.1
Sealift Support	JP 4-01.2
Movement Control	JP 4-01.3
Joint Theater Distribution	JP 4-01.4
Terminal Operations	JP 4-01.5
Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore	JP 4-01.6
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration	JP 4-01.8
Blood Program	DODD 6480 series
Medical Services	DODD 6480 series and JP 4-02
Petroleum Support	DODD 4140 series and JP 4-03
Engineer Support	JP 4-04
Mobilization Planning	JP 4-05
Mortuary Services	JP 4-06
Common User Logistics Planning Joint Operations	JP 4-07
Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations	JP 4-08
Global Distribution	JP 4-09
Contracting	DOD 5000 Series

Figure IV-3. Logistic Area References



A robust intratheater ground transportation system increases forward unit flexibility.

of sustainment to the deployed forces. Operational reach may be improved by establishing advanced bases or depots and by improving the security and efficiency of the distribution system and LOCs.

b. Operational reach is a relative value.

It may be improved by denying one or several components of the enemy's operational reach. The essence of a campaign plan is to accomplish the assigned national strategic objectives, with logistics providing the extension of the CINC's strategic and operational reach into the theater.

c. As CINCs move forces forward, they must **gain control of C4I system centers, transportation nodes, and prospective base areas**. These centers and areas become physical objectives for the combat forces to **seize, control, and pass** to the logistic system as it moves forward to exploit new gains. The resulting **forward momentum** of the logistic system results **in an extension of the operational reach and endurance of the combat forces**.

"Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate control of its logistic support."

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles
Logistics in the National Defense,
1959

4. Applied Operational Logistics

a. Logistics as a Force Multiplier.

Correlation of combat power between opposing forces is often so close that a **small advantage** gained by one side over the other may prove decisive. Logistics plays a **significant role**, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the advantage from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by **increasing the timeliness and endurance of the force**. For example, logistic assets deployed as part of the early entering force will enhance throughput of

arriving forces and enhance combat sustaining power of early elements. Additionally, a small investment in forward infrastructure may pay large dividends by reconstituting forces rapidly and returning them to battle in time to influence the outcome. Specifically, forward battle damage repair and maintenance capability, rapid runway repair capability, and forward medical treatment facilities may help in reconstituting forces efficiently. Figure IV-4 illustrates some of the impacts of logistics at the operational level of war.

b. Logistics as a Deterrent. **Logistic forces and the activation of logistic Reserve Component forces play a key role in deterrence,** a major element of US military strategy. Adequate logistic resources and capabilities convey a **national will to fight a**

protracted conflict. Also, increased states of readiness of logistic forces, the activation of national defense reserve logistic assets (e.g., the RRF), or repositioning afloat prepositioned ships closer to the AOR may defuse tensions. These actions are usually less provocative than the posturing of combat forces and are often considered as joint OPLAN deterrent options.

c. Logistics as a Contributor to Flexibility. The **composition and disposition** of military forces and logistic resources are important considerations in developing **flexibility.** Essentially, a capable, comprehensive logistic package increases the **CINC's force employment options.** Having logistic infrastructure, HNS agreements, ACSAs, and contingency contracts in place before hostilities commence provides operational flexibility and assists CINC's in achieving the maximum use from available forces. To remain flexible, the logistic plan should **anticipate and provide for the next step** in case of operational success or failure, partial success, or change in the situation and intent of the enemy. Logistics plans and the dispositions of materiel and transport assets should allow exploitation or recovery operations in the shortest possible time. Management of change is key to timely support and response.



Figure IV-4. Applied Operational Logistics

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CHAPTER V

CONTRACTORS IN THE THEATER

"In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army."

Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781

1. General

a. Contractors have historically provided significant support to the Armed Forces of the United States. The contribution of contractors to today's joint operations continues to be significant. **Contractor support can augment existing capabilities, provide expanded sources of supplies and services, bridge gaps in the deployed force structure, leverage assets, and reduce dependence on US-based logistics.** This force multiplier effect enhances the CINC's fighting capability.

b. Contractors are a particularly valuable resource when cross-servicing agreements, ACSAs, and HNS agreements do not exist or when these agreements cannot provide the required supplies or services. Additionally, less transportation support and fewer military support personnel are required when contracting for supplies and services from local contractors. This improves response times and frees strategic and intratheater airlift and sealift for other priorities. Using civilian contractors is particularly effective when a military ceiling is placed on the size of a deployed force. Civilian contractors can also be used to replace already deployed forces, freeing them for use in other contingencies.

c. **The management and control of contractors is significantly different than the C2 of military personnel.** The terms and conditions of the contract establish the legal relationship between the Government and contractor. The warfighter's link to the contractor is through the contracting officer or the contracting officer's representative.

Contracting officers establish contracts with conditions and provisions of performance which support warfighter requirements.

d. In all instances, contractor employees cannot lawfully perform military functions and should not be working in scenarios that involve military combat operations where they might be conceived as combatants.

2. Types of Contractor Support

Contractor support falls into **three broad categories — systems support, external theater support, and theater support.** Commanders and planners should be aware that a requirement for a contracted system or capability needs to be identified early so that all contractors who provide support to the theater that require transportation can be integrated into the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for timely deployment.

a. **Systems Support Contractors.** Systems support contractors logistically support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts awarded by Service program managers or by Military Service component logistic commands. They support specific systems throughout their system's life cycle (including spare parts and maintenance) across the range of military operations. These systems include but are not limited to weapons systems, C2 infrastructure, and communications systems.

b. **External Theater Support Contractors.** External theater support



Systems support contractors logistically support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts awarded by Service program managers or by military Service component logistic commands.

contractors, working pursuant to contracts awarded under the command and procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater, provide support for deployed operational forces. These may be US or third country businesses and vendors. These contracts are usually prearranged, but may be contracts awarded or modified during the mission based on the commanders' needs. Examples include the Army's LOGCAP, the Air Force's AFCAP, the Navy's CONCAP, CRAF contracts, and war reserve materiel (WRM) contracts.

Service and agencies have awarded these contracts to support US forces in operations worldwide. The services provided by these types of contracts include but are not limited to building roads, airfields, dredging, stevedoring, transportation services, mortuary services, billeting and food services, prison facilities, utilities, and decontamination.

c. **Theater Support Contractors.** Theater support contractors support deployed operational forces pursuant to contracts arranged within the mission area, or prearranged contracts through HN and/or

regional businesses and vendors. Contracting personnel with the deployed force, working under the contracting authority of the theater, Service component, or JTF contracting chief, normally award and administer these contracts. Theater support contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Immediate contracts involve contracting officers procuring goods, services, and minor construction (either from the local vendor base or from nearby offshore sources) immediately before or during the operation itself.

In the case of contracting for construction in contingencies, the Services agencies designated as DOD construction agents for the peacetime military construction program for specific geographic areas under DODD 4270.5, "Military Construction Responsibilities," may be used to provide construction contracting in support of military operations. For countries where there is no designated DOD construction agent, the supported CINC will usually designate a contract construction agent for support in a contingency.

Additional guidance on construction contracting is found in JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

3. Integrated Planning

a. Thorough planning facilitates effective contracting and identifies contractor and Service responsibilities for contracted support and for support of the contractor. The use of contractors may contribute to increased flexibility and improved performance in logistic support. However, **it is imperative that logisticians fully integrate, in logistics plans and orders**, the functions performed by contractors together with those performed by military personnel and government civilians. Planning must also consider the need for contingency arrangements if a contractor either fails or is not permitted to perform the service in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.

b. Although contractors are expected to use all means at their disposal to continue providing essential services during periods of crisis, this may not be possible in all contingencies. Core logistic support competencies must be maintained to ensure that support to deployed forces will continue in the event contractor support is not available.

c. In both deliberate and crisis action planning, joint operation planners consider the mission, mission forces required, support forces required, and potential sources of support. The latter normally includes US military capability, allied and coalition nation military capability, HNS, and available contract resources.

d. **Predeployment planning allows commanders and contracting officers to ensure that supporting contractor personnel arrive properly equipped and trained.** Services are responsible for ensuring that contractor personnel to be

deployed are required to meet specified requirements per the terms and conditions of the contract. This will include proper immunizations, force protection measures and training, and weapons familiarization as required, along with familiarization with specialized equipment such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective clothing and masks.

4. Visibility

a. **The supported CINC is responsible for overall contractor visibility** and orchestrates the movement of contractors along with combat forces. In a joint operation, the CINC or subordinate JFC designates a lead Service as executive agent to plan and head contracting, finance, and resource management functions for the theater. That Service assigns a mission chief of contracting, who publishes a joint contracting support plan (JCSP) governing all contracting by DOD agencies within the designated operational area. The Services and DLA conduct contracting operations in accordance with Service doctrine and DLA policy within the guidelines of that JCSP.

b. The CINC or subordinate JFC ensures that guidance concerning contractor support is included in the OPLAN and/or OPORD and based on the available assets. Additionally, the CINC or subordinate JFC reviews requirements and establishes priorities based on available assets. This centralizes management of contracting support at the highest level to promote equality of support throughout the theater or operational area and to efficiently coordinate the JCSP.

c. The CINC establishes the CINC Logistics Procurement Support Board, chaired by a J-4 representative and including representatives from each of the component and functional commands, to integrate and monitor contracting activities throughout the



An effective theater logistic organization requires full integration of contractor support. Contractors arriving in theater must receive appropriate processing.

AOR. To fully integrate contractor support into the theater operational support structure, it is imperative to have oversight of contractors. This can be accomplished through the use of a military unit, for example, the CINC's JTLM organization.

5. Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

a. **The supported CINC or subordinate JFC integrates contractors into the force flow.** The TPFDD is a force requirement document, a transportation movement document, and a tool for allocation of constrained resources, including airlift, sealift, and port assets. When developing the TPFDD for an operation, commanders must address when contractor support should commence and how the contractor will arrive in the operational area. Consequently, a fully integrated OPLAN and/or OPORD must reflect not only military unit deployment requirements, but also DOD civilian and contractor deployment requirements — including whether the contractor will be moving on Defense Transportation System assets or on assets arranged by the contractor.

b. **The supporting CINCs are responsible for ensuring that accurate data on contractor personnel and equipment is entered into the TPFDD and verified to the supported CINC.**

c. The supporting Service or agency is responsible for ensuring that contractor support is available when needed through advance planning and integration of contractor deployment requirements into the contracting support plan, the TPFDD, and the governing contract. This responsibility includes maintaining visibility of the contractors' surge capability, which may be exercised from time to time in conjunction with opportune training events such as emergency deployment readiness exercises.

6. Arrival in Theater

An effective theater logistic organization requires full integration of contractor support. Contractors arriving in the theater as well as already in theater must receive appropriate processing via JRSOI process. When planning JRSOI operations, commanders and planners must include contractor requirements in operation and supporting

plans, contracting support plans, and specifications of the governing contracts.

7. Applicable Law

a. **Theater contracting involves three main bodies of law: international, HN, and US law.** Commanders must ensure that a Judge Advocate or legal counsel is consulted at the outset and involved in planning and reviews of all OPLANs and OPORDs to ensure compliance with various international, US, and HN laws and applicable treaties, SOFAs, status of mission agreements, ACSAs, memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreements.

b. Contracting organizations are mandated to use either US uniform commercial code or federal acquisition laws in order to minimize reliance on less familiar principles of international law to acquire supplies and services needed to support military operations and to limit foreign legal exposure. Less restrictive, theater contingency contracting may prove a valuable means of supporting some of the needs of a deployed force when active combat or actual occupation of hostile territory occurs. However, applicable HN law must be researched prior to entry into the theater.

c. Contractors must comply with the law of the HN in performing its contract. The contractor's hiring and firing of its workforce, the salaries and severance entitlements it pays, taxation and social withholding, workplace safety requirements, and all other conditions of employment are mandated by HN law. Generally, HN law governs relations between the contractor and its workforce.

- An exception to this rule may be provided for by terms agreed with the HN in an international agreement (when provided) and, to the extent provided in an applicable agreement, certain qualifying

contract employees may be afforded logistic support from US sources and relief from HN tax, customs, immigration, and labor laws just as if they were a member of the military or civilian component stationed in the HN.

- International agreements may also affect contractor support by directing the use of HN resources prior to contracting with commercial firms, restricting the firms to be solicited or the goods or services to be provided by contract, or prohibiting contractor use altogether. Planners should ascertain how HN laws may impact contract support and take any limiting factors into consideration in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

d. Support agreements may affect contracting by restricting services to be contracted or, in some cases, prohibiting contractor use altogether. Planners and contracting officers are responsible for taking into consideration these agreements and laws when preparing all contingency contracts and OPLANs and OPORDs.

8. CINC's Responsibilities

The supported CINC is responsible for determining restrictions imposed by applicable international agreements on the status of contractor personnel operating in the CINC's AOR. Few SOFAs contain provisions addressing the status and privileges of contractor personnel. In the absence of SOFA provisions, HN law governs the status and activities of contractor personnel. Contractor personnel do not have special status unless specifically granted by treaty or by the HN.

9. Status-of-Forces Agreements

SOFAs provide for the status of members of an armed force present within the territory of another nation. In many cases, SOFAs

include provisions concerning civilian employees of the force and dependents. Very few SOFAs include any provisions concerning contractor personnel. Without specific SOFA provisions granting them special status or privileges, contractor personnel are subject to all HN domestic laws. Planners and contracting officers should carefully review any applicable agreements to determine their impact on the status and use of contractors in military operations. Any requirements to include provisions for contractor personnel should be raised to the CINC and Chief of Mission or Department of State for possible relief during negotiations occurring at execution. The Department of Defense, coordinating with the State Department, should negotiate agreements requesting contractors be given the same status as DOD civilians for the purpose of providing non-peace-time operational support to US forces. This will designate contracts and their employees as “members of the force”, ensuring that they will be able to perform their mission.

10. Host Nation and Cross-Service Support Agreements

HN and cross-service support agreements exist with numerous countries. New HN and cross-service support agreements may be negotiated for a specific operation. These agreements permit acquisitions and transfers of specific categories of logistic support to take advantage of existing stocks in the supply systems of the United States and allied nations. Agreements may be accomplished notwithstanding certain other statutory rules related to acquisition and arms export controls. While the usefulness of HN and cross-service agreements may have limited application with the HN, logistic support items may be acquired from any nation with which the United States has an ASCA and transported to use in the operational area. Planners and contracting officers must consider acquisition

pursuant to these agreements as potential alternatives to support by contracts and should incorporate and/or reference these agreements into the OPLANs and OPORDs, as appropriate.

11. Theater-Specific Policies

a. The supported CINC identifies theater-specific policies and requirements in the OPLAN. These policies and requirements are subsequently incorporated within the statement of work and objectives and addressed during the contract negotiation process.

b. If support from existing contracts is likely in a specific operation, the CINC should identify any known or anticipated support requirements for contractor personnel in the OPLAN. The CINC should notify contractors likely to deploy of all specific policies and requirements for personnel operating within the CINC’s theater. Examples of theater-specific policies and requirements include: theater admissions requirements; NBC training and equipment; weapons training; prohibited activities; local customs and courtesies; vehicle licensing; governing status-of-forces provisions; and international agreements. Ultimately, contractor compliance with theater-specific policies and requirements depends on the terms of the contract.

12. Law of War Status of Contractor Personnel

a. US and foreign contractors accompanying the armed forces (other than some local hire personnel providing housekeeping services, who are noncombatants) are considered civilians accompanying the force and are neither combatants or noncombatants. As such, depending on the function they perform or their physical location, they may be at direct risk from hostile action. The 1949 Geneva

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War establishes that civilians accompanying the force in international armed conflict have prisoner of war status if captured.

b. To confirm their status as civilians accompanying the force, commanders should issue Uniformed Services Geneva Convention cards designating them accordingly. Except for special purpose equipment, such as chemical, protective or cold weather equipment, contractors generally are not required to wear US military uniforms or clothing. Contractors may be required to wear battle dress uniforms when camouflage integrity or other military necessity dictates. In these situations commanders should ensure that contractors wear a symbol that establishes their contractor status. Specific questions should be addressed to the command staff judge advocate.

13. Contractor Security

a. Force protection responsibility for DOD contractor employees is a contractor responsibility, unless valid contract terms place that responsibility with another party (e.g., the geographic CINC or Chief of Mission). Commanders shall ensure that contractor security provisions are incorporated into OPLANs and/or OPORDs, the governing contract, and in the determination of structure and size of theater security forces.

b. As a general rule, contractor personnel accompanying US forces should not be armed. Regardless of prior military experience or reserve status, contract personnel are not military personnel. Issuing weapons to contractor personnel deployed in an uncertain or hostile environment can cloud their status, leaving them open to being targeted as a combatant. Additionally, unless specifically allowed by host nation law, SOFA provision, or other international agreement, US forces

have no legal basis for issuing arms to contractor personnel. Since contractor personnel are not subject to command authority enforced by an internal system of penal discipline, commanders have no method of guaranteeing armed contractor personnel will act in accordance with the law of war or HN law. (For criminal liability for war crimes, see paragraph 15, "Discipline") However, if not in the context of an international armed conflict and under very limited special circumstances (e.g., to protect themselves from bandits or dangerous wild animals in isolated areas where there is no uniformed military presence to provide force protection), contractors may be issued personal weapons if consistent with HN law and not precluded by the law of armed conflict. In such special limited cases, the issuance of such weapons must be authorized under procedures approved by the geographic commander and comply with military regulations regarding firearms training and safe handling. Likewise, the geographic commander will determine the requirement for training and equipping contractor personnel with NBC equipment. Acceptance of personal weapons or any other military equipment by contractor personnel is based on the terms of the contract.

14. Other Logistic Services and Equipment

a. The contract will address other logistic services and equipment provided to contractor employees such as individual protective equipment, rations, housing, laundry and bath, medical, legal, mortuary, morale, welfare and recreation, postal, and religious services. Depending on the operational environment, either the contractor, the military, the HN, or third parties may provide this support. Unless contractor personnel are providing emergency essential services in the forward area and there is no adequate military substitute for these services, care should be taken to evacuate or remove them from areas of imminent enemy

attack. In some cases, contractors may live and work under field conditions similar to those for the supported military forces.

b. Commanders will ensure that other logistic services (including exchange privileges for access to clothing and personal hygiene items, where appropriate) are incorporated into the governing contracts and OPLANs and/or OPORDs, and be prepared to modify them quickly when circumstances warrant such action.

15. Discipline

a. Contract employees are disciplined by the contractor through the terms of the employee and employer relationship. Employees may be disciplined for criminal conduct by their employer per the terms of their employment agreement. Contract employees are also fully subject to the domestic criminal law of the host country. An exception to this rule would be if the contract employees fell under a SOFA during a time of war or as defined in a pertinent treaty or agreement.

b. Commanders have no penal authority to compel contractor personnel to perform their duties or to punish any acts of misconduct. Likewise, should contractor personnel be detained or charged under HN law, military commanders have no means of asserting jurisdiction or demanding release, unless contractor employees are granted status protection under a SOFA or other agreement with the HN. However under US

federal criminal law (Title 18, Section 2441) a national of the United States, including contractor employees, may be tried for a war crime as defined under this statute. Trial would be held in an US district court and the US national would be afforded all legal protection available to one charged for violating US federal criminal law.

c. Planners and contracting officers should incorporate disciplinary provisions into the governing contracts and OPLANs and/or OPORDs, and ensure that the contractor incorporates these provisions into their employment agreements. Specifically, disciplinary provisions under the contract may include revocation or suspension of clearances, restriction from installations or facilities, or revocation of privileges.

16. Contractor Redeployment

a. Orderly withdrawal or termination of contractor operations ensures that essential contractor support remains until no longer required and that the movement of contractor equipment and personnel does not inadvertently hinder the overall redeployment process. Therefore, careful planning for the departure of contractor support from the operational area is as essential as that for military forces. Any contractor activity that may create environmental, legal, or fiscal claims on the United States must be carefully monitored prior to and during cessation of contractor support and redeployment of contractors.

AN UNEXPECTED NEED

When Operation DESERT SHIELD began, contractors performing maintenance on E-3 aircraft and other systems in Saudi Arabia suddenly required gas masks and other mobility equipment that had not been specified contractually since Saudi Arabia was not considered a combat zone prior to 1 August 1990.

VARIOUS SOURCES

b. For contractors returning to the United States, the redeployment planning and execution process is similar to that of military forces. Contractors from third country nations or the HN do not require the same level of redeployment processing as those returning to the United States. Nonetheless, serious consideration must be given to when they will terminate operations as provided in the contract and, if required, when and how they will exit the operational area.

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APPENDIX A

LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(As specified by Title 10 United States Code)

1. Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the following.

a. Develop national security emergency operational procedures and coordinate them with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development with respect to residential property for the control, acquisition, leasing, assignment, and priority of occupancy of real property within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

b. Review the priorities and allocations systems developed by other Federal departments and agencies to ensure that they meet DOD needs in a national security emergency.

c. In cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, identify those industrial products and facilities that are essential to mobilization readiness, national defense, or postattack survival and recovery.

d. In cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, analyze potential effects of national security emergencies on actual production capability, taking into account the entire production complex, including shortages of resources, and develop preparedness measures to strengthen capabilities for production increases in emergencies.

e. With the assistance of the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, provide management direction for the stockpiling of strategic and critical materials; conduct

storage, maintenance, and quality assurance operations for the stockpile of strategic and critical materials; and formulate plans, programs, and reports relating to the stockpiling of strategic and critical materials.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense. Those most concerned with logistic matters are the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD[L]). The USDP handles emergency preparedness functions. The USD(AT&L) sets policy for acquisition through DODDs of the 5000 series. The DUSD(L) is the principal staff adviser to the Secretary of Defense for determining logistic requirements. The DUSD(L) also carries out force structure analysis of logistic support capability including repair, overhaul and maintenance of equipment, and supply management. Further, the USD(AT&L) directs and controls the DLA.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman's responsibilities include the following primarily logistic functions.

a. **Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and**

mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

b. **Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities** to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans.

c. **Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities** (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

d. After consultation with the CINCs, **establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness** of each combatant command to carry out their assigned missions.

e. Review the **logistic plans and programs** of the combatant commands **to determine their adequacy and feasibility** for the performance of assigned missions.

f. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense for information and consideration **general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization** programs.

g. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the **development of logistics-related military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces**.

h. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, **statements of military requirements based on US strategic plans**. These statements

should include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases and for equipping and maintaining military forces.

4. Military Departments

Secretaries of the Military Departments have the following logistic responsibilities.

a. Exercise **authority to conduct all affairs of their departments** to include recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering and maintaining forces; constructing, outfitting, and repairing military equipment; constructing, maintaining, and repairing buildings, structures, and utilities; and acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property or natural resources.

b. Prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the **effective prosecution of war and military operations throughout the range of military operations**.

c. Maintain mobile Reserve forces in a state of readiness, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment.

d. **Recruit, organize, train, and equip** interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands.

e. **Conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons**, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of functions assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

f. **Create, expand, or maintain an infrastructure** that supports US forces using installations and bases, and provide administrative support unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

5. Military Services

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (under their departmental Secretaries) as well as the Coast Guard (under the Department of Transportation in peacetime and the Department of the Navy in wartime) are responsible for the functions enumerated in DODD 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.” They will provide logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

6. Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command

USCINCSOC is responsible for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via US Special Operations Command Service component logistic infrastructure and in coordination with theater Service components.

7. Defense Logistics Agency

a. DLA is a Combat Support Agency of the Department of Defense and is controlled and directed by USD(AT&L). DLA functions as an integral element of the DOD military logistic system by providing worldwide logistic support to the Military Departments and the combatant commands across the range of military operations, as well as to other DOD components, Federal agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations as assigned. DLA has the following logistic responsibilities:

- Provide integrated materiel management and supply support for all DLA-managed commodities (including subsistence; clothing, textiles, hard copy maps, and supplies; POL; construction materiel; medical materiel; and weapon system repair parts);
- Provide property disposal services, to include HM and HW;
- Provide contract administration services;
- Act as executive agent for DOD Donation Program; and
- Provide a DLA Contingency Support Team (DCST) to support a CINC’s contingency taskings.

b. During contingency operations, DLA will establish consolidated in-theater management of DLA operations and provide a single point of contact for DLA matters by employing a DCST. The DCST functions to support the CINC, subordinate JFC, JTLM element, or the disaster relief defense coordinating officer. The level of support provided by the DCST is based on the mission and tasks assigned to DLA by the combatant commander. The deployable DCST is tailored to anticipate contingency taskings and may be as small as four members or as large as a team of 80. The decision to employ a DCST is normally accomplished during the planning or early execution phases of a crisis with an initial DLA planning or liaison cell responding to immediate CINC requirements. The DCST is made up of an initial response team, a command support element, and functional elements (a materiel management element, fuels support element, disposal element, and a contingency contract administration services element). In addition there is provision for a domestic disaster relief DCST which consists of an initial response team, a command support element, a distribution operations

management element, and a mobility operations center element. (Team composition varies depending on the Federal Response Plan emergency support functions supported.)

Further discussion of DLA's contingency capabilities is found in JP 4-07, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations."

APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPPORTED CINC'S J-4 AND FUNCTIONS OF JOINT LOGISTIC CENTERS, OFFICES, AND BOARDS

1. General

This appendix relates some insights, gained from experience and studies, that bear on the effective organization of a combatant command's J-4 and the wartime functions of that staff. Guidance implied by these insights is general in nature and not directive. The degree of application of the implications drawn from the information provided here may vary among combatant commands.

2. Organizational Considerations

Often there may be little time to shift from a peacetime organization to a different wartime organization. Any effort involved in doing so will reduce resources available to apply to the significant logistic problems that accompany deployment and other initial logistic tasks in war. The logistic organization, therefore, should be tailored to respond to anticipated war tasks.

a. On the combatant command staff, these tasks will most likely take the form of coordination and planning functions and are derived from the commander's mission. Therefore, conducting an inventory of wartime tasks is a preliminary requirement in validating or improving staff organization.

b. Although the J-4 organization should be based on wartime tasks, it could well be staffed at reduced levels in peacetime. Still, the full wartime structure should be defined to aid in rapid expansion. The use of Reserve Component augmentees may provide pre-trained expertise to support the wartime structure. It is critical that augmentees be identified in advance, trained, included in

exercises, and scheduled for movement in OPOD TPFDD.

c. Organizing around war tasks encourages rather than precludes delegating to Service components certain special logistic planning tasks or the actual operation of certain joint logistic functions.

d. Lessons learned have identified the need to utilize a logistic management process that provides a unified focus and optimizes support of deployed forces. Limited logistic resources, combined with reduced force infrastructure, fewer forward locations, austere operating locations with limited infrastructure, and increased joint operations in nonlinear battlespace make it imperative to capitalize on the assets and capabilities available in-theater to facilitate support to the warfighter. JTLM is one way to help achieve a unified focus within theater by integrating information, product delivery, flexible response, and effective C2. JTLM ensures that the right product is delivered to the right place at the right time. The CINC may, as an option, establish a JTLM element to fuse movement control and materiel management to integrate and synergize the logistic capabilities of the joint force. JTLM should be planned for and documented in OPLANS, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANS), and functional plans as part of the deliberate planning process. JTLM allows the CINC to choose among a variety of options when selecting the logistic support function best suited to fulfill the needs of the AOR. Some options include the following: using a service organization as its nucleus, for instance the Army Theater Support Command organizational concept; augment J-4; delegate to a JTF commander; establish a stand alone

logistic agency; ensure that the predominant Service manages joint requirements; or expand the logistic readiness center (LRC).

- JTLM key elements include increased reliance on common-user logistic support, a smaller logistic footprint, integrated logistic forces, increased tactical flexibility, single theater logistic management system, common logistic picture, asset visibility across the supply chain, anticipatory logistic management, and rapid access to operational information.
- JTLM relies heavily on improved communications and enabling technologies such as JTAV, GCSS, ITV, and AIT to track force and sustainment flow while eliminating redundancy and excess. Although these enabling technologies are not fully mature, the CINC should capitalize on all available advanced information technologies and the Services' automated information systems to integrate joint force requirements and capabilities into a single, common operating picture. Further, JTLM uses enhanced automation capability to link JRSOI and joint theater distribution in order to provide common-user and cross-Service logistic support.
- In the end, JTLM success depends on the supported CINC setting a common standard for support, enhanced logistic connectivity, and the flexibility and responsiveness of logisticians operating at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

3. Key Functions

The CINCs will usually form command centers and operational planning teams in wartime. The logistic staff members in these groups are usually supported by a LRC or are

teamed with representatives from various functional areas: fuels, munitions, engineering, supply, surface transportation, sealift, airlift, and medical services. In addition to operating the LRC and providing representation in the command center, the logistic staff performs four key functions.

a. **Monitor Current and Evolving Theater Logistic Capabilities.** The status information collected from Service components should support the following questions.

- Are any planned operations in jeopardy because of logistic limitations?
- Are there any types of operations that should not be considered because they could not be supported?
 - The data reported should be in the form of gross comparisons of current stock and expected consumption and should identify the on-hand percentage of requirements of critical items and munitions.
 - The logistic status information should be converted to output indicators stating the types of operations current and incoming assets could support, including factors such as intensity of combat, duration of the operation, and the operational reach that may be attained.
 - In summary, this function involves collecting, consolidating, interpreting, and explaining data regarding current and upcoming logistic status in the theater. It then relates those data to the operations the CINC is considering.

b. **Coordinate Logistic Support with Upcoming Operations.** This function involves directing the shift of logistic support from one Service component or one geographic area to another in the theater. To

perform this function properly, the logistic staff needs to use information technology enablers to know materiel commonalties among the Services, logistic force capabilities, the location of Service component resources, what materiel is en route to the theater, and how to interpret the various means of measuring support levels.

c. Advise the CINC on the Supportability of Proposed Operations or COAs. Because logistic support of Service components is a Service responsibility, Service components must also perform this task. However, the J-4 should be able to provide a gross analysis of COAs at the combatant command level before the Service components get involved in detailed assessments.

d. Act as the CINC's Agent and Advocate to Non-theater Logistic Organizations. This function involves routinely reporting logistic status to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting extra resources, overseeing priorities conveyed to supporting organizations, overseeing adjustments to the flow of forces and supplies, and coordinating logistics with allies and their combatant commands.

4. Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards

The following are examples of joint logistic centers, offices, and boards that may be established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs or subordinate JFCs to coordinate the logistic effort.

a. Logistic Readiness Center

- Formed at the discretion of the CINC and operated by the CINC's logistics staff, the LRC supports the command center and operational planning teams.

- The LRC receives reports from supporting commands, Service components, and external sources, distills information for presentation to the CINC, and responds to questions.

b. Joint Movement Center

- The joint movement center (JMC) is established under the supervision of the combatant command J-4 to implement the tasking and priorities provided by the CINC.

For detailed information, see JP 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control."

- The JMC coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through the establishment of strategic or theater transportation policies within the assigned theater, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by the CINC.

JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System," provides joint transportation procedures for use of common-user lift assets and should be consulted by the logistic planner.

- The J-4 directs or recommends to the CINC, as appropriate, COAs with respect to allocation of common-user transportation capabilities when movement requirements exceed capability or when competing requirements result in unresolved conflicts.
- Although the functions and responsibilities of the JMC may differ,

depending on circumstances, the JMC will normally:

- Interface with JOPES to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies;
 - Analyze user capabilities to ship, receive, handle cargo and passengers, and recommend solutions to shortfalls;
 - Advise the J-4 on transportation matters that would adversely affect combat contingency operations;
 - Serve as the liaison with the HNs and coalition partners for transportation issues;
 - Disseminate information concerning HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel; and
 - Coordinate NEO movement support.
- Communication links may be required to support the JMC:
- With each of the transportation control elements (e.g., movement control center, airlift control center, and water terminal clearance authority);
 - With each component; and/or
 - Directly with USTRANSCOM and the transportation component commands (AMC, MSC, and MTMC).

c. Logistic Staff Officer for Petroleum and Subarea Petroleum Office

- Normally, the unified command Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) manages wholesale bulk petroleum support. The primary duties of the logistic staff officer for petroleum are as follows.

- Coordinate POL planning and mission execution matters;
- Coordinate the supply of common bulk petroleum products to joint force components;
- Using DOD Manual 4140.25-M, “Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, and Distribution Facilities,” coordinate with Service components in determining requirements for bulk petroleum and ensure stockage through the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) sources; and
- Recommend necessary reallocation and apportionment of petroleum products and facilities to CINCs.

See JP 4-03, “Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine,” for additional guidance.

- When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk petroleum in the theater, the JPO may establish a subarea petroleum office (SAPO). Staff augmentation may be provided by Service components. The primary function of the SAPO is to discharge the staff petroleum logistic responsibilities of a joint force. The SAPO will conform to the administrative and technical procedures established by the combatant command and the DESC in DOD Manual 4140.25-M, “Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, and Distribution Facilities.” Key duties of the SAPO are as follows.
 - Review and consolidate area resupply requirements through the JPO to the DESC.
 - Release or reallocate prepositioned WRM stocks.

- Assist the DESC in executing applicable support responsibilities in the AOR.

- Take continuous action to identify and submit requirements to HNs for petroleum logistic support.

d. Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board

- The Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the theater.
- The JCMEB is a temporary board, activated by the geographic combatant commander and staffed by personnel from the components and agencies or activities in support of the combatant command.
- The JCMEB arbitrates all issues referred to it by the Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) and, if appropriate, assumes responsibility for the preparation of the civil engineering support plan.
- The JCMEB will coordinate its activities with the regional or theater wartime construction managers having responsibility for the assigned AOR. Construction and engineering requirements that the JCMEB cannot satisfy from within joint force resources will be elevated to the regional or theater wartime construction managers for support.

See JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support," for additional guidance.

e. Joint Facilities Utilization Board

- The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use

of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with JCMEB priorities.

- The JFUB is activated on order of a geographic combatant or subordinate JFC and chaired by a geographic combatant or subordinate joint force J-4 or engineer, with members from components and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs).
- The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the taskings of the JCMEB.

See JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support," for additional guidance.

f. CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board

- The geographic combatant commander should consider establishing a CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB) to ensure that a properly coordinated and prioritized contracting management program, in line with warfighting concerns, exists. The establishment of the board is contingent on the existence of procurement operations in the AOR.
- The CLPSB is chaired by a J-4 representative of the combatant command and includes representatives from each of the Service component commands and DLA. It should also include, when appropriate, members of other DOD Combat Support Agencies and US agencies or organizations concerned with contracting matters.

- The functions of the CLPSB should be consistent, but not redundant, with those of the Military Departments and should adhere to all applicable laws, DODDs,

the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the DOD FAR Supplement. CLPSB functions are as follows.

- Assess the impact of a potential loss of contractors performing essential services and planning in accordance with DOD Instruction 3020.37, “Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises.”
- Identify contracting issues that may affect other unified commands to the cognizant Joint Staff Office of Primary Responsibility, J-4.
- Coordinate with US Embassies and host countries for contracting of supplies, services, and operations by contractors performing under US contracts.
- Eliminate duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services, when appropriate.
- Provide an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.
- Provide guidance on the consolidation of purchases.
- Develop and issue command contracting policy covering matters unique to that command, or authorize subordinate unified commands to issue such policies unique to their operational area.
- Provide support to the Joint Logistic Board in addressing assigned projects on studies that involve acquisition and/or contracting policies and procedures affecting the unified commands.
- Develop policies and procedures that continually improve the coordination of

contract administration services performed overseas.

- Distribute CLPSB summaries to other commands to share information on contracting issues of mutual interest.
- Establish procedures to coordinate procurement with the supply operations of the command or area.
- Prescribe payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.
- Promulgate, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for third-country national and indigenous employees, in coordination with appropriate agencies.

g. Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center. The Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) is under the control of the command surgeon and coordinates and controls, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, the movement of patients within and out of the assigned AOR. TPMRCs generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute Global Patient Movement Requirements Center-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the medical treatment facility. The TPMRC should be task-organized to maintain flexibility in response to the tactical situation and mission of the combatant command.

For detailed information, see JP 4-02.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations.”

h. Joint Blood Program Office

- Within the office of the command surgeon, the Joint Blood Program Office

(JBPO) is task-organized to meet operational requirements and is staffed by Service representatives who are knowledgeable in blood bank techniques.

- The JBPO plans, coordinates, and directs the handling, storage, and distribution of blood and blood components within the assigned AOR. The JBPO consolidates and forwards requirements for resupply to the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO).

For detailed information, see JP 4-02.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations."

- Area JBPO will be activated on the order of a CINC if the situation dictates.

i. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office

- The Army component commander is routinely designated executive agent for the theater mortuary affairs program, which includes the establishment and operation of the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO) under the staff supervision of the combatant command J-4.
- The JMAO plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs. The JMAO will provide guidance to facilitate the conduct of all mortuary programs and maintain data (as required) pertaining to the search, recovery, identification, care, and disposition of all US missing and deceased personnel, including personal effects, in the assigned theater. The JMAO will serve as the central clearing point for all mortuary affairs and casualty information, and will monitor the deceased and missing personal effects program.

For detailed information, see JP 4-06, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations."

j. **Joint Medical Surveillance Team.** The Joint Medical Surveillance Team is responsible for the following.

- Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the health surveillance activities of force health protection in support of joint operations.
- Provide the clinical and administrative expertise to ensure compliance with health surveillance policies and programs and maintain the highest level of accountability.
- Ensure proper documentation of all health surveillance initiatives, to include pre- and post-deployment questionnaires, serum samples, immunizations, disease and non-battle injury reports, and environmental samples.
- Assist in the risk communication and health education and training program.
- Collect and analyze medical threat and health surveillance data.
- Recommend intervention strategies for minimizing casualties and optimizing health readiness.
- Document lessons learned for improving the health surveillance program in subsequent operations.

k. **Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board.** The JMPAB is the agency charged with performing duties for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters that establish materiel priorities or allocate resources. The JMPAB is responsible for the following.

- Modify and recommend priorities for allocations of materiel assets for the

- fulfillment of logistic requirements of the theater (both US and allied forces).
- Review, act on, or forward requests for modifications in force and activity designators to the Joint Staff.
 - Review, act on, or forward requests to establish or change the priorities in the master urgency list to the Joint Staff.
 - Prepare recommendations to the Joint Staff on modifications to priorities and allocations of resources assigned to other CINCs.

1. **Joint Transportation Board.** The Joint Transportation Board is a wartime and/or contingency body that ensures the most effective use of DOD common-user transportation resources in meeting competing and/or conflicting combat commander movement requirements. The board acts for the Chairman unless it cannot resolve issues; these matters are then referred to the Chairman for decision.

The charter for, and membership on, the Joint Transportation Board is in JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System," Annex B.

APPENDIX C

LOGISTIC INDICATORS AND CHECKLIST FOR OPLANS AND CONPLANS

1. Logistic Indicators

The following logistic considerations are a guide for use as indicators to assess logistic feasibility of various COAs. The indicators are by no means exclusive, but a process for identifying critical information requirements or analytical work necessary to develop an OPLAN or CONPLAN. Unless otherwise noted, these indicators apply to the strategic and operational level of logistics.

a. Materiel sourcing can only be accomplished by the Services and sourcing agencies. Early liaison among all concerned is essential to assess:

- Status of critical supplies and materiel in the theater, in the pipeline from CONUS to the theater, and in CONUS; and
- Pre-positioning of adequate war reserves.

b. Constraints en route to or within the theater.

c. Status of facilities and resources.

d. Movement control concepts.

e. LOC and node security status.

f. Availability of HNS, ACSAs, and IA to DCAs.

g. Time-phasing and readiness status of logistic support.

h. Availability of adequate communications connectivity for logistic automated systems.

i. Manufacturing rate of the CONUS base or production line needed to sustain forward operations.

j. **Concentration.** Are superior resources concentrated to support combat power at the decisive time and place?

k. **Visibility.** Do commanders know what logistic support they have and where it is at all times?

l. **Mobility.** Do commanders understand the capabilities of theater mobility assets in supporting operational movements and how long it will take to move forces and logistic assets to the decisive point of concentration?

m. **Configuration of materiel for transport.** Are there adequate means to move materiel where and when it needs to be moved and capabilities to reconfigure it for delivery if required?

n. Establishment of a theater distribution system that delivers resupply from rear echelons to front units.

o. Unusually high wastage or pilferage at any point in the logistic system.

p. Impact of NEO on logistic support.

2. Checklist for OPLANs and CONPLANS

Planners should ensure that logistic issues are addressed in the appropriate Annex of OPLANs (Annex D for logistics, Annex P for HNS, and Annex Q for medical). OPLAN considerations include the following.

a. Has a thorough review of the OPLAN or OPORD been made?

b. Are logistics-related annexes and estimates prepared?

- Have communications connectivity required for support of logistic automated systems been identified and included?
- Is initial distribution of supplies included?
- Have logistic plans been coordinated with component commanders? Has consideration been given to assigning the responsibility for theater support to the dominant users of services?
- Are movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies included? Have adequate provisions been made for defense during movements?
- Do annexes and estimates encompass projected impacts of NEO and displaced persons on routes, services, facilities, and sustainment?
- Are construction and other engineering requirements included? Has a barrier plan been considered? Have those materiel requirements been identified for sourcing?
- Have environmental support plans and related annexes been developed? Are provisions for the procurement, storage, issue, and disposition of hazardous materials and waste been included? Have provisions been made to ship hazardous waste across national boundaries? What actions have been identified to recover and re-mediate contaminated military operation locations?
- Do data capture processes and communications infrastructure support

the timely exchange of logistic information?

c. How many days can assigned forces sustain operations with organic supplies?

Are sustainment supplies phased to provide uninterrupted operations? What is the supply safety level?

- If allied or HN forces are involved, what logistic demands will the United States be responsible for meeting?
- Are US logistic assets compatible with allied or HN logistic assets or requirements (fuel type, interoperable equipment, and standard processes and procedures)?

d. Petroleum

- What is the concept of operations for petroleum support?
- What HNS is available?
- What are component responsibilities for petroleum support? Have components provided estimates of POL requirements?
- Have arrangements been made to contract for HN sources, with the supported CINC's JPO or DESC? Should a SAPO for resupplying POL be established?
- Has a quality control program for POL been established?
- Have POL storage methods and sites been selected? Have security arrangements for the sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for transportation of POL within the assigned theater?

e. **Munitions**

- What are the critical munitions required for this operation?
- Are sufficient stocks of these critical munitions available?
- Have these munitions been properly relocated, positioned or sourced to support the operation?
- May any immediate critical munitions shortfalls be remedied through transfer between component commands or from foreign forces as a quick fix?
- Have components provided estimates of ammunition resupply requirements?
- Have ammunition storage sites been selected and properly sited?
- Have security arrangements for the ammunition sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for the transportation of ammunition within the theater?

f. **Health Services Support Analysis.**

Detailed HSS analysis is accomplished in Annex Q of the OPLAN.

- Are the medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities delineated and assigned?
- Are provisions made to provide emergency medical assistance to other than US forces, to include noncombatant evacuees, contractors, and allied personnel that directly support US forces and enemy prisoners of war?
- Has the theater evacuation policy been established? If so, have requirements for medical support (beds, personnel, medical supplies and blood products) and

patient movement workload been identified?

- Is sufficient medical support available for deploying US forces to ensure a continuum of care for all casualties (disease, non-battle injuries, battle fatigue, and wounded in action)? Are all deploying units listed in the TPFDD, and do they arrive in theater when required?
- Have estimates of medical sustainability and anticipated resupply requirements been established?
- Have resupply channels been determined? Has a single integrated medical logistic manager been designated?
- Has a TPMRC been established to coordinate movement of patients within and out of the assigned AOR?
- Has a JBPO or similar function agency been activated to plan and coordinate the handling, storage, and distribution of blood and blood products within the assigned AOR and consolidate and forward resupply requirements to the ASBPO?
- Have medical personnel augmentation packages been identified and requirements submitted? Do hospitals have enough personnel and equipment to support movement of critical patients? Are there sufficient litters, straps, blankets, and other supplies as required to support anticipated workload?
- Have provisions been made to establish and operate the fixed-wing medical evacuation system?
- Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?

- Have force health protection (FHP) procedures been established and sufficient personnel identified to ensure protection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to the theater? Has a health surveillance program been established?
- Have medical communications channels, frequencies to be used by medical personnel, and any dedicated or medical-unique communications nets, operating procedures, or requirements been identified?

g. Individual Health Readiness Indicators. Has the health readiness of the force been assessed? Indicators of force health readiness are as follows.

- Immunizations
 - Per Joint Instruction
 - Combatant Command Specific Instructions
- Deployed Medical Record
 - Blood Type
 - Medication or Allergies
 - Special Duty Qualifications
 - Immunization Record
 - Pre-deployment Questionnaire
- Dental Class I/II
- HIV Test Within Previous 12 Months
- Tuberculosis Skin Test Within 12 Months
- DNA Sample on File

- Current Physical Exam in accordance with Service Policy
- 90-Day Supply of Prescription Medications
- Required Medical Items (e.g., Glasses, Protective Mask Inserts, Hearing Aids)
- No New or Unresolved Health Problems (e.g., P-4 Profile, Pregnancy)

h. Sustainability Analysis

- Are procedures established for maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations? Is there a requirement to provide disposal support within the theater where there is no Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO)? Is a DRMO that can be used located in the vicinity of the theater?
- Are inter-Service or HN agreements or coordination required?
- Have arrangements been made to obtain maintenance support not organic to the force?
- Can a theater feeding plan be supported and sustained?
- Has a JMAO been established to plan and coordinate all mortuary operations such as remains identification, transportation and temporary burial of the dead, and collection and processing of personal effects? Is there a JMAO to serve as a central point for graves registration information? Have mortuary affairs guidelines been established to include the following:
 - Current death program?

- Concurrent return program?
 - Graves registration program?
 - Personal effects program?
 - Return of remains program?
 - Have laundry and shower support requirements been generated in coordination with the medical authority, with consideration for environmental factors?
 - Have component requests for existing facilities, real estate, inter-Service support, and construction been evaluated and prioritized?
 - Has provision been made for battle damage repair (e.g., rapid runway repair)?
 - Is a CLPSB required to coordinate contracting operations? Are liaison personnel required to provide in-theater assistance such as fuels and subsistence, reutilization and marketing, and contract administration?
 - Have procedures been established to coordinate with US Embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services?
 - Has a joint logistic communications plan been developed to provide a general guide for logisticians' C2 requirements? How does this correspond with the need to establish a JTLM element to fuse materiel and transportation management at the theater level?
 - Are adequate security procedures established for classified logistic data transmission?
 - Has the need been considered for additional US security assistance to friendly countries in the assigned theater?
- i. Transportation Analysis**
- Have joint-use transportation requirements been established?
 - Has a JMC been established (if needed) to ensure that transportation requests are validated and theater common-user transportation resources are employed with maximum effectiveness?
 - Are common-user transportation requirements, capabilities, and performance monitored?
 - Are transportation shortfalls and conflicts in priorities adjudicated?
 - What HN transportation facilities and equipment are available?
 - Has the JMC evaluated and disseminated information about HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel?
- Additional guidance is located in CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)," Enclosure C, Annex D "Planning Guidance — Logistics."*
- Has JMC communication with JOPES been established to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies?
 - Have the impacts on sustainability due to NEO, displaced persons, and other competing requirements for access to supply routes, nodes, and transportation assets been addressed in the analysis?

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APPENDIX D

FOCUSED LOGISTICS — JOINT LOGISTIC VISION FOR 2020

1. General

“Focused Logistics is the fusion of logistics information and transportation technologies for rapid crisis response, deployment and sustainment, the ability to track and shift units, equipment and supplies even while en route, and delivery of tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly to the warfighter.”

Lieutenant General John J. Cusick
Joint Staff Director
for Logistics, 1996-1998

As we enter a new millennium, the changing nature of the threat and an unstable international environment necessitate renewed emphasis on the development of a fully integrated joint warfighting capability. The objective of focused logistics is to improve support to the warfighter. Logistic forces have the responsibility to sustain combat power at all levels — strategic, operational, tactical — providing the resources necessary for US forces to achieve and maintain battlespace dominance. Focused logistics will usher in new thinking, processes, and products designed to enhance US responsiveness to the warfighter. It will result in the fusing of information and logistic technologies into a new and significantly enhanced support capability. It will provide quick, intelligent, and timely logistic capability throughout the world, in peacetime, conflict, and war. Focused logistics is the springboard for the investigation, validation, and implementation of future joint logistic initiatives.

2. Joint Vision 2020

“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operational based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions.”

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1993-1997

Joint Vision (JV) 2020, the follow-on vision to JV 2010, encompasses four operational concepts: **dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, focused logistics**, and the enabling concepts of **information superiority** and **technological innovation**. Each will contribute to achieving **full spectrum dominance** for the 2020 force. The interrelation of Focused Logistics to the other operational concepts of JV 2020 is important. While the contribution of logistics has been widely recognized throughout US history, this is the first time logistics has been formally designated a **full partner in the joint warfighting process**. Focused logistics draws from the core competencies of each of the Services and Defense Agencies. This joint logistic community effort centers on identifying and evaluating desired operational capabilities for the 2020 force. These logistic capabilities, if proven and

implemented, will translate into a future joint operating capability. The work of identifying future desired operational capabilities is a collaborative effort of the Services, CINCs, Defense Agencies, and industry. The project identifies specific goals and milestones and promotes progress, while retaining flexibility to adapt to the evolving JV 2020 environment.

3. Challenges of Focused Logistics

“The fact that the future is uncertain is no excuse for failing to make adequate preparations.”

USMC Operational Maneuver From the Sea

The challenges of focused logistics represent the grouping of similar logistic functions and systems to define desired operational capabilities for the 2020 force. These are: **joint deployment and rapid distribution, information fusion, FHP, multinational logistics, agile infrastructure, and joint theater logistics management**. Defining, developing, understanding, validating, and implementing these tenets becomes the essence of future joint logistic operations.

a. **Joint deployment and rapid distribution** is the process of moving multi-Service forces to an operational area coupled with the accelerated delivery of logistic resources through improved transportation and information networks. These integrated deployment, distribution, and informational networks will provide the warfighter with improved visibility and accessibility of assets from source of supply to point of need.

- Improved management techniques in joint deployment, force reception, and theater distribution will be facilitated by improvements in processes and information technology. This increased

emphasis on movement velocity and precision, employing the combined **strategic airlift, sealift, and commercial transportation** capabilities now being fielded, will assure time-definite delivery, **reduce the logistic footprint** and enhance the mobility, sustainability, and effectiveness of deployed forces.

- A streamlined process for **global as well as theater distribution and JRSOI** will enhance and potentially accelerate throughput within and between operational areas. Meanwhile, developments in **JLOTS** operations will provide a much needed capability to deploy and sustain military forces in regions of the world where ports, airfields, and related infrastructure are not accessible or available.

b. **Information fusion** is the primary platform and key enabler for achieving major improvements in logistic support. This concept will provide timely and accurate access and integration of logistic data across units and combat support agencies. Information technology will improve logistic operations by providing reliable and critical information regarding valuable resources that are either in process, in transit, or in storage.

- Support systems such as the **GCSS** will provide a single common operational picture of asset status, location, and condition from a single platform across the Services. A host of logistic information systems will become an integral part of the overall interoperability vision as GCSS matures. These include major joint programs for **AIT, the GTN, ITV, JTAV, and JDST**.
- Information fusion results in a focused logistic effort; the integration of logistic functions into a functional “system of systems” designed to provide reliable,

responsive, and timely support when and where it is needed. Commercial advances in information technology may be applied to US systems and concepts of the future. Emphasis in 2020 must shift from large inventories to high speed movement of assets needed to support the warfighter. The “inventory-for-speed” tradeoff is effective both in terms of cost and responsiveness. The impact and potential of enhancements in information management will guide the development of user-friendly, open architecture systems capable of near real time asset visibility and accessibility.

c. **Force health protection** is the unified strategy to protect service members and their families from medical hazards associated with military service. The goal is to mitigate risks to Service members during military operations, with the desired outcome of a healthy and fit force, fully protected from health hazards across the range of military operations. FHP involves key actions to optimize health, prevent casualties, and provide superior casualty care and management when required. This strategy includes health threat identification, employment of appropriate countermeasures, and global medical surveillance.

d. **Multinational logistics** establishes mutual logistic support relationships between the United States and its allies or coalition partners. Multinational and third party logistics play an important role in most military engagements. It is essential that planners capitalize on the resources, processes, and capabilities of multinational and contractor-supported operations if these key elements are to be successfully integrated into the overall joint logistic infrastructure and organization.

e. **Agile infrastructure** will effectively size the logistic footprint through intelligent reductions in logistic forces, facilities,

equipment, and supplies. These reductions will be accomplished through changes to joint logistic doctrines, policies, structures and processes for inventory management, engineering, services, maintenance, and infrastructure.

- Reliable information combined with **accelerated cycle times** provided by Service initiatives such as “Lean Logistics,” “Precision Logistics,” and “Velocity Management” will **reduce the logistic footprint** and minimize inventories while maximizing support. Sustainment of forces deployed in any operation will be faster, more direct, and versatile.

- Attaining the agile infrastructure envisioned in focused logistics will require the support of the entire DOD logistic community. Major efforts must be undertaken to advance **outsourcing and privatization**, incorporate the best **commercial business practices**, redefine **civil engineering support**, and improve facilities management. Service initiatives for regional maintenance and two level maintenance will improve future **maintenance operations**. **Afloat and land-based pre-positioning**, improved management of **secondary war reserve items, sea-based logistics, direct delivery** (vendor or USTRANSCOM), and **other initiatives** will reduce deployment and sustainment requirements and the theater logistic footprint.

f. **Joint theater logistic management** integrates the logistic capabilities of the forces in-theater to fulfill the common-user and cross-Service support mission. When applied to the other challenges and desired operational capabilities of focused logistics, JTLM facilitates support to the warfighter while achieving economies and reducing the logistic footprint. JTLM optimizes resources

Appendix D

by synchronizing all logistic support efforts in-theater. The objective is to provide rapid, timely delivery of forces, materiel, and sustainment to the CINC. JTLM provides to the CINC the ability to synchronize,

prioritize, direct, integrate, and coordinate common-user and cross-Service logistic functions necessary to accomplish the joint theater mission.

APPENDIX E

REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 U.S.C. 161 et. seq. PL 99-433).
2. DOD Directive 2000.8, "Cooperative Supply Support Agreements."
3. DOD Directive 2010.8, "DOD Policy for NATO Logistics."
4. DOD Directive 4270.5, "Military Construction Responsibilities."
5. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components."
6. DOD Instruction 3020.37, "Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises."
7. DOD Manual 4140.25-M, "Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, and Distribution Facilities."
8. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 14 February 1992, "Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions."
9. CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."
10. DJSM-89-92, 27 January 1992, "Command Relationships."
11. JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
12. JP 1-01, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."
13. JP 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
14. JP 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions."
15. JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
16. JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."
17. JP 3-10, "Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations."

18. JP 3-17, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations.”
19. JP 3-34, “Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
20. JP 3-35, “Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.”
21. JP 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.”
22. JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.”
23. JP 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”
24. JP 4-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.”
25. JP 4-01.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water Terminal Operations.”
26. JP 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).”
27. JP 4-01.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations.”
28. JP 4-01.8, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.”
29. JP 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”
30. JP 4-02.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations.”
31. JP 4-02.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations.”
32. JP 4-03, “Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine.”
33. JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”
34. JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”
35. JP 4-05.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.”
36. JP 4-06, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.”

37. JP 4-07, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations.”
38. JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.”
39. JP 4-09, “Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.”
40. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”
41. NATO Logistics Handbook.

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APPENDIX F

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-0, 27 January 1995, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSA	acquisition cross-Service agreement
AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
AIS	automated information systems
AIT	automatic identification technology
AMC	Air Mobility Command (formerly Military Airlift Command)
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ASBPO	Armed Services Blood Program Office
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CINC	commander of a combatant command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CLPSB	CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COE	common operating environment
COMMZ	communications zone
CONCAP	construction capabilities contracts (Navy)
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COP-CSE	common operational picture — combat support enabled
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreements
DCST	DLA Contingency Support Team
DESC	Defense Energy Support Center
DII	Defense Information Infrastructure
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DRMO	Defense Reutilization Marketing Office
DRMS	Defense Reutilization Marketing Service
DUSD(L)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FHP	force health protection

Glossary

GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCSS	Global Combat Support System
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HM	hazardous materials
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HSS	health service support
HW	hazardous waste
IA	implementing arrangement
IT	information technologies
ITV	in-transit visibility
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office
JCMEB	Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
JCSP	joint contracting support plan
JDST	joint decision support tool
JFC	joint force commander
JFUB	Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JLOTS	joint logistics over-the-shore
JMAO	Joint Mortuary Affairs Office
JMC	joint movement center
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JTAV	Joint Total Asset Visibility
JTF	joint task force
JTLM	Joint Theater Logistics Management
JV 2020	Joint Vision 2020
LOC	line of communications
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program (Army)
LRC	logistics readiness center
MHE	materials handling equipment
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation

OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPREP	operational report
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SAPO	subarea petroleum office
SITREP	situation report
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
TC-AIMS II	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II
TCC	transportation component command
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USCINCTrans Command	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USDP	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WRM	war reserve materiel

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization or Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

advanced base. A base located in or near a theater of operations whose primary mission is to support military operations. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

base. 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-02)

civil engineering. Those combat support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat power. The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (JP 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistics systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)

combat support. Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (JP 1-02)

common operating environment. Automation services that support the development of the common reusable software modules which enable interoperability across multiple combat support applications. This includes segmentation of common software modules from existing applications, integration of commercial products, development of a common architecture, and development of common tools for application developers. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

common servicing. That function performed by one Military Service in support of

another Military Service for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part of theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. Also called COMMZ. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

concept of logistic support. A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02)

consumer logistics. That part of logistics concerning reception of the initial product, storage, inspection, distribution, transport, maintenance (including repair and the serviceability), and disposal of materiel, and the provision of support and services. In consequence, consumer logistics includes: materiel requirements determination, follow-on support, stock control, provision or construction of facilities (excluding any materiel element and those facilities needed to support production logistics activities), movement control, codification, reliability and defect reporting, storage, transport and handling safety standards, and related training. (JP 1-02)

cooperative logistics. The logistic support provided a foreign government/agency through its participation in the US Department of Defense logistic system with reimbursement to the United States for support provided. (JP 1-02)

cooperative logistics support arrangements. The combining term for procedural arrangements (cooperative logistics arrangements) and implementing procedures (supplementary procedures) which together support, define or implement cooperative logistic understandings between the United States and a friendly foreign government under peacetime conditions. (JP 1-02)

course of action development. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System with the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (JP 1-02)

cross-servicing. That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

Defense Information Infrastructure. The shared or interconnected system of computers, communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structures serving DOD local, national, and worldwide information needs. The Defense Information Infrastructure connects DOD mission support, command and control, and intelligence computers through voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services. It provides

information processing and services to subscribers over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes command and control, tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit DOD information. Also called DII. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

depot. 1. Supply — An activity for the receipt, classification, storage, accounting, issue, maintenance, procurement, manufacture, assembly, research, salvage, or disposal of material. 2. Personnel — An activity for the reception, processing, training, assignment, and forwarding of personnel replacements. (JP 1-02)

distribution. 1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the "right time" to support the geographic combatant commander. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities,

units, or billets. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

distribution system. That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units. (JP 1-02)

dominant user concept. The concept that the Service which is the principal consumer will have the responsibility for performance of a support workload for all using Services. (JP 1-02)

D-to-P concept. A logistic planning concept by which the gross materiel readiness requirement, in support of approved forces at planned wartime rates for conflicts of indefinite duration, will be satisfied by a balanced mix of assets on hand on D-day and assets to be gained from production through P-day when the planned rate of production deliveries to the users equals the planned wartime rate of expenditure (consumption). (JP 1-02)

environmental considerations. The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or programs that may impact on or are affected by the planning and execution of military operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and protection of flora and fauna. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment

facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, US or foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. 4. The ordered or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by Department of State, Department of Defense or appropriate military commander. This refers to the movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The evacuation is caused by unusual or emergency circumstances and applies equally to command and non-command sponsored family members. (JP 1-02)

evacuation policy. 1. Command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and destinations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. (JP 1-02)

facility. A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. (JP 1-02)

Global Combat Support System. The Global Combat Support System is a strategy that provides information interoperability across combat support functions and between combat support and command and control functions through the Global Command and Control System. Also called GCSS. (This term and its definition is approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Global Command and Control System. Highly mobile, deployable command and control system supporting forces for joint and multinational operations across the range of military operations, any time and anywhere in the world with compatible, interoperable, and integrated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems. Also called GCCS. (JP 1-02)

Global Transportation Network. The designated Department of Defense (DOD) in-transit visibility system, providing customers with the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units and non-unit cargo, passengers, patients, forces, and military and commercial airlift, sealift, and surface assets from origin to destination across the range of military operations. The Global Transportation Network (GTN) collects, integrates, and distributes transportation information to combatant commanders, Services, and other DOD customers. GTN provides the US Transportation Command with the ability to perform command and control operations, planning and analysis, and business operations in tailoring customer requirements throughout the requirements process. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign

forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

interdepartmental/agency support. Provision of logistic and/or administrative support in services or materiel by one or more Military Services to one or more departments or agencies of the United States Government (other than military) with or without reimbursement. (JP 1-02)

international cooperative logistics. Cooperation and mutual support in the field of logistics through the coordination of policies, plans, procedures, development activities, and the common supply and exchange of goods and services arranged on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements with appropriate cost reimbursement provisions. (JP 1-02)

international logistics. The negotiating, planning, and implementation of supporting logistics arrangements between nations, their forces, and agencies. It includes furnishing logistic support (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logistic support from, one or more friendly foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces, with or without reimbursement. It also includes planning and actions related to the intermeshing of a significant element, activity, or component of the military logistics systems or procedures of the United States with those of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces on a temporary or permanent basis. It includes planning and actions related to the utilization of United States logistics policies, systems, and/or procedures to meet requirements of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or forces. (JP 1-02)

international logistic support. The provision of military logistic support by one participating nation to one or more participating nations, either with or without reimbursement. (JP 1-02)

inter-Service support. Action by one Military Service or element thereof to provide logistic and/or administrative support to another Military Service or element thereof. Such action can be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. (JP 1-02)

in-transit visibility. The ability to track the identity, status, and location of Department of Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; medical patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. See also global transportation network. (JP 1-02)

joint decision support tools. Joint decision support tools are a compilation of processes and systems developed from the application of maturing leading edge information systems technologies that provide the warfighter and the logistician with the means to rapidly plan, execute, monitor, and replan logistic operations in a collaborative environment that is responsive to operational requirements. Also called JDST. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint logistics. The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Military Departments of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

joint movement center. The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. Also called JMC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint servicing. That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in support of two or more Military Services. (JP 1-02)

joint total asset visibility. The capability to provide users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies. It includes visibility of those items while in processing, in storage, or in transit. Also called JTAV. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

lead nation. One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing

a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

level of supply. The quantity of supplies or materiel authorized or directed to be held in anticipation of future demands. (JP 1-02)

line of communications. A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistic support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

logistic estimate of the situation. An appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing contemplated courses of action to provide conclusions concerning the degree and manner of that influence. (JP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition,

storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

logistics over-the-shore operations. The loading and unloading of ships with or without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. Or as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities. Also called LOTS operations. (JP 1-02)

logistics sourcing. The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistics requirements. (JP 1-02)

logistic support. Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. (JP 1-02)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02)

materiel planning. A subset of logistic planning and consists of a four-step process: a. requirements definition. Requirements for significant items must be calculated at item level detail (i.e.,

national stock number) to support sustainability planning and analysis. Requirements include unit roundout, consumption and attrition replacement, safety stock, and the needs of allies. b. apportionment. Items are apportioned to the combatant commanders based on a global scenario to avoid sourcing of items to multiple theaters. The basis for apportionment is the capability provided by unit stocks, host-nation support, theater prepositioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and continental United States Department of Defense stockpiles and available production. Item apportionment cannot exceed total capabilities. c. sourcing. Sourcing is the matching of available capabilities on a given date against item requirements to support sustainability analysis and the identification of locations to support transportation planning. Sourcing of any item is done within the combatant commander's apportionment. d. documentation. Sourced item requirements and corresponding shortfalls are major inputs to the combatant commander's sustainability analysis. Sourced item requirements are translated into movement requirements and documented in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base for transportation feasibility analysis. Movement requirements for nonsignificant items are estimated in tonnage. (JP 1-02)

movement control. 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. (JP 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. An overseas location used as the primary

transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacements units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistic support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host-nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called ALSS. (JP 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseas location with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites (ALSSs) by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called FLS. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below

the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

P-day. That point in time at which the rate of production of an item available for military consumption equals the rate at which the item is required by the Armed Forces. (JP 1-02)

pipeline. In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flow from sources of procurement to their point of use. (JP 1-02)

planning factor. A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often

expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (JP 1-02)

port. A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term “ports” should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. (JP 1-02)

priority. With reference to operation plans and the tasks derived therefrom, an indication of relative importance rather than an exclusive and final designation of the order of accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

shared data environment. Automation services that support the implementation and maintenance of data resources that are used by two or more combat support applications. Services provided include: identification of common data, physical data modeling, data base segmentation, development of data access and maintenance routines, and data base reengineering to use the common data environment. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

single port manager. Through its transportation component commands, US Transportation command is the Department of Defense-designated single port manager for all common-user aerial

and sea ports worldwide. The single port manager performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces' equipment and sustainment from the aerial and sea port of embarkation and hand-off to the combatant commander in the aerial and sea port of debarkation (APOE and SPOD). The single port manager is responsible for providing strategic deployment status information to the combatant commander and to manage workload of the APOD and SPOD operator based on the commander's priorities and guidance. The single port manager is responsible through all phases of the theater aerial and sea port operations continuum, from a unimproved airfield and bare beach deployment to a commercial contract supported deployment. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

supplies. In logistics, all materiel and items used in the equipment, support, and maintenance of military forces. (JP 1-02)

sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (From the definition of "military capability" in JP 1-02.)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the

detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

time-definite delivery. The delivery of requested logistics support at a time and destination specified by the receiving activity. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)


time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

transportation component command. The three component commands of USTRANSCOM: Air Force Air Mobility

Command, Navy Military Sealift Command, and Army Military Traffic Management Command. Each transportation component command remains a major command of its parent Service and continues to organize, train, and equip its forces as specified by law. Each transportation component command also continues to perform Service-unique missions. Also called TCC. (JP 1-02)

transportation system. All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of US forces and their supplies across the range of military operations, involving both mature and immature theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 4-0** is in the **Logistics** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

