

JP 3-07.2 FIRST DRAFT REVIEW COMMENTS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
1.		J34	S	0			Change title to "Joint Commanders' Guide for Antiterrorism		A
2.		J34 USAF					Make entire pub 'For Official Use Only"		A
3.		USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Review the capitalization of words and phrases throughout the text. This is especially true where an acronym is being establish, just because the acronym is placed in all caps does not mean that the phase needs to use capitalization.	JP 1-01 guidance	A
4.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	A				Consideration should be given to reducing redundancies (listed below) or including FPCON measures. While understanding the desire to have a stand-alone document there is great redundancy between this JTTP and DOD 2000.12-H. However, FPCON measures are deleted in this version which defeats the stand-alone nature. Eliminating unnecessary redundancies will reduce the size of the JTTP and reduce or negate the need to change the JTTP as changes to DOD 2000.12H occur. Adding the FPCON measures greatly increases stand-alone nature. Redundancies: With the exception of page 150-152 line 7 (the first 3 paragraphs) chapter 5 is an almost identical copy of DOD 2000.12H, chapters 15 and 9. Appendixes A, B and C are almost identical copies of chapters 5, 7 and 6 (respectively) from DOD 2000.12H.		A- Add FPCON measures to Appendix F
5.		EUCOM EPOC-AT// JFCOM	A				Draft DODI 2000.16 changes term FPCON to ATCON. If reflected in new 2000.16, this change should be reflected if it occurs prior to publication of the revision of JP 3-07.2.		R- FPCON stays
6.		EUCOM EPOC-AT USMC	A				Department of Defense appears as both DOD and DoD. This should be standardized to DOD. All occurrences of "U.S." should be changed to "US" in this publication.	Standardization / consistency with JP 1-02	A
7.		NORAD J-	U				Administrative: General comment for each of the		A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		55 Mr. Tom Robison DSN: 692-4680 thomas.robison@northcom.smil.mil					chapter lead-in quotes. Recommendation: Quotes should be from sources after September 11, 2001. Rationale: Reading "old" quotes, even if relevant, have the effect of making the reader believe that the material in the document reflects a pre-9/11/2001 mind-set. Our approach to antiterrorism has changed and the publication reflects our current approach.		
8.		USMC	S	0.0			General comment. The opening paragraph of this publication states that the publication "...sets forth the tactics, techniques, and procedures governing the conduct of US antiterrorism operations. It provided a basis for understanding US national policy and general objectives relating to antiterrorism and explains important DOD and US government agency command and control relationships. In addition, it outlines basic US military antiterrorism capabilities and provides commanders with guidance on how to organize, plan, and train for the employment of US forces in interagency and multinational antiterrorism operations." While this publication in its current form goes into great length to explain national policy, and command and control relationships, it does not adequately "... set forth joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in a joint operations...". This is an important task, and one that is lacking in the current realm of joint operations. For the US Armed Forces to meet the asymmetrical threat in the battlefield of tomorrow it is imperative that a base line for the protection of that force be forged with the lessons learned in the current Global War on Terrorism.	This document does not adequately address JTTPs for antiterrorism.	A- more checklists and diagrams are added.
9.		NORAD J-55 Mr. Tom Robison DSN: 692-4680	U				Administrative: Chapters V, VI & VII are too detailed. Recommendation: Chapters V, VI, and VII should be abbreviated and specific details provided in supporting Appendices.		A- use tables as possible.

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		thomas.ro bison@no rthcom.sm il.mil					Rationale: Readers needing specifics on how to do a detailed activity should be able to find that information in the appropriate Appendix rather than the body of the publication. Sponsor Comment:		
10.		NORAD J- 55 Mr. Tom Robison DSN: 692- 4680 thomas.ro bison@no rthcom.sm il.mil	U				Administrative: A new DOD strategy for Homeland Defense is due to be published in the next 2 months. Recommendation: Use the new DOD strategy that is being produced by Mr. McHale's office as a primary reference for this document. Rationale: Use the most current information that is available. Sponsor Comment:		A- if available
11.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	A				Chapter 2. Consider deletion of entire chapter.	Informative primer but not critical to JTTP for AT. Elimination would reduce volume and not substantively detract from purpose.	R- reduce verbage. Use TTP described below.
12.		USN	M				GENERAL COMMENT: This pub must be written in coordination with JP 3-26 which is nearing promulgation. Terms, definitions, and acronyms must be the same in both of them.	Consistency across the spectrum of joint pubs..	A
13.		EUCOM EPOC-AT J8JRO CBRND	A/S	0			Consideration should be given to reducing redundancies (listed below) or including FPCON measures. While understanding the desire to have a stand-alone document there is great redundancy between this JTTP and DOD 2000.12-H. However, FPCON measures are deleted in this version which defeats the stand-alone nature. Eliminating unnecessary redundancies will reduce the size of the JTTP and reduce or negate the need to change the JTTP as changes to DOD 2000.12H occur. Adding the FPCON measures greatly increases stand-alone nature. Redundancies: With the exception of page 150-152 line 7 (the first 3		A- add FPCONS to appendix and reference appropriately Doc intended to be stand alone

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							<p>paragraphs) chapter 5 is an almost identical copy of DOD 2000.12H, chapters 15 and 9.</p> <p>Appendixes A, B and C are almost identical copies of chapters 5, 7 and 6 (respectively) from DOD 2000.12H.</p>		
14.	2	USAF	S	0			<p>Recommend JP 3-07.2 contain some reference to current Service efforts on Contractor Background Checks. For example, the Air Force is currently dealing with this issue via a Headquarters Air Force Threat Working Group-initiated proposal to OUSD (AT&L) DP&AP from SAF/AQ for an Interim Rule to the AF Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement that would allow immediate implementation of contractor background checks at CONUS AF installations.</p>	<p>Knowing who is working on our military installations is part of the AT picture as commanders, responsible for the safety and security of their installations deal with the problem. This effort fits quite well into a Joint TTPs publication as it was inspired by concerns that terrorists might seek entrée into USAF installations.</p>	<p>A- include under chapter six. Some related verbage is found in the draft DoDI 2000.16 std 18</p>
15.	1	USAF/ USN	A	0			<p>Be consistent with terms, acronyms throughout the document, e.g., once term provided with acronym consistently use that acronym throughout the document.</p> <p>Antiterrorism - AT Host Nation – HN United States – US – America - American Department of Defense - DOD DOS – DoS DOJ – DoJ Federal Bureau of Investigations - FBI DODD Directive – DODD DOD Instruction – DODI Installation – base Program – program Personnel – personnel Force Protection – FP Homeland Security – HS Secretary of Defense – SecDef Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal - ATEP PPBS – PPBE Combatant Commander – combatant commander Services – Military Departments Area of Responsibility - AOR US Northern Command - USNORTHCOM</p>	<p>Consistency – common practice Consistent with DODI 2000.16, Antiterrorism Standards (DRAFT) [ATCON vice FPCON] The term, Force Protection Condition (FPCON) is referred to throughout the document. However, the draft DODI 2000.16 recommends changing FPCON to Antiterrorism Condition (ATCON). Deconflict JP3-07.2 with DODI 2000.16.</p>	<p>A- except FPCON will remain FPCON.</p>


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						Homeland Security – HS (JP 3-26 lists HS) Homeland Defense – HD (JP 3-26 lists HD) Change all references to FPCON to ATCON or FPCONs to ATCONs Al-Qaida – Al-Qaeda Federal, State, Local – Federal, state, local * Be consistent throughout the publication.		
16.	EUCOM EPOC-AT NORTHCOM/J34	A	0			Draft DODI 2000.16 changes term FPCON to ATCON. If reflected in new 2000.16, this change should be reflected if it occurs prior to publication of the revision of JP 3-07.2.		R FPCONsw ill remain
17.	EUCOM EPOC-AT	A	0			Department of Defense appears as both DOD and DoD. This should be standardized to DOD.	Standardization / consistency with JP 1-02	A
18.	USN	S	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Replace, throughout the text, HLD with <u>HD</u> and HLS with <u>HS</u>	Consistency with JP 3-26	A
19.	USN NC J34	A	0			GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the pub there is two different spellings for Al-Qaeda (al-Qaida). Should pick one and stick w/it.	Consistency	A- Use Al-Qaeda
20.	USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Review the establishment and use of acronyms throughout the text. Establish at first use then use throughout the remainder of the text.	JP 1-01 guidance	A
21.	USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the text review the use of JFC, combatant commander, geographic combatant commander, and functional combatant commander. For greater applicability wherever possible refer to JFC.	At times the reader is not certain if the passage applies to a geographic or functional combatant command or even all JFCs.	A
22.	USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the pub change <u>PPBS</u> to <u>PPBE</u>	Name change	A
23.	USN	S	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Consideration should be given to reformatting selected Appendices from the narrative style they are currently in to a “spreadsheet” or “matrix” format. For example, Appendix E	This would not only reduce the volume of the text but would place relevant information in a more “user friendly” format. This would allow for local reproduction for use by AOs. watch officers, and liaison officers and sharing with multinational forces, OGAs, and NGOs, where appropriate	A
24.	USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Review the capitalization of words and phrases	JP 1-01 guidance	A

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							throughout the text. This is especially true where an acronym is being establish, just because the acronym is placed in all caps does not mean that the phase needs to use capitalization.		
25.		USN USMC	S	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Replace, throughout the text, HLD with <u>HD</u> and HLS with <u>HS</u>	Consistency with JP 3-26	A
26.		USN	A	0			GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the pub there is two different spellings for Al-Qaeda (al-Qaida). Should pick one and stick w/it.	Consistency	A- Use Al-Qaeda
27.		USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the text review the use of JFC, combatant commander, geographic combatant commander, and functional combatant commander. For greater applicability wherever possible refer to JFC.	At times the reader is not certain if the passage applies to a geographic or functional combatant command or even all JFCs.	A
28.		USN	A	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Throughout the pub change PPBS to <u>PPBE</u>	Name change	A
29.		USN	S	0		0	GENERAL COMMENT: Consideration should be given to reformatting selected Appendices from the narrative style they are currently in to a "spreadsheet" or "matrix" format. For example, Appendix E	This would not only reduce the volume of the text but would place relevant information in a more "user friendly" format. This would allow for local reproduction for use by AOs. watch officers, and liaison officers and sharing with multi-national forces, OGAs, and NGOs, where appropriate	
30.		USN	S	0.01		5.11	Change as follows: This publication sets forth the tactics, techniques, and procedures governing the joint conduct of United States (US) antiterrorism (AT) operations. It provides a basis for understanding US national policy and general objectives relating to antiterrorism and explains important Department of Defense (DOD) and US Government agency command and control relationships. In addition, it outlines basic US military antiterrorism capabilities and provides commanders with guidance on how to organize, plan, and train for the employment of US forces in interagency and multinational antiterrorism operations. <u>This publication provides guidance and sets forth</u>	Simpler More consistent with JP 1-01 guidance Prescriptive to DOD/US Armed Forces not all US government agencies It is a stretch to say it provides a basis for understanding national policy – this is better accomplished in DODD(I)s, the AT Handbook, and other resources.	A

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						<u>tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to organize, plan, and train for the joint employment of United States (US) forces in joint antiterrorism (AT) operations. It outlines US national policy and objectives relating to AT, explains important Department of Defense (DOD) and US government agency command and control relationships, and basic US military AT capabilities.</u>	We don't do interagency operations we effect interagency coordination (per JP 3-08). The Purpose and Application paragraphs take care of this pubs relation to multinational operations.	
31.	J34	s	.01			Add comment that "This publication supercedes and replaces CJCSI 5260, CDRs' HNBK for Antiterrorism.	5260 is being cancelled. This will be the joint guide for cdrs.	A
32.	USN JFCOM	M	0.01		16.19	Change as follows: It sets forth joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for <u>interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.</u>	We don't do interagency operations we effect interagency coordination (per JP 3-08).	A
33.	USMC	S	0.01		6.8	Change to read: "...antiterrorism (AT) operations. It provides a basis for understanding US national policy and general objectives relating to <u>AT antiterrorism</u> and explains important Department of Defense (DOD) and..."	An acronym can only be established in the Preface if it is used two or more times in the Preface.	
34.	USMC	S	0.01		16	Change to read: "...Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets..."	An acronym can only be established in the Preface if it is used two or more times in the Preface.	
35.	USN USAF	M	0.02		22.23	Change as follows: For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable <u>and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.</u>	Consistent with JP 1-01 guidance	A
36.	USAF	A	0.03		36	Change to read: The page cite for "Jurisdiction and Authority for . . ." should read "IV", not "V"	Correction	A
37.	USN	C	0.03		15.23	Change as follows: CHAPTER II TERRORIST THREAT ● Overview ————— II-1 ● Terrorist Tactics ————— II-2 ● Terrorist Groups ————— II-12	Provides a better structure for material presented within text. This revision attempted to retain the structure of the 1998 version and it doesn't work. For example under the	A- update table of contents after pub is revised. Numerous additions

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorist Organization II-14 • Terrorist Targets II-23 • Domestic Terrorism II-27 • <u>General</u> • <u>Underlying Conditions</u> • <u>Operating Environment</u> • <u>Modern Technologies – there could be two subparagraphs one dealing with the nature of technology and its influence on terrorist organization, communications, tactics, techniques, etc. and one on its impact on AT programs and TTP.</u> • <u>Tactics</u> • <u>Terrorist Group Structure and Organization</u> • <u>Targets</u> • <u>Domestic Terrorism</u> 	<p>TERRORIST TACTICS paragraph this edition talks about technology as a target not a tactic (pg.II-8 – II-9) and technological advances and their impact on AT capabilities.</p> <p>In its paragraph covering TERRORIST ORGANIZATION the discussion attempts to cover underlying reasons for terrorism, how today’s environment is used by terrorist groups, an extended discussion of al-Qaida – which should be moved into a vignette and not be part of the main text, and very little on a terrorist group’s basic structure.</p> <p>We should clearly outline the salient issues required within this JTTP and present them in a logical, structured, sequence.</p>	to be made to appendii and later chapters.
38.	J34	S	.03		30	Add topics of Joint Threat Assessment format and Ops/Intel fusion. Including some collection plan example to walk intel req’s through security, ATO, and intel representatives	Available on JAT Guide	A
39.	USMC	S	0.03		12 13	Change to read: “Overview of <u>Antiterrorism</u> AT Program Elements” “Overview of <u>Department of Defense</u> DOD Role and Responsibility”	Acronyms are not used in the table of contents or corresponding chapter, section, figure, or table headings.	A
40.	USMC	S	0.04		8 15 25	Change to read: “ <u>Antiterrorism</u> AT Plan Development” “ <u>Antiterrorism</u> AT Force Protection in High-Threat Areas” “Initial Response to a <u>Weapons of Mass Destruction</u> CBRNE Attack”	Acronyms are not used in the table of contents or corresponding chapter, section, figure, or table headings. Use overarching terminology in this case.	A

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41.		USAF	A	0.05		3	Change to: High Risk Personnel Protection	Proper spelling	A
42.		USAF JFCOM TRANSC OM	S	1.01	1	19.24	Change to read: ". . .standards, and procedures for the Department of Defense (DOD) combatting <u>antiterrorism</u> (AT) (CbT) program is contained in DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.12, "DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program," August 18, 2003, DOD Instruction (DODI) 2000.14, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures," DOD O-2000.12-H, "DOD Antiterrorism Handbook," 9 February 2004, and DoDI O-2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism Standards" (DRAFT), March XX, 2004.	DODI 2000.14 is being canceled by DODI 2000.16, and title of the AT handbook was incorrectly identified as a Directive.	A
43.		USN	A	1.01		16.18	Change as follows: This definition is the foundation, throughout this publication, for the guidance to combatant commanders, subunified commanders, joint task force (JTF) commanders, and component joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates.	Simplicity	A- use : "This definition provides the basis, for the guidance provided to <u>joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates</u> throughout this publication."
44.		USMC	S	1.01		16	Change to read: "...or ideological (<u>Joint Publication [JP] 1-02</u>)."	Identify acronyms on first use.	A
45.		USMC	S	1.01		18.24	Change to read: "...Specific policy, directive guidance, standards, and procedures for the Department of Defense (DOD) <u>the antiterrorism portion of the</u> combating terrorism (CbT) program is contained in DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.12, DoD DOD Antiterrorism Program, DOD Instruction (DODI) 2000.14, DoD DOD Combating. Terrorism Program Procedures, DODD O-2000-12.H, DoD DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, and DODI 2000.16, DoD DOD Antiterrorism Standards."	Accurate language. In JPs it is all CAPs. Insert comma.	A
46.		J34/	S	1.02		1	Cbting terrorism definition should be consistent with	Consistency JP1-02 as	A

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		USAF					definition listed in DoDO2000.12.H. (pg 26) Change to read: "Combating terrorism involves actions including antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts), counterterrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism), terrorist consequence management (preparation for and response to consequences of a terrorist incident), and intelligence support (collection or dissemination of terrorism related information), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. This publication does not address CT.	amended through 23 Mar 04 adds the word "preempt" after "deter."	
47.		USAF	S	1.02	1.5	1.5	Change to read: "Combating terrorism involves actions including antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent and deter and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. This publication addresses only AT. The following definitions, also shown in Figure 1-1, are provided assist in understanding the difference between AT and CT."	To eliminate duplication. Figure 1-1 and sub-paragraphs a and b on this page both provide definitions of AT and CT. Defining them three times is not necessary. An alternative to this change would be to leave lines 1-5 unchanged and eliminate sub-paragraphs a and b.	A- leave lines 1-5 unchanged and eliminate sub-paragraphs a and b.
48.		USJFCO M	S	1.02		11.12	Change as follows: "Antiterrorism is defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces." If accepted, list in Glossary as well, followed by: "(Upon approval of the revision of this pub, this definition will be included in JP 1-02.)"	Correctness and consistency with the definition of AT used in DODI 2000.16, DODD 2000.12, and DOD 2000.12H.	A
49.	4	USAF	C	1.03	3.		Add figure that illustrates ALL of the sub-elements OSD/JS consider to be part of the broader FP concept. Example:  "XOHD Figure for FP.ppt"	The DOD IG report, Force Protection in the Pacific Theater (D-2004-007), October 14, 2003, and the 2003 Defense Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference out briefs show conclusive evidence that we (DOD) are confused over	A

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								<p>this concept. As we fight a Global War on Terrorism we cannot afford to stop short of resolving this concept with a simple illustration showing the relationship of the sub-elements to the broader FP concept. Rather than have 4 services, 9 COCOMS, 26 Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities propagate their OWN concepts, why not develop ONE (1) baseline sanctioned by OSD/JS. The FP concept and the Sub-elements (programs like AT) that make up the whole need to be understood as we work to integrate our efforts here and abroad to fight the Global War on Terrorism.</p>	
50.	2	USAF	S	1.03	3	6.9	<p>Change to read: “These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential <u>capability</u> so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.”</p>	<p>Poor wording --“potential” is not what is applied.</p>	A
51.	3	USAF	S	1.03	3.	10	<p>Add: “ . . . disease, (JP 1-02, <u>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</u>, 12 April 2001, (As Amended Through 23 March 2004)). FP is a <u>responsibility inherent to all commanders for which they are ultimately accountable.</u></p>	<p>Spell out full title of publication, with date at its first use – use short title (JP 1-02) for subsequent uses. Add line regarding FP to link the first sentence explaining the relationship of AT to FP. Comment will link FP to AT and the broader aim of the policy reviews to rebuild the FP construct so commanders and ATOs understand their varying and inherent</p>	A

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								responsibilities.	
52.	5	USAF	M	1.03	4	19.21	Change to read: “The Department of Defense's <u>DOD's</u> AT program is one of several programs that fall under the overarching <u>FP concept</u> . Combating Terrorism and Force Protection programs. The AT program shall be a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection <u>detection and prevention</u> of terrorist attacks against DOD. . . .”	2000.14 is being canceled by the new DoDI 2000.16, per ASD (SO/LIC) FP is not a DOD program; it is a broader concept IAW paragraph 3, this text. Recommend Detecting first in order to Prevent.	A
53.	7	USAF/ USN/ JFCOM	M	1.03	4.	19.23	“The AT Program shall be a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment...” Note. There is an inconsistency with DOD 0-2000.12-P, Feb 04 (Draft), the DOD AT Strategic Plan, para C.1.1.1, which says the AT program is a “collective, proactive effort to deter, prevent, and defend against terrorist attacks aimed at DOD personnel and their families, DOD contractors , installations, infrastructure, and key assets critical to mission accomplishment”	There is an inconsistency in coverage that needs to be resolved. Note that DOD contractors are included in the DOD AT Plan but not included in the Joint Pub. Moreover, the DOD AT Plan cites “...infrastructure, and key assets critical to mission accomplishment” whereas the Joint Pub only cites “infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment.’ Need to standardize the language in the publications to ensure consistency and completeness of meaning.	Use DoD 2000.12P definition:
54.		USN	S	1.03 to 1.04		20 to 1	Change as follows: The AT program shall be <u>is</u> a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparations to defend against and planning for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents.	More accurate Extant vice future	A
55.		USJFCO M	A	1.03		5	Change as follows: “taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense <u>DOD</u> personnel (to include family)”.	Acronym previously established; also, IAW JP 1-01, glossary definitions should not be repeated verbatim in the text.	A
56.		USJFCO M	S	1.03	3	1.10	Comment: Recommend including a diagram that illustrates the relationships between AT, Combating Terrorism, Consequence Management, Crisis		A

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							Management, Physical Security, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Information Operations, other security programs, and Force Protection. This document is incomplete without an illustration that depicts these relationships as outlined in reference DODD 2000.12, DODI 2000.16, and DOD 2000.12H. All of the Joint Staff and ASD SOLIC plans, policies, and directives continuously verbalize these relationships, but have yet to produce a simple diagram that depicts the relationships.		
57.		USMC	S	1.03		17	Change to read: "Overview of <u>Antiterrorism</u> AT Program Elements"	Acronyms are not used in the table of contents or corresponding chapter, section, figure, or table headings.	
58.		USMC	S	1.04		6	Change to read: "...refine the AT Pplan."	Term is not capitalized in this general usage.	
59.		J34	A	1.04		10	Change caption to read: Every commander has the responsibility for the security of the command against terrorist attacks.		A
60.		J34	A	1.04		18	Change paragraph to read: The Commanders at all levels have the responsibility and authority to enforce appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of DOD elements and personnel subject to their control. Commanders shall ensure the AT awareness and readiness of all DOD elements and personnel (including dependent family members) assigned or attached. They must also ensure appropriate AT protection and readiness of DOD elements and personnel while pursuing mission accomplishment.	Grammar. It is a runon sentence as written	A
61.		J34	A	1.04		23	Change to read: (3) The geographic Combatant Commanders' AT policies take precedence over all AT policies or programs of any DOD Component operating or existing in that command's area of responsibility		
62.	6	USAF USN	A	1.04	4	3.5	Change to read: The minimum elements of an AT program shall be all the elements and assessments of the risk management process, planning, training and exercises, resource generation, and program reviews. "The minimum elements of an AT program are: risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource	Wording taken right out of DODI 2000.16 (DRAFT)	A

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							<u>generation, and comprehensive program review.”</u>		
63.	7	USAF	S	1.04	4.	10	Change to read: “Every commander has a responsibility <u>and accountability</u> for the <u>FP security</u> of the command against varying levels and types of terrorist threat.”	Every commander has an inherent responsibility and accountability for the protection of their forces and resources to accomplish the mission – this FP is delivered by the cognizant and faithful execution of programs that are sub-elements of the FP concept and contribute to each accomplishment. Every commander should be aware of the status of the programs that contribute to their FP responsibilities. Which is why I recommend a figure be included in this text to demonstrate as a visual aid.	A
64.	8	USAF	S	1.05	5a1	4.5	Change to read: The Department of Defense's AT program shall be all encompassing using an integrated systems approach. “The DOD's AT program shall be one of the programs, when executed, that contributes to the commander's overall FP responsibility.”	The AT program cannot be “all-encompassing”, it has minimum requirements per DODI 2000.16, and it is a sub-element of the overall FP concept.	A
65.		USJFCO M	S	1.05		4.5	Change as follows: “The Department of Defense's DOD's AT program shall be all use encompassing using an integrated systems approach.”	AT is not an “all encompassing” program. It involves staff synchronization, planning, and coordination that help the JFC form an initial plan to protect DOD assets. An AT Officer is a staff officer that maintains no command authority, does not own or direct assets, and is not in charge of forces responding to the scene of a terrorist incident.	A
66.		USMC	S	1.05		3	Change to read: “The DOD C omponents and the...”	Term is not capitalized in this general usage.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
67.		USMC	S	1.05		17	Change to read: "The Ccommanders at all..."	Term is not capitalized in this general usage.	A
68.		USMC	S	1.05		23	Change to read: "The geographic Ccombatant Ccommanders' AT..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage.	A
69.		USMC	S	1.06		1	Change to read: "...of any Ccomponent operating or existing in that command's are of responsibility (AOR) except for those under the security responsibility of a Cchief of Mmission (COM). All DOD personnel traveling into a Ccombatant Ccommander's AOR..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage.	A
70.		USMC	S	1.06		18.19	Change to read: "to contact the Ccombatant Ccommand to obtain..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage.	A
71.		TRANSCOM	A	1.06	5a4	8	Change reference to CJCSI 5261.01B to 5261.01C	Current instruction is .01C	A
72.		J34	A	1.06		8	More information about CBT RIF can be found online at www.atep.smil.mil .	amplification	A
73.		USAF	A	1.06		13	Change to: overseas travel).	Parenthesis opened on line 11, but not closed on line 13	A
74.	8	USAF	M	1.06	6	15.22	"Commanders do not have the same legal responsibility to provide security for DOD contractors as that provided for military forces or direct-hire employees." But there seems to be disparity between this framework, which is also silent with respect to the families of DOD personnel, and the wording of the DOD AT Strategic Plan, para C.1.1.1, which describes DOD's AT program as a "collective, proactive effort to deter, prevent, and defend against terrorist attacks aimed at DOD personnel and their families, DOD contractors , installations, infrastructure, and key assets critical to mission accomplishment"	Recognizing that DOD O-2000.12-P, February 2004 is also still in draft, the difference in the two publications conveys some serious policy implications, to wit: Are the families of DOD personnel included, and are DOD contractors part of the framework of DOD's AT effort? These differences should be reconciled in BOTH publications. Note: this publication should also be in the reference section (Appendix K) of JP 3-07	A- Include contractors per 2000.12P
75.	1	USAF	S	1.06	5	22	Add the following sentence: "Additionally, commanders may provide an additional, higher level of security, to which the government may have agreed pursuant to a particular contract."	This may provide additional support from contractors with flexibility by commanders built into the process. We submit that this may provide the commander with additional flexibility to obtain work from contractors that they may not	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								otherwise provide because of security concerns. This concept should be considered and addressed here. If, alternatively, a decision is made that commanders may not provide higher levels of protection for contractors (for policy reasons) pursuant to contracts, this should be stated here.	
76.		USJFCO M	S	1.06		8	Change as follows: "... of Staff Instruction 5261.01B <u>C</u>)." Track fix on page I-20, line 14.	Staff Instruction 5261.01B, dated 1 Jul 01 was superseded by Staff Instruction 5261.01C, dated 1 Jul 03. NOTE: CJCSI 5261.01D is now in DRAFT and should be released soon.	A
77.		J34	S	1.07		3	Add a description of ASD/SOLIC role	Completeness	A
78.		USN	S	1.07		17	Change as follows: (a) Develop strategic planning guidance for DOD's role in Homeland Security (HLS).	Consistency with JP 3-26	A
79.	9	USAF	A	1.07	7b	4	Change to read: The F <u>f</u> iscal year 2003 National . . ."	JP 1-02	A
80.	9	USAF	A	1.07		11	This would be a logical place to insert an Org Chart	To illustrate how ASD/HD looks under the USD/P. For comparison, an org chart showing how the Department of Homeland Security is configured might also be effective to show on the one hand the civilian Homeland Security effort, and on the other, the military Homeland Defense effort. The Department of Homeland Security website has an excellent org chart for the Tom Ridge-led effort.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
81.		USN	S	1.07		19	Change as follows: (b) Develop and update force employment policy, guidance, and <u>provide oversight</u> .	More accurate	A
82.		USMC	S	1.07		4	Change to read: "...for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD) (<u>ASD(HD)</u>). The..."	Correct form of acronym.	A
83.		USMC	S	1.07		7.8	Change to read: "one of the As Assistant S ecretaries as the... ASD/HD <u>ASD(HD)</u> and..."	Term is not capitalized in this general usage. Correct form of acronym.	A
84.		USMC	S	1.07		17	Change to read: "...Security (HLS <u>HS</u>)."	Correct acronym.	A
85.		USMC	S	1.08		5.6	Change to read: "...defense (HLD <u>HD</u>) and.....for HLD <u>HD</u> missions..."	Correct acronym.	A
86.		USAF	S	1.08		9	Change to: Provide coordination with the Office <u>Department</u> of Homeland Security.	Proper terminology	A
87.	10	USAF	S	1.17	2	6.7	Change to read: "... Low Intensity Conflict) [ASD (SO/LIC)] in development and maintenance of <u>the AT program</u> , standards and procedures. Review doctrine, <u>policy</u> , standards, and procedures of the DOD"	DODI 2000.16 requires that ASD (SO/LIC) provide oversight of the Polices and Standards of the AT program, laid out by DODD 2000.12. Changes made to reflect policy.	A
88.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	A	1.17	c.		Delete para c. which begins "The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of shall: ..." Renummer subsequent paragraphs.	Role of CJCS in AT is not critical to JTTP for AT. Elimination would reduce volume and not substantively	R- Chairman' s responsibi

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								detract from purpose.	lities underlie JSIVAs, etc.
89.		USJFCO M USAF transcom	S	1.17		19.20	Change as follows: “Annually, as part of the DOD program and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE) cycle, ...” (And throughout document use PPBE) Track fix on following pages (lines): 1.20 (16,22), 1.25 (13), 1.30 (2), and 1.31 (22). Also make appropriate changes in Glossary, page GL-6, line 5.	Correct program name and acronym.	A
90.		USCG	S	1.17	5.c.(2)	8-10	Change to read: “...the Secretary of Defense and in conjunction with the DOD components <u>and Services</u> , the AT training for all DOD <u>and Armed Forces</u> personnel including ...”	USCG personnel are required to participate in AT training. This is especially true for those personnel assigned to combatant commands.	A
91.		USN	A	1.18		1	Establish the acronym PSA	JP 1-01 guidance	A
92.		SCRA/DT RA	A	1.18	(7)	22	Change to read as follows: “Assess the implementation of Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) Antiterrorism Conditions (ATCONs) for uniform implementation and dissemination as specified....”	Consistency with changes being made with DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD, Antiterrorism Standards. Reference proposed changes from FPCONs change to ATCONs.	R
93.	12	USAF	A	1.18	6	18	Change to read: “. . . .documents for AT <u>issues</u> considerations.	Consistency – previously identified as AT issues (page 1.17 line 3).	A
94.	13	USAF	S	1.18	7	22.23	Change to read: (7) Assess the implementation of Force Protection AT Conditions (FPATCONs) for uniform implementation and dissemination as specified by DODD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, DODI Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, and DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H. , DoD Antiterrorism Handbook.	This is the first use of the term FP Conditions – change to AT Conditions here and throughout. Also – once document titles have been fully identified at first use – subsequent uses can use short title.	R
95.		NJ55P MR. Terry Ropes DSN: 692- 1638 Terry.ropes@norad.	U	1.19	(9)	17	Substantive: Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]) on sharing of terrorism intelligence and counterintelligence data and information on AT. This includes threats posed to the DOD Components and the DOD elements and personnel by domestic and foreign		R

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		mil					<p>terrorists.</p> <p>Recommendation: Add after last sentence: For Homeland Defense (HLD) AT operations, intelligence should be classified "Releasable to Canada" to support NORAD's HLD mission.</p> <p>Rationale: SECDEF has directed CDRNORAD to conduct Air Defense of North America through the ONE EXORD. NORAD is a US and Canadian bi-national command.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment: Not concur. Allow flexibility for classification to originating authority.</p>		
96.	14	USAF	S	1.19	8	11	Change to read: ". . . .for Global Operations (Antiterrorism/ Homeland Defense Force Protection) . . ."	Correct office name	R
97.	15	USAF	S	1.19	9	18.19	Change to read: ". . . .of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]) on sharing of terrorism intelligence and counterintelligence data and <u>law enforcement (LE), suspicious activity report (SAR)</u> information on AT."	See 4 Mar 2003, DCI MOU between the IC, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security concerning Information Sharing, and 2 May 2003, DepSecDef Memo, Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist threats to DoD Within The United States. Add both to references.	A
98.		USJFCO M, J34, USN, USAF	A	1.20		14	Change as follows: "Ensure 46-out-year maintenance ..."	Typographical error.	A
99.	16	USAF	S	1.21	13a	13.14	Change to read: These elements include threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, planning, exercises, program reviews and training. <u>"These elements include risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource generation, and comprehensive program review."</u>	Wording taken right out of DODI 2000.16 (DRAFT)	A
100.	17	USAF	A	1.21	b	17	Change to read: ". . . provides the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, Defense agencies, <u>DOD Field Activities</u> , joint task forces and. . . ."	Field activities will also require access to ATEP.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
101.		USJFCO M	A	1.21		9	Change as follows: "CJCS guidance is transmitted to the Director, Joint Staff for implementation."	Misplaced thought not consistent with the paragraph.	A
102.		USJFCO M	S	1.21		11.13	Change as follows: ""(a) Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal. ATEP encompasses the policies, procedures, trained personnel, and information systems that support trained personnel in managing the elements of an AT program, from the Joint Staff through the operating forces and components, along the entire spectrum of warfare across the range of military operations."	Acronym previously established. More precise definition of ATEP. Consistency with JP 3-0 ROMO.	A- make chapter that covers Online support to AT ATEP, CVAMP, JAT, JPEN
103.		USJFCO M	A	1.21		16	Change as follows: "(b) The Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal ATEP System. A is a comprehensive ..."	Clarity; acronym previously established.	A
104.		USCG/	A	1.21	5.d.	23	Change to read: Geographic E combatant E commanders shall:"	Grammar.	A
105.	19	USAF	A	1.22	2	13.14	Change to read: "(2) Ensure AT policies and programs include specific prescriptive standards derived from DODI Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, to address specific terrorist threat capabilities and."	Use short title – by design any terrorist capability is a threat.	A
106.		USCG/ USAF	S	1.22	5.d.(1)	4-5	Change to read: "... the E combatant E commander assumes responsibility based on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with a <u>Chief of Mission</u> (COM). ..."	First use of an acronym, it should be spelled out.	A
107.	20	USAF	A	1.23	3	5	Change to read: "... performing <u>training or exercises</u> in the Combatant Commander's AOR."	Common practice.	A
108.	21	USAF	A	1.23	4	12	Change to read: "... AOR that are not under the <u>security</u> responsibility of a COM."	It is assumed we are talking about the AT responsibility – just say responsibility without qualifying.	A
109.	22	USAF/ J3	A	1.23	4	14	Change to read: "... Ensure AT program reviews include a validation of the <u>17 thoroughness</u> of the AT risk management"	AT is redundant – the risk management process was previously identified as one of the minimum requirements of the AT program.	A
110.	11	USAF	S	1.23		17	..."chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE)..." Please note. A definition	The Air Force grappled with the definition of the "E" and it	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							of the "E" should be included in the Glossary of JP3-07.2, and then that definition should be added to JP1-02.	was considered by the Air Force's overarching body dealing with CBRNE, the AF/XON-chaired C-CBRNE Council. The Council accepted an AF/XOF recommendation that the definition in DODI 2000.18, "Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, December 4, 2002, be the official definition of "E." We, in turn, recommend that this definition be used in JP 3-07.2 and then referred to JP 1-02 for inclusion.	
	111.	USAF	A	1.23	5d4	17	Change "high yield" to "high-yield."	Proper punctuation.	A
	112.	USAF	A	1.23	4	20	Change to read: ". . . the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertinent actions taken for AF protection."	AT is redundant.	A
	113.	USN	C	1.23		1.08	Change as follows: Exercise tactical control (TACON) (for force protection) over all DOD elements and personnel (including force protection responsibility for DOD dependent family members) (except those under the security responsibility of a COM) within the Combatant Commander's AOR. TACON (for force protection) applies to all DOD personnel assigned permanently or temporarily, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in the Combatant Commander's AOR. TACON (for force protection) is in addition to a Combatant Commander's normal exercise of operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces. Establish force protection policies for all DOD personnel in the combatant commander's AOR. The geographic combatant commander's force protection policies will take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any DOD component deployed in that	TACON for FP – as a new command relationship – was considered for incorporation into the UNAAF but REJECTED. There's a fine line here. The UNAAF does say, "Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the combatant commander is exercising TACON authority for force protection purposes." Under these circumstances the combatant commander is exercise good old fashioned	A

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						command's AOR and not otherwise under the security responsibility of the DOS. <u>Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the combatant commander is exercising TACON authority for force protection purposes.</u>	TACON (because FP considerations dictate that he needs to), not some new, watered-down version of TACON. The fix at left leads with DODI 2000.16 language and finishes with the lift from the UNAAF. It gets the idea/policy across without creating a new command relationship in joint doctrine.	
114.	USN/J34	S	1.23		10.15	Clarify: (4) Periodically, assess and review the AT programs of all combatant commander assigned DOD components in their AOR. Assess the AT programs of all DOD components performing in their AOR that are not under the security responsibility of a COM. Military Service component <u>Component</u> commands or other subordinate commands reporting to the Combatant Commander may be delegated responsibility to conduct these assessments. Ensure AT program reviews include a validation of the thoroughness of the AT risk management methodology used to assess asset criticality, terrorist threat, and vulnerabilities.	Combatant-commander assigned DOD components in their AOR is awkward and confusing – we are talking about geographic combatant commander responsibilities Considers the salient point we desire to make and then presents it in a succinct, straight-forward manner	A
115.	J-8 / PAD, Jay Wilmeth J-8, PAD 703-602- 1159	A	1.23	D(4)	14	Word missing between thoroughness and of --		A
116.	USJFCO M	S	1.23		1.7	Comment: The following discussion is an excellent example of why a diagram cited above is required: "Exercise tactical control (TACON) (for force protection) over all DOD elements and personnel (including force protection responsibility for DOD dependent family members) (except those under the security responsibility of a COM) within the Combatant Commander's AOR. TACON (for force protection) applies to all DOD personnel assigned permanently or		A

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							temporarily, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in the Combatant Commander's AOR. TACON (for force protection) is in addition to a Combatant Commander's normal exercise of operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces." Clarity. DOD has a definition for FP; however, we do not have any FP directives, instructions, or strategic plans. Although this section may be technically correct in the use of terminology and intent, it only serves as the foundation for confusion at the level of execution for the AT program.		
117.		USJFCO M	A	1.23		5.7	Change as follows: "Homeland Security vs. Homeland Defense Homeland security (HLS) is not the same as homeland defense (HLD)." Track change throughout publication and in glossary.	DOD recognized acronyms or Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, also being established in FC coord. of JP 3-26, <i>Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security</i>	A
118.		USJFCO M	A	1.23		14	Change as follows: "Ensure AT program reviews include a validation of the 17 thoroughness of the AT risk management."	Typographical error.	A
119.		USAF	A	1.24	5	2	Change to read: ".with host nation (HN) officials on matters involving AT policies and programs measures. "	First use of HN in text – provide abbreviation and use HN for subsequent uses – also previously identified polices and programs – be consistent.	A
120.		USAF	A	1.25	8	11	Change to read: ". . . . Commander or for which that Commander has AT responsibility."	AT is redundant	A
121.		USAF	A	1.25	9	22	Change to read: ". . . . Task Forces, to ensure that effective mechanisms are in place to maintain an AT protective posture"	AT is redundant	A
122.		USAF	A	1.26	10	6	Change to read: "Assess the terrorist threat for the AOR according to this DODD Directive 2000.12 and."	Grammar.	A
123.		USAF	A	1.26	10	9	Change to read: "On the basis of the 48 threat assessment,"	Miscellaneous character.	A
124.		USAF	A	1.26	11	19	Change to read: ".elements and personnel under their security responsibility, but not under the command of the combatant."	These qualifying terms (security/AT) are redundant. The Commander/COM has an inherent responsibility and accountability for the	A

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								protection of forces/personnel/resources under their control. The successful execution of the AT program minimum elements will contribute to the overall force protection of those personnel in conjunction with the successful execution of other programs related to the broader FP concept.	
125.		USAF	S	1.27	15	17	Change to read: “. . . the Defense Agencies, <u>DOD Field Activities</u> , and the Military Departments, as appropriate.	Proper term is DOD Field Activities – Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activity are differentiated with different names to indicate the size of the organization, Field Activity being the smaller of the two categories.	A
126.		USAF	S	1.28		2	Change to: Develop <u>and implement</u> the capability to	The fusing of intel must be implemented to be of value. Development is necessary, but not sufficient	A
127.		USN	S	1.28		16.17	Change as follows: Coordinate programs with the appropriate Combatant Commanders <u>geographic combatant commander</u> and the COMs.	Clarity We are talking functional and geographic so we don't want to lose the reader	A
128.		USCG	C	1.3	3.	3-10	Change to read: “. . . FP is defined as: actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense <u>and Armed Forces</u> personnel (to include family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. . . .”	USCG while not a part of DOD is one of the five Armed Services. USCG maintains its own service specific FP policy and programs consistent with DOD guidance. USCG personnel and resource assigned to geographic combatant commanders for operations come under the combatant's commanders FP responsibilities. JP 1-02 definition should be change to be inclusive of the Armed	R- Keep consistent with JP 1-02.. Add bullet to accommodate USCG as military service.

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								Forces to recognize this fact.	
129.		USAF	A	1.30	7	1.3	Change to read: “. . . . Ccommander has AT responsibility. Work with the Service component commands to ensure that resource requirements to implement the AT programs are identified and programmed according to PPBES procedures.”	These qualifying terms (security/AT) are redundant. The Commander/COM has an inherent responsibility and accountability for the protection of forces/personnel/resources under their control. PPBES is the proper term.	A
130.		USAF	S	1.30		5	Change to: Develop <u>their own</u> a functional Combatant...	Use of “functional” was confusing. The whole section refers to functional combatant commanders, so inclusion of “functional” here can be misconstrued as either referring to a usable (i.e., functional) plan or for functional areas like security, intel, etc.	A
131.		USAF	A	1.30	f	9	Change to read: “Directors of other Defense Agencies and <u>DOD</u> Field Activities, Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . .”	Proper term.	A
132.		USAF	S	1.30	1	13.16	Change to read: (1) Support the geographic Combatant Commanders as they exercise overall <u>FP</u> responsibility and execute their AT programs for the personnel and resources for the AT within their respective AOR. Institute AT Programs, ensure that Defense Agencies and <u>DOD</u> Field Activities conduct vulnerability assessments that address terrorism as a potential threat to the DOD elements and personnel, and incorporate AT measures into contingency response plans.	The execution of just the AT program will not provide the full complement of programs or support to the commander to complete their FP responsibilities – At is only one supporting program.	A
133.		USAF	S	1.30	2	23	Change to read: “. . . characteristics of the activity, geographic location, <u>vulnerabilities</u> , assessed terrorism threat level, and <u>FPATCON</u> . * Use the short title for all the texts referenced in the	DODI 2000.16 refers to the terrorism threat level – use this term consistently here and throughout the text.	R

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							paragraph.		
134.		USAF	A	1.31	2	2	Change to read: "Coordinate with the applicable Combatant Commander to ensure AT plans and <u>plans and polices and programs</u>"	Previously listed as policies and programs – one of the minimum requirements is a AT plan.	A
135.		USAF	S	1.31	3	7	Change to read: ". . . .AT training <u>and exercise</u> program."	One of the minimum elements is training and exercise.	A
136.		USAF	S	1.32	5	7	Change to read: ". . . .supporting the Department of Defense's <u>DOD's AT program</u> activities."	IAW DODD 2000.12.	A
137.		USAF	S	1.32	6	11	"Identify and designate incumbents of high-risk <u>billets that are potentially high-risk targets of terrorist attacks</u>"	Clarity.	A
138.		USAF	A	1.32	8	19	Change to read: ". . . . design, and execution of military and minor construction projects to mitigate AT vulnerabilities and. . . ."	AT is redundant and not required – we are talking about vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists.	A
139.		USAF	S	1.32	8	21	General Comment: Correct Reference. UFC 4-010-10, UFC 4-010-02 DOD minimum AT standoff distance	Accuracy, was republished on 8 October 2003	A
140.		USJFCO M	A	1.32	5	6	Change as follows: "... Congress in the Congressional Budget Justification Book, including the number ..."	Correctness.	A
141.		NORAD J35 Maj Butler DSN: 692-5370 gregory.butler@norad.mil	S	1.33	h. (1)	29	Substantive: The para h. is talking about three distinct circumstances in which the Department of Defense would be involved in activities within the United States in support of security of the nation. Para (1) lists one of these distinct circumstances as "Extraordinary circumstances which require the Department to execute its traditional military missions" and goes on to list Air Patrols (APs) as one of those. Recommendation: Rewrite para (1) to eliminate "Extraordinary" and mention that NORAD is lead Department of Defense agency performing Homeland Defense missions on a daily basis to include the air defense of North America, using, for example, APs. Rationale: NORAD is accomplishing military missions <u>daily</u> in support of defense of the nation, and these are		A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							not considered extraordinary. Sponsor Comment:		
142.		USAF	M	1.33	insert	5.16	Change to read: Homeland Security vs. Homeland Defense Homeland security (HLS) is not the same as homeland defense (HLD). Homeland security HS is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. It is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal organizations. Homeland defense HD is the protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population and defense critical infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies, against threats and aggression. military attacks emanating from outside the United States.	HS is defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security – DoD has no official definitions for HD. Those will be decided by SPG projects to complete this summer. Be consistent with what you put in here with what is in JP 3-26, to include using the same acronyms for HS and HD. SPG in Force Planning construct, Page 6 – lists “Defend the U.S. Homeland” – the “external” terminology has been removed.	A
143.		USAF	S	1.33	g	19.20	Change to read: “. . . . defense activities, missions (air, land and maritime defense) the Department of Defense DOD will take the lead and be supported by other Federal agencies.”	Per JP 3-26, Homeland Defense is the Mission Area, and (Air, Land and Maritime Defense) are the Missions.	A
144.		USAF JFCOM	S	1.33	h	26	Delete paragraph h and sub paragraphs.	According to pages I-2 and I-3, this discussion of HD and military response is outside the scope of AT (defined as reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, plans, training, etc.). HD and military response to incidents should be covered in a separate TTP. If rejected, modify IAW below comments. Thorough	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								discussion of homeland security and homeland defense can be found in JP 3-26. An abridged reprint does not seem needed here. Also, the discussion of homeland security vs homeland defense (p. 1.33) is at odds with current discussion in JP 3-26.	
145.		USN	S	1.33 to 1.36		26 to 5	GENERAL COMMENT: Align this text with that in the FC draft of JP 3-26	Consistency	A
146.		USCG	M	1.33	Box	5-16	General comment. When presenting two ideas using the term versus or the abbreviation "vs." the clear implication is the that two ideas are opposed to one another. Homeland defense is clearly a subset of homeland security if one follows the logic presented in JP 3-26. While it's appropriate to briefly present the construct here, a discussion that presents the relationship between the two terms as complementary is in order here.		A
147.		USCG	A	1.33	15.g.	19	Change to read: "... defense <u>defense</u> activities ..."	No need to italicize the word for emphasis here. It merely detracts from the reading.	A
148.		J-8 / PAD, Jay Wilmeth J-8, PAD 703-602-1159	A	1.35	i	2-10	Numbering is off. Line 2 should be (1), with (a) (b) below	Clarity	A
149.		USAF	S	1.35	3	10.14	Change to read: (3) USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility <u>AOR</u> is America's homefront. The AOR includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Canada, Mexico, <u>Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Bermuda, St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, and waters out to 500 nautical miles (excluding Greenland).</u> and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. The	Per the USNORTHCOM AT CONOPS for CONUS.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							defense of Hawaii and our territories and possessions in the Pacific remains the responsibility of US Pacific Command.		
150.		USCG	M	1.35	Box	16-21	General comment. This box adds no value. By emphasizing the creation of Northern Command and discussing it homeland defense responsibilities exclusively could, the reader may easily conclude that Northern Command is the only combatant command that has homeland defense responsibilities which is not true.		A
151.		USCG	A	1.05	5.a.	1	Change to read: "a. It is DOD policy that: "	Clarity.	A
152.		USCG	S	1.05	5.a.(1)	3	Change to read: "(1) The DOD components, and the DOD elements, and personnel shall be <u>afforded</u> protection from terrorist acts through a <u>high-priority, comprehensive AT</u> program. The Department of Defense DOD's AT program shall be all encompassing, <u>of the highest priority, and developed through</u> using an integrated systems approach."	Brevity and clarity.	A
153.		USCG	A	1.05	5.a.(2)	17-19	Change to read: "(2) The Commanders at all levels have the responsibility and authority to enforce appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of DOD elements and personnel subject to their control and shall ensure the AT awareness and readiness ..."	Grammar.	A
154.		USCG	A	1.05	5.a.(3)	1	Change to read: " The geographic <u>C</u> ombatant <u>C</u> ommanders' AT policies take precedence..."	Grammar.	A
155.		USCG	S	1.07	5.b.(2)(c)	21	Change to read: "(c) Serve as the DOD Incident Manager for DOD support to <u>federal, S</u> tate, and local civil authorities.	There may be times when a federal agency is leading the incident management effort. See JP 3-08.	A
156.		J34	S	1.xx			Add section on distinguishing between FP and AT THIS IS AN OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (SO/LIC) AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, J3 MESSAGE INTENDED TO ALLEVIATE CONFUSION AMONG THE DOD COMPONENTS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ANTITERRORISM (AT) TO FORCE PROTECTION (FP) AND TO CLARIFY THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF FP.	Use the FP Construct message to develop distinction between AT and FP. Use diagram fm above.	A

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>2. PROBLEM: AT HAS BECOME ALMOST SYNONYMOUS WITH FP, HENCE THE EXPRESSION AT/FP. ASSESSMENT TEAMS ARE ALSO DISCOVERING THAT COMMANDS AT ALL LEVELS ARE DESCRIBING THEIR ANTITERRORISM PROGRAMS AS FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS. THIS LINKAGE OF AT WITH FP HAS LED TO AN ERRONEOUS MINDSET THAT ANTITERRORISM IS THE TOTAL SUM OF THE PARTS OF FORCE PROTECTION. IT IS CRITICAL THAT OUR COMMANDERS AND SENIOR LEADERS NOT ONLY UNDERSTAND HOW AT RELATES TO FP, BUT ALSO SHOULD BE ABLE TO EDUCATE OTHERS HOW THEY RELATE. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR CLARIFICATION:</p> <p>A. ANTITERRORISM: THE APPROVED DEFINITION OF AT FROM JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS DESCRIBES AT AS DEFENSIVE MEASURES USED TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND PROPERTY TO TERRORIST ACTS, INCLUDING LIMITED RESPONSE AND CONTAINMENT BY LOCAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN FORCES. WHILE AT INTEGRATES OTHER DEFENSIVE ACTIONS (SUCH AS PHYSICAL SECURITY, CBRN DEFENSE, OPERATIONS SECURITY, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS, ETC,) IN A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM DESIGNED TO PROTECT AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK, IT DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL THE ASPECTS OF FORCE PROTECTION.</p> <p>B. FORCE PROTECTION: THE DOD APPROVED DEFINITION OF FORCE PROTECTION IS CURRENTLY ARTICULATED IN JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, AS:</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST DOD PERSONNEL (TO INCLUDE FAMILY MEMBERS), RESOURCES, FACILITIES, AND CRITICAL INFORMATION. THESE ACTIONS CONSERVE THE FORCE'S FIGHTING POTENTIAL SO IT CAN BE APPLIED AT THE DECISIVE TIME AND PLACE AND INCORPORATE THE COORDINATED AND SYNCHRONIZED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO ENABLE THE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE JOINT FORCE WHILE DEGRADING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE ENEMY. FORCE PROTECTION DOES NOT INCLUDE ACTIONS TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY OR PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTS, WEATHER, OR DISEASE.</p> <p>C. FP IS A JOINT TASK. JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS CONDUCT FP IN SIMILAR FASHION AS MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER; INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE; EMPLOYING FIREPOWER; SUSTAINING OPERATIONS; OPERATING IN A CBRN ENVIRONMENT; AND PROVIDING COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING THE EXECUTION OF CAMPAIGNS, MAJOR OPERATIONS, AND TACTICAL ENGAGEMENTS. FP ACTIONS ARE INTENDED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE SERVICES, AND BY JOINT FORCES UNDER JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL USING JOINT DOCTRINE. FP CAN BE APPLIED AT MULTIPLE LEVELS OF COMMAND, FROM THE STRATEGIC-THEATER, THROUGH THE OPERATIONAL, AND DOWN TO THE TACTICAL LEVEL. FORCE PROTECTION IS AN OVERARCHING CONCEPT AND MISSION RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT TO COMMAND WITHIN ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IT SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SYNONYMOUS TERM WITH ANTITERRORISM OR OTHER SUPPORTING TASKS.</p>		

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							3. EFFECTIVE WITH THIS MESSAGE, THE OFFICIAL DEFINITION OF FP IS THAT AS DESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02. DURING THE COURSE OF NORMAL REVISIONS OF DOD AND JOINT STAFF PUBLICATIONS OSD AND THE JCS WILL SYSTEMATICALLY UPDATE FP-RELATED PUBLICATIONS TO INCORPORATE THE APPROVED FP DEFINITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.		
157.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	A	2.00			Chapter 2. Consider deletion of entire chapter.	Informative primer but not critical to JTTP for AT. Elimination would reduce volume and not substantively detract from purpose.	R
158.		USN J8 JRO CBRND	C S	2.01 to 2.33			<p>GENERAL COMMENT: This revision of this chapter attempted to retain the structure of the 1998 version and it doesn't work.</p> <p>For example under the TERRORIST TACTICS paragraph this edition talks about technology as a target not a tactic and technological advances and their impact on AT capabilities.</p> <p>In its paragraph covering TERRORIST ORGANIZATION the discussion attempts to cover underlying reasons for terrorism, how today's environment is used by terrorist groups, an extended discussion of al-Qaida – which should be moved into a vignette and not be part of the main text, and very little on a terrorist group's basic structure or organization.</p>	<p>We should clearly outline the salient issues required within this Chapter and present them in a logical, structured, sequence.</p> <p>Specific, follow-on comments will attempt to assist in the restructuring of the content, however, once the LA reviews all Service and combatant command comments on this draft a re-thinking of what needs to be presented, relevant to TTP, should be conducted.</p>	a- Use outline as discussed above
159.		USN	S	2.01		13	Change as follows: <u>1. Overview General</u>	More accurately describes paragraph content	A
160.		USN	S	2.01		16.19	Change as follows: This chapter provides background information an overview of issues dealing with concerning the terrorist threat to enable the commander at any echelon to create and employ AT tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined in this publication.	Simplicity, accuracy, and relevance	A
161.		USN	M	2.01 to		28 to	Change as follows: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a	There was nothing indiscriminate about the 9/11	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
				2.02		2	dramatic escalation in trends toward more destructive terrorist attacks and <u>showed how vulnerable the United States is and the importance of countering terrorism... toward more indiscriminate targeting among international terrorists.</u>	attacks against the World Trade Center Buildings and the Pentagon.	
162.		USN	M	2.02		2.04	Delete or clarify: There is an apparent shift in operational intensity from traditional sources of terrorism — state sponsors and traditional terrorist organizations — to extremist groups.	A shift from one type of organization to another doesn't equate to a shift in intensity.	A
163.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	S	2.02	1	2	Change: "There is an apparent shift in operational intensity from traditional sources of terrorism state sponsors and traditional terrorist organizations to extremist groups." To Read: "The new terrorist paradigm includes traditional state sponsored terrorism, well organized networks of non state actors, extremist groups and criminal networks. Moreover, they may act independently or in a well orchestrated offensive."	Captures broad spectrum of sources/groups.	A
164.		CSO/DTR A	S	2.02	1	<u>1</u>	Replace words: "trends toward more destructive terrorist attacks and toward more indiscriminate targeting <u>High Profile Targeting</u> among international terrorists.	<u>September 11 targeting was well-placed</u>	R- discussed above
165.		USN	A	2.02		15.16	Change as follows: Their targets will be just as likely economic (tourists, financial networks) or agricultural ones (livestock, crops) as embassies or military <u>forces/facilities</u> .	Completeness – otherwise the grammar is off and the sentence is incomplete.	A
166.		USAF	M	2.02			Add substantial discussion on evolution of terrorist tactics, include a brief history on progression of tactics and more specifically detail ways in which terrorists operate.	Current discussion is valuable but lacks depth needed in TTP. If lead agent concurs, HQ AFDC SMEs will gladly submit draft addition for this section	A- Need slide of terrorist targeting progressio n, RCIED, VBIED, IED, technique s
167.		USN	M	2.03		5	Delete: Use of Technology From the COMMON TERRORIST TACTICS box	Use of technology is a means not a tactic. This deletion also supports a	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								rewrite of the text that removes subparagraph 2.m, Use of Technology and Weapons of Mass Effects from under a paragraph dealing with Terrorist Tactics.	
168.		USN/J34	S	2.04		7.13	Change as follows: Bombing. The improvised explosive device (IED) is the terrorist's weapon of choice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to the perpetrator. Suicidal bombings, however, are a preferred common employment method. Other Advantages to these tactics include their attention-getting capacity and the ability to control casualties through time of detonation and placement of the device. Announcing responsibility for the bombing or denying responsibility for the incident. It is also easily deniable should the action produce undesirable results, <u>generates media interest and may lead to increased coverage of a terrorist groups agenda/activities.</u>	More inclusive and relevant.	A
169.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	M	2.04	c.	10	Change: "Suicidal bombings, however, are a preferred employment method." To Read "Suicidal bombings, however, are a preferred employment method for large vehicle borne explosive improvised devices (VBIED).", or "Suicidal bombings, however, are a frequently employed method."	Suicide bombings do not constitute the major of IED attacks; and since this method could almost always be employed the veracity of claiming this to be the preferred method is questionable.	R-discussed above
170.		CSO/DTR A	A	2.04	c	<u>10</u>	Change " Suicidal bombings, however, are a preferred employment method. " to " <u>Suicide bombers are an acceptable employment method.</u> "	<u>Clarity</u>	<u>R-discussed above</u>
171.		USN DTRA	S	2.04		7.13	Change as follows: Bombing. The improvised explosive device (IED) is the terrorist's weapon of choice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to the perpetrator. Suicidal bombings, however, are a frequently employed method. Other Advantages to these tactics include their attention-getting capacity and the ability to control casualties through time of	More inclusive and relevant.	a

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							detonation and placement of the device. <u>Announcing responsibility for the bombing or denying responsibility for the incident, it is also easily deniable</u> should the action produce undesirable results, <u>generates media interest and may lead to increased coverage of a terrorist groups agenda/activities.</u>		
172.		USJFCO M	M	2.04 - 2.12	2.a. - 2.m.		Comment: The sub-paragraphs (a) – (m) of this paragraph 2 describe the various types of terrorist tactics. However, the description/definition provided for each tactic are not IAW the DIA groupings for these tactics, nor do the short description/definition of the tactics do not match the descriptions or definitions used by DIA.		A- FIND/USE DIA
173.		USAF	S	2.05		9	Change to: target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability.	Do not believe we know why aircraft are the preferred target. Also, do not believe aircraft are more vulnerable to takeover than a bus or train.	A
174.		USCG	S	2.05	1.g.	11- 12	Change to read: "... in the eyes of the <u>intended</u> audience."	Clarity.	A
175.		USN	S	2.07		10.12	Change as follows: Chemical weapons have been used by terrorists to date and there is potential for the use of both chemical and biological weapons in the future.	Unnecessary	A- see below
176.		CSO/DTR A	S	2.07	k	<u>10- 12</u>	Replace " Chemical weapons have been used by terrorists to date and there is potential for the use of both chemical and biological weapons in the future. " to read: " <u>Terrorists have employed chemical and biological weapons in the past, and some terrorist organizations will seek to employ all types of CBRNE weapons when they can obtain them.</u> "	<u>Terrorists have employed biological weapons in the past. Al Qaeda programs seeking to obtain and employ CBRNE weapons have been uncovered. Al Qaeda is not the only group trying to obtain CBRNE weapons.</u>	<u>A</u>
177.		CSO/DTR A	S	2.07	k	<u>18- 20</u>	Delete words: "The technology is simple and the cost per casualty (for biological weapons in particular) is extremely low – much lower than for conventional or nuclear explosives."	<u>Biological weapons not cheaper than conventional weapons.</u>	<u>A</u>
178.		USAF	S	2.07		12	Change to: <u>chemical, and biological and radiological</u> weapons...	Radiological devices are discussed later in the paragraph, but not mentioned in the introductory sentence.	A
179.		CSO/DTR A	S	2.08	l	<u>5</u>	Add: " <u>The use of exotic insects, animals, or plants to poison or destroy the food supply or ecosystem is a</u>	<u>Use of non-native plants or animals is not a high cost</u>	<u>A</u>

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>potential low cost terror weapon.</u> "	<u>weapon.</u>	
180.		EUCOM EPOC-AT J34	A	2.08	1	2-4	Change: "Examples would be intentional dumping of hazardous chemicals into a city's water supply, or the destruction of an oil tanker, the intentional burning of an oil field, or the use of exotic insects and/or plants to poison or destroy a nation's food supplies." To Read: "Potential examples include intentional dumping of hazardous chemicals into the public water supply, the destruction of oil tankers causing ecological harm, destroying oil fields, or poisoning a nation's food supplies."	Recommended change in phrase.	A- include above also.
181.		USN USAF	C	2.08 to 2.12		7 to 12	GENERAL COMMENT: Remove entire subparagraph m, Use of Technology and Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) from paragraph 2 Terrorist Tactics, discussion. Consider developing a separate paragraph that discusses new threats enabled by modern technologies This new paragraph should follow a discussion of the operating environment and precede the discussion of terrorist tactics (see comment #10). A rewrite must focus on salient information relevant to producing TTP for the joint forces. Generic, historical discussion and conceptualizing what may happen needs to be regulated to other documents or restricted to relevant vignettes.	The discussion of use of technology and weapons of mass effects, as written, does not belong in a discussion of terrorist tactics. The discussion is flawed as technology isn't discussed as a tactic but as a means to conduct attack – computer network attacks, bombings of infrastructure, attacks, etc. It also talks of technology as a target not a tactic It covers material on WMD, subparagraph m(3), better suited for inclusion in subparagraph 2k on pg. II-7. The discussion also provides a limited overview of the actual tactics, techniques, or procedures, that could be used for AT. This material also needs to be "broken-out" from the general discussion of technologies impact on the nature, tactics, and techniques	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								of terrorism and terrorist groups. Finally, the term “weapons of mass effects” is flawed. See glossary comment on the term. There was no discussion of WME in JP 3-40, nor any plans for discussion of this in JP 3-0, or other related JPs.	
182.		J8 JRO CBRND	S	2.09	2m3	19.04	Move entire paragraph to para 2k. page II-7. Use of Special Weapons and WMD.	The paragraph currently falls under “use of Tech and WME” It would fit better under para 2k	A
183.		USAF/ JFCOM	S	2.10	3	1.4	Add: This raises the possibility of radiological bombs that use fissile material to contaminate targets. <u>Terrorists have attempted to obtain industrial radiological sources to be used in a “dirty bomb” scenario. This would result in panic, adverse economic effects, and potential health risks.”</u>	There is a higher likelihood of terrorists obtaining and using industrial radiological source in a dirty bomb scenario than terrorist obtaining and using fissile material in a dirty bomb. From a technological/hazard perspective, fissile material would not nearly be as damaging as some other radioisotopes commonly available in industry. Consider omitting the section referring to use of fissile material in a dirty bomb and emphasizing the higher risk of using common radioisotopes.	A
184.		USAF	A	2.10	m 5.10	13	Delete - all paragraphs concerned with technology and antiterrorism capabilities.	Does not pertain to Chapter II, Terrorist Threat.	A
185.		USN	C	2.12 to 2.23			GENERAL COMMENT: The current paragraph 3, Terrorist Groups and paragraph 4, Terrorist Organization should be combined into one paragraph <u>Terrorist Group Structure and Organization</u> . Its content should be constructed from material on pages II-12, II-13, II-20, and II-23. A new paragraph titled; <u>Underlying Conditions</u> should be developed from the material currently making up	Better structures the discussion of salient information	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>subparagraph 4.b.</p> <p>A second new paragraph titled; <u>Operating Environment</u> should be developed and some of the information used in subparagraph 4.m. included therein.</p> <p>The text on page II-19, lines 2-4 can be modified and used to transition between the existing text on terrorist groups (pg.II-12 – II-13) to a discussion of a terrorist organizations <u>groups</u> basic (generic) structure. The material beginning on line 11 of pg.II-20 then can be modified to continue the discussion of a terrorist group's structure.</p> <p>Figure II-2 is broken – it may be (stretching it) a reflection of the “structure of terror” but it isn't a figure that reflects a “terrorist organization <u>group</u>'s basic (generic) organization. The underlying conditions, international environment, and states portion of the pyramid don't reflect a basic/generic organization. They may influence it but they are not part of it.</p> <p>The text from line 19 on pg. II-20 through line 16 on pg. II-23 should be reformatted and placed in a shaded gray box as a vignette. It does not provide the user with tactic, techniques, or procedures but rather provides a historic, editorial view, of how a terrorist group may be organized/work. It singular focus on al-Qaida also makes it appropriate for a vignette.</p>		
186.		USAF	A	2.12	10	11.12	Change to read: “Recent efforts have reduced barriers between agencies on for the <u>machine to machine transfer</u> , fusion, and dissemination of AT data.”	4 Mar 2003 HLS Memo has mandated and the IC CIO Information Sharing Working Group are making strides toward this end.	A
187.		J34	S	2.12		13	Add chart of threat matrix- attached.	Concisely puts threats in single area	A
188.		USAF	M	2.12		22	Change to: <u>Historically</u> , terrorist groups <u>have also been</u> are categorized...	As currently written, the paragraph treats two different ways of categorizing terrorist groups (i.e., operational tradition and government affiliation) as one category.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
189.		USAF	S	2.13		10	Change to: Messianic Religious cults or organizations...	Appears the point is not whether use of "messianic" may be viewed as anti-Jewish within the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, the term is highly revered by both Jews and Christians, while its current usage is unnecessary (e.g., many of these groups do not emphasize the leader "messiah", but their cause)	A
190.		USAF	M	2.13	b	15	Omit the word "Cult" from "Hizballah is both the "party of God" and a religious-cult organization ..."	Within the intelligence and foreign policy communities, Hizballah is not typically described as a "cult."	A
191.		USJFCO M	S	2.13		12.13	Change as follows: "Shinrikyo cult or the Abdul-Ramman group that perpetrated the World Trade Center bombing) or Al-Qaeda,"	Reference to Abdul Ramman group is a dated holdover from the previous version of this JP.	A
192.		J34	S	2.13		17	Add diagram showing concept of different terrorist groups with diverse ideologies..but refined to common set of tactics.	Visual image of threat	A
193.		J34	S	2.13			Include section on target attack process and how to detect/defeat		A
194.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	M	2.19	Figure II-2	4	Change "TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BASIC STRUCTURE" To Read "GENERAL TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT"	"Underlying Conditions, International Environment, and States" are not part of a Terrorist Organization.	
195.		USJFCO M	S	2.19		4.7	Comment: This diagram is entitled Terrorist "Organization Basic Structure." However, the diagram has nothing to do with the organizational structure of terrorist groups. It more accurately describes the "cause and effect" relationship between socio-economic and geo-political systems that cause terrorism. In fact, the deleted figure II-4 on page II-16 is more accurate than this one. The accompanying text details the diagram in language that best explains terrorists today, as opposed to the "cut and dry mold" of past attempts. If an ATO needs to understand the organizational structure of a terrorist organization, (s)he should look to the Intel reports for that particular organization / group.		A- CHANGE DIAGRAM

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							(Perhaps DIA could help here, for that information is well beyond the scope of this pub.) As such, this diagram needs to be renamed or removed		
196.		USCG	S	2.19	4.b.	10-11	Change to read: "Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their <u>base of support</u> ."	Clarity.	A
197.		USAF	M	2.20		1.2	Change to: As a result of freer, more open borders, as well as sympathetic governments this environment unwittingly provides terrorists access to havens, capabilities and other support to terrorists.	Al Qaida has benefited from sympathetic governments (e.g., Yemen) and previously sympathetic governments (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), in much the same way as they have benefited from freer, more open borders.	A
198.		USAF	S	2.20		2.3	Delete: But access alone is not enough. Terrorists must have a physical base from which to operate.	Not needed. The idea is implicit in having access to havens, capabilities and other support, as written in the previous sentence.	A
199.		USAF	S	2.20		9	Change to: membership, resources, <u>supporters</u> , and security determine...	Terrorist supporters, whether nation states, friendly tribes or co-opted neighborhoods are relevant to the discussion of terrorists capabilities and reach.	A
200.		USAF	M	2.21		10	Add discussion to: Such past successes provide valuable lessons for the future. List some of the valuable lessons for the future	If the lessons are valuable, they should be discussed in the TTP.	A
201.		USAF	A	2.22	h	1	roms <u>ROMs</u>	Correctness. ROM is an acronym. See JP 1-02.	A
202.		USAF	A	2.22	i.	4	Reword sentence: "... with the ease of <u>a</u> vacationer or business traveler."	Clarity	A
203.		USAF/JF COM	A	2.22	4j	14	Add quotation marks before "hawalas."	Proper punctuation.	A
204.		USAF	S	2.22		18	<u>Besides U.S. citizens</u> , the September 11 attacks...	Accuracy.	A
205.		USCG	S	2.22	4.i.	6	Change to read: "... some al-Qaida have escaped <u>remain at large</u> to plan additional terrorist attacks."	Using the term escaped gives the terrorists too much credit.	A
206.		USCG	S	2.22 - 2.23	4.i.	23 - 4	Change to read: "Terrorists can now use the <u>take full</u> advantage of technology to disperse leadership, training, and logistics not just regionally but globally. Establishing and moving cells in virtually any country is	Terrorists have been using technology for some time. This change acknowledges their ability to adapt to new	A

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							relatively easy in a world where more than 140 million people live outside of their country of origin and millions of people cross international borders every day daily.”	technology as it come on line.	
207.		USCG	M	2.22 2.27			General comment. Use the same name for al-Qaida throughout the document. On page 2.22 the term al-Qaida used. On page 2.27 the term Al-Qaeda is used.		A-SEE ABOVE
208.		USCG	S	2.23	5.a.	20- 21	Change to read: “ It is sometimes difficult for Americans <u>at times, find it difficult</u> to understand ...”	Clarity.	A
209.		USN	M	2.24	5	8	Delete para 5 in its entirety.	This sort of material – devoid of any actionable informatio – is one of the reasons that we’re reviewing a 472 page document. There are far too many debatable (potentially contentious) generalizations in this paragraph to salvage it.	A
210.		USAF	S	2.24			Add figure of Sun Tzu picture with caption: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat	Stresses the previous point on importance of knowing the reasons why the US is targeted by terrorists.	A
211.		USAF	M	2.24		12.13	Change to: The reasons US interests are a target for so many terrorist groups <u>are</u> complex. <u>The more we understand the reasons, the more and must be understood in order to effectively we can</u> combat terrorism in the long term. <u>To understand the reasons, we need to better understand our enemies, think like they think and see the world as they see it.</u>	Arguably, we have typically tried to understand the reasons from our own perspective, rather than “get inside their minds” and see it from their perspective. As a result, we have probably not done a good job of understanding their reasons, motives, etc.	A
212.		USN	M	2.24	5	8	Delete para 5 in its entirety.	This sort of material – devoid of any actionable information – is one of the reasons that we’re reviewing a 472-page document. There are far too many debatable (potentially contentious) generalizations in this paragraph to salvage it.	A
213.		USN	M	2.25 to 2.26		24 to 10	Change as follows: Terrorism is a major consideration across the range of military operations. It attracts a great deal of attention	To better align this with evolving JP 3-0 language.	A

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>and few question its actual and potential capacity to kill and destroy. The threat of terrorism in all operations is only one of many FP issues the commander must consider. The same types of acts that gain attention in peacetime military operations can hinder military operations in war (e.g., espionage, sabotage, vandalism, or theft).</p> <p>f. In peacetime military operations, there is no definitive method of differentiating terrorist acts from other violent crimes because the perpetrator's intent may be the only discriminator. A rule of thumb that can be applied is if the act is obviously related to personal gain (robbery of money or high value items) or personal motivation (hatred, love, revenge) it is a crime, but probably not terrorist related. On the other hand, if the act appears to adversely affect military operations (communications facilities, fuel storage areas) or has a high symbolic value (headquarters, particular individuals), the crime probably has terrorist implications even when no claim is forthcoming.</p> <p>In joint military operations short of war, rRecognizing the difference between acts of violence and terrorist acts is vital in order to properly understand the threat's intent and determine required <u>force protection and defensive measures.</u></p>	<p>Simplifies and focuses discussion</p> <p>Helps the reader understand that there is a difference between force protection and defensive operations/actions.</p>	
214.	USAF	M	2.25		26.27	Delete: The threat of terrorism in all operations is only one of many FP issues the commander must consider.	The sentence undermines the importance of the antiterrorism TTP document. Terrorism is the number one FP concern at this time (e.g., Global War on Terrorism, creation of NORTHCOM and other orgs to counter terrorists, etc).	R- FP includes other vital functions such as IO, health, safety, etc
215.	USN	M	2.25 to 2.26		24 to 10	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>Terrorism is a major factor across the range of military operations. It attracts a great deal of attention and few question its actual and potential capacity to kill and destroy. The threat of terrorism in all operations is only one of many FP issues the commander must consider. The same types of acts that gain attention in peacetime military operations can hinder military operations in war (e.g., espionage, sabotage, vandalism, or theft).</p>	<p>To better align this with evolving JP 3-0 language.</p> <p>Simplifies and focuses discussion</p> <p>Helps the reader understand that there is a difference between force protection and</p>	A

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						<p>f. In peacetime military operations, there is no definitive method of differentiating terrorist acts from other violent crimes because the perpetrator's intent may be the only discriminator. A rule of thumb that can be applied is if the act is obviously related to personal gain (robbery of money or high value items) or personal motivation (hatred, love, revenge) it is a crime, but probably not terrorist-related. On the other hand, if the act appears to adversely affect military operations (communications facilities, fuel storage areas) or has a high symbolic value (headquarters, particular individuals), the crime probably has terrorist implications even when no claim is forthcoming.</p> <p>In joint military operations short of war, recognizing the difference between acts of violence and terrorist acts is vital in order to properly understand the threat's intent and determine required <u>force protection and defensive measures.</u></p>	defensive operations/actions.	
216.	USJFCO M	S	2.26	f	1.10	<p>Delete: "f. In peacetime military operations, there is no definitive method of differentiating terrorist acts from other violent crimes because the perpetrator's intent may be the only discriminator. A rule of thumb that can be applied is if the act is obviously related to personal gain (robbery of money or high value items) or personal motivation (hatred, love, revenge) it is a crime, but probably not terrorist-related. On the other hand, if the act appears to adversely affect military operations (communications facilities, fuel storage areas) or has a high symbolic value (headquarters, particular individuals), the crime probably has terrorist implications even when no claim is forthcoming. Recognizing the difference between acts of violence and terrorist acts is vital in order to properly understand the threat's intent and determine required defensive measures."</p>	If the principles and guidelines suggested by this paragraph were used by intelligence analysts, they would lose their MOS. This narrative is editorial in nature and not linked to any doctrinal technique or procedure. Lastly, an aggressor's motivation or intent for conducting an attack is not the basis for "defensive measures". Defensive measures are based on threat capability and our susceptibility to that tactic.	A
217.	USN	M	2.27 to 2.31	6		<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>a. On September 11, 2001, our Nation learned a terrible lesson. American soil is not immune to foreign terrorists capable of mass murder and terror. The worst of these terrorists – and target number one in our war on terrorism – is the terrorist network Al-Qaeda. Yet the threat to America is not limited to Al-Qaeda nor to suicide hijackings of commercial aircraft. The threat is</p>	<p>The material should be salient and focused on presenting relevant TTP.</p> <p>The rewrite simplifies the text, , removes gratuitous verbiage thus reducing its volume , and better focuses the reader on</p>	A

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>much broader, as we learned on October 4, 2001, when we discovered that a life-threatening biological agent—anthrax—was being distributed through the U.S. mail.</p> <p>b. Unless we act to prevent it, a new wave of terrorism, potentially involving the world's most destructive weapons, looms in America's future. Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon. Securing the American homeland is a challenge of monumental scale and complexity. The 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the attacks of 9/11 highlights the threat of domestic terrorist acts within the US designed to achieve mass casualties. Domestic terrorist groups (such as the National Alliance, the Aryan Nation, and the extremist Puerto Rican separatist group Los Macheteros), trans-national terrorist groups, and special interest extremist groups continue to pose a threat to the peace and stability of our country.</p> <p>c. The terrorist threat to America takes many forms, has many places to hide, and is often invisible. Our enemies seek to remain invisible, lurking in the shadows. And while Al-Qaeda remains America's most immediate and serious threat, other international terrorist organizations, as well as domestic terrorist groups, possess the will and capability to attack the United States.</p> <p>d. One fact dominates all domestic terrorist threat assessments: terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and in our preparations. They can balance the difficulty in successfully executing a particular attack against the magnitude of loss it might cause. They can monitor our media and listen to our policymakers as our Nation discusses how to protect itself - and adjust their plans accordingly. Where we insulate ourselves from one form of attack, they can shift and focus on another exposed vulnerability. We must defend ourselves against a wide range of means and methods of attack. Our enemies are working to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons for the purpose of wreaking unprecedented damage on America. Terrorists continue to employ conventional means of attack, while at the same time gaining expertise in less traditional means,</p>	what is important.	

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						<p>such as attacks on computer, banking, and utility systems. <u>Other terrorists are working to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons for the purpose of wreaking unprecedented damage on America.</u> Our society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets that can be attacked through a variety of methods.</p> <p>e. The American people and way of life are primary targets of terrorists. Our population and way of life, while the source of our Nation's strength, is also a source of inherent vulnerability. Our population is large, diverse, and highly mobile, allowing terrorists to hide within our midst. Americans congregate at schools, sporting arenas, malls, concert halls, office buildings, high-rise residences, and places of worship, presenting targets with the potential for many casualties. Much of America lives in densely populated urban areas, making our major cities conspicuous targets. Americans subsist on the produce of farms in rural areas nationwide, making our heartland a potential target for agroterrorism.</p> <p>fc. <u>Terrorist organizations groups have time on their side. They can infiltrate organizations,</u> groups, or geographic areas to wait, watch, and identify weaknesses and opportunities while it is much more difficult for us to do the same. This trait is made even more relevant by our reliance on habitual processes such as repetitiveness in training and in our daily lives.</p> <p>gd. The US military organizes, trains, and equips forces primarily to conduct combat operations. Inherent within the combat capabilities of the Services the military rapidly responds to domestic emergencies or disasters and provides support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, authorized law enforcement, and other activities.</p> <p>h. The Department of Defense cooperates with and provides support to civil <u>authorities</u> Military commanders are responsible to ensure that DOD resources are used <u>as directed by</u> and consistent with laws, Presidential directives, executive orders, and DOD policies and directives. <u>judiciously by adhering to the following principles:</u></p> <p>(1) Except in the case of immediate response (see chapter 1) when local commanders can respond to save</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate gross property damage, DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, State, and Federal civil authorities and when they are requested by a lead federal agency (LFA):</p> <p>(2) DOD specialized capabilities (e.g., airlift and reconnaissance) are used efficiently.</p> <p>(3) The Secretary of Defense retains command of military forces providing civil support.</p> <p>(4) DOD components do not perform any function of civil government unless authorized.</p> <p>(5) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, or where provided for by law, military operations will have priority over civil support missions. (See JP 3-26, <i>Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security</i> for detailed guidance to the Armed Forces in the conduct of homeland security operations in joint, multinational, and interagency environments in the conduct of homeland security operations and JP 3-07.7, <i>Doctrine for Civil Support</i>, for guidance on military support to civil authorities.)</p>		
218.	USAF	S	2.27		5	Change to: 6. Domestic Terrorism <u>Against the Homeland</u>	Current title may lead readers to conclude the section discusses domestic terrorist organizations.	A
219.	USAF	S	2.27		7	Add: <u>Terrorists have attacked on American soil since we became a Nation. Historically, though, the attacks were primarily committed by Americans, done infrequently, and on a generally small scale. Since the early 1990s, the scale of the attacks has increased, as has the presence of foreign terrorists (e.g., World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995 [conducted by Americans], and the attacks of September 11, 2001).</u>	Demonstrates our understanding terrorism in the homeland is not new, rather that the stakes are now higher and the foreign threat is on the rise. The KKK, Symbionese Liberation Front and other morons have committed terrorist attacks in the homeland.	A
220.	USAF	M	2.27		7	Delete: On September 11, 2001, our Nation learned a terrible lesson. American soil is not immune to foreign terrorists capable of mass murder and terror.	In 1993, the World Trade Center was attacked for its first time by foreign terrorists. Six were killed and 1,000 injured.	A
221.	USCG	A	2.27	6.b.	15	Change to read: "b. Unless we act to prevent # terrorism , a new wave of terrorism , potentially	Clarifies the subject of the sentence.	A
222.	EUCOM	S	2.28	4	14	Change: "One fact dominates all domestic terrorist	Proposed change is more	R- USE

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		EPOC-AT					<p>threat assessments: terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and in our preparations."</p> <p>To Read: "Terrorists are often strategic actors. They frequently choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and in our preparations."</p>	accurate.	BELOW
223.		USAF	S	2.28	d	14	<p>"One issue dominates all domestic terrorism threat assessments: terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses. . . ."</p>	<p>The "fact" referred to is characteristic of all terrorists, not just "domestic terrorists." Also, the view that they are "strategic actors" is not really a "fact". In any event, the concept is vague and too simplistic.</p> <p>Be consistent – DODI 2000.16 uses the term Terrorism Threat Assessment, Terrorism Threat Level, etc.</p>	A
224.		USCG	A	2.28	6.d.	14-16	<p>Change to read: "d. One fact dominates all domestic terrorist threat assessments: terrorists are act strategically actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and in our preparations. They can <u>balance carefully weigh</u> the difficulty in successfully executing..."</p>	Clarity.	R- see above. Their target selection based on weaknesses is not a 'strategic' issue
225.		USAF	S	2.30		10	.. or mitigate gross <u>great</u> .."	Match wording in the relevant DOD Directive	A
226.		USAF	S	2.31	5	2	Change to read: ". . . . military operations will have priority over civil support <u>MACA</u> missions."	Per JP 3-26 the mission area is CS the mission is MACA (MSCA, MSCLEA, or MACDIS)	A
227.									
228.		J34	S	2.34			Add a section on expeditionary Terrorist TTP (NGIC section)_	Applicable unique information	A
229.		J-8 /	S	3.0	Gene		Recommend detailing interagency intel sources and	TTIC, National Joint Terrorist	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		JTAMDO Morman, Jeffrey L, CAPT, (703) 602- 1103 USAF			ral		DoD connectivity to same	Task Force; FBI's SIOC and JTF operations; and DHS Ops Center activities contribute to CT	
230.		J34	S	3.00			<p>Add Countersurveillance section. Compose section fm this message: 1. THIS IS A COORDINATED OSD AND JOINT STAFF MESSAGE. THE INTENT IS TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERT TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE DETECTION EFFORTS BY MILITARY POLICE FORCES TO DETER TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES.</p> <p>2. THE RECENT INCREASE IN REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS INDIVIDUALS CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SITES IN THE UNITED STATES AND OVERSEAS INDICATES POSSIBLE PRE-OPERATIONAL TARGETING BY TERRORISTS AND MERITS ATTENTION BY COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS. THE PERSISTENT STREAM OF REPORTS NECESSITATES COMMANDERS AND SECURITY PLANNERS TO UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE, KNOW WHAT TERRORISTS LOOK FOR, AND KNOW HOW THEY CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. WITH THIS BASIC KNOWLEDGE, COMMANDERS CAN THEN IMPLEMENT PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES, COMPLY WITH DOD STANDARDIZED REPORTING PROCEDURES, AND IN THE END DETER, DETECT, DISRUPT, AND DEFEND AGAINST FUTURE ATTACKS.</p> <p>3. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. TERRORISTS CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE TO DETERMINE A TARGET'S SUITABILITY FOR ATTACK BY ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING SECURITY SYSTEMS</p>	Make CS section fm message attached in previous column.	

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>AND DISCERNING WEAKNESSES FOR POTENTIAL EXPLOITATION. TERRORISTS CLOSELY EXAMINE SECURITY PROCEDURES, SUCH AS SHIFT CHANGES, ACCESS CONTROL, AND ROVING</p> <p>PAGE 10 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS PATROLS; CITIZENSHIP OF SECURITY GUARDS; MODELS AND TYPES OF LOCKS; PRESENCE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT CAMERAS; AND GUARD DOGS. AFTER IDENTIFYING WEAKNESSES, TERRORISTS PLAN THEIR ATTACK OPTIONS AT THE POINT OR POINTS OF GREATEST VULNERABILITY.</p> <p>4. TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES. THE BASIC METHODS OF SURVEILLANCE ARE "MOBILE" AND "FIXED" (OR STATIC).</p> <p>A. MOBILE SURVEILLANCE ENTAILS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY THE TERRORISTS OR OPERATIVES CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE, USUALLY FOLLOWING AS THE TARGET MOVES. TERRORISTS CONDUCT MOBILE SURVEILLANCE ON FOOT, IN A VEHICLE, OR BY COMBINING THE TWO. MOBILE SURVEILLANCE USUALLY PROGRESSES IN PHASES FROM A STAKEOUT, TO A PICK UP AND THEN THROUGH A FOLLOW PHASE UNTIL THE TARGET STOPS. AT THIS POINT OPERATIVES ARE POSITIONED TO COVER LOGICAL ROUTES TO ENABLE THE SURVEILLANCE TO CONTINUE WHEN THE TARGET MOVES AGAIN.</p> <p>B. TERRORISTS CONDUCT FIXED OR STATIC SURVEILLANCE FROM ONE LOCATION TO OBSERVE A TARGET, WHETHER A PERSON, BUILDING, FACILITY, OR INSTALLATION. FIXED SURVEILLANCE OFTEN REQUIRES THE USE OF AN OBSERVATION POINT TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT, DISCREET OBSERVATION OF A</p>		

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						<p>SPECIFIC LOCATION. TERRORISTS ESTABLISH OBSERVATION POSTS IN HOUSES, APARTMENTS, OFFICES, STORES, OR ON THE STREET. A MOBILE SURVEILLANCE</p> <p>PAGE 11 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS UNIT, SUCH AS A PARKED CAR OR VAN, CAN ALSO SERVE AS AN OBSERVATION POST. TERRORISTS OFTEN PARK OUTSIDE A BUILDING, FACILITY, OR INSTALLATION TO OBSERVE ROUTINES OF SECURITY AND PERSONNEL COMING AND GOING. TERRORISTS ALSO USE VARIOUS MODES OF TRANSPORTATION TO INCLUDE BUSES, TRAINS OR BOATS OR MOVE BY FOOT TO APPROACH AND OBSERVE INSTALLATIONS.</p> <p>5. PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES. THE INCORPORATION OF VISIBLE SECURITY CAMERAS, MOTION SENSORS, WORKING DOG TEAMS, RANDOM ROVING SECURITY PATROLS (VARYING SIZE, TIMING, AND ROUTES), IRREGULAR GUARD CHANGES, AND ACTIVE SEARCHES (INCLUDING X-RAY MACHINES AND EXPLOSIVE DETECTION DEVICES) OF VEHICLES AND PERSONS AT ENTRY POINTS WILL IMPROVE A FACILITIES' SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND PRESENT A ROBUST FORCE PROTECTION POSTURE THAT DRAMATICALLY INHIBITS TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS. THE EMPLACEMENT OF BARRIERS, ROADBLOCKS, AND ENTRY MAZES THAT ARE COVERED BY ALERT SECURITY FORCES WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETERRENCE AS THESE MEASURES INCREASE STANDOFF AND IMPROVE SECURITY FORCE REACTION TIME IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNANNOUNCED RANDOM SECURITY MEASURES SUCH AS 100%</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>IDENTIFICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL ENTERING THE FACILITY / INSTALLATION, CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS AND SEARCHES OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES, AND</p> <p>PAGE 12 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS VISIBLE DISPLAYS OF VEHICLES MOUNTED WITH CREW SERVED WEAPONS WILL INCREASE UNCERTAINTY AND THUS THE RISK OF FAILURE IN THE MINDS OF TERRORISTS.</p> <p>6. SURVEILLANCE DETECTION. BECAUSE TERRORISTS MUST CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE--OFTEN OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS, MONTHS, OR YEARS--DETECTION OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IS POSSIBLE. REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF EXPERTISE, TERRORISTS INVARIABLY COMMIT MISTAKES. KNOWING WHAT TO LOOK FOR AND TO BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH THE ORDINARY FROM THE EXTRAORDINARY ARE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL SURVEILLANCE DETECTION. FOR THESE REASONS, OVERT SURVEILLANCE DETECTION IN ITS MOST BASIC FORM IS SIMPLY WATCHING FOR PERSONS OBSERVING PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND INSTALLATIONS.</p> <p>A. THE OBJECTIVES OF OVERT SURVEILLANCE DETECTION MEASURES ARE TO RECORD THE ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS BEHAVING IN A SUSPICIOUS MANNER AND TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION IN A FORMAT USEABLE BY THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT OVERT SURVEILLANCE DETECTION EMPHASIZES THE AVOIDANCE OF INTERPERSONAL CONFRONTATIONS WITH SUSPICIOUS INDIVIDUALS UNLESS EXIGENT SITUATIONS NECESSITATE OTHERWISE.</p>		

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						<p>DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR TRENDS, COMMANDERS AND SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT</p> <p>PAGE 13 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS OFFICIALS IN COORDINATION WITH INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS THROUGH INSTALLATION THREAT WORKING GROUPS MAY DETERMINE THE NEED FOR MORE SPECIALIZED COVERT COUNTERSURVEILLANCE MEASURES TO ASSURE INSTALLATION PROTECTION.</p> <p>B. FOR SURVEILLANCE DETECTION EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS, MILITARY POLICE/SECURITY FORCES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT INCIDENTS OF SURVEILLANCE AND SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES BY PROVIDING DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PEOPLE, THE TIMES OF DAY, THE LOCATIONS, THE VEHICLES INVOLVED, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SIGHTINGS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS FOR INCORPORATION INTO REPORTS SUCH AS AIR FORCE TALON OR THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT REPORT. THE INCIDENT REPORTS ARE IMPORTANT PIECES OF INFORMATION THAT OVER TIME COMBINED WITH OTHER SIMILAR SIGHTINGS ALLOW INVESTIGATORS TO ASSESS THE LEVEL OF THREAT AGAINST A SPECIFIC FACILITY, INSTALLATION, OR GEOGRAPHIC REGION.</p> <p>C. THE EMPHASIS OF SURVEILLANCE DETECTION IS ON INDICATORS AND WARNINGS OF TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES. SURVEILLANCE DETECTION EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON RECORDING, THEN REPORTING INCIDENTS</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>SIMILAR TO THE FOLLOWING:</p> <p>PAGE 14 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS</p> <p>(1) MULTIPLE SIGHTINGS OF THE SAME SUSPICIOUS PERSON, VEHICLE, OR ACTIVITY, SEPARATED BY TIME, DISTANCE, OR DIRECTION.</p> <p>(2) POSSIBLE LOCATIONS FOR OBSERVATION POST USE.</p> <p>(3) INDIVIDUALS WHO STAY AT BUS / TRAIN STOPS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS WHILE BUSES / TRAINS COME AND GO.</p> <p>(4) INDIVIDUALS WHO CARRY ON LONG CONVERSATIONS ON PAY OR CELLULAR TELEPHONES.</p> <p>(5) INDIVIDUALS WHO ORDER FOOD AT A RESTAURANT AND LEAVE BEFORE THE FOOD ARRIVES OR WHO ORDER WITHOUT EATING.</p> <p>(6) JOGGERS WHO STAND AND STRETCH FOR AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME.</p> <p>(7) INDIVIDUALS SITTING IN A PARKED CAR FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.</p> <p>(8) INDIVIDUALS WHO DON'T FIT INTO THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT BY WEARING IMPROPER ATTIRE FOR THE LOCATION (OR SEASON).</p> <p>(9) INDIVIDUALS DRAWING PICTURES / TAKING NOTES IN AN AREA NOT NORMALLY OF INTEREST TO A STANDARD TOURIST OR SHOWING INTEREST IN OR PHOTOGRAPHING SECURITY CAMERAS, GUARD LOCATIONS, OR NOTICEABLY WATCHING SECURITY REACTION DRILLS AND PROCEDURES.</p> <p>(10) INDIVIDUALS WHO EXHIBIT UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR SUCH AS STARING OR QUICKLY LOOKING AWAY FROM INDIVIDUALS OR VEHICLES AS THEY ENTER OR</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>PAGE 15 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS LEAVE DESIGNATED FACILITIES OR PARKING AREAS.</p> <p>(11) TERRORISTS MAY ALSO EMPLOY AGGRESSIVE SURVEILLANCE BY FALSE PHONE THREATS, APPROACHING SECURITY CHECKPOINTS TO ASK FOR DIRECTIONS, OR "INNOCENTLY" ATTEMPTING TO SMUGGLE NON-LETHAL CONTRABAND THROUGH CHECKPOINTS. CLEARLY THE TERRORISTS INTEND TO DETERMINE FIRSTHAND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SEARCH PROCEDURES AND TO GAUGE THE ALERTNESS AND REACTION OF SECURITY PERSONNEL.</p> <p>D. IT IS IMPORTANT TO HIGHLIGHT THAT THE ABOVE SURVEILLANCE INDICATORS ARE RECORDED OVERTLY AND WHILE PERFORMING NORMAL MILITARY POLICE/SECURITY FORCES ACTIVITIES. THE INTENT IS TO RAISE THE AWARENESS OF OUR MILITARY POLICE/SECURITY FORCES TO RECORD AND REPORT THE UNUSUAL DURING THE COURSE OF ROUTINE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY DUTIES.</p> <p>7. REPORTING TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE INDICATORS. IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES AND EMPLOYING OVERT SURVEILLANCE DETECTION PRINCIPLES WILL DETER TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE. HOWEVER, REGARDLESS OF THE CAPABILITIES OF A FACILITY OR INSTALLATION TO RESOURCE ANTITERRORISM PROTECTIVE MEASURES, GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ARE ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISHING COHESIVE, TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE</p>		

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>PAGE 16 RUEKJCS8601 UNCLAS RESPONSES TO THE INDICATORS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY. INSTALLATION COMMANDERS AND SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD COORDINATE AND ESTABLISH PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (I.E. INSTALLATION THREAT WORKING GROUPS) TO DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING RELATIONSHIPS TO IMPROVE SECURITY FOR THE INSTALLATION AND THE MILITARY COMMUNITY AT LARGE. FOR THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN THE INDICATORS OF TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE CONTINUE DESPITE WELL EXECUTED OVERT SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES THE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO PROVIDE DETAILED REPORTS OF THE INDICATORS OF SURVEILLANCE TO THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. AS REPORTS OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCREASE AND THE TRENDS CLEARLY INDICATE PRE-OPERATIONAL TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE, IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR COMMANDERS IN COORDINATION WITH SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS TO IMPLEMENT MORE SOPHISTICATED, UNIQUELY TAILORED COUNTERSURVEILLANCE SOLUTIONS AND ASSETS TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. SPECIALIZED COUNTERSURVEILLANCE ASSETS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AND VETTED BY FORWARDING REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND VIA PRE-DETERMINED SERVICE OR COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST PROCEDURES.</p>		
231.		USN	A	3.01		28.30	Delete: This chapter provides the reader with the elements of	Removes unnecessary text	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							the intelligence cycle that have particular importance in a viable AT program.		
232.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	S	3.01	1.	23	Change: " Intelligence and counterintelligence are the first line of defense in an AT program." To Read: " Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical in the development of an AT program."	DOD has correctly moved from "threat-based" AT programs to "vulnerability-based" AT programs in recent years. Given the limitations of intelligence regarding specific warnings the first line of defense is to address vulnerabilities.	A
233.		USAF	S	3.01			Separate Intelligence and analysis into one chapter and counter-intelligence into another chapter.	Intelligence and counter-intelligence are two distinct functional areas and have their own goals, methods, and products. Lumping them into one category implies that they are the same. Some services separate these two areas out into two distinct career tracks because of this reason (e.g. USAF with OSI and the intelligence AFSCs as separate). Additionally, there are Intelligence Oversight concerns in implying that intelligence personnel accomplish counter-intelligence.	A
234.		USAF	A	3.01	Intro	4.17	Recommend a more current quote – maybe something like below from the National Commission Testimony: <u>We made mistakes. Our failure to watchlist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in a timely manner—or the FBI’s inability to find them in the narrow window of time afforded them—showed systemic weaknesses and the lack of redundancy.</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>There were at least four separate terrorist identity databases at State, CIA, Department of Defense, and FBI. None were interoperable or broadly accessible.</u> <u>There were dozens of watchlists, many</u> 	Need a more current quote.	A

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p><u>haphazardly maintained.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>There were legal impediments to cooperation across the continuum of criminal and intelligence operations. It was not a secret, we all understood it, but little action was taken by anyone to create a common arena of criminal and intelligence data that we all could access.</u> <p><u>But most profoundly we lacked a government wide capability to integrate foreign and domestic knowledge, data, operations, and analysis.</u> <u>Warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>We all understood Bin Ladin's intent to strike the homeland but were unable to translate this knowledge into an effective defense of the country.</u> <u>Doing so would have complicated the terrorists' calculation of the difficulty in succeeding in a vast open society that was, in effect, unprotected on September 11.</u> <p><u>During periods of heightened threat, we undertook smart, disciplined actions, but ultimately all of us must acknowledge that we did not have the data, the span of control, the redundancy, the fusion, or the laws in place to give us the chance to compensate for the mistakes that will be made in any human endeavor. This is not a clinical excuse—3,000 people died. In the end, one thing is clear. No matter how hard we worked -- or how desperately we tried -- it was not enough. The victims and the families of 9/11 deserve better.</u></p> <p><u>Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 14, 2004.</u></p>		
235.	USAF	S	3.01	1a	24.27	Change to read: "A <u>Strategic</u> , well-planned, <u>proactive</u> , systematic, all-source intelligence and counterintelligence programs <u>are</u> <u>is</u> essential. The role	Strategic and proactive added to represent that DoD AT Strategic Plan and Information	A

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							of intelligence and counterintelligence is to identify the threat, provide advance warning, and disseminate critical <u>information</u> /intelligence in a usable form for the commander.”	to represent the collection and dissemination of Suspicious Activity Reports per the 2 May 03, DepSecDef memo.	
236.		USJFCO M	M	3.01 - 3.15			Comment: The first 15 pages of Chapter 3 in the JTTP are a restated version of the organizational functions or responsibilities enumerated in DODD 2000.12 and information contained in Chapter 5 of DoD 2000.12H.. As such, the material does not provide additional explanation or outline the techniques or procedures available to DOD Component intelligence analysts in the development of a threat analysis or intelligence fusion. The JTTP could identify the applicable Service doctrine that sets the DOD standard for the pertinent technique or procedure (much like what has been done with the format for the AT Plan and using the OPORD format). In the case of intelligence fusion, the JTTP could steer the ATO to approved doctrinal literature on link analysis techniques and other CI doctrine found in Army FM 34-60 (Counterintelligence). The TTP that can be applied to AT already exist	.	A
237.		CSA/DTR A USAF	A	3.02	b	9	Move Figure III-1 from pg. III-3 to bottom of pg. III-2	<u>Consistency</u>	<u>A</u>
238.		USAF	A	3.02	1a	1	Change to read: “. . . .warnings upon which to recommend AT FP actions.	The commander may use the information/intelligence developed by executing a AT program with the minimum requirements for his/her broader FP responsibilities.	A
239.		USAF	S	3.02	b.	7.8	Change to read: “. . . . open-source information, criminal records, government intelligence, and local, <u>state and federal information from continual liaison and if overseas, CI FP Source Operations, see JP 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations, 7 May 2002.</u> (See Figure III-1.)	Installation AT WG, TWG, and FPWGs must be proactive in including state, local and federal Law Enforcement officials from the community surrounding the installation. We also cannot forget about hw we operate in the deployed environment with CIFSOs.	A
240.		USAF	S	3.03	F3.0		Re-do separate table for Counter-intelligence sources	Sources for intelligence and	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
					1		and Intelligence sources.	counter-intelligence are not the same and should be spelled out more clearly.	
241.		USN	S	3.03 to 3.04			GENERAL COMMENT: Shouldn't the DHS be added to the list of government sources providing open-source information (publications)	Completeness	A
242.		USAF	S	3.04		18	Add: See DOD Directive 5200.27 on proper handling of this information.	DOD personnel generally do not understand policy on acquiring or retaining information on persons not affiliated with DOD.	A
243.		J34	A	3.04		20	Typo, replace '.' With ',' after board.	grammar	A
244.		USN	S	3.05		9	Replace Navy Antiterrorism Alert Center with <u>Multiple Threat Alert Center</u>	Name change	A
245.		J-8 / JTAMDO Morman, Jeffrey L, CAPT, (703) 602-1103	A	3.05	1	2-3	FAA is part of DOT and FBI is part of DOJ	Correctness	A
246.		USN	A	3.05		10.12	Change as follows: In combatant commands, the J-2 is responsible for the integration of intelligence policy issues across the command staff.	Unnecessary Too restrictive – subordinate commands, supporting commands, support agencies, allies and coalition partners, etc.	A
247.	52	USAF	A	3.05	3	5.6	Change to read: “. . . .Federal Communications Commission, <u>Department of Homeland Security (DHS)</u> , and DOD.”	DHS is part of the Intelligence Production Group/Community Branch. Per the FAA website, “In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Sep 11, 2001, Congress created a new Transportation Security Administration that succeeded FAA as the agency with primary responsibility for civil aviation security.” www.faa.gov/aboutfaa/history_brief	A

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								TSA is part of DHS.	
248.		USAF	S	3.05		6	After "DOD." add: <u>In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center was created. This new center merges and analyzes terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture. It includes DOD representation. Lastly, the FBI has a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) which includes nearly 30 agencies, spanning the fields of intelligence, public safety, and federal, state, and local law enforcement. The National JTTF collects terrorism information and intelligence and funnels it to the 66 local and state JTTFs. The DOD is represented at the national level and many of the state and local JTTF's have Service representation from nearby military installations.</u>	Increase awareness within DOD of two additional sources of government intelligence specifically dedicated to analyzing and disseminating terrorist-related threat information.	A
249.	54	USAF	A	3.06	Al-Qaid a Quot e		Take a new Quote from the latest version of the US DOS Patterns of Global Terrorism, April 2004	Use quote from most recent publication – update references in back of publication with the latest version of the Patterns of Global Terrorism.	A
250.	53	USAF	A	3.06	1	3.4	Change to read: (1) General. The FBI is responsible for collecting and processing domestic terrorist information to <u>protect the United States from terrorist attack.</u>	FBI's Number 1 Priority per IAW: http://www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm	A
251.		USAF EUCOM	S	3.06 3.07		37 22	General Comment. This description of "Al-Qaida" needs to be moved to Chapter II since it is not related to the subjects being discussed here.	Self-explanatory. More appropriate to Chapter II if retained.	A
252.		USN	S	3.07		14.16	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend discussion be expanded to discuss content, accessibility, etc. Enough to allow the user to determine of what benefit it may prove to be and to distinguish it from the NCIC database maintained, albeit with restricted access, maintained by the FBI.	Additional information Usefulness	A
253.		USN	S	3.07		26.31	Change as follows: (a)The combatant commander, through the commander's J-2, Joint Intelligence Center, and the CISO, and in consultation with DIA, CIA, embassy staff , US country team, and applicable host-nation authorities, obtains intelligence and counterintelligence specific to	Accuracy Remove redundancy/confusion	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							the operational area and issues intelligence and counterintelligence reports, advisories, and assessments to the units within the combatant command's control or operating within the combatant command's AOR. This network is the backbone for communicating intelligence and counterintelligence information, advisories, and warning of terrorist threats throughout the region.	Too limiting	
254.	55	USAF TRANCO M	A	3.09	1	10	Change to read: ".the <u>DIA</u> Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CbT), serving as the." Cnage all to JITF-CT throughout document	Add DIA to illustrate that JITF-CT is part of DIA, also 2000.12 uses JITF-CT, not JITF-CbT.	A
255.	56	USAF J8	A	3.09	4	21.22	Change to read: "Conduct specific risk assessments in support of the <u>Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection</u> Program.	The current title of DODD 3020 is Defense Critical Infrastructure.	A
256.		USJFCO M	S	3.09		14	Comment: Recommend more specificity on the domestic law enforcement database – content, accessibility, etc. The FBI already maintains the NCIC database, which is somewhat restricted in accessibility. There are privacy issues as regards criminal records, which should be addressed. There is also an FBI initiative called the Virtual Case File, which may be useful in this regard.		A
257.	57	USAF	A	3.10	10	18.19	Change to read: "Provide a member to the DOD ATCC and subcommittees as required. pursuant to enclosure 3 of this Directive.	Delete portion that was taken from 2000.12 that does not make sense in context.	A
258.		USN	S	3.16		F3.0 2	Add a note to the Figure to state that the list of information requirements is not all inclusive – or words to that effect.	We don't want to mislead the reader and have him believe this is a complete list for each and every situation.	A
259.		USJFCO M	M	3.16		F3.0 2	Comment: Figure III-2. Information Requirements is using elements of information that are not IAW the DIA data elements required for a proper defining or rating of the threat factors and threat levels. We need to resolve any potential differences between the information in figure III-2 and the DIA methodology elaborated in DOD 2000.12H, Chapter 5, paragraph C5.4.4.		A
260.		USN	S	3.17		16.19	Change as follows: This process is operative across the range of military operations, promotes coordination between all levels of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law	Doesn't belong in a JP. Save for a programs or requirements document.	A

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							enforcement communities, broadens acquisition channels, and enhances timely distribution of information to the supported commander.		
261.	58	USAF USN	S	3.17	2a	3.15	<p>Change to read: Terrorist threat analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information in order to identify terrorist targeting of US interests. A vulnerability analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining information on the security posture of a facility. The threat analysis is then paired with the facility's vulnerability analysis to create the threat and vulnerability assessment. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack. To enhance this capability to collect and analyze information from many sources, DIA maintains a terrorism data base on the Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System and the combatant command's J-2; the CISO, in consultation with DIA, focuses this data base information and regional information toward the intelligence and counterintelligence needs specific to the security of the command. Country threat assessments and information about terrorist organizations, biographies, and incidents in the data base are disseminated to the commands and Services.</p> <p><u>Terrorism threat analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups that could target the DOD Components or the DOD Elements and Personnel. A threat analysis shall review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a terrorism threat assessment. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation to determine the vulnerability to a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility or other site. The threat assessment, and vulnerability assessment are then utilized with the criticality assessment to</u></p>	Brings process in line with definitions in DODI 2000.16 (DRAFT) and utilizes one consistent term for database. Make database consistent term throughout publication.	A

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							provide the commander with the basis for their risk management decisions. The commander must <u>determine which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures are required to minimize risk of attack or lessen the severity of the outcome of an attack. To enhance this capability, which requires the collection and analysis of information from, many sources DIA maintains a terrorism database on the Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data system. The combatant command's J-2, the CISOs, in consultation with DIA, focuses this database information and regional information toward the intelligence and counterintelligence needs specific to the security of the command. Country threat assessments and information about terrorist organizations, biographies, and incidents in the database are disseminated to the commands and services.</u>		
262.		USAF	M	3.18		4	After "organizations focus on conventional forces." add: <u>It is worth noting that the terrorist attacks against the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard in 1995, Khobar Towers in 1996 and the USS Cole in 1998 all occurred when those areas were in THREATCON Bravo. In fact, the THREATCON was lowered from Charlie to Bravo approximately 45 days prior to the attack against Khobar Towers.</u>	Provides historic examples which support the need for reorientation of intel & CI collection and operations.	A
263.		USCG	S	3.20	2.b.	14-15	Change to read: "... by conducting the <u>vulnerability (Appendix B) and criticality (Appendix C) and vulnerability (Appendix B)</u> assessments.	Style. Refer to appendices in the order they appear in the pub.	A
264.		J34	S	3.20			Add discussion of Joint Threat Assessment, which will be added as an appendix. Similarly, add a section on Ops intel fusion and intelligence collection (collection planning). A good refrence for this is the JAT guide. The intent is to have the commander, ATO, intel officer, and security officer see the fusion of their efforts in a central document. Do not use the entire JAT collection, but pick the PIR that represents the surveillance issues/suspicious issues at gate/on base, etc. The SOR/SIR can also state that the observer should photograph incident and forward picture to supervisor... supports issuing digital cameras and/or disposable cameras to ECPs, patrol, etc.		

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265.		USN USAF JFCOM	S	3.23		12.17	Change as follows: Multi-echelon wargaming of possible terrorist attacks is the best test, short of an actual incident, to analyze the ability of an installation, base, ship, unit, <u>airfield</u> , or port to respond. Drills and exercises test suspected vulnerabilities and AT measures. These exercises and drills also train the staff as well as reaction force leadership and help maintain a valid threat assessment by identifying and adjusting to changing threat capabilities as well as installation, base, ship, unit, or port <u>known</u> vulnerabilities.	Completeness Removes redundancy	A
266.		USJFCO M	M	4.00			General Comment: This chapter is essentially devoid of AT tactics and procedures. There are two primary legal issues that concern every member of DOD at the level of execution; Rules of Engagement and Use of Force. These topics were not covered in the JTTP yet Commanders are incorporating this training in pre-deployment exercises and similar training events. Recommend including discussion on ROE/RUF		A
267.		USN USAF J8 JRO CBRND	A S	4.01		4.08	Replace this quote with one more recent. If the new NMS isn't out by the time we need to go to signature look to the NSS or the National Security for Homeland Security. <i>"US forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security partners, using all means authorized by the President and the Congress to counter international terrorism at home and abroad."</i> National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997 Use "To defeat terrorists we will support national and partner nation efforts to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist organizations. We will work to deny terrorists safe havens in failed states and ungoverned regions. Working with other nations' military and other governmental agencies, the Armed Forces help to establish favorable security conditions and increase the capabilities of partners. The relationships developed in these interactions contribute to a global antiterrorism environment that further reduces threats to the United States, its allies, and its interests.	Update to make more relevant The proposed replacement quote is from the NMS 2004	A

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268.		NC/J34	A	4.02	3	11	When discussing United States Northern Command area of responsibility recommend adding (excluding Greenland) after Canada.	Adds clarity.	A
269.		USN USAF	M	4.06		17.18	Change as follows: However, Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which requires that noncombatants be treated in a humane manner, also applies to captured terrorists. <u>However, detained terrorist will be treated humanely, as outlined in appropriate regulations, and consistent with the Geneva Conventions.</u>	The Geneva Conventions only apply between nation states that are parties to the Conventions. Terrorist groups are not nation states, are not parties to the Conventions and are therefore not entitled to any of the protections afforded by the Conventions. Thus, the Geneva Conventions do not “apply” to captured terrorist. * NOTE – Need to keep this material aligned with the new JP on detainee ops scheduled to begin development.	A
270.		USAF/ J34 JFCOM	M	4.06	1b	22.24	Change to read: b. Jurisdiction. <u>Most terrorist acts may be prosecuted as criminal acts violating local criminal, state, federal, or international laws. In an internationally recognized war or hostilities short of war (regional or global), terrorists can also be tried under military jurisdiction by either a court-martial, if applicable, or military commission.</u>	The criminality of terrorist acts is not limited to federal crimes, but may include violations of local, state, federal, and international law.	A
271.		USJFCO M USAF	M	4.06		9.11	Delete 1st sentence and insert the following: “Terrorist acts committed in the U.S. or committed outside the U.S. against U.S. persons or property are federal crimes whether committed during peacetime or in military operations.”	Correctness. All terrorist acts are crimes. U.S. federal jurisdiction only attaches to those crimes committed in U.S. or against U.S. interests.	A
272.		USJFCO M	S	4.06 4.07		22.24 1.3	Delete and replace existing paragraph with the following: “Terrorist acts committed in the U.S. will be subject to federal and state jurisdiction. Terrorist acts committed outside the U.S. against U.S. persons or property is a federal crime and will be subject to federal jurisdiction. In an internationally recognized war or hostilities short of war (regional or global), terrorist may be subject to military jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the local government. If subject to U.S. military jurisdiction, a terrorist may be tried by courts-martial or military	Correctness. Statement that terrorist act is a federal crime does not establish jurisdiction. In the U.S. jurisdiction may be state and federal. Outside the U.S., federal jurisdiction only if against U.S. persons or property. Outside U.S., military jurisdiction may co-exist with local government	A

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							commission, subject to the rules established by the President.”	jurisdiction.	
273.		USN / J34	S	4.07		18.21	GENERAL COMMENT: The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the Navy and Marine Corps as a matter of law. However, DODD and SECNAVINST apply similar restrictions pursuant to 10 USC 375. This should be clarified within this text.	Clarity Completeness Understanding	A- insert “The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the Navy and Marine Corps as a matter of law. However, DODD and SECNAVINST apply similar restrictions pursuant to 10 USC 375. “Similarly, the USCG retains law enforcement authority in accordance with 14USC 89 and its assignment to the Dept of Homeland Security. “ after

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									1385).
274.		USAF	S	4.07	c.	7	Change to read: "Commander's Authority. A commander's <u>responsibility and authority</u> accountability to enforce security measures and to protect persons and property is paramount during any level of conflict.	Change ties in the comments from Chapter one where it details DOD Policy for commanders at all levels have the Responsibility and Accountability to enforce appropriate security measures. Because of this fact OSD/JS should work together with the services to develop a baseline illustration showing, which programs when executed to certain strategic goals and performance objectives, i.e., the DOD AT Program, contribute to the commanders, responsibility and authority, generally referred to by a commander's FP responsibility. If we are going to hold commanders accountable for this responsibility we should take the next step by establishing a baseline from which they can adjust based upon their mission requirements and resource available.	A
275.		USAF JFCOM	M	4.07	c	9	"Commanders must coordinate should confer with their legal advisors to determine the extent of their authority to combat terrorism."	Clarifies that the commander is solely responsible for his or her own actions.	A
276.		USAF	A	4.07	2	18.5	General Comment: Clarify paragraphs on Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. Current disorganization and apparent deletions leaves the reader confused on the limitations attached to providing immediate humanitarian assistance to the civil populace compared to providing law enforcement assistance to US civil authorities. Fails to address restrictions that might affect OCONUS military assistance to civilians by DOS, SOFA or other host nation agreements. Recommend	Presenting a capability to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act, in plan, as well as in deed, in the local community, as well as on the installation, is a valuable tactic in combating terrorism.	A

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							reinstating the deleted references, especially DODD 3025.15 as critical to the reader's understanding of limitations and responsibilities in this arena.		
277.		USJFCO M	S	4.07		7.10	Delete and replace existing paragraph with the following: "Commanders will always have the authority to exercise the right of self-defense, as described in the Standing Rules of Engagement. Commanders must be familiar with the existing rules of engagement and coordinate with their legal advisers to determine the extent of their authority to combat terrorism."	Correctness. First sentence is not helpful in defining commander's authority – "paramount" to what. In fact a commander may not have the ability to protect property of any kind and may be limited in his authority to protect persons not part of his unit. The existing ROE will define the commander's authority to take action against terrorists.	A
278.		USAF	A	4.08	2	8	Change to read: ". . . . taken by a military commander or by responsible officials of other DO Defense Agencies, <u>DOD Field Activities</u> to	Proper terms	A
279.		J-8 / JTAMDO Morman, Jeffrey L, CAPT, (703) 602- 1103	S	4.08	3	9	Jurisdiction and authority for handling terrorist incidents: believe there is a PDD that dictates that DOJ (who has delegated to the FBI) as the lead federal agency for all terrorist incidents	Clarification of designated authority regardless of where the incident (federal/state property) occurs	A
280.		USJFCO M	S	4.08		1	Change as follows: " ... federal functions and property national security. "	The President's authority/responsibility under Article II is to protect national security; that is not limited to federal functions and property but may include the protection of individuals and private or state property.	A
281.		USJFCO M	S	4.08		1.5	Delete.	The sentence is incorrect, mixes authorities and does not give a complete analysis of a complicated area. The sentence implies that the President uses his Constitutional authority to respond to a civil disturbance.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								The President uses the statutory authority provided by 10 USC 331, the Insurrection Act, to deploy troops in response to a civil disturbance. If the President was deploying forces within CONUS to counter terrorism, he would rely on Art II authority. Military Assistance to Civil Authority (response to a civil emergency) is not a Posse Comitatus issue and has separate statutory authority.	
282.		USJFCO M	S	4.08		7.13	Delete and insert definition of "Immediate Response" as found in DODD 3025.1. Also note that Immediate Response is not an exception to PCA in that it does not allow Military to perform law enforcement activities.	Description of Immediate Response is not accurate and may mislead a commander. For example, the language indicates that Immediate Response is appropriate "to provide support to civil authorities..." The definition in DODD 3025.1 states that Immediate Response is appropriate to provide support to civil authorities or "the public" .	A
283.		CSA/DTR A	A	4.09	F4.0 1	<u>Middle</u>	Change " DDO " to " <u>DOD</u> "	Correct acronym	A
284.		USAF	S	4.09		6	suffering, or limit <u>mitigate great</u> property damage.	Match wording in the relevant DOD Directive.	A
285.		USJFCO M	C	4.09		F4.0 1	Comment: Figure IV-1 Request for Assistance is an excellent reinforcement of the comments made in Items 38 (above). The diagram is the essence of a crisis management and consequence management flow chart and easily serves as the rationale for putting the ASD-HD, DD AT/HD, and JDOMS staffs as the lead agent for crisis management, consequence management, and critical infrastructure protection in CONUS. Figure IV-1 Request for Assistance, contains no reference to AT, either in terms of organizational structure or coordination. Why is it in the JTTP for Antiterrorism? For		A- Explain role of Fig IV-1 in consequence mgmt for response to a terrorist incident on base.

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							some reason our policy documents now mask Crisis Management under the term "Terrorist Incident Response Measures" and put the responsibility on the ATO. Figure IV-1 shows a process that goes way beyond a "limited response" to a terrorist event.		TCM is part of AT program and the greater framework needs to be understood.
286.		USJFCO M	A	4.09		9	Change as follows: "... notify Executive Agent <u>JDOMS</u> through ..."	correctness	A
287.		USAF	S	4.10	2b	6.7	Change to read: "Commanders may also assist with the emergency restoration of essential public services and utilities. This may include fire fighting, water <u>supplies</u> , communications <u>facilities</u> , transportation <u>means</u> , <u>electrical power</u> , and fuel."	Clarification of wording.	A
288.		USJFCO M	S	4.12		16	Re-letter the subparagraphs and make discussion of 10 USC 331-334 subpara (a), as one of the exceptions to PCA concepts. 10 USC 331-334 is the Insurrection Act and general applies to domestic insurrections, not isolated acts of terrorism, especially foreign terrorism. Delete the statement in line 19, "are the primary statutory exceptions pertinent to terrorism scenarios."	The representation of the Insurrection Act is incorrect. The Insurrection Act is just one of numerous exceptions to PCA, if that is the point of the discussion. A response to a terrorist incident, which is outside the normal MACA response to a civil emergency will likely be in accordance with the Presidents Art II authority, especially if the it, is a foreign terrorist event.	A
289.		USAF	M	4.13	b	18	Delete paragraph titled "Vicarious Liability".	There is no new issue of vicarious liability for commanders. Commanders already understand their liability in the case that they do not do their duty and they already know their legal advisors are important to them. The example used to illustrate vicarious liability is not vicarious liability but is dereliction of duty. Vicarious	A

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								liability for commanders is such a remote possibility that this paragraph has absolutely no place in a JTTP pub. It is a shallow attempt to scare commanders and drive them to their legal advisors. It is grossly misleading and totally unnecessary.	
290.		USJFCO M	M	4.13		18	Delete.	Discussion of a commander's vicarious liability is incorrect and not contextual in relation to antiterrorist activities.	A
291.		USAF	M	4.14	b	7	After "the scope of their authority": add the following sentence: "Commanders must not use civilian contract personnel to circumvent any statutory or regulatory obligation or limitation that may be imposed with respect to use of military personnel.	This clarification would require commanders to avoid subverting statutory or regulatory controls via the use of civilian contractors.	A
292.		USAF	A	4.14	2b	8	Change to read: In this right, The command legal adviser has become increasingly important to the commander in planning, training and operational phases of the antiterrorist program.	The phrase "In this right" makes no sense.	A
293.		USAF	S	4.18	3	all	Delete entire section.	No mention of DOD role in this process. Not pertinent to DOD or services. Jurisdiction for terrorist related crimes is a DOJ and state issue. If DOD somehow became involved, we would be supporting another lead agent. This detailed discussion does not belong in an already lengthy TTP.	A
294.		USJFCO M	M	4.18	3	9	Delete entire section.	Discussion of jurisdictional authorities, especially state and federal, is irrelevant. This	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								issue is only relevant if the Military intends to get involved in the prosecution of terrorists, which has always been a civilian authority (federal or state) responsibility. If we are engaged in a PCA activity, it will be in support of civilian authorities. If we are acting under the Presidents Art II authority, jurisdiction is not relevant.	
295.		USAF	A	4.19	F4.0 2		Proprietary vice Proprietorial	Correct spelling	A
296.		USAF	A	4.20	2	8.10	Change to read: "In territory that is under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and a <u>state State</u> , both sovereigns have the authority to investigate or prosecute violations of <u>their respective their respective laws</u> respectively.	Did not make sense as was written.	A
297.		USAF	M	4.22	C	8.11	Change to read: " If a terrorist act is a violation of both Federal and State law, then the Federal Government can either act, or defer to the State authorities, depending on the nature of the incident and the capabilities of local authorities. " " <u>If a terrorist act is a violation of both Federal and State law, then the Federal Government and State Government can both act, or the Federal Government can defer to the State Government, or the State Government can defer to the Federal Government, depending upon the nature of the incident and the capabilities of the various authorities.</u> "	This principle recognizes that action that constitutes crimes under federal law and state law can be prosecuted by both governments (or either), without creating double jeopardy problems.	R- USE BELOW
298.		USJFCO M	M	4.22		8.11	Change as follows: "If a terrorist act is a violation of both Federal and State law, then <u>both</u> the Federal Government <u>and the State Government</u> can either act, or one can or defer to the State authorities other, depending on the nature of the incident and the capabilities of local authorities."	This clarifies that both the Federal and State Governments can act without creating double jeopardy problems.	A
299.		USAF	A	4.23	4	10	Add: <u>DOD forces and installations are subject to the</u>	Clarification. Emphasizes	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		USJFCO M					<u>DOD FPCON System, which is similar in structure to the HSAS, but based on slightly different criteria for substantially different target. Knowledge of HSAS is beneficial in coordinating with civilian authorities.</u>	adherence to DOD FPCON (ATCON in Draft DOD 2000.16) System, acknowledges benefit of HSAS understanding.	
300.		USAF	M	4.23	4a	13.15	Change to read: Overview. The primary Federal organizations dealing with terrorism crisis management are the National Security Council (NSC), <u>Homeland Security Council (HSC)</u> , DOS, and DOJ, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).	Per HSPD-1 A. Homeland Security Council Securing Americans from terrorist threats or attacks is a critical national security function. It requires extensive coordination across a broad spectrum of Federal, State, and local agencies to reduce the potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage should such an attack occur. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) shall ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.	A
301.		USAF	A	4.24	4b2	3	Sentence: The PCC has four standing subordinate groups to coordinate policy on specific areas relating to responding to terrorism. Recommend adding a sentence listing the four subordinate groups.	The function of the four subordinate groups is set out, but no listing of them is ever made. Listing them will increase clarity.	A
302.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	M	4.26	d.(1)	9	Delete or provide reference to following statement: "The exception to this is on the Arabian Peninsula where the DOS and DOD signed an MOU transferring responsibility for terrorism against US interests there to the Department of Defense."	Reviewer is unaware of any such MOU. The Dec 97 MOU which may be the purported source does not transfer this responsibility. Quotes from that MOU are below: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MOU IS TO DEFINE CLEARLY THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								<p>THE SECURITY OF DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN AREAS NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF A CINC.</p> <p>A. THIS MOU AFFECTS ONLY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL IN THE COVERED COUNTRIES THAT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF A CINC. THE AUTHORITIES OF THE COM, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER SECTION 207 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1980, 22 U.S.C. SECTION 3927, AND NSDD-38, SHALL NOT BE ALTERED OR AFFECTED BY THIS MOU.</p>	
303.		USAF	S	4.29		18	Insert parenthetical after "... alert." (<u>The Homeland Security Advisory System levels do not directly equate to Force Protection Conditions.</u>)	Accuracy. The HSAS level is one of many factors a commander should use to make a FPCON declaration.	R-COVERED ABOVE
304.		USJFCOM	M	4.29 - 4.34	4.e(4)		Delete all information concerning the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) contained in paragraph 4.e(4). This system is unrelated to the DOD AT Condition System, Threat Warning System, or anything else we use. DOD has never linked defensive actions by units in the field to any level of the HSAS. Placing information for HSAS in this JP would only confuse the field by making it appear as if some link to DOD exists. Furthermore, How does any of this information pertain to JTTP that the field needs? This information is germane to JP 3-26, but not in this JP.		A
305.		USAF	A	4.32	3	18	Change to read: "... alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and. . ."	Grammar	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
306.		USN	M	4.34 to 4.35		20 to 2	Change as follows: The USCG is the LFA for Maritime Homeland Security and for Maritime Homeland Defense. And, as such, since the Coast Guard is simultaneously and at all times both an armed force of the United States (14 USC 1), and a law enforcement agency (14 USC 89), and because terrorism can be classified as either a criminal act or an act of war, the USCG's capabilities are extremely relevant, valuable, and needed whether the threat is termed a military or terrorist attack.	DoD will be LFA for maritime HD. When the USCG is conducting its operations subordinate to the DHS, the USCG is conducting HS not HD. Last sentence is unnecessary. Who "classifies" an act of terrorism as one thing or the other?	A- USE USCG COMMENTN BELOW
307.		USAF	A	4.34	5a	13.15	Change to read: "The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard USCG reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. However, the USCG also works closely with the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation Security as well as maintaining its existing . . ."	USCG previously spelled out with acronym – grammar.	A USE USCG COMMENTN BELOW
308.		USJFCOM	S	4.34		20.21	Change as follows: "The USCG is the LFA for Maritime Homeland Security and for Maritime Homeland Defense. "	"Defense" is a DOD/USNORTHCOM/NAVNO RTH mission	USE USCG COMMENTN BELOW
309.		USCG	C	4.34-35	4.e.(5)	11-23, 1-8	Change to read: "(5) The United States Coast Guard (a) The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. However, the USCG also works closely with the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation Security as well as maintain its existing independent identity as a Military Service. Upon declaration of war or when the President so directs, the Coast Guard would operate as an element of the Department of Defense, consistent with existing law. <u>(a) The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under DHS, the USCG maintains its statutory status as one of the five Armed Forces and conducts national security missions as a Military Service at all times. Upon declaration of war by</u>		A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>the Congress or when the President so directs (may be via the convenience of any Executive Order) at any time, the USCG may be transferred to the Department of Navy, consistent with United States Code. As Service Chief, the Commandant would report directly to the Secretary of Navy. Importantly, all law enforcement authorities of the USCG would transfer to the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official. In addition, posse comitatus still would not apply to the USCG. Memoranda of Agreement with DOD exist for USCG support of Maritime Homeland Defense and the employment of USCG capabilities and resources anywhere in the world in support of the National Military Strategy.</p> <p>(b) The USCG is the LFA for Maritime Homeland Security and for Maritime Homeland Defense. And, as such, since the Coast Guard is simultaneously and at all times both an armed force of the United States (14 USC 1), and a law enforcement agency (14 USC 89), and because terrorism can be classified as either a criminal act or an act of war, the USCG's capabilities are extremely relevant, valuable, and needed whether the threat is termed a military or terrorist attack. The Coast Guard's homeland security mission is to protect the US Maritime Domain and the US Maritime Transportation System and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on US territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Additionally, the USCG Coast Guard will prepare for and, in the event of attack, conduct emergency response operations. And, when directed, as the supported or supporting commander, the Coast Guard will conduct military homeland defense operations in its traditional role as a Military Service.</p>		
310.		USAF	A	4.36	4h1	7	Sentence: The Department of the Treasury is responsible for preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and by <u>for</u> protecting the President and other officials from from terrorist attacks.	Typos.	A
311.		USAF	M	4.36	h2	15.16	about individuals or organizations that finance terrorists can be submitted by calling 1-866-867-8300 within the US or by contacting the nearest US embassy or consulate if	I called this number and it just rang – no voice mail or person pick-up – verify this is still the correct number.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
312.		USAF	A	4.36	i	22	Change to read: “. . . .1947 and EO 12333, <u>UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES</u> , 4 December 1981	First use of document, include full title and date.	A
313.		USJFCO M	M	4.37 - 4.42	4L		Delete: Paragraph 4L starting on page IV-37 and concluding on page IV-43. This information is merely a restated version of data contained in DODD 2000.12, DODI 2000.16, and DOD 2000.12H.		R-
314.		J8 JRO CBRND	S	4.37	411	19.01	Add WMD CST teams to list of specialized teams	CSTS are vital in civilian communities. Gives an example of NG asset.	A
315.		USAF	S	4.38	b	16.17	Change to read: “These local agreements, because of military turnover and reorganization, should be reviewed and tested annually. <u>When updates or new MOUs/MOAs are accomplished coordinate with ASD(HD), as required.</u> ”	ASD (HD) may also need Situational Awareness on these MOU/MOAs.	A
316.		USAF	A	4.39	b	8	Change to read: “. . . . Ppersonnel traveling”	Grammar	A
317.		USJFCO M	S	4.42		F4.0 3	Redraw figure IV-3 to show SECDEF reporting directly to President at equal level with Attorney General	Chart shows SECDEF subordinate to AG. AG only gives advice and consultation to President on decision. Presidential decision is passed directly to SECDEF not through AG.	A
318.		USJFCO M	M	4.42 - 4.48			Comment: Although an interesting read, soldiers at the level of execution are better served with guidance on how they can apply the use of force. Techniques or procedures that are geared to lowest level of application are considerably more useful than an explanation of how the process for permission to use force works.		A- NO CHANGE
319.		USN	M	4.43		13.17	Change as follows: (b) For the military planner <u>planning within in</u> the United States, its territories, and its possessions, this relationship between the DOJ and Department of Defense requires the development of local memorandums of agreement or understanding between the installation, base, unit, or port and the appropriate local FBI office to preclude confusion in the event of an incident. Because of military turnover and reorganization, these local agreements should be reviewed and tested annually.	Too limiting. Applies to commanders – planners and other staff members only assist the commander!	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
320.		USJFCO M	S	4.44		9	Change as follows: "...any incident occurring on military installations to isolate and contain the incident <u>under the direction of Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).</u> "	Commander USNORTHCOM has recently been assigned TACON for Force Protection in CONUS.	A
321.		USJFCO M	S	4.45		5.6	Change as follows: "If the FBI declines jurisdiction, the senior military commander <u>Commander, USNORTHCOM, as the Geographic Combatant Commander, will take action to resolve the incident.</u> "	Commander USNORTHCOM has recently been assigned TACON for Force Protection in CONUS.	A
322.		USJFCO M	S	4.45		12.13	Change as follows: "In all cases, command of military elements remains within military Channels <u>under the direction of Commander, USNORTHCOM.</u> "	Commander USNORTHCOM has recently been assigned TACON for Force Protection in CONUS.	A
323.		USJFCO M	S	4.45		20	Change as follows: "... incidents, the installation-unit commander's ..."	AT responsibilities are not unique to installation commanders but apply to all commanders. In a foreign AOR, an installation commander may not exist.	A
324.		USN	A	4.46		3.06	Change as follows: Such agreements, notwithstanding, the <i>Standing Rules of Engagement</i> (CJCS Instruction 3121.01A), make it clear that the commander retains the inherent right and obligation of self-defense even in such situations.	Not required	A
325.		USJFCO M	S	4.46		6.11	Insert deleted section.	Discussion of inherent right of self-defense is important.	A
326.		USAF	A	4.47	5c	4.5	Be implemented by geographic combatant commands, subunified commands, JTFs, and component commands, IAW responsibilities and procedures established in DODD 2000.12, " <i>DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures</i> ," DODI O- 2000.16, " DOD Combating Terrorism Program- Antiterrorism Standards ," and DODD O- 2000.12-H, "Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence;" <i>DoD Antiterrorism Handbook</i> "	Correct title of DOD Instruction.	A
327.		USAF JFCOM	S	4.48	d	4	Add to Read: The installation commander must include exterior terrain, avenues of approach, <u>threat capabilities (possession of stand-off weapons such as MANPADs or mortars), hazardous material storage in proximity to the US Forces, and host nation security processes when developing security plans for the installation, regardless of who provides exterior defense.</u>	Clarification and amplification of the need for commanders to consider threats outside the wire regardless of who is delegated to provide exterior defense.	A
328.		USCG	A	4.07	1.C.(24	Change to read: "... has the authority to use the	Clarity.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
					1)		military forces in cases of emergency ...”		
329.		USAF	A	5.01	1	18	Change to read: “Antiterrorist AT measures are intended”	AT previously used acronym.	A
330.		USAF	S	5.01	1	24	Change to read: “. . . . COORDINATED with DODD 3020, <u>Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection</u> ,	Current Draft Title of DoDD.	A
331.		USJFCO M	S	5.01		15.18	Change as follows: “The program is designed to <u>applies a wartime defensive mindset to</u> foster a protective posture in peacetime (i.e., units performing normal duties and serving in security assistance organizations, peacekeeping missions, or mobile training teams) that will carry over to a wartime environment. ”	Clarity. When a tactical commander adapts wartime defensive principles to a peacetime “condition”, the overall emphasis and implementation of the AT is better executed and understood at the installation level.	A
332.		USJFCO M	A	5.01		18.23	Delete.	Description of antiterrorism measures does not need to be repeated in this paragraph.	A
333.		USJFCO M	M	5.01		23.27	Comment: What does “AT programs should be <i>incorporated and integrated</i> with DODD 3020, Critical Infrastructure Protection...” mean? Are we saying that AT is now a subset of CIP? Are we now putting the added planning responsibility for CIP on the shoulders of the ATO? What authority is inherent to the ATO that they should have this responsibility, particularly in CONUS? Just because a terrorist may attack an asset does not automatically make it the ATO’s responsibility in terms of defensive planning and execution. This is one aspect of a disturbing trend we’ve seen in the implementation and structure of mission. When coupled with the addition of “crowd control” in Chapter 6 of the JTTP (which for us is totally unrelated to AT oversight for planning or execution) we see an attempt by other staff elements to divest themselves of missions and programs they are better suited to manage (particularly at the joint level). We should resist any attempt to place AT in an oversight responsibility of CIP or civil disturbances, particularly in CONUS. They are clearly separate from AT and belong to other security programs under the FP Umbrella		R- USE ABOVE...
334.		USN	A	5.02		18.22	Change as follows: It cannot be stressed enough that the AT Program is the	Simplicity & readability	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							ultimate responsibility of the commander or, in the case of a DOD Agency, the civilian equivalent. As such he or she who has the authority and responsibility to alter or add to the AT program as deemed necessary to accommodate the local situation.		
335.		USJFCO M	S	5.02		4	Change as follows: "The <u>incident</u> command, control ..."	Clarification.	A
336.		USJFCO M	S	5.02		5	Change as follows: "... foreign -terrorist attacks on ..."	Commander USNORTHCOM has recently been assigned TACON for Force Protection in CONUS; therefore, there is now a geographic combatant commander responsible for domestic attacks.	A
337.		USJFCO M	S	5.02		11.12	Delete last sentence.	Commander USNORTHCOM has recently been assigned TACON for Force Protection in CONUS; therefore, there is now a geographic combatant commander responsible for domestic attacks.	A
338.		USJFCO M	A	5.02		17	Change as follows: " Although an installation or unit may already have some elements in place, all ... "	Unnecessary statement lends nothing to content.	A
339.		USAF	A	5.03	b	19	Change to read: " <u>Antiterrorism Officers (ATOs)</u> should refer to Combatant"	First use of the term – spells out and provide acronym – all subsequent uses can be ATO or ATOs.	A
340.		USAF USN	S	5.03	b	20.21	Change to read: "Consider using the Joint Staff J3 DDAT/HD J-34 <u>Joint AT program manager's guide (JAT Guide) Installation Antiterrorism Program and Planning Tool (IPT)</u> as it shall facilitate what would"	I believe you are referring to the JAT guide here. If so make change here and throughout the publication.	A
341.		USJFCO M	A	5.03 5.05 5.13		19 12 2	Delete: "TA" and substitute with: "threat and vulnerability assessment."	Correctness. "TA" is not an approved abbreviation for "threat assessment" in JP 1-02. Likewise, IAW JP 1-02, A"threat and vulnerability assessment" is the correct term.	A
342.		USJFCO M	A	5.03 5.05 7.16		20.21 20 17.18	Delete: "Installation Antiterrorism Program and Planning Tool (IPT)" and substitute with: "Joint Antiterrorism Tool (JAT)".	IPT was the previous version of software and has since been incorporated into the	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
				53.03		12.13		newer JAT program.	
343.		USN	A	5.05		20.22	Change as follows: The JAT GUIDE, particularly Part III, provides an integrated approach to fulfilling the requirements of the above standards.	Acronym previously established	A
344.		USN	S	5.06		3.16	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend you realign to correspond to DOD Standards 24 through 29 in draft DODIO-2000.16 of March 2004. Include identification of each standard in the appropriate subparagraph	Clarity Understanding Consistency	A
345.		USJFCO M	S	5.06		3.16	Comment: Recommend spelling out: Level 1 basic, Level II training for AT/ ATTO, Level III- CDR and Level IV for Flags. Realign subparagraphs to correspond to DOD Standards 24 through 29 in (draft) DoDI O-2000.16 as of March 2004. Include brief explanation of each standard in the appropriate subparagraph.	Completeness.	A
346.		USJFCO M	S	5.06		4	Change as follows; "...Standards, provides guidance <u>policy</u> for the conduct of AT-related training to include eligibility, ..."	The DODI 2000.16 does not provide "guidance" on how to accomplish the standards. It sets "policy" requirements. Providing guidance on how to implement policy should be described in the JTTP.	A
347.		USJFCO M	S	5.06		14	Change as follows: "4. <u>Level II</u> ATO Training"	Consistency with "Level I" element in subparagraph 2.	A
348.		USJFCO M	S	5.06		15	Insert: "5. Level III and Level IV Command & Executive Management Training" ReNUMBER subsequent paragraphs.	Consistency with "Level I" element in subparagraph 2.	A
349.		USN	M	5.07		6.10	Change as follows: 1. Training Strategy Development. The solution is to let your AT working group do the development work. This solution shall make use of Use their varied expertise as well as giving and give them co-ownership of the strategy. Instead of imposing the training externally, this <u>This approach allows for a process of internal adoption. From an organizational viewpoint, this shall greatly will</u> speed the rate at which training occurs.	Simplicity Ownership is a COMMAND THING Grammar Simplify.	R- USE BELOW FM JFCOM
350.		USN	A	5.07		15.17	Change as follows: Quite often, organizations like the Interagency Operations Security (OPSEC) Support Staff shall can conduct mobile training teams at your location to train	Better word	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							large numbers of individuals at a relatively low cost.		
351.		USAF	A	5.07	c	2	Change to read: “. . . supporting skills, <u>and resources such as how to conduct an assessment, and SIPRNET access</u> , constitute a hidden set of. . . .”	Deficiencies found in JSIVA trend analysis.	A
352.		USJFCO M	S	5.07		6.10	Change as follows: “1. Training Strategy Development. The solution is to let your AT working group do the development work. This solution shall make use of their varied expertise as well as giving them ownership of the strategy. Instead of imposing the training externally, this approach allows for a process of internal adoption. From an organizational viewpoint, this shall greatly speed the rate at which training occurs <u>The Commander, through the operations staff, conducts the mission analysis necessary to incorporate AT TTP into individual and collective training. The approved strategy is then outlined within the unit training guidance and training goals.</u> ”	Correctness. The commander establishes individual and unit training objectives and implements them in published guidance and goals.	A
353.		USN	S	5.08		13.15	Change as follows: If terrorists can see that the US is prepared for their attacks, they shall <u>may</u> shift their efforts elsewhere, thus fulfilling the AT Program’s goal of deterring terrorist acts.	Correct word. There is no guarantee they will shift their efforts because we seem prepared	A
354.		USN	A	5.08		19.21	Change as follows: The answer shall <u>is</u> not always be an external provision of additional resources. Often, the answer shall <u>may</u> be the reprogramming of internal resources.	Better words	A
355.		USN	A	5.08 to 5.09		23 to 1	Change as follows: Nearly all combat operations, now and in the future, <u>shall will</u> be joint operations.	Simplicity	A
356.		USAF	A	5.08		2	Delete words: Success is often achieved through steady, incremental progress (crawl before walking, walk before running).	Brevity. Idea implied by phrase is already conveyed in the paragraphs and topic.	A
357.		USJFCO M	A	5.08		2	Delete: “...(crawl before walking, walk before running).”	Inappropriate colloquialism.	A
358.		USJFCO M	A	5.08		13.15	Delete last sentence.	As written, this sentence implies that we should invite terrorists to our exercises as observers.	A
359.		USJFCO	A	5.09		1.2	Change as follows: “the future shall <u>will</u> normally be	Editorial	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		M					joint operations. However, U nless our forces practice AT procedures during joint operations to resolve interoperability issues, soft spots shall will be created.”		
360.		USCG	A	5.11	1.c.	20-22	Change to read: “... to counter the terrorist threats to military installations, bases, ships, facilities, equipment, and personnel. By definition, t he AT plan should contain all the specific measures taken <u>necessary</u> to establish and ...”	Grammar.	A
361.		USN	S	5.12		4.05	Delete: Accordingly, an effective AT plan accounts for all aspects of the AT program.	Unnecessary	A
362.		USN	S	5.12		23	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend adding a sentence stating that the Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments are components of a single integrated process and that the risk assessment (management) process is last, so resources or the lack thereof will be assigned as the working group and commander feels need for their specific area.	Clarity	A
363.		USAF	S	5.12	c	3.4	Change to read: “ . . . and a <u>comprehensive</u> program review.”	DRAFT 2000.16	A
364.		USJFCO M	S	5.12		23	Add the following: “The Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments are components of a single integrated process and the risk assessment (management) process is last, so resources or the lack thereof will be assigned as the working group and Commander feels need for their specific area.”	Clarity; adds transition to following discussions of those areas.	A
365.		USAF	A	5.13			Align Appendix A, B, C, etc. references with the paragraphs, i.e., (1) Threat Assessment – Appendix A, Vulnerability Assessment – Appendix B, Criticality Assessment – Appendix C, etc. here and throughout the publications.	Common Practice.	A
366.		USAF	S	5.13	1	5.6	Change to read: “Annually, <u>or upon FPCON change</u> , commanders integrate threat information prepared by the intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement communities, technical information from. . . .”	Intel, CI and LE should conduct a review when the threat changes.	A
367.		USAF/JF COM	M	5.13	3	23	Add the following: threat changes (see Appendix B). <u>“There may be several vulnerability assessments conducted on an installation (i.e., water vulnerability,</u>	Too often, vulnerability assessments tend to be stove piped without functional	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>CBRN vulnerability, etc.); the findings of these functional area vulnerability assessments must be included in the overall installation assessment.</u>	experts that can include a true assessment various functional areas. When experts conduct these assessments, the findings must be incorporated into the overall assessment for the full picture of threats and vulnerabilities.	
368.		USN	S	5.15		1.17	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend changing “measures” to pre-planned responses.	Avoid confusion with FPCON measures	A
369.		USN	A	5.25		2.03	Change as follows: The organization’s Commander is responsible for the development of the AT plan.	Unnecessary	A
370.		USAF	S	5.25		8	Change to: b. There is no directed methodology for developing an AT plan. The responsibility...	The document is authoritative not directive. Consequently, stating that there is no directive guidance on how to develop AT plans is not necessary. Additionally, the sentence disengages the reader: Why should I pay attention, when you start by telling me there is no directed methodology?	A
371.		USAF	A	5.25	1	21	Change to read: “. . . <u>threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments.</u> ”	Reorder in the order they should be accomplished.	A
372.		USAF	S	5.26	2c3	16.19	Change to read: “While there is no mandated format, it is recommended that organizations use the <u>format included in Appendix D standard five paragraph order outlined in JP 5 002 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.</u> ”	Don’t force the reader to go to another document to find this format. There is a format included in Appendix D of this publication – why not use it?	A
373.		USJFCO M	S	5.26		22	Delete: “geographic”.	This statement applies to all combatant commander plans.	A
374.		USN USAF	S	5.32		20.23	Change as follows: The geographic combatant commander with permanently assigned forces designates a staff office, usually in the Operations Directorate , law enforcement, or security section, to supervise, inspect, test, and report on the base AT programs within the theater. This staff section also coordinates with host-	Unnecessary Capitalization not required	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							nation authorities and US embassies and consulates.	Completeness	
375.		USAF	S	5.32		21	Change to : ... office officer ,	DOD Instruction 2000.16 requires designation of an officer, not an office.	A
376.		USAF	M	5.32		21	Change to: , <u>on their special staff or usually</u> in the Operations....	The combatant commands are mixed in where this staff resides. There are arguments for both structures.	A
377.		USN	S	5.33		1.03	Change as follows: Simultaneously, the Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2), under the combatant commander's authority, disseminates intelligence on terrorist activities to the subordinate and supporting commands to ensure that the AT measures are appropriate to the threat.	Unnecessary	A
378.		USCG	A	5.33	4.	2-3	Change to read: " ... disseminates intelligence on terrorist activities to the subordinate commands ..."	Grammar.	A
379.		USCG	A	5.9	1.b.(4)(e)	2	General question. What is a "soft spot"?	What is the context that is intended to be conveyed?	A- REWORD TO DESCRIBE VULNERABILITY
380.		USAF	M	6.00			Add in-depth discussion on RAMs: what they are, key considerations in using RAMs, and examples of RAMs	RAMs are a vital element in an antiterrorism program: maximizes scarce resources, deters adversaries, etc. Be glad to write a proposed section for inclusion in chapter VI if lead agent concurs.	A
381.		USN	A	6.01		22.23	Change as follows: This responsibility cannot be ignored in any situation .	Unnecessary	A
382.		USAF	A	6.01	1	18	Change to Read: The installation, base, ship, unit or port...	Unnecessary duplication	A
383.		USAF	A	6.01		24	Add paragraph describing that the AT plans and preparations are best developed by a cadre of unit or installation personnel who are each subject matter experts/advisors to the commanders. The base engineer, MP/police/security commander, medical officer/ NBC or fire officer/ communications officer, etc provide input to the AT Plan, advise the commander, but the commander remains		A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							responsible overall.		
384.		USAF	A	6.01	2	25	Change to read: "AT Force Protection in High Threat Areas"	FP is a broad concept that is the responsibility of the commander for which they are ultimately responsible.	A
385.		USN	S	6.02		1.04	Change as follows: The following are antiterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures for high risk missions; they represent worst-case procedures. Security and force protection measures for forces performing security assistance, peacekeeping, mobile training teams, and other small military similar activities can be derived from and are influenced by these measures.	Reads better and is more complete	A
386.		USN JFCOM	S	6.02		6.14	GENERAL COMMENT: Subparagraph heading (line 6) says non-urban facilities, which are undefined, while line 8 talks to urban areas. This is confusing. Clarify	Understanding Clarity	Change line 6 a to say Installations, bases, ships, and expeditionary sites.
387.		USN	S	6.02		8.10	Change as follows: Easily defended locations are often rare in urban areas because of building and population density or lack of proper cover and concealment and an inability to create sufficient perimeter stand-off.	Grammar More accurate	A
388.		USN	A	6.02		10.13	Change as follows: Political restrictions may also limit the military's ability to construct fortifications or disrupt areas. but Commanders, however, must take all practical means to ensure force protection and identify shortcomings to appropriate levels of command for resolution.	Readability	A
389.		USN	A	6.02 to 6.06		21 to 5	GENERAL COMMENT: Consider moving text to a matrix (Figure) and changing the text to refer the user to that matrix (Figure).	A matrix would present the material in a clearer format that is more user friendly. It would better adapt itself to field use, reproduction for handbooks, SOPs, and other uses the operating forces may have. It would also reduce the	A – make into single page matrixes for installations, & ground, air, sea movement

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								volume of the pub	
390.		USAF JFCOM	A	6.03	B2	12	Change to Read: What is known about the terrorists? <u>What is their agenda, capabilities, where is there support infrastructure, are they supported by the local population how can they be recognized?</u>	Clarification	a
391.		USAF JFCOM	A	6.03	B3	14	Change to Read: How do the terrorists receive information? <u>Have they infiltrated the installation, port, host nation military or the local law enforcement?</u>	Clarification	a
392.		USAF/JF COM	A	6.03	B4	16	Change to Read: (Think like the terrorists! Would you ambush or raid? What is the potential for snipers, mortars, rockets, air or ground attacks, suicide attacks, firebombs arson, kidnappings, or bicycle, car or truck bombs? MANPADS, or improvised explosive devices delivered by manpacks, vehicles or suicide personnel?)	Clarification	a
393.		USAF	A	6.03	B6	23	Change to Read: Local law enforcement personnel (e.g., host nation police) can at times be valuable source for this information , <u>host and friendly nation intelligence services can be valuable sources of information.</u>	Clarification	a
394.		J34	A	6.04		16	What local industries are in the area and what types of chemicals to they use?		a
395.		USJFCO M USAF	A	6.04		19	Change as follows: "Determine what is the friendly situation. <u>What local law enforcement, host nation, allied or friendly nation assets might be available?"</u>	Clarity.	A
396.		J34	A	6.04		22	Add: How do I vet non US personnel, such as contractors and other foreign or third country national who come on to the base?		A
397.		J34	A	6.05		12	Add: Communications- Is there a method for mass alerting across the base? What radios are used on base? Are they secure? Is there redundancy in the system?		A
398.		USN	S	6.06		7.09	QUESTION. Is defense the correct word or should it be security or force protection? Change I text to: Planning should include a combination of law enforcement and security assetsbarrier planning, sensors employment, other obstacles (add: such as ditches or barriers), local-hire security forces (if applicable), unit guards, deception, and on-call support from reaction forces.	Clarity & consistency	Use Planning A.
399.		USAF JFCOM	A	6.06	F2	4	Change to Read: Will the situation be influenced by the existence of any religious or racial concerns , <u>cultural,</u>	Clarification	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>racial, regional or allied political concerns?</u>		
400.		USJFCOM	S	6.07		6	Add: "Also consider employment of road spikes, dragon teeth, or tire shredders to slow down unauthorized traffic." The force protection exposition and display (FPED) usually produces a compilation of useful equipment and can be found on line or requested from DTRA at atfphelp@dtra.mil	Completeness.	A
401.		J34	S	6.06		12	Add: new paragraph Terrorist incident response and Terrorist consequence management planning should include considerations for fire response, NBC and TIC response (including in place sheltering and evacuation considerations), mass notification, EOD/IED response, medical response and evacuation, and mass casualty procedures.		A
402.		J34	S	6.07		21	Security review should also include review of procurement, storage, and preparation of food supplies used on base. A food vulnerability assessment can be initiated by food services personnel to review the complete food process.		a
403.		USAF	S	6.08	F6.0 1		Add to the list: Radio, Handgun / rifle, Ammunition, Hearing protection	Essential security force equipment.	A
404.		USN	S	6.09		6.08	Change as follows: b. Guard Duties. Guard duties are detailed in <u>Service regulations and in local, general, and special orders and standard operating procedures</u> . In a terrorist high-risk environment, special orders should address as a minimum the following:	Simplicity	A
405.		USN	S	6.09		16.18	Change as follows: Specific rules of engagement (ROE) or use of force policy in the event of civil disturbances, potential damage, or injury to US personnel or specific property, looting, or arson.	Simplicity and understanding	A
406.		USAF JFCOM	A	6.09	b	7	Change to read: "In a terrorist high-risk threat environment, special orders should" * make change here and elsewhere in the publication.	Section deals with High Threat – Risk will be dependent upon each commander's perception risk management process based upon the Threat, Vulnerability and Criticality Assessments.	A
407.									

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
408.		USN JFCOM	S	6.10		16	Add: <u>Do not stop for dead or dying animals in /beside the road</u> <u>Do not allow people to walk-up to vehicles</u>	Incorporate lessons learned from Iraq	A
409.		USAF	S	6.10		5	Add: <u>(9) Evacuation procedures.</u>	Evacuation procedures are a vital addition to the other excellent items in the list (e.g., search procedures, ROE, etc.)	A
410.		J34	S	6.10		5	Add a paragraph that emphasizes the importance of taking digital photographs of any suspicious activity, unauthorized visitors, suspected surveillance, 'accidental' visitors, etc. Terrorists and criminals avoid having picture taken and may be discouraged from returning to a location that has already photographed them.		A
411.		USN	M	6.13		16.18	Change as follows: Convoy escort composition depends on available forces. Light armored vehicles, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, or trucks equipped with M2 50-caliber and MK19 40mm machine guns are extremely effective. <u>Vehicles used should be appropriately hardened and posses the necessary weapons systems and other equipment to address the threat.</u> Overhead helicopters and AC-130 gunships can also be used as air escorts if available.	The effectiveness of these assets is arguable. The salient point should be that they need the appropriate armor plating, weapons, and other equipment called for by the operating environment	A
412.		USJFCO M	S	6.13		17	Change as follows: "... vehicles, <u>"up-armored"</u> high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, or trucks equipped with M2 50- ..."	Completeness. Up-armored HUMVEEs are an absolute necessity in Iraq for security/convoy duty.	See above
413.		USN	S	6.16		8	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend consulting with TRANSCOM/MSC and adding a sentence clarifying responsibilities of ship's masters and security detachment for MSC ships	Completeness Clarity	a
414.		USJFCO M	S	6.16		8	Comment: The statement that "The ship's captain is solely responsible" may not be true when it comes to MSC's shipmasters with security detachments being attached. As such, recommend coordinating with TRANSCOM/MSC to clarify responsibilities of ship's master and security detachment for MSC ships.		a
415.		USAF	S	6.21	m	9	Change to Read: Explosive detection MWDs should be considered upon bomb discovery or during entry to the	Clarification, DOD MWDs are not utilized in the presence of	a

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							site of the explosion. Explosive detection MWDs, EOD or other available detection methods should be utilized to sweep areas surrounding suspected explosive devices or incident sites for secondary devices.	suspected explosive devices	
416.		USAF	S	6.22	n	10	Change to read: Coordination between military intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies and host-nation	CI is another component – order changed to reflect previous usage.	a
417.		J34	S	6.xx			<p>Add section on suicide bombers/ high risk TCPs fm 09 July 03 message below. Put message in publication language: AMPN/REF A IS AN OSD SOLIC/JOINT STAFF MESSAGE HIGHLIGHTING REFERENCES AND RESOURCES TO ENHANCE VEHICLE SEARCHES AND INSPECTION PROCEDURES. REF B IS A MESSAGE FROM THE COMBINED FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (CFLCC) FOR CENTRAL COMMAND REFERENCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP) TO MITIGATE THE POTENTIAL VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND HOMICIDE BOMBER THREAT. REF C IS A DIA/JITF-CT ANALYTICAL PRODUCT ON TERRORIST USE OF LURES TO TARGET FIRST RESPONDERS AND ONLOOKERS. REF D IS A DIA/JITF-CT ANALYTICAL PRODUCT ON TERRORIST USE OF INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE DEVICES. REF F IS A DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED WORLDWIDE: VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED DEVICES . REF F IS A UNITED STATES ARMY NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER MESSAGE ON VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INDICATORS. REF G IS JITF-CT SPECIAL ANALYSIS/ASSESSMENT OF THE 12 MAY 03 RIYADH HOUSING COMPOUND.</p> <p>RMKS/ 1. (U) THIS IS A COORDINATED MESSAGE FROM OASD (SO/LIC) AND THE</p>		

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						<p>JOINT STAFF. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO HIGHLIGHT REFERENCES AND RESOURCES AND CAPTURE BEST PRACTICES TO ENHANCE ANTITERRORISM MITIGATION MEASURES FOR CONDUCTING HIGH RISK VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS AND DETERRING SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBERS.</p> <p>2. (U) RECENT VEHICLE BORNE BOMB AND SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER ATTACKS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM HIGHLIGHT THIS THREAT TO OUR FORCES. BECAUSE OF ROBUST PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN PLACE AT DOD INSTALLATIONS, OUR CHECKPOINTS AND ROADBLOCKS ARE INCREASINGLY BECOMING PRIME TARGETS FOR TERRORISTS. SECURITY FORCES AT ACCESS CONTROL POINTS CAN ALSO BE TARGETED AS A MEANS TO GAIN ACCESS TO INSTALLATIONS/COMPOUNDS.</p> <p>3. (U) THE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND THE SERVICE COMPONENTS HAVE ESTABLISHED EXCELLENT TTP FOR DEALING WITH HIGH RISK VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS AND THE SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER. TTP AND LESSONS LEARNED ON SERVICE AND COMBATANT COMMAND WEB SITES AND DIA JITF-CT ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST TACTICS ARE EXCELLENT SOURCES FOR COMMANDERS AND ANTITERRORISM OFFICERS TO REVIEW (MESSAGES ARE REFERENCED ABOVE). THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS PROVIDE INFORMATION GLEANED FROM COMPONENT THREAT REPORTING, TTP AND LESSONS LEARNED.</p> <p>4. (U) THREAT:</p> <p>A. (U//FOUO) INSIGHTS FROM RECENT ATTACKS:</p> <p>(1). (U) SEVERAL VEHICLE BOMB AND SUICIDE BOMBER ATTACKS WERE MADE AT CHECKPOINTS DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN IRAQ DURING MARCH AND APRIL 2003. AN IRAQI POSING AS A TAXI CAB DRIVER</p>		

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						<p>FEIGNED A BREAK DOWN AND DETONATED HIS VEHICLE WHEN FOUR SOLDIERS APPROACHED KILLING THEM ALL. THREE RANGERS WERE KILLED IN WESTERN IRAQ WHEN AN SUV DROVE UP TO THEIR CHECK POINT (ALONG WITH OTHER CARS) AND THEN EXPLODED. IN ANOTHER INSTANCE, AN IRAQI AT A CHECKPOINT SET OFF EXPLOSIVES HIDDEN UNDER HIS CLOTHES WOUNDING A NUMBER OF MARINES. IN ALL CASES, DECEPTION WAS USED TO GET CLOSE TO US FORCES AND INCREASE THE EFFECT OF THE ATTACK. THIS TACTIC IS CONTINUING TO BE USED BY ENEMY PARAMILITARY DURING THE STABILITY PHASE.</p> <p>(2). (U) THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON 12 MAY CONDUCTED AGAINST THREE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING COMPOUNDS IN RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA OCCURRED MINUTES APART USING THE SAME METHOD. IN EACH OF THESE ATTACKS, AN INITIAL ASSAULT TEAM WAS USED TO PENETRATE THE GATE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER GROUP THAT DROVE A VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE THROUGH THE BREACHED GATE AND DETONATED IT NEXT TO A PRE-SELECTED TARGET ON THE INSTALLATION. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM THESE ATTACKS:</p> <p>(A). (U//FOUO) THE TERRORISTS CONDUCTED PRE-OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND IDENTIFIED WEAK POINTS AT GATES AND IN SECURITY PROCEDURES TO STRIKE SOFT TARGETS AND AMERICANS.</p> <p>(B). (U//FOUO) THE THREE ATTACKS WERE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY-A SIGNATURE AL QAIDA TACTIC.</p> <p>(C). (U//FOUO) TERRORISTS ADDED MODIFICATIONS TO THEIR TACTICS IN ORDER TO DEFEAT SECURITY MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO COUNTER</p>		

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						<p>PREVIOUS ATTACKS.</p> <p>B. (U) SUICIDE BOMBER THREAT: EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USED BY INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE BOMBERS: ALL INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE DEVICES ARE BASED UPON THE SIMPLE CONCEPT OF USING A HUMAN BEING TO DELIVER A BOMB TO A TARGET. GENERALLY, THE BOMB WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS:</p> <p>(1). (U) A SIMPLE SWITCH FOR INITIATION CONSISTING OF A PUSH-BUTTON OR TOGGLE SWITCH COMPLETING AN ELECTRIC CIRCUIT. RELATIVELY SMALL INITIATION DEVICES REDUCE THE CHANCES OF DISCOVERY.</p> <p>(2). (U) FRAGMENTATION - SUCH AS NAILS, BALL BEARINGS, OR OTHER SMALL METAL PIECES. DISPERSED FRAGMENTATION IS THE PRIMARY KILL MECHANISM IN INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS.</p> <p>(3). (U) DEVICES ARE GENERALLY CONCEALED WITHIN AN ARTICLE OF CLOTHING WORN CLOSE TO THE BODY - SUCH AS A VEST, BELT, OR JACKET. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHERE THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IS DISGUISED TO LOOK LIKE A COMMON, INNOCUOUS OBJECT.</p> <p>(4). (U) PLASTICIZED EXPLOSIVE AS A MAIN CHARGE - USUALLY A HOMEMADE MIXTURE, ALTHOUGH GROUPS WITH ACCESS TO GREATER RESOURCES UTILIZE MILITARY GRADE EXPLOSIVES.</p> <p>(5). (U) MANY DEVICES HAVE A BACKUP TRIGGER SYSTEM, SUCH AS AN ELECTRONIC TIMER, PAGER, OR BOOBY-TRAP TYPE SWITCH. IF THE ATTACKER IS KILLED, APPREHENDED, OR ATTEMPTS TO ABORT THE ATTACK, A SECONDARY TRIGGER SYSTEM PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE INITIATION METHOD.</p> <p>C. (U) POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF A SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER ARE AS</p>		

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						<p>FOLLOWS:</p> <p>(1). (U) AN INDIVIDUAL WHO DELIBERATELY IGNORES ORDERS TO STOP OR ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT A SECURITY CHECKPOINT.</p> <p>(2). (U) AN INDIVIDUAL WEARING TOO MUCH CLOTHING FOR THE PREVAILING WEATHER CONDITIONS.</p> <p>(3). (U) A PERSON WITH SUSPICIOUS BULGES IN THEIR CLOTHING, CARRYING PACKAGES/BAGS, WEARING SACHELS/BACKPACKS OR WALKS WITH UNSTEADY GATE.</p> <p>(4). (U) MAY EXHIBIT A WIDE RANGE OF CHARACTERISTICS: CLEAN SHAVEN WITH CLOSELY CROPPED HAIR, EXHIBITS UNUSUAL EMOTIONAL Demeanor SUCH AS BLANK STARE, GRIN, UNRESPONSIVE, AND MAY PERSPIRE OR APPEAR GAUNT/ ILL.</p> <p>(5). (U) AN INDIVIDUAL HANDLING WIRES, SWITCHES, AN ACTUATOR, OR A DEAD MAN S SWITCH.</p> <p>D. (U//FOUO) VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (VBIED) THREAT: A VBIED IS A VEHICLE MODIFIED TO CONCEAL AND DELIVER LARGE QUANTITIES OF EXPLOSIVES TO A TARGET. THE MOTIVE BEHIND SUCH INCIDENTS IS TO CAUSE MANY CASUALTIES AND GROSS PROPERTY DAMAGE. POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF A VBIED THREAT ARE AS FOLLOWS:</p> <p>(1). (U//FOUO) NOTICEABLE SAGGING OF THE VEHICLE ON ITS SPRINGS CAUSED BY THE HEAVY WEIGHT OF EXPLOSIVES FOUND IN IT. ORDINARILY THE EXPLOSIVES WILL BE PLACED TOWARD THE REAR OF THE VEHICLE, CAUSING IT TO RIDE LOWER IN THE REAR. HOWEVER, SAGGING SPRINGS ARE NOT NORMALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF TRUCKS BEING USED FOR</p>		

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						<p>VBIEDS BECAUSE THESE VEHICLES ARE DESIGNED TO CARRY THE WEIGHT.</p> <p>(2). (U//FOUO) DARKENED OR COVERED WINDOWS TO CONCEAL EITHER THE VEHICLE S CONTENTS OR THE ACTIONS OF THE DRIVER.</p> <p>(3). (U//FOUO) UNUSUAL ITEMS INSIDE THE VEHICLE: GAS CYLINDERS, WIRES, LEAFLETS, LARGE BAGS OR BOXES, AND BATTERIES BESIDES THE NORMAL CAR BATTERY.</p> <p>(4). (U//FOUO) INDICATIONS OF A TRIGGERING DEVICE-I.E., A SWITCH, RADIO TRANSMITTER, TIMER, WIRES OR ROPES PASSING FROM THE FRONT SEAT TO THE REAR OF THE VEHICLE, ETC.-VISIBLE NEAR THE DRIVER, UNDER THE SEAT, OR WITHIN ARMS REACH.</p> <p>(5). (U//FOUO) THE PRESENCE OF THE VEHICLE IN AN AREA WHERE IT SHOULD NOT BE, PERHAPS ILLEGALLY PARKED.</p> <p>(6). (U//FOUO) HOLES MADE IN THE VEHICLE BODY TO HIDE EXPLOSIVES AND THEN CRUDELY COVERED.</p> <p>(7). (U//FOUO) EVIDENCE THAT AN INTERIOR DOOR PANEL HAS BEEN REMOVED TO HIDE EXPLOSIVES.</p> <p>(8). (U//FOUO) THE PRESENCE OF POWDER OR PRILLS (SMALL ROUNDED GRANULAR MATERIAL) LEFT WHEN EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL WAS LOADED INTO THE VEHICLE.</p> <p>(9). (U//FOUO) RECENT PAINTING OF THE VEHICLE TO COVER BODY ALTERATIONS.</p> <p>(10). (U//FOUO) ADDITIONAL FUEL TANKS, USED TO SECRETE EXPLOSIVES OR TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GASOLINE TO FUEL THE EXPLOSIVE EVENT.</p> <p>(11). (U//FOUO) UNUSUAL SMELLS, E.G., A BURNING TIME FUSE, GASOLINE, FERTILIZER, ETC.</p> <p>(12). (U//FOUO) AN ADDITIONAL ANTENNA ON THE</p>		

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						<p>CAR FOR RADIO-CONTROLLED DEVICES.</p> <p>(13). (U//FOUO) ANY DISTURBANCE TO THE UNDERCOATING OR DIRT ON THE BOTTOM OF A VEHICLE.</p> <p>(14). (U//FOUO) INDICATIONS THAT DRIVERS MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH VBIED ARE AS FOLLOWS:</p> <p>(A). (U//FOUO) DRIVING ERRATICALLY; DRIVING TOO SLOW OR TOO FAST.</p> <p>(B). (U//FOUO) IGNORING ORDERS TO STOP, ATTEMPTING TO CIRCUMVENT A SECURITY CHECKPOINT, OR ATTEMPTING TO MANEUVER TOO CLOSE TO COALITION ASSETS.</p> <p>(C). (U//FOUO) WEARING INAPPROPRIATE DRESS OR GROOMING FOR THE VEHICLE TYPE.</p> <p>(D). (U//FOUO) SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS, SWEATING, SHAKING, OR UNUSUAL SPEECH PATTERNS.</p> <p>(E). (U//FOUO) THE PRESENCE OF A LONE DRIVER IN THE VEHICLE. THIS IS STANDARD FOR VBIED OPERATIONS; HOWEVER, THERE COULD BE ANY NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE VEHICLE IF THE VBIED IS BEING DRIVEN BY AN UNSUSPECTING PERSON.</p> <p>(F). (U//FOUO) INABILITY TO OPERATE THE TRUCK OR EQUIPMENT PROPERLY.</p> <p>(G). (U//FOUO) ATYPICAL APPEARANCE. MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISTS MAY BE UNCHARACTERISTICALLY CLEAN-SHAVEN AND HAVE VERY SHORT HAIRCUTS. CUTTING THE HAIR IS A PART OF THE PURIFYING RITUAL THAT MANY FOLLOW PRIOR TO AN ATTACK.</p> <p>(H). (U//FOUO) AGE: MID-TWENTIES. THE AVERAGE MIDDLE EASTERN SUICIDE TERRORIST IS ABOUT 24 OR 25, BUT IN THE CURRENT IRAQI SITUATION, AGE IS LESS OF A DISCRIMINATOR.</p> <p>(15). (U) OTHER SUSPICIOUS CONDITIONS:</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>(A). OCCUPANTS CAREFUL WHEN CLOSING THE DOORS.</p> <p>(B). VEHICLE LEFT LOCKED AND UNOCCUPIED.</p> <p>(C). NOT OBVIOUSLY ENGAGED IN LOADING OR UNLOADING.</p> <p>(D). DISPLAYING HAZARD WARNING LIGHTS.</p> <p>(E). PARKED NEAR OR ADJACENT TO AN IMPORTANT TARGET.</p> <p>(F). ILLEGALLY PARKED.</p> <p>(16). (FOUO) COMMON AREAS FOR CONCEALING VBIED EXPLOSIVES:</p> <p>(A). ABOVE ROOF LINER.</p> <p>(B). BEHIND DOOR PANELS.</p> <p>(C). IN SPARE WHEEL WELL.</p> <p>(D). IN HOLLOWED-OUT SEATS.</p> <p>(E). UNDER FALSE FLOORING.</p> <p>(F). INSIDE FUEL TANK (SMALLER ALTERNATE FUEL TANK ELSEWHERE).</p> <p>(G). IN LEGITIMATE CARGO AREA --- SUCH AS TRUNK, TRAILER, OR STORAGE BIN.</p> <p>(H). IN LEGITIMATE PACKAGED CARGO.</p> <p>(17). (FOUO) GENERAL SAFE BLAST/FRAGMENTATION DISTANCES FOR VBIED HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE AS FOLLOWS:</p> <p>(A). COMPACT SEDANS CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 500 POUNDS (227 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE IN THE TRUNK. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 30 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 381 METERS.</p> <p>(B). FULL-SIZE SEDANS CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 1,000 POUNDS (455 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE IN THE TRUNK. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 38 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 534 METERS.</p> <p>(C). PASSENGER OR CARGO VANS CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 4,000 POUNDS (1,818 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 61 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 838 METERS.</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>(D). SMALL BOX VANS (14 FT) CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 10,000 POUNDS (4,545 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 91 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 1,143 METERS.</p> <p>(E). BOX VAN OR WATER/FUEL TRUCKS CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 30,000 POUNDS (13,636 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 137 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 1,982 METERS</p> <p>(F). (U) SEMI-TRAILER CAN CARRY A MAXIMUM OF 60,000 POUNDS (27,273 KILOS) OF EXPLOSIVE. THIS GIVES A LETHAL BLAST RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 183 METERS, AND A FRAGMENTATION HAZARD OF 2,134 METERS</p> <p>5. (U) THE FOLLOWING TTP MAY PROVE EFFECTIVE DETERRING, DISARMING OR MITIGATING PEDESTRIAN SUICIDE BOMBER ATTACKS:</p> <p>A. (U) VISUAL OBSERVATION REMAINS THE PRIMARY METHOD OF DETECTING SUICIDE BOMBERS (SEE INDICATORS IN PARA 4.</p> <p>C). SCREENING METHODS CAN ALSO BE EMPLOYED SUCH AS HAVING SUSPECTS OPEN THEIR COATS OR LIFT SHIRTS AT A SAFE DISTANCE BEFORE APPROACHING A CHECKPOINT. THERMAL IMAGERS HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE FOR STANDOFF DETECTION OF CONCEALED WEAPONS ON PERSONNEL, PROVIDED THAT EXTERNAL CLOTHING IS NOT TOO HEAVY. THESE ITEMS SERVE AS A HEAT SINK (I.E., BLOCK RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS) AND THEREFORE ARE RENDERED AS DISTINCT SPOTS ON THERMAL IMAGES. THIS TECHNIQUE MAY PROVE EFFECTIVE FOR DETECTING CONCEALED EXPLOSIVES BUT HAS NOT BEEN TESTED IN THIS ROLE.</p>		

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						<p>B. (U) IF A BOMBER IS IDENTIFIED, ORDERS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO EVACUATE THE AREA IMMEDIATELY (MINIMUM OF 50 METERS AWAY) AND TO TAKE COVER (BEHIND SUBSTANTIAL BARRIER). SAFE DISTANCES DEPEND UPON THE MASS OF EXPLOSIVE CARRIED BY THE BOMBER AND THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF FRAGMENTS USED. DISTANCES WILL NECESSARILY BE CONSTRAINED IN URBAN CONDITIONS BUT SAFETY ZONES MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN SELECTING CHECKPOINTS OR ESTABLISHING GATE OPERATIONS. IT SHOULD ALWAYS BE ASSUMED THAT FRAGMENTS ARE PART OF THE CHARGE AS SAFE STANDOFF DISTANCES ARE GREATER FOR FRAGMENTS THAN FOR BLAST.</p> <p>C. (U) IF A BOMBER IS IDENTIFIED, SECURITY PERSONNEL SHOULD TRAIN WEAPONS ON THE BOMBER AND MAINTAIN EYE CONTACT FROM BEHIND COVER. ENSURE FIELDS OF FIRE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND REHEARSED TO AVOID FRATRICIDE AND ENDANGER INNOCENT BYSTANDERS.</p> <p>D. (U) SEPARATE THE SUBJECT FROM THE IED: WARN TARGET THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WILL RESULT IN DEATH. GIVE ORDER TO RAISE HANDS, TAKE OFF OUTER GARMENTS AND PLACE ON THE GROUND. HAVE SUBJECT MOVE A SAFE DISTANCE AWAY FROM CLOTHING AND THEN HANDCUFF. CLOSE AND NEGOTIATE TACTICS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED, AS HOMICIDE BOMBERS ARE TRAINED TO AVOID SURRENDER AT ALL COSTS.</p> <p>E. (U) ASSUME A FAIL SAFE CELL PHONE OR RADIO-CONTROLLED INITIATOR COULD BE USED IN THE EVENT THAT THE BOMBER IS INCAPACITATED OR HESITATES. THIS TACTIC WOULD NORMALLY INVOLVE A SECOND SUSPECT WITH A</p>		

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						<p>LINE-OF-SIGHT VIEW OF THE BOMBER. CONSIDER SURVEILLANCE DETECTION EFFORTS TO MONITOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND DETER ENEMY OBSERVERS NEAR THE CHECKPOINT OR GATE.</p> <p>F. (U) IF DEADLY FORCE IS EMPLOYED, BULLET IMPACT MAY INITIATE THE EXPLOSIVE CHARGE (S). THEREFORE FIRING ON THE SUSPECT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN FROM COVER AND NOT BE AIMED AT MID- BODY.</p> <p>G. (U) IF THE SUSPECT IS NEUTRALIZED AND THERE IS NO EXPLOSION, DO NOT ADMINISTER FIRST AID. THE EXPLOSIVE CHARGE SHOULD BE RENDERED SAFE BY AUTHORIZED EOD PERSONNEL ONLY.</p> <p>6. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE TTP TO CONSIDER TO MITIGATE THE VBIED THREAT AT HIGH RISK VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS:</p> <p>A. (U) ELEMENTS:</p> <p>(1) (U) A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT TO ENSURE COMMAND AND CONTROL.</p> <p>(2). (U) A SECURITY ELEMENT TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING AND OBSERVE FLOW OF VEHICLES APPROACHING THE CHECKPOINT.</p> <p>(3). (U) TRAFFIC SENTRY TO OPERATE STOP POINT FORWARD OF AND CONTROLS TRAFFIC LEADING TO CHECKPOINT. SIGNS IN THE LOCAL LANGUAGE SHOULD BE USED TO COMMUNICATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEGOTIATING BARRIERS LEADING TO SEARCH LOCATION.</p> <p>(4). (U) SEARCH TEAM TO HALT VEHICLES, CONDUCT SEARCHES AND DIRECT CLEARED VEHICLES ONWARD. ONE MEMBER SHOULD SEARCH THE VEHICLE WHILE THE OTHER TEAM MEMBERS PROVIDE OVER WATCH.</p> <p>(5). (U) AN ASSAULT ELEMENT IN FORTIFIED POSITIONS TO OVERWATCH CHECKPOINT. THIS ELEMENT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE (CONSISTENT</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>WITH ROE) ANY VEHICLE THAT ATTEMPTS TO FORCE IT S WAY THROUGH OR POSES A DANGER TO THE CHECKPOINT.</p> <p>B. (U) CHECKPOINTS SHOULD PRESENT A ROBUST SECURITY POSTURE IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE THREATS. CONSIDER EMPLOYING ARMORED VEHICLES AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS IN OVERWATCH POSITIONS TO SUPPORT DISMOUNTED TROOPS. CONSIDER AN ANTIARMOR CAPABILITY FOR SECURITY ELEMENTS.</p> <p>(1). (U) A SERPINTINE VEHICLE MAZE (BARRIERS/ FREEWAY DIVIDERS) CAN BE USED TO SLOW VEHICLES APPROACHING THE SEARCH AREA. A VEHICLE MAZE WILL ENABLE SECURITY PERSONNEL MORE TIME TO REACT TO A VEHICLE ATTEMPTING TO RUN OR ATTACK THE CHECK POINT, AS WELL AS CHANNEL THREAT VEHICLES IN ESCAPE LANES TO A PREDETERMINED LOCATION FOR ENGAGEMENT.</p> <p>(2). (U) HASTY CHECKPOINTS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TERRAIN FEATURES/SURROUNDING OBSTACLES (BRIDGES, HIGHWAY/ROAD INTERSECTIONS, REVERSE SLOPE OF A HILL, JUST BEYOND A SHARP CURVE) TO SLOW VEHICLES AS THEY APPROACH THE CHECKPOINT. DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS MAY REQUIRE ENGINEERS OR OTHER SUPPORT TO EMPLACE OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS TO CHANNEL TRAFFIC. DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS SHOULD INCLUDE HOLDING/SEARCH AREAS WITH APPROPRIATE BLAST PROTECTION FOR PERSONNEL CONDUCTING SEARCHES.</p> <p>C. (U) SUGGESTED PROCEDURES:</p> <p>(1) (U) INSTRUCT PASSENGERS TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE AT A PRE-DESIGNATED AND WELL-MARKED SEARCH AREA.</p> <p>(2). (U) ALL PASSENGERS SHOULD BE</p>		

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						<p>INSTRUCTED TO COME OUT WITH ARMS ABOVE THEIR HEADS. ONCE OUT OF THE VEHICLE, INSTRUCT MALE PASSENGERS TO LIFT THEIR SHIRTS IN ORDER TO ENABLE SECURITY FORCES TO OBSERVE WAIST. IF THERE IS DOUBT, HAVE THEM STRIP.</p> <p>(3). (U) INSTRUCT ONE PASSENGER TO OPEN ALL DOORS, HOOD, AND TRUNK.</p> <p>(4). (U) CONSIDER THAT WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE ALSO CARRIED OUT ATTACKS AND ENSURE THEY ARE DISARMED AS WELL. USE FEMALE US MILITARY/HOST NATION SECURITY PERSONNEL TO SEARCH WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN A SEPARATE, CLOSED AREA.</p> <p>(5). (U) IF ANY MEMBER OF THE CHECKPOINT HAS ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE VEHICLE, BACK EVERYONE OFF AND CALL FOR ASSISTANCE.</p> <p>D. (U) SUGGESTED EQUIPMENT - THE FOLLOWING ARE MISSION ENHANCING TOOLS AT A HIGH RISK CHECKPOINT:</p> <p>(1). (U) LOUD SPEAKER TEAM WITH LINGUIST. TIME PERMITTING, PREPARE AND EMPLACE SIGNS IN THE LOCAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTING DRIVERS WHAT TO EXPECT AND DO AT THE CHECKPOINT.</p> <p>(2). (U) EXPLOSIVE DETECTOR DOG TEAMS.</p> <p>(3). (U) USE OF METAL DETECTOR WANDS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES, IF POSSIBLE, IN ADDITION TO A CRUSH AND FEEL SEARCH.</p> <p>(4). (U) STINGERS/CALTROPS (DEVICE THAT CAN BE DRAGGED ACROSS THE ROAD TO PUNCTURE TIRES).</p> <p>(5). (U) VEHICLE CONTROL AND BLAST MITIGATION BARRIERS.</p> <p>(6). SEPARATE SEARCH AREAS FOR SMALL AND LARGE VEHICLES. CONSIDER USING TRENCHES LARGE ENOUGH FOR VEHICLES TO ENTER SO THEY MAY BE SEARCHED. VEHICLES CAN PULL INTO THE DITCH AND OPEN ALL DOORS PRIOR</p>		

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							TO SEARCH.		
418.		J34	S	6.xx			<p>Add section on manpad threat mitigation: SUBJECT: ANTITERRORISM (AT) MITIGATION MEASURES AGAINST MAN PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPAD) THREAT REF/A/DOD/INST 2000.16/14JUN2001// AMPN/REF A PROMULGATES DOD ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS. RMKS/ 1. THIS IS A COORDINATED MESSAGE FROM OASD (SO/LIC) AND THE JOINT STAFF. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EMPHASIZE TO COMMANDERS AND ANTITERRORISM OFFICERS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING THE MANPAD THREAT IN THEIR AT PLANS. 2. THE 28 NOVEMBER 2002 TERRORIST ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI AIRLINER IN KENYA HIGHLIGHTS THE POTENTIAL MANPAD THREAT TO US AVIATION INTERESTS, BOTH CONUS AND OCONUS. COMMANDERS WHO OWN AND/OR ARE SUPPORTED BY AIR ASSETS SHOULD CONSIDER RISK AND MAKE DECISIONS TO ALTER, DIVERT, OR CANCEL AIR MISSIONS IF THE MANPAD THREAT IS TOO GREAT TO MITIGATE. THIS IS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL FOR LOCATIONS TRANSITED BY COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS MOVING OUR FORCES AND EQUIPMENT. 3. AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (AMC) MAINTAINS A WORLDWIDE DATABASE WITH CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS INFORMATION THAT CAN ASSIST</p> <p>PAGE 09 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS COMMANDERS TO REACH PRUDENT DECISIONS PERTAINING TO THE MANPAD THREAT. THE AMC INTELLIGENCE COMBINED</p>		

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						<p>RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE OFFERS BOTH AUTOMATED RISK ASSESSMENTS KNOWN AS THE VIRTUAL THREAT ASSESSOR (VTA) PROGRAM, AND FORMAL THREAT WORKING GROUP (TWG) VIRTUAL RISK ASSESSMENTS. BOTH PRODUCTS OFFER SUCH ITEMS AS AIRFIELD INFORMATION, TERRORIST, MEDICAL, MILITARY, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND OTHER THREAT INFORMATION, ALONG WITH ARCHIVED BRIEFINGS AND OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION. THE WEB ADDRESS FOR THESE PRODUCTS IS HTTP://WWW.AMCIN.SCOTT.AF.SMIL.MIL/VTA.</p> <p>4. AIRFIELD SECURITY AND LOCAL AREA ASSESSMENTS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO IDENTIFY THE AREA OF VULNERABILITY TO THE MANPAD THREAT (IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE LAUNCH SITES) TO INCLUDE THE AIRFIELD ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE CORRIDORS AS WELL AS POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE GROUND TARGETS SUCH AS PARKED AIRCRAFT OR GROUND VEHICLE MOTOR POOLS. A THOROUGH ASSESSMENT COULD INCLUDE SECURITY FORCES, INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCAL/HOST NATION AUTHORITIES.</p> <p>A. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-MISSILE AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER HAS FLIGHT PATH THREAT ANALYSIS SIMULATION (FPTAS) SOFTWARE THAT ALLOWS THE LOCAL COMMANDER TO QUANTIFY THE AREAS OF GREATEST</p> <p>PAGE 10 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS MANPAD THREAT. FPTAS USES AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE, FLIGHT PATH DATA, MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS, AND DIGITAL TERRAIN ELEVATION DATA TO</p>		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<p>GENERATE MAPS DEPICTING AREAS FROM WHICH MANPADS COULD ENGAGE U.S. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT. COMMANDERS HAVE USED THESE MAPS TO IDENTIFY FLIGHT PATHS WITH MINIMUM EXPOSURE TO THE MANPAD THREAT AND HAVE ADJUSTED TAKE-OFF/LANDING PATTERNS TO LIMIT THEIR EXPOSURE AND UTILIZE AREAS READILY SECURED BY GROUND TROOPS. THIS SOFTWARE CAN BE DOWNLOADED AT THE FOLLOWING WEB SITE: HTTP://MSIC.DIA.SMIL.MIL/MS_HOME_PAGES/FPTAS/.</p> <p>B. CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE MANPAD LAUNCH SITES INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1). COVER AND CONCEALMENT - THE ABILITY OF AN OBJECT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE TERRORIST FROM RETURN FIRE AND PREVENT DETECTION BY SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL. (2). LINE OF SIGHT PROVIDING UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW OF THE TARGET. (3). EXPOSURE TIME - THE AMOUNT OF TIME THE INTENDED TARGET IS VULNERABLE FROM AN OPERATIONAL ATTACK. (4). DISTANCE TO TARGET AND TARGET RECOGNITION FOR THE TERRORIST TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE INTENDED TARGET. (5). ACCESSIBILITY OF THE LOCATION FOR EASE OF INGRESS/EGRESS, SET <p>PAGE 11 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS UP TIME REQUIRED FOR A TERRORIST FIRE TEAM TO GET INTO POSITION TO ATTACK, AND THE TIME TO DISCOVERY IN TERMS OF THE AMOUNT OF TIME IT TAKES TO DETECT A FIRE TEAM ONCE THEIR WEAPONS ARE EXPOSED.</p> <p>5. THERE ARE TWO AREAS WHERE COMMANDERS AND ANTITERRORISM OFFICERS</p>		

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						<p>SHOULD EMPLOY MITIGATION MEASURES TO COUNTER THE MANPAD THREAT: AIRFIELD/INSTALLATION DEFENSE AND REDUCING AIRCRAFT IN-FLIGHT SUSCEPTIBILITY.</p> <p>A. THE FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN DEVELOPING AT PLANS IN REGARDS TO AIRFIELD/INSTALLATION DEFENSE AND THE MANPAD THREAT.</p> <p>(1). ONCE AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE LAUNCH SITES IS ACCOMPLISHED, PRIME MANPAD LAUNCH SITES AND VULNERABLE AREAS CAN BE ISOLATED BY EXPANDING THE AIRFIELD AREA OF CONTROL AND REDUCING AREAS OF VULNERABILITY. THE FOLLOWING MITIGATION MEASURES MAY REQUIRE COORDINATION WITH LOCAL/HOST NATION AUTHORITIES:</p> <p>(A). INCREASED PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT PRIME LAUNCH SITES. VISUAL OBSERVATION OF SECURITY TEAMS IS A STRONG DETERRENT.</p> <p>(B). FOCUSED AND RANDOM PATROLS OF VULNERABLE AREAS. INCORPORATE RANDOM PATROLS INTO THE INSTALLATION RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES PROGRAM.</p> <p>(C). IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT SURVEILLANCE OF VULNERABLE</p> <p>PAGE 12 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS AREAS TO INCLUDE BOTH LAUNCH SITES AND POTENTIAL TARGETS.</p> <p>(2). ENSURING PERSONNEL ARE EDUCATED ON THE MANPAD THREAT (TO INCLUDE COMPONENT RECOGNITION), AREAS OF VULNERABILITY, AND REACTION PLANS. DEVELOP AND PROVIDE MANPAD AWARENESS TRAINING FOR SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL AND LOCAL/HOST NATION LAW ENFORCEMENT. DEVELOP A MANPAD</p>		

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						<p>AWARENESS PROGRAM FOR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH GROUPS AND LOCAL BUSINESSES/INSTALLATION FACILITIES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO AIRFIELDS OR ALONG FLIGHT PATHS. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-MISSILE AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER HAS A WEB SITE IN THEIR ENDURING FREEDOM SECTION THAT HAS A MANPADS LINK THAT IS A GOOD SOURCE FOR INFORMATION ON MANPAD SYSTEMS (HTTP://MSIC.DIA.SMIL.MIL/MS_HOME_PAGES/SAM/SD_HOME_PAGE3.HTML). OTHER TRAINING MAY EXIST WITHIN DOD. CONTACT YOUR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR GUIDANCE.</p> <p>(3). ENSURING TIGHT AIRFIELD ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE FOR AIRFIELD OPERATIONS. CONSIDER DISPERSAL OF PARKED AIRCRAFT TO REDUCE DAMAGE FROM A MANPAD OR ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE ATTACK.</p> <p>(4). DEVELOPING AND EXERCISING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR RESPONDING TO AN INCIDENT OF A MANPAD THREAT. RAPID REACTION PLANS WILL FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE CAPTURE OF A TERRORIST TEAM, EVEN POST ATTACK, TO</p> <p>PAGE 13 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS DETER/PREVENT FUTURE ATTACKS AND EASE CONCERN FOR AIR TRAVEL SAFETY BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE.</p> <p>B. THE FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN DEVELOPING AT PLANS TO REDUCE AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT SUSCEPTIBILITY DUE TO THE MANPAD THREAT.</p> <p>(1). ESTABLISHING AIRFIELD SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF AIRCREW TACTICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND/OR TACTICS. DEVELOPMENT AND</p>		

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>DISSEMINATION MAY REQUIRE COORDINATION WITH LOCAL/HOST NATION AUTHORITIES. ENSURE AIRCREW AWARENESS OF POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MANPAD ON THEIR AIRCRAFT. ENSURE AIRCREWS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE TIED INTO THE AMC INTELLIGENCE COMBINED RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE TO OBTAIN CURRENT INFORMATION ON AIRFIELD SECURITY ASSESSMENTS.</p> <p>(2). VARYING ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES OF AIRCRAFT. STAGGER THE ARRIVAL TIMES OF NORMAL SCHEDULED MISSIONS TO MAKE ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE, AND GROUND TIMES HARDER TO PREDICT FOR THE TERRORIST.</p> <p>(3). RANDOMLY CHANGING APPROACH AND DEPARTURE ROUTES AS A DETERRENT (IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION GUIDELINES).</p> <p>(4). LIMITING OR DISCONTINUE USE OF LANDING LIGHTS WITHIN IDENTIFIED THREAT ZONES TO REDUCE HEAT PRODUCING/TARGETING OPTIONS.</p> <p>(5). IN HIGH THREAT AREAS OR WHEN INTELLIGENCE HAS INDICATED A HIGH</p> <p>PAGE 14 RUEKJCS1213 UNCLAS ALERT STATUS, COORDINATING AND DEVELOPING PLANS FOR ENGINE RUNNING OFFLOADS TO MINIMIZE GROUND TIME.</p> <p>6. OASD (SO/LIC) SO-CT (AT) POINT OF CONTACT IS LTC DENNIS GREENWOOD, AT DSN 223-0286, COMMERCIAL 703-693-0286, EMAIL ADDRESS: DENNIS.GREENWOOD@OSD.MIL. BT</p>		
419.		J34	S	7.01		All	Add corresponding references and appendixes with	Common, necessary tasks	a

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							diagrams of entry control points, bunker construction, HeESCO bastion barrier construction, countermobility ditch construction		
420.		USN J8 JRO CBRND /Navy	A	7.01		22.25	Change as follows: If the attack involves a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) device, the number of casualties and the extent of the areas involved may quickly overwhelm organic resources. This situation is covered in more detail later in section paragraph 5.	Need to establish acronym as it is used later in the text and this seems to be its first use.	a
421.		CSO/DTR A	A	7.01	b	22-25	Replace " If the attack involves a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive device, the number of casualties and the extent of the areas involved may quickly overwhelm organic resources. " to read: " <u>Attacks employing CBRNE weapons may produce massive casualties or widespread destruction, which can quickly overwhelm organic resources.</u> "	Original wording is confusing	See above
422.		USAF	A	7.01	b	20	Change to read: A commander's responsibility <u>and authority</u> to enforce security measures and to protect persons and property is paramount during any level of conflict.	This statement appears in various places throughout the text – make it consistent. Change ties in the comments from Chapter one where it details DoD Policy for commanders at all levels have the Responsibility and Authority to enforce appropriate security measures. Because of this fact OSD/JS should work together with the services to develop a baseline illustration showing, which programs when executed to certain strategic goals and performance objectives, i.e., the DoD AT Program, contribute to the commanders, responsibility and authority, generally referred to by a commander's FP responsibility. If we are going to hold commanders accountable for this	a

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								responsibility we should take the next step by establishing a baseline from which they can adjust based upon their mission requirements and resource available.	
423.		J34	S	7.01		2	Add TCM... so it should read TIR and Terrorism Consequence Management	Completeness	A
424.		J34	S	7.01		19	Insert a new paragraph. Label it "B. Terrorism Consequence Management..." and describe it similarly to the new 2000.16 definitions and new DoD Stds 20 and 21. The chapter can then better distinguish between the two concepts. Items of interest could include discussion of mass notification and medical surveillance. Include the diagram from PDD 39 that shows how Crisis management and consequence management overlap depending on what type of effort is underway.	Consistency with stds... TIR and TCM.	A
425.		CSO/DTR A	A	7.01	b	22-25	Replace " If the attack involves a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive device, the number of casualties and the extent of the areas involved may quickly overwhelm organic resources. " to read: " <u>Attacks employing CBRNE weapons may produce massive casualties or widespread destruction, which can quickly overwhelm organic resources.</u> "	Original wording is confusing	A
426.		USN	A	7.02		1	Delete: This Chapter addresses management of a terrorist incident.	Unnecessary	A
427.		SOUTHCOM	S	7.02	1d	10.13	After paragraph: "There are an unlimited number of potential terrorist incidents requiring a response. Developing separate courses of action for each is an unrealistic task. To prepare for the most probable, or likely threats, AT Plans should address (at an absolute minimum) each potential threat identified through the Threat Assessment Process. <i>Additionally, broad category threat response plans should be developed in order to provide an initial response to threats not yet identified through the Threat Assessment Process</i> "	As currently written, the intent of this paragraph is to focus units on most likely threats. However, while it is important that units place emphasis on probable and/or likely threats determined from the threat assessment, they should also be prepared to some degree for other possible threats not yet identified as significant through the threat assessment. Adding the	A

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							sentence prevents units from focusing too narrowly on select events without developing even a basic plan for other threats not yet on the radar.	
428.	USAF	A	7.02	c	3.4	Change to read: "DODI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards"	DODI previously provided as abbreviation – document previously provided with full title and date so short title can be used.	A
429.	USAF	A	7.03	a	8	Change to read: ". . . .element of the DOD CbT Program <u>DOD AT program</u> ."	2000.14 is being canceled by 2000.16.	A
430.	USAF	M	7.04	3a	12.17	Change to read: "a. Onset of a Terrorist Incident: The onset of a terrorist incident begins with the detection of an unlawful act of violence or threatened violence. Detection may result from routine surveillance performed by an installation or facility intrusion detection system, guard or security force, <u>an unusual incidence of an infectious disease in the case of bioterrorism, or aware vigilant DOD-affiliated or community persons.</u> Once detection of a criminal act occurs, first responding security or law enforcement personnel must perform an initial assessment."	Bioterrorism and covert terrorist acts are often overlooked in anti-terrorism plans. Based on over 20 exercises at AF installations and feedback from JSIPP bases, it is obvious that plans for reaction to a bioterrorist incident are lacking in most functional areas. Most installations have not determined procedures for: (1) integrating patient surveillance systems with installation security/response, (2) increasing FPCON based on a potential bioterrorist event, and (3) implementing measures in concert with civilian/local authorities to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.	A
431.	USAF JFCOM	S	7.04	B1	21	Change to Read: On-duty Security Forces/Military Police patrols or guard personnel usually provide initial response to a terrorist attack. The initial response force is usually under the control of the on-scene senior officer or non-commissioned officer assuming responsibility. The Initial Response Force consists of the forces identified in the installation's/ship's terrorist	Clarification, accepts that the initial response force may include elements other than MPs depending on the incident	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							response plans with on-scene command relationships and chain of command clearly established in the same sources.		
432.		USJFCO M	M	7.04		13.15	Change as follows: "Detection may result from routine surveillance performed by an installation or facility intrusion detection system, guard or security force, <u>an unusual incidence of an infectious disease in the case of bioterrorism, or aware vigilant</u> DOD-affiliated persons."	Completeness. Bioterrorism and covert terrorist acts are often overlooked in anti-terrorism plans and many installations have not established procedures for: (1) integrating patient surveillance systems with installation security/response, (2) increasing FPCON based on a potential bioterrorist event, and (3) implementing measures in concert with civilian/local authorities to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.	A
433.		USJFCO M USAF	S	7.05		9.11	Change as follows: " Each <u>Every</u> shift of the daily security force must have trained personnel who are aware of the threat and are capable of reacting promptly to any new development."	Clarity; all assigned forces should be trained and knowledgeable.	A
434.		USJFCO M	S	7.05		19.21	Change as follows: " For foreign incidents, t <u>The initial response force must also be prepared to interface with local law enforcement or emergency service personnel, host nation police, or military forces that may also be responding to the incident.</u> "	Synchronization of emergency services is equally as important in domestic incidents as it is in foreign incidents.	A
435.		J8 CBRND	S	7.05	3b3	19.21	Add to paragraph, " to the incident in accordance with existing Host Nation Support Memorandums of Agreement and/or Status of Forces Agreements.:	More clearly explain legal considerations	A
436.		J8 CBRND	S	7.11		7.9	Add after tactics "and secondary attacks with the desired purpose of harming first responder personnel."	Secondard attacks are common tactic	A
437.		USAF	A	7.06	3d2a	21	Change to read: "...medical); hazardous materials; bioenvironmental <u>engineering</u> ; safety; and public affairs..."	Properly references bioenvironmental engineering function.	A
438.		USJFCO M	S	7.06		9.16	Delete references to "predetermined locations" and "pre-designated in the EOC's SOPs."	All plans will most likely be modified upon execution to suit the specific crisis at hand.	A
439.		USAF	A	7.07	2	18	Change host government to <u>HN</u>	Previously used acronym.	A
440.		USAF USJFCO	S	7.11	b	4	Add: <u>All initial responders, such as fire and medical personnel must understand and be trained to protect the</u>	Clarification, personnel other than MPs require this training	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		M					<u>incident location as a crime scene within established protocols.</u>		
441.		USAF	A	7.15	5a	14	Change to read: National-level responders many not be immediately accessible nor available	Grammar	A
442.		J34	A	7.16		1.8	Insert new para 1. "activate mass notification telling personnel to shelter in place, evacuate or take other appropriate action."		A
443.		CSO/DTR A	A	7.16	d	15	Replace words: "This parallelism shall ensure <u>ensures</u> that if there is a need for Federal assistance, incoming support can easily transition into the appropriate functional areas on the installation."	Active versus passive	A
444.		USN	M	7.17		6.07	GENERAL COMMENT: Validate use of National Response Plan as appropriate in the following text: The tenets of the National Response Plan shall help an installation develop its response based on crisis and consequence management.	JP 3-08 and JP 3-26 FC Drafts have been modified to reflect the NRP is "still-coming", thus they elected to mention the I-NRP and other references.	A
445.		USAF	S	7.19	6b	21	Add paragraph: <u>(5) Sample collection, including samples collected at the scene taken during initial and follow-on response.</u>	Key evidence and crucial to site characterization.	A
446.		USAF	A	7.20	c	5	"In coordination with the <u>Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)</u> , an after-action report should be prepared within <u>seven 7</u> working"	First use of SJA – numbers under 10 should be spelled out.	A
447.		USAF	A	7.21	3	17	Who are our combating terrorism forces?? Do you mean US Special Operations Command as in our Counter Terrorism Forces, or is this a new term to indicate a special AT/CT force?	Clarify who the CbT forces our in this paragraph.	Use- When US militArY forces are employed, the DoD provides a spokesma n for addressin g military operationa l matters.
448.		USAF	A	7.22	5f	23	Change to read: " should be given to media representatives <u>personnel</u> ;..."	Style; agreement	A
449.		USAF	S	7.22	5f	23.1	Change to read: "...however, they should not be permitted to visit the incident site <u>until the investigation is complete</u> and such access is cleared by <u>appropriate officials.</u> "	Not in agreement with 5e(6); or principles of release of information under 5400.1; 5400.14	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
450.		J34	S	Appendix A			Insert Joint Threat Assessment example	Fm JAT guide and CIFA	A
451.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	M	C.03	2.d.	13	Delete: "Assets include personnel, equipment, stockpiles, buildings, recreation areas, or transportation systems that are deemed critical as defined by <i>DoD Antiterrorism Force Protection Installation Planning Template</i> .", or Change to Read: "Assets include personnel, equipment, stockpiles, buildings, or transportation systems that are deemed critical as defined by <i>DODD 3020</i> ."	Unlike the AT planning template, a DODD is an authoritative reference.	A
452.		USAF	A	C.03		1.3	and the " Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability " (CARVER) matrix tool,	The acronym CARVER is already established on page B-3.	A
453.		USAF	A	D.01	c	20	applicable to managers of OSD <u>Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities</u> as they develop plans to protect personnel,	Correct terms	A
454.		USAF	A	D.03			Be consistent throughout sample AT plan with ENTER vs. Enter and brackets.	Consistency.	A
455.		USAF	S	D4.06	2	10	"It is also designed to <u>detect and deter</u> a terrorist threat, . . . "	One must have the SA from detection before you know you can or need to deter something.	A
456.		USCG	A	D.1	1.c.	19-20	Change to read: "... it is applicable <u>applies</u> to managers ..."	Grammar.	A
457.		USAF	S	D.12	5	22	". . . deployment of a Joint Task Force <u>or a President or Secretary of Defense</u> directed mission. . . . "	Current terminology – NCA is no longer used.	A
458.		USAF	A	D.14	Annex B	9	Add: "Appendix 1 – DIA Threat Assessment or Service worldwide Threat Assessment, e.g. USAF (XOHD) Postulated Worldwide Nonnuclear Threat." Adjust Appendixes as appropriate.	One of the JSIVA trends for the USAF (XOHD) has been installation officials not being familiar with the USAF (XOHD) product.	A
459.		USAF	A	D.19	Appendix 2	3	Combating Terrorism Readiness <u>Initiative Fund (CbT RIF)</u> Submission Instructions.	Correct term.	A
460.		USN	A	55.01 to 55.30			GENERAL COMMENT: Consider placing text in a matrix format.	A matrix would present the material in a clearer format that is more user friendly. It	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								would better adapt itself to field use, reproduction for handbooks, SOPs, and other uses the operating forces may have. It would also reduce the volume of the pub	
461.		USAF	S	55.01	a	18	Add: _____ Is commander/ATO aware of and integrating other programs supporting FP?	Ties in the relationship of FP and the AT program spelled out in Chapter 1 and DoD's Policy on the AT program and the commander responsibility and accountability for FP.	A
462.		USAF	S	55.02	a	18	Add: _____ Do ALL installation units participate in RAMs?	JSIVA trend analysis shows that RAM programs are not being executed installation wide, and usually fall on the SFS or MP units.	A
463.		USAF	S	55.02	a	23	Add: _____ ATO staff and resources sufficient, e.g., reliable and accessible SIPRNET access?	JSIVA trend data shows this to be a problem.	A
464.		USAF	S	55.03	a	2	DIA, <u>service specific</u> and/or FBI threat Assessment current?	Pertinent to USAF via JSIVA trend data.	A
465.		USAF	S	55.04	b	4	Is ATWG active? Meeting minutes documented, <u>open items follow-up and closed?</u> Accomplishments?	It is not enough that these groups meet and document their meetings – there needs to be an accounting of the open items and process to track and close them – just as we request for MOU/MOA due to PCS and personnel rotations, this process must be follow-upped and tracked. This is one reason why C-VAMP has come around – because we find the same vulnerabilities over and over again.	A
466.		USAF	S	55.04	c	8	Do threat assessments provided by DIA, <u>service counterintelligence, intelligence</u> and/or FBI <u>integrate with the</u> local threat assessment process.	I don't know where you are going with this statement – DIA TAs will not have the low level information that the local	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							What is your intended focus here – the TA provided by DIA/FBI, etc. or the local process??	TAs should be providing.	
467.		USAF JFCOM	M	55.04	2c	13	Change to read: “Consider the vulnerability of the facilities <u>and utilities</u> ?”	Many DOD facilities rely on local communities for their utility support	A
468.		USAF JFCOM	M	55.04	2c	15	Change to read: “Consider the criticality of the facilities <u>and utilities</u> ?”	Many DOD facilities rely on local communities for their utility support	A
469.		USAF	A	55.05	c	8	Is <u>counterintelligence</u> or law enforcement support needed?	CI all one word.	A
470.		USAF	S	55.05	c	12	Local information network established? <u>Part of ATWG?</u>	Need to bring state, local, federal reps from off the base on the base to integrate information flow.	A
471.		J34	S	55.08		20	Delete (OCONUS)		A
472.		USAF	A	55.09	g	23	Does the plan layout the task organization and Mission Essential or Vulnerable Areas (MEVAs)?	Grammar	A
473.		USCG	A	55.1	1.	7	Change to read: “... following C checklist is ...”	Grammar. No need to capitalize.	A
474.		USAF	A	55.12	g	3	Mass notification procedures?	Grammar	A
475.		USJFCO M	A	55.07		8	Comment: Recommend breaking Level I through IV training into four distinct lines on the checklist. The fact that a unit has all required personnel trained at one level, does not automatically mean all personnel are adequately trained at all levels. Division into four distinct entries would provide better management information.		A
476.		USJFCO M	A	55.13		10	Delete: “High Risk Personnel”.	This question is handled in section 7 (page E-19).	A
477.		USJFCO M	A	55.13		19	Delete: “Annual Level I training current?”	Redundant. Same as line 8.	A
478.		USJFCO M	A	55.13		21	Delete: “AOR updates current and briefed?”	Redundant. Same as line 12.	A
479.		USN	M	55.14		10	GENERAL COMMENT: Recommend adding <u>FPCON attainment procedures</u> , i.e. notification to chain of command, time to set FPCON, requested waivers for measures that are unattainable and why, statement that tenants were notified, and so on.	Completeness	A
480.		USAF	S	55.14	h.	9	Terrorist Consequence Management Measures or Consequence Management measures (Page E-12, line	Consistency. Which one – is there a difference that needs to be spelled out in Glossary.	Use TCM

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							7)		
481.		USJFCO M	S	55.15		17	Delete: "Emergent (OCONUS) needs for immediate support by CbT-RIF"	(1).CbT-RIF is no longer restricted to OCONUS use.(2). Redundant. Same as line 14.	A
482.		USAF	A	55.17	j	4	"For deploying organizations (e.g., battalion,"	Grammar	A
483.		USAF	S	55.17	3.	13	". . . .itinerary, safeguarding classified material, <u>evaluating articles in installation publications</u>)?"	This is an area where we can close some gaps – What did we do right after 11 Sep – review and scrub web pages for to much revealing information, have we migrated that information along with the it can't happen here mentally back to our web pages and processes?	A
484.		USAF	A	55.18	4	6	"Does the command have procedures to receive and process Defense <u>Threat Terrorism</u> Warning Reports <u>Messages</u>"	Correct Term	A
485.		USAF	A	55.19	7	12	"Have personnel designated as "-Personnel at High-Risk. . . ."	Grammar	A
486.		USAF	A	55.21	9	23	" <u>Do S</u> service members in Moderate, Significant,"	Grammar	A
487.		USAF	A	55.23	10	23	"Does the <u>AT</u> plan. . . ." * Specify here and throughout the section (See E-24, line 19, also E-27 para 15.) that we are referring to the AT plan.	Consistency	A
488.		USJFCO M	S	55.23			Insert into section 9: "Has the staff judge advocate considered the ramifications of imposing these housing policies in CONUS and advised on the consequences?" (See the discussion on Congressional intent for HRP travel safety. Should similar considerations of "highly unusual circumstances" be applied here? Note page H-23)	CONUS has been a significant threat area since 9/11. Some of these policies should be enforced in CONUS, but may be a violation of the law.	A
489.		USAF	A	55.29	15	21	"Does the command review <u>their</u> own and subordinate"	Grammar	A
490.		USAF	S	55.30	15	1	"Does the command review the AT <u>program plan</u> when the terrorist threat level changes?"	The program will consist of the five minimum elements one of which is the plan – the plan should have contingencies for what to do if the terrorist threat	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								or ATCON changes – I believe you mean here to review the AT plan.	
491.		USN	M	56.00			GENERAL COMMENT: This pub must be written in coordination with JP 3-26 which is nearing promulgation. Terms, definitions, and acronyms must be the same in both of them.	Consistency across the spectrum of joint pubs..	A
492.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	A	56.01	1.a.	13	Change: "They are outlined in DOD O-2000.12-H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook, Appendix 3, DOD FPCON System." To Read: "They are outlined in DODI 2000.16." If: This proposed change to DODI 2000.16 occurs prior to publication of this JTTP.	Draft DODI 2000.16 adds FPCON measures and removes them from DOD O-2000.12-H.	A
493.		EUCOM EPOC-AT USAF CSA/DTR A	S	56.01	1.a.	16	Ref: "Per DOD Instruction 2000.16, <i>DoD Antiterrorism Standards</i> , FPCON measures are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. An AT Plan with a complete listing of site-specific AT measures, linked to an FPCON, shall be classified, as a minimum, CONFIDENTIAL. When separated from the AT Plan, specific measures and FPCON measures remain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Recommended change in draft DODI 2000.16 to this requirement is: "Complete listings of site-specific AT measures, linked to an ATCON, shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL to ensure proper safeguarding of AT Plans. When separated from the AT Plan, specific AT measures linked to an ATCON and site-specific ATCON levels may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Release outside of command/ATplanning channels shall only be made to those personnel tasked with execution and then only those specific measures for which they have responsibility." Language in this JTTP should mirror, at time of submission for signature, current DODI 2000.16.	Language in this JTTP should mirror, at time of submission for signature, current DODI 2000.16.	R- NO ATCONS
494.		USAF	S	56.08	2	6	Insert: An Installation's Tactical Deception Plan can be bolstered by the use of RAMS	On page F-7 there is a caveat that relates: "Advantages of implementing RAMS include, but are not limited to:" and	A

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							then 7 advantages are listed. While this caveat exists stating that there are more advantages, the one advantage that is often overlooked is the impact RAMS can have on a tactical deception plan. RAMS can often serve as the active process of an implemented deception plan.	
495.	USAF JFCOM	S	56.08	B	19	Add: <u>Provides a means to test the procedure, utilizing various methods, resources and personnel to ensure it can be effectively implement in an emergency.</u>	Clarification, additional knowledge	A
496.	EUCOM EPOC-AT	M	56.09	c.(3)		Change: "RAMs should be visible (to confuse surveillance attempts) and should involve the command as a whole, not just the security forces." To Read: "RAMs should include visible actions in order to confuse surveillance attempts) and should involve the command as a whole, not just the security forces."	While generally true, some RAMs should not be visible (e.g. countersurveillance, selected enhanced security measures).	1. A
497.	USN JFCOM	S	56.12		17	Add: <u>Specific measures for each FPCON are listed in Appendix X</u>		A- add FPCONS to an appendix
498.	USCG	A	56.4	3.b.	18	Change to read: "b. The DOD -FPCON system allows ..."	Consistency in addressing FPCON system. Use of DOD is not necessary as this is a JP. Also, see para 1.b. of this appendix which does not use the DOD qualifier for the FPCON system.	A
499.	USCG	A	57.1	1.	8	Change to read: "... Office - <u>Department</u> of Homeland e <u>Security</u> ..."	Grammar.	A
500.	USAF	A	58.12	b	10	<u>". . . explosive devices, or evidence of biological agents, e.g., suspicious white powder."</u>	Lest we forget about the Anthrax attacks.	A
501.	USAF	A	58.19	5a	15	<u>"Executives, family members and staff should check persons"</u> * Make change here and else where throughout this section where it would apply.	Executive will most likely be at the office most of the time – it will be the family and staff members that will need to exercise cognizance of who is in, at and around the	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								residences.	
502.		USAF	A	58.21	n	10.11	Executives should cooperate with law enforcement security personnel and abide by their security recommendations concerning you're home security.	Grammar	A
503.		EUCOM EPOC-AT	S	58.29	(a)1.		Ensure the following is a factor in determining HAV authorizations: "1. Country Threat Level. HAVs are for use primarily overseas in countries with High Terrorist Threat Levels. Considerations include the threat capability and vulnerability of the target, and environment in which the threat operates."	Emperical data would suggest that the country threat level is not, nor should be, a compelling factor. Rather the symbolic value of the target and assessed threat to that invidual should be paramount.	A
504.		USAF	A	58.34	10a	20	". . . protective security details PSDs, is constant."	Previously used acronym.	A
505.		USAF	A	58.34	b	23	"Executive have a special responsibility to set a personal example of combating terrorism awareness, . . ."	It will be through their awareness to terrorism, the threat, capabilities and effects that they can set the example for the reason for a strong AT program.	A
506.		USAF	S	60.04		14	In order to ascertain what the most recent version of JP 1-02 is, need to include "as amended" date.	Completeness	A
507.		USJFCO M	A	60.04		14	Change as follows: "26. JP 1-02, <i>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i> <u>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</u> ."	Correct format for referencing a JP.	A
508.		USAF	A	60.05		18	3336. CJCSI 3121.01A, " <i>Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces (U)</i> ."	Note: This CJCSI is not listed in the CJCSI publications listing (April 2004) of the JEL.	A
509.		USAF	S	61.01			Add the following to the References in Appendix K: " <u>Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (18 USC 1385)</u> "	Follows other instances of publications that are used in this publication are listed as references.	A
510.		J8 CBRND	S	60.01		23	Add National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002"	Key National policy document	A
511.		J8 CBRND	S	60.02		4	Add National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key aAssets, Feb 2003	Key document	A
512.		USAF	A	61.01	5	18	United States Department of State, <i>Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 2003, April 2004</i>	Latest version	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
513.		USAF	A	61.02	14.	17	DOD O-2000.12-H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook, 9 February 2004.”	Correct title	A
514.		USAF	A	61.02	15.	20	DODD 3020, Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection	Current DRAFT title	A
515.		USAF	A	61.03		8	Add: <u>DOD Directive 5200.27, “Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense”</u>	Vital reference for proper handling of law enforcement and other information on other-than-DOD personnel.	A
516.		USAF	M	61.06	N/A	N/A	Add the following references: DCI Memorandum, Homeland Security Information Sharing Memorandum of Understanding, 4 Mar 2003 (DAC-01355-03) DepSecDef Memorandum, Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DoD Within The United States, 2 May 2003 (U05646-03)	Pertinent references.	A
517.		<u>CSO/DTR</u> <u>A</u>	A	61.4 Appd x K	1	1	Add “DoD Directive 5105.62, <u>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</u> ”	Valid reference.	A
518.		USCG	A	61.4	25.	11- 12	General comment. JP 1-01 may be replaced by CJCSI 5120.02 by the time this pub is published.		A-CHECK AT TIME OF PUBLICA TION
519.		USAF	A	99.01			Add the following acronyms to Glossary, Part I: CARVER - Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability. CVAMP - Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program. HAV - Heavy Non-Tactical Armored Vehicle JSIVA - Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment MEVA - Mission Essential Vulnerable Area MSHARPP - Mission, Symbolism, History, Accessibility, Recognizability, Population, and Proximity. NTAV - Non-Tactical Armored Vehicle PSD - Protective Security Details	These acronyms are used in appendices B, C, and H of this JP.	A
520.		USJFCO M	A	99.02		8	“CISO” definition: Insert an <i>alternative / additional</i> definition of “CISO,” i.e., “counterintelligence staff officer”	Consistency with JP 1-02.	A
521.		USN	A	99.03		1.02	Change as follows: DODD Department of Defense D irective	Lower case per JP 1-02	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							DODI Department of Defense Instruction		
522.		USN	M	99.03		19.20	Change as follows: HLD homeland defense HLS homeland security	Acronyms per JP 3-26 FCD	A
523.		USN JFCOM	S	99.04		10	Add <u>IPPT Installation Antiterrorism Program and Planning Tool</u>	Used in Chapter VIII (pg.16 line 18)	A
524.		USN	A	99.04		11	Change as follows: J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff	Lower case per JP 1-02	A
525.		USN JFCOM	A	99.04		17	Add <u>JSIVA</u> and its definition	The acronym is used throughout the document.	A
526.		USAF	A	99.05			Add MAA and its associated meaning, or delete from publication. Term is also not in JP 1-02 – add if pertinent.	Used in text.	A
527.		USN	A	99.06		8	Change as follows: RAM random antiterrorism measures	Acronyms should generally be singular.	A
528.		USN	A	99.06		11	Change as follows: Move entry for "R&R" to precede that of "RAM".	Alphabetization.	A
529.		USAF	A	99.07		6	Change "Investigations" to "Investigation"	Correctness	A
530.		USAF	S	99.08			Need to insert a definition of Consequence Management (taken from JP 1-02) into the Glossary. Note that "consequence management" is mentioned some 13 times in JP 3-07.2	Completeness	A
531.		USN	M	99.09		15.22	Change as follows: force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)	Although approved in JP 1-02, this sentence is not part of a <u>definition</u> . It is merely a reason for "force protection". Recommend revision of JP 1-02.	A
532.		USAF	A	99.09			Add the following term and its definition to the Glossary, part II. DOD Elements and Personnel - A collective term meaning DOD military and civilian personnel and their dependent family members; DOD contractors; DOD installations and facilities; DOD-	Completeness. This term is used frequently in this JP, but is not defined. Source: DOD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							owned, leased, or managed infrastructure and assets critical to mission accomplishment; and other DOD-owned, leased, or managed mission essential assets overseas and in the United States, its territories, and possessions.		
	533.	USN	M	99.11		12.14	Change as follows: homeland defense. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. <u>United States</u> territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States external threats and aggression. Also called HLD.	Use definition and acronym from JP 3-26 FCD.	A
	534.	USN	M	99.11		17.22	Change as follows: homeland security. Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state, and federal organizations. Also called HLS. The concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to them and major disasters and emergencies, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. Also called HS.	Recommend use of definition modified from JP 3-26 FCD and acronym HD.	A
	535.	USAF	S	99.11		12.15	Coordinate with JP 3-26 writing personnel and SPG personnel. DOD has only "working" Definitions of HLD and HLS.	HS is defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security. DoD has no official definitions for HD. Those will be decided by SPG projects to complete this summer. Be consistent with what you put in here with what is in JP 3-26, to include using the same acronyms for HS and HD. SPG in Force Planning	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								construct, Page 6 – lists “Defend the U.S. Homeland” – the “external” terminology has been removed.	
536.		USN	M	99.13		17.23	Change as follows: military assistance to civil authorities. Those activities and measures taken by DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including natural and manmade disasters, national security emergencies, and DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Also called MACA. The broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances. Also called MACA.	Recommend use of definition in JP 3-26 FCD.	A
537.		USN	M	99.13		17.23	Change as follows: military assistance to civil authorities. Those activities and measures taken by DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including natural and manmade disasters, national security emergencies, and DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Also called MACA. The broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances. Also called MACA.	Recommend use of definition in JP 3-26 FCD.	A
538.		USN	M	99.14		3.04	Delete from this pub and from JP 1-02: negotiations. A discussion between authorities and a barricaded offender or terrorist to effect hostage release and terrorist surrender. (JP 1-02)	This definition is too narrow. Negotiations are also common in other military operations besides dealing with terrorists.	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
539.		USN	M	99.14		9.10	Delete from this pub and from JP 1-02. If not deleted, change as follows: operations center. The facility or location on an installation, base, or facility used by the commander to command, control, and coordinate all crisis <u>operational</u> activities. (JP 1-02)	This definition is too narrow (and obvious). Revise or delete from this pub and JP 1-02.	A-REVISE
540.		USN	A	99.14		13.19	Change as follows: operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)	Lower case after a, b, and c per JP 1-02.	A
541.		USN	A	99.15		11	Change as follows: status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which that defines the legal position...	JP 1-02.	A
542.		USN	A	99.15 to 99.16		22.03	Change as follows: terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (This term and its definition replaces the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)	Definition is in JP 1-02.	A
543.		USAF	S	99.16		5	terrorist. An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result. <u>commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.</u>	Accuracy. Clarity. Conformity. 1. In the context of this JP, the definition for terrorist does not conform to the definitions of "terrorism" and "terrorist groups." The latter definitions both specifically include the purpose for the act, i.e., political, religious, or ideological objectives. 2. The terrorist definition also	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								<p>includes the term “intimidation” which the other two definitions do not.</p> <p>3. “...to achieve a result” also appears flawed. This would make anyone who uses any kind of violence - for any reason - a terrorist.</p> <p>This definition basically follows the generic definition of terrorism as found in various dictionaries; however, the emergence of organized, global terrorism and the terrorist acts of the past few years now require modifications of these earlier definitions.</p>	
544.		USAF	S	99.16		8.10	<p>terrorist groups. Any element regardless of size or espoused cause, which repeatedly number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence, or threatens violence, in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives.</p>	<p>Accuracy. Clarity.</p> <p>1. To include “repeatedly” places a condition on this definition and implies there needs to be more than once such act committed by an “element” to be labeled a terrorist “group.”</p> <p>2. In our opinion, the distinction between element and group is meaningless, as is the fact whether acts are committed repeatedly or not. They key here is to identify a terrorist group as an organized unit with a purpose.</p> <p>3. The term “terrorist element” is only used once in this JP (page B-16); in contrast, the term “terrorist group” is used 43 times.</p> <p>Terrorist element is not</p>	A

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								defined anywhere (that we have been able to find, including in referenced DOD issuances)	
545.		USN	A	99.17		13	Change as follows: threat analysis. In antiterrorism, threat analysis is a <u>A</u> continual process of compiling and...	JP 1-02 definition.	A
546.		USN	S	99.18		1.05	Change as follows: weapons of mass destruction. — <u>A</u> Weapons that are <u>is</u> capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)	Recommend revision of this and the JP 1-02 definition so that the term is singular per general dictionary convention.	A
547.		USN	M	99.18		8.11	Delete the term weapons of mass effect. weapons of mass effects. A single system or device that can create large scale (over 1 km² area, and/or result in hundreds to thousands of material or personnel "casualties") detrimental (lethal or non-lethal, including economic) effects to military or civilian operations. Also called WME.	We'd be coining a misnomer by allowing WME into joint doctrine. As explained in Chapter II, WME – the weapon part of the term - can involve "limited technological techniques" or use of a relatively small conventional weapon (presumably at some critical node). Even modest weapons may create debilitating effects across complex, critical infrastructure. So, for example, a WME could be a relatively unsophisticated denial of service attack on a key server or a small but well-placed explosive device. The point is that the concept isn't about the nature or magnitude of the weapon. It's solely and only about the magnitude of the effect - big.	A-DELETE ANY WME REFERENCE

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								<p>Which all leads to the fact that this is a poorly coined term given the thought we're trying to capture. We're not trying to define a class of weapons. We're trying – unnecessarily – to create a new term that captures “really big attacks on infrastructure.” What’s wrong with simply talking in terms of CIP or CND?</p> <p>Another reason WMD works and WME doesn't is because we've some hope of detecting/tracking WMD as a class of weapons. Since WME includes such ubiquitous “weapons” as airliners, Dells, and small conventional explosive devices, there's literally no hope of detecting or tracking them all.</p> <p>The definition offers metrics that don't stand up to scrutiny. If a weapon results in destruction over three quarters of a km (below the one km threshold) and “only” 97 people then it isn't a “WME?” Why is there an upper limit on casualties (thousands)? How would one measure “hundreds of... material casualties?”</p> <p>It doesn't matter that WME somehow made it into the NMS. We should not perpetuate a flawed construct by defining it in doctrine.</p>	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
548.	1	J7	S	.01	1	9	Change to read as follows: "In addition, it outlines basic US military antiterrorism capabilities and provides commanders with guidance on how to organize, plan, and train for the employment of US forces in interagency <u>coordination</u> and multinational antiterrorism operations."	Per JP 3-08, "interagency operations" is not a defined term.	
549.	2	J7	S	1.02	2b	15	Change to read as follows: "Sensitive and compartmented CT programs are addressed in relevant National Security Decision Directives, National Security Directives, contingency <u>joint operation plans</u> , and other relevant classified documents."	Consistency with JP 5-0.	
550.	3	J7	S	1.06	5a(3)	1	Change to read as follows: ". . . or programs of any DOD Component operating or existing in that command's area of responsibility (AOR) except for those under the security responsibility of a Chief of Mission (COM). All DOD personnel traveling into a Combatant Commander's AOR will familiarize themselves with all AOR- specific AT policies and comply <u>with them.</u> "	Clarity.	
551.	4	J7	S	1.06	5a(4)	6	Who administers the CbT-RIF?	This paragraph does not supply enough details about the fund.	
552.	5	J7	M	1.07	5b(1)	11	Delete lines 11 thru 22 on this page and lines 1 thru 9 on the next page and replace with the following: " <u>The principal duty of the ASD(HD) is to provide overall supervision of HD and CS activities support within DOD. In that role, the ASD(HD) responsibilities include:</u> <u>(a) Developing strategic planning guidance for DOD's role in HS.</u> <u>(b) Developing and updating force employment policy, guidance, and oversight.</u> <u>(c) Overseeing DOD activities that provide MACA</u>	Consistency with JP 3-26 FC, Chapter II, para 2e(2).	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p><u>in domestic emergencies in accordance with existing national level emergency response plans and approved memoranda of understanding.</u></p> <p><u>(d) Providing DOD support, as appropriate, to assist in developing capacities and capabilities of civilian agencies requisite to conduct HS missions.</u></p> <p><u>(e) Serving as the DOD domestic crisis manager focusing on coordination and integration of DOD domestic crisis activities with other departments and agencies and the combatant commanders. Exceptions include those activities requiring the use of special operations forces.</u></p> <p><u>(f) Assuming responsibility for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), domestic AT and FP, HD interagency coordination, HD technology transfer, NSSEs and COOP / COG."</u></p>		
553.	6	J7	M	1.12		15	The roles and responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) need to be discussed in this paragraph.	Completeness,	
554.	7	J7	S	1.18	5c(5)	8	Change to read as follows: "Ensure assessments are conducted of <u>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</u> exercises, air/sea ports of embarkation/debarkation, and in-transit forces."	These are CJCS exercises.	
555.	8	J7	S	1.21	5c(1 3)(b)	16	Change to read as follows: "(b) Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal System. A comprehensive web enabled system that provides the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, Defense agencies, <u>subordinate joint task</u> forces and components, and others with information processing and dissemination capabilities necessary for AT programs."	Subunified commands must also be part of the AT program.	
556.	9	J7	M	1.23	5d(3)	1	Change to read as follows: " Exercise tactical control (TACON) (for force protection) over all DOD elements and personnel (including force protection responsibility for DOD dependent family members) (except those under the security	Consistency with JP 0-2, Chapter V, para 2f. Forces are never assigned temporarily. Combatant commanders exercise	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							responsibility of a COM) within the Combatant Commander's AOR. TACON (for force protection) applies to all DOD personnel assigned permanently or temporarily, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in the Combatant Commander's AOR. Exercise authority (TACON) for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the combatant commander's AOR; except for those for whom the chief of mission retains security responsibility. TACON (for force protection) is in addition to a Combatant Commander's normal exercise of operational control (OPCON) combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces."	COCOM, not OPCON, over assigned forces.	
557.	10	J7	S	1.26	5d(10)	6	Change to read as follows: "Assess the terrorist threat for the AOR according to this DOD Directive 2000.12 and provide threat assessment information to the DOD components and the COMs in the AOR. Develop risk mitigation measures and maintain a database of those measures and the issues that necessitated their implementation. On the basis of the threat assessment, identify and designate incumbents of high-risk billets and dependent family members to receive AT resident training."	Correctness.	
558.	11	J7	M	1.33		9	Change to read as follows: "Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. It is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal organizations. Homeland Security, as defined in the	Consistency with JP 3-26, Figure I-2.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p><u>National Strategy for Homeland Security, is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.</u></p> <p>Homeland defense is the protection of US territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States <u>protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression."</u></p>		
559.	12	J7	M	1.34		14	Rewrite this entire key term for consistency with JP 3-26 FC.	This description of MACA is not consistent with that found in JP 3-26 FC. Per JP 3-26, military assistance to civil authorities is the broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances. The Secretary of the Army is no longer the DOD executive agent.	
560.	13	J7	S	2.05	2f	6	Change to read as follows: "f. Hijacking or Skyjacking. Sometimes employed as a means for	Clarity.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							escape, hijacking is normally carried out to produce a spectacular hostage situation or <u>equally provide a vehicle for carrying out a lethal mission.</u> "		
561.	14	J7	S	2.25	5d	7	Change to read as follows: "The Armed Forces of <u>the United States</u> are clearly visible symbols of US projection of power and presence; thus, terrorists find military personnel and installations appealing targets."	Completeness.	
562.	15	J7	S	2.31	5h(5)	1	Change to read as follows: "(5) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, or where provided for by law, military operations will have priority over civil support missions. (See JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security for detailed guidance to the Armed Forces in the conduct of homeland security operations in joint, multinational, and interagency environments.)"	Consistency with JP 3-26, Preface.	
563.	16	J7	M	3.01	1a	28	Change to read as follows: "This chapter provides the reader with the elements of the intelligence cycle <u>process</u> that have particular importance in a viable AT program. Effective intelligence and counterintelligence support requires effort, planning and direction, collection and analysis, <u>processing and exploitation, analysis and production, investigations, and dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.</u> "	Consistency with JP 2-01.1, Figure I-1.	
564.	17	J7	M	3.03		F3.0 1	Change to read as follows: "Distributed on a need-to-know basis throughout the Services "	This information is also distributed by the combatant commander's JIC.	
565.	18	J7	S	3.03	1b(1)	9	Change to read as follows: "Government sources include congressional hearings; publications by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), <u>Department of Homeland Security (DHS),</u> Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . "	Completeness.	
566.	19	J7	S	3.05	1b(3)	2	Change to read as follows: "These agencies include the CIA (lead agency), DIA, National Security	USCG is part of DHS.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							Agency, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), <u>Department of Homeland Security United States Coast Guard (USCG)</u> , Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Communications Commission, and DOD."		
567.	20	J7	S	3.10	1c(2) (c)9	18	What Directive?	Clarity.	
568.	21	J7	S	4.08	2a(2)	7	Change to read as follows: "(2) Immediate Response. Immediate Response is that action authorized to be taken by a military commander or by responsible officials of other DOD Agencies to provide support to civil authorities to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate great property damage. <u>Under these circumstances, support elements must advise the DOD Executive Secretary (EXECSEC) through command channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorizations. The EXECSEC will notify SecDef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and any other appropriate officials.</u> Any commander or DOD official acting under "Immediate Response" authority shall advise the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) through command channels by the most expeditious means available and shall seek approval or additional authorization as needed (see Figure IV-1)"	Consistency with JP 3-26 FC, Chapter II, para 2d.	
569.	22	J7	S	4.20	3a(2)	6	Change to read as follows: "(2) Concurrent jurisdiction means that the Federal Government and the State each have the right to exercise the same authority over the land, including the right to prosecute for crimes. In territory that is under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and a State, both sovereigns have the authority to	Clarity	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							investigate or prosecute violations of Federal their respective laws."		
570.	23	J7	S	4.36	4h(1)	6	Change to read as follows: "(1) The Department of the Treasury is responsible for preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and by protecting the President and other officials from <u>from</u> terrorist attacks."	Correctness.	
571.	24	J7	M	4.37	4l	11	This paragraph must discuss the specific roles of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM.	Completeness.	
572.	25	J7	S	4.45	5b(1)	22	Change to read as follows: "Notification to the DOS is made at the <u>geographic</u> combatant commander level."	Correctness and completeness.	
573.	26	J7	M	6.01	1	12	Change to read as follows: "Preventive and protective security measures should be taken by military units and individual Service members to protect themselves and their ability to accomplish their mission during <u>mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment</u> and expeditionary operations. Additionally, rest and recuperation (R&R) facilities also require close consideration. These facilities are frequently vulnerable due to their location and generally easy access. Service personnel are at risk of lowering their guard while using these R&R facilities. The installation, base, ship, unit, or port AT plan provides the mechanism to ensure readiness against terrorist attacks while the unit performs its tactical and technical mission during deployments."	Completeness. "Technical mission" is not a term used in joint doctrine.	
574.	27	J7	S	6.02	2	1	Change to read as follows: "The following are antiterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures for high risk <u>threat area</u> missions; they represent worst-case procedures."	Consistency with title of paragraph.	
575.	28	J7	S	51.0 6	2d(2)	9	Change to read as follows: "The combatant commanders, through their Intelligence Directorates and Counterintelligence Staff Officer,	Combatant commanders are assigned AORs not AOs.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							and in consultation with the DIA, embassies' staffs, country team, and applicable host nation authorities, assess intelligence specific to their areas of operation <u>responsibility</u> and issue intelligence reports, advisories, and counter intelligence reports to the units within the combatant commander's control or AOR."		
576.	29	J7	S	52.1 7	3c(2) (e)	9	Change to read as follows: "Effect considers public relation <u>reaction</u> in the vicinity of the target, but also considers the domestic and international reaction as well."	Correctness.	
577.	30	J7	S	52.2 0	3d(1) (a)	1	Change to read as follows: "(a) Provide a means to database <u>enter</u> vulnerability assessment findings <u>into a database</u> in accordance with DODD 2000.16, for both higher headquarters and local assessments."	Clarity.	
578.	31	J7	S	53.0 1	1	7	The definition used here of a "critical asset" is not consistent with that proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-26 which reads as follows: " critical asset. A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively."	Consistency with JP 3-26.	
579.	32	J7	S	54.0 1	1c	19	Change to read as follows: "c. Although this sample is patterned after the military operations order, it is applicable to managers of OSD Agencies as they develop plans to protect personnel, activities, and material under their control.	Correctness.	
580.	33	J7	S	55.0 8	2f	18	Change to read as follows: " _____ Does the command have the procedures to process immediately through the chain of command reports of significant information obtained identifying organizations with WMD capability in their AOR	Only combatant commands are assigned AORs.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>operational area?</u>		
581.	34	J7	S	55.1 3	2h	21	Change to read as follows: " AOR <u>Operational area</u> updates current and briefed?"	Only combatant commands are assigned AORs.	
582.	35	J7	S	56.0 5	3b(3)	14	Change to read as follows: "(3) It is essential for military commanders and DOD civilians exercising equivalent authority to implement formal analytical processes that result in a set of AOR <u>operational area</u> or locality-specific terrorist threat indicators and warnings for use when transitioning from lower to higher FPCONs."	Only combatant commands are assigned AORs.	
583.	36	J7	S	99.0 8		10	Insert the following: "antiterrorism awareness. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) "	This appears to an obsolete term.	
584.	37	J7	S	99.0 8		11	Change to read as follows: "civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) <u>(This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-26.)</u> "	This term and definition are proposed by JP 3-26. JP 3-26 is the proper venue for this term.	
585.	38	J7	S	99.0 8		16	Change to read as follows: "combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02) <u>(This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-40.)</u> "	This term and definition are proposed by JP 3-40.	
586.	39	J7	S	99.0 8		20	Insert the following: "consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and	This is a key term in the JP.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)"		
587.	40	J7	A	99.09		8	Change to read as follows: "counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. <u>Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.</u> Also called CT. (JP 1-02)"	Consistency with JP 1-02.	
588.	41	J7	A	99.09		15	Change to read as follows: "force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. <u>Also called FP.</u> (JP 1-02)	Consistency with JP 1-02.	
589.	42	J7	S	99.11		12	Change to read as follows: " homeland defense. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. Also called HLD. (Upon approval of the revision of this pub, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)	This term and definition are proposed by JP 3-26. JP 3-26 is the proper venue for this term.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>The protection of United States territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Also called HD. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-26.)"</u>		
590.	43	J7	S	99.1 1		17	Change to read as follows: "homeland security. Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state, and federal organizations. Also called HLS. (Upon approval of the revision of this pub, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) <u>Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. Also called HS. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-26.)"</u>	This term and definition are proposed by JP 3-26. JP 3-26 is the proper venue for this term.	
591.	44	J7	S	99.1 3		17	Change to read as follows: "military assistance to civil authorities. Those activities and measures taken by DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of	This term and definition are proposed by JP 3-26. JP 3-26 is the proper venue for this term.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including natural and manmade disasters, national security emergencies, and DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Also called MACA. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) <u>The broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances. Also called MACA. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-26.)</u> "		
592.	45	J7	S	99.1 5		6	Insert the following: "primary target. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) "	This appears to an obsolete term.	
593.	46	J7	S	99.1 5		10	Insert the following: "secondary targets. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) "	This appears to an obsolete term.	
594.	47	J7	S	99.1 7		12	Insert the following: "terrorist threat level. An intelligence threat assessment of the level of terrorist threat faced by US personnel and interests in a foreign country. The assessment is based on a continuous intelligence analysis of a minimum of five elements: terrorist group existence, capability, history, trends, and targeting. There are five threat levels: NEGLIGIBLE, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and CRITICAL. Threat levels should not be confused with force protection conditions (FPCON). Threat level assessments are provided to	This is a key term in this JP.	

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							senior leaders to assist them in determining the appropriate local FPCON. (Department of State also makes threat assessments, which may differ from those determined by Department of Defense.) (JP 1-02)"		
595.	48	J7	S	99.1 7		23	Insert the following: "vulnerability assessment. A Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site. Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism. (JP 1-02)"	This is a key term in this JP.	

		J34	S				Add appendixes for - online/technology support to AT, including directions for ATEP, CVAMP, JAT GUIDE		A
		J34	S				Add new criticality guidance		A
		J34	S				Add TTP for expeditionary location (NGIC product) Add section on IEDs/ enemy tps, convoy procedures, 5 and 25 procedures,, with pictures, vehicle search TTP, IED standoff, Add fm FM 5-103 Survivability diagrams from pg 3-12 on thickness of material needed for protection fm major weapon (RPG, 82mm, 107mm, 250lb, 500lb) Add diagrams for revetments 4-38 Add bunker diagrams from 4-27 Add concertina construction fm figure 3-6 in Engineering hndbk on JAT guide		A
		J34	S				Add appendixes with diagEs for ECPs, bunker, Hesco Bastion construction, countermobility ditching, Barrier planning, cable connections		A
		J34	S				1. ESTABLISH SECURITY ZONE - MINIMUM OF 150m		

#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CLEAR FOLIAGE (OUT TO 300m IF POSSIBLE) OR DENY USE OF ADJACENT BUILDINGS (DEMOLITION, BOARD UP) - CONDUCT UNPREDICTABLE RECON PATROLS OUTSIDE FOB PERIMETER IN SECURITY ZONE - ESTABLISHED ELEVATED SURVEILLANCE/DIRECT FIRE OVERWATCH (GUARD TOWERS WITHIN PERIMETER, VACANT BUILDINGS OUTSIDE PERIMETER) - EMPLOY REMOTE SURVEILLANCE ON AREAS NOT DIRECTLY OBSERVED (IR CAMERAS, GSR) - UTILIZE GENERATOR LIGHT SETS/SPOTLIGHTS TO DENY DISMOUNTED APPROACHES IN LIMITED VISIBILITY - DESIGNATE/ENFORCE A CIVILIAN TRAFFIC DISMOUNT POINT/PARKING LOT TO KEEP VEHICLES OUT OF FOB - DENY VEHICLE ACCELERATION BY ESTABLISHING TCPs USING BARRIER MATERIALS/SPOTLIGHTS ON MAJOR AVENUE OF APPROACH TO MAIN GATE - DESIGNATE ADJACENT SUBORDINATE UNITS OR PATROLLING ELEMENTS TO MAINTAIN/REHEARSE QRF FUNCTION TO DEFEAT THREATS, CONDUCT COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE OR REINFORCE FRIENDLY FORCES IN SECURITY ZONE 2. CONTROL ACCESS TO MAIN GATE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ESTABLISH SECURITY SCREENING POINTS IN-DEPTH ON ACCESS ROAD - 100% ID CHECK FOR ALL CIVILIANS - ESTABLISH SERPENTINE BARRIER OF CLASS IV/HESCO® BASTIONS - CONSTRUCT HARDENED MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT IN OVERWATCH - BUILD SECURITY POSITIONS IN-DEPTH (2-3 SENTRY FIGHTING POSITIONS) OUTSIDE AND INSIDE MAIN ENTRANCE - DEVELOP AN ALTERNATE ENTRY/EXIT GATE ("BAT CAVE") THAT CAN ONLY BE OPENED FROM INSIDE THE PERIMETER AND USED ONLY FOR SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS (I.e., DISTURBANCE AT FRONT GATE) 		

	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>3. <i>PREPARE TO DEFEND WITHIN THE PERIMETER</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DISTRIBUTE KEY FUNCTIONS BETWEEN SEPARATE BUILDINGS OR WITHIN BUILDINGS (KEEP LIVING AREA AWAY FROM TOC IF POSSIBLE) - CREATE BLAST BARRIERS/SERPENTINE ON THE ROUTE BETWEEN MAIN GATE AND KEY BUILDINGS (DON'T ALLOW A STRAIGHT DRIVE) - MAINTAIN/REHEARSE INTERNAL REACTION FORCE (RF) TO REINFORCE MAIN GATE DEFENSE OR REACT TO CONTACT WITHIN THE PERIMETER TO BLOCK ACCESS TO KEY NODES - DEVELOP/REHEARSE GENERAL DEFENSE PLAN FOR ALL PERSONNEL OCCUPYING THE FOB - ESTABLISH/REHEARSE CASUALTY COLLECTION POINTS, MEDEVAC LANDING ZONE, AMMUNITION RESUPPLY POINT, RALLY POINTS 		