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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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VOLUME 3**



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***Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control***

***DOD NUCLEAR-RELATED AND DOE/NNSA  
CARGO (OTHER THAN CAT I & II SNM)  
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS***

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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This instruction replaces portions of AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*, the AMC Concept Of Operations (CONOPS) For Aircrew/Ground Handling Procedures For Transporting Category I & II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) Associated With The Department Of Energy (DOE), and implements AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*, and is consistent with AFPD 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*, and portions of AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, and T.O. 11N-45-51 series, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*. It establishes the requirements and guidance for wartime and peacetime logistic airlift of DoD nuclear-related and DOE/NNSA cargo other than Category I & II Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This AFI may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this publication must be routed to AMC/A3N for coordination prior to certification and approval. It applies to all personnel, especially planners, aircrews, controllers, security forces and maintenance personnel, involved in DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo movements.

Submit suggested improvements to this instruction on AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, through MAJCOM channels to AMC/A3N, 402 Scott Drive, Unit 3A1, Scott AFB, IL, 62225-5302 or by email to [AMC.A3N@amc.af.mil](mailto:AMC.A3N@amc.af.mil).

This publication requires the collection and or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act (PA) of 1974. The authorities to collect and or maintain the records prescribed in this publication are Title 37 *United States Code*, Section 301a and Executive Order 9397, *Numbering System for Federal Accounts Relating T.O. Individual Persons*, November 22, 1943

and E.O. 9397 (SSN) as amended by Executive Order 13478, Amendments to Executive Order 9397 Relating to Federal Agency Use of Social Security Numbers, November 18, 2008. Forms affected by the PA have an appropriate PA statement. System of records notice F011 AF XO Aviation Resource Management System (ARMS) applies.

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## Chapter 1

### GENERAL

**1.1. Objective.** Guidance contained in Volume 1, 2, and 4 of this instruction series is written exclusive of each other based upon the mission that is to be executed. Specifically, guidance from one of these Volumes does not apply to any of the other Volumes. This instruction prescribes basic guidance and approved procedures for planning, scheduling, controlling, executing, and supporting airlift missions transporting DoD nuclear-related and other Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) cargo (other than Category I and II Special Nuclear Material (SNM)).

#### 1.2. Key Words Explained

1.2.1. "Will" and "shall" indicate a mandatory requirement.

1.2.2. "Should" is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.

1.2.3. "May" indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.

1.2.4. "Note" indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., which are considered essential to emphasize.

**1.3. Responsibilities.** AMC, Nuclear Operations Division (AMC/A3N), is the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this instruction. Unless otherwise specified in cited source references, AMC/A3 is the waiver authority for the procedures unique to this publication and 18 AF/CC is the authority for specified mission planning and execution waivers.

**1.4. Distribution.** The following individuals and agencies associated with supporting or executing nuclear airlift operations will maintain a copy of this instruction:

1.4.1. Commanders of nuclear capable logistics units (PNAF/ Munitions Squadron (MUNS)/ Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS)).

1.4.2. Operations, logistics, and safety staff agencies.

1.4.3. Security Forces units.

1.4.4. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) airlift squadron(s)/units.

1.4.5. Each individual PNAF aircrew member.

1.4.6. Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) for nuclear accounts.

1.4.7. Custodial unit Civil Engineering, Readiness and Emergency Management, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units.

1.4.8. Non-PNAF C-5, C-17, and C-130 crewmembers (authorized to maintain a copy, but only required to maintain a copy when tasked with executing a mission contained in this volume).

#### 1.5. Protecting Classified Information.

1.5.1. Use caution at all times to avoid compromising classified information. Adhere to all available classification guidance.

1.5.2. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy, CG-W-5, *Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide*, TCG-WPMU-2, *Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Weapon Production and Military Use*, Airlift Request, Economy Act, Mission Setup Message, and nuclear transportation technical orders govern the classification of nuclear mission information. Restricted data and formerly restricted data are not normally releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN). Do not send this type of information to any agency (civilian or military) of a foreign government unless directed to do so by an authoritative publication such as the SWOG.

1.5.3. Do not use terms in unclassified text that reveals nuclear or classified cargo is aboard a specific aircraft or mission or at a specific location.

1.5.4. Do not talk around classified information. Use only the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name when discussing a particular mission in unclassified media or via open lines. Do not use the term "nuclear-related" or "DOE nuclear cargo" in conjunction with the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name. Do not associate line numbers with any of the shipping information that reveals actual nuclear cargo data (e.g., nuclear cargo or package name, net explosive weight (NEW), dimensions, or weight).

1.5.5. Do not talk about any aspect of a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE SAAM unless the other person has an appropriate security clearance and a definite need-to-know. This applies even after a mission is complete.

1.5.6. For specific guidance on classification of Special Nuclear Material, refer to DoDI O-5210.67, *Special Nuclear Material Information, Security Classification Guidance*.

**1.6. Releasing Information.** Only appropriate commanders and public affairs officers may release information about nuclear mishaps to the public or news media. Public Affairs will ensure timely and uniform implementation of DoD approved policies as referenced in DoDI 5400.13, *Public Affairs Operations*, and AFI 35-104, *Media Operations*, to establish and conduct efficient and effective procedures for the release of nuclear activity information to the public, including news media (domestic, international), to include nuclear operations, accidents, IND incidents, or nuclear weapon significant incidents.

**1.7. Logistics Movement of DoD Nuclear-Related and Other DOE/NNSA Cargo Airlift Operations.**

1.7.1. DoD nuclear-related cargo and DOE/NNSA SNM will not be combined on the same mission.

1.7.2. All DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo air movements will be by Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM). DoD nuclear-related items should be consolidated with established nuclear cargo SAAMs when possible. If unable, a SAAM equal to the appropriate priority will be established.

1.7.3. The Copilot or other commissioned Active Duty officer may perform Courier duties described in this Volume, except when a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) crew is required. PNAF aircrews will be used to airlift DoD nuclear-related cargo when required by

Attachment 2. PNAF crews will be used to airlift LLCs from CONUS to OCONUS locations (and vice versa).

1.7.3.1. Once in theater, USAFE may airlift LLCs and other Type II cargo via non-PNAF crews and aircraft according to T.O. 11N-45-51, *Transportation of Nuclear Materiel*.

1.7.3.2. USAFE is responsible for all coordination and planning requirements in this instruction for their in-theater DoD nuclear-related cargo air movements (i.e. de-conflict with PNAF missions, meeting delivery dates, mission planning, security, airfield coordination, Mission Setup Messages, diplomatic clearances, etc).

1.7.4. Mixed Cargo must be moved using a mission priority and security level or procedure commensurate with the requirements of the classified cargo.

**1.8. Mission Tasking.** The applicable Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) will task the appropriate unit(s) as follows:

1.8.1. All DoD nuclear-related airlift missions will be tasked through established SAAM tasking procedures. AFNWC/NCL will provide an Airlift Request through the appropriate AOC.

1.8.2. Other DOE/NNSA missions will be processed through established DOE to DoD Economy Act Request, USTRANSCOM SAAM requirements, and AOC SAAM tasking procedures.

1.8.2.1. In addition to the Economy Act request, DOE/NNSA will provide an Airlift Request message to the applicable AOC for completion of the Mission Setup Message and include the following information:

1.8.2.1.1. Cargo loading and offloading location, available delivery dates, weights, item quantity, hazards, size, and detailed description.

1.8.2.1.2. Security classification and Type security required (Type I, Type II, other).

1.8.2.1.3. Personnel authorized to sign for DOE material list. Include full name, Social Security Number (SSN), security clearance, job title, employer, phone number, HRP status, and on/off load location(s).

1.8.2.1.4. Specific location/itinerary requirements: chains, nets, pallets, dunnage, hand trucks, drivers, and escort requirements.

1.8.2.2. Changes to the Airlift Request message for Other DOE/NNSA cargo missions will be sent as soon as possible to the applicable AOC.

## Chapter 2

### MISSION MANAGEMENT

**2.1. General.** This Chapter provides guidance in planning and scheduling DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo airlift missions. OPSEC is essential at all times and in all mission correspondence. Mission success relies upon reliable, qualified, and prepared aircrews and support personnel during all phases of a mission (from planning through execution).

#### **2.2. Planning Criteria.**

2.2.1. Deliver cargo by the most efficient route to minimize the number of landings and handling of DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo.

2.2.2. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide* (SWOG) applies to DoD nuclear-related cargo movements per Attachment 2.

2.2.3. Mission planners, shipper, and receiver personnel will coordinate on all scheduled operations and sequences of events.

2.2.4. Mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Replacing, Staging, and Swapping sequence of events (SOE) and procedures for a particular mission. See paragraph 2.11 for additional execution guidance.

2.2.5. Aircrew scheduling requirements/limits in applicable MDS Vol 3, *MDS-Specific Operations Procedures*, and this instruction apply.

2.2.6. Ground Operations. Required ground operations vary greatly depending upon the cargo type, quantity, and overall complexity of the operation.

2.2.6.1. Remain Over Night (RON). With prior coordination, missions carrying DoD nuclear-related, other DOE/NNSA cargo, or general cargo may be scheduled to RON at an en route location. Mission planners will coordinate to RON with DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo aboard (Hot RON) through the installation DoD nuclear-related airlift mission POC.

2.2.6.1.1. USAFE/A3/10 approval is required to Hot RON in the USAFE Area of Responsibility (AOR).

2.2.6.1.2. Refer to the SWOG for additional DoD nuclear-related RON guidance.

2.2.6.2. En route Stop (Non-RON). Normal ground time for loading and offloading is 2+15 hours. Planners must adjust this time based on the type and quantity of cargo being transported, ground support available, and anticipated complexity of on/offload procedures.

2.2.6.3. Pre/Depositioning Mission Segments.

2.2.6.3.1. Due to stringent maintenance preparation for mission aircraft, schedule only the minimum number of legs required to position the aircraft at its onload location. If a stop is planned, it must be at an en route station able to provide suitable support if necessary.

2.2.6.3.2. Missions may be scheduled to return to home station or other follow on non-nuclear mission tasking at the conclusion of a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo airlift mission. The Aircraft Commander may request a crew enhancement delay through normal channels if needed during mission execution.

2.2.6.3.3. On depositioning legs without DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo, the operating airlift wing may return the aircraft and crew to home station on training time. If the operating wing elects to operate on training time, aircrews will coordinate their intentions with the respective AOC prior to their depositioning leg. AOC planners will not recut the mission, but must be notified, and a change to the Setup Message will not be made. When requested by the operating mission wing, training time should be planned into Mission Setup Message prior to mission launch from home station to minimize coordination efforts during the airlift-tasked portion of the mission.

2.2.7. Schedulers, planners, and operating crews must also consider the following:

2.2.7.1. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), to include the Classified Supplement (available at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil> and <https://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil>).

2.2.7.2. Host military command restrictions.

2.2.7.3. Airfield restrictions, operating hours, Prior Permission Required (PPR), etc.

2.2.7.4. User capability (hours of operation, security, etc.)

2.2.7.5. DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*.

2.2.7.6. Deconflict mission itinerary with airfield non-support messages IAW AFI 21-203, *Nuclear Accountability Procedures*.

### 2.3. Air Refueling (A/R).

2.3.1. A/R is not normally required for DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo movements.

2.3.2. The appropriate AOC will coordinate altitude reservations with the appropriate altitude reservation facility. Plan a backup 24-hour slip in tanker support and altitude reservations, if applicable.

2.3.2.1. Include the following information in the tanker request and A/R supplement:

2.3.2.1.1. Airborne or manned ground spares for each primary tanker.

2.3.2.1.1.1. AOC mission planners will determine the best option to meet the requirements of that particular mission segment. They will coordinate the information to the appropriate air refueling AOC planning section.

2.3.2.1.1.2. AOC mission planners will provide the operating tanker crew a briefing concerning mission OPSEC, SWOG routing, and other relevant restrictions via secure means.

2.3.2.1.1.3. AOC mission planners, flight managers, and tanker units may split the planned offload of fuel across multiple tankers.

2.3.2.1.2. When refueling, SWOG restrictions apply to the tanker(s) when airlifting DoD nuclear-related cargo.

2.3.3. To prepare for the unlikely event of an unsuccessful A/R when airlifting DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo, support bases and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations identified in the Mission Setup Message will stand by to support emergency divers until released by the appropriate AOC.

2.3.3.1. Ensure the pre-coordinated emergency divert location is prepared to receive an aircraft in the event of an emergency divert. Should the A/R be aborted, the applicable AOC will notify the emergency divert location and confirm host nation notification/coordination.

2.3.4. If the Aircraft Commander determines at any time that the planned A/R is not necessary, they must cancel A/R at the earliest opportunity. The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

2.3.5. A/R over open ocean areas at least 12 nautical miles (NM) off shore.

2.3.6. Accomplish the A/R IAW applicable MDS Vol 3.

2.3.7. The Aircraft Commander will provide the post-A/R report to the controlling C2 cell via appropriate means within 15 minutes after completing an A/R.

2.3.7.1. Do not attempt to contact the crew in flight to determine successful completion of the A/R unless no message has been received from the crew after 15 minutes past the anticipated completion of the air refueling. Contact the crew if a high priority message or emergency order must immediately be transmitted. The AOC will notify the appropriate pre-coordinated emergency divert location and release ground support personnel after the A/R is successfully completed.

## **2.4. Mission Planning/Coordination.**

2.4.1. Cargo Clearances. The AFNWC/NCL will transmit cargo clearance requests as required by the SWOG for DoD nuclear-related cargo. DOE/NNSA will transmit an Economy Act request for other DOE/NNSA cargo. A copy of the request will be forwarded to AOC planners.

2.4.2. Overflight Clearances. Mission planners will coordinate overflight clearances as required by the SWOG and country specific Letters of Understanding.

2.4.3. Diplomatic Clearances. Mission planners will coordinate Diplomatic Clearances as required by the SWOG and the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide.

2.4.4. Flight plan DoD nuclear-related airlift missions with the utmost care. Consider factors such as weather, routing, overflight rights, suitable alternate/emergency airfields, host base capabilities, anticipated onload/offload times, and fuel requirements. Refer to the SWOG for additional information.

## **2.5. Mission Setup Message (Content, Classification, and Distribution).**

2.5.1. Mission planners will prepare a classified Mission Setup Message for all missions transporting DoD nuclear-related cargo and other DOE/NNSA cargo. AOC planners will send Setup Message at least 15-calendar days before home station departure. (See

Attachment 3 for a sample message). Support requirements will be coordinated by secure means at all times.

2.5.2. The classified Mission Setup Message is the sole source of mission information to users and host bases.

2.5.3. Mission Setup Messages will be classified according to mission destinations, overflight classification designated by the SWOG, or the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy.

2.5.3.1. PART I will be unclassified.

2.5.3.2. PART II will be classified. All paragraph classifications will be marked in accordance with DoDM 5200.01, Vol 2, *DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information*.

2.5.4. At a minimum, the Mission Setup Message will contain the following information:

2.5.4.1. PART I *Unclassified*

2.5.4.1.1. SAAM Number.

2.5.4.1.2. Mission Itinerary.

2.5.4.2. PART II *Classified*

2.5.4.2.1. Hazardous Cargo Information. Include hazardous cargo information required by AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, to include all cargo weights, size, and detailed description.

2.5.4.2.2. Security Requirements

2.5.4.2.3. Specific station requirements. To preclude misunderstanding by host base support personnel, special requirements will be written in plain language with a clear and detailed description of the sequence of ground operations.

2.5.4.2.4. Courier Officer Listing

2.5.4.3. Information may be added or modified as long as messages are in standard format (Attachment 3).

2.5.5. Distribution of Mission Setup Message

2.5.5.1. Mission Setup Messages will be distributed to the operating unit, all DoD stations (including pre-coordinated emergency divert locations) identified on the mission itinerary, Command and Control entities, participating MAJCOMs and COCOMs, Air Force, Joint Staff, DTRA, and DOE/NNSA Office of Secure Transportation (OST).

2.5.5.2. Requests to receive Mission Setup Messages should be made to AMC/A3N.

2.5.5.2.1. Approved requests will be forwarded to 618 AOC/XOOOD with the correct SIPR organizational and/or individual email addresses.

2.5.5.2.2. Organizations or individuals approved for receipt of the Mission Setup Message will annually validate approval by the end of each fiscal year (FYXX) with the applicable MAJCOM.

#### 2.5.6. Mission Setup Message (Station Support Requirements Acknowledgement and 24-hour Confirmation):

2.5.6.1. The DOE/NNSA OST and all DoD stations listed on the mission itinerary will send an acknowledgement of ability to support/non-support the mission itinerary and/or the applicable special requirements listed in Part II of the Mission Setup Message. Note: DOE/NNSA will provide Acknowledgement of Station Support Requirement messages for all locations that do not have ability to send receive classified messages.

2.5.6.1.1. The Acknowledgement of Station Support Requirements message will use a standard format. (AF Form 527D)

2.5.6.1.2. Paragraph 7 of the Mission Setup Message will state when acknowledgement needs to be received by the mission planners, operational unit, and the applicable AOC. Mission planners will provide three working days for stations to send an acknowledgement to an original Mission Setup Message.

2.5.6.1.3. A station only needs to send acknowledgement for the most current Mission Setup Message, i.e., when a change to a Mission Setup Message is released before a station has sent the acknowledgement for the previous message.

2.5.6.2. A 24-hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will be sent by DOE/NNSA OST, all DoD en route stations and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations as listed in the mission itinerary. A station with multiple itinerary entries on the same day can be combined on one 24-hour message. A station with a single entry spanning two consecutive days and no additional entries on the second day need only send one 24-hour message. Note: DOE/NNSA will provide 24-hour Confirmation of Support Requirements messages for all locations that do not have ability to send receive classified messages.

2.5.6.2.1. The 24-hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will use a standard format. (AF Form 527E)

2.5.6.2.2. The 24-hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will be sent to the mission planners, operational unit, and applicable AOC no later than 24-hours prior to station arrival. If 24-hours prior falls on a non-duty day then the message will be sent the first duty day prior. The AOC will make a final voice confirmation of support from the 24-hour POC listed on the acknowledgement and confirmation messages.

2.5.6.2.3. A station only needs to send a 24-hour Confirmation of Support message for the most current Mission Setup Message, i.e., when a change to a Mission Setup Message is released before a station has sent the 24-hour Confirmation for the previous message.

## 2.6. Changes to Mission Setup Message.

2.6.1. Changes to Mission Setup Messages must be kept to a minimum. Should changes be absolutely necessary the following guidance will apply:

2.6.1.1. All changes will be coordinated and distributed IAW paragraph 2.5.5. and acknowledged IAW para 2.5.6.

2.6.1.2. Separate messages will be used for each change. Change messages will be in the original format with a clear statement advising the reason for change and all changes will clearly identify the information that is changed.

2.6.1.3. Changes will not be generated solely to correct non-critical typographical errors. Write-in changes to Mission Setup Messages are not permitted.

#### 2.6.2. Requesting Changes to the Mission Setup Message.

2.6.2.1. Requests to change a mission setup must come from the requesting unit's Gp/CC or higher and be submitted to the AOC mission planners for coordination. The DOE/NNSA OST can provide this function for missions transporting other DOE/NNSA cargo.

2.6.2.2. Stations that submit a non-support acknowledgement message will also send a request for change to the Setup Message.

2.6.2.3. Requests to change the mission itinerary by greater than 2 hours will not be accepted within 10 days of mission execution.

2.6.2.4. Missions enter execution 24-hours prior to scheduled home station departure and are complete after the last active leg of the mission itinerary. Changes to the mission setup will be issued automatically for the following:

2.6.2.4.1. Mission is delayed more than 2 hours by maintenance, weather, or other factors.

2.6.2.4.2. Change to cargo information that does not impact the itinerary or timing beyond 2 hours.

2.6.2.4.3. Aircraft Divert

2.6.2.4.4. A change will not be issued solely to cancel an A/R.

2.6.3. Waiver authority for requests made up to 5 days prior to execution may be delegated to AOC Director, Current Operations. **Note:** Waiver requests that do not contain the following information below will be denied:

2.6.3.1. Name, grade, unit and title of requester.

2.6.3.2. Date of request.

2.6.3.3. Mission number of affected mission.

2.6.3.4. Detailed reason the change is necessary.

2.6.3.5. Date and time the required change was discovered.

2.6.4. When changes to the itinerary are necessary after a mission has started, the AOC will coordinate with AOC mission planners to publish changes to the Mission Setup Message and forward to the aircrew with an information copy to the operating wing. To avoid delay of a mission, voice confirmation of changes between AOC and the aircrew are acceptable but should be used as a last resort only. Changes to the Mission Setup Message will be forwarded to all stations and the operating wing using the format in Attachment 3.

## 2.7. Additional Airlift Requirements.

2.7.1. Attachment 2 lists the types of DoD nuclear-related and DOE/NNSA materials and associated handling requirements. The AFNWC/NCL will schedule DoD nuclear and nuclear-related cargo missions via the Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule (NOSS). Any changes to the AFNWC/NCL SAAM Airlift Request must be coordinated between AOC mission planners and the AFNWC/NCL. Coordination must be accomplished as soon as additional cargo is identified.

2.7.2. If changes to DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo are approved before the mission starts, the Mission Setup Message will be changed through normal channels via procedures listed in paragraph 2.6.

2.7.3. Only DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request or Economy Act may be accepted.

2.7.3.1. If a discrepancy is identified between the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo, the Mission Setup Message, the Airlift Request, or the Economy Act, contact the AOC mission planners through the Consolidated Control Center (CCC). The AOC will immediately contact AFNWC/NCL or DOE/NNSA POC to resolve any discrepancies. The AFNWC/NCL or DOE/NNSA POC will identify to the AOC acceptable actions, e.g. serial number of nuclear cargo transposed. AFNWC/NCL or DOE/NNSA POC will recommend if the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo should be accepted by AMC Courier or should remain at the shipping unit and transported on a future mission. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo.

2.7.3.2. If AFNWC/NCL or DOE/NNSA POC, AOC, and the aircrew resolve the discrepancy and the decision is made to move the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo, AFNWC/NCL or DOE/NNSA POC will issue a new Airlift Request/Economy Act and the AOC will issue a new SAAM Setup Message. The aircrew will attempt to attain a hard copy of the Airlift Request/Economy Act and Setup Message before departure. If unable to attain a hard copy due to operational restrictions (i.e. at a foreign installation), the aircrew may continue the mission after receiving an unclassified email confirmation. Use a voice confirmation as a last resort.

2.7.3.3. If a discrepancy is identified at the arrival/offload location, it will be resolved prior to offloading DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo.

2.7.4. Cargo:

2.7.4.1. Opportune cargo may be carried on positioning legs, but do not change the route of flight to solely accommodate the movement of cargo.

2.7.4.2. Unused space aboard DoD nuclear-related cargo missions may be used for general cargo if:

2.7.4.2.1. The user approves the cargo to be aboard.

2.7.4.2.2. Extra landings will not be required.

2.7.4.2.3. The added weight will not cause problems with required fuel, aircraft center of gravity (CG), etc.

2.7.4.2.4. It is compatible with the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo. Use the hazardous material compatibility chart in AFMAN 24-204(I), *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, for air transportation to determine compatibility with other explosive and hazardous materials.

2.7.4.2.5. General cargo (if jettisonable) must be loaded so it may be jettisoned, if necessary, without disturbing the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo. **Note:** Time permitting aircrews should jettison general cargo before jettisoning DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo. Furthermore, jettison unclassified DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo before jettisoning classified DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo.

2.7.4.2.6. It will not cause security problems, including aerial port onloading and offloading.

2.7.4.2.7. Cargo is thoroughly searched before loading aboard the aircraft.

2.7.4.3. Foreign nationals (non-US persons/citizens) will not be used to load or offload DoD nuclear-related cargo. Additionally, foreign nationals will not be used to load or offload general cargo when DoD nuclear-related cargo is already aboard the aircraft. This restriction does not apply to other DOE/NNSA cargo.

## **2.8. Passengers, Mission Essential Personnel, and Flying Crew Chief.**

### **2.8.1. Passengers:**

2.8.1.1. Passengers may be carried on any mission segment in which the aircraft is empty or only carrying general cargo.

2.8.1.2. When classified DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo is aboard, only the following passengers may be carried as necessary to accomplish the mission:

2.8.1.2.1. Couriers, shipper escorts, authorized inspectors, flying crew chiefs, security forces, and DoD or DOE/NNSA personnel manifested as duty passengers. Passengers shall be authorized in the Airlift Request, Economy Act, or by separate message. All personnel lists must be provided to the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to home station departure.

2.8.1.2.2. DOE/NNSA personnel who fly on other DOE/NNSA movements will be manifested as duty passengers. These individuals will accompany the aircrew to/from onload/offload locations. In-flight duties will include, but are not limited to, ensuring the cargo remains at safe radiation levels during transport. When transporting other DOE/NNSA cargo requiring radiation monitoring, DOE/NNSA will ensure appropriate personnel accompany the mission to perform this function.

2.8.1.2.3. DOE/NNSA personnel requiring airlift on other DOE/NNSA cargo missions will be identified by the DOE/NNSA NLT ten days prior to mission execution. The Field Operations Officer or designee from the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) will provide a listing with individual information. For questions contact: Office: (505) 845-4180/4448/5071 or STE: (505) 845-4180/6262/4867.

### **2.8.2. Mission Essential Personnel (MEP):**

2.8.2.1. MEPs must meet the basic requirements of applicable MDS Vol 3, AMCI 11208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, and AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*.

2.8.2.1.1. Individuals requesting MEP authorization will provide the approving authority, their SSN, security clearance, specific mission for which MEP is requested, and reason for participating in the mission. This information must be provided to the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to home station departure.

2.8.2.1.2. MEP procedures and approval will be IAW AFI 11-401. MEP authority is granted for specific individuals on particular missions. MEP authority will not be used as blanket approval on all DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA airlift missions nor will it constitute personnel travel clearance required by the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. Inspector and observer lists will be approved by AMC/A3 after coordination through AMC/A3N. Lists may remain valid for up to a year, and must be renewed annually or when personnel changes dictate.

2.8.2.1.3. Classify requests appropriately if a specific mission or location is included. Approve requests for MEP based on security clearance, need-to-know, space available on the aircraft, and valid in-flight or ground duty to perform.

2.8.2.1.4. Without a specific in-flight duty, individuals requesting MEP to observe onload and offload operations will not be approved if any other transportation is available.

2.8.2.1.5. Commanders of tasked operating wings and NAFs may authorize MEP status for people under their command. All others must be approved by AMC/A3.

2.8.2.1.6. AMC/A3 validated MEP letters will be transmitted via message from AMC/A3N, and approved by the owning Operations Group Commander.

2.8.2.2. IAW AFI 11-401, the Operations Group Commander is the final authority of MEP status on DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA airlift missions operated by their wing. MEPs must be on official orders, and fall into the following categories:

2.8.2.2.1. Commanders, supervisors of aircrews, and related programs: Vice commanders, operations group commanders, deputy operations group commanders, squadron/unit commanders, and operations officers.

2.8.2.2.2. Certified aircrew flight examiners from the operating parent wing or MAJCOM.

2.8.2.2.3. Chiefs of Safety and Nuclear Surety Managers (NSM) from the parent wing and MAJCOM performing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits (NSSAV) or augmenting Functional Expert Visits (FEV).

2.8.2.2.4. AMC nuclear operations staff personnel performing FEVs, augmenting NSSAVs, or escorting authorized DVs. Crewmembers and guests are either part of the crew or on MEP status, but not both for any given mission day.

2.8.2.2.5. MAJCOM inspector general, Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA), Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and AMC Nuclear Surety office inspectors and augmentees conducting inspections/observations. **Note:** AFIA, AMC/IG, DTRA, and AMC/SEW offices are

responsible for distributing and maintaining current authorization letters. Updated letters will be sent via email which have been digitally signed to AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG, 603 AOC (TACC), and 4 AS/DOOMS offices as soon as changes occur to ensure authenticity.

2.8.2.3. MEP authorization (individual orders or MAJCOM/NAF message) will have the approval authority, security clearance, SSN, mission number, and reason for participating in the mission. Orders will not specify a particular mission number. Classified mission details will be transmitted via classified means (i.e. SIPRnet, Secure Fax, etc.).

2.8.2.4. Persons traveling as MEP will be briefed by the operating squadron/unit (or Aircraft Commander when joining the mission en route) on specific mission information needed to accomplish their assigned task. Briefing will include familiarization on applicable security and safety standards and emergency procedures.

2.8.2.5. MEPs must be positively identified by a service or agency official identification card.

2.8.2.6. Travel orders for MEPs will cite the MEP authority and be presented to aircrew before mission operation.

2.8.2.7. MEP authority provides direct access to the mission aircraft without processing through passenger service section; therefore, the aircrew is responsible for manifest and anti-hijacking procedures for MEPs. The Loadmaster will annotate all MEPs on a DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*.

2.8.2.8. MEP verification. Aircraft commanders will not allow anyone to fly on a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo mission unless they are convinced of the person's identity and the legality of their authorization.

2.8.2.8.1. If there is any doubt or suspicion, regardless of rank or position, diplomatically but firmly deny access to the aircraft and cargo.

2.8.2.8.2. Unless an MEP is personally known, do not accept just a set of orders as authorization. Verify and confirm the orders through other channels. For example, MAJCOM IG, AFIA, AFSEC, DTRA, and AMC Nuclear Surety inspectors are identified on a master inspector's list/letter. If required the Aircraft Commander will call outside offices for verification.

2.8.3. Flying Crew Chiefs (FCC). Flying crew chiefs are not normally required on DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo missions. FCCs may be scheduled on DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA missions at the discretion of the operating wing commander.

2.8.3.1. FCCs must possess a final Secret security clearance.

2.8.3.2. The Aircraft Commander will brief the FCC and must cover security precautions to prevent inadvertent violations by the FCC. Stress safety precautions to include specific precautions in Chapter 8.

2.8.3.3. FCCs will not seal mission aircraft, nor will they be allowed unescorted access to aircraft containing DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo. Do not leave the FCC in sole custody of the aircrew mission publications, forms, letters, or aircrew

sidearms. **Exception:** When servicing and maintenance are required, the FCC may seal empty DoD nuclear-related/DOE/NNSA mission aircraft.

## 2.9. Aircrew Qualification and Certification.

2.9.1. Crewmembers who occupy a primary crew position when DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo is airlifted will be qualified and current according to AFI 11-2 MDS Vol 2, *MDS-Specific Evaluation Criteria*.

2.9.2. If PNAF personnel are required per Attachment 2:

2.9.2.1. Crewmembers will be current in recurring PNAF training requirements according to AFI 11-2 MDS Vol 1, *MDS-Specific Aircrew Training* and AFI 11-237, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Training* (to be replaced by AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Airlift Training*).

2.9.2.2. No one will perform duties requiring PNAF certification unless they:

2.9.2.2.1. Are certified in the respective PNAF crew position. Trainees are authorized access to and handling of DoD nuclear-related cargo.

2.9.2.2.2. Have, as a minimum, a final SECRET clearance with Restricted Data (RD)/Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).

2.9.2.2.3. Are current in Nuclear Surety training and PNAF academics.

2.9.2.2.4. Have received Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) training IAW AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program*.

2.9.2.3. PNAF Training. Crewmembers in training for PNAF certification/qualification must have as a minimum a final SECRET clearance with RD/FRD and accomplished PNAF academic and Nuclear Surety training.

**2.10. Aircrew Complement.** Use Table 2.1. for minimum aircrew complement on DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo airlift missions.

**Table 2.1. Aircrew Complement.**

Crew Position <sup>1, 2, 3</sup>	MDS
Aircraft Commander	1
Courier <sup>4</sup>	1
Co-Pilot	1
Loadmaster	1

### Notes:

**Note 1.** If PNAF aircrew required IAW Attachment 2, crewmembers will be qualified and certified IAW paragraph 2.9.

**Note 2.** Non-PNAF flight examiners will not administer evaluations on PNAF missions.

**Note 3.** Squadron/unit commanders will ensure the appropriate crew complement is assigned to meet mission requirements IAW applicable portion of this instruction and applicable

AFI 11-MDS Vol 3.

**Note 4.** Only applicable if PNAF aircrew is required IAW Attachment 2 and T.O. 11N-45-51. List authorized Courier officers in the Mission Setup Message. Do not annotate on the flight authorization.

## **2.11. Aircrew Replacement and Staging.**

2.11.1. Do not replace crewmembers unless absolutely necessary. Avoiding Courier replacement is especially critical due to briefing requirements, letters of introduction, Courier identification, and custody receipt.

2.11.2. See Chapter 6 for specific procedures if a Courier is replaced.

2.11.3. Aircrew Staging and Crew Swap.

2.11.3.1. All planned stage and swap crews will receive a predeparture briefing at home station. During execution, crewmembers will brief counterparts on unique mission aspects not covered during the predeparture mission briefing.

2.11.3.2. Crew Staging. Pre-position aircrews at forward/en route locations to maximize throughput in large scale (multi-mission) movements. This practice eliminates pre-and de-positioning legs. It may involve swapping crews at an en route location with DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo aboard, but will not involve handling of DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo at the en route location used.

2.11.3.3. Crew Swap. A crew swap is defined as using pre-positioned crews to initiate or complete a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo mission. This option may only be used when absolutely necessary, to avoid crew duty day waivers, to maximize surety, and only after all normal scheduling options are exhausted.

2.11.3.3.1. Mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Swap SOEs and procedures for a particular mission.

2.11.3.3.2. When used prior to mission departure, a pre-positioned crew may pre-flight and pre-position the aircraft and onload DoD nuclear-related cargo via normal procedures. They will then transfer the cargo and mission responsibilities over to the main operating crew to execute the primary mission segment.

2.11.3.3.3. When used after mission arrival, a pre-positioned crew may receive DoD nuclear-related cargo and mission responsibilities from the primary crew then offload the cargo, post-flight and re-position the aircraft as necessary via normal procedures.

## Chapter 3

### PREDEPARTURE REQUIREMENTS

**3.1. Aircrew Mission Planning and Predeparture Briefing.** Aircrew mission planning and pre-departure processes in addition to the MDS Vol 3 requirements will be at the discretion of the tasked unit.

**3.2. Publications, Forms, and Letters.** The following lists the minimum pubs, forms, and letters required to be carried according to each type of airlift mission.

3.2.1. DoD nuclear-related cargo missions:

3.2.1.1. Publications:

3.2.1.1.1. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*.

3.2.1.1.2. T.O. 11N-45-51, *Transportation of Nuclear Materiel*.

3.2.1.1.3. T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD), *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*.

3.2.1.1.4. T.O. 11N-45-51B, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*.

3.2.1.1.5. T.O. 11N-20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Material Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations (C-RD)*.

3.2.1.2. Forms:

3.2.1.2.1. AFNWC/NCL Airlift Request.

3.2.1.2.2. Mission Setup Message and any changes.

3.2.1.2.3. DD Form 2825, *Individual Receipt*, AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*, or other official receipt form.

3.2.1.2.4. DD Form 1911, *Materiel Courier Receipt*.

3.2.1.2.5. DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest* (not required if item is included in the normal mission kit).

3.2.1.2.6. SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*.

3.2.1.2.7. Blank cargo manifests.

3.2.1.2.8. AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*.

3.2.1.3. Letters:

3.2.1.3.1. Lists of persons authorized to receive nuclear cargo (include lists for certified alternate airfields).

3.2.1.3.2. U.K. Letter of Understanding.

3.2.1.3.3. Official Courier identification letters.

3.2.1.3.4. Request for waiver to customs and agriculture boarding requirements.

3.2.1.3.5. Security acknowledgment letters.

- 3.2.1.3.6. Current MEP authorization letters of AMC/IG, AFIA, DTRA, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety, and MAJCOM Nuclear Operations (i.e. AMC/A3N) personnel.
- 3.2.1.3.7. Sequence of Events letters.
- 3.2.1.4. Serialized security seals and tamper tape (not required if items are included in the normal aircraft mission kit).
- 3.2.2. Other DOE/NNSA cargo missions:
  - 3.2.2.1. Publications:
    - 3.2.2.1.1. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*, if required by mission coordination.
  - 3.2.2.2. Forms:
    - 3.2.2.2.1. Economy Act Request.
    - 3.2.2.2.2. Mission Setup Message and any changes.
    - 3.2.2.2.3. DOE/NNSA Authorized Recipient/Certification List.
    - 3.2.2.2.4. DD Form 2825, AF Form 1297, or other official receipt form.
    - 3.2.2.2.5. DD Form 1911, *Materiel Courier Receipt*.
    - 3.2.2.2.6. DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest* (not required if item is included in the normal mission kit).
    - 3.2.2.2.7. Blank cargo manifests.
    - 3.2.2.2.8. AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*.
  - 3.2.2.3. Letters:
    - 3.2.2.3.1. Request for waiver to customs and agriculture boarding requirements.
    - 3.2.2.3.2. Current MEP authorization letters of AMC/IG, AFIA, DTRA, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety, and MAJCOM Nuclear Operations (i.e. AMC/A3N) personnel.
  - 3.2.2.4. Serialized security seals and tamper tape (not required if items are included in the normal aircraft mission kit).
- 3.2.3. The Courier officer, will conduct an inventory, accept custody of the classified material, and sign an AF Form 310 prior to home station departure. Account for all classified material after the mission.
- 3.2.4. At en route crew rest locations, store classified material in a suitable document storage facility (command post, communications center, security forces classified holding area, base ops, etc.). Obtain a receipt (DD Form 2825, AF Form 1297, or other official hand receipt) for the material when released to any agency. When transferring classified material between stage or replacement Couriers, the Couriers will conduct an inventory of the material. Use an AF Form 310 to transfer custody of classified documents.
  - 3.2.4.1. Classified aircrew mission material may be stored overnight in the aircraft provided:
    - 3.2.4.1.1. The aircraft is sealed.

3.2.4.1.2. A full-time US guard, military, or sworn government civil servant, who is present to perform a policing function. (Not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "Protection Level 1 (PL-1)" restricted area, e.g., an ACC alert area). Refer to AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*, for additional information on protecting classified material on aircraft.

3.2.4.1.3. Only aircrew, not including the crew chief or other MEPs, are authorized to access the aircraft.

3.2.4.1.4. Security personnel are informed classified material is aboard (security forces do not guard classified material unless associated with the required priority level).

3.2.4.2. If a customs agent requests to inspect the classified material, present the Identification of an Official Courier Letter (Attachment 4.1.). If there are problems, contact the nearest US embassy, US consulate, or US military agency for assistance.

### **3.3. Aircrew/Security Team Arming.**

3.3.1. A minimum of two crewmembers will be issued a weapon.

3.3.1.1. Aircrew will arm in accordance with AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, and authorized by AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*.

3.3.1.2. Conceal the weapon at all times. Reference the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide for further restrictions.

3.3.2. On positioning and depositioning mission segments, comply with applicable MDS Vol 3.

3.3.3. During RONs, crews will store their weapons in accordance with applicable MDS Vol 3.

## Chapter 4

### EN ROUTE OPERATIONS

**4.1. General.** This Chapter outlines en route operational procedures to be used by aircrews and command and control centers (CCC). Included are procedures for communications, cargo loading and offloading, aircraft emergency divers, and crew rest.

**4.2. Special Considerations When Transporting DoD Nuclear-Related and Other DOE/NNSA Cargo.**

4.2.1. Aircrew members shall follow guidance in AFI 11-202 Vol 3, *General Flight Rules*, regarding consumption of alcoholic beverages.

4.2.2. Security Alternate Fuel. When fuel planning for DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo mission segments, include sufficient fuel (10,000 pounds for C-17) to permit departure from destination and climb to an appropriate altitude to level off with "required overhead" fuel. List this fuel in the "stored fuel" on the appropriate fuel planning form according to applicable MDS Vol 3. Security alternate fuel is designed for all missions to allow the Aircraft Commander the option of departure from an immature or deteriorating security situation. This is in addition to all other required fuel. Do not offload DoD nuclear-related cargo to allow for security alternate fuel. General cargo will be offloaded to allow for security alternate fuel.

4.2.3. Flight Planning. Enter "hazardous cargo," "inert devices," or both if applicable and the mission number in the "remarks" section of the DD Form 175, *Military Flight Plan*, or in the "other information" section of the DD Form 1801, *DoD International Flight Plan*. **Note:** LLCs with line numbers and certain Type 3 trainers and JTAs are hazardous cargo.

4.2.4. On air refueled DoD nuclear-related cargo mission segments, use the pre-coordinated emergency divert location designated in the Mission Setup Message if at all possible. If a different emergency divert location is necessary, inform the controlling CCC as soon as possible so the duty controller can advise the new emergency divert location. Before takeoff, the Aircraft Commander must ensure the new emergency divert location confirms security is available.

4.2.5. At Air Force bases, do not display hazardous cargo placards (explosives category 1.1, etc.). The host will determine use of placards at other bases.

**4.3. Aircraft Preparation.**

4.3.1. Chapter 8 contains further information for aircraft selection and preparation.

4.3.2. Ensure appropriate T.O. 1C-MDS-1 and -9, Loading Instructions, preloading checklists are complete prior to commencing onload of DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo.

4.3.3. The necessary aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and support equipment will be pre-positioned at the designated parking area before aircraft arrival. The equipment will be fully serviced and inspected for serviceability before placement at the parking area. After engines are shut down, ensure AGE equipment is positioned so that it minimizes blockage of taxi routes and avenues of exit.

#### **4.4. Cargo Acceptance and Transfer.**

4.4.1. The Courier will accept and transfer custody of cargo in accordance with Chapter 6. Only DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message, Airlift Request, or Economy Act may be accepted and handled. If cargo differs from the Mission Setup Message, Airlift Request, or the Economy Act, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3.

4.4.2. Do not ship items which have been exposed to abnormal conditions unless specifically authorized.

4.4.3. Custody of DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo is transferred upon signing the DD Form 1911.

**4.5. Loading and Offloading Procedures.** DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo will be loaded only on a mission capable aircraft serviced and prepared for loading. The aircrew is responsible for safe and proper loading of the cargo.

4.5.1. The primary mission Loadmaster will direct loading, tie down, load distribution, and shipping preparation of DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo.

4.5.2. Use T.O. 1C-MDS-1 and -9 procedures for loading and offloading.

4.5.3. Host installations shall consider prohibiting restricted area photography for force protection or OPSEC concerns. If local installations prohibit photography, procedures for gaining photography authorization will be included in the installation defense plan.

4.5.4. Handle DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo with care and avoid excessive handling. Handle only one item, pallet, or package of cargo at a time. When hand-carrying, use both hands if practical.

4.5.5. During inclement weather (high winds, ice storms, etc.), onload and offload may be delayed due to local policies or the Aircraft Commander's judgment.

4.5.6. Loadmaster will determine what cargo is jettisonable. This is a physical determination with reference to limitations of AFMAN 24-204(I) or T.O. 1C-MDS-9. Loadmaster will ensure crew is aware of all cargo that is non-jettisonable.

#### **4.6. Ground Emergencies.**

4.6.1. Anyone observing an unsafe act or condition during any ground phase of the DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo mission will immediately stop the operation. Correct the condition before operations are resumed. Report all situations to the Aircraft Commander.

4.6.1.1. If DoD nuclear-related cargo is dropped during handling and the container remains intact, coordinate with the shipper to annotate damage on DoD Form 1911.

4.6.1.2. If a DOE/NNSA container is dropped during handling and the shipping container remains intact, check with the DOE/NNSA representative to ensure item can still be shipped.

4.6.1.3. If a DoD nuclear-related or DOE/NNSA container is dropped or otherwise damaged during handling and the shipping container ruptures, coordinate emergency actions with security forces and fire department. Notify tower or ground control

requesting them to notify the local support United States EOD team immediately and declare a ground emergency. Evacuate nonessential persons upwind, if possible, a minimum of 2,500 feet or as briefed.

4.6.2. Security Emergencies. Resist any attempt by a hostile force to capture DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo IAW AFI 31-117.

#### **4.7. Engine Running Onload and Offload (ERO) Procedures.**

4.7.1. ERO procedures may only be used to load or offload LLCs and Group X kits on missions transporting DoD nuclear-related cargo. Do not ERO bolstered DoD nuclear-related trainers.

4.7.2. General procedures for EROs are in applicable MDS Vol 3. The following additional information applies:

4.7.2.1. No more than 50 floor loaded LLCs will be loaded or offloaded during an ERO.

4.7.2.2. C-17, C-5, and C-130 aircraft are approved to ERO palletized LLCs.

4.7.2.3. Troop doors and crew entrance door will not be used for ERO.

4.7.2.4. Transfer all paperwork inside the aircraft.

4.7.2.5. If there is any question regarding the overall safety of the ERO, shutdown all engines before onload or offload operations.

**4.8. Procedures for Crossload Transfer of DoD Nuclear-Related and Other DOE/NNSA Cargo.** An aircraft change may be necessary during a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA airlift mission due to maintenance or other unforeseen problems. This could occur at home station, en route, or at an emergency divert location. Aircraft change may require a crossload of the cargo to keep it moving to its final destination. In the event such a transfer must occur, the following procedures will help ensure a safe, secure transfer of DoD nuclear-related cargo from one aircraft to another.

4.8.1. Do not begin crossload of DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo until the replacement aircraft has been fully configured, fueled, preflighted, and appropriate security requirements are in place.

4.8.2. One Courier will maintain custody of the cargo throughout the crossload. Any transfer of custody will occur before or after the crossload.

4.8.3. Aircrew will ensure the safest and most secure environment for any DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo involved in the crossload.

4.8.4. Aircrew will be responsible for the transfer operation. They will work closely with the shipper or receiver, munitions, security, intelligence, and transportation personnel.

4.8.5. The Aircraft Commander and Courier will conduct briefings with all personnel participating in aircraft crossload. The briefings will include an overview of the crossload operation and each participant will be briefed on individual duties. The primary Loadmaster will brief loading/offloading duties as required during the operation.

4.8.6. Aircrew will coordinate with security forces to ensure security requirements are understood and security is adequate before commencing the crossload operation.

4.8.7. If the cargo is transferred to a new aircraft and crew, the original aircrew is responsible for offloading, and the new crew is responsible for loading the new aircraft. The accepting aircrew will have custody of DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo at the time of transfer in writing.

#### 4.9. Departure Procedures.

4.9.1. Destination Support Confirmation. Aircraft with any DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo aboard must not take off until all destinations and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations acknowledge that they are capable of meeting security requirements. Before beginning each day's operation, check with the MAJCOM CCC and/or the DOE/NNSA Field Operations Officer or designee from the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) for the status of stations to be transited that day. CCC will review the mission folder to ensure all stations on the day's itinerary have confirmed security and support requirements. CCC will use all other sources available, e.g., airfield threat security evaluations file, etc., to evaluate the security status of en route stations. CCC must be prepared to rapidly appraise security for a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA mission and provide any changes to the crew immediately. If security is questionable or an acknowledgment message has not been received, CCC will immediately attempt to confirm security, holding departure to the suspect station until security is confirmed. If the 24-hour confirmation of support message is not available, call the destination base or the DOE/NNSA Field Operations Officer or designee from the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) directly. The AOC can help provide base contacts and telephone numbers.

#### 4.9.2. Departure Message:

4.9.2.1. Once airborne, the aircrew will contact the CCC directly via aircraft radio or phone patch with their departure time and estimated time of arrival (ETA).

4.9.2.1.1. DoD nuclear-related missions. CCC will notify destination point of contact (identified in their acknowledgment message) by the most expeditious means available and pass aircraft type, mission number, tail number, and ETA. Insist security forces be notified. If CCC is unable to contact destination, they will advise the Aircraft Commander. The Aircraft Commander will make the final decision to land or divert to a pre-coordinated emergency divert location. **Note:** OPSEC procedures are extremely important during this process. Make every effort to avoid "signatures" of a classified mission. Avoid discussions that could reveal the purpose of the mission.

4.9.2.1.2. For missions with short en route times or several quick stops that would make departure calls to destinations impractical, CCC may phone destinations before aircraft is airborne.

4.9.2.1.3. Other DOE/NNSA missions. If the mission will not arrive on time at the offload station as a result of a late departure, contact the applicable AOC mission planners and have them contact one of the following: Senior Aviation Official for DOE/NNSA, Office: (202) 586-6177, Cell: (301) 602-3139; The Office of Secure Transportation (OST) Transportation and Emergency Control Center (TECC): 1-800-428-0496 (For CONUS arrivals, the OST TECC will contact the convoy personnel so

they are ready to provide security and receive the cargo upon arrival); or other installation/agency POCs as necessary.

#### **4.10. CCC Coordination.**

4.10.1. The aircrew must keep the appropriate AOC advised of mission progress. If ETA changes by more than 15 minutes, the arrival destination must be informed as soon as possible.

4.10.2. Releasing Pre-coordinated Emergency Divert Locations.

4.10.2.1. AOC mission planners will develop Mission Setup Message support requirements for applicable pre-coordinated emergency divert locations. Bases will be tasked to support the unlikely event of an emergency divert for any reason (ex: Weather, A/R, maintenance, etc.). AOC mission planners will coordinate with the operating unit during mission planning to establish standby posture requirements and key time points/related mission milestones (completion of A/R, ETP passage, etc.).

4.10.2.2. The Aircraft Commander will contact the appropriate AOC when passed the key time points/related mission milestones. Upon concurrence with the Aircraft Commander, the appropriate AOC will contact the pre-coordinated emergency divert location command post to release the installation's standby requirements.

4.10.3. Aircraft Divert. The Aircraft Commander will inform the appropriate AOC as soon as possible after coordinating any divert with air traffic control agencies. The AOC will notify the pre-coordinated emergency divert location, appropriate en route agencies, host nation authorities, and the original destination to advise them the aircraft is diverting.

#### **4.11. Arrival Procedures.**

4.11.1. DoD nuclear-related cargo.

4.11.1.1. In-Flight Notification:

4.11.1.1.1. At least 30-minutes before ETA, contact one of the following in this order: (1) command post, (2) base operations, or (3) control tower. If required, pass the SAAM number and verify the base is prepared for the aircraft arrival. Request the ETA be passed to appropriate support agencies, including the agency specified as single point-of-contact in the security acknowledgment message.

4.11.1.1.2. If the arrival base does not have hazardous cargo information, request the following be relayed immediately to the crash-fire protection agency and other support agencies as appropriate:

4.11.1.1.2.1. Aircraft call sign, type, and mission number.

4.11.1.1.2.2. ETA.

4.11.1.1.2.3. DoD explosives hazard class and division.

4.11.1.1.2.4. Request for special handling (isolated parking, security, etc.).

4.11.1.1.3. On legs with no hazardous cargo aboard, pass the call sign, mission number, and any special requests to the appropriate agency at least 30-minutes before ETA.

#### 4.11.2. Other DOE/NNSA cargo.

4.11.2.1. If there is a U.S. presence, contact the destination with ETA when 30-minutes from the airfield.

4.11.3. Taxi and Parking. It is the Aircraft Commander's responsibility to make host airfield operations aware of the need for isolated parking. It is a host base responsibility to ensure the taxi route and parking spot meet the quantity-distance separation requirements of AFMAN 91201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, and T.O. 11N-45-51A.

4.11.4. Arrival Message. Contact CCC with unclassified arrival information as soon as possible after landing. CCC will dispatch arrival message.

#### **4.12. Divert to Alternate Airfield.**

4.12.1. Refer to the SWOG for additional guidance on divert locations, unscheduled landing, and inadvertent overflight procedures when carrying DoD nuclear-related cargo.

4.12.2. If pre-coordinated emergency divert locations cannot be used or as listed in the SWOG, alternate emergency sites may be considered according to the SWOG priority and the following:

4.12.2.1. Be under US military control.

4.12.2.2. Have adequate security. DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108 and the SWOG contain additional information on security guidance for emergency divers.

4.12.2.3. Should have a nuclear storage capability. Every attempt should be made to store DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo on the aircraft while at non-nuclear emergency divert location or at a location without nuclear storage capacity during entire ground time. This might be unacceptable from a security, maintenance, or host base or theater point of view.

4.12.3. Ensure the route to be flown to the divert location is compatible with the SWOG.

4.12.4. If aircraft maintenance is a problem, consider maintenance capability at the alternate location.

4.12.5. If the divert location is in CONUS or a US military base in a foreign country, use procedures in the SWOG as well as the following additional guidance:

4.12.5.1. Have controlling CCC relay hazardous cargo information and coordinate arrangements for security, storage, etc. Give 30-minute in-flight notification.

4.12.5.2. If unable to contact CCC or if CCC cannot contact alternate base, request security forces meet the aircraft in the 30-minute notification call.

4.12.6. If the airfield is in a foreign country, but not under US military control, contact controlling CCC and relay the aircraft call sign, mission number, aircraft type, airport of intended landing, ETA, and reason for the emergency divert. Request assistance from nearest Air Force base, American Embassy, or consulate. Landing in any foreign country is extremely sensitive and will be handled as quietly as possible with the agency controlling the field. Keep mission as inconspicuous as possible while still protecting DoD nuclear-related cargo. Use procedures in the DoD FCG to protect the sensitivity, which states, "US military aircraft are sovereign instrumentalities." When cleared to overfly or land in foreign territory,

it is US policy to assert that military aircraft are entitled to privileges and immunities which customarily are accorded warships. These privileges and immunities include, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary: exemption from duties and taxation; immunity from search, seizure, and inspections (including customs and safety inspections); or other exercise of jurisdiction by the host nation over aircraft, personnel, equipment, or cargo aboard.

4.12.6.1. Air Force Aircraft Commanders will not authorize search, seizure, inspection, or similar exercises of jurisdiction enumerated above by foreign authorities except by direction of Air Force headquarters or the American Embassy in the country concerned. Diplomatically, but firmly, deny any access to aircraft by foreign officials and attempt to have US officials in the country resolve the problem.

**4.13. Emergency Procedures.** During any emergency, aircrew must take every precaution to protect lives and property. The following emergency procedures apply:

4.13.1. Pass the following information to appropriate ATC agency and request it be passed to the divert location:

4.13.1.1. Aircraft call sign, nature of the emergency and landing intentions.

4.13.1.2. Aircraft position and ETA to destination.

4.13.1.3. Number of personnel aboard.

4.13.1.4. Fuel aboard.

4.13.1.5. Hazardous cargo is aboard.

4.13.2. Make a 30-minute prior-to-arrival radio call to the destination base to include:

4.13.2.1. Location of the cargo.

4.13.2.2. A statement that "negative hazardous cargo is aboard" when aircraft carries inert devices only.

4.13.2.3. A description of the physical appearance and location in the aircraft of inert devices when mixed loads of hazardous material and inert devices are aboard.

4.13.3. If an emergency requires an immediate landing and the Aircraft Commander must choose between communication security and flight safety, then safety will take precedence. Classified information may be disclosed to the extent necessary for safety of flight.

4.13.4. In an emergency, the Aircraft Commander bears moral obligation to jettison cargo or crash-land where the least amount of damage will result. Record coordinates of each jettisoned item. Observe jettison restrictions in the SWOG.

**4.14. Border Clearance Procedures.**

4.14.1. Purpose. To give aircrews border clearance procedures when carrying LLCs and classified nuclear support materiel.

4.14.2. Policy and Procedures. Border clearance is the responsibility of the Aircraft Commander.

4.14.2.1. Use general border clearance procedures in AFI 11-2MDS Vol 3.

4.14.2.2. Prepare cargo manifests (DD Form 1385, Cargo Manifest) for customs officials on all cargo. The shipper will supply manifests for unclassified non-nuclear cargo. Loadmasters will prepare manifests for DoD nuclear-related cargo and other classified cargo. List this cargo as classified material, classified cargo, hazardous material, classified test equipment, or similar wording which best describes it. Descriptions must not associate cargo with nuclear material. These manifests must include number of units, weight, and cubic displacement in feet.

4.14.2.3. Waivers of Customs and Quarantine Boarding. A letter will be prepared and reproduced in the format depicted in Attachment 4.2. with appropriate organizational letterhead.

4.14.3. The Aircraft Commander will tactfully request US customs and agriculture quarantine inspectors accept a waiver for boarding and examination of aircraft because of the classified cargo aboard.

4.14.3.1. If waiver is denied and the aircraft is at an enroute location, the Aircraft Commander will request a "permit to proceed" to the final destination.

4.14.4. When filing a flight plan into a base that does not have customs or agriculture quarantine inspectors readily available, request customs and/or agriculture inspectors meet the aircraft by contacting the arrival base command post/AMCC. Determine hours of operations of customs facilities and comply with any requirements for advance notification. In a divert situation, give as much lead-time as possible to arrange for customs and agriculture inspectors.

**4.15. Crew Rest Procedures.** Before entering crew rest at an en route station, the Aircraft Commander will ensure the aircraft is sealed (as required). Provide command post and AOC contact information during crew rest in the case of an emergency.

**4.16. Itinerary Deviation.**

4.16.1. As soon as it is apparent a mission will deviate from published itinerary, notify the appropriate CCC of ETA for remaining en route stations on that day's itinerary. CCC will immediately notify destination or DOE/NNSA points of contact and appropriate diplomatic clearance authorities by telephone. Passing timely and accurate information to destination is extremely important.

4.16.2. If a mission deviates by two or more hours from last published itinerary, the CCC will coordinate with the Aircraft Commander and AOC mission planning to send a mission change message (Attachment 3). Points of contact at bases scheduled to be transited, the pre-coordinated emergency divert location, and tanker unit (if applicable), and appropriate en route agencies will also be advised by secure means of new times. Do not launch until CCC and/or DOE/NNSA has determined subsequent stations for that day can accept the mission in accordance with the revised plan. If the aircrew coordinates directly with the shipper or receiver, advise CCC.

4.16.3. Mission Change Message:

4.16.3.1. The mission planning section will coordinate mission change message with the Aircraft Commander. Attempt to return mission to its original itinerary by adjusting ground times if possible. Do not sacrifice proper crew rest to return to the original

schedule; however, do not perpetuate small delays by using originally planned ground times if less time will provide adequate crew rest.

4.16.3.2. The Aircraft Commander will relay revised information to CCC. CCC is responsible for checking times for conflicts with other missions, notifying the pre-coordinated divert location, tanker unit (if applicable), appropriate en route agencies, and remaining bases. The mission planning section will draft and send any message traffic required. Take care to ensure classified information is not compromised.

4.16.3.3. Use Attachment 3, format, and classify the mission change message the same as original Mission Setup Message or in accordance with the SWOG. Include hazardous cargo information if changed from the Setup Message. Changes to overflight information messages required by the SWOG will normally be made as directed in the SWOG or Letters-of-Agreement (LOA).

4.16.3.4. Include all addressees in the Mission Setup Message including the aircrew's current location, divert locations, and remaining bases. Omit stations already transited.

4.16.4. Unscheduled Hot RON. Mission delays may force the aircrew into an unscheduled Hot RON. If it becomes apparent to an Aircraft Commander the crew will not be able to proceed to the next destination and complete the offload within remaining CDT, he or she will immediately contact AMC CCC and request authority for either:

4.16.4.1. An extension to crew duty day.

4.16.4.2. Permission to offload cargo and attempt the mission at a later time.

4.16.4.3. Permission to Hot RON at current location, emergency divert location, or destination airfield. Do not proceed to destination if the mission will arrive without sufficient time to complete offload (if one is planned) unless destination base has confirmed through CCC they can support the Hot RON. At USAFE bases, USAFE/A3/10 approval is required for a Hot RON. CCC will coordinate Hot RON requests through USAFE/A3/10NM.

## Chapter 5

### SECURITY

**5.1. General.** Security standards for DoD nuclear-related cargo, aircraft sanitization, EALs, and emergency security actions are listed in DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108. Security standards for PL 1, 2, and 3 area entry control, marking, and security requirements are located in AFI 31-101.

**5.2. Types of Security.** The degree of security protection will vary according to the cargo. DoD security requirements are broken into two categories, Type I security and Type II security. Refer to DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108 for a full description of Type I and Type II security. Refer to AFI 31-101 for a full description of PL 1, 2, and 3 security. **Note:** When discussing security requirements with another service, a detailed description may be necessary.

**5.3. Protection Standards.** Provide security IAW Attachment 2. Aircrew will ensure security meets DoD and Air Force standards. As a minimum, all DOE/NNSA cargo requires Type II security.

**5.4. Sanitization.** Sanitized aircraft are not required for DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo.

**5.5. Type II Restricted Area Procedures.** Use Type II security to protect DoD nuclear-related cargo while in logistic transport status IAW Attachment 2. Aircrew will provide Type II security while it is in aircrew custody. Request an acknowledgement from the RON base to ensure they can support Type II security requirements.

5.5.1. Searches and inspections of hand-carried items are not required during Protection Level 3 (PL3) or Type II security operations, but may be directed by the local security forces.

5.5.2. Type II Entry Authority. Authenticate and give the guard a list of persons authorized to grant entry and serve as escort while the crew is gone (EAL or aircrew orders). When classified, DoD nuclear-related, or DOE/NNSA cargo is aboard, only the aircrew can grant entry and serve as escorts. The Courier may designate any responsible person as entry and escort authority when the aircraft is empty. The escort must stay with anyone who requires access to the aircraft and is not on a list validated by aircrew Courier officer.

**5.6. RON with DoD Nuclear-Related Cargo.** Every attempt should be made to store cargo on the aircraft while at a location without nuclear storage capacity or at non-nuclear emergency divert locations. Transfer custody only to persons according to paragraph 6.3. When DoD nuclear-related cargo remains aboard overnight the following applies:

5.6.1. The aircraft will be sealed.

5.6.2. Type II security will be maintained according DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108, as supplemented when required (not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "PL1" restricted area, e.g., an AFGSC alert area).

5.6.3. Only the aircrew (not including the crew chief or MEPs) are authorized unescorted access to the aircraft.

5.6.4. Security personnel are informed that Type II security material is aboard. **Note:** Do not request security support merely to guard aircrew's classified mission material.

## Chapter 6

### CUSTODY TRANSFER PROCEDURES

**6.1. General.** This Chapter expands on Courier requirements and DoD nuclear-related cargo custody procedures in T.O. 11N-45-51. The Courier is final authority for cargo security, except during airborne emergencies when the Aircraft Commander rules that safety-of-flight is paramount. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo.

**6.2. Courier Designation and Certification.** Identify Couriers to shippers in writing. Identification will include the Courier's name, rank, and security clearance. Normally, this identification is in the Mission Setup Message; however, it may be a separate message sent by AOC mission planners via email after they validate the information. This may occur when Couriers are replaced during mission execution. Verify the Courier's identification by using the Common Access Card (CAC). **Note:** "Identification of an Official Courier Letter" (Attachment 4.1.) is for use during border clearance and does not satisfy any of the above requirements.

#### **6.3. Persons Authorized to Sign for Cargo.**

6.3.1. DoD nuclear-related cargo. Each organization that ships or receives DoD nuclear-related material is required to publish a list of those persons authorized to sign for cargo according to T.O. 11N-45-51 and AFI 21-203. The Courier will have the appropriate Certification of Personnel to Receipt for Classified Material letter NLT ten days prior to mission execution. If letter changes are required while the mission is en route, the organization making the change will fax or email the corrected copy to AOC mission planners who will in turn forward to the Courier. Couriers will only release DoD nuclear-related cargo to authorized persons.

6.3.1.1. Identify shipper/receivers by cross-referencing data IAW T.O. 11N-45-51.

6.3.2. Other DOE/NNSA cargo. The DOE/NNSA publishes a list of people who are qualified to sign for DOE/NNSA cargo, called the "DOE/NNSA Authorized Recipient/Certification List." This list of federal agents will be used to authenticate the DOE/NNSA convoy personnel. The Courier will have the list NLT ten days prior to mission execution. **Note:** The Field Operations Officer or designee from the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) will provide a listing with individual information. For questions contact: Office: (505) 845-4180/4448/5071 or STE: (505) 845-4180/6262/4867.

6.3.2.1. The custody transfer of all other DOE/NNSA cargo will be as follows:

6.3.2.1.1. CONUS departure with U.S. delivering material to foreign nation:

DOE/NNSA Federal Agent/Representative → Aircrew → DOE/NNSA Federal Agent/Representative → Receiving Agency

6.3.2.1.2. OCONUS departure with U.S. recovering material from foreign nation:

Shipping Agency → DOE/NNSA Federal Agent/Representative → Aircrew → DOE/NNSA Federal Agent/Representative

6.3.3. The DD Form 1911 will be used for all custody transfers.

**6.4. Courier Responsibilities.** The Courier is responsible for receipt, custody, security, safety, and delivery of DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo to authorized receivers. Specific responsibilities include:

6.4.1. Have written instructions that specify DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo to be shipped (Mission Setup Message/Airlift Request/Economy Act).

6.4.2. Have a list of authorized receivers.

6.4.3. Receive the shipper's briefing.

6.4.3.1. For DoD nuclear-related cargo missions, the Courier will use applicable portions of the AF Form 527B for briefing requirements. DoD shippers may use the AF Form 527C or a locally developed brief provided all briefing requirements IAW T.O. 11N-45-51 are met. If needed, the Courier will contact the shipper via email or phone to clarify details.

6.4.3.2. The Courier and shipper will brief applicable items IAW T.O. 11N-45-51. Any questions about forms or cargo will be resolved before accepting cargo.

6.4.3.3. The Courier will verify that CDS has not been activated on training items that do not have sealed command disable panels. If a command disable indicator shows, ensure shipper is aware of this condition and the DD Form 1911 is properly annotated.

6.4.3.4. If the Aircraft Commander and primary mission Loadmaster were not present for the shipper and Courier briefing, the Courier will brief them on hazards or nature and special handling instructions before loading.

6.4.4. Before accepting and loading DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo, the Courier, shipper, and primary Loadmaster will inspect cargo.

6.4.4.1. Inspect cargo for general conditions. Check the following as applicable: training weapon(s) securely attached to bolster; pressure relief valves; tie-down and winching attachments; number and integrity of seals; condition of bolster tires/wheels; and condition of casters, wheels, and carrier brakes. Deficiencies affecting safety must be corrected before accepting cargo.

6.4.4.2. Document minor damage, e.g. scratches, scrapes, small dents, etc., in the remarks section of the DD Form 1911. Have the shipper initial entry.

6.4.4.3. Inspect all containers to verify condition of seals. Request the shipper replace any broken or missing seals. Have the shipper verify the condition of the seals for palletized LLCs. If broken or missing seals cannot be replaced and the integrity of the container is suspect, reject the container. If the container is accepted with broken or missing seals and the integrity is not suspect, annotate the exact condition on DD Form 1911.

6.4.4.4. DoD nuclear-related cargo presented for shipment must be exactly as described by the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request. If cargo differs from the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3. Serial numbers must also agree with those listed on DD Form 1911 and the cargo diplomatic clearance approval message, if required.

6.4.5. Accept custody of nuclear cargo by signing DD Form 1911 and release custody only on signature of positively identified authorized receivers or a replacement Courier. Do not sign for cargo that the Courier cannot maintain custody of and/or inspect.

**6.5. Documentation.** Shippers are required to provide properly completed DD Forms 1911. Instructions for the forms are in T.O. 11N-45-51. On mission termination at home station, return completed DD Forms 1911 to the squadron/unit and maintain on file for 6 months. DD Forms 1387, *Military Shipment Label*, are required on LLCs by T.O. 11N-45-51. DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*, is required on all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number.

**6.6. Replacement Courier.**

6.6.1. If the Courier must be replaced while a mission is in progress, custody must be transferred to either a replacement Courier or a qualified Courier on the crew. The rest of the stations to be transited must be notified of the Courier change by message from the appropriate CCC or parent wing if the Courier was not previously included in the Mission Setup Message.

6.6.2. If a replacement Courier is not available, duties may be assumed in the following order of precedence:

6.6.2.1. Courier Qualified Extra Pilot. In this case, the mission may proceed to where a replacement Courier is available or complete the mission if the additional pilot workload will not detract from Courier duties.

6.6.2.2. Aircraft Commander. As a last resort, use the Aircraft Commander as the Courier when it is more important from a security standpoint to move the mission than to wait for a replacement Courier. The primary consideration is always cargo security.

6.6.3. In an aircraft mishap, when the Courier and/or another Courier-qualified crewmember cannot perform duties, the highest ranking surviving crewmember automatically will assume Courier duties.

## Chapter 7

### DOD NUCLEAR-RELATED AND OTHER DOE/NNSA AIRLIFT MISSION SUPPORT

**7.1. General.** Airlift priority of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) given to DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo missions is 1A3 (CJCSI 4120.02C, *Assignment of Movement and Mobility Priority*), which is preceded only by presidential support, presidential-approved, and combat troop support missions. Priorities are used to fill Airlift Requests. All mobility agencies will support the missions according to the JCS priority. Support will involve all aspects of the mission, to include security, EOD, maintenance, fuel, aircrew transport, and billeting. Bases that belong to other MAJCOMs or services fall under AFJI 11-204. It requires base commanders to establish a written plan or directive to ensure priority support.

**7.2. Airlift Support.** Bases that support DoD nuclear-related missions will have a written plan or instruction to support these missions. In addition, plans at bases that regularly receive requirements to support DoD nuclear-related cargo aircraft will also comply with AFJI 11-204.

#### **7.3. Responsibilities.**

7.3.1. Bases requiring a written instruction or plan to support DoD nuclear-related missions will ensure the following is specified:

7.3.1.1. A single focal point to handle information on the mission.

7.3.1.2. The base communications procedures to notify the appropriate agencies of an inbound aircraft. Bases must be able to respond to a short-notice emergency divert.

7.3.1.3. Taxi routes and parking spots.

7.3.1.4. Security force procedures (equipment, response times, etc.).

7.3.1.5. Priority maintenance and aerial port support.

7.3.1.6. Priority crew transportation, billeting, and messing.

7.3.1.7. Fire-fighting support requirements in T.O. 11N-20-11.

7.3.1.8. EOD procedures (notification, response, equipment).

7.3.2. The shipper/receiver will be present for shipments and receipts of DoD nuclear-related cargo to personally ensure priority support.

7.3.3. In addition to the support plan, installation commanders will ensure all support requirements are coordinated with appropriate base support agencies.

7.3.4. Commanders of USAFE units in tenant status will arrange priority support with their hosts.

**7.4. Command and Control.** DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo airlift missions place demands on the command and control system over and above normal operations. AOC mission planners will ensure a "Y" is in the CLOSE WATCH block. AOC will monitor the exact status of each mission. Missions executed by an AOC besides 618 AOC (TACC) and/or a MAJCOM besides AMC should use the equivalent offices of responsibility listed below. Specific responsibilities are:

7.4.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD mission planners will maintain ready access to the SWOG and the DoD FCG, understand overflight procedures and restrictions, and in coordination with tanker planning section, coordinate tanker support, and obtain altitude reservation (ALTRV) approvals. Flight planning branch will validate computer flight plans (CFP) for compliance with the SWOG and DoD FCG restrictions, EURO Control Route availability Document (RAD), ALTRV routings, and avoid heavily populated areas then transmit to the current C2 system. Mission planning section confirms diplomatic clearances and ensures alternates on CFPs are capable of supporting DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo missions.

7.4.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will mission planners will assist Aircraft Commanders in determining the best divert location for a DoD nuclear-related mission. In accordance with the Mission Setup Message and this instruction, notify the selected divert location of all required support needed to meet the aircraft when it lands. When the Aircraft Commander informs the AOC that he or she has selected a different divert location from the one pre-coordinated via the Mission Setup Message, the duty controller must then coordinate with the new divert location and advise the pre-coordinated divert location it is no longer under consideration as a divert option. When time permits, use guidance for mission change message IAW paragraph 2.6.

7.4.3. AMC/A7S and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will actively monitor security status of bases that nuclear airlift missions are scheduled to transit. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will be prepared to confirm each day's itinerary with Aircraft Commanders when they check in. Mission Setup Message will request a support confirmation message be sent from each base on the itinerary to appropriate CCC 24-hours before arrival at each base. Use this message to confirm security before allowing aircraft to proceed. Only attempt contact with the destination base to confirm support via non-secure means if the 24-hour confirmation of support message has not been received.

7.4.4. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD mission planning section will prepare and send mission change messages IAW paragraph 2.6. and 4.16.3 after coordination with the Aircraft Commander. Check for conflicts with other missions and include hazardous cargo information if load is changed.

7.4.5. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will act as the point of contact between shippers or receivers and aircrew during the mission. Pass updates to down line bases as requested by the Aircraft Commander.

7.4.6. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will ensure DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo airlift missions delayed for maintenance problems get immediate and priority support.

7.4.7. AMC Command Center will prepare and submit Operational Report 3 (OPREP-3) covering nuclear mission incidents according to paragraph 10.1 and JCS Pub 6.

**7.5. Intelligence Support.** Intelligence support is an essential element of the mission. It requires constant attention and adherence to procedures to successfully ensure cargo safety and security. To ensure DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo missions and aircrews receive timely threat intelligence information, these procedures will be followed. Missions executed by an AOC besides 618 AOC (TACC) and/or a MAJCOM besides AMC should use the equivalent offices of responsibility listed below.

7.5.1. Home Station OSS/IN will:

7.5.1.1. Monitor planned DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo missions for pre-mission intelligence briefing requirements and remain aware of off-station missions that could require en route Intelligence support.

7.5.1.2. Provide pre-mission intelligence briefings to aircrews IAW AFI 14-2(MDS) Vol 3, MDS-Specific *Unit Intelligence Procedures*.

7.5.1.2.1. Intelligence pre-mission briefings will be IAW AFI 14-2C-17, Vol 3, and must include the following:

7.5.1.2.2. Airborne threat from potential hostile countries.

7.5.1.2.3. Terrorist and sabotage threats.

7.5.1.2.4. Other activity along route that might impact mission.

7.5.1.2.5. All source Foreign intelligence collection and criminal threats.

7.5.1.3. Debrief aircrews on their return as required and report mission results IAW the Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive (MIRD).

7.5.2. AMC/A2 will provide support IAW AFI 14-2(MDS)Vol 3 and DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108. AMC/A2 will:

7.5.2.1. In coordination with AFOSI 3 FIR, disseminate a DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo mission threat summary message for each DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo mission using the Mission Setup Message addressee list. This message will assess the threat levels for each scheduled stop. This message will be disseminated no later than 24-hours prior to scheduled mission departure. Lead for Intelligence support (OSI or A2) will vary depending on mission itinerary.

7.5.2.2. Monitor DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo missions worldwide and provide intelligence updates and threat warnings to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOZ as necessary.

7.5.2.3. As needed, provide intelligence threat updates and terrorist advisories to Setup Message addresses during mission execution.

7.5.3. Where AMC intelligence personnel are not available, host base intelligence unit or theater air command intelligence staff will provide threat data to an en route mission.

## Chapter 8

### LOGISTICS SUPPORT

**8.1. General.** This guidance outlines maintenance procedures for aircraft used to carry DoD nuclear-related and other DOE/NNSA cargo. It applies to all maintenance and operations personnel who support or conduct DoD nuclear-related cargo airlift missions.

**8.2. Aircraft Selection and Preparation.** DoD nuclear-related cargo airlift missions are assigned JCS priority 1A3. Aircraft selected to fly these missions should and be the most reliable to preclude potential mission delays while the aircraft is in the mobility system.

#### **8.3. General Maintenance and Servicing.**

8.3.1. Fuel servicing guidance for explosive loaded aircraft is contained in T.O. 00-25-172, *Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding*. Aircraft should be refueled before being loaded with DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo to reduce the severity of a mishap. Cargo aircraft loaded with transportation-configured explosives may be refueled at aircraft explosive cargo parking areas, commonly called hot cargo pads. (See AFI 91-203, *Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Instruction*, for additional aircraft refueling information)

8.3.2. Aircrew will oversee all maintenance activities on aircraft with DoD nuclear-related cargo aboard.

#### **8.4. En route Maintenance.**

8.4.1. Close coordination between MAJCOM CCC, USAFE AMOCC, AOC, maintenance, and Aircraft Commander is required at all times.

8.4.2. The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

8.4.3. Use weapon system Minimum Essential Subsystem Listing (MESL) to determine status of aircraft. A Maintenance Operations Control (MOC) senior controller will personally monitor maintenance support for missions while on their station.

8.4.4. Maintenance support of JCS 1A3 airlift missions will take precedence over missions with lesser priorities.

8.4.5. When a replacement aircraft is required en route, every effort must be made to select an aircraft to meet the criteria in paragraph 8.2.

8.4.5.1. The aircraft may be selected from the nearest location consistent with mission requirements.

8.4.5.2. Spare aircraft selected from other locations will only be selected after coordination with the applicable AOC.

8.4.5.3. Open discrepancies must not adversely affect or delay a mission.

#### **8.5. Safety Precautions and Personnel Requirements.**

8.5.1. If DoD nuclear-related or other DOE/NNSA cargo is aboard, perform maintenance only in the presence of the aircrew, who will ensure proper safety precautions are used. Take the following safety precautions, as well as any others deemed necessary:

8.5.1.1. Ground aircraft in accordance with MDS specific technical orders and T.O. 00-25-172.

8.5.1.2. Aircraft parking areas must satisfy explosive quantity-distance criteria. Consult the local explosive safety officer when in doubt.

WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS  
Major General, USAF  
ACS, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

- CJCSI 4120.02C, *Assignment of Movement and Mobility Priority*, 22 December 2011
- DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons*, 23 June 2011
- DoDI 5400.13, *Public Affairs Operations*, 15 October 2008
- DoDI O-5210.67, *Special Nuclear Material Information, Security Classification Guidance*, 23 May 2011
- DoDM 5200.01, Volume 2, *DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information*, 24 February 2012
- DoD S-5210.41-M, *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, 13 July 2009
- DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (DoD FCG) (authorized by DoDD 4500.54E, only available at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil> and <http://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil>).
- AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, 11 November 1994
- AFJI 48-104, *Quarantine Regulations of Armed Forces*, 24 January 1992
- AFMAN 24-204(I), *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, 1 September 2009
- AFMAN 31-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, 1 February 2010
- AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, 12 January 2011
- AFPD 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*, 19 January 2012
- AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*, 6 July 2011
- AFPD 21-2, *Munitions*, 20 September 2005
- AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*, 10 December 2010
- AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*
- AFI 21-203, *Nuclear Accountability Procedures*, 23 November 2009
- AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, 8 October 2009
- AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*, 1 November 2005
- AFI 35-104, *Media Operations*, 22 January 2010
- AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program*, 21 September 2010
- AFI 91-203, *Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Instruction*, 15 June 2012
- AMCI 11-208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, 1 June 2000
- T.O. 00-25-172, *Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding*, 15 July 2002

T.O. 11N-20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Material Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations*, 17 August 2011

T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD), 51B, 51, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Material*, 10 December 2010

### ***Prescribed Forms***

None

### ***Adopted Forms***

AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*

AF Form 527B, *Courier Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527C, *Shipper's Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527D, *Acknowledgment of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 527E, *24-Hour Confirmation of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*

DD Form 175, *Flight Plan, Military*

DD Form 1385, *Cargo Manifest*

DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*

DD Form 1801, *International Flight Plan, DoD*

DD Form 1911, *Material Courier Receipt*

DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*

DD Form 2825, *Internal Receipt*

SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*

### ***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**A/R**—Air Refueling

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFJI**—Air Force Joint Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFNWC/NCL**—Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center/Nuclear Logistic Division

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**AFSEC**—Air Force Safety Center

**AGE**—Aerospace Ground Equipment

**ALTRV**—Altitude Reservation

**AMC**—Air Mobility Command

**AOC**—Air Operations Center  
**AOR**—Area of Responsibility  
**ATC**—Air Traffic Control  
**CAC**—Common Access Card  
**CC**—Commander  
**CCC**—Consolidated Control Center (618 AOC (TACC)/XOC)  
**CDS**—Command Disable System  
**CDT**—Crew Duty Time  
**CFP**—Computer Flight Plans  
**CG**—Center of Gravity  
**CONOPS**—Concept of Operations  
**CONUS**—Continental United States  
**C-RD**—Confidential Restricted Data  
**DoD**—Department of Defense  
**DOE**—Department of Energy  
**DTRA**—Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
**EAL**—Entry Authority List  
**EOD**—Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
**ERO**—Engine Running Onload or Offload  
**ETA**—Estimated Time of Arrival  
**FCC**—Flying Crew Chief  
**FCG**—Foreign Clearance Guide  
**FCP**—Foreign Clearance Program  
**FEV**—Functional Expert Visit  
**FRD**—Formerly Restricted Data  
**GDSS**—Global Decision Support System  
**HRP**—Human Reliability Program  
**INRAD**—Intrinsic Radiation  
**ICAO**—International Civil Aeronautical Organization  
**JCS**—Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**LLC**—Limited Life Component  
**LOA**—Letter of Agreement

**MAJCOM**—Major Command  
**MASO**—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer  
**MDS**—Mission Design Series (e.g., C-17)  
**MEP**—Mission Essential Personnel  
**MESL**—Mission Essential Subsystem Listing  
**MHE**—Materials Handling Equipment  
**MIRD**—Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive  
**MOC**—Maintenance Operation Control Center  
**MUNS**—Munitions Squadron  
**MUNSS**—Munitions Support Squadron  
**NAF**—Numbered Air Force  
**NEW**—Net Explosive Weight  
**NLT**—No Later Than  
**NM**—Nautical Miles  
**NNSA**—National Nuclear Security Administration  
**NOFORN**—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals  
**NOSS**—Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule  
**NSM**—Nuclear Surety Manager  
**NWRM**—Nuclear Weapons Related Material  
**NSSAV**—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit  
**OCONUS**—Outside the Continental US  
**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility  
**OPREP**—3 – Operational Report 3  
**OSI**—Office of Special Investigations  
**OST**—Office of Secure Transportation  
**PNAF**—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force  
**PPR**—Prior Permission Required  
**RD**—Restricted Data  
**RON**—Remain Over Night  
**SAAM**—Special Assignment Airlift Mission  
**SOE**—Sequence of Events  
**SSN**—Social Security Number

**SWOG**—Special Weapons Overflight Guide

**S-RD**—Secret Restricted Data

**S-FRD**—Secret Formerly Restricted Data

**TACC**—Tanker Airlift Control Center

**TECC**—Transportation and Emergency Control Center

**USAFE**—United States Air Force in Europe

### *Terms*

**Class II Components.**—Weapon components composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear released during detonation.

**Custody.**—The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, weapons and their components. Custody also includes maintaining accountability for weapons and their components.

**Handling.**—Physically maneuvering weapons either directly or indirectly by people.

**Inert Devices.**—Devices not containing hazardous materials, but closely resembling nuclear item or explosive items that are classified as hazardous.

**Logistics Movement.**—The transport of nuclear weapons in connection with supply or maintenance operations. Under certain specified conditions, combat aircraft may be used for such movements.

**Nuclear Airlift Mission. A SAAM tasked to transport Nuclear or DoD Nuclear**—Related cargo.

**Nuclear Cargo.**—Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and Class II nuclear components prepared for logistics movement.

**Nuclear—Related Cargo.** Nuclear training and test weapons, non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, limited life components (LLC), and equipment associated with the logistics movement of nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear Weapon.**—A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration that, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

**Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.**—Those aircrews, aircraft, and other functions that provide for peacetime support of logistical airlift of nuclear weapons and nuclear components.

**Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).**—All domestic requirements and those requiring special or delivery at points other than those within the established channel airlift route patterns and those that require special handling due to weight or size of the cargo, the urgency or sensitivity of movement, or other special factors.

**Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG). A United States Air Force**— developed AFI, applicable to all elements of the DoD, which delineates areas authorized for overflight by United

States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and the specific security classification for overflight of foreign countries.

## Attachment 2

## NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS &amp; REQUIREMENTS

Table A2.1. Cargo Requirements

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept <sup>1</sup>	Cargo Classification	Security Required <sup>1</sup>	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
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*NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELATED COMPONENTS / KITS*

Limited Life Components (LLCs)	No	Yes	No	C-RD or S-RD	Type II	No	Yes <sup>2</sup>	Yes
H1700 With or Without Components	No	Yes	No	Unclassified - S-RD	Type II	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base Spares Group X Kits	No	No	No	Unclassified	PL3	No	No	No

*NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELATED TRAINING UNITS*

Bomb Dummy Units (BDU)	No <sup>3</sup>	No	No <sup>3</sup>	Unclassified	PL3 <sup>3</sup>	No	No	No
Munitions Dummy Unit (MDU)	No <sup>3</sup>	No	No <sup>3</sup>	Unclassified	PL3 <sup>3</sup>	No	No	No
Type 3A, B, C, and D Trainers	Yes	Yes	No	Normally Secret-RD <sup>4</sup>	Type II	No	No	Yes
Type 3E Trainers (OCONUS Only)	Yes	Yes	No	Uncl <sup>5</sup>	PL3	No	No	No

*OTHER MAJOR ASSEMBLIES (OMA) /JOINT TEST ASSEMBLIES(JTA)<sup>6</sup>*

Joint Test Assemblies	Yes	Yes	No	S-RD	Type II	No	Yes	Yes
OMA (e.g. CTU, VFA, ITMU, TTTU)	Yes	See Note 6	No	Unclassified - S-RD	PL3 <sup>6</sup>	No	Yes <sup>2</sup>	Yes for OCONUS

Attachment 2 NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS &amp; REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept <sup>1</sup>	Cargo Classification	Security Required <sup>1</sup>	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
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**DOE / NNSA SNM AND OTHER DOE / NNSA CARGO**

Other DOE / NNSA Cargo	No	See Note 7	See Note 7	Unclassified - S-RD	See Note 7	See Note 7	See Note 7	Yes
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**Notes:**

**Note 1.** In accordance with this table or as required by the user, whichever is more restrictive.

**Note 2.** Required when transported to/from OCONUS. Once in-theater, non-PNAF USAFE or AMC aircrews and aircraft may transport LLCs, other Type II cargo, and OMAs. Ref: TO 11N-45-51A.

**Note 3.** May simulate / execute equivalent WR weapon requirements for exercise or training purposes or per unit request.

**Note 4.** Type 3A, B, C, D trainers are NWRM and require positive inventory control. Ref: AFI 20-110

**Note 5.** Type 3E load trainers are not NWRM. Ref: AFI 20-110

**Note 6.** OMA's may include but are not limited to, Joint Test Assemblies (JTA), Compatibility Test Units (CTU), Vibration Fly Around Units (VFA), Instrumented Test Measurement Units (ITMU), and Thermal Telemeter Test Units (TTTU). Transportation requirements will be determined by AFNWC/NCL. Security requirements will vary, handle IAW security classification.

**Note 7.** Specifics will be identified in Economy Act Request when possible or the Airlift Request message prior to planning and coordination with tasked unit(s). SWOG compliance requirements will vary depending on cargo and users. Security requirements and capabilities will vary depending upon Host Nation capabilities and security agreements established during mission coordination and planning. As a minimum, all DOE/NNSA cargo requires Type II security.

**Attachment 3**

**MISSION SETUP MESSAGE**

This attachment depicts an example Mission Setup Message. Planners may deviate from this format as necessary to accommodate mission-specific requirements and ensure proper information is thoroughly coordinated between all agencies executing or supporting the tasked mission.

**Figure A3.1 – Sample Mission Setup Message**

----- [START OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE] -----

**\*\*618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON MISSION: ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON DSN 779-4584. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG AT DSN 779-3366/3367 TO REACH THE ON-CALL PLANNER. 24-hourS PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG STE 779-0324-3366/3367. \*\***

**(U) MMM SAAM: 0000-00 // DTG: DD0000Z MMM YY // Call Sign: REACH 0000**

**(U) Part I is UNCLASSIFIED, Part II is classified (*Identify classification*)**

**PART I** (*Use this section to describe the unclassified / releasable mission data*)

**(U)** Close Watch SAAM 0000-00 operated by C-17; itinerary follows (all dates calendar MMM YY; all times ZULU):

*(Indicate information for all installations transited or tasked for support and any aerial refueling tracks in the provided blocks. Arrival/Departure info will be depicted in DD/hhmm format, Ground Time / Event Duration will be in hh+mm format. Indicate key Unclassified information in the Remarks blocks)*

Station / Event	ICAO	Arrival/ Start Time	Ground Time/Event Duration	Departure/ End Time	Remarks

**Notes:** (*Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below*)

**Note 1.** The air refueling track is not a published track and has no specific identifier. This is the GDSS identifier used for non-published air refueling tracks.

**Note 2.** The active portion of the mission is complete at this station. The remaining itinerary may change without need to create a Setup Message change.

**PART II** (*Use this section to describe the classified support and cargo requirements*)

- 1. (U)** Indicate mission priority here. For example “JCS Priority is 1A3.”
- 2. (U)** Indicate type of cargo being transported IAW the appropriate parts of this instruction. For example “This mission transports Nuclear (and/or Nuclear Related) cargo.” Furthermore, indicate the following: “Priority support is required by AFJI 11-204, A/R 95-

27. Specific requirements are identified by station in paragraph (*indicate appropriate paragraph*).”

3. Use this section to describe the cargo hazards for each location tasked to support. (U)  
Hazardous cargo on-board for arrival at station:

STATION	T.O. 11N-20-11 LINE NUMBER <sup>1</sup>

**Notes:** : (*Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below*)

**Note 1. Shippers:** DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling Data/Certification, are required on all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number.

**Note 2.** Not a scheduled landing. Hazardous cargo information only for divert situation.

4. (U) Types of Security (*List only the Security references*)

4.1. (U) Type I -- Security IAW to DoDD 5210.41; Enclosure 9, DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; (AFMAN 31-108Vol 3\_AFGM1)

4.2. (U) Type II -- Security IAW DoDD 5210.41; Enclosure 9, DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; (AFMAN 31-108Vol 3\_AFGM1)

5. (*Identify Classification*) **Special Requirements for Each Station** (*Indicate requirements for all installations transited or tasked for support in separate paragraphs with sub-paragraphs detailing the following if appropriate for each installation:*

- 1) Fuel, MHE, or equipment requirements
- 2) Clarify if specific waivers or command authorizations are granted/approved at each installation
- 3) Crew requirements for billeting or vehicles
- 4) Requirements for security by location [Type I, Type II, standby/divert support, etc.]
- 5) EDD requirements when necessary
- 6) Fireguard requirements where necessary
- 7) Support / SF release coordination
- 8) PPR requirements, to include a suspense for receiving the PPR
- 9) Message acknowledgment expectations

(*Separately identify de-positioning itinerary installation information after the following statement*)

**\*\*THE ACTIVE PORTION OF THIS MISSION IS NOW COMPLETE. THE REMAINING PORTION OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS INFORMATIONAL ONLY AND MAY CHANGE WITHOUT CREATING A SETUP MESSAGE CHANGE.\*\***

6. (U) Courier Officer will be one of the following (*these individuals are authorized to sign and receipt for nuclear weapons/DOE/NNSA specified cargo*):

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>

## 7. (U) Acknowledgement and Confirmation Messages

**7.1. (U)** Send acknowledgement of the station support requirements listed in this classified message *NLT DD MMM/0000Z*. Send to the following SIPR addresses 618 TACC/XOC-DD02 (TACC.XOC.DD2@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); 618 TACC/XOOON SAAM MISSIONS (TACC.XOOON@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); tasked unit organizational account (e.g. 4AS.DOOMS.MCCHORD@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL). Blank acknowledgement and 24-hour confirmation forms were included with this message. Please complete the appropriate form for Acknowledgement or confirmation.

**7.2. (U)** Send acknowledgement messages for any subsequent changes to the Setup using the proper form in para. 7.1., except use “**Acknowledge Change X to Setup MMM SAAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. Fill in the Change Number block of the form with appropriate number.

**7.3. (U)** Send a confirmation message 24-hours (or last duty day) prior to the aircraft scheduled arrival at your location. Use the proper form listed in para. 7.1, except use “**24-hour Confirmation MMM SAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY (CHANGE X)**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. **Your station may be required to send multiple 24-hour confirmations if the mission will transit your base on different days.**

**8. (U)** Send required briefings to tasked unit NLT COB DD MMM YY.

**9. (U)** 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON POC's are [NAME], [NAME], and [NAME].

**\*\*ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON STE DSN 312-779-4584\*\***

**DERIVED FROM: TCG-WPMU-2, 09/2004 & SPECIAL WEAPONS OVERFLIGHT GUIDE, 08/2006**

**CLASSIFIED BY: [NAME]**

**Exempt from Automatic Declassification - FRD**

----- **[END OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE]** -----

**Attachment 4**  
**FORMS**

**Figure A4.1. Identification of an Official Courier Letter.**

<p>MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN</p> <p>FROM: (Appropriate Wing/CC)</p> <p>SUBJECT: Identification of an Official Courier</p> <p>1. (Rank) (Name), (SSN), USAF, is acting in an official capacity as Courier for (organization) and is carrying one mission kit in support of this assigned mission. Documents in this kit will be used during temporary duty in conjunction with this mission and returned to (organization) when the mission terminates.</p> <p>2. The inscriptions on the cover, "OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION, EXEMPT FROM EXAMINATION," and the signature of the Courier's commander further identify this kit.</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">Wing Commander Signature Official Signature Block</p>
--

**Figure A4.2. Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination.**

<p>MEMORANDUM FOR CUSTOMS AND QUARANTINE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Date)</p> <p>FROM: (Aircraft Commander)</p> <p>SUBJECT: Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination</p> <p>Office (base name—port of entry)—I hereby certify that aircraft (type and number), based at (name and location of base), is carrying classified cargo, and I request a waiver of customs and quarantine boarding and examination. I further certify that all baggage (crew and passenger) has or will be offloaded and made available for customs examination, and that the aircraft has been sprayed in accordance with AFJI 48-104, Quarantine Regulations of Armed Forces, or as requested by the quarantine inspector.</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">(Signature of Aircraft Commander) (Rank)</p>
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**Note:** Use official stationary header

**Figure A4.3. Security Acknowledgment Letter.**

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR ON-DUTY SECURITY FORCE OFFICIAL

FROM: Courier Officer

SUBJECT: Security Acknowledgment (check only one paragraph)

1. I understand the nature of the cargo aboard aircraft number \_\_\_\_\_, and will provide security that meets the requirements of DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft restricted area unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the Aircraft Commander or Courier officer immediately. The restricted area around the aircraft is a no-lone zone when the aircrew is not present.
2. I will provide at least one posted entry controller for aircraft number \_\_\_\_\_. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft, unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the Aircraft Commander or Courier officer immediately. The aircraft interior is / is not (select one) a no-lone zone.
3. I will provide at least one posted entry controller for aircraft number \_\_\_\_\_. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed IAW DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108.
4. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number \_\_\_\_\_. Persons on the attached lists(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed IAW DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108.
5. This aircraft is a Protection Level 3 resource. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number \_\_\_\_\_.

Seal Number(s) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, Signature)\_\_\_\_\_  
(Organization)\_\_\_\_\_  
(Time and Date)

Attachments (2):

1. Aircrew Orders
2. Access List(s)

