

Joint Publication 2-0



Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations



9 March 2000



Intelligence plays a vital role in the conduct of successful joint operations. Proper employment of collection and analysis assets is essential if joint force commanders are to gain and maintain information superiority. Without accurate intelligence, our joint forces will lose the essential advantages of surprise, operational security, and flexibility.

We must also be cognizant of the changing roles and missions facing the Armed Forces of the United States and ensure that intelligence planning keeps pace with the full range of military operations. The future battlefield will demand high levels of joint interoperability and force enhancement, and the value of intelligence support as an exploitable multiplier cannot be overstated.

Joint force commanders, planners, and warfighters at all levels are encouraged to become thoroughly familiar with the doctrine in this publication and use it as a tool for meeting the Nation's future challenges.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Henry H. Shelton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the intelligence support to joint operations series. It describes doctrine for intelligence support to interagency, joint, and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Explains the Role of Intelligence**
 - **Defines the Commander's Role in Intelligence Operations**
 - **Explains the Intelligence Cycle**
 - **Discusses Intelligence Operations at Each Level of War**
 - **Establishes Standards for Joint Intelligence Architecture**
-

Role of Intelligence

Knowledge of the enemy is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare.

Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy to joint force commanders (JFCs). Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. **Intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs** in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary's probable intent and future course of action.

Intelligence is critical across the range of military operations.

In **peacetime**, intelligence operations seek to provide the national leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives, while providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and implement the national security strategy. During **war**, intelligence strives to identify the adversary's capabilities and centers of gravity, project probable courses of action, and assist in planning friendly force employment. During **military operations other than war**, intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost.

Commander's Role in Intelligence Operations


Commanders are more than just consumers of intelligence.

JFCs and their component commanders are the key players in the planning and conduct of intelligence operations. Commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into their plans and operations. Commanders state operational requirements and provide continuous feedback to ensure optimum intelligence support to operations. This interface is essential to the following purposes of intelligence: to support the commander; to identify, define, and nominate objectives; to support operational planning and execution; to avoid surprise; to assist friendly deception efforts; and to evaluate the effects of operations.

The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is an important joint doctrinal concept.

The **intelligence cycle** provides a simplified model of how intelligence operations are conducted and establishes the basis for common joint intelligence terminology, tactics, techniques, and procedures.



Intelligence Operations

Intelligence operations assist a commander in accurately visualizing the battlespace.

Intelligence operations are the wide-ranging **activities conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations** to provide the commander with accurate and timely intelligence. Effective intelligence operations enable commanders at all levels to apply their available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively. Resources used by a JFC in intelligence operations may include, in addition to those of the JFC's own command, those of adjacent forces, theater, and national levels.

Intelligence operations apply at all levels of war.

The concept of **strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence operations** aids JFCs and their intelligence staffs in visualizing the flow of intelligence from one level to the next. The concept **facilitates the allocation** of required collection, analytical, and dissemination resources and **permits the assignment** of appropriate intelligence tasks to national, theater, component, and supporting intelligence elements. At each level of intelligence operations, certain major tasks must be performed if the JFC is to receive the necessary intelligence.

Joint Intelligence Operational Architecture

The joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure.

A **joint system of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities** enables the Intelligence Community to support the JFC and subordinate joint force components and integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernmental organizations, as needed.

Multinational Operations

In many situations, the Armed Forces of the United States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct military operations other than war.

In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. In some multinational operations, JFCs will be able to use existing international standardization agreements (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, standardization agreement) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation has its unique aspects, such standing agreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. In other cases a JFC participating in the coalition or alliance, following national and theater guidance, must develop the policy and procedures for that particular operation. Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary and take into consideration the

intelligence system strengths, limitations, and unique and valuable capabilities each nation will have.

CONCLUSION

This publication is the keystone document of the intelligence support to joint operations series. This publication describes doctrine for intelligence support to interagency, joint, and multinational operations.

CHAPTER I

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN JOINT OPERATIONS

“At the heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to sound judgment.”

General Curtis E. Lemay,
USAF, 1968

1. Intelligence and Joint Warfare

a. **Intelligence will play a critical and continuous role in supporting warfighting.** Advances in **computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications** will provide joint force commanders (JFCs) with the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and disseminate relevant data to thousands of locations. These capabilities, combined with the ability to deny or degrade the adversary’s ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, will provide the JFC with **information superiority**. Likewise, the fusion of all-source intelligence along with the integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster, and will enhance battlespace awareness — a key component of information superiority.

b. Joint Publication (JP) 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” lists **knowledge of the enemy** as one of the fundamentals of joint warfare. The intelligence community provides that knowledge to JFCs. The intelligence system tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing; what they are capable of doing; and what they may do in the future.

c. **The most important roles of intelligence are assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace (see Figure I-1), assessing adversary capabilities and will, identifying the adversary’s centers of gravity (COGs), and discerning the adversary’s probable intent.** Visualization includes more than having knowledge of the characteristics of the operational area. **Visualization requires knowing the current dispositions and activities of adversary forces throughout the battlespace.** It requires knowing the current and future capabilities of adversary forces to operate in and across each battlespace dimension based on a detailed analysis of the effects of weather, geography, and other relevant considerations. Most importantly, it requires understanding the adversary’s objectives, identifying how the adversary might fulfill those objectives, and determining the adversary’s readiness to achieve the objectives. Together, all these factors make a critical contribution to the JFC’s capability to achieve information superiority. However, intelligence must enable the JFC to know the potential and probable future state of events well in advance of the adversary. This knowledge allows the JFC to predict the adversary’s future course of action (COA) and scheme of maneuver, and to anticipate and plan detailed countermeasures to adversary actions.




Figure I-1. Dimensions of Battlespace

“In antiquity (and to this day, in some countries) kings and generals used to act on the advice of diviners or fortune-tellers. Not so the statesmen and army commanders of today. Nevertheless, they find it hard to accept a situation in which nobody can foretell the future for them. Many of them hope, or delude themselves, that the intelligence system serving them can fulfill this purpose.”

Shlomo Gazit
Chief, Israeli Military Intelligence,
1974-1979

d. **Determining the adversary’s intent is the most difficult challenge confronting intelligence.** The factor which makes this so difficult is the drawing of conclusions based upon the dynamic process of action and reaction between a joint force and its adversary. Clausewitz referred to this as the ‘process of interaction.’ He believed that “the very nature of interaction is bound to make it

unpredictable.” Estimating the outcome of the ‘process of interaction’ requires the intelligence officer to know what future friendly actions are planned and then to simultaneously forecast the following factors: the likelihood of the friendly action being detected by the adversary; how the adversary will interpret the friendly action; the adversary’s future capabilities; and finally, how the adversary will most likely react. The long term projection of adversary intent is particularly difficult because, at the time that intelligence personnel are being asked to determine it, adversaries may not yet have formed their intent, may be in the process of changing their intent, or may not yet have undertaken any detectable action that would provide indicators of their future plans.

e. A simple **example of the ‘process of interaction’** is the situation in which an intelligence officer, having detected certain adversary actions and correctly determined

the adversary's intent, forecasts that the adversary is preparing to attack. The commander reacts by having friendly forces take appropriate defensive measures. The adversary commander, however, detecting these actions and deciding that attacking is no longer a desirable COA, cancels the attack. Adversary actions produced a friendly reaction resulting in changed adversary intent. This situation is known as the **'paradox of warning.'**

"An important difference between a military operation and a surgical operation is that the patient is not tied down. But it is a common fault of leadership to assume that he is."

Captain Sir B.H. Liddell Hart
1944

f. Accurate forecasts should inform the JFC of the **full range of actions open to the adversary** and go on to identify **which actions are most likely**. The JFC must, however, understand the dynamics that are at play in forecasting future events.

2. Intelligence Purposes

a. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) (or other designated positions) and intelligence organizations are guided by **fundamental intelligence purposes**. Figure I-2 summarizes intelligence purposes.

INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

THE J-2 AND THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MUST BE GUIDED BY FUNDAMENTAL INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES TO:

- **SUPPORT THE COMMANDER**
- **IDENTIFY, DEFINE, AND NOMINATE OBJECTIVES**
- **PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**
- **SECURITY OF OPERATIONS—AVOID DECEPTION AND SURPRISE**
- **SECURITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY DECEPTION**
- **EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS AND MODIFY THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES OR TERMINATE OPERATIONS**

Figure I-2. Intelligence Purposes

b. **Support the Commander.** The J-2 directly supports the JFC's responsibilities for **determining objectives, directing operations, and evaluating the effects** of those operations. The J-2 supports the execution of the plan with the intelligence needed to sustain the operation, attain joint force objectives, provide support to subordinate commands, and continually support force protection efforts. The J-2 analyzes the potential threat situation and provides assessments to support friendly opportunities.

c. **Identify, Define, and Nominate Objectives.** 'Objective' is the first principle of war to be supported by intelligence. All other aspects of military operations are dependent on the determination of clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. In the process of **identifying and nominating military objectives**, the J-2 should understand the command's responsibilities; the JFC's mission and intent; means available, including multinational forces; opposing forces; weather; and characteristics of the operational area. **Intelligence should provide the commander with an understanding of the adversary** in terms of the adversary's probable intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, probable COAs, most dangerous COA, values, and critical vulnerabilities. The J-2 recommends objectives based on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, COGs, and likely COAs. Once objectives are determined by the commander, the J-2 must continuously review them with respect to the adversary and the changing situation to see they remain relevant to the commander's intent.

d. **Plan and Execute Operations.** **Intelligence should be provided at all command levels for planning, directing, and conducting operations** once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JFC. This intelligence is critical to commanders and staffs in identifying and selecting specific

objectives and targets, and in determining the means, operations, and tactics to be used in achieving the JFC's overall mission. **The J-2 then supports the execution of the plan with the operational intelligence** needed to sustain the operations, attain joint force objectives, and support force protection. To maintain the initiative, **the JFC will seek to get inside the adversary's decision making cycle**; i.e., the JFC will seek to develop procedures and an organization in order to receive new and accurate intelligence and respond to the new situation faster than the adversary. The J-2 must help in identifying the adversary's decision making cycle and identifying vulnerabilities that may be exploited.

e. **Security of Operations — Avoid Deception and Surprise.** The way J-2s, the intelligence staff, and supporting organizations approach collection, analysis, and dissemination will, to a large extent, determine friendly force vulnerability to adversary deception efforts. Despite the apparent weight of evidence and decision making predisposition, **intelligence analysts should remain sensitive to the possibility that they are being deceived** and should consider any hypothesis that an adversary is capable of supporting. Similarly, analytical approaches that emphasize anomalies characterized by a lack of activity (e.g., absence of seasonal training, VIPs missing from ceremonial events) are particularly valuable.

f. **Security of Operations Through Military Deception.** Attacking the mind of the adversary — to mislead, delude, or create uncertainty — helps to achieve the security and surprise principles of war. **Intelligence provides the two critical components** that are the basis for effective friendly unit actions and effective psychological operations in support of deceptions that enhance operations security and surprise. The first component is **analysis of the adversary's susceptibility to deception and surprise**. The second



Signals intelligence can assist the JFC to get inside the adversary's decision making cycle.

component is the **feedback to operations on the adversary's actions** and determining if they are responses to the deception. The process of identifying deception objectives to complement operational objectives should be an interactive process, with the commander in a central role orchestrating the efforts of the operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence (CI) resources. In this process, **the J-2 should help the commander and staff to gain insights into the adversary's capability to process, filter, and evaluate intelligence on the friendly situation.**

g. **Evaluate the Effects of Operations.** Intelligence should assist JFCs in **determining when objectives have been attained** so that JFCs can determine whether joint operations should be modified or terminated. Intelligence evaluates military operations by assessing their effect on the adversary situation with respect to the JFC's intent and objectives.

3. Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations

Intelligence is critical across the range of military operations. JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," divides the range of

military operations into two major categories: **war** and **military operations other than war** (MOOTW). Even in peacetime, intelligence operations continue. In fact, peacetime intelligence operations provide the national leadership with the intelligence needed to realize national goals and objectives, while simultaneously providing military leadership with the intelligence needed to accomplish missions and implement the national security strategy.

a. Intelligence During War

- JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," identifies key collective warfighting capabilities such as exploiting the information differential; attacking the adversary's COGs; and leveraging among forces. By determining the symmetries and asymmetries between friendly and adversary forces, intelligence assists the JFC and operational planners in identifying the best means to accomplish the joint force mission. For example, in support of joint information operations, intelligence provides the JFC and component commanders with estimates of what the adversary's information

capabilities are; when, where, and how the joint force can exploit its information superiority; and the threat the adversary poses to friendly information and information systems.

- Intelligence that enables the JFC to **focus and leverage combat power** and to **determine acceptable risk**, is key to allowing the JFC to achieve powerful, dynamic concentrations where the adversary is vulnerable, and permits the JFC to exploit the maximum range of assigned, attached, or supporting weapon systems. Intelligence provides key ingredients to successful targeting by providing identification of key targets, collection to detect these targets, and the assessment of the accuracy of delivery means and the extent of damage to the targets. By helping the commander form the most accurate possible vision of future events in the battlespace, intelligence makes time an ally instead of an adversary.
- Wartime support to the commander must be anticipatory and precise. **Intelligence must maximize and synchronize support to the JFC** by focusing on satisfying the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Intelligence provided to the JFC must **properly balance the factors of accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevancy**. The result of the intelligence process must be a package or service to the friendly commander that actively supports and enhances the commander's vision of the battlespace in a readily usable manner.

b. **Intelligence During MOOTW.** Maintaining a forward presence enables US forces to gain regional familiarity and develop a common understanding of important cultural, interpersonal, and social differences. Activities such as professional military

exchanges and forward basing enhance US forces' ability to shape potential MOOTW and establish mutual support with host country nationals. Intelligence support is equally critical in MOOTW involving the use or threat of force and MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force (See Figure I-3).

- **MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force.** The intelligence requirements in support of MOOTW such as strikes and raids, peace enforcement, and counterterrorism are **similar to those required during war**. Intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest loss of life and political cost. Intelligence is essential to protect joint forces participating in these operations. While intelligence efforts are supporting peacekeeping operations, intelligence must also provide the JFC with I&W of any possible escalation of violence and a firm basis upon which to develop necessary contingency plans.
- **MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force.** Intelligence is essential in operations such as disaster relief, foreign humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations in a permissive environment, most support to counterdrug operations, and security assistance. Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC's questions concerning actual and potential threats, terrain, climate and weather, infrastructure, cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, leadership, and many other issues concerning the operational area. **Intelligence helps the JFC determine which forces to employ and assists in estimating the duration of the operation.** During disaster relief

INTELLIGENCE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

MOOTW INVOLVING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE

STRIKES AND RAIDS, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM

- helps joint force commanders (JFCs) with force deployment and employment decisions
- supports force protection mission
- prepares for possible escalation to war

MOOTW NOT INVOLVING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE

DISASTER RELIEF, FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- provides JFC with information about the operational area
- helps JFC determine which forces to employ
- assists JFC in estimating the duration of the operation

Figure I-3. Intelligence During Military Operations Other Than War

operations, intelligence can play an important role in surveying the extent of damage and the level of suffering and can assist in planning for the deployment of relief forces.

c. **Intelligence During Peacetime.** During peacetime, intelligence helps commanders project future adversary capabilities; make acquisition decisions; protect technological advances; define weapons systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems requirements; shape organizations; and design training to ready the joint force. **Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions** to identify threats to US

interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively.

4. Intelligence Responsibilities

a. Intelligence organizations involved in joint operations provide intelligence to assist the JFC in the achievement of military objectives.

b. **National-Level Intelligence Organizations.** National-level intelligence agencies and organizations support unified and joint operations. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) coordinate with these agencies and organizations to identify intelligence

requirements that may be addressed through their capabilities.

A detailed discussion of each national-level agency is contained in JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides direction to the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2, to ensure that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and CI support is available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the combatant commands.

d. Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2.

The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is a unique organization, in that it is both a major component of DIA (a combat support agency) and a fully integrated element of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff J-2 is responsible for working with national-level organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. The J-2 keeps the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff apprised of foreign situations that are relevant to current and potential national security policy, objectives, and strategy.

e. The Chiefs of the Military Services

provide intelligence support for departmental missions related to military systems and equipment and training. They also support national intelligence activities in support of Department of Defense (DOD) entities, including combatant commands, subordinate joint commands, and Service components of those commands. Service intelligence staffs and organizations produce a broad array of products and services (such as weapons system-specific targeting materials) as well as technical expertise in specialized areas such as information operations (IO) and foreign weapons systems. At both the component and unit level, Service intelligence personnel are involved in the operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and provide tailored

intelligence support for weapons system employment.

5. Intelligence and the JFC

a. The combatant command J-2 assists the commander of a combatant command (CINC) in developing strategy, planning theater campaigns, and organizing the theater command relationships, including intelligence assets, for effective joint and unified operations. Additionally, the combatant command J-2 is responsible for determining the requirements and direction needed to ensure unity of the intelligence effort supporting the commander’s objectives.

The combatant command J-2 provides higher echelon, up to and including the NMJIC, and subordinate commands with a single, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments.

The combatant command J-2’s responsibility also includes applying national intelligence capabilities, employing joint force intelligence resources, and identifying and integrating additional intelligence resources such as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and component command intelligence assets.

Joint force intelligence responsibilities are reflected in Figure I-4. The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force.

b. The combatant command’s JIC ensures that the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate commands are satisfied. The JIC is organized in the manner best suited to satisfy the combatant commander’s intelligence requirements. Functions of the JIC may include, but are not limited to:

- Coordinating the intelligence effort of subordinate commands;
- Coordinating the theater collection plan and employment of theater assigned and supporting sensors;

- Developing and maintaining data bases that support planning, operations, and targeting; and
- Validating battle damage assessment (BDA) from higher, lower, and adjacent sources.

c. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the standard support missions (shown in Figure I-5) from the JFC. Intelligence staffs and forces organic to a component command will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants the organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign an intelligence support mission to that component commander.

Support relationships are further explained in JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

"Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy."

**Machiavelli
Discourses, 1517**

d. Commanders are more than just consumers of intelligence. **JFCs and the component commanders are the key players in the planning and conduct of intelligence operations.** Commanders must know intelligence doctrine and understand intelligence systems' capabilities and limitations as well as procedures and products. They must provide clear, precise guidance and make their intelligence requirements known. Additionally, commanders (as well as other users) must continuously provide feedback on the effectiveness of intelligence in supporting operations.

e. Commanders **focus intelligence operations** by defining their mission,

JOINT FORCE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- **Defining intelligence support**
- **Prioritizing intelligence requirements**
- **Identifying intelligence resources**
- **Establishing intelligence support procedures**

Figure I-4. Joint Force Intelligence Responsibilities

operational area, area of influence, and areas of interest (AOIs) as well as providing commander's intent, planning guidance, PIRs, and feedback on the effectiveness of intelligence support.

f. Commanders are **ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into their plans and operations.** The successful synchronization of intelligence support operations with all other elements of joint operations begins with the commanders involving their intelligence planners in the earliest stages of policy development and operation planning.

g. Commanders must **actively engage their intelligence officers in discussions of adversaries, force protection, and future operations.** Commanders must hold their intelligence personnel accountable for providing accurate, timely, and predictive intelligence. However, JFCs must understand the challenges and limitations that confront intelligence personnel in forecasting future adversary actions.

STANDARD SUPPORT MISSIONS

GENERAL

An intelligence element in general support will provide support to the joint force as a whole and not to any particular subordinate unit. The intelligence element responds to the requirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

DIRECT

An intelligence element in direct support provides intelligence support to a specific unit. The intelligence element is required to respond to the supported unit's intelligence requirements. As a second priority, the intelligence element will respond to the intelligence requirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

CLOSE

An intelligence element with a close support mission will provide intelligence support on targets and objectives sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration and coordination with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported unit.

MUTUAL

Intelligence elements receive a mutual support mission when their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other, and their capabilities allow them to coordinate their activities in order to assist each other to respond to the intelligence requirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

Figure I-5. Standard Support Missions

CONVOY PQ17

In June 1942, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound ordered the Royal Navy cruisers and destroyers escorting the Murmansk bound Convoy PQ17 to abandon the convoy while it was off the North Cape of Norway. The convoy was further ordered to scatter. Each ship was to make its own way to Murmansk.

Despite the stated position (based upon ULTRA intercepts) of Commander N.E. Denning, chief of the German surface ship section in the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC), that the German battleship Tirpitz was in its Norwegian port, Pound believed that the Tirpitz and its battle group had sailed to attack PQ17. In fact, the Tirpitz had not sailed. As a result of scattering, however, the convoy became vulnerable to air and submarine attacks. Twenty-three of the thirty-four merchant ships in the convoy were sunk in one of the worse disasters to befall any Allied convoy during World War II.

Patrick Beesly, who served in the OIC during World War II, offered the following analysis of why the fatal decision to scatter the convoy was made:

“Quite apart from age and health (Pound was 65 and would die from a brain tumor the next year), and despite his great experience as a staff officer, Pound did not, in my opinion, understand the intelligence scene. Although the OIC was only a few minutes' walk from his own office he very rarely visited it. He appreciated neither the strengths or weaknesses of Special Intelligence: he required 'Yes' or 'No' answers to his questions ('Can you assure me that Tirpitz is still in Altenfjord?') - something that the very best intelligence officers can seldom give. In all intelligence problems there must always be some element of uncertainty, always a last piece of the jigsaw puzzle which can only be filled in by guesswork. It may be inspired intuition, but it should always be based on a thorough background knowledge of the enemy and his way of thinking. After three years of war it ought to have been obvious that Denning, one of the most brilliant intelligence officers of either world war, had this gift, but Pound could not bring himself to rely on so junior an officer's opinion. Events proved Denning right and Pound wrong. Senior officers, who have to take final responsibility, must not only fully understand the sources, methods, and extent of their intelligence organization, but also personally know their intelligence officers sufficiently well to assess their capabilities and to rely on their assessments or, if they are not satisfied, replace them.”

SOURCE: Beesly, Patrick, Convoy PQ17, A Study of Intelligence and Decision Making, published in Intelligence and Military Operations, Michael I. Handel, ed., London, U.K.: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1990, 292-322

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CHAPTER II THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

“The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged.”

General George Washington
26 July 1776

1. The Intelligence Cycle and Joint Operations

For joint operations, the intelligence cycle provides the basis for common intelligence terminology, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Knowledge of the intelligence cycle is fundamental to understanding the intelligence operations addressed in Chapter III, “Intelligence Operations.”

2. The Intelligence Cycle as a Model

See Figure II-1.

a. The intelligence cycle is a simplified conceptual model of how intelligence operations are conducted. **The cycle is composed of six phases:** planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration.




Figure II-1. The Intelligence Cycle

dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback. The intelligence process may not continue throughout the entire cycle. For example, a request for imagery will require planning and direction activity but may not involve new collection, processing, or exploitation. The request could go directly to a production facility where previously collected and exploited imagery is reviewed to determine if it will satisfy the request.

b. The commander's mission provides the focal point for all phases of the cycle. The activities within each phase are **conducted continuously and in conjunction with activities in other phases**. For instance, planning is updated based on previous information requirements being satisfied and upon new requirements being identified as a result of analysis performed in the production phase.

3. Intelligence Disciplines and Sources

a. Intelligence disciplines are well defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting, using a specific category of technical or human resources. Intelligence sources are the **means or systems** that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors.

b. Intelligence sources are grouped according to one of the **seven intelligence disciplines**: imagery intelligence (IMINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); and CI (Figure II-2).

Detailed descriptions of the intelligence disciplines are contained in Appendix C (classified) of JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations." CI, which is both a collector and a consumer of intelligence, is also addressed in detail in JP 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations."

c. Information is sought from the **widest possible range of sources** to avoid any bias that can result from relying on a single source of information and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence. **The collection of information from multiple sources is essential** to countering the adversary's operations security and deception operations. The operations of all collection sources must be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cueing and tip-off among collectors.

4. The Intelligence Cycle

a. Planning and Direction Phase

- Intelligence planning for rapid response to possible theater crises occurs well ahead of time as part of a command's overall, integrated deliberate planning process. The most likely threat scenarios are used as the core of this planning effort, which includes determining the personnel, equipment, and intelligence architecture essential for generic support to theater deployments. When a particular crisis situation unfolds, crisis action planners develop an actual operation plan using deliberate planning as the basis. Intelligence input to the operation plan includes an adjusted and updated threat scenario and an intelligence annex that tailors intelligence support to the geographical area, nature of the threat, scope of operations, and assigned forces. Feedback from

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

IMINT — Imagery Intelligence

HUMINT — Human Intelligence

SIGINT — Signals Intelligence

MASINT — Measurement and Signature Intelligence

OSINT — Open-Source Intelligence

TECHINT — Technical Intelligence

CI — Counterintelligence

Figure II-2. Intelligence Disciplines

deployed intelligence personnel to both crisis action and deliberate planners helps ensure that benefits of lessons learned are incorporated as soon as possible into planning for subsequent operations.

- In the planning and direction phase, the direction for current and future operations is established by the **commander's PIRs**. PIRs are subsets of the commander's critical information requirements. Using the PIRs as guidance, intelligence personnel then perform the necessary planning for how best to provide the information needed to satisfy these requirements.
- When establishing PIRs, the commander should request intelligence that is **vital to the joint force's ability to accomplish the assigned mission**. The PIRs are the commander's statements of the force's critical intelligence needs. The J-2 is responsible for assisting the commander in determining PIRs.
- The JFC's **total number of PIRs for any operation (or any phase of an operation) should be very small**, e.g., no more than six to twelve. Excessive PIRs result in unfocused intelligence collection and production. To prevent being distracted by unimportant information, the commander must specifically identify the intelligence that will make a difference in the joint force's ability to accomplish the mission. For complex, phased operations, **separate PIRs should be identified for each phase**. As an operation develops, the commander should change the PIRs to address new requirements or concerns. Changes in the situation will rule out some PIRs and/or demand the development of new ones as operations progress. PIRs should be ranked and disseminated in priority of importance. The methodology used to build PIRs focuses on the level of operations to be conducted, mission, time frame of expected operations, and priority of requirements. The different levels of

operations will fall into two broad categories; war and MOOTW, such as peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, operations supporting civilian authorities, and strikes and raids.

- Using PIRs as the basis, **the intelligence staff proposes the command's information requirements** (those items of information that **must** be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander). For example, if the PIR is "Will the enemy attack within the next 72 hours?", the information requirements will be questions such as "Where is the XX Armored Division?"; "Has the artillery subordinate to the XX Corps deployed forward?"; "Are aircraft being loaded with air-to-ground munitions at the forward airfields?"; and "Where are the major surface combatants?" Information requirements are concerned with **identifying the specific indicators** that will fill a gap in the command's knowledge and understanding of the battlespace and adversary activities.
- In addition to focusing on the joint force's PIRs, the intelligence staff must be concerned with the PIRs of **higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements**. Subordinate force intelligence requirements must be addressed and prioritized during planning. Conflicts for resources must be resolved and unnecessary redundancies eliminated.
- Once PIRs are determined, intelligence personnel review existing intelligence data bases searching for answers to the requirements. If the intelligence does not already exist, they issue **requests for information** (RFIs) and initiate the development of a **collection plan**. An RFI is a specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products, and is distinct from standing

requirements or scheduled intelligence production. An RFI can be initiated at any level of command, and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures. An RFI will lead to either a production requirement if the request cannot be answered with information on hand, or a collection requirement if the request demands collection of new information. Collection planning and requirement management are major activities in the planning and direction phase.

- JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations," details collection requirements, operations, and management. It explains the relationship between collection management and operations. It also details the flow of RFIs from the component or joint task force (JTF) requester to the DIA and/or NMJIC at the national-level, and the response back to the requester. Additionally, it describes the collection manager's functions for collection requirements management and collection operations management.
- PIRs also justify national production and system acquisition by: (1) formulating statements of intelligence interest to the Intelligence Community; (2) justifying tasking of national collection resources to DIA; and (3) identifying resource shortfalls to the Services and the Department of Defense for longer-term solution through acquisition and/or training. But the most immediate, direct application of PIRs is in defining the intelligence support provided in theater to deployed forces.
- **Collection Planning**
 - Collection planning **matches RFIs** with the appropriate collection capabilities. It also **synchronizes the**

timing of collection (allowing for the time required for the other phases of the intelligence cycle) **with the operational scheme of maneuver**. Collection planning registers, validates, and prioritizes all collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements. Collection planning culminates in **preparation and/or revision of the command's intelligence collection plan**, which tasks or submits intelligence requirements to the appropriate internal and external supporting intelligence organizations and agencies.

Collection planning is addressed in detail in JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

- Collection managers monitor the results of the other phases of the intelligence cycle to determine if PIRs and information requirements are being satisfied. The **effectiveness of the collection plan in meeting the JFC's requirements is continuously assessed** by the command's collection managers.
- At each level of command, J-2s and senior intelligence officers must know not only their command's PIRs and information requirements, but also **be aware of the PIRs of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands**. The J-2 must also be knowledgeable about the abilities, limitations, and required lead times of the available collectors. The joint force collection managers must be able to task or coordinate with any collection capability assigned to the force and be able to obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.
- A variety of collection sources are required so that information from one source can be tested or confirmed by

others. **Multiple collection sources** enable collection managers to **'cross-cue' between different sources** (e.g., using SIGINT direction finding to focus collection by imagery systems). The collection system also needs **redundancy** so that the loss or failure of one collection capability can be compensated for by duplicate or complementary capabilities.

- During collection planning, **the intelligence staff coordinates closely with the operations staff**. Collection managers must ensure that the collection plan is **synchronized with the operation plan** so that collection efforts are focused correctly at the critical times. Additionally, reconnaissance and surveillance operations must be integrated with other forms of intelligence collection operations and coordinated with CI activities.

- In conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, collection managers will, when necessary, **nominate 'no-strike' targets** to the operations staff through the J-2 targeting element. 'No-strike' targets are usually adversary entities whose intelligence value to future operations may exceed the benefit to be gained from attacking them. Additionally, 'no fire' areas may be designated to protect friendly operations behind enemy lines or other sensitive targets.

For further information on 'no-strike' targets, see JP 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."

- **Other Planning**. Planning also entails determining the **intelligence organizational and equipment requirements** and creating the necessary **intelligence architecture**. How the JTF

J-2 will be organized and where it will be established are critical decisions that must be made early in the planning process. The available intelligence resources, both personnel and systems, must be allocated to the assigned forces.

The unique planning requirements for multinational operations are addressed in Appendix A, "Intelligence in Multinational Operations."

•• **Joint intelligence architecture planning** requires early identification of information requirements including procedural and technical parameters. Establishing information flow, timeliness, content, format, and priorities will help shape the requisite joint intelligence architecture's technical specifications that most efficiently supports a JFC. Joint intelligence architecture planning must ensure survivability, secureability, and interoperability of both information architectures and the information contained therein for all combinations of government-commercial configurations. Organizational, doctrinal, and personnel issues should also be considered to maximize the benefits of technical architectures for the goals of the JFC.

•• **Anticipated intelligence production requirements** must be coordinated from tactical through national levels. These production activities should be directed and coordinated to be mutually supporting and non-duplicative.

•• **Intelligence dissemination requirements and procedures** must be identified and coordinated with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands and with the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer

Systems Directorate (J-6). An important consideration is the **management of information** transmitted over communications paths. JFCs must consider intelligence requirements when prioritizing information dissemination in terms of the product, the available communications paths, and the time sensitivity of the product. Dissemination priorities must be updated throughout the course of the operation.

•• **Coordination with CI activities** must be accomplished prior to the initiation of operations. Identification of ongoing and planned intelligence activities and JFC intentions will enable CI specialists to assess physical and personnel vulnerabilities and hostile forces' capability to target military operations using technical means, terrorism, espionage, and sabotage, or to evoke agitational interference (e.g., demonstrations, strikes). CI activities also provide formal liaison with host nation law enforcement and security activities to assist operations and provide support to the joint force's protection. The joint force J-2 normally organizes a CI section within the J-2 CI/HUMINT staff element (J-2X) to specifically coordinate and deconflict all CI activities: tactical, operational, strategic, and multinational. JP 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations," provides additional details of the organization and functions of a J-2X CI staff section within the J-2X.

"Maps are necessary in order to see the whole panorama of battle and to permit intelligent planning."

George S. Patton, Jr.
6 March 1944

•• **Mapping requirements** must be identified. The **Geospatial Information**

and Services Officer on the joint staff works closely with the Operations Directorate (J-3) and other staff elements to determine requirements and priorities. **Maps, charts, digitized products, and precise geodetic coordinates are critical** to mission planning and the execution of combat operations. Early coordination by the combatant command with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is essential to obtaining adequate support. NIMA can provide specialized or tailored products during crisis situations, but must be tasked to do so during the earliest stages of planning operations.

JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations,” provides detailed information on obtaining NIMA support.

•• **Administrative planning** is also required. Financial, contracting, training, personnel support, automated data processing (ADP) requirements, physical and personnel security matters, intelligence and CI oversight compliance, Inspector General issues, releasability and disclosure policy, and Freedom of Information Act guidance are all functions of administrative support that must be addressed in the intelligence plan.

•• Planning also requires identifying intelligence **personnel augmentation** requirements (both active and reserve) to the Manpower and Personnel Directorate; **logistic** requirements to the Logistics Directorate; **lift and transportation** requirements in the time-phased force and deployment data to the J-3; and **communications** requirements for intelligence operations to the J-6.

b. Collection Phase

- During the collection phase, those intelligence sources identified in the collection plan **collect information about the battlespace environment and adversary.**
- **Collection requirements management** is the process that supports the tasking of requirements to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies. It is used to monitor the overall satisfaction of these requirements and assess the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.
- Collected information is provided via secure media to the appropriate **processing and exploitation elements.**

c. Processing and Exploitation Phase

- During this phase, **raw information is converted** to forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in the production phase. Processing and exploitation actions include initial imagery interpretation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and decryption, as well as reporting the results of these actions to production elements. Processing and exploitation may be performed by the same element that collected the information.
- An **example of processing and exploitation** is in taking the technical parameters (frequency, pulse repetition frequency, and bandwidth) detected by a SIGINT collection system and associating the parameters with a particular radar system. Rather than having to deal with raw data, the analyst is provided with the essential fact — the identity of the radar.



Unmanned aerial vehicles provide commanders with near-real-time tactical information.

- Different types of information require **different degrees of processing** before they can be used. In the area of SIGINT, thanks to improvements in hardware and software, processing and exploitation are increasingly being performed by the collection systems. Captured adversary documents may only require translating before they can be used by analysts. On the other hand, the technical exploitation of an item of adversary equipment may require months of intensive effort before its full capabilities can be determined.

d. Analysis and Production Phase

- During the analysis and production phase, **all available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted** to create products that will satisfy the commander's PIRs or RFIs. Intelligence products can be presented in many forms. They may be oral presentations, hard copy publications, or electronic media.
- Intelligence production could be facilitated through a collaborative, or federated, effort in which information is rapidly and fully shared among geographically dispersed organizations.

This approach involves dividing the analysis and production effort among intelligence facilities in theater, intelligence centers in the continental United States, and joint intelligence reserve centers to meet the intelligence needs of the joint force.

- Intelligence production for joint operations is **accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon**. Whereas the functions carried out in both the collection and processing and exploitation phases were primarily performed by specialists from one of the intelligence disciplines, analysis and production is done primarily by **all-source analysts**.
- Intelligence is produced from the information gathered by the collection capabilities **assigned or attached to the joint force** and from the refinement and compilation of intelligence received from **subordinate units and external organizations**.
- A key tool for conducting intelligence production is the **joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)** process (see Figure II-3).

DOD INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PROGRAM

The DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) is structured to capitalize on the analytical and production resources of the entire defense intelligence community to focus expertise and maximize output to the consumer. The structure is an explicit, logical division of activities, responsibilities, and accountability among national, Service, and combatant command production centers.

Production centers at all levels are assigned clearly delineated areas of analytical and production responsibility across the range of military operations. These centers support the efficient use of DOD resources, prevent duplication of effort, and provide timely support to customer requirements.

A combatant command's intelligence production is performed by a JIC, which is assigned directly to the combatant command in support of theater or specialized forces. The JIC serves as the cornerstone for fulfilling all the operational intelligence requirements of the CINCs, subordinate force commanders, and JTFs. The production activities for the theater are scheduled and accomplished by the JIC, which focuses on producing tailored, finished intelligence in support of theater mission planning and execution.

Subordinate forces request or pull the tailored intelligence products needed from intelligence data bases electronically available at intelligence centers at all levels. This concept allows joint force commanders to acquire relevant intelligence, based on their mission and the specific phase of the ongoing operation, using intelligence data bases physically maintained at other echelons and locations. The combatant command J-2 remains responsible for the coordination of intelligence in-theater, managing the flow of intelligence through direct communications with each command and Service.

SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Management Document, DOD-0000-151-94
Subj: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program

•• **JIPB is a systematic approach used by intelligence personnel** to analyze information about the battlespace environment and the adversary. The JIPB process is used to define the total battlespace environment; describe the battlespace's effects on adversary or friendly COAs; evaluate the capabilities of any adversary forces that may operate in that battlespace; and determine and describe potential threat COAs.

•• **Analysts use the process** to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all aspects of the battlespace environment. The process

is also used to determine an adversary's capabilities to operate in the environment. **The process can be applied to the full range of joint military operations** and to each level of war.

The JIPB process is described in detail in JP 2-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace."

- Activities during the analysis and production phase of the intelligence cycle result in intelligence products.




Figure II-3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Process

Intelligence products are generally placed in one of six categories: I&W; current; general military; target; scientific and technical; and CI (see Figure II-4). The categories are distinguished from each other primarily by the purpose for which the intelligence was produced. The categories can and

do overlap, and the same intelligence data can be used in each of the categories.

•• **Indications and Warning.** I&W intelligence concerns foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States, US or allied military forces, US political or economic interests, or to US

citizens abroad. I&W is very time-sensitive. It includes forewarning of adversary actions or intentions; the imminence of nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to US activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events.

•• **Current Intelligence.** Current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations across the full range of military operations. It involves the integration of time-sensitive, all-source intelligence and information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. One of the most important forms of current intelligence is the intelligence estimate. Estimates provide forecasts on how the situation may develop and the implications for planning and executing military operations.

•• **General Military Intelligence (GMI).** GMI is intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreign countries and organizations and other topics that could affect potential US or allied military operations. This broad

category of intelligence is normally associated with long-term planning. Identifying and monitoring trends effecting national security facilitates the effective application of scarce resources to shape the global environment to US advantage. However GMI is also an essential tool for the JFC, and must be in place long before the start of preparations for a particular military operation. An up-to-date, comprehensive intelligence data base is critical to effective, rapid crisis response in an increasingly multipolar, global environment. GMI supports the requirement to quickly respond to differing crisis situations with corresponding intelligence spanning the globe.

•• **Target Intelligence.** Targeting is the process of selecting adversary forces, geographical area, installations or activities planned for capture, degradation, destruction, or neutralization by military forces and matching the appropriate response to them by taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. Target intelligence entails the analysis of enemy units, disposition, facilities, and systems relative to the mission, objectives, and the capabilities at the JFC's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose. **Throughout the targeting process, it is imperative for intelligence personnel to ensure that all available Intelligence Community information is fully considered and appropriately de-conflicted to support proper target nomination.**

See JP 2-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting," for further information.



Figure II-4. Categories of Intelligence Products

•• **Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence.** S&T intelligence is intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. It includes S&T characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, subsystems, and associated materiel, as well as related research and development. S&T also addresses overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness.

•• **Counterintelligence.** CI analyzes the threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services and the intelligence activities of non-state actors such as

organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers. CI analysis incorporates all-source information (derived from SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, HUMINT, TECHINT, and OSINT) and the results of CI investigations and operations to support a multi-discipline analysis of the force protection threat.

e. **Dissemination and Integration Phase**

- During the dissemination and integration phase, **intelligence is delivered to and used by the consumer.** Dissemination can be by a variety of means. The means must be determined by the needs of the user. Briefings, video-teleconferences, telephone calls, FAX transmissions, electronic

FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

“The estimate, in its entirety, is a presentation of possibilities:

- the forces available to the other side that may interfere and disrupt the military operation;
- the available weapons systems and their operational characteristics; and
- the possible timetable of intervention.

This is clearly not an attempt to predict the course of events. On the contrary, it can be stated with near certainty that these ‘possible courses of action’ available to the enemy will never materialize, the most drastic, severe, and perilous possibilities having been deliberately chosen for presentation. Furthermore, what really happens depends, of course, on the decisions made by the other side, their timing, their rate of implementation, the combat readiness of their forces and their speed of action. The true test of intelligence does not lie in whether these possibilities actually occur, but in whether forces of whose existence intelligence was unaware come into play, or if their speed of intervention exceeds the intelligence forecast.

For instance, before the ‘Entebbe Operation’ (July 1976), intelligence pointed out the existence of Ugandan MIG fighters at the Entebbe airport and the possibility (even though of low probability) that they could be used to shoot down the fleet of Israeli Hercules transports during the flight north after the rescue. Israel’s government, basing its decision on these data and the estimate, ordered the destruction of the MIGs on the ground to ensure the safe flight of the task force and the hostages.”

SOURCE: Major General Shlomo Gazit
Chief, Israeli Military Intelligence, 1974-1979

messages and, of increasing importance, remote terminal access to computer data bases and direct data transfers are all means of dissemination. The diversity of dissemination paths **reinforces the need for interoperability** among command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems.

- **The Global Command and Control System** will facilitate the development of an integrated common operational picture (COP), built on a foundation of geospatial information, that displays the disposition of friendly, neutral, and adversary forces across the joint battlespace. Advanced battle management capabilities that allow US forces to be employed faster and more flexibly than those of potential adversaries are dependent upon development of the COP.
- Joint intelligence dissemination must be **consistent with the C4I for the Warrior concept** that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior's requirements for intelligence exchange. This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs to the maximum extent possible if they: have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through pre-planned PIRs; emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates); and accommodate warrior pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System [JDISS]). **This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of RFI messages and intelligence reports.** Broadcasts such as the tactical

information broadcast service and the tactical related applications are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders.

Chapter IV, "Joint Intelligence Architecture," provides a more comprehensive discussion of the joint intelligence architecture.

- Supporting intelligence organizations must emphasize providing intelligence to the warfighter using the **best available technology**. Intelligence organizations at all levels must ensure precision and commonality in reporting terminology to minimize the possibility of confusion on the part of users reviewing assessments and estimates.
- Intelligence organizations at all levels must **ensure that their products are getting to the users by the time they are needed**. Simply putting the product into the dissemination system is not enough. Intelligence organizations must initiate and maintain close contact with the user to ensure that the product has been received and meets their requirements.
- After intelligence products are delivered, **intelligence personnel and organizations are responsible for supporting the users** as they integrate the intelligence into their decision making and planning processes. Products may require further clarification or they may raise new issues that must be immediately addressed. Products may need to be related to a larger intelligence picture. Products may cause the user to consider new operational concepts that require the intelligence to be interpreted in a new context.
- Rather than being the end of a process, **the integration of intelligence is a**

continuous dialogue between the user and the producer. How or even whether intelligence is used is ultimately up to the user. The role of the producer is to ensure that the user has the best intelligence possible for decision making.

f. Evaluation and Feedback Phase

- During the evaluation and feedback phase, intelligence personnel at all levels **assess how well each phase of the intelligence cycle is being performed.** Commanders and operational staff elements must provide feedback. When areas are identified that need improvement, the necessary changes are made.
- **Evaluation and feedback are continuously performed during every other phase of the intelligence cycle.** Personnel involved in different phases coordinate and cooperate to identify if transitions from one phase to another require improvements. Individual intelligence operators aggressively seek to improve their own performance and the performance of the processes in which they participate.
- An important aspect of evaluation and feedback is **identifying and reporting lessons learned.** The **Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)** provides a means for personnel participating in joint operations and exercises to share with other organizations the problems encountered and the solutions developed to overcome those problems. It is essential that intelligence organizations outside the joint force fully participate in the JULLS process to ensure that the benefits of lessons learned are disseminated as widely as possible.

- The **attributes of intelligence** (shown in Figure II-5) are qualitative objectives for intelligence used to support joint operations and standards against which intelligence activities and products are evaluated. A failure to achieve any one of the attributes may contribute to a failure of operations.

- **Anticipatory.** Intelligence must anticipate the informational needs of the commander and joint force staff in order to provide a solid foundation for operational planning and decision making. Anticipating the joint force's intelligence needs requires the intelligence staff to identify and fully understand the command's current and potential missions, the commander's intent, all relevant aspects of the command's battlespace, and all possible friendly and adversary COAs. Most




Figure II-5. Attributes of Intelligence

importantly, anticipation requires the aggressive involvement of intelligence in operation planning at the earliest time possible.

- **Timely.** Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it. Timely intelligence enables the commander to anticipate events in the operational area. This, in turn, enables the commander to time operations for maximum effectiveness and to avoid being surprised.

- **Accurate.** Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as it exists, and estimate future situations and courses of adversary action based on those facts and sound judgment. It is not enough that intelligence is true; **to be accurate it should also describe what is known of the situation.**

- **Usable.** Intelligence must be tailored to the specific needs of the commander. It must be provided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension. The commander must be able to quickly apply intelligence to the task at hand. Providing useful intelligence requires the producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used. Commanders operate under mission, operational, and time constraints that will shape their intelligence requirements and determine how much time they will have to study the intelligence that they are provided. Commanders may not have the time to spend analyzing intelligence reports that are excessively complex and difficult to comprehend. Intelligence products must be written with the consumer, not the intelligence community, in mind. The “bottom line” must be up front and easily understandable. Oral presentations should be simple and to the point. The

use of approved joint terms and straightforward presentation methods will facilitate rapid and effective application of intelligence to support joint operations.

- **Complete.** Complete intelligence answers the commander’s questions about the adversary to the fullest degree possible. It also tells the commander what remains unknown. To be complete, intelligence must identify all of the adversary’s capabilities. It must inform the commander of the possible COAs that are available to the adversary commander. When justified by the available evidence, intelligence must forecast future adversary actions and intentions. If there is inadequate information upon which to base forecasts, the intelligence staff must ensure that the commander is aware that the future contains much uncertainty. The effort to produce complete intelligence never ceases. While providing available intelligence to those who need it when they need it, the intelligence staff must give priority to the commander’s unsatisfied critical requirements. Intelligence organizations must anticipate and be ready to respond to the existing and contingent intelligence requirements of commanders and forces at all levels of command.

- **Relevant.** Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the operation at hand. It must aid the commander in the accomplishment of the command’s mission. Intelligence must contribute to the commander’s understanding of the adversary, but not burden the commander with intelligence that is of minimal or no importance to the current mission. It must help the commander decide how to accomplish the assigned mission without being unduly hindered by the adversary.

Commanders must communicate their intent and their operational concept to the intelligence staff if they want relevant intelligence. Requirements must be updated and refined as the friendly mission or the adversary situation changes.

•• Objective. For intelligence to be objective, it should be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or an adversary, institutional position, predetermined objective,

operation, or method of operations. **Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.**

•• Available. Intelligence must be readily accessible to the commander. **Availability is a function of not only timeliness and usability, but also appropriate security classification.** Intelligence producers must strive to provide data at the lowest level of classification, thereby providing the greatest access, while ensuring that sources of information are protected.

CHAPTER III

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

“The great military victory we achieved in DESERT STORM and the minimal losses sustained by US and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
Commander in Chief
US Central Command, 1991

1. Intelligence Operations

a. Enabling a commander to accurately visualize the battlespace requires carefully coordinated and synchronized intelligence operations. Intelligence operations are the **wide ranging activities** conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose of **providing the commander with relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence**. Effective intelligence operations enable JFCs at all levels to apply their available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively.

b. Intelligence operations are characterized by **centralized planning** and **decentralized execution**. Intelligence operations seek to maximize the support offered to the JFC, while simultaneously providing specialized and detailed intelligence to other commanders and staffs throughout the joint force.

c. Of particular importance is the seamless provision of joint intelligence support to operational forces across the range of military operations as they deploy from one theater to another. To effectively plan and execute unit missions, deploying intelligence personnel must know the supported theater’s intelligence concept of operations, intelligence architecture, estimate of the situation, map standards, and other theater-specific requirements. This information should be rapidly provided to deploying forces in a standardized electronic format by intelligence producers. This focuses the intelligence

community’s effort on satisfying operational requirements.

2. Intelligence and the Levels of War

a. **Levels of War.** JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” discusses three levels of war: **strategic, operational, and tactical** (see Figure III-1). The levels are a doctrinal perspective that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions and apply to both war and MOOTW. The levels of war assist commanders in visualizing a logical flow of operations, allocating resources, and assigning tasks.

- All levels of war have corresponding intelligence operations. The concept of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence operations **aids JFCs and their J-2s in visualizing the flow of intelligence** from one level to the next. The concept facilitates the allocation of required collection, analytical, and dissemination resources and permits the assignment of appropriate intelligence tasks to national, theater, component, and supporting intelligence elements.
- Intelligence operations at all levels should support the JFC. Strategic intelligence operations provide **continuity and depth of coverage** even while the joint force is deploying. During campaign planning, strategic and

LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGIC

National Command Authorities Senior Military Leaders Combatant Commanders

- assist in developing national strategy and policy
- monitor the international situation
- assist in developing military plans
- assist in determining major weapon systems and force structure requirements
- support the conduct of strategic operations

OPERATIONAL

Combatant and Subordinate Joint Force Commanders and their Component Commanders

- focus on military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries
- monitor events in the joint force commander's operational area
- support the conduct of joint campaigns

TACTICAL

Commanders

- support planning and conducting battles and engagements
- provide the commanders with information on the imminent threats to their forces

Figure III-1. Levels of Intelligence

operational intelligence operations focus on **providing to the JFC information** required to identify the adversary's COGs. During execution, operational intelligence operations provide the JFC with relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence relating to the accomplishment of campaign or major operation objectives.

- **Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level of intelligence operations.** National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations.

Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. Operational and tactical intelligence operations **reduce the JFC's uncertainty** about the adversary and the environment. Operational and tactical intelligence operations provide the JFC information required to identify COGs and decisive points for the optimum application of combat power, thereby allowing the JFC to achieve leverage by bringing the JTF's strengths to bear on the adversary's vulnerabilities.

b. Strategic Intelligence Operations

- **Strategic intelligence** is produced for the NCA, the **senior military leaders**, and the **CINCs**. It is used by the NCA to develop national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations.
- **Strategic intelligence supports joint operations across the range of military operations.** Strategic intelligence **determines the current capabilities and forecasts future developments** of adversaries or potential adversaries that could affect the national security and interests.
- Strategic intelligence operations also **produce the intelligence required by CINCs to prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans** to accomplish missions assigned by higher authorities. **Theater strategic intelligence** includes determining when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and

conduct theater level campaigns and strategic unified operations. It also supports IO.

c. Operational Intelligence Operations

- Operational intelligence is primarily used by combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs and their component commanders. Operational intelligence focuses on the **military capabilities and intentions** of adversaries and potential adversaries. **Operational intelligence helps the JFC and component commanders keep abreast of events within their operational area** and helps commanders determine when, where, and in what strength the adversary might stage and conduct campaigns and major operations.
- Operational intelligence operations **support all phases of military operations**, from deployment through employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces.
- Within the theater, **operational intelligence addresses the full range of military operations.** Operational intelligence operations produce the intelligence required to **accomplish strategic objectives** within theaters and/or joint operations areas (JOAs), to include planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations.
 - JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," defines a **campaign** as "**a series of related military operations** aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space."
 - **Operational intelligence supports all aspects of the joint campaign.** Intelligence operations focus on

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information, information-based processes, and information systems (such as command, control, communications, and computers [C4] systems, weapons systems, and infrastructure systems) used by the US military forces will be protected relative to the value of information contained therein and the risks associated with its compromise or loss. Information systems defense relies on four interrelated processes. These include a process to protect information and information systems, a process to detect attacks or intrusions, a restoration process to mitigate the effects of incidents and restore services, and a response process. Information systems will incorporate information system defense capabilities and employ them continuously across the range of military operations . . . Intelligence is an important element in the protection process. Intelligence provides an understanding of the threat to information and information systems by identifying potential information adversaries, their intent, and their known and assessed capabilities. Threat information is a key consideration in the risk management process.

SOURCE: CJCSI 6510.01A, 31 May 1996
Defense Information Operations Implementation

providing the JFC information required to **identify adversary COGs and provide the relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence to the JFC** necessary to execute the campaign plan. Operational intelligence also provides critical support to friendly IO.

d. **Tactical Intelligence Operations**

- **Tactical intelligence** is used by commanders for **planning and conducting battles and engagements**. Relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence allows tactical units to achieve positional advantage over their adversaries. Precise threat and target status reporting, in particular, is essential for success during actual mission execution. Tactical intelligence also provides critical support to friendly IO.
- Tactical intelligence addresses the threat **across the range of military operations**. Tactical intelligence operations identify and assess the adversary’s capabilities,

intentions, and vulnerabilities, as well as describe the environment. Tactical intelligence seeks to identify when, where, and in what strength the adversary will conduct tactical level operations. Together with CI, **tactical intelligence will provide the commander with information on the imminent threats to the force** from terrorists, saboteurs, insurgents, and foreign intelligence collection.

3. Major Intelligence Tasks

- a. At each level of intelligence operations, **certain major tasks must be performed if the JFC is to receive the necessary intelligence**. These strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level tasks are listed in CJCSM 3500.04, “Universal Joint Task List.” Since the tasks follow the phases of the intelligence cycle discussed in Chapter II, “The Intelligence Cycle,” the same tasks generally apply to each level of intelligence. However, the differing needs of JFCs at each level create distinct tasks.



Intelligence assets address the threat across the range of military operations.

"Tell me what you know . . . tell me what you don't know . . . tell me what you think . . . always distinguish which is which."

General Colin Powell
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1989-1993

b. Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations

• General Tasks

- Intelligence personnel assist their consumers in determining their intelligence requirements, then plan the collection effort and issue the necessary orders and requests to intelligence organizations. Intelligence plans are prepared. Personnel and systems are allocated.

- Planning and directing include reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements may include providing intelligence for US forces and multinational forces engaged in a wide range of activities.

• Strategic Intelligence Tasks.

Intelligence operations focus on developing strategic intelligence policy; assisting and advising the NCA and CINCs on the development of policy governing strategic intelligence operations; preparing the strategic collection plan; and allocating national intelligence resources.

• Operational Intelligence Tasks.

Intelligence personnel assist JFCs in determining their PIRs. Operational information requirements are identified and prioritized and the theater collection plan is prepared. Theater intelligence resources are allocated and support is requested from national agencies, other theaters, and allies. During MOOTW, operational intelligence tasks include training and helping allies and multinational partners to conduct intelligence operations.

• Tactical Intelligence Tasks.

Intelligence personnel assist tactical commanders in determining their PIRs. Tactical information requirements are identified and prioritized and the tactical collection

plan is prepared. Tactical intelligence resources are allocated and support is requested from national agencies, other theaters, and allies.

c. **Collect Information**

• **General Tasks**

- Intelligence collection operations are conducted to collect information from all available sources. Information is collected on current and potential adversaries. Collection operations are conducted to support component and multinational forces.

- Information is collected on the nature and characteristics of the battlespace environment and the adversary. Items of interest include political, economic, industrial, geographic, demographic, topographic, hydrographic, medical, climatic, and cultural conditions. Biographic data on the adversary's leadership is collected. Threats include those nations and groups supporting the adversary. During MOOTW, collection operations are conducted against a wide variety of adversaries or potential adversaries, to include insurgents, terrorists, illegal drug traffickers, and belligerents.

JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," lists sixteen types of MOOTW.

- Information may be collected from civilians, to include internees, displaced civilians, or defectors. The information gained could include the general attitudes of civilians towards their own government as well as to US or friendly forces. It could also include information on potential terrorist threats to US or friendly forces. It is important that any information gained from civilians be

carefully evaluated for reliability, then reported expeditiously to ensure the information is usable.

- Reconnaissance and surveillance operations must be integrated with other forms of intelligence collection operations at each level.

• **Strategic Intelligence Tasks**

- Intelligence requirements include activities and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives, multinational and regional relations, or US and allied military forces. Of particular importance is information relating to adversary or potential adversary's strategic vulnerabilities, strategic forces, strategic COGs, and any capabilities relating to the development and employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- Information is collected on strategic targets to enable the detection, identification, and location of the adversary's strategic COGs and high-payoff targets. This task includes collecting information relating to WMD and their production and storage sites.

• **Operational Intelligence Tasks**

- Information is gathered on operational and tactical threat forces and their COGs. Locating and reporting captured or isolated personnel falls under this task. This task applies across the range of military operations.

- Information is collected to support the detection, identification, and location of the adversary's operational COGs and high-payoff targets. Of particular interest are those targets which, if destroyed, would lead directly or indirectly to the rapid collapse of the adversary. Of

particular interest are the production, infrastructure, and delivery systems associated with WMD.

- **Tactical Intelligence Tasks.** Tactical intelligence tasks support the execution of battles and engagements. In addition to information from strategic and operational sources, it includes information gathered from tactical sources, such as combat reporting. Locating, reporting, and field interrogation of captured or isolated personnel is an integral part of this process. Tactical intelligence provides the tactical commander with the intelligence needed to employ combat forces against adversary forces and achieve the objectives of the operational commander. Information is gathered on operational and tactical adversary forces and their COGs, current activity, disposition, order of battle, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, strengths, doctrine, and other essential information as may be directed by the commander. Additionally, information is gathered on the nature and characteristics of the battlespace, such as terrain, weather, and local population. Tactical intelligence tasks are distinguished from those at other levels by their perishability and ability to immediately influence the outcome of the tactical commander's mission.

d. Process and Exploit Collected Information

- **General Tasks**
 - Technical processing and exploitation operations include activities such as imagery development and interpretation, document translation, data conversion, technical analysis of captured adversary material, and decryption of encoded material.

- Information is collated to identify and group together related items of information for comparison. Individual elements of information are associated and combined with related information on a single subject in order to improve the reliability or credibility of the information.

- There are no distinct differences in the major tasks relating to processing and exploitation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

e. Analyze and Produce Intelligence

- **General Tasks**

- Processed and exploited information is converted into intelligence that satisfies the consumer's intelligence requirements. The conversion requires that information be appraised to determine its credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy; integrated by selecting and combining information to form patterns; analyzed to review information to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation; and interpreted to judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge.

- What the adversary (or potential adversary) can do, as well as where, when, and with what strength it can do it, are determined. Both military and nonmilitary capabilities must be addressed. Military capabilities include ground, air, naval, nuclear, space, chemical and biological, and unconventional warfare, IO, and joint capabilities. Nonmilitary capabilities include political and economic actions.

- All discernible COAs open to the adversary are identified. When sufficient

intelligence is available, the relative order of probability of each COA is determined. Any factors that may influence the adversary to adopt each COA are identified and explained.

- The vulnerability of vital elements of the adversary's ability to conduct military operations are identified for each level of war. Vulnerabilities may pertain to political, leadership, geographic, climate, economic, scientific, sociological, or military factors.

- From the results of intelligence production operations, intelligence products are prepared. The types of intelligence products are described in Chapter II, "The Intelligence Cycle."

- **Strategic Intelligence Tasks**

- Global and regional issues and threats are identified to the NCA, the senior military leadership, and the CINCs. This task includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives.

- Worldwide strategic I&W of threats are identified and reported. Intelligence requirements include any foreign developments that could threaten the United States, its citizens abroad, or allied military, political, or economic interests. This task also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks.

- **Operational Intelligence Tasks**

- Information concerning the nature and characteristics of the battlespace is used to determine the type and scale of operations the theater will support and

the impact of significant regional features and hazards on the conduct of both friendly and adversary campaigns or joint operations. The analysis assists in determining the impact of limiting factors (for example, rules of engagement) and the JFC's AOI. Significant regional factors include political, economic, industrial, infrastructure, geographic, demographic, topographic, hydrographic, climatic, populace, cultural, medical, lingual, historical, and psychological aspects of the battlespace.

- Information relating to the adversary's military and nonmilitary capabilities is used to determine the adversary's ability to conduct military operations. Factors that are addressed include mobilization potential; force structure (including alliance forces); force dispositions; equipment; military doctrine; C2 structure; and decision making processes. This evaluation includes continuous refinement of the orders of battle for the entire array of joint and multinational forces available to the adversary commanders in the battlespace.

- **Tactical Intelligence Tasks.** Tactical intelligence production tasks focus on executing military operations (e.g., threat and target status reporting).

- f. **Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence**

- **General Tasks**

- The J-2 staff provides intelligence promptly, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means to those who need it. Intelligence personnel ensure that the intelligence is understood by its consumers and assist the consumers as they apply the intelligence to their operations.

- Dissemination requires the establishment of appropriate communications systems and procedures.

- Integration requires that the J-2 and other intelligence personnel fully participate in all operation planning and execution, and develop close working relationships with the JFC and other staff elements.

- The same dissemination and integration tasks are performed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

g. Evaluate Intelligence Operations

- **General Tasks.** Intelligence operations are evaluated to determine how they are being performed and to make any necessary improvements. The intelligence tenets identified in Chapter II, “The Intelligence Cycle,” provide the criteria for evaluating intelligence operations.

- The same evaluation tasks are performed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

4. Responsibilities of the Joint Force J-2

JFCs organize their joint force staff and assign responsibilities as necessary to ensure unity of effort and mission accomplishment. To plan, coordinate, and execute required intelligence operations, J-2s at all echelons have the following major responsibilities (see Figure III-2).

a. **Participate in all Decision Making and Planning.** Using the intelligence estimate as a basis, the J-2 participates in the JFC’s decision making and planning processes from the time that operations are first contemplated

or directed until the completion of the operation. **The JFC and the J-2 must conduct a continuous dialog** concerning the adversary’s relative ability to prevent the joint force from accomplishing its mission.

b. **Synchronize Intelligence With Operations.** **The J-2 synchronizes all intelligence activities with the JFC’s concept of operations.** Effective synchronization results in the **maximum use of every intelligence asset** where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success. To achieve synchronization, **the J-2 must play an active role** during the wargaming and analysis of all COAs and plans.

c. **Develop Concept of Intelligence Operations.** To communicate guidance and requirements to higher and lower echelons of command, the joint force J-2 develops and disseminates a concept of intelligence operations. The concept can include such information as tasking authorities, reporting responsibilities, required coordination, obtaining communications-related support and backups, and requirements for intelligence-related boards, centers, and teams.

See JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

d. **Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans.** The JFC’s PIRs and the results of wargaming serve as the basis for the intelligence plan. The plan will list the **JFC’s PIRs** and the **supporting information requirements**. It will **identify the intelligence forces** available for the operation, resolve shortfalls, and **assign or recommend tasks** (as appropriate) that will best support the joint force’s requirements. This plan should **allocate available joint force and supporting intelligence assets** among the elements of the joint force in accordance with the

J-2 RESPONSIBILITIES

Participate in all Decision Making and Planning

Synchronize Intelligence With Operations

Develop Concept of Intelligence Operations

Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans

Plan to Use Operational Forces for Collection

Use Special Operations Forces to Conduct Special Reconnaissance

Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

Organize for Continuous Operations

Maintain Flexibility

Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support

Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

Figure III-2. J-2 Responsibilities

commander's intent, main effort, and concept of operations; the J-2 must ensure that component intelligence requirements critical to success of key component operations receive appropriate intelligence support. The plan also addresses how any shortfalls between assigned or attached capabilities and requirements will be met by national and supporting capabilities.

e. **Plan to Use Operational Forces for Collection. Forward and engaged combat forces have a responsibility to report information that can be integrated with**

intelligence obtained from reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A lack of contact with the adversary may be just as significant as positive intelligence.

f. **Use Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Conduct Special Reconnaissance.** Special Reconnaissance provides the JFC with a unique "eyes-on-target" deep look capability, especially useful in areas where other sensors are not available, or can't provide required "resolution." Based on operational requirements, the theater J-2 must identify the PIRs and associated reporting

criteria to properly focus on the SOF Special Reconnaissance assets.

g. **Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture.** A truly joint intelligence infrastructure must be created to provide the best possible intelligence to the JFC. It must be constructed to ensure protection of information and intelligence from inadvertent disclosure, and guarantee integrity of the data and assured access to all sources. The joint force C4I architecture required to support the JFC's concept of operation must be **designed during the planning phase and redefined during the pre-deployment phase.** JTFs that are primarily composed of forces from a single Service should be provided the necessary personnel and communications to permit the implementation of a joint intelligence system.

Chapter IV, "Joint Intelligence Architecture," discusses the requirements for a joint intelligence architecture.

h. **Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort.** For each operational area, there should be unity of intelligence effort to **ensure complete, accurate, current, and pertinent intelligence.** Unity of effort is also required to **reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.** All joint force intelligence capabilities must be **integrated in an interoperable and seamless architecture,** so that all joint force elements have access to required intelligence. This approach allows the JFC and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet the joint force's intelligence requirements.

i. **Organize for Continuous Operations.** Intelligence organizations should be structured for **continuous day-night and all-weather operations.** The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support

even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost. **Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable** to ensure required intelligence support is available to the JFC. An important component of survivability is **redundancy** in critical C4I capabilities.

j. **Maintain Flexibility.** Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, products, and personnel **must be flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities.** They must serve all possible strategies and tactics. JFCs need timely intelligence products to identify, influence, and exploit opportunities.

k. **Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support.** The J-2 must plan for **integrating national and theater intelligence elements and products into the joint force's intelligence structure.** National and theater intelligence organizations will make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability, capacity, or expertise.

See JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for details on the capabilities of the national intelligence organizations.

l. **Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence.** Personnel experienced with foreign disclosure regulations must be assigned to the joint force to facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence. The J-2 must **ensure that intelligence is readily accessible to the JFC and other members of the joint force while still adhering to security standards** of security clearance and need-to-know. However, all efforts must be made to ensure that the personnel and organizations that need access to required intelligence will have it in a timely manner.

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CHAPTER IV

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

"In establishing a Joint Intelligence Center at each combatant command, we have improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter while decreasing the resources required to provide such support."

**CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions
of the Armed Forces of the United States
February 1993**

1. Purpose

a. A JFC must be capable of coordinating the actions of people, organizations, and resources at great distances. **Successful operations require that the JFC be supported by an integrated C4ISR infrastructure** that is capable of generating and moving intelligence, operational information, and orders where needed in the shortest possible time.

b. To prevail, the JFC's decision making and execution cycles must be **consistently faster** than the adversary's and **able to provide better information**. Being faster and better requires having effective control over the collection, processing, and dissemination of information.

c. **JP 6-0**, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations," **establishes joint doctrine for C4 support**. It envisions a global communications and information grid into which all military information customers can plug interoperable systems. The joint intelligence operational architecture described in this chapter is an integral part of the C4 support concept described in JP 6-0. C4 support must be **interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable**. Intelligence organizations use a variety of sensors and other information sources to collect and analyze data and produce

intelligence products. **C4 systems support to intelligence is normally limited to providing the communications interface and media required to move intelligence and related information. C4 systems support does not typically cover the collection and production of intelligence.**

d. Defense Intelligence Agency

- In coordination with the Joint Staff, national intelligence agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Military Service intelligence organizations, DIA is responsible for developing, implementing, and managing the configuration of information, data, and communications standards for intelligence systems. DIA establishes defense wide intelligence priorities for attaining interoperability between the tactical, theater, and national intelligence systems and the respective C4 systems at each level.
- The C4ISR architecture framework defines a common approach for the Department of Defense to follow in developing and describing C4ISR architectures. In this approach, **an architecture is designated as operational, systems, or technical**. In this chapter, these terms will be used to discuss the overall C4 architecture and the C4ISR architecture limited to intelligence operations.

e. The joint intelligence operational architecture is a **dynamic, flexible structure capable of providing global access to an information grid** that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The joint operational architecture facilitates the capability of the **national and defense intelligence communities** to focus on supporting the JFC and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. The joint intelligence operational architecture is configured to provide the **baseline data** needed to support commanders at all levels. The CINCs are responsible for the intelligence operational architecture for their commands. For contingency operations the JFC, supported by the joint force J-2, is responsible for establishing the joint force intelligence operational architecture required to accomplish the assigned mission.

f. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence is responsible for integrating C4ISR architectures.

2. Characteristics

a. **The joint intelligence operational architecture is integral to each phase of the intelligence cycle** — from planning and direction through dissemination and integration, with evaluation and feedback being done throughout each phase. **The architecture supports intelligence functions over a distributed global network** employing communications systems, computers, space-based C4I support systems, and their associated resources and technologies.

b. **The operational architecture supports the range of military operations** as envisioned in the national military strategy. The intelligence operational architecture **supports the intelligence requirements of**

decision makers, from the NCA down through the joint force's tactical commanders. The intelligence operational architecture incorporates the policies, procedures, reporting structures, trained personnel, automated information processing systems, and connectivity to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence that is fused into the JFC's C4I systems. The operational architecture also provides support to **natural or man-made disaster** relief efforts that require military support.

3. Requirements

See Figure IV-1.

a. The joint intelligence operational architecture must be capable of being **tailored to support a specific JFC's information requirements**. Intelligence must be provided in a form that is readily understood and directly usable by the recipient without providing the user irrelevant data. **Dissemination of intelligence consists of both "push" and "pull" control principles**. The **"push"** concept allows the higher echelons to push intelligence down to satisfy existing lower echelon requirements or to relay other relevant information to the lower level. The **"pull"** concept involves direct electronic access to data bases, intelligence files, or other repositories by intelligence organizations at all levels. "Push" updates must be based on the JFC's PIRs to ensure that the JFC receives critical information and intelligence. Other information must be available on an as-needed "pull" basis so that the joint force J-2 avoids information overload. From the NCA through the tactical commanders, the architecture must provide complete, tailored, all-source intelligence to the decision maker.

"Push" and "pull" control principles are discussed in detail in JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS

- Adapt to the joint force commander's (JFC's) requirements
- Avoid single points of failure
- Accommodate the full range of missions and operational scenarios
- Integrate the intelligence cycle with the JFC's decision making and execution cycle
- Permit users to train and exercise with intelligence capabilities in peacetime
- Incorporate new and emerging technologies

Figure IV-1. Architectural Requirements

b. The operational architecture must **ensure that no source of information collection, production, or dissemination is subject to a single point of failure.** At the same time, the architecture must identify and eliminate the unnecessary duplication of intelligence capabilities so that scarce resources can be focused to meet prioritized requirements.

c. The operational architecture must be **capable of accommodating the widest possible range of missions and operational scenarios.** It must respond to the JFC's requirements for information at any time and any place and be capable of supporting multinational operations with no loss in timeliness. The intelligence operational architecture must incorporate the capabilities of the national and Service intelligence organizations, and provide to the JTF and its components the capability to access national and Service capabilities when necessary.

d. The operational architecture must **achieve a seamless integration of the JFC's decision making and execution cycles with all phases of the intelligence cycle.** In developing the operational architecture, the intelligence community must streamline the processes in each phase of the cycle to ensure responsiveness to the JFC's requirements.

e. The operational architecture must be **developed so that users can train and exercise with intelligence capabilities in peacetime.** Intelligence systems, policies, procedures, connectivity, security, and fusion requirements must be part of joint training exercises and be incorporated into simulations. During exercises, capabilities must function exactly as in a real operation, so that the users train in a realistic, seamless environment. The architecture must be configured so that real world data bases are preserved and cannot be accidentally or maliciously altered during an exercise.

f. The intelligence technical architecture must **provide for integration with the existing and projected teleconferencing capabilities of C4I systems**. Secure teleconferencing will permit groups of dispersed users to collaborate during the planning and execution of intelligence operations and to coordinate with operational users. Dispersed users include, but are not limited to, JFCs and their subordinate commanders, the theater JICs and joint intelligence support elements (JISEs), the Joint Staff, Services, the combat support agencies, and the NCA.

4. Standards

See Figure IV-2.

a. **Survivable**. The system design specified in the technical architecture must be as survivable as the command structure it supports. Assets that are vulnerable to damage or destruction must have alternative means of providing required data with minimal risk.

b. **Interoperable**. It is imperative that intelligence and operations systems architectures be fully interoperable in order to facilitate a COP. The systems architecture must comply with DOD joint technical architecture. The technical architecture must be designed to accommodate interoperability



Figure IV-2. Architectural Standards

and integration with existing and projected intelligence information systems and with those joint C4 systems that must exchange information with the intelligence technical architecture.

c. **Secure**. Information must be protected according to a developed intelligence technical architecture security policy. The architecture must be designed so that the widest possible access is permitted without compromising security.

d. **Compatible**. The architecture must use common data elements when re-engineering existing systems or applications and developing new systems. As a mid-term objective, all component's intelligence systems must be capable of receiving and exchanging data, information and intelligence products. This capability must extend to applications, data bases, and communications protocols to ensure that intelligence information can be fused with operational C4I systems.

5. Organizations

a. In addition to the J-2 staffs at every joint level of command, the **key organizations** in the joint intelligence architecture are the JCS **NMJIC**, the **JICs** and, when formed, the **JTF JISEs** (see Figure IV-3). Working together, these organizations play the primary role in managing and controlling the intelligence operations described in Chapter III, "Intelligence Operations." These organizations are linked by formal relationships that facilitate RFI management and optimize complementary intelligence functions by echelon without obstructing the timely flow of critical intelligence up, down, or laterally.

- **National Military Joint Intelligence Center**




Figure IV-3. Joint Intelligence Organizations

•• As part of the Joint Staff J-2’s staff, **the NMJIC is the channel through which joint forces’ crisis-related and time-sensitive intelligence requirements are tasked to the appropriate national agency or command**, when they cannot be satisfied using assigned or attached assets. Requirements for national collection and support in collection coordination are handled by the defense collection

coordination center collocated with the NMJIC.

JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” provides details of the support that national agencies such as DIA, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office, and NIMA, as well as the intelligence

organizations of the Services, can provide to joint forces.

•• **The NMJIC is responsible for:** (1) serving as the DOD single point of entry for crisis-related and time-sensitive RFI; (2) global I&W; (3) current intelligence; (4) situation summaries; and (5) national targeting support. **During crises, the NMJIC expands as necessary utilizing DIA assets**, establishing a working group, intelligence task force or, in the case of a major crisis like Operation DESERT STORM, an expanded intelligence task force. Besides supporting the combatant commands and JTFs, the NMJIC supports any coalition partners or allies and prescribed international organizations.

•• **The NMJIC participates in targeting** by developing national-level target lists. When requested, the NMJIC supports the theater in performing BDA.

NMJIC development of target lists is described in JP 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting.”

•• If the NMJIC requires DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) support to satisfy a requirement, DI’s Operational Intelligence Coordination Center (OICC) is contacted. The OICC serves as the crisis management office for DI and is the single point of contact for requirements involving support during crisis situations. DI’s analytical expertise includes military capabilities, S&T, missile, medical, estimative, military production and geography, intelligence data bases, and operational support and facilities intelligence. The OICC will prioritize and coordinate suspenses and analytical requirements with the NMJIC, DI elements, and consumers as required.

•• **Any JTF requirements for captured materiel and document exploitation support are coordinated with DIA by the NMJIC.** The support is tailored to the crisis and can range from a liaison officer to the joint force J-2, to a robust joint staff element with a fully staffed joint captured materiel exploitation center and joint document exploitation center.

•• **The NMJIC serves as the point of contact with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) task force**, when established. The DCI may, in some situations, establish a task force to focus CIA support for ongoing military operations. The DCI task force would be composed of representatives from the intelligence community.

•• At the request of the CINC, the NMJIC **may** deploy a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support the **commander, JTF (CJTF)** during a crisis or contingency operation. NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, NIMA, NSA, or other intelligence community agencies as required. **The NIST mission is to provide a tailored national-level all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. NIST supports intelligence operations at the JTF headquarters and is traditionally collocated with the JTF J-2. In direct support of the JTF J-2, the NIST will perform functions as he or she designates.** The NIST is designated to provide a full range of intelligence support to a CJTF, from a single agency element with limited ultra-high frequency voice connectivity to a fully equipped team with JDISS and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) video-teleconferencing

capabilities. Current methods of operation continue to rely on both agency and command-provided communications paths (e.g., bandwidths) to support deployed NIST elements. NIST provides coordination with national intelligence agencies, **analytical expertise**, I&W, special assessments, targeting support, and access to national data bases, and facilitates RFI management.

- **Joint Intelligence Centers**

- The JIC is the **primary intelligence organization** providing support to joint forces at the operational and tactical levels. The JIC concept **fuses the main support capabilities** of all Service, combat support agency, and combat units into a **central location for intelligence support**. Although a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every RFI, it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations, both lower, higher, and laterally.

- **The JIC has a flexible design and can expand** to meet the needs of the CINC as required. **During non-crisis periods**, JIC personnel levels are normally maintained at the minimum level required to perform essential functions such as I&W, current intelligence, collection management, and GMI production in the JIC's area of production responsibilities. **During crises**, the JIC can be augmented with personnel from other theater intelligence organizations, other commands, and national intelligence organizations (see Figure IV-4).

- As crises develop, **JICs bring together the personnel and equipment needed to manage intelligence support requirements**. Because the JICs are the focal points for intelligence support to joint operations, they can be augmented

with personnel drawn from many sources, including Reserve Components and the combat support agencies.

- **Joint Intelligence Support Elements**

- At the discretion of the subordinate JFC, **a JISE is established during crises or the preparation stage for operations** to augment the subordinate joint force J-2 element. Under the direction of the joint force J-2, a JISE normally **manages the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination** for a joint force.

- **The size and organization of the JISE will be determined by the JTF J-2** based upon the level of augmentation that is required. Personnel and equipment requirements for the JISE are submitted to the combatant command. Resources will be provided by the JIC, other theater intelligence organizations, other commands, and national organizations as required (see Figure IV-4).

- **When formed, the JISE may be collocated with the JTF J-2 element in the JOA, or may operate in a "split base" mode**. In split-base mode, the JISE's operations and personnel are divided between two locations: with the JTF J-2 in the JOA, and outside the JOA, possibly at the JTF's home base or at another remote location. Split-base operations can be used to **reduce the number of personnel that must be deployed** and supported in the JOA and to **reduce the communications requirements** of the deployed force.

- **The JTF J-2 defines the JISE's functions and responsibilities** and its relationship with the J-2 staff. In many cases, specific responsibilities may be shared between the J-2 staff and JISE. For example, the J-2 plans element may be responsible for setting forth




Figure IV-4. Joint Intelligence Center and Joint Intelligence Support Element Augmentation Sources

collection requirements, while the JISE's collection management element will prepare the collection plan and manage its fulfillment.

b. In addition to the support provided by joint intelligence staffs and organizations, JFCs receive valuable support from the **Service intelligence organizations** and from the **intelligence staffs and organizations** belonging to the joint force components. JFCs must consider the intelligence capabilities of these elements during the planning and execution of all joint operations.

- **Multinational Operations.** In many situations, Armed Forces of the United

States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct MOOTW. Because each multinational operation will be unique, standardized agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization agreements (STANAGs) may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. The JFC participating in the coalition or alliance must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance.



Ultralite satellite communications link joint forces to the worldwide intelligence systems.

Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary and take into consideration the intelligence system strengths, limitations, and the unique and valuable capabilities each nation will have.

See Appendix A, “Intelligence in Multinational Operations,” for details.

- **Multinational Intelligence Center.** Just as the theater-level JIC and subordinate joint force-level JISE are critical components of the joint intelligence system architecture, establishing a multinational intelligence center is necessary for consolidating and prioritizing requirements for participating nations. Also the center must coordinate between the collection capabilities of each nation.

6. Systems

a. The joint intelligence systems architecture should be supported by a network of **integrated work stations, file servers, and communications links**. These three elements must work together, compliant with the evolving defense information infrastructure

common operating environment and DOD joint technical architecture, to create the **interoperable information environment** required to support military operations. The network includes direct connectivity by appropriate communications or communications relay link (landline, radio, satellite, and others as appropriate) and broadcast capability to support time-sensitive needs.

b. The **information grid concept** allows data collected by whatever means to be **communicated directly to a user** or to a **processing site or platform** by the most efficient path, then passed on or through to the user as appropriate. A critical aspect of the information grid is its ability to make **all intelligence accessible** by way of standardized file servers to standards-compliant work stations.

c. To maximize the utility of the systems architecture, **systems must be compatible**. **Standard communications protocols and standard encryption devices** must be available at all echelons. The systems architecture should have the flexibility to accommodate, not to replace, existing I&W and direct support systems. The systems

NORTH AFRICA - 1941

“Evidence of foresight was conspicuously absent in the sluggish and unreliable British communications networks. Information was passed up and down chains of command with little or no provision for alternative routing in case of failure of one link in the chain. There was no means by which the 8th Army commander could communicate directly with forward troops if and when he needed to. When time-sensitive intelligence cannot be relayed quickly and reliably to those who need it most, it is of negligible value in the fast-paced environment of the modern battlefield. Success in solving this problem, which is as technical as it is organizational, requires meticulous planning and thorough testing. The Germans, who were much more experienced in mobile warfare, were able to build effective communications systems while the British were still engaged in a learning process.”

Michael I. Handel
Former Professor of National Security and Strategy
Army War College

SOURCE: Handel, Michael I., *Intelligence and Military Operations*, published in *Intelligence and Military Operations*, Michael I. Handel, ed., London, U.K.: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1990, page 62

architecture is intended to overlay additional capabilities using existing communications carriers. Until an effective multi-level security system is in place with joint forces, the intelligence architecture must support three possible levels of information: sensitive compartmented information (SCI), non-SCI (SECRET and below), and an architecture that can support intelligence releasable to allies and coalition partners.

d. The SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network and Global Command and Control System are evolving into common non-SCI support systems for joint forces. The **JWICS and JDISS currently form the foundation for commonality** among all SCI support systems in the joint intelligence system architecture.

- **Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System**
 - JWICS satisfies the requirement for **secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission services** for SCI. JWICS

incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video conferencing.

- Video-capable JWICS nodes can create, receive, transmit, and store **video images** as well as **voice, text, graphics, and data**. Information can be either **broadcast** or **shared interactively** among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multi-point basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed by way of allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications.
- **Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System**
 - JDISS provides the **standard workstation server software configuration**. The basic backbone for the **dissemination of intelligence to and**

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

JWICS is a sensitive compartmented information element of the Defense Information System Network. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multi-point information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing.

from deployed JDISS nodes is the JWICS network. Where JWICS is not required or not available, JDISS has a **versatile communications capability** that can interface with existing communications systems, such as tri-Service tactical communications systems. The system architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and ensures that support is maximized for a joint force engaged in military operations.

- **All-source intelligence dissemination** in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels **is by way of JWICS and JDISS**. These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. **The systems architecture provides access to data** from national, theater, and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system.

- The **“pull” capability** is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. The **“pull” concept** results in a JFC requesting and receiving only intelligence relevant to the mission and current phase of the operation.

- In addition, **time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components** by way of dedicated broadcasts in response to pre-planned PIRs. ADP interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished through the use of JDISS. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence

production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC and vice versa.

- Multiprocessing combined with flexible connectivity to computer systems at all echelons of the command structure and within the Services allow intelligence analysts **access to imagery and multiple data bases** while concurrently **producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements**. The ability to communicate across all echelons of the command structure and within the Services, is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.

7. Procedures

- a. **Standardized procedures are the third component of the joint intelligence operational architecture**. Following established guidelines, information is processed and exploited before it is passed on in the correct format to the standardized file servers. Where required, the data can be automatically passed to the standardized file servers without processing.

- b. **Processing and disseminating information collected by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) provides a good example**. Very high resolution video collected by the UAV can be viewed in near real time at a downlink processing site, but disseminating this video requires high bandwidth. The unprocessed video can be relayed directly by fiber optic line or satellite to a headquarters’ element or intelligence center.

c. At the same time, **targeting information can be reported to tactical elements by voice communications or message.** Selected video frames can be captured by JDISS and made available to all users over the joint architecture. Information processed by a headquarters element or JISE could, in turn, be transmitted or made available by JWICS and/or JDISS.

d. In this example, **all the capabilities linked to and by the joint operational architecture are exercised** including both “pull” and “push” dissemination. The information is made available for a variety of users’ needs and is included in products and reports that serve multiple purposes for the tactical users.

APPENDIX A

INTELLIGENCE IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong."

General of the Army George C. Marshall
22 January 1948

1. Nature of Multinational Operations

a. National interests require the United States to act in concert with other nations. In many situations, Armed Forces of the United States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct MOOTW.

b. Multinational operations take place within the structure of an alliance or coalition. Some multinational military alliances, such as NATO and the United Nations (UN) Command in the Republic of Korea, are highly structured and enduring. Others, such as the coalition formed during the Gulf War, are less formal and endure for only a few months.

c. In multinational operations, the multinational force commander (MNFC) exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The President retains **command authority** over US forces, but may place appropriate forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specific military objectives. **However, any large scale participation of US forces in a major operation will likely be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional security organizations such as NATO.** Therefore, in most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. In some circumstances, the JFC will need to seek authority to go outside the usual politico-

military channels to provide information to nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations. Unique intelligence policy and dissemination criteria will have to be tailored to each multinational operation.

2. Intelligence Principles for Multinational Operations

a. In some multinational operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use existing international standardization agreements (e.g., NATO STANAGs) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. A JFC participating in a coalition or alliance must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on theater guidance and national policy as contained in national disclosure policy (NDP) 1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." NDP 1 provides policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance.

b. The following general principles (Figure A-1) provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures:

- **Maintain Unity of Effort.** Intelligence personnel of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the

PRINCIPLES FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

- **MAINTAIN UNITY OF EFFORT**
- **MAKE ADJUSTMENTS**
- **PLAN EARLY AND PLAN CONCURRENTLY**
- **SHARE ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION**
- **CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY OPERATIONS**

Figure A-1. Principles for Multinational Operations

common adversary must be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.

- **Make Adjustments**

- There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is readiness, beginning with the highest levels of command, to make the adjustments required to resolve significant differences.

- Major differences may include how intelligence is provided to the commander (jointly or individual Services or agencies), procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies, and the degree of security afforded by different communications systems and procedures. Administrative differences that need to be addressed may include classification levels, personnel security clearance standards; requirements for access to sensitive intelligence, and translation requirements.

- **Plan Early and Plan Concurrently.**

JFCs need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. NATO and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command have developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures that provide examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance.

- **Share All Necessary Information**

- Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary consistent with NDP and theater guidance. However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared with coalition members until approved by the appropriate national-level agency.

- Force protection is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact on the commander's force protection mission.

- When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, the intelligence derived from that source should still be provided to other coalition members. The J-2 must establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence production agencies often print highly classified reports in such a manner that compartmented information is separated from intelligence that can be widely disseminated by a “tear line” (the J-2, G-2, and/or S-2 keeps information above the tear line and disseminates the intelligence below). Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.

- The joint force J-2 must obtain the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from DIA as soon as possible. J-2 personnel must be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The efficient flow of intelligence will be enhanced by the assignment of personnel knowledgeable of foreign disclosure.

• **Conduct Complementary Operations**

- Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary. Each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations and unique and valuable capabilities. Host-nation security services’ capabilities, for example, will contribute significantly to force protection. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguists requirements, may help overcome such limitations.

- All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a

multinational collection management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational collection operations.

3. **Multinational Intelligence Architecture**

- a. An intelligence operational architecture must be established for every multinational operation. The architecture discussed in Chapter IV, “Joint Intelligence Architecture,” provides a starting point from which a multinational intelligence architecture can be developed.

- b. A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing the intelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiring and fusing the nations’ intelligence contributions. The multinational intelligence center must include representatives from all nations participating in the multinational operation. Designating a single Director of Intelligence for the multinational command will greatly assist in resolving the inevitable differences among the multinational members.

- c. Critical to the multinational architecture is developing a standardized methodology for disseminating and exchanging intelligence. When possible, the methodology must be conceived and exercised as part of the multinational planning process before operations begin. The effectiveness of the methodology must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet changing circumstances.

- d. Intelligence liaison is critical between commands and among supporting and supported organizations. Liaison personnel are instrumental in resolving problems resulting from language barriers and cultural and operational differences that normally occur in multinational operations. Because

of the inherent complexities associated with multinational operations, an aggressive liaison effort is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort. A robust liaison effort with sufficient communications is particularly critical in the initial stages of planning and forming a coalition, particularly when the US intelligence network is not yet established.

e. The multinational operational architecture portrayed in Figure A-2 was established to support US and UN forces in Somalia as members of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) effort. Two levels of intelligence were established: Level 1 data could be shown to but not retained by coalition forces or the UN, while Level 2 data was

cleared for release to the coalition and the UN. Level 1 intelligence remained within US-only channels, while Level 2 data flowed to the UNOSOM II information center in Mogadishu either from the UN Headquarters or via the US JISE.

f. In some situations there may be more than two levels of intelligence required. For example, an operation involving a mixture of NATO and non-NATO forces could have “US Only,” “Releasable to NATO,” and “Releasable to Non-NATO” levels. The MNFC will play a major role in advising the national intelligence community on the intelligence requirements for each of the intelligence requirements for each of the coalition members. The MNFC will need to




Figure A-2. United Nations Operations in Somalia Intelligence Architecture

recommend what intelligence should be provided to each member.

g. Figure A-3 illustrates the intelligence structure established by US European Command (USEUCOM) for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. In this situation, USEUCOM established national intelligence centers at each NATO headquarters to provide intelligence support to both NATO and US forces. NISTs were deployed to ensure timely dissemination of intelligence from national intelligence agencies.

h. In addition, US SOF may be assigned down to coalition brigade level to act as coalition liaison elements. During Operations DESERT STORM and JOINT ENDEAVOR, these teams were known as coalition support teams. These teams have the ability to receive and disseminate intelligence directly to and from their counterparts. The team members are selected based upon their language and cultural knowledge of the area. These teams will be in direct communication with either their combined joint special operations task force, or the next higher special operations command and control element.




Figure A-3. US Intelligence Support to SFOR

4. Additional Guidance

Additional guidance on intelligence operations in multinational operations can be found in JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to

Military Operations.” Information on principles and concepts to support multinational operations can be found in JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” and JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

The development of JP 2-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. The National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 599, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 496 (July 26, 1947), as amended and codified at 50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.
2. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 100 Stat. 1017 (Oct. 1, 1986) as amended and codified at various sections in 10 U.S.C.
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4. National Disclosure Policy (NDP) 1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.”
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6. Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities 46 Fed. Reg. 59441 (Dec. 4, 1981).”
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9. JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”
10. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
11. JP 1-01, Chg-2, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”
12. JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
13. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”
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15. JP 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.”
16. JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.”

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20. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”
21. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”
22. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”
23. JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”
24. JP 3-55, “Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations.”
25. JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”
26. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.”
27. CJCSM 3500.04, “Universal Joint Task List.”
28. C4ISR Architecture Framework v1-0, (current version), C4ISR Architecture Working Group (AWG).
29. DOD Joint Technical Architecture v1.0, (current version), ASD (C3I) and USD (A&T).

APPENDIX C

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Intelligence (J-2).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 2-0, 5 May 1995, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations."

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP	automated data processing
AOI	area of interest
BDA	battle damage assessment
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander of a combatant command
CJTF	commander, joint task force
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COP	common operational picture
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DI	DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
GMI	general military intelligence
HUMINT	human intelligence
I&W	indications and warning
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IO	information operations
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	J-2 CI/HUMINT staff element
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staff
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JFC	joint force commander
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JOA	joint operations area

Glossary

JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MNFC	multinational force commander
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	national disclosure policy
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIST	national intelligence support team
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NSA	National Security Agency
OICC	Operational Intelligence Coordination Center
OSINT	open-source intelligence
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
RFI	request for information
S&T	scientific and technical
SCI	sensitive compartmented information
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SOF	special operations forces
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
TECHINT	technical intelligence
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
USEUCOM	United States European Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

analysis. None. (This term and its definition are approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

analysis and production. See intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)

collate. 1. The grouping together of related items to provide a record of events and facilitate further processing. 2. To compare critically two or more items or documents concerning the same general subject; normally accomplished in the processing and exploitation phase in the intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

collection management. In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection

sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required. See also intelligence; intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

collection planning. A continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combat intelligence. That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

direction. In artillery and naval gunfire support, a term used by a spotter and/or observer in a call for fire to indicate the bearing of the spotting line. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

dissemination and integration. See intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

evaluation and feedback. See intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

foreign intelligence. Information relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence, except for information on international terrorist activities. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

general military intelligence. Intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or (2) topics affecting potential US or allied military operations, relating to the following subjects: armed forces capabilities, including order of battle, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military materiel production and support industries; military and civilian C4 systems; military economics, including foreign military assistance; insurgency and terrorism; military-political-sociological intelligence; location, identification, and description of military-related installations; government control; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts. (Excludes scientific and technical intelligence.) Also called GMI. See also intelligence; military intelligence. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and

precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling data bases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also called GI&S. (This term and its definition are included for information and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 2-03. Note: GI&S includes what formerly had been referred to as "mapping, charting, and geodesy" or "MC&G.")

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

information processing. None. (This term and its definition are approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information requirements. Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

integration. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

intelligence cycle. The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are six phases in the cycle: a. planning and direction—Determination of intelligence requirements, development of appropriate intelligence architecture, preparation of a collection plan, and issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies. b. collection—Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. c. processing and exploitation—Conversion of collected

information into forms suitable to the production of intelligence. d. analysis and production—Conversion of processed information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. e. dissemination and integration—Delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable form and the application of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. f. evaluation and feedback—Continuous assessment of intelligence operations during each phase of the intelligence cycle to ensure that the commander's intelligence requirements are being met. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence discipline. A well defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are seven major disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence (communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence), open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence. See also human intelligence; imagery intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; signals intelligence; open-source intelligence; technical intelligence; counterintelligence. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the preparation and subsequent provision of intelligence to a commander and staff to aid in planning

and conducting military operations. See also joint doctrine; joint intelligence doctrine. (JP 1-02)

intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (JP 1-02)

intelligence operations. The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. Predominantly, it refers to either intelligence collection or intelligence production activities. When used in the context of intelligence collection activities, intelligence operations refer to collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting of information. When used in the context of intelligence production activities, it refers to collation, integration, interpretation, and analysis, leading to the dissemination of a finished product. (JP 1-02)

intelligence requirement. 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence source. The means or system that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. An intelligence source can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

interpretation. A part of the analysis and production phase in the intelligence cycle in which the significance of information is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint captured materiel exploitation center. Physical location for deriving intelligence information from captured enemy material. It is normally subordinate to the joint force J-2. Also called JCMEC. (JP 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence architecture. A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the theater joint intelligence centers, and subordinate joint force joint intelligence support elements. This architecture encompasses automated data processing equipment capabilities, communications

and information requirements, and responsibilities to provide national, theater, and tactical commanders with the full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence center. The intelligence center of the combatant command headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the combatant commander and staff, components, subordinate joint forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the preparation of intelligence and the subsequent provision of intelligence to support military forces of two or more Services employed in coordinated action. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component

command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Also called JIPB. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence support element. A subordinate joint force forms a joint intelligence support element as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (JP 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence. Intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called MASINT. See also intelligence. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national intelligence support team. A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

open-source intelligence. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

operational intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. See also intelligence; strategic intelligence; tactical intelligence. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

planning and direction. See intelligence cycle. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

priority intelligence requirements. Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making. Also called PIRs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

processing. 1. In photography, the operations necessary to produce negatives, diapositives, or prints from exposed films,

plates, or paper. 2. A system of operations designed to convert raw data into useful information. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

reconnaissance. A transitory mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (This term and its definition are included for information and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-55.)

request for information. 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures. 2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. Also called RFI. (JP 1-02)

scientific and technical intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. Also called S&TI. (JP 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. See also intelligence; operational intelligence; tactical intelligence. (JP 1-02)

surveillance. The sustained systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (This term and its definition are included for information and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-55.)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting

tactical operations. Also called TACINTEL. See also intelligence; operational intelligence; strategic intelligence. (JP 1-02)


target acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. (JP 1-02)

targeting. 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (JP 1-02)

technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and material for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary's technological advantages. Also called TECHINT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 2-0** is in the **Intelligence** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

