Appendix Anhang Verhandlungsgeschichtliche Dokumente mit Bezügen auf Nicht-tödliche Chemikalien und die ”Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung einschließlich der innerstaatlichen Bekämpfung von Unruhen”
Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological ) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use Report of the Secretary-General containing the unanimous report of the group of consultant experts. (Document A/7575 and S/9292), transmitted to UN GA on 1 July 1969). The Secretary-General urged the Members of the UN to undertake the following measures:
In their findings and conclusions the experts stated inter alia: "The present inquiry has shown that the potential for developing an armoury of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons has grown considerably in recent years, not only in terms of the number of agents but in their toxicity and in the diversity of their effects. At one extreme, chemical agents exist and are being developed for use in the control of civil disorders; and others have been developed in order to increase the productivity of agriculture. But even though these substances may be less toxic than most other chemical agents, their ill-considered civil use for military purposes could turn out to be highly dangerous..." The General Assembly adopted on 16 December 1969, by 120 to 0, with one abstention, resolution 2603 B (XXIV). By this resolution the General Assembly, in paragraph 6, "Recommends the Report of the Secretary-General to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as a basis for its further consideration of the question of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". With regard to the second out of three recommendation by the Secretary-General (see above) the General Assembly adopted a declaratory resolution by an affirmative vote of 80 to 3 (Australia, Portugal and the United States) with 36 abstentions. In this resolution (2603 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, the General Assembly, inter alias: Declares as contrary to the generally recognised rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June1925, the use in international armed conflict of
Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons In Chapter 4. Working Definitions of Chemical and Biological Weapons for the Purposes of this Report, three groups of chemical and biological agents are discerned: "A lethal agent is one intended to cause death when man is exposed to concentrations well within the capability of delivery for military purposes. An incapacitating agent is one intended to cause temporary disease or to induce temporary mental or physical disability, the duration of which greatly exceeds the period of exposure. (Footnote 4) A harassing agent (or short term incapacitator) is one capable of causing a rapid disablement that lasts for little longer than the period of exposure." Footnote 4 reads: "No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between lethal and incapacitating agents used in chemical and biological warfare, because incapacitating agents can be lethal or permanently disabling under certain circumstances (e.g., in the presence of malnutrition or pre-existing disease; in infants or the aged; or when there is exposure to unusually high doses, as in enclosed spaces or in close proximity to functioning chemical or biological weapons). For similar reasons, no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between harassing agents and other anti-personnel chemical agents; furthermore, harassing agents may be used in war in conjunction with high-explosive, fragmentation or other weapons to increase the lethal effectiveness of the latter – as distinct from their employment in riot control in order to reduce injuries and to safe lives." Consequently, in Annex 1, Chemical Agents, the Report lists three different tactical functions of chemical warfare agents:
(The Report says with regard to lethal doses of incapacitating agents: "In this connection, it may be noted that estimates of lethal doses for man are likely to be more unreliable for the harassing agents than for any other CW agents").
White House press release dated 25 November 1969 "Under the auspices of the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defence, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Science and Technology, the intelligence community, and other agencies worked closely together on this study for over 6 months. These government efforts were aided by contributions from the scientific community through the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee. This study has now been completed and its findings carefully considered by the National Security Council. I am now reporting the decisions taken on the basis of this review. Chemical Warfare Program As to our chemical warfare program, the United States:
Consonant with these decisions, the administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva protocol of 1925, which prohibits the first use in war of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare’. The United States has long supported the principles and objectives of this protocol. We take this step toward formal ratification to reinforce our continuing advocacy of international constraints on the use of these weapons." Biological Research Program ...
President Nixon’s message White House press release dated 19 August 1970 "To the Senate of the United States: With the view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva June 17, 1925. I transmit also the report by the Secretary of State which sets forth the understandings and the proposed reservation of the United States with respect to the Protocol. In submitting this Protocol for approval, I consider it desirable and appropriate to make the following statements:
Working Paper on a model for a comprehensive agreement concerning the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare.
"Scope of the prohibition... 6. The agents would be separated into two categories according to two technical criteria
Work Program regarding negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons. With regard to the scope of prohibition, the paper pleads for a combination of four general criteria: general toxicity standard, identification of specific agents, general structural formula, criterion based on purpose. The latter has been described as follows: "The Biological Weapons Convention relies on a general formula which prohibits agents ‘of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’. This definition is both comprehensive and simple. Such a definition by itself, however, could be insufficiently precise for effective application to chemicals which are produced in extremely large quantities for peaceful purposes."
Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The scope of prohibition envisaged in Paragraph I of the draft reads:
Working Paper on definitions of controlled substances The paper discusses the idea to use toxicity limits for defining chemical substances which are potential chemical warfare agents: "A criterion based on a toxicity limit would have the advantage of being directly related to the potential danger from a particular substance." The disadvantage of this method is mentioned too: "However, laboratory procedures for toxicity determination are not uniform from country to country – or even within a single country. Accurate, reproducible toxicity values can be obtained only if the testing procedure and form of presentation of results are very carefully specified in advance". A general criterion such as that in the Biological Weapons Convention "would provide the simplest and most comprehensive definition". (page 4) Working Paper on two groups of chemical agents of warfare Chemicals to be prohibited are those as comprised by: the Geneva Protocol, the UN Report on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, Report of the Secretary General, United Nations, New York, 1969 A/7575/Rev.1, and the report of the World Health Organisation, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva 1970. The concept already included in the Swedish paper CCD/322 to divide the chemicals to be prohibited into two groups is further upheld. The paper supports the idea to delimit supertoxic agents and other toxic agents. In the latter group CS is included with the remark "Police use". Working Paper on some aspects of the definition, classification and prohibition of chemical agents. The paper calls (on page 1) "attention to possible harmful uses of chemical compounds which are not classified as chemical warfare agents. For instance, a total herbicide used in standard concentrations has toxic effects on plants but it is not dangerous for men. However, if used in concentrations ten times higher, it may also have, beside its basic effects, direct and indirect toxic effects on people and animals." As a suitable definition that would cover all chemical agents was proposed(on page 2): "All chemical compounds intentionally used in quantities which directly or indirectly, immediately or after some time, can produce physiological disturbances or cessation of physiological functions in men or animals, should be considered as chemical agents". Finally the paper stresses that "any agreement concerning the prohibition of chemical agents must be a comprehensive one" (page 4). Working paper on toxicity of chemical substances, methods of estimation and applications to a chemical control agreement. The comments in regard to the role of a toxicity criterion given in the paper "will not be applicable to the control of the less toxic chemical warfare substances, for example the irritants, incapacitants, or some of the older agents, such as mustard gases. We assuming herein, as the United States Paper suggests, that such chemicals would be defined by other criteria of the control agreement" (page 1). 26 April 1973 (CCD/400) Working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. "(II) SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION 7. Discussions in the Committee show a basic agreement on the objective of the negotiations relating to chemical weapons, namely that they should aim, in accordance with the relevant United Nation resolutions, at reaching a comprehensive ban, covering the development, production and stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons, their equipment and means of delivery, as well as the destruction of existing stocks" (page 2). The problem of defining chemical substances in a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The paper states "A widely expressed view in the CCD has been that a treaty could set out the scope affected by way of a general purpose criterion, while more detailed technical provisions could be elaborated in an annex to the treaty" (page 1). For such supplement the paper discusses several versions.
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The scope of the prohibition is defined in Article 1: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
The problem of defining compounds having military significance as irritating and incapacitating agents. "Non-lethal Agents 2. Attention is drawn to the meaning of some of the terms used in this paper: harassing or irritating means having a physiological effect which will render individuals incapable of normal concerted physical effort during exposure and only for a very short period of time (minutes) after exposure ceases. These are generally known as riot control agents; incapacitating means having physiological or mental effects which will render individuals incapable of normal concerted physical or mental effort or both for a significant period of time after exposure. Such agents resemble riot control in that the effects are temporary and without permanent damage but are different in that the effect may last for hours or in extreme cases for days" (page 1). The paper than explains that the military utility of harassing and incapacitating is not related to their possible lethal effects, but to their harassing and incapacitating effect. The paper than discusses the tolerance limits given in the Report of the Secretary-General for "non-lethal agents" and proposes instead a tolerance limit for the medium dosage. With regard to the conclusions to be drawn from the for the scope of prohibition, the paper says in its paragraph 9 (page 3): "In the case of harassing or irritating agents which are widely recognised as essential for civil riot control because of their quick reaction and short duration without injury, it is unlikely that governments would be prepared to ban their continued development, production and stockpiling. It might on the other hand be generally accepted that the development, production and stockpiling of incapacitating agents could be prohibited. This acceptance would stem from the unreliability and unpredictable effects of incapacitating agents, particularly the psychochemicals. It would seem unlikely that governments would wish to retain such agents for civil police use. In the event of there being a disposition to prohibit incapacitating agents but to allow irritating agents for civil use, an expert review committee could determine into which category fell those chemicals above the agreed threshold of effectiveness".
Executive Order 11850 of 4-08-75 32 - National Defense Subchapter A – General Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as: (a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. (b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. (c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners. (d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations. I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy. NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance. Section 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States. The provisions of Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975, appear at 40 FR 16187, 3 CFR, 1971 - 1975 Comp., p. 980, unless otherwise noted.
Working paper on use of measurements of lethality for definition of agents of chemical warfare. The paper starts with the proposition: "To arrive at a Treaty limiting or prohibiting chemical weapons it may be necessary to define what chemical agents shall fall within the terms of the Treaty in which case it will also be necessary to agree to a measure of lethality. The specific problems associated with determination of lethality of chemical warfare agents are discussed and the general concept of the LD50 as a measure of lethality is explained". Under "limitations of the proposal"(page 9) the paper refers to the shortcomings of this concept: "The most important limitation on the above proposal, or on others which adopt a sole criterion of lethality, is that they would not include materials which are less lethal, but which could still have military utility against forces or civilians poorly protected. (For this reason, it may be necessary to allow a category of chemical agents of lesser lethality the use of which as agents of weapons of war would be prohibited, but whose manufacture for legitimate civil uses would be permitted). This shortcoming could be avoided if the treaty also prohibited materials which caused disability lasting more than a few days. However, the means of verifying this property of chemicals would be much more difficult than simple lethality, and at the present time non-lethal but permanently disabling chemical weapons are only a possibility. The treatment of chemical weapons which cause temporary disability (incapacitating agents and irritant agents) is outside the scope of this paper; however, similar principles might be applicable in defining levels of incapacitating potency as have been proposed above for defining lethality, i. e., use of known incapacitating or irritant compounds as standards of comparison for tests with experimental animals or human subjects." Review of proposals for defining chemical warfare agents in a CW Agreement In the summary the paper sees a broad support, perhaps consensus, for a general purpose criterion. In addition, one or more specific technical criteria, or the use of toxicity as an additional criteria toxicity thresholds were proposed for a definition. However, the decision on values to be adopted and testing procedures to be used was proposed to postpone to a later stage.
Draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. "ARTICLE I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never, in any circumstances, to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or use:
Working paper concerning incapacitating chemical warfare agents (full text) "Introduction In addition to chemicals that kill or permanently disable, chemicals which have temporary, incapacitating effects are potential chemical warfare agents. For this reason, it is appropriate to consider their inclusion in a future CW arms control measure. The draft Conventions presented by the Socialist countries (CCD/361), Japan (CCD/420), and the United Kingdom (CCD/512), all appear to place restrictions upon incapacitants, as well as on other agents. In addition, the 10-nation memorandum on CW (CCD/400) would seem to advocate prohibition of incapacitants. While the view that incapacitating agents should be subject to constraints appears to be widely held, little information has been presented at the CCD on this category of agent. The only working paper dealing explicitly with incapacitating agents was presented by Canada in 1974 (CDD/433). That paper examined the problem of defining compounds having significance as irritating or incapacitating agents. The purpose of this paper is to present additional background material.
What are incapacitating agents? As pointed out in Canadian working paper CCD/433, ‘incapacitating means having physiological or mental effects which will render individuals incapable of normal concerted physical or mental effort or both for a significant period of time after exposure’. The effects are intended to be temporary, resulting in no permanent damage. Such effects may last for hours (or for days in extreme situations) after removal from exposure. In order to be effective militarily, incapacitating agents must fill the basic requirements common to all chemical agents: reasonable cost of manufacture from readily available materials; a high degree of stability in storage as well as during and after dissemination; capability of being disseminated efficiently and a relatively short time interval between exposure to the agent and the onset of desired effects. In addition, the difference between the effective and lethal doses of an agent must be wide enough to permit the spontaneous recovery of most victims with no permanent after effects. The most important types of incapacitating agents are found in the following categories:
Effective dose and other definitional criteria Toxicity thresholds based on median lethal dose are generally agreed to be a useful supplement to the general purpose criterion for defining which chemicals are potential lethal CW agents. In the Canadian paper CCD/414 this general approach was extended to potential incapacitating CW agents. It was suggested that: "A chemical compound or element can be considered as a potential agent of war if it has a median incapacitating or irritating dosage of less than 500 mg. min/M3". While determination of medium lethal dosage is relatively straightforward, measurement of median effective dosage is much more complex. The experimental procedure used will depend on the type of effect expected. Separate methods would be needed to determine effective dosage for each class of agents. One method for measuring human mental performance, called the Number Facility Test (NF), employs a series of addition problems, each consisting of three randomly selected 1- or 2-digit numbers. The score is the number correctly added within a 3-minute period. Other tests have been developed to measure eye-hand co-ordination and dexterity. The types of tests used for animal testing are often based on conditioned reflex responses, physical endurance and visual discrimination. Criteria based on chemical structure or physical properties, analogous to those suggested for lethal agents, would appear to have little utility. Potential incapacitating agents are so diverse that it does not appear possible to find any simple definitional formula. In view of the lack of suitable technical criteria, consideration might be given to relying solely on the general purpose criterion. Verification considerations Generally speaking, the findings reached on verification of restrictions on lethal agents will also apply to incapacitating agents. In other words, the ability to verify restrictions on development, production or stockpiling will be no better or worse for incapacitating agents then for lethal agents. Military role of incapacitating agents While the potential military role for incapacitating agents has been discussed for decades, such agents do not appear to have become a major component of CW stockpiles. A key factor has undoubtedly been the unsuitability of currently known agents for military purposes. If incapacitating agents were not eventually covered in a CW agreement, however, increased effort might well be devoted to overcoming these shortcomings. Conclusions
Joint USSR-United States Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Chemical weapons / answers to questionnaire contained in CD/41 Question 2 refers to the subjects to be covered by a comprehensive CW-ban. Question 2c raises the problem whether a ban "only cover lethal agents or also incapacitants? Tear gas? Herbicides and defoliants?" Answer: "Incapacitating agents should be prohibited. Tear gas and herbicides can be considered as dual purpose agents. Production for chemical warfare purposes should be prohibited. (this does not exclude some specific military uses which cannot be considered as chemical warfare (such as riot control, e.g. in prisoner of war camps or clearing excessive vegetation around bases))." Chemical Weapons / Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to the prohibition of chemical weapons. While admitting, that no consensus could be reached at this stage, items were listed that "could be tentatively distilled from the discussion" ((a)objective of general, complete and verifiable prohibition. (b) Scope of prohibition posed on the general purpose criterion)
Chinese Delegation’s Proposals on the Main Contents of a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The first paragraph of the Chinese basic position reads: "1. The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be comprehensive. The scope of prohibited activities in connection with chemical weapons should include their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use; the scope of prohibited chemical weapons should include all chemicals determined by a general purpose criterion, i.e. whose types and quantities fail to justify the claim that they are intended for peaceful purposes, and weapons systems using these chemicals."
Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention Attempt for a definition (page 2): "A chemical weapon is a weapon which incorporates a chemical mixture and is designed to achieve military objectives in warfare through its toxicological action on biological systems. This would include effects on plant and animal systems as well as man himself. Toxicology in this context is taken in the broad sense of any toxicological response of which lethality is but one example. Thus both physical and mental incapacitation, irritancy and detrimental effects on plants would be included as well as other effects which may become threats in the future such as genetic alteration, human pheromones, or even the use of chemicals for torture, truth serums and mind control."
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents Page 2: "We propose the following definition for chemical warfare agents: All chemical substances which are developed, produced, stockpiled and used for hostile purposes, and whose toxic effects are used to interfere with or destroy the normal functions of man, animal and plant in such a way as to lead to death, temporary incapacitation or permanent injury, regardless of whether these poisonous effects occur immediately or in delayed fashion, and regardless of the origin and method of manufacture of these substances, should all be considered chemical warfare agents. In accordance with above formulation of the definition, chemical warfare agents specifically include:
Incapacitating Agents (Some aspects of definition, classification and toxicological characteristics) In the paper reference is made to the Joint Report of USSR and USA, CD/112, in which those agents are classified as non-lethal or other harmful chemicals. For the purpose of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons preference is given to classify incapacitating agents according to the duration of toxic effects into the main categories short-term incapacitants and long-term incapacitants. "Short-term incapacitants Short-term incapacitants may be defined as chemical compounds that are capable of rapidly causing a temporary disablement that lasts a little longer than the period of exposure. They have also been called ‘harassing agents’, ‘riot agents’, etc. They are unlikely to kill or produce long lasting injury, except when used in doses (concentrations) much higher than those necessary to produce disablement. Short-term incapacitants have been extensively employed in wars and by police forces (about 15 sensory irritants have been used at various times in different parts of the world). They are peripheral sensory irritant materials which interact, at the site of action (contamination), with sensory receptors in the skin and mucosae, causing local uncomfortable sensation with related reflex effects. The uncomfortable sensation and reflex effects hinder the performance of co-ordinated activities and this forms the basis for the shot-term incapacitating or harassing properties of these chemical substances. We would like to underline that what is characteristic of these substances is the prompt onset of effect upon exposure and the rapid disappearance of signs and symptoms after the period of exposure." ... "LONG-TERM INCAPACITANTS Long-term incapacitants may be defined as chemical compounds whose application causes temporary illness or induces temporary mental or physical disability, the effect of which may be delayed in onset and whose duration greatly exceeds the exposure period. These incapacitating agents could be classified as physical incapacitants or mental incapacitants, according to whether they act predominantly on the physical or mental activities of the subject." (The effects of physical incapacitants and mental incapacitants are further described in extenso) The paper closes with the following conclusions: If the toxicity criterion is to be one of the foundations for the prohibition of highly toxic or lethal chemical warfare agents, then incapacitating agents and among them riot control agents only, should be the subject of further consideration and agreement. The other incapacitating agents should be encompassed by the Convention in order to be banned. In our opinion, a quantitative limitation of production and a limitation of the types of incapacitating agents and types of devices for their use should be set in order to distinguish them as much as possible from those agents which can be used as chemical weapons. If new short-term incapacitating compounds are discovered in the future the criterion for their possible use should be based on the safety threshold for humans and should in any case be of a similar or lesser toxicity than the existing ones. Some Viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (page 2, paragraph 2) "The definition of a chemical warfare agent must be both comprehensive and accurate. Its comprehensiveness is designed to ensure that all chemical warfare agents which should be prohibited are brought within the scope of the prohibition. It should include not only supertoxic lethal agents but also incapacitating agents and irritant agents; it should include not only single-purpose chemical warfare agents but also dual-purpose chemical warfare agents and precursors which can turn into chemical warfare agents during the process of their use."
Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. "Definition of chemical weapons for the purpose of the Convention ‘chemical weapons’ means:
... "Other definitions For the purposes of the Convention:
Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention (Page 2): "Element II General Definition of Chemical Weapons
Element III: Other Definitions (Page 3): "7. ‘Permitted purposes’ means non-hostile purposes and military purposes not connected with the use of chemicals weapons. 8. ‘Non-hostile purposes’ means industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons." 11. An ‘incapacitant’ */ 12. An ‘irritant’ */ */to be elaborated (Page 10) Element X: Declarations 7. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to submit annual declarations concerning the following substances produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used:
United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban (Page 1)
Terminology "Key terms used in the Convention should be carefully defined to ensure that the Convention’s provisions are clear and precise. Important terms that need to be defined, and the United States understanding of them, are given below: The term ‘chemical weapons’ should be used to mean:
(Page 2) "The term ‘non-hostile purposes’ should cover industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, or protective purposes;
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (page 2) "Article II, Definitions For the purpose of this Convention:
"8. ‘Permitted purposes’ means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes: protective purposes; and military purposes that do not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to interfere directly with normal functioning of man and animals so as to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent damage."
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Annex I (page5) II. Definitions and Criteria "For the purposes of this Convention: 1.***/ The term ‘chemical weapons’ shall apply to the following, together or separately:
***/The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the Convention is agreed could be handled outside the definition of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions made to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued." (page 6)
(page 7)
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 5) "II. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: 1.*/ The term ‘chemical weapons’ shall apply to the following, together or separately:
- "[the term ‘chemical weapons’ shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super- toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are approved by the Consultative Committee for use by a Party for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes]."
(page 7) "3. [Permitted purposes] [Purposes not prohibited by the Convention] [Non-hostile purposes] means:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament (identical with 33) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament (identical with 33)
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 5) "II. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: 1.1/ The term ‘chemical weapons’ shall apply to the following, together or separately:
(page 6)
(page 7) "3. ‘Purposes not prohibited by the Convention’ means:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 7) "II. Definitions and Criteria (identical with 36) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 18) (identical with 36) The Conference was held on the invitation of the government of the French Republic. Governments of 149 States were represented at the Conference.
Final Declaration "The representatives of States participating in the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, bringing together States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other interested States in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, solemnly declare the following:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 12) "II. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: (identical with 36) (page 13)
(page 14) (identical with 36)
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 21) (identical with 40) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (identical with 40)
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 23) "II. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: 1.1/ The term ‘Chemical Weapons’ shall apply to the following, together or separately:
5. ‘Purposes Not Prohibited Under the Convention’ means:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 15) (identical with 43) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 20) "II. Definitions and Criteria (identical with 43)
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament Appendix I (page 14) "II. Definitions and Criteria (identical with 43)
Proposed Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (page 4) " I. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: 1. The term ‘Chemical Weapons’ shall apply to the following, together or separately:
"2. "The term ‘Chemical Weapons’ shall not apply to the following:
(page 6) "7. ‘Purposes not prohibited by this Convention’ means:
WORKING PAPER FOR THE FINAL PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (page 9) "Article II, Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention:
(page10) "5. ‘Purposes not prohibited under this Convention’ means:
Article III, Declarations (page 13) "4. With respect to domestic riot control and domestic law enforcement:
(CD/CW/WP.403) (page 2) "ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE 5. Each State Party undertakes not to use herbicides, law enforcement and riot control agents as a method of warfare; such a prohibition should not preclude any other use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.*/ ________________ */ All other references to riot control agents in CD/CW/WP.400 will be deleted consequent to this provision." (CD/CW/WP.404)
ARTICLE II; DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA "For the purpose of this convention:
"6. ‘Purposes not prohibited under this Convention’ means:
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
(page 8) "Article I, General Obligations 5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare" (page 9) "Article II, Definitions and Criteria
2. ‘Toxic Chemical’ means: Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (page 11) "9. ‘Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention’ means:
Article III, Declarations (page 14) "(e) With respect to riot control agents:
(ii) Update its declaration not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective."
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons - Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. EXPLANATORY NOTE on the draft Chemical Weapons Convention contained in Document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 (pages 8 and 9)
Proposed joint amendments to CD/CW/WP.400/ Rev.1*
amendments to cd/cw/wp. 400/Rev.1
cluster 1: Herbicides and riot control agents ARTICLE X WP. 400/Rev.1, page 41 WP 417, page 7 7. Each State Party has the right...if it considers that
VERIFICATION ANNEX; PART XI WP. 400/Rev.1, page 166 WP.417, page 19 1. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, or of alleged use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, initiated pursuant to Articles IX or X, shall be conducted in accordance with this Annex and detailed procedures to be established by the Director-General.
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (page 8) "Article I, General Obligations 5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare" (page 9) "Article II, Definitions and Criteria
(page 11) "9. ‘Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention’ means:
(page 14) Article III, Declarations. Paragraph 1 "(e) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shall be updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective."
Final Record of the six hundred and thirty-fifth Plenary Meeting on the Report of the negotiations on the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Amb. von Wagner, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee: "Article II, which defines all important terms used in the articles of the convention, is particularly important for the purpose of delineating precisely the scope of the basic obligations as contained in article I." (p.9)
57.Sunshine Project (Austin/Hambug 24.9.2002) The Sunshine Project today accuses the US military of conducting a chemical weapons research and development program in violation of international arms control law. The charges follow an 18 month investigation of the Department of Defense's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD). The investigation made extensive use of the US Freedom of Information Act to obtain Pentagon records that form the primary basis of the allegations. An array of documents, many of which have been posted on the Sunshine Project website, demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that JNLWD is operating an illegal and classified chemical weapons program. Specifically, the Sunshine Project accuses the JNLWD of: Conducting a research and development program on toxic chemical agents for use as weapons, including anesthetics and psychoactive substances, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; Developing long-range military delivery devices for these chemicals, including an 81mm chemical mortar round, that violate the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pursuing a chemical weapons program while fully cognizant that it violates the Chemical Weapons Convention and US Department of Defense regulations; Attempting to cover up the illicit program by classifying as secret even its own legal interpretations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and attempting to block access to documents requested under US information freedom law. These charges are detailed in the attached Annex to this news release, in the accompanying map and fact sheet, and the Sunshine Project's JNLWD documents web page, which has full text of more than two dozen documents. Specific citations are in footnotes below. The Weapons: JNLWD's secret program is not focusing on highly lethal agents such as VX or sarin. Rather, the emphasis is on "non-lethal" chemical weapons that incapacitate. JNLWD's science advisors define "non-lethal" as resulting in death or permanent injury in 1 in 100 victims.(1) JNLWD's Research Director told a US military magazine "We need something besides tear gas, like calmatives, anesthetic agents, that would put people to sleep or in a good mood." (2) These weapons are intended for use against "potentially hostile civilians", in anti-terrorism operations, counterinsurgency, and other military operations. The major focus of JNLWD's operation is on the use of drugs as weapons, particularly so-called "calmatives", a military term for mind-altering or sleep inducing chemical weapons. Other agents mentioned as militarily useful in the documents are convulsants, which are dangerous cramp-inducing drugs, and pharmaceuticals that failed development trials due to harmful side-effects. (3) This interest in so-called "calmatives" has been discussed in previous Project publications. (4) New documents prove the existence of an advanced development program for long range delivery devices for the chemicals, in particular a "non-lethal" 81mm mortar round with a range of 2.5 kilometers and which is designed to work in standard issue US military weapons (the M252 mortar) (5). Photos of testing of this round and a gas generating payload canister are posted on the Sunshine Project's website. (6) JNLWD has recently asked the company building the gas canister, General Dynamics, to develop methodologies to characterize the aerosols it generates, and to calculate the ground area coverage of gas clouds created by an airburst at different altitudes. (7) A chemical mortar round with a 2.5 kilometer range has solely military applications, and cannot possibly be justified for a US military domestic riot control purpose. The Solutions: UN Inspectors into the US: The Sunshine Project, while urging the United States to immediately halt this chemical weapons program, also announces its intention to take its allegations and evidence to the 7th Session of the Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention, scheduled to start in The Hague on October 7th. There, the Sunshine Project will present its case to governments and request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons send a UN weapons inspection team to the US to investigate. US Oversight: The Sunshine Project calls upon the US Congress to investigate JNLWD's arms control violations, to conduct public hearings, to hold JNLWD and its superiors responsible for their actions, to freeze all JNLWD funding, and to immediately declassify all JNLWD documents. Says Edward Hammond, director of the Sunshine Project US, "We can present hard evidence for an illicit and shameful chemical weapons program in the US. If the US invades Iraq and uses these weapons, we may witness the depravity of the US waging chemical warfare against Iraq to prevent it from developing chemical weapons." Jan van Aken, Director of the Sunshine Project in Germany says "The US administration 'names names' of alleged violators at arms control meetings. We have written documentation that the British government told JNLWD that its program violates the CWC in private talks. (8) However, Europe must publicly denounce American chemical weapons violations in The Hague. Those who remain silent will bear part of the guilt." Escalation danger: JNLWD's chemical weapons program not only violates international law, it presents an escalation threat. Any use of chemical weapons in a military situation - even if the agents are purported to be "non-lethal" - carries the inherent danger of escalation into an all out chemical war and heightened violence. If attacked with a chemical of unknown nature with a fast incapacitating effect, victims may assume that lethal chemicals, leading to heightened violence or even retaliation in kind. This rapid escalation danger is one of the key reasons why the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of even tear gas or pepper spray as a method of warfare. The Road to a Chemical Arms Race: In addition, JNLWD's program might easily be used to disguise lethal chemical weapons development. Deadly chemicals are the former specialty of JNLWD's partner in the program, the US Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground. Long range delivery devices may easily be converted to use biological agents or other chemicals, including lethal nerve gas. Design and development of new delivery devices, production facilities or delivery experiments - all key parts of a lethal chemical weapons program - might easily be performed by the US or other countries if the buzz-word "non-lethal" is used as a cover. If non-lethal chemical warfare programs are not banned, the basic principles of the CWC could fall apart, resulting in new full blown chemical arms race even before Cold War stocks are destroyed.
ANNEX TO SUNSHINE PROJECT NEWS RELEASE "US Military Operating a Secret Chemical Weapons Program" (24 September 2002) An Outline of the Case Against the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate The charges made by the Sunshine Project are supported by thousands of pages of US government documents, many obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act, and many of which are available on our website. This news release and annex are accompanied by a map and fact sheet on JNLWD's program. This is available for download from our website. The charges against JNLWD will be further detailed in a briefing for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and diplomats attending the October meeting of the Chemical Weapons Convention. A brief outline is provided here: JNLWD is conducting a research and development program on toxic chemical agents for use as weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. JNLWD's desire for chemical weapons is intense and widely documented. JNLWD has explicitly stated that it is operating a program to develop "calmative" chemical weapons (9). In May 1999, its Research Director told Navy News and Undersea Technology "We need something besides tear gas, like calmatives, anesthetic agents, that would put people to sleep or in a good mood." In 2000, JNLWD's Commanding Officer told New Scientist "I would like a magic dust that would put everyone in a building to sleep, combatants and non-combatants." (10) The Marine Corps Research University (MCRU), a major JNLWD contractor, produced an October 2000 study that concluded "the development and use of calmatives is achievable and desirable" and urged "immediate consideration" of drugs like diazepam (Valium). (11) The unit that produced the study is headed by JNLWD's former commander. JNLWD currently has a secretive technology investment program for incapacitating chemical weapons that is being conducted in cooperation with the US Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground. (12) It is urging academic and private institutions to bring it new proposals for chemical agents (13) and has repeatedly emphasized the need for the US military to develop a calmative capability. In addition, it recently concluded a new request for proposals that includes a call for "advanced riot control agents", (14) a military synonym for drug weapons. In October 2001, it offered to equip US commercial aircraft with calmative-dispensing weapons. (15) 2. JNLWD is developing long-range military delivery devices for these chemicals that violate the Chemical Weapons Convention and have no law enforcement application. JNLWD has been funding the development of chemical weapons delivery devices since the late 1990s. 1999 and 2000 photos of outdoor tests of chemical aerosol equipment and wind tunnel tests at the US Army Soldier Chemical Biological Command are included on the obverse side of the accompanying map. JNLWD has funded a multi-year program to microencapsulate chemical agents, specifically, anesthetics and anesthetics mixed with corrosive chemicals to penetrate thick clothing. (16) In 2001, JNLWD accelerated this effort, developing a specification for an 81mm "non-lethal" mortar round with a 2.5 kilometer range. (17) The round can use chemical payloads and is required to work in standard issue military M252 mortars. (18) Under this program, in September 2001, JNLWD inked a deal with General Dynamics that calls for building a "dispersion gas generator" for this mortar round and to "identify analytical tools that can be used in follow-on design/performance modeling of droplet formation and dynamics" and to perform "preliminary parametric estimates of ground area coverage versus payload volume and height of burst." (19) The JNLWD team which developed chemical micro-encapsulation methods and the Aberdeen Proving Ground team which is participating in the chemical agents technology investment program are both collaborating with JNLWD in the mortar round design. (20) JNLWD is pursuing this program despite being fully cognizant that it violates the Chemical Weapons Convention and US Department of Defense regulations. The JNLWD program runs afoul of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the global ban on the development and use of all chemical weapons. And JNLWD is well aware of this fact. JNLWD presentations in 2001 list the Chemical Weapons Convention as a major "challenge" to its calmatives program. (21) In 2000, JNLWD held a series of war games with British military officials. JNLWD's report of the war games concludes "In all three game scenarios, players espoused calmatives as potentially the most useful anti-personnel non-lethal weapons" but that "the principle concern was about the legality of the weapon and possible arms control violations" Despite this, it continues "The end result is that calmatives are considered the single most effective anti-personnel option in the non-lethal toolkit" (22) At the end of the wargames series, JNLWD held a final, high-level meeting with UK officials. It included the participation of five active duty US Marine Corps and Army generals. British officials objected to the US calmatives program, saying that it is illegal. JNLWD replied by saying but that it would proceed anyway (quoting from the report): "a research and development program with respect to chemically based calmatives. [will] be continued as long as it is cost-productive to do so." In the same report, JNLWD acknowledges that its research and development program violates Department of Defense regulations, declaring its intent to evade the law: "DOD is prohibited from pursuing [calmative] technology. If there are promising technologies that DOD is prohibited from pursuing, set up MOA with DOJ or DOE." (DOD is the US Department of Defense. DOJ is the US Department of Justice. DOE is the US Department of Energy. MOA is a Memorandum of Agreement.) (23) 4. JNLWD is seeking to cover up this illicit program by cloaking it behind US secrecy law. JNLWD has made a systematic effort hide its program from public view and to impede the Sunshine Project's investigation. JNLWD asked the US Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) to perform a legal review of its "non-lethal" chemical weapons; but then classified the JAG opinion, preventing its release. (24) JNLWD has placed export control restrictions on its 81mm "non-lethal" mortar specification. (25) In 2002, JNLWD officials trained US Marine Corps officers in its anti-personnel chemical weapons capabilities. It classified the training "secret". (26) Interviewed by news media, JNLWD officials deny developing chemical weapons; but have informed the Sunshine Project in multiple telephone conversations that they will deny release of documents requested under FOIA because of "classified weapons development". With 18 months elapsed since the Sunshine Project's first Freedom of Information Act requests to JNLWD, almost two thirds of the documents requested have not been released. JNLWD has ordered the US National Academies of Science to halt release of documents it deposited in the public record at that institution, (27) despite the fact that the National Academies states that there are no security markings on the documents requested, (28) and in apparent violation of US law TO DOWNLOAD THE MAP AND ILLU-STRATIVE TEXT THAT ACCOMPANY THIS RELEASE, VISIT: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr240902map.html
NOTES 1) Kenny, J. The Human Effects of Non-Lethal Weapons, presentation of the JNLWD Human Effects Advisory Panel to the US National Academy of Sciences Naval Studies Board, 30 April 2001 2) Susan LeVine, JNLWD Research Director, quoted in Non-Lethal Programs Will Enhance Navy And Marine Warfighting in Navy News and Undersea Technology, v. 16, n.19, 10 May 1999. 3) Lakoski J, Murray, W.B., Kenny J. The Advantages and Limitations of
Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique, Applied Research Laboratory / College of
Medicine, Pennsylvania State University, 3 October 2000, URL 4) See the Sunshine Project news release Pentagon Program Promotes Psychological Warfare (1 July 2002), the information brief The MCRU Calmatives Study and JNLWD: A Summary of (Public) Facts (19 September 2002), and Sunshine Project Backgrounder #8, Non-Lethal Weapons Research in the US: Calmatives & Malodorants (July 2001). All available at the Sunshine Project website. 5) See, for example, 81mm Frangible Case Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-C-1077 (June 2001), US Army TACOM and M2 Technologies, online at: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/jnlwdpdf/m281mm.zip 6) See side two of the accompanying map and information sheet, URL: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr240902map.html 7) Liquid Payload Dispensing Concept Studies Techniques for the 81mm
Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-M-1444 (Sept. 2001), US Army TACOM and
General Dynamics, URL: 8) Assessment Report: US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW)/Urban Operations
Executive Seminar, JNLWD, November 2000, URL: 9) ibid (and other documents) 10) Colonel George Fenton, USMC, JNLWD Commanding Officer, quoted in War without tears, New Scientist, 16 December 2000. 11) Lakoski J, Murray, W.B., Kenny J. The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique (URL above). 12) The US Department of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Program Overview, April 2001, URL: http://www.sunshine-project.org/ publications/jnlwdpdf/jnlwdpo01.pdf 13) See Fenton, G. To The Future: Non-Lethal Capabilities Technologies
in the 21st Century, presentation to the University of New Hampshire's Non-lethal
Technology and Academic Research III symposium, November 2001, URL: 14) Nonkinetic/limited effects/non-lethal weapons for crowd control, US Department of the Navy solicitation M67854-02-R-6064, 18 July 2002, URL: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/ jnlwdpdf/crowdcontrolbaa.pdf 15) See Non-Lethal Weapons Suggested to Incapacitate Terrorists in Airliners, Air Safety Week, v. 15 n. 39, 15 October 2001. 16) Durant Y. White Paper: Delivery of chemicals by microcapsules, Advanced Polymer Laboratory, University of New Hampshire, 1998, URL: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/ jnlwdpdf/unhmicrocap.pdf 17) 81mm Frangible Case Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-C-1077 (June 2001), US Army TACOM and M2 Technologies, URL above. 18) See Liquid Payload Dispensing Concept Studies Techniques for the 81mm Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-M-1444 (Sept. 2001), US Army TACOM and General Dynamics, URL above. 19) Liquid Payload Dispensing Concept Studies Techniques for the 81mm Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-M-1444 (Sept. 2001), US Army TACOM and General Dynamics, URL above. 20) Aberdeen Proving Ground: see Design and Development of an 81mm
Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge, United Defense LP, US Army Soldier Biological Chemical
Command (SBCCOM), US Army Research Laboratory, March 2000, URL: 21) Fenton, G. To The Future: Non-Lethal Capabilities Technologies in the 21st Century, presentation to the University of New Hampshire's Non-lethal Technology and Academic Research III symposium, November 2001, URL above. 22) US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) / Urban Operations War Game Two Assessment, JNLWD, June 2000. The wargame was held 13-16 June 2000 at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 23) Assessment Report: US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW)/Urban Operations Executive Seminar, JNLWD, November 2000, URL above. 24) Response letter (3 September 2002) from US Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law Division to Sunshine Project Freedom of Information Request of 21 August 2002. 25) Several JNLWD-funded contracts indicate this. See, for example, 81mm Frangible Case Cartridge, Contract DAAE-30-01-C-1077 (June 2001), US Army TACOM and M2 Technologies, URL above. 26) Non-Lethal Weapons: Acquisitions, Capabilities, Doctrine, & Strategy: A Course of Instruction, contract M67004-99-D-0037, purchase order M9545002RCR2BA7, between the US Marine Corps University (Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory) and JNLWD, December 2001. URL: http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/jnlwdpdf/mcrucourse.pdf 27) Letter from Col. George Fenton to the National Academies of Science (NAS), 17 May 2002, text provided in an e-mail from Mr. Kevin Hale, Director of the NAS National Security Office to William Colglazier, Executive Officer, 17 May 2002. 28) Letter from Kevin Hale (NAS) to Col. George Fenton (JNLWD), 17 May 2002. This letter and the e-mail of note #27 were provided by the NAS Public Affairs office.
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