III.
BUILDING A EUROPEAN CRISIS REACTION FORCE
A. HEADLINE GOAL COMPONENTS
23. In order to achieve the headline goal, European countries will
have to develop the capabilities needed to ensure effective performance
in crisis management. These capabilities include the ability to deploy
forces quickly, sustain them in the field and operate together with one
another, as well as flexibility, survivability, and command and control.
In addition to 50,000 to 60,000 ground troops, comprising 15 brigades,
the EU force would require the support
of 300 to 500 aircraft and around 15 surface warships.
24. Actual personnel numbers could be much greater, depending
on the length of rotations and the ultimate duration of the mission. For
example, if troops were expected to serve for six months before rotating
out, a one-year deployment would require 100,000 to 120,000 troops to be
available, with half ready to deploy and the other half available to prepare
for deployment. However, such an organisational structure would require
withdrawal of forces after 12 months. While this is what the headline goal
calls for, a firm withdrawal date would restrict political flexibility
in managing a crisis, because an adversary would be able to wait out the
EU.
In order to sustain a mission indefinitely,
EU
members would need, at a minimum, three times the number of forces deployed
--- one group of forces training for deployment, another deployed, and
another recovering after deployment. In other words, fulfilling the headline
goal may require as many as 150,000 to 180,000 ground troops that can be
deployed, plus adequate numbers of sailors and airmen to sustain maritime
and air deployments. Other experts have even suggested a 4:1 ratio.
25. When speaking about the state of European forces, an official
at one ally's delegation to NATO stated,
"They can deploy, but they cannot sustain." With 2 million men and women
in uniform, Europe has no shortage of military personnel. Analysts say
the problem is not so much in deploying troops, it is in supplying the
logistical support needed to keep an operation going in the field. An important
question to answer is exactly what capabilities are needed to fulfil the
headline goal --- to identify specific assets needed, examine what the
European allies already possess, and how they might go about obtaining
what they lack.
26. At the same time, the EU
is at its most effective when it integrates political, economic and civilian
assistance. ESDP would allow it to add military capabilities to this package,
but the emphasis in crisis management should be on integrating all of these
areas.
27. For the time being, the EU
has proved its ability to carry out low-end tasks as far as Petersberg
tasks are concerned. Operation Alba which was undertaken in 1997 to restore
order in Albania and help with the delivery of humanitarian assistance
is an example, albeit one conducted as a coalition of the willing under
Italian leadership. In a mid-level intervention, the Bosnia and Kosovo
interventions show that the Europeans are able to project forces without
major problems. However, in areas like transportation, communications,
strategic lift, and intelligence, the European allies will have to decide
whether they will acquire their own capabilities or seek to inherit the
co-operative arrangements with NATO that
have been negotiated by the WEU.
28. The first joint WEU/NATO
crisis management exercise (CMX/CRISEX 2000) held in February 2000 was
designed to test all the detailed joint work undertaken since Berlin. The
fictitious scenario on which the CRISEX exercise was based entailed a crisis
situation in an island laid waste by ethnic clashes, with the result that
tens of thousands of persons are displaced; a UN
resolution calling for aid; the NATO
decision to support WEU with its own means;
and the NATO and WEU
decision to entrust the command of the operation to DSACEUR (Deputy SACEUR).
29. This interim spring report will focus on identifying the
key questions relating to achievement of the headline goal. The visits
to the United Kingdom and France, two of the leading countries in developing
ESDP, will provide some of the answers, as will further research and discussions
with officials at NATO, the WEU,
and the EU. ESDP remains an extremely
fluid concept, one that will be fleshed out further as the year goes on.
B. CAPABILITIES EXISTING ON NATIONAL LEVEL
30. To determine what capabilities the European allies already possess
toward the headline goal, one might start by looking at the European contributions
in Bosnia and Kosovo. With the exception of the United Kingdom and France,
most European countries have failed to invest in the equipment and training
that would enable them to project power effectively. Germany, Italy, and
Spain still have work to do in professionalising and restructuring their
military forces. A survey of the largest allies yields the following capsule
analyses of their power-projection capabilities:
31. Germany: In 1997, Germany took the unprecedented step of
deploying a sizeable contingent of combat troops to the former Yugoslavia
as part of SFOR. Roughly 2,500 German
forces are serving there, and Germany has committed around 6,000 persons
to KFOR. While Germany plans a 56,000-strong Crisis Reaction Force, it
currently only counts about 10,000 personnel in its reaction forces. One
airborne unit in southern Germany is fully capable of deploying out-of-area,
and some other units are maintained at high readiness. Other units assigned
to the reaction forces contain up to 30% conscripts, who cannot be deployed
outside the country, so their readiness is lower. German defence planners
are working to improve the mobility of their forces, focusing on transport
aircraft and helicopters. Plans ultimately call for six combat aircraft
squadrons, six manoeuvre brigades, and a naval contingent, but only three
brigades today are pledged to NATO's
main reaction force, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).
32. United Kingdom: In 1998 the British SFOR
contingent numbered some 5,000 ground troops, second in size only to the
US contribution. A nuclear state with significant power projection capabilities,
the United Kingdom has more than 25,000 forces stationed abroad. The recent
Strategic Defence Review directed changes designed to make British military
forces more deployable, sustainable and flexible. As part of the SDR, the
United Kingdom is developing Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, which will comprise
all high-readiness forces across all services, including 77,000 army troops.
The United Kingdom provides most of the logistical and administrative support
to the ARRC, as well as the largest share of its combat forces. In addition,
British forces make up a sizeable part of the maritime and air components
of NATO reaction forces, including 16
surface combatants and more than 100 combat aircraft.
33. France: France carries an important share of the burden of
defending Western interests, and maintains substantial defence spending
levels. France makes noteworthy contributions to international peacekeeping,
and has committed 2,500 troops to SFOR
missions --- the third largest contingent after the US and the UK as well
as more than 5,000 to KFOR. French Reaction Forces are among the largest
of any Western nation. These include the Force d'Action Rapide, which comprises
one airmobile, one parachute and two light armoured divisions, and the
Force d'Action Navale, which includes a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,
9 surface combatants and several nuclear attack submarines and replenishment
auxiliaries.
34. Italy: Italy's NATO missions
include its commitment of 2,000 military personnel to SFOR.
Its KFOR contingent is 4,500 personnel, one of the largest, with a full
complement of tanks, armoured vehicles, and helicopters.
35. Your Rapporteur will continue his research into the capabilities
that the other allies possess and report his findings in the final report
this autumn.
C. CAPABILITIES THAT MUST BE ACQUIRED
36. While European capabilities in terms of the forces required
for Petersberg tasks are judged by NATO's
International Military Staff to be sufficient overall, European armed forces
face shortcomings in satellite capabilities, strategic mobility and command
and communications systems. The WEU found,
in light of the Kosovo conflict, that European forces lack the capacity
to carry out complex operations independently on a sustained basis, pointing
to shortfalls in lift and refuelling capacity, in addition to lacking appropriate
weapons systems. However, there may be less costly ways to gain access
to some of these capabilities, such as using unmanned aerial vehicles or
civilian satellite capabilities for intelligence in peace support operations.
37. At the recent EU defence
ministers gathering in Portugal, it was announced that a Force Generation
Conference will be held in November 2000, during the French presidency
of the EU. That conference would identify
all the capabilities needed to handle EU-led operations and which EU
members are willing to provide which capabilities. The interim military
body has been mandated to provide a detailed definition of the force. However,
there is already a divergence of opinion on the role of NATO,
with the United Kingdom believing that the NATO
planning system should remain pre-eminent while France has called for a
sizeable EU planning staff.
38. Several documents submitted to the Lisbon European Council
will provide some guidance to the Force Generation Conference, namely "Strengthening
the Common European Security and Defence Policy" and "Elaboration of the
Headline Goal: 'Food for Thought'" as well as the WEU
audit recommendations. This last document pinpoints the areas where efforts
should be concentrated on, notably:
"For operations at the higher end of the Petersberg task spectrum, military
air and sea transport assets and capabilities should be considerably reinforced;"
"With regard to sustainability and survivability of forces, nations should
reinforce their logistics capacity to support their forces once they have
been deployed and should improve their capabilities for establishing supply
lines;"
"Search and rescue capabilities should be capable of covering a hostile
environment;"
"With regard to medical support to forces, efforts should be made in the
field of long-haul medical evacuation and in the NBC (nuclear, biological,
chemical weapons) area;
"Capacities in the area of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)" should
be improved;
39. Your Rapporteur intends to continue his research for the
autumn report on the specific capabilities that need to be procured by
the EU members if they are to reach
the headline goal.
D. CHALLENGES AND COSTS
40. A major challenge to meeting the headline goal will come when
defence budgets are passed by EU member
states this year. As is discussed at greater length in the report by Mr
Paul Helminger for the Economic Committee, European defence budgets have
been declining or static for the past decade. Developing the capabilities
needed to meet the headline goal will require, at least, that European
countries spend their defence budgets more effectively, and greater efforts
toward interoperability and standardisation in European defence equipment
in the future should produce some efficiencies. However, in the near term,
ESDP most likely will require increases in defence spending. Whether the
governments that so eagerly are pursuing ESDP will be willing to pay for
it remains to be seen.
41. A larger challenge is that of a political framework for ESDP.
If the headline goal force is developed, who will decide when it is deployed,
who will give political guidance to that deployment, and who will exercise
legislative oversight? NATO's air operation
in Kosovo was plagued by difficulties in co-ordinating civilian oversight
of a military mission. It is unclear how the EU,
starting from scratch in its security policy, will avoid the difficulties
that NATO experienced in this area.
42. With most capabilities to be procured at the national level,
the ESDP will encounter many of the same problems that confront NATO,
even after 50 years of defence co-operation. Three problems are at the
fore:
Fair distribution of responsibilities: At the Force Generation Conference,
the EU members will have to decide how they will share the burden of fielding
the European reaction force. If 15 brigades are to be available, which
country will be responsible for how many? How will this be decided? Who
will provide support? Who will assess readiness? Who will command? And
how will gaps be filled if no country offers to provide a needed capability?
Cost-sharing: Beyond the question of force contributions, EU countries
will have to decide how they will pay for whatever common costs they encounter
in organising the ESDP force. The European Commission has recently proposed
a "Rapid Reaction Fund," but it seems to be aimed only at civilian and
police tasks. According to the Presidency Reports annexed to the Helsinki
Conclusions, "member States will participate in the ad hoc committee of
contributors." The WEU cost-sharing formula could provide a basis, but
the contributions of the neutral EU members would have to be considered
in determining national cost shares.
Free-riders: In any alliance, there are temptations for individual member
states to spend less than their fair share on the common defence. In the
EU, there is the specific problem of the four neutral countries and whether
they will contribute to the European force to the extent that their national
wealth might suggest. In NATO, no nation fulfils the force goals that are
agreed to with the Alliance. How the EU will deal with free-riding is an
unanswered question
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