Western European options for nuclear risk reduction Martin Butscher, Otfried Nassauer & Stephen Young
1 Canberra Commission, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1996, Canberra. Available on the web at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html. 2 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, 1997. 3"Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations", International Court of Justice, Communique No. 96/23, 8 July 1996. 4 "Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda", United Nations Document A/C.1/53/48/Rev.1, 5 November 1998.
1 The five declared nuclear-weapon states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. India and Pakistan, despite their recent nuclear tests, are only nuclear-capable states, as neither has deployed nuclear weapons. Israel, though it has not tested, is also a nuclear-capable state. 2 House of Lords, Official Report, The Stationery Office, 17 December 1997, column 684. 3 Gallup, commissioned by the National Steering Committee of Nuclear Free Local Authorities, conducted from 5-10 September 1997 on a represen-tative sample of 1008 people. 4 The Strategic Defence Review, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998, Cmnd 3999, The Stationery Office. Also available on the web at http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm. 5 Strategic Defence Review, "Supporting Essay Five: Deterrence, Arms Control, and Proliferation", para. 5, The Stationery Office, July 1998. Also available on the web at: http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/essay05.htm. 6 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 62. 7 Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Lord Gilbert, indicated a figure of £940 million (approximatly US$1,503 million) for nuclear weapons related costs in FY1997-98 (House of Lords, Official Report, 9 December 1997, column 4). On 10 February 1995, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Nicholas Soames told Christopher Mullin, MP, in a written answer, that 7.2% of the 1993/94 Defence budget (approximately £1,600 million) (US$2,560 million) was spent on maintaining and operating British nuclear forces. In addition, the government routinely attributes some costs associated with Trident, including construction costs at Aldermaston, Faslane and Coulport, to other parts of the Defence budget. 8 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 8. 9 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 62. 10 "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996", Cm 3223, HMSO, London, May 1996, p.24, and "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 6. 11 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 9. 12 House of Commons, Official Report, 16 July 1998, column 237. 13 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., Figure 1, Note 3. 14 The UK uses the Mark 4 Trident re-entry vehicle, which in the US is used to carry the Trident W76 warhead. In 1982-83 the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group established a "Statutory Determination" to allow "communication to the UK of atomic information on the MK-4 Re-entry Body and W-76 Warhead for the Trident Missile Systems", Annual Historical Summary (U), Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, HQ, Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 October 1982 - 30 September 1983, Document released under the Freedom of Information Act. 15 Report of the missile buy in George Jones and Tim Butcher, "Britain adds to Trident arsenal", The Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1997, and confirmation that the total purchased will be 58 in Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 65. 16 House of Commons, Official Report, 31 July 1998, para. 448. 17 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 14. 18 "The British Strategic Nuclear Force: Text of Letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the US Secretary of Defense", Cmnd 8517, 11 March 1982. 19 Malcolm Rifkind (then Secretary of State for Defence), "UK Defence Strategy; A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?", Ministry of Defence, London, 16 November 1993. 20 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 63. 21 House of Commons, Official Report, The Stationery Office, 20 May 1997, column 24. 22 See Paul Rogers, The Role of British Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War, BASIC Research Report 95.1, November 1995, and Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, BASIC Research Report 98.2, March 1998. 23 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 24 House of Commons, Official Report, 4 December 1997, column 577. 25 House of Lords, Official Report, 29 October 1998, column WA224. 26 For a review and analysis of US policy on this, see Hans Kristensen, op. cit. 27 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 31. 28 Ibid., para. 12. 29 "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996", presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, May 1996, Cmnd 3223, p.24. Available on the web at: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/mod/defence/deffc.htm. 30 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 January 1997, column 27. 31 House of Lords, Official Report, 23 June 1997, column 1458. 32 Letter from the Ministry of Defence Directorate of Nuclear Policy to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 23 February 1994. 33 House of Lords, Official Report, 17 December 1997, column 688. 34 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 26. 35 The Labour Party, New Labour: because Britain deserves better, 1997. 36 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 70. 37 The Labour Party, A Fresh Start for Britain: Labour's Strategy for Britain in the Modern World, 1996. 38 Robin Cook, "Bombs Away", New Statesman and Society, 14 April 1995. 39 Ministry of Defence, Press Release 055/97, "Britain's Defence: Securing our Future Together", 28 May 1997. 40 House of Lords, Official Report, 10 February 1998, column 996. 41 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para. 27. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., para. 15. 44 Ibid., para. 10. 45 Ibid., para. 35. 46 Ibid., para. 32. 47 "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Treaty or Use of Nuclear Weapons", Fifty-second session, UN First Committee, A/C.1/52/L.37. 48 U.K. Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution A/C.1/52/L.37. 49 House of Lords, Official Report, 26 January 1998, columns 7-8. 50 "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Treaty or Use of Nuclear Weapons", op. cit. 51 U.K. Explanation of Vote, op. cit. 52 "Transparency in Armaments", Fifty-second session, UN First Committee, A/C.1/52/L.2/Rev.1.
1 "Livre Blanc sur la D‚fense", La Documentation Fran‡aise, 1994, p.35. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p.77. 4 Ibid., p.78. 5 Ibid., p.79. 6 Ibid., p.82. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p.83. 9 Ibid., p.107. 10 Ibid. 11 Figures from Arm‚es d'Aujourd'hui, February 1992, 1993, 1994. Published by SIRPA and from the Loi de Finances 1998, Rapport G‚n‚ral No. 85, Tome 3, Annexe 43. 12 Jean Michel Boucheron, "Rapport No. 305, Projet de loi de Finances, Annexe 40, D‚fense", 12 November 1997, p.85. 13 Maurice Blin, "Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998, adopt‚ par l'Assembl‚e Nationale - D‚fense", Senat, Rapport G‚n‚ral No. 85, Tome 3, Annexe 43, 1997. 14 M. Jean Faure, "Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998, adopt‚ par l'Assembl‚e Nationale - D‚fense - Nucl‚aire, Espace et Services Communs", Senat, Avis No. 88, Tome IV, 1997. 15 See Jean Michel Boucheron, "Rapport No. 305, Projet de loi de Finances, Annexe 40, D‚fense", 12 November 1997. For the section on simulation of nuclear tests, see pp. 90-1. 16 Jacques Chirac, "Allocution aux Arm‚es", 23 February 1996. 17 Maurice Blin, "Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998, adopt‚ par l'Assembl‚e Nationale - D‚fense", Senat, Rapport G‚n‚ral No. 85, Tome 3, Annexe 43, 1997. 18 Fran‡ois Mitterand, Speech to the seminar Rencontres Nationales pour l'Europe, 11 January 1992. 19 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 20 "The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons", Assembly of the Western European Union Document 1420, Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, 19 May 1994. 21 "Livre Blanc sur la D‚fense", op. cit., p.46. 22 Ibid. 23 Bruno Tertrais, "L'Arme Nucl‚aire aprŠs La Guerre Froide", Economica, Paris, 1994. 24 Foreign Minister Alain Jupp‚, Speech at the 20th Anniversary of the Centre d'Analyse et Pr‚vision, 30 January 1995. 25 Prime Minister Alain Jupp‚, Speech to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de D‚fense Nationale, 7 September 1995. 26 Ibid. 27 "Franco-German Common Security and Defence Concept", 9 December 1996, para. 3.1. 28 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/10566, "Answer of the Federal Government to questions by MP's Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, Christian Sterzing, Ludger Volmer and the Faction of Alliance 90 / The Greens", Bonn, 28 April 1998, p.7.
1 "Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes", Washington, 3 July 1958. 2 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 January 1998, column 135. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., column 139-140. 5 Ibid., column 140. 6 "British-French Joint Statement on Nuclear Co-operation", issued at the Anglo-French Summit, London, 29-30 October 1995 7 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 8 House of Commons, Official Report, 22 January 1998, column 29. 9 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 10 Cited in Martin Butcher, "Nuclear Weapons in the European Union", CESD Issues in European Security Number 5, Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD), Brussels, May 1996. 11 "Interview", Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 January 1998, p.32. 12 House of Commons, Official Report, 22 January 1998, column 628. 13 House of Commons Defence Committee, "Progress of the Trident Programme", HC 350 of 1994-95, 5 July 1995, p.25. 14 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for Co-operation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes", Paris, 27 July 1961. 15 "Amendment modifying the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for Co-operation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems to provide for Co-operation on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Activities and Installations for Mutual Defense Purposes", Paris, 22 July 1985. 16 Richard Ullman, "The Covert French Connection", Foreign Policy, Summer 1989, Vol. 75, pp. 3-33. 17 "Memorandum of Agreement on Co-operation Concerning Nuclear Safety and Security", Washington, 4 June 1996. 18 M. Jean Faure, op. cit. 19 Maurice Blin, op. cit. 20 Jean Michel Boucheron, op. cit., p.90. 21 Ibid. 22 M, Jean Faure, op. cit., and Jean Michel Boucheron, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 23 "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995", Cm 2800, HMSO, London, 3 May 1995, p.77. 24 House of Commons Defence Committee, "Progress of the Trident Programme", HC 297 of 1993-94, 4 May 1994, p.15. 25 Ibid. 26 "Progress of the Trident Programme", op. cit., p.24. 27 For further information on US nuclear warhead design activities for naval strategic forces, see Christopher E. Paine and Matthew G. McKinzie, End Run: The US Government's Plan for Designing Nuclear Weapons and Simulating Nuclear Explosions under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Natural Resources Defense Council Nuclear Program, August 1997. Available on the web at: http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/fppubl.html. 28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs", May 1997, p.18.
1 Otfried Nassauer, Oliver Meier, Nicola Butler, Stephen Young, "U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97", BASIC-BITS Research Note 97.1, February 1997. 2 Department of the US Air Force, 11th Wing, Information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Joshua Handler, Princeton University, released 30 January 1998; Department of the US Air Force, Headquarters US Air Forces in Europe, Information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Joshua Handler, released 12 February 1997; Der Spiegel, No. 16/98, 13 April 1998, p.135; USAF Electronic Systems Center: Press Release, Hanscom, 18 July 1995; USAF Electronic Systems Center: Communication to BASIC, Hanscom, 20 November 1996; US Congress, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY 1987, Part 5, p.216; US Congress, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY 1990, part 7, p.479; Institut fr Internationale Politik: Die Atomare Planung der NATO nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, Wuppertal, 1990. 3 No modernized nuclear weapons storage capability has been built at Spangdahlem. However the air base has an inactive Cold War-era nuclear weapons storage facility. Nuclear Surety Inspections are taking place for the 52nd Fighter Wing. It is not clear whether they are limited to the 52nd Logistics Group, responsible for the Munitions Special Support Squadrons in Buechel, Kleine Brogel, and Volkel, or whether flying squadrons have been inspected as well. However, even if they were inspected, this would not necessarily indicate the presence of nuclear weapons in Spangdahlem. They could be deployed in Ramstein. If nuclear weapons are stored in Spangdahlem, as assumed by the Natural Resources Defence Council, Spangdahlem would be the only overseas location at which the USAF nuclear weapons are not stored in modernized vaults. Excess vaults were available and already paid for in 1995, when the decision to reduce the construction program for vaults was taken by NATO's SLOWPIG working group. Cf. William M. Arkin, Richard S. Norris, Joshua Handler, "Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998", Nuclear Weapons Databook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, March 1998, p.25, (available on the web at: http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/fppubl.html), and Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit. 4 NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", Rome, 7 November 1991, S-1(91)85, p.15. 5 Charles E. Johnson, "U.S. Policies on Nuclear Weapons", (formerly) Top Secret - Restricted Data, Washington, 12 December 1964, partially declassified in 1991 (Lyndon B. Johnson Library). 6 US Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty", Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p. 262. 7 The Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adrian Fisher, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Rusk's letter was "seen by the Soviets and key members of the ENDC before it was made public and there was no objection. In view of the fact it is public and has been referred to in a public hearing, I assume all countries in the world are on notice of our intention." See ibid., p.340. 8 Leonard Meeker, "Proposed Revised Articles of US Non-Proliferation Treaty", Memorandum (formerly confidential), US Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Washington, 6 July 1966. 9 "Working Paper Presented by the Members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty to the 2nd PrepCom for the NPT Review Conference 2000", Geneva, 28 April 1998. 10 The agreement between the US and The Netherlands is typical: "Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Mutual Defence Purposes", signed at The Hague, 6 May 1959, entered into force 27 July 1959. 11 For an example see: Privy Council 1963-1224, "Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces", Ottawa, 16 August 1963 (formerly SECRET) and the secret answer by W.W. Butterworth, US-Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa, 16 August 1963 as reprinted in John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal, Durndurn Press, Toronto/Oxford, 1998, pp. 241-245. The documents are the first such bilateral agreement to become public. 12 See, for example, "Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador K.J. Jele, to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", 8 May 1998. 13 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject: NATO Enlargement", US Department of State, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1997. 14 NATO/Russia, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperationand Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May 1997, p.8. 15 "Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of State Albright", Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington DC, 21 October 1997. See also, "Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of Defense Cohen", Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington DC, 21 October 1997. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 NATO, op. cit. 21 Ibid. 22 For background on NATO's Strategy evolution since the end of the Cold War see Rob de Wijk, "NATO at the Brink of the New Millennium", London/Washington, 1997 and Otfried Nassauer "Neue NATO-Strategie" in Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and Jo Angerer (eds), Siegermacht NATO, Berg am See, 1993, pp. 37-115. 23 Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit. 24 For an examination of US policy, see Hans Kristensen, op. cit. 25 Final Communiqu‚, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 16 December 1997. 26 See Karl Heinz Kamp "Das neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme", St. Augustin, August 1998, pp.5-6. The author has been recently working on the NATO Strategy Review in his capacity as a member of the German Foreign Ministry Planning Staff. 27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, Washington, September 1997, The Joint Force. 28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operation, JP 3-12-1, Washington, 9 February 1996, p.V. 29 For a more detailed description of these developments in US nuclear doctrine see Hans Kristensen, op. cit. 30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, op. cit., pp. III-8. 31 First reported in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms", Washington Post, 7 December 1997, p.1. 32 See for example: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12, Washington, December 1995; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Washington, May 1997; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, May 1997. 33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, op. cit., pp. VIII, III-6, III-7. When questioned, after BASIC and BITS published this fact in August 1998, a DoD spokesperson replied "we are confident that we can mount an effective response to terrorism without using nuclear weapons" but added "Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance any capability available to us. I stress that these policies have to do with a situation in which the US our allies or our forces have been attacked with chemical or biological weapons" (See DoD-Spokesperson Fax to B. Bender, 26 August 1998). To say the least, either US policy is deliberately highly ambiguous or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a different interpretation of US strategy and doctrine than the US Department of Defense. 34 Interviews by the authors conducted during September-October 1998. 35 See for example: Karl Heinz Kamp, op. cit., or Paul Cornish, "Die NATO vor der Jahrtausendwende - Neue Aufgaben, neue Mitglieder- neue Strategie?" in NATO Brief, No 3, 1997, pp.21-24. 36 Deutscher Bundestag, op cit., p.5. 37 Both positions exist in the US Administration as well. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff take the position that sub-strategic weapons should play a role in offensive counter-proliferation, others are more interested in negotiating verified disarmament for these weapons. During the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, the US and Russia decided to discuss tactical nuclear weapons. 38 Quoted in Elaine Grossman, "STRATCOM Chief Calls for START III Limit on Tactical Nuclear Weapons", in Inside the Pentagon, 9 April 1998, p.6.
1 Quoted in Daniel Plesch and Stephen Young, "A Permanent Non-Proliferation Treaty", BASIC Reports No. 45, 1 June 1995. 2 From a conversation with the authors, 25 July1998. 3 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I). 4 "Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", op. cit. 5 Canberra Commission, op. cit. 6 "Intervention by the South African Delegation to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Year 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, International Peace and Security, and Security Assurances", New York, 9 April 1997. 7 Cluster 1: Speaking Points, Ireland, NPT PrepCom, 9 April 1997. 8 Statement by Ambassador J.S. Selebi, South African Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, 20 January 1998. 9 Rebecca Johnson,"The CD Adopts Agenda, But Not Yet a Programme of Work", Geneva Update No. 38, Disarmament Diplomacy, Acronym Institute, London Issue No 22, January 1998. 10 Ambassador Andr‚ Mernier, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the Conference on Disarmament, "European Security and the NPT Review Process", conference speech, 24 March 1998. 11 "Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gnther Seibert, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament at the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Geneva, 29 April 1998. 12 Labour Party, New Labour: because Britain deserves better, op. cit. 13 Ambassador Ian Soutar, interview with the author, 27 October 1998. 14 First reported in "Norwegian scientific rocket causes global scare", by Rolf Soderlind, Reuters, Oslo, 25 January 1995. A more detailed description appeared in Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert", Scientific American, November 1997, p. 76. Available on the web at: http://www.sciam.com/1197issue/1197vonhippel.html. 15 Bill Gertz, "Mishaps put Russian missiles on combat mode", The Washington Times, 12 May 1997. 16 Information conveyed to the authors by Frank von Hippel from discussions he has had with Russian officials. 17 Bruce G. Blair, et al., op. cit. 18 Richard Garwin and Aaron Tovish have proposed this type of system. See, for example "Verifying the de-alert status of submarines on patrol", in De-Alerting Alert, No. 2, January 1998. Available on the web at: http://www.fas.org/cusp/alert/dealert2.htm. 19 Bruce G. Blair, et al., op. cit. 20 "Supporting Essay Five", op. cit., para.13. 21 The first figure comes from "One on One", Gen. Eugene Harbinger (Interview), Defense News, March 10-16, 1997, p.70. The second is from testimony by Gen. Harbinger before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 March 1998, cited in Elaine Grossman, op. cit. 22 Cited in Jurgen Dragsdahl, "NATO-Russia Cooperation Stuck in Neutral", BASIC Reports No. 64, 4 June 1998. 23 William M. Arkin, et al., op. cit. 24 According to Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998, 970 US tactical nuclear weapons remain, a mixture of B-61 gravity bombs and submarine-launched cruise missiles. The 180 figure is based on information received by Joshua Handler of Princeton University under the Freedom of Information Act request and other information from Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit. 25 Ibid. 26 "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces", Signed by US President William Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 21 March 1997. 27 Final Communiqu‚, Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group on 11th June 1998, Press Release M-DPC/NPG- 1(98)72, 11 June 1998, para. 8. Available on the web at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-072e.htm. 28 Ibid. 29 Elaine Grossman, op. cit. 30 Ashton Carter and John M. Deutch, "No Nukes? Not Yet", Wall Street Journal, 4 March 1997, p. 18. 31 U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements, Executive Report, July 1998, Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Summary available on the web at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum145.html. 32 See, for example, Oliver Meier and Otfried Nassauer, "Next START by CART: Breaking the Disarmament Deadlock", Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, February 1997. Available on the web at: http://www.basicint.org/start_cart.htm. Also see Oleg N. Bykov and Jack Mendelsohn, "START-III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast?", The Atlantic Council of the United States, October 1996. 33 Under the SALT process the US and the then-Soviet Union decided that weapons with a range greater than 5,500 km would be called strategic and subject to negotiations. All other weapons were excluded. While the distinction may have been a useful during these early arms control negotiations, it soon was criticized as artificial. The Soviet Union considered any weapon capable of reaching its territory strategic. Under today's circumstances, maintaining this distinction creates new problems as the disarmament process moves to cover all nuclear postures. Most Chinese nuclear weapons aimed at Russia are non-strategic by the SALT definitions. All of India's nuclear posture will be non-strategic for at least another decade. Finally, the UK's decision to assign both strategic and sub-strategic tasks to its nuclear-armed Trident missiles makes verifiable distinction between strategic and non-strategic weapons impossible. 34 Final Communiqu‚, op. cit., para. 9. 35 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para 3. 36 Colin Powell, My American Journey, Random House, New York, September 1995. 37 R. Jeffrey Smith, "The Dissenter", The Washington Post, 7 December 1997. 38 Quoted in Ian Taylor, "Bonn wants Nato pledge on no first nuclear use", The Guardian, 19 November 1998. 39 The quote is from Der Spiegel, cited in William Drozdiak, "Bonn Proposes That NATO Pledge No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons", Washington Post, 23 November 1998. 40 Document 5273/98 (Presse 15), 27 January 1998, First Meeting of the Cooperation Council Between the European Union and the Russian Federation.
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