Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN)
PENN Newsletter No. 9 / December 1999


c/o BITS   Rykestr. 13  D-10405 Berlin    Germany    Phone: +49-30-446858-0      Fax: +49-30-4410221


Dear Friends

When the press reported that NATO was going to remove its nuclear weapons from Western Europe, we all watched with bated breath and some skepticism. This, unfortunately, did not happen, nor did NATO change its policy on „first use". Instead the US Congress set about undermining the nuclear arms control regime by refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and by opening a debate on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that will most likely destroy it. Consequently the relations between Russia and the US have deteriorated with Yeltsin rattling his nuclear saber as a warning to these developments. In the European Union developments surrounding the creation of a military crisis intervention force have been developing at pace and will probably cause the debate on a place for nuclear weapons in an integrated Europe to return to the political agenda sometime in the future.



No Nukes, Not Yet

"The United States is preparing to withdraw its last nuclear bombs deployed in seven European countries", the French news Agency afp reported on November 4, 1999. Based on both diplomatic and military sources at NATO in Brussels, the author assumed that the decision would be officially announced during NATO's autumn ministerials to be held the month after in Brussels. The seven countries affected are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It is believed that up to 180 B-61 nuclear bombs are still being stored in these countries.

What followed could be called a denial. It came from Kenneth Bacon, the Pentagon's spokesman: "I have no information suggesting that report is correct", he said on November 4, 1999. European government spokespersons joined him in the days after.

NATO's Defense Ministers meeting on December 2nd and 3rd proved Bacon right and the afp-story wrong - at least for the time being. Meeting as NATO's Nuclear Planning Group the Defense Ministers reiterated at length the Washington Summit's New Strategic Concept language on the importance of nuclear weapons for the Alliance. The ministers repeated the need "to maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe".

Several leading European politicians, however, recently expressed their belief, that US nuclear weapons deployments in Europe were no longer necessary. Angelika Beer, Defense Spokesperson for Alliance 90 / The Greens in the German Bundestag told a nation-wide TV program: "Just take them out. (..) The time has come to remove all nuclear weapons". In Italy, the Minister for the Environment, Edo Ronchi, told the news agency "Ansa": "All warheads should be removed from Europe." These politicians were, however, speaking in their personal capacity, not as representatives of these nation's governments.

There is still some movement to come about on this matter. When the Dutch Social Democrat Koenders suggested to his Foreign Minister, van Aartsen, during a Lower Chamber debate on December 8, 1999, that the Netherlands should initiate a debate within NATO on the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, van Aartsen answered: "(..) this will not happen extensively [during] next week ['s North Atlantic Council Meeting], but it will have to take place next year within the context of NATO discussing the possibility of reducing the numbers of NATO nuclear weapons in the framework of simultaneous and negotiated reductions on the Russian side."

During NATO's North Atlantic Council meeting on December 15th and 16th, the Alliance's Foreign Ministers will review proposals prepared by NATO's Nuclear Policy Unit, on implementing the decisions taken during the Alliance's 1999 Washington Summit. Para 32 of the communiqué reads: "In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security measures verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options."

With the US categorically rejecting German Foreign Minister Fischer's proposal to adopt a "No first Use" policy, NATO is left with very limited options to take concrete steps which would not seriously affect the Alliance's current nuclear doctrine and deployment structure. One possible initiative would be to try to engage Russia in an increased information exchange about tactical nuclear weapons deployments. Another could propose information exchange on reduced readiness schemes. However, if NATO is to carry new initiatives in the nuclear field into substance, the Alliance is only very few steps away from having to offer the removal of all US nuclear weapons still deployed in Europe. There simply is no other initiative which is likely to substantially increase Russia's willingness to engage in negotiated reductions of tactical nuclear postures. ON


Towards NATO No First Use

In the run-up to the December NATO Ministerial, Ambassador Graham, Secretary McNamara, and Jack Mendelsohn traveled to three NATO capitals, Prague, Rome, and Berlin to meet with senior officials of Foreign and Defense Ministries, and with members of Parliament to promote a review of NATO nuclear weapon use doctrine. Ambassador Graham also visited NATO Headquarters.

The Delegation made the argument that the first use doctrine was designed for the Cold War to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact that has now dissolved. Nuclear proliferation is the greatest threat to NATO and the principal line of defense against this threat is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. However, NATO’s current nuclear weapon use policy is potentially inconsistent with the all important NPT-related negative security assurances reaffirmed in 1995 by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (along with Russia and China). No exception was made for a nuclear response to chemical and biological weapons. These commitments, negative security assurances, remain essential for the future viability of the NPT regime. Moreover, if NATO, the strongest conventional military alliance, still needs to retain the option to use nuclear weapons first, then NATO would lose its credibility when arguing against nuclear proliferation to states potentially threatened by chemical and biological weapons.

Some argue the continued value of "calculated ambiguity", which they claim was demonstrated especially during the Gulf War. Regardless of whether one believes Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical weapons by the threat of nuclear retaliation, revelations by President Bush and several of his advisors that the use of nuclear weapons was ruled out from the very beginning of the conflict, now precludes the United States and NATO from credibly using such a policy in the future. It is important that NATO take a significant step in supporting the NPT regime before the NPT 2000 Review Conference. The most significant step available is to lower the prestige value of nuclear weapons by strictly limiting their role and announcing that NATO will not introduce nuclear weapons into future conflicts. No first use is not merely a declaratory policy – although this in itself would carry weight – a policy of no first use would in fact change U.S. and Russian nuclear war plans, thereby facilitating de-alerting measures and nuclear weapon reductions.

Thus the argument may be summed up in four key points: NATO’s position to reserve the option of first use is unnecessary as any threat to NATO territory which would mandate first use of nuclear weapons has disappeared; it is inconsistent with international commitments (NPT, NSAs); it is absurd as nuclear weapons would have no role in out-of-area "humanitarian" interventions; and it is no longer credible.

It appears that the process of changing a policy as controversial as nuclear weapons use may take years. Germany and Canada are leading the effort to update the policy and make it more consistent with current realities and emerging threats. Support for such a change is in view, but will be revealed quietly, through private negotiations within NATO between opponents and proponents of a no first use policy. It is essential that the December Ministerial keep the door open to such an important debate and establish a review of NATO nuclear use policy. LT


Europe's Road Towards Military Integration

A Status Report

1999 saw the European Union undertaking a number of major steps towards developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESD-Policy). The CESD-Policy intends giving the 15 nation European Union its own military wing. It is legally based on the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks, i.e. all forms of involvement of the military in crisis management operations, into the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which entered into force on May 1, 1999. Collective defense, the core task of a military alliance such as NATO, is outside the current scope of these developments. The EU has four non-aligned members, who can not commit themselves to collective defense. While the process gained political momentum by late 1998, the most concrete decisions were taken during the Cologne and Helsinki European Council Summits in June and December 1999.

The Political Aim

The Helsinki Summit underlined the Union's determination "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis." The Cologne Summit had already agreed that EU-led operations should include options for both, crisis management operations where NATO resources were required as well as operations to be conducted without the use of NATO resources. EU crisis management capabilities are seen as complementary to NATO's and to be conducted, "when NATO as a whole" does not want to become engaged. While building up the necessary resources the EU promised to avoid unnecessary duplication with NATO and clarified, that it does not want to create a European army. It also promised to consult EU developments with NATO and other European countries, including the candidates for EU-membership, in an informal manner.

Towards Independent Decision Making

To prepare and support Council decisions on EU crisis management the EU will develop a number of new bodies:

A planning and analysis cell attached to the Council, acting also as a situation center;

a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level, tasked with dealing with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESD-Policy;

a Military Committee composed of national Chiefs of Defense, represented by their delegates tasked to present military advice and recommendations to the PSC and

a Military Staff within the Council to provide military expertise and support to the CESD-Policy. It will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for EU crisis management operations.

This structure closely mirrors NATO's basic decision-making bodies and thus can act either in close cooperation with NATO or independent of the Alliance.

Since both the factual and legal implications of institutionalizing Europe's military crisis-management policies have not yet fully been assessed, the Helsinki Summit decided to start off with interim measures and structures, to be put into place by March 2000. A Standing Interim Political and Security Committee will precede the PSC. An interim body of military representatives will precede the Military Committee and national military experts backing the Council Secretariat will form the predecessor of the future EU military staff. In addition the EU can access WEU capabilities and use them for support. The November 1999 Luxembourg WEU ministerial supported this development by allowing the European Council direct access, as required, to the expertise of the Organization's operational structures, including the WEU Secretariat, the Military Staff, the Satellite Center and the Institute for Security Studies.

To both better coordinate and better communicate these developments, the Cologne Summit decided to appoint Javier Solana, the then NATO Secretary General, for the newly created position as the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Later during the Luxembourg WEU-Ministerial in November 1999, Solana was also appointed WEU Secretary General. As chair of both positions and having substantial freedom to maneuver, Solana will be able to shape his new role and position in between Foreign and Defense Policies.

Towards Independent Military Capabilities

Based on a UK proposal the Helsinki summit decided on an "headline goal" to reorganize the European crisis reaction forces into a corps of 50-60.000 soldiers which, by 2003, could deploy and conduct crisis operations within 60 days (with spearhead rapid reaction forces to be available much earlier) and maintain them for at least one year. This will require maintaining a minimum of 100.000 to 150.000 earmarked troops. Force grouping such as the Eurocorps could be used to implement this headline goal. The Eurocorps is already on the road to change with the participating nations agreeing to transform it into a European rapid reaction corps with deployable headquarters similar to NATO's Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The restructuring of the Eurocorps will last four years. A similar restructuring process has been suggested for the European Air Group, a Franco-British air force unit created earlier which was later joined by Belgium, Germany and Italy multinational. France and Germany already have more in store for the Eurocorps: They have proposed the Eurocorps assume command of the KFOR troops currently stationed in Kosovo already during the coming year. Again it is France and Germany who also suggested the creation of a European Air Transport Command, an idea that got approval during the Helsinki Summit.

The majority of decisions on how to finance these developments have not yet been taken. Decisions on capabilities, costly to implement, such as deployable command and control, satellite communications, strategic intelligence and other capabilities, identified as weaknesses of the European countries during a recent WEU audit on European military crisis management capabilities, will prove complex and difficult. The Amsterdam Treaty does not allows the EU members to jointly procure military hardware from EU resources. Defense procurement has to come from national defense budgets. However, beyond coordinating national procurement plans, some Defense Ministers already have obviously targeted the EU for some future R&D projects and procurement programs, which can be labeled "dual use". One example being the European global positioning system Galileo. Thus a mixed approach envisaged. Some future EU military capabilities will be made up by national contributions, others by multinational efforts and - where entitled - the EU will set up its own military capabilities.


Washington has aired a number of concerns over these plans. In principle they concentrate on the independence of the European crisis management structures under development. The US is keen to maintain NATO as the primary decision-making body on all military aspects of European Security. The US concept for a European Security and Defense Identity strengthens the European contributions to NATO, militarily and financially. However, it intends making all European decisions and actions dependent on a prior decision in NATO's North Atlantic Council, thus giving the US an effective "veto" over European military action. This remains true for all structures developed under NATO's auspices, such as the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters as well as for NATO-WEU cooperation, as, for example, in the 1999 "Framework Document on the Release, Monitoring and Return or Recall of Assets and Capabilities".

Some US concerns have been voiced directly, others indirectly via the interests of other states concerned. Washington's concerns are voiced as the three "Ds". "No De-coupling" means that strengthening European Security and Defense policies should not lead towards weakening either NATO or the transatlantic link. "No discrimination" means that EU crisis-management operations should be open to equal participation by non-EU-NATO members in Europe and from across the Atlantic. "No duplication" means maximum limitation of NATO and EU-capabilities duplicating each other. The argument is likely to be used to limit independent military capabilities to be controlled by the EU while favoring either national or NATO control. One likely example for the debate to come is whether the EU or NATO should control a future fleet of transport aircraft.

Knowing that in the near future the European Union will indeed lack the capability to conduct any larger scale operation unless it can draw on NATO capabilities, the US has concentrated on engaging the European Union into binding formal agreements as early as possible. On the US agenda one can find discussing NATO priority in decision-making, NATO-use of future EU military capabilities and forces and others aspects as early as possible. On the other end the EU position is to enter negotiations on formalizing relations between the EU and NATO only after the respective EU structures and capabilities are in place. While the US is interested in making sure, that it has a say if not a veto in EU decision-making, the European Union members are likely to be interested in avoiding such a situation. In the longer term they should be interested in gaining access to NATO's capabilities under conditions and circumstances equal to those under which NATO might have access to EU capabilities.

The Way Ahead

While collective defense, and therefore other major controversial topics, such as the future of British and French nuclear weapons in an integrating Europe, have been left aside for the time being, the process of integrating European military and defense policies has sped up. As a result the European Union is now approaching the break point, at which it will have to decide on whether to develop a European collective defense, which includes or excludes an independent European nuclear deterrent, with much greater speed.

The next steps to be conducted will include another review of the European Union Treaty, to begin in February 2000 and to come to its conclusion during the same year. The Inter-Governmental Conference is likely to decide on the leftovers from negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty, such as redistributing voting rights between larger and smaller EU members in the EU Council and broadening decision-making by qualified majority voting. However, there might be also some new topics, such as most the important questions resulting from integrating defense policies and military crisis-management. These topics will be identified during the first half of 2000 under Portuguese Presidency. The EU is keen to accomplish this process by the end of 2000, as the schedule of preparing the EU for enlargement by early 2003 would be endangered. Under the French Presidency by the end of 2000 the EU will also decide about the future fate of the WEU. Two major options exist. One integrates the WEU fully into the EU, the other continues to integrate WEU structures, capabilities and resources, but avoids shutting down the WEU as an organization. The latter has been nicknamed "WEU-cannibalization". As a parallel development the EU will continue to develop its military crisis-management capabilities. ON


US Plays Russian Roulette With Treaties

The United States’ recent actions surrounding two key international arms control treaties, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) are setting grossly irresponsible precedents for other nuclear weapons states and threaten to destroy the entire international arms control architecture.

On October 13 the United States senate voted on and rejected the CTBT, which represents the most formidable international consensus against nuclear explosions, with 51 votes to 48. The rejection struck a severe blow to both non-proliferation and to President Clinton, who had put considerable weight behind the treaty’s ratification. While more than 150 countries have already signed the treaty, it cannot come into force until all 44 countries judged to have nuclear capability ratify it. With Russia, China, India, Israel and Pakistan all yet to ratify the CTBT, the signal sent by the US is unlikely to prompt them to do so in the near future. Russia and China have both stated that they had been waiting for the US to sign. Although Beijing has since stated that it deeply regrets the US senate’s decision, it will nevertheless accelerate its own efforts to ratify the treaty. The two newest nuclear states, India and Pakistan, have to date refused to sign following their nuclear tests in May 1998. Without legitimate US leverage there is little hope of convincing them to do so in the near future.

The US Senate’s decision not to ratify the CTBT could have serious repercussions for the forthcoming review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in early 2000 as the non-nuclear states party to the treaty will have to ask themselves whether or not the nuclear states will ever fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to work towards the total disarmament of all nuclear weapons. The CTBT has been interpreted as a first step in this direction and the unlimited extension of the NPT was bound to the CTBT. Rejecting the CTBT therefore not only sends a signal to all non-nuclear states that the nuclear weapons are meaningful militarily, but are also a political tool for promoting their national interests.

A more worrying development, this time at the hands of the Clinton Administration, is the attempt to change the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) under the guise of building a limited defense against attack from so-called rogue states. The logic behind the treaty was that peace between the United States and the Soviet Union depended on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). As long as both sides were assured of the ability to destroy the other, neither would attempt a nuclear attack. Under the Reagan administration the US toyed with the development of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the project, nicknamed Starwars, was to deploy a shield against a massive Soviet attack. SDI was abandoned after it became clear that the project was too ambitious and posed too great a risk to MAD. The Treaty has long been viewed as outdated as the US has continued to develop similar systems under various guises and as MAD has become less relevant with so-called rogue states developing and acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. The Clinton administration is attempting to change the treaty in order to allow the US to continue with the development of anti-ballistic missile defense systems, but attempts to alter the treaty could see it go the same was as the CTBT when put before the senate. Attempts to get Russia to agree to changes in the treaty have prompted some strong responses from Russia. Shortly after the US announced their intentions to change the ABM treaty Russia’s first deputy defense minister, Nikolai Mikhailov, was quoted in the Washington Post threatening to counter any US ABM systems through the deployment of nuclear technology that can counter and target these systems. During the following week Russia flexed its muscles in a display of power for the US:

On Nov. 3 Russia announced it had test-fired one of the anti-ballistic missiles they were permitted under the ABM treaty. Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of Russia’s rocket forces, was quoted by The Associated Press as saying the test must be viewed in the context of a "possible symmetrical and asymmetrical response" to U.S. actions.

The Russian Press continued to focus public attention on the deployment of Russia’s new ICBM, the Topol-M, which Moscow made clear would be deployed and operational by the end of 1999. Russia also indicated it was considering fitting the Topol-M with multiple warheads - in defiance of START treaty restrictions - to decrease the effectiveness of the U.S. ABM system.

On Nov. 5 Russia received the first of 11 strategic bombers from Ukraine in exchange for writing off its $285 million natural gas debt. Eight of the 11 bombers will be supersonic TU–160 Blackjack bombers. The other three will be refitted TU-95 Bear bombers. Both are able to fire nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

Col. Gen. Anatoly Sitnov, chief of armaments, announced that up to 28 percent of all money invested in weapons procurement would go toward modernizing strategic nuclear forces.

Ambassador James Collins canceled a trip to the Kraznoyarsk-26 military site after the Kremlin would not allow him to take his top scientific advisor with him. Collins was also barred from inspecting other US-Russian projects at the site.

Altering the ABM treaty, which is seen as a cornerstone treaty in a fragile strategic balance, could have ramifications well beyond this Russian power play. The Russian Duma is unlikely to ratify START II and the Kremlin has said that any further discussions with the United States on strategic arms cuts would become pointless. Paul Podvig of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies went so far as to say Russia seemed willing to pull out of START I if the ABM treaty was tampered with. A week US attempt to assuage the Russians through assisting in the development of Russian radar tracking equipment did nothing to calm the situation.

Through failing to ratify the CTBT and through attempting to weaken the ABM treaty, the US is attacking and undermining both established arms control structures and future controls. The US is playing a dangerous and hypocritical game: instead of leading through example, it has chosen, instead, not to practice what it preaches. Both Russia and China have spoken, but the US does not appear to be listening. If Russia feels the need to shout any louder it will be tantamount to the US placing a loaded gun against its own head. PC/AW


Nuclear Weapons Free Austria

On July 1st 1999 the Austrian Federal Parliament finally passed a constitutional law which prohibits not only the production of nuclear weapons - already forbidden by NPT - but also the deployment, transportation, testing and use of nuclear weapons. This is a major breakthrough against NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, should Austria join NATO sooner or later or deepen her relationship with the EUs security policy. Austria will not allow nuclear sharing arrangements or even allow overflights for any existing or possible new arrangements of that kind.

The result of the elections of Oct. 3 1999 shows that no two-party-coalition of the 3 big parties has a constitutional majority. The SPÖ alone can block any constitutional change against all other parties.

The seats in the Federal Parliament:

party % +-% seats

SPÖ (Social Democrats):




ÖVP (Peoples Party):




FPÖ (Haider Party):
















Total seats:



An absolute majority in Parliament needs 92

A 2/3 majority (for changing constitution) 122

A 1/3 majority

(for blocking constitutional changes) 63

SPÖ chancellor Klima, who's party fought an election campaign strongly underlining Austria's neutrality and anti-NATO position on the election day reiterated several times that no party will be able to force Austria into NATO or to end Austria's neutrality.

This constitutional law "Bundesverfassungsgesetz für ein atomfreies Österreich" was agreed upon on July 1st 1999. It went into force on August 13, 1999. The following is an unofficial translation, provided by AISA - Austrian Information-Center for Security Policy and Arms Control, Georg Schöfbänker.

Source: Bundesverfassungsgesetz: Atomfreies Österreich. (NR: GP XX AB 2026 S. 179. BR: AB 6033 S. 657.) Publikationsorgan. BGBl. I, Nr. 149/1999.
Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes (RIS):

Federal Constitutional Law for a Nuclear Free Austria

The Federal Parliament has agreed upon:

1. Nuclear weapons must not be produced, stored, transported, tested or used in Austria. Facilities for the deployment of nuclear weapons must not be created.

2. Facilities in order to produce energy through nuclear fission must not be created. Already existing facilities of that kind must not be put into operation.

3. The transportation of fissionable material on Austrian territory is forbidden, as far as this goal does not conflict with international obligations. Apart from this ban is the transportation for strictly peaceful purposes, but not for purposes for energy-production through nuclear fission and waste disposal. Beyond, no exemptions are to be made.

4. It has to be guaranteed by law that damages affecting Austria caused by a nuclear accident will be reasonably compensated and that this compensation may be as far as possible claimed against a foreign damaging party.

5. The Federal Government is responsible for the execution of this Federal Constitutional Law.

Klestil Klima

For further information please contact:

Dr. phil. Georg Schöfbänker

Austrian Information Center for Security Policy and Arms Control

Tel and Fax: +43 (0)732 71 09 42


PENN - Suggested Readings

A new research report, published by BITS, describes options for bringing India and Pakistan into the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation process. The study, entitled "Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-proliferation after the Nuclear Tests" is largely based on interviews with delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and outlines different scenarios for the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament after the tests. It concludes that new and old nuclear weapon powers, as well as non-nuclear weapon states will have to work together to prepare the way for a de-nuclearization of South Asia and the world.

The study recommends that Islamabad and New Delhi should freeze their nuclear programs and reinvigorate their bilateral confidence and security building process. These steps should be reciprocated by the other nuclear weapon powers, including cutting their own nuclear arsenals and introducing further transparency measures. The arms control process should be widened to include all nuclear weapon possessors and – eventually – non-nuclear weapon states. Towards this goal it is essential that negotiations on a fissile material treaty get off to a good start.

Recent developments have made the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements more important but also less likely. On August 17, 1999 the National Security Advisory Board released a draft nuclear doctrine, which outlines the possible future Indian nuclear policy. It increases the likelihood of additional nuclear tests calling on India to "step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field". The document recommends the development of a full-fledged nuclear triad and emphasizes that "India will not accept any restraints" on building its nuclear research and development capability.

The re-election of the BJP-government during early October has made it more likely that the recommendations contained in the draft will be implemented. If India were to further increase its nuclear capability it would likely result in a regional arms race, preventing India and Pakistan from participating in a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

On October 12, the elected Pakistani government of Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a military coup. The head of the new military regime, General Pervaiz Musharraf has so far said little about Pakistan’s new nuclear policy. According to the new foreign minister, however, Pakistan’s signature of the CTBT will depend on India’s policy and the complete lifting of sanctions. Finally, on October 13, the US Senate vote down CTBT. This has made it even more unlikely that India and Pakistan will sign the test ban. As Indian analyst Braham Challaney said after the US vote: "All is said and done, the treaty is dead. (..) India can just relax now." OM

The research report „Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-proliferation after the Nuclear Tests„ can be ordered at BITS (Rykestr. 13, D-10405 Berlin, Tel. +49 30 441 0220, FAX +49 30 441 0220, E-mail: for 22,- DM (+5,- DM postage) or US$12 (+ 3 US$ postage).

For further information please contact:

Dr. Oliver Meier

VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Center)

Tel +44 (0)20 7440-5960 (direct -6966),

Fax +44 (0)20 7242-3266,



"Sharks and Minnows off Helsinki" is the title of a BITS-Research Note, published on December 2, 1999, just prior to the European Council Summit Meeting in Helsinki. It outlines major policy alternatives to be considered by the European Union while developing a Common European Security and Defense Policy. Special emphasis is placed on the question whether and under which circumstances EU military crisis-management might provide a useful alternative to current NATO policies.

A forthcoming BITS' publication will provide a post-Helsinki analysis of the Common European Security and Defense Policy developments. The research note is a follow up to "Sharks and Minnows off Helsinki". The emphasis is on decisions taken at Helsinki. It describes decision-making alternatives for Portugal's EU presidency during the first half of 2000.

"CESD-Policy Documents 1998/99" is the title of a BITS compilation of all major official policy proposals and documents on developing a Common European Security and Defense Policy adopted during 1998/1999. The December 1999 compilation contains all major policy documents on developing a CESD-Policy from 1998/99 (e.g. St. Malo Declaration, European Council's Vienna, Cologne and Helsinki-Summit documents, WEU-Ministerial decisions and many others) plus an introduction describing the respective policy developments. Most documents are available in English and/or German. The compilation can be ordered from BITS in electronic format for free. Please E-mail your order to "" and write "CESD-Policy" into the subject line. For printed copies a wire transferred, prepaid reimbursement of $ 15 / DM 25 (including postage and handling) is required. In Europe a bank transfer covering all transfer costs (to: BITS-FV, Postbank Berlin, Sort Code 100 100 10, Account No 577005-107) will do as well.

Editor's Note

The PENN network has suffered some serious losses over the past few months with several of our most experienced staffers leaving. Stephen Young left BASIC and is now working for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers in Washington, DC. Dr. Oliver Meier left BITS and is now with VERTIC in London, as a consequence PENN no longer has a permanent representative in Geneva. Finally Henrietta Wilson left BITS to return to England. They all provided valuable contributions to our network's efforts and successes, we wish them well for the future. We would like to apologize for the delays caused through training new staff at both BASIC and BITS.

The next PENN Newsletter will include an article on the vote in the New Agenda Coalition. Please check your address details and inform us of any changes.

BITS would like to thank the W. Alton Jones Foundation for its generous support for the PENN program for the fourth year.

ViSdP / Responsibility at BITS: Otfried Nassauer (ON), Roman Michaels (copy editor) and authors indicated: Peter Cross (PC) - BITS, Oliver Meier (OM) - VERTIC, Georg Schöfbänker (GS) - Austrian Information Center for Security Policy and Arms Control (AISA), Leonor Tomero (LT) - Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) and Arend Wellmann (AW) - BITS.

ISSN 1434-4262