Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN)
PENN Newsletter No. 14 / May 2001


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Dear Friends,

another PENN-Newsletter has reached you. It arrives as the Bush administration announces that it is formulating a new nuclear strategy of deterrence and a revised concept of arms control and non-proliferation. The announcements of Bush’s second nuclear age still lack the amount of detail necessary to make an educated judgement. Nevertheless, we are trying to provide you with an in-terim assessment of Washington’s deliberate ambiguity. In addition, this newsletter provides you with a number of hard facts: The number of US nuclear weapons that can be deployed in Europe needs to be reassessed. New evidence shows that the 214 nuclear weapons storage systems built in Europe can hold two weapons each, not one. In the US, the Air Force, the Navy and the nuclear weapons laboratories are pushing the new US administration towards the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. And in Europe, it’s time to present an interim assessment balanc-ing the development of military and non-military crisis-management capabilities.


  • Analysis


BMD - Bush, Missiles and Defenses

On May 1, George W. Bush has held his first speech on security issues which made obvious that the Bush administration is opting for a strategy-oriented ap-proach. First things first. Let's clarify our interests, define the strategy and the means to best serve our interests and then let's come to the details of imple-mentation, the decisions on new weapon systems, the details of arms control, unilateral initiatives and po-litical tactics. ”Top to bottom”, as one administra-tion official said. The self-set goal of the new administration is Hercu-lean. The intended shifts in defense policy, strategy and postures as well as in the overall security policy can be compared with those of the McNamara re-forms in the early 1960ies, which resulted in giving up the strategy of ”massive retaliation” and adopting ”flexible response”. They are likely to become as controversial as McNamara’s reforms. Whether Bush’s revolution in strategy affairs will be convinc-ing and enhance stability is far from clear. To the opposite, there are good reasons to doubt. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party gained control of the US-Senate. Allies and other states concerned raised serious questions during initial consultations. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has indi-cated he will need more time to make his mind about America’s future strategy and priorities. Two summits between Presidents Bush and Putin have been scheduled. And - partially as a consequence of the changing environment - President Bush did not use the opportunity to provide a further outline of strategic thinking in his administration during his speech to Navy personnel on May 25.

Missile Defense

Missile Defense seems to be at the core of the new administration's policy. While avoiding to an-nounce any details about the system’s architecture, concrete deployment plans or even a general sched-ule, President Bush again presented his general out-line, his credo: ”We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. De-terrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation”, he argued. ”Cold war deter-rence is no longer enough.” In elaborating on the de-fenses to be introduced into the traditional deter-rence equation, the Bush administration has an-nounced a number of changes: First, there is no longer a ”National” missile defense. Strategic and theater elements of defending against missiles will be all dealt with under the same rubric - missile de-fenses. Thus there is no longer room for Allied ar-guments the US might seek to de-couple. Second, the new administration is committed to a multi-layered system that will be no longer restrained to ground based interceptors. This gives higher priority to re-gional missile defense systems, such as the NATO In-tegrated Extended Air Defense System (NATINEADS) to be explored over the next couple of years. Many Allies have already declared their in-terest in joining such an exploration of defenses against medium range ballistic missiles with ranges from 1.000 to 3.000 kilometers. Missile Defense op-tions to be evaluated by the US according to Presi-dent Bush include sea- and air-based systems, boost-phase intercept technologies and last but not least space-based assets including weapons. Research and development funding for space and missile defense technologies will be increased.

Bush also announced that his administration has identified some options for near-term deployment. However, he neither identified them nor did he say, whether they would require a decision on the fate of the ABM Treaty in the near future. Experts have pre-sented one option meeting these vague criteria and leaving sufficient time to consult Allies as well as ex-plore the future of the ABM Treaty with Russia. Ground Based Interceptor deployment could be ini-tially limited to small numbers and to Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota and thus be techni-cally legal under the ABM Treaty. Similarly, radar upgrades and deployments could be initially limited to what is technically legal under the treaty. Finally, whatever the official name of this system would be, its function would be that of a national testbed. In such circumstances, operational deployments would concentrate on theater and regional missile defense systems based at sea, at land or in the air and thus re-flect more immediate risks from short and medium-range missiles.

To overcome Russia’s objections and win its coop-eration in changing the ABM Treaty, Moscow will probably be offered a substantial package of incen-tives: Deep cuts into current nuclear arsenals, ex-tended cooperation on early warning of missile launches, joint missile defense exercises, political and technological cooperation in developing regional missile defense systems, and the integration of some of the more promising Russian missile defense tech-nologies into a European-Russian regional system. An offer for increased mutual transparency in nuclear affairs plus some economic incentives might well be-come part of such an initiative. Condoleeza Rice re-cently made the point, when she said: ”We want to convince the Russians that it is in their best interest to move beyond the ABM Treaty and to develop a new relationship with us.” Convincing Russia will re-quire substantial offers of cooperation if it is possible at all.

However, centering the debate around missile de-fenses allows to achieve a second goal, much more important to the Bush administration: It helps to re-open the debate about the concept of deterrence, the future role of nuclear weapons, the logics of stability and the function of arms-control. ”We must seek se-curity based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us,” Bush ar-gued.

The Future of Deterrence

The Bush administration seems to favor a new concept of deterrence that gives the US more flexibility, more freedom of action and allows Washington to exploit the advantages of superior US capabilities. While the new administration argues it wants to overcome a concept of deterrence which is based on "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD), a closer look at President Bush’s speech and the remarks made by other members of his administration indicates, that the new administration will strive for another goal. It wishes to decrease the role of or even eliminate the second principle deterrence has been traditionally based on – mutual assured vulnerability.

While discussing missile defenses with a reluctant Russia, the new administration points out that – although both sides might sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals – Russia’s future nuclear posture will continue to be capable of penetrating US missile defenses with devastating results. Thus to Russia the US would remain vulnerable whilst the situation for "rogue nations" or "states of concern" would be entirely different. They should not find the US vulnerable to their more limited capabilities.

The People's Republic of China is dealt with as a special case. Since China’s current long range nuclear posture is nearly as small as the postures to be possibly acquired by some ‘states of concern’, China will be left with the decision to either invest in enlarging its long-range nuclear forces or to face a situation in which it could no longer credibly deter the US. Only in the mid- to long-term, Russia might face the perspective of a similar situation, if – for financial reasons - she could not maintain an arsenal large enough to overwhelm the growing future US missile defense capabilities.

Those in the Bush administration who whish to develop such a new concept of deterrence hope to reduce or eliminate the effects of self-deterrence, at minimum in conflicts with lesser WMD opponents. They claim this happens in two ways. On the one hand, defenses against ballistic missile threats will make such threats against the US less credible and thus less likely to occur. No such opponent could be any longer sure that he would find the US vulnerable. At the same time the decision on whether or not to retaliate against (or attack) such an opponent with nuclear weapons could be eased for the US, if the US nuclear posture would offer more flexible and adaptable means than it does today. Today’s nuclear posture in many cases leaves the US with a decision on whether or not to use high yield multiple warhead nuclear weapons against a single or limited number of targets often to be found in highly populated areas. The collateral damage and the political consequences to be expected by all likelihood would result in a decision not to use nuclear weapons. However, if the US had the option to pinpoint attack targets with low-yield single warhead long-range weapons resulting in limited collateral damage, it might be easier to take the decision to actually use nuclear weapons. It would be also easier to go after such targets as core leadership bunkers of the opponent. Both, threatening leaders of ‘states of concern’ with "decapitation" and a mixture of offensive and defensive capabilities to render foreign WMD useless reminds of ideas ventilated during the early years of the Reagan administration. This is not by accident. For decades many US strategists have been hoping to reduce the impact of self-deterrence on US decision-makers. In addition the flexibility and military utility of the US nuclear posture would increase sharply. Decision-making on the political level would become much more flexible.

The Future of Arms Control

Donald Rumsfeld believes the ABM Treaty to be a relict of "ancient history" rather than a "cornerstone of stability". From his perspective the treaty rather prohibits stability than ensuring it. Thus, as President Bush said in his speech "we must move beyond the ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past." The attack on the ABM Treaty also has a second, more important function. It opens the door for a new discussion on the future role of arms control. There are more and other arms-control treaties, such as the Outer Space, INF- or CTBT- treaties that might be said to enshrine the past and prohibit the development of "promising technology to defend ourselves".

Again, the Bush administration is in search of greater unilateral flexibility as well as fewer binding restrictions – a favorable position to the stronger, being able to exploit such flexibility if advantageous. Lesser emphasis on treaty based arms control does not necessarily result in no further steps of disarmament. Unilateral steps of disarmament, unless codified in treaty language remain reversible and provide for greater flexibility.

The Bush administration is likely to deliver a first proof soon. Unilateral cuts into the expensive and huge US nuclear posture will be announced, possibly in the context of either the June 16 or July meetings between US President Bush and Russian President Putin and as part of a package to convince Russia of giving up the ABM Treaty. The informal NATO-summit announced for June 13 offers the opportunity for high-level consultations with the Allies.

The number of nuclear weapons to be kept operational is likely to be reduced below the 2.000 to 2.500 warhead limit envisaged for a future START-III treaty. Depending on whether Russia is prepared to react by announcing similar cuts and whether sub-strategic weapons will or will not be included into such an initiative, a reduction to as few as 1.000 to 1.500 operational weapons seems possible. Moscow herself has suggested a limit of 1.500. Russia’s arsenal is rusting so quickly that it seems unlikely that she can maintain more than 1.000 weapons in a decade or so. Thus there is a strong incentive for Moscow to agree.

The deeper the cuts, the more likely that the new US administration will win Russia’s support for mutual unilateral movements. Russia will agree that she too needs flexibility to rearm in case that China or one of the lesser nuclear powers not bound by bilateral treaties will sharply increase its arsenal. Such a move could result from attempts by these countries to ensure the capability to penetrate a growing future US missile defense capability.

However, the net result of such an initiative would be comfortable to the United States. Reserve postures and hedges are likely to be contained in the small-print of any initiative for unilateral cuts. They would allow for timely and substantial rearmament. Washington will have much stronger a capability to use such an option, if need should arise. Unilateral cuts allow Washington to play its owns strengths against the weaknesses of other nuclear powers.

It is far from clear that unilateral nuclear reductions can compensate for the damage likely to result to the overall arms control and non-proliferation acquis. The new administration has sent disturbing signals. Talks with North Korea on the North Korean missile programs have been put on hold, the draft for a biological weapons convention verification protocol under negotiation in Geneva did not find the new administration ready for support. Both decisions are pointing at a wider problem: Striving for flexibility and fewer restrictions in a unilateral way might make those proliferation risks a self-fulfilling prophecy which are said to make the new administration’s shifts in strategy a necessity.

International Reactions: Correct on Detail – Flawed in Strategy

Strong opposition and serious concerns in the international arena have met the new administration’s planned shifts. Both, countries like Russia and China but also Allies have raised their opposition or serious concerns. The arguments presented questioning the administration plans reflect different tactics. One tactic tries to raise questions, buy time and present an opinion only upon presentation of the details of the new administration’s proposals. Many NATO Allies are using it. They argue that unless the details are known, no final judgment can be made. A second tactic raises concerns and spells out political conditions to be met to make the Bush administration’s plans acceptable. Safeguarding the achievements of the arms control and nonproliferation regime before changing or eliminating the ABM Treaty as well as taking Russia’s interests into account or avoiding regional arms races are ranking high when it comes to this second tactic. Again it is the US Allies making these arguments. Third some countries are trying to raise the prize to be paid by the US for their agreement to US-plans to build missile defenses. Russia might well follow this tactic while being well aware that it cannot prohibit unilateral decisions by the new US administration. Finally there are those, who oppose the plans in principle. China is the most outstanding example.

While these tactics in most cases raise correct points and serious arguments, they are falling short of meeting the most critical need. With the possible exemption of concerns in respect to the arms control and nonproliferation acquis, they do not challenge the new administration’s strive for a new strategy of deterrence, for a new role and concept of arms control and for achieving flexibility in defining stability in a unilateralist approach. Thus they are likely to fail.

Getting deep nuclear cuts, some de-alerting, a de-valuation of nuclear weapons in the US-Russian relations and some confidence-building measures might silence those asking for maintaining the arms control acquis. Russia might agree as soon as the political prize offered to her is sufficiently high. Russia’s agreement will make those losing their argument, who argue that Moscow should not be alienated. China’s opposition and the risk of regional arms races in Asia might seem most others to be either not important enough or far enough away to make them a matter of principle. Thus, the Bush administration might well get what it wants. Not in every detail, but in principle – a new deterrence for a second nuclear age, which allows to play US strengths against other WMD powers weaknesses, made possible by lifting some of the current arms control restraints existing for missile defenses and the military use of space.

Arguing with the Bush Administration

Missile defense critics from all camps, no matter whether government or NGO, will have to refine if not rethink their arguments. The Bush-administration is not the Clinton administration. While the latter worked bottom up, the former works top down. That makes for a huge difference. Thus there is no longer a sustainable way to stand the debate while singling out individual details or concentrating opposition on single issues, such as details of a future missile defense system, the nuclear posture or plans for making military use of space. What needs to be confronted is the concept itself, the new vision of deterrence, the "second nuclear age".

A strategy to work might consider to either attack the underlying premises and assumptions of the debate about a new deterrence concept, such as the threat assessment and the assumptions about the logic of actors. Or it might present a counter-strategy of action, realistically promising success, e.g. by eliminating "projected threats", such as the North Korean and Iranian missile threats by other, non-military means and thus strengthen international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. Ideally, it would do both at the same time. The recent decision of the EU to engage North Korea over its missile program and exports might offer such an opportunity. If the EU succeeds to negotiate an effective and verifiable end to the North Korean program, the Bush administration would find it very hard to oppose or even block such a development. The most important prerequisite for such a success is seeking early Russian and via Russia Chinese cooperation. To strengthen such an approach, the EU should develop a joint position on how to maintain and strengthen the arms control and non-proliferation acquis. It should ask others to join the Union in accomplishing initiatives to strengthen non-proliferation regimes and arms control treaties.

Still, coping with the Bush administration’s approach will remain difficult. The reason why is pretty simple. If it comes to discuss deterrence and stability under the auspices of deterrence, it comes to discuss belief and sets of dogma. At the end of day, neither side can really prove the validity and credibility of its arguments. Was deterrence effective in safeguarding the world against the Cold War becoming a hot one? All participants, if honest, while answering such questions, have to admit that there is no way they could present a final proof for their belief.

Indeed, initiating a theological debate, a debate on beliefs fits President Bush well. Even more, it allows for an incredible flexibility and freedom to justify unilateral decisions while reasoning belief. ON


Sweden still struggling for civilian aspects of EU crisis management

In the area of crisis management, the Swedish Presidency has repeatedly stated that it attaches great significance to the civilian aspects and to co-operation with the UN and the OSCE. The Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SWEFOR) and the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS) organised an international Conference in Stockholm the 20th of April to evaluate the progress made by the Swedish Presidency in this area so far. The conference made it clear that although Sweden is trying to strengthen the EU capacity in the field of civilian crisis management, the political will from many other member states is lacking, and a consensus cannot be reached on many decisions necessary to develop an effective civilian capacity. If Sweden is to deliver on its rhetoric, a lot of hard work remains to be done before the Gothenburg summit.

The Swedish ministers Anna Lindh and Thomas Bodström have called for police contributions from all member states, and a Police Capability Conference will be held on the 10th of May. However, this conference will not have the same significance as the Military Capability Conference of November 2000. Participating in the Police Conference will be the member states’ Police Commissioners who are to give informal indications of contributions. Another Police Capability Conference at ministerial level with formal contribution pledges will be held during the Belgian Presidency.

Today it seems as if there will be no problem in reaching the target of 5000 police. However, there are serious shortcomings when it comes to the EU capacity for planning and conducting police operations. Sweden has proposed a police planning capability to be set up in the Council Secretariat, but due to opposition from some member states, no agreement on this has yet been reached. There is a controversy between member states as to whether this capacity should be a counter-balance to the military staff, consisting of personnel seconded from the member states, or whether it should be integrated into an overarching crisis management planning structure in the Council Secretariat. One can only hope that Sweden will manage to convince the other member states that an integrated planning capacity in the Council Secretariat is the best alternative, because otherwise it will be difficult to achieve an integrated approach to crisis management where civilian capabilities play a leading role.

The Swedish Presidency will establish concrete targets for all the three civilian areas identified at Feira. Regarding the Rule of Law, the plan is to establish a concrete quantitative target. The Swedish Presidency considers prosecutors and judges them to be especially important, but other categories within the judicial and penitentiary systems can be considered as well. In the area of civil administration, the idea is to establish a qualitative target. This target will be formulated in terms of the EU capacity to support certain key functions that have to work in crisis situations. The EU experts on civil administration should function as counsellors and trainers of local civil servants, but should also be able to take on executive functions. In the area of Civil Protection, the member states will probably adopt a concrete target stating that the EU should have the capacity to send out 2000 civil protection workers. The EU should also be able to send out an Assessment Team of a limited number of personnel at very short notice (about 24 hours).

For Rule of Law and Civil Administration, the Swedish Presidency stresses the importance of developing a comprehensive database and common training modules, although each member state will be responsible for the actual training. Also for Civil Protection, Sweden is trying to make member states undertake to co-ordinate their training programmes, and it is also possible that a training programme will be developed within the EU. Furthermore, it is considered very important to strengthen the Commission resources in disaster relief/civil protection so that they can be used in crisis management operations outside the EU.

The four civilian areas identified at Feira aim at managing acute crisis with traditional institutional means. This is not enough if the goal is long-term peace building. Sweden has started thinking about new civilian capacity areas such as experts on democracy and human rights, observation and verification, mediation and reconciliation, support to independent media, disarmament and demobilisation etc. Sweden is planning to identify a couple of such capacity areas and to give the Belgian Presidency the task of establishing concrete targets for those areas.

However, Sweden will only give this task to the Belgian Presidency if Belgium agrees too, and Belgium is not currently considering new capacity areas as a priority. In the area of civilian crisis management, the Belgian Presidency, according to current plans, will focus on the following five issues: 1) the police capacity target; 2) coherence within the EU structure; 3) synergy between the EU and other outside actors; 4) training of the four capacity areas identified; and 5) financing of the four capacity areas identified.

As the EU continues to develop its civilian crisis management capacity, it is vital that this endeavour is done in accordance with other international structures in the realm. Sweden has been working towards an agreement on formal collaboration with the UN, but will probably not have finalised this by the end of its presidency. However, there is still an ambition that guidelines for co-operation will be adopted by the General Affairs Council (GAC) in May. One element in these guidelines will be that Kofi Annan shall meet with GAC once per year to discuss strategic issues. Louis Frechette, his deputy, will meet with the PSC to discuss co-operation at a more operational level. Another central proposal under discussion is that the UN shall be able to call on the EU Rapid Reaction Force for assistance in a crisis management operation. There are also discussions about creating a database for the information exchange between the two organisations, and it is possible that an EU contact person will be placed in New York.

Contacts between the EU and the OSCE have increased during the Swedish Presidency. The two organisations see possibilities for co-operation primarily through: 1) possible joint data bases on mission staffing; 2) mission planning and implementation; 3) training and joint training exercises. A great part of the discussions has concentrated on how the EU capacity can be used to respond quickly to a possible request from the OSCE regarding secondment of civilian police officers to OSCE operations. This development is positive from an OSCE point of view, even though it must be understood that the two organisations may be drawing upon the same pool of civilian police. Strengthening of co-operation in the field of the rule of law has also been recognised as a priority. In this area, co-operation might be improved through joint standard setting and increased information sharing. There is also a mutual interest in improving the information flow between the EU Situation Centre and the OSCE Situation Room.

No member state sees very positively towards the fact that the EU is developing civilian capacities for crisis management, which clearly makes work in the Civil Committee difficult. Many observers are of the opinion that the member states at the Feira summit accepted that the EU should develop civilian capacities only because they realised that any other decision wouldn’t be politically defensible. And since the political will is lacking from many member states, it is difficult to get things done.

Sweden has been forced to yield on a number of issues. From the beginning, Sweden hoped that the police conference should be at a higher level, that the identification of new capacity areas should have gone further, that the police planning capability should be in place quickly, and that the guidelines for co-operation – especially with the UN – should be more concrete. However, one must understand that good intentions are not always enough if fifteen countries are to agree. Public pressure for a strong EU conflict prevention and civilian crisis management capability needs to continue long after the end of the Swedish Presidency.   FB


Rethinking the US-British Strategy on Iraq

In the middle of February, the United States and Britain conducted air raids against radar installations in the surroundings of Bagdad. According to official sources, the rationale for the bombing was that Iraq had acquired new anti-aircraft equipment that would threaten the US/UK pilots who patrol the no-fly zones over southern Iraq. A no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel and another south of the 33th were imposed on Iraq by Britain and the US in the aftermath of the Gulf War in order to protect the Shi'ite and Kurdish population inhabiting those territories.

From various vantage points, a revision of the British-American policy towards Iraq is largely overdue. As far as effectiveness is concerned, the sanctions-and-bomb pattern that has been followed so far has rendered little result. Repeated bombings have failed to persuade the Iraqi President that the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a bad idea. Economic sanctions have been useless where they have not been counterproductive. Sanctions are increasingly being flouted, and smuggling of goods and petroleum has become common practice. Far from promoting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, ten years of sanctions have reaffirmed his leadership while shrinking the living standards of the population.

The main problem with the current Iraq policy does not lie with its manifest lack of achieving the intended results, but with its unpopularity. Three UN Security Council members, China, Russia and France are not particularly happy with the bombings, because they have never sanctioned neither the imposition of the no-fly zones nor any of the air strikes carried out against Iraq after the Gulf War. The strikes encountered mounting hostility from Iraq’s neighbours, who generally favor a lifting of the sanctions. This is a substantial disadvantage, because for any Iraq policy to work, co-operation of its neighbouring countries is necessary. Also, opposition among NATO allies such as France and Germany is growing. This is, once again, unfortunate. Solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance would benefit if the US and its European allies could agree on something like a common Iraq strategy. In order to maintain a strong transatlantic link with the European allies, more of them than just Britain must be kept on side.

Outside the US, there is general agreement that the Iraq policy should be changed. Unfortunately, neither the UN, who has instituted working groups to review the use of its sanctions, nor any single country has come up with a perfect solution to the Iraqi question. But the international community, including first and foremost the US, would be better off adopting a more ‘moderate’ strategy as suggested by US Secretary of State Powell. His approach would consist of easing economic sanctions to permit the rebuilding of Iraq’s economy while concentrating on depriving the country from access to WMD technology. While Powell has been promoting this idea in his first Middle East tour, it is unclear whether he will be able to make it prevail in Washington. A majority of hardliners in the Bush administration - Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, his deputy Wolfowitz and Vice-President Cheney - would prefer to arm Iraqi opposition groups to overthrow the regime. While the Administration is working out its final position, it might be a good occasion for European NATO members to signalise to the US that Powell’s idea is really worth considering.  CP


The European Commission’s Concept of Conflict Prevention

The European Commission tabled a Communication on 11 April presenting its concept of Conflict Prevention. The document does not only outline the policy fields in which the Commission has already adopted a conflict prevention approach, but it also defines its priorities and explains the way in which it intends to maximise the effectiveness of its actions. It also proposes to enhance certain instruments which could have a conflict prevention impact and makes suggestions as to how to eliminate present shortcomings.

As a concept, there is very little room for objections. It is extremely comprehensive in the instruments listed for use in either short- or long-term conflict prevention, ranging from enhancing diplomatic means such as the role of the EU Special Representatives to promoting the OECD guidelines for Multinational enterprises. Close co-operation with other international organisations is a leitmotiv of the paper. Equally, the fields of action suggested extends to halting the spread of small arms, promoting nuclear safety and disarmament, financing human rights training, supporting child-related rehabilitation measures in post-conflict situations, etc. Special emphasis is placed on addressing the causes of conflict through programmes on the fair management of water resources and environmental degradation or anti-drug-action. Notably, it even incorporates a gender perspective into the EU’s conflict preventive action. Also, the recently approved Rapid Reaction Mechanism - at times designated Rapid Reaction Facility to general confusion - has to be seen in this context. It will enable the Community to put first-aid projects speedily in place as required by emergency situations.

Inclusive, far-reaching and accurate as the Concept is, it is still possible to identify a number of difficulties with it: First, an impeccably drafted concept remains just a bunch of good intentions until its principles are concretised in specific initiatives. Specific initiatives cannot render the expected results unless they are properly funded. It remains to be seen what remains of this excellent starting point when conflict prevention arrives in the field e.g. in the Great Lakes Area.

Secondly, there are clear limits to the conflict prevention approach. One of them is of a scientific nature: research on the subject began relatively recently, and evidence is difficult to determine. How to know when preventive measures have been instrumental in hindering a crisis? This means that planners are not always able to work on premises which have been solidly and entirely proven. Further, there are legal constraints. It is each state’s sovereign decision whether or not to allow Community actions on its territory – which means that the Community may not always be able to operate its programmes. Unfortunately, this is most likely to be the case precisely in those countries which are most in need of conflict preventive measures - that is, countries with authoritarian, undemocratic regimes. Finally, the competence of the Community ends where ‘high politics’ begin. While the Communication suggests that sanctions policies be reviewed to be used in a more intelligent way, only the European Council can decide what line, if any, should be adopted.

By fortune, the Commission knows well where its limitations are. Therefore, it invites the Council to co-operate with her where competencies intermingle or combined action is required. While the Communication underlines that political dialogue between the EU and countries concerned can be very useful for the prevention of conflicts, it makes clear that, for this to be the case, the Union "must be capable of reaching a timely agreement on its policy". The baton has been now passed to the Council.    CP


  • Short Reports


Mini-Nukes in the Making? Part II

While in search for a new deterrence doctrine, the incoming Bush-administration has been declined to find options to reduce costs and numbers of nuclear weapons in the US posture. It will soon seek relief from Congressional restrictions allowing no cuts below START I levels prior to the final ratification of the START lI treaty. Steven Maaranen, a Los Alamos National Laboratories Political Scientist, heads the inter-agency review preparing the recommendations for the future US nuclear strategy and posture. Maaranen is likely to face competing demands. While the political leadership seems to favor fewer nuclear and stronger conventional forces, plans for new ICBMs, SLBMs, submarines and bombers are already emerging from the drawing boards of the services and contractors. Los Alamos and Sandia both propose the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.

Paul Robinson, Director of the Sandia National Laboratories and long-term Chair of the Strategic Advisory Committee to the Commander in Chief Strategic Command recently made a proposal. Speaking at the Nuclear Decisionmakers Forum, he suggested the US should build special low-yield warheads for single re-entry vehicle sea-launched ballistic missiles to be placed on submarines. These missiles should be used to hold at risk or attack hardened leadership targets in rogue nations – a "To whom it may concern"-deterrent. Using precision targeting and guidance technologies, Robinson argued, such a weapon could provide US forces with unique capabilities. They could be forward based, strike from long distance and avoid the need to violate neutral country airspace. Robinson suggested these weapons to use low-yield warheads with a few kilotons of explosive power, not sub-kiloton mini-nukes, to minimise "collateral damage". Their main function would be to destroy hardened underground targets.

Stephen Younger, the Deputy Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, has been lobbying for new types of nuclear weapons for quite a while. In a paper on "Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century" published in June 2000 he made a similar case. "Some targets require the energy of nuclear weapons for their destruction. However, precision targeting can greatly reduce the nuclear yield required to destroy such targets. Only relatively few targets require high nuclear yields." Younger’s argument implies that most of the US nuclear posture needs to be modernized. Today, almost all nuclear weapons in the active US arsenal are high-yield weapons. Almost all of them do not make use of advanced precision targeting capabilities, such as the Global Positioning System. Most advanced targeting systems heavily depend on electronics and thus are vulnerable to the effects of an EMP. To ensure that these weapons would still function in a superpower nuclear exchange, they do not incorporate such vulnerable elements.

However, both suggestions and those of others have one goal in common. They seek to finally overcome the 1994 Congressional legislation prohibiting research and development that could lead to a precision nuclear weapon of less than 5 kilotons and open the way for research into a future generation of weapons. Similar to those in the Air Force promoting a new Minuteman IV missile and those in the US Navy, who suggest a Trident III should be considered, planners at the nuclear weapons laboratories perceive the new administration as a great chance to get a second age of nuclear deterrence finally on track.

However, a study by Princeton physicist Robert Nelson on "Low-Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons" concludes: "No earth-burrowing missile can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with a nuclear yield even as small as 1 percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapon. The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout", thus challenging the logic that low-yield weapons will much reduce collateral damage. He argues that "it is simply not possible for a kinetic energy weapon to penetrate deeply enough into the earth to contain a nuclear explosion". His study also contains a reminder of the political logic behind the 1994 Congressional legislation, which was written to avoid the development of weapons that would blur the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons.  ON


‘Utterly Irresponsible’: Bush Administration Proposes Deep Cuts in Non-Proliferation Programs

The Bush administration has proposed an 11 percent cut in a range of programs to diminish threats from nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Overall, the administration proposed cuts in the Energy Department’s budget for nuclear nonproliferation activities to $774 million in fiscal 2002 from $874 million in the current fiscal year, according to Steve LaMontagne from the Council for a Livable World. This proposal is contained in budget documents for fiscal year 2002 presented on April 10 and includes a 75 percent cut in the Nuclear Cities Initative, a program dedicated to re-employ Russian nuclear scientists, a 29 percent cut in a nuclear reactor safety program, and an 18 percent cut in a program to enhance security at Russian nuclear weapons facilities. Several other programs are planned to be completely eliminated. Earlier this year, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler task force described the dangers posed by Russia's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials as "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today" and recommended spending $30 billion over the next ten years on nuclear risk reduction and non-proliferation.

The budget reductions were widely critized among Democrats and non-proliferation lobbyists: "This budget proposal, unless corrected by Congress, would take a dangerous step backward," said former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The top-ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden, called the proposed reductions "utterly irresponsible".

The administration’s cutback proposals were made only few days after President Bush had announced a comprehensice review of the nuclear threat reduction programs. "We want to make sure that any money that is being spent is being spent in an effective way," the president said at a press conference on March 29. The review will be conducted by senior officials at the National Security Council and last six to eight weeks. Dozens of programs that are run mainly by the State Department, Pentagon and Department of Energy will be examined. Government officials stressed that the review is to improve the quality and effectiveness of the cooperative programs. But Kenneth Luongo, a former Clinton administration official and executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), expressed concern about the administration’s implicit bias: "A prejudiced review that looks at what can be eliminated, and not what can be improved, is missing an enormous opportunity and is likely to further rile relations with Russia."

The reason lying behind the administration’s initative are recent Russian activities in the area of selling nuclear, military and dual-use technology to so-called "rogue" states. But Washington’s reaction indicates that the so-called realism towards Russia lacks any political concept on nuclear proliferation threats. As Michael McFaul of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted: "True realism on the part of the Bush foreign policy team would mean increasing, not decreasing, the size of these efforts." This also means that Washington’s policy can be self-fullfilling. Senator Nunn warned: "If we don't do it, no one will – not even the Russians."

After all, Russia could be even more promiscuous in its commercial activities in the area of nuclear export. It is remarkable that over the past decade no weapons of mass destruction have found their way out of Russia and that there have not been more accidents with nuclear materials. Nevertheless, the risks still posed by nuclear proliferation, incidents and brain drain from Russia’s nuclear sector must not be underestimated. In Mid-April, a new study by the Carnegie Endowment provided the first detailed statistical overview over the situation inside the Russian nuclear and missile complexes. Findings include that more than 62% of employees earn less than $50 per month and 58% of experts are forced to take 2nd jobs to earn money. 14% of experts would like to work outside of Russia, and 6% express interest in moving "any place at all." Thus it is obviously wrong to abandon the Clinton administration's policy to treat Russia as a partner in nuclear cooperation and to choose a non-proliferation approach that directly antagonizes Moscow instead.       MN


More US Nuclear Weapons In Europe?

The storage capacity for nuclear weapons in Europe is probably twice as large as assumed earlier. New photographs released by the USAF on the internet show an open nuclear weapons storage vault within an F-16 aircraft shelter. The storage vaults can hold two weapons instead of one. Earlier photographs available from the time when these storage systems were developed had shown a vault that was unlikely to contain more than a single weapon. At the time of writing it is not known for sure, whether all vaults can hold two weapons or only some.

Thus, the storage capacity for US nuclear weapons in Europe needs to be reassessed. A maximum of 428 US nuclear weapons can be deployed on all bases and 360 weapons on all bases currently operational. Earlier we had reported a maximum storage capacity of 214 nuclear weapons at all 13 airbases, respectively of 180 weapons on operational bases. However, it is unlikely that NATO in the current political environment is using the full storage capacity. About 150-180 nuclear weapons are believed to be currently deployed in seven European countries: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the UK.

In addition, documents released under the Freedom of Information Act to Princeton University scholar Joshua Handler describe USAF-plans to modernize the nuclear weapons storage systems in Europe in order to keep them operational beyond the year 2005. USAF cost estimates have placed a $10.1 million price tag on the program under which a number of hard- and software changes to the storage systems monitoring and communications components would be conducted. NATO’s common infrastructure budget shall finally carry the costs. While research, development prototyping and testing is scheduled to be finished by FY 2002, procurement and installation is planned to be conducted in Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005. Completion of the program is expected during the first quarter of 2005. The upgrade is planned to be conducted at all 13 airbases, where nuclear weapons WS3 systems have been built under the NATO program, no matter whether they are actually in use or in caretaker status. Vaults on two British RAF bases are not included in the upgrade program. If upgraded, the storage systems can remain in use until 2018. ON


In or Out? – Nuclear Weapons in Germany

The German Ministry of Defense moved quickly to deny news from PENN-Newsletter No 13 and Der Spiegel. No, it had no plans to end nuclear sharing within NATO. Nothing was about to be changed. "I wouldn’t know, what I should change and why", Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said on February 9, when asked whether the Bundeswehr was planning changes to its contribution to NATO nuclear capabilities.

However, while making his statement, the Minister obviously was not aware of the plans made by the German Air Force (GAF) published on the Ministry’s homepage. On January 29, the Inspector of the GAF LtGen Porz issued an order implementing the new structure of the Luftwaffe. It states that "Fighter Bomber Wing 31 "B" and Fighter Bomber Wing 33 will be equipped during 2007 and 2010 respectively during 2012 and 2015 with multi-role EFA 2000 aircraft. Fighter Bomber Wing 34 (Memmingen) will be dissolved by 2003."

FBW 34 currently has no active nuclear role, but rather one as a nuclear caretaker. Memmingen Airbase hosts 11 storage vaults for nuclear weapons. Thus, by 2003 the German capability to provide nuclear capable aircraft will be reduced from three to two wings. FBW 31 has a nuclear care-taker role, too, which will end during the 2007-2010 timeframe, when the unit´s Tornado aircraft will be replaced by non-nuclear capable EF 2000’s. The same will happen to the GAF’s only active nuclear capable unit, FBW 33 at Buechel AB between 2012 and 2015.

While we can not completely exclude the option that the PENN Newsletter pointed the German MoD to a major mistake in the long-term Bundeswehr planning, we did not yet find any indication that GAF-planning was changed subsequently in order to provide the Luftwaffe with dual capable aircraft beyond 2012-2015. This would be costly, since it would require to make the Eurofighter dually capable on a national basis.   ON


Cut down on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program?

On April 1, the ‘father of Pakistan's nuclear program', Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan was replaced by Dr Javed Mirza as director of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). The move has attracted criticism from conservatives as a decision to stop the enrichment of uranium in Pakistan's nuclear facilities under pressure from western governments. The chairman of the Pakisan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Ashfay Ahmad, was also replaced by Pervez Butt.

The Pakistan government announced on 23 April that due to financial constraints, it will cut 25 per cent of the PAEC budget. According to Finance Ministry officials, ten percent of the cuts will come from the classified budget used for the country's nuclear and missile research program. The other 15 percent will affect the PAEC's open general budget.

Although the Pakistani government declared that neither the personnel changes nor the financial cuts will affect the "essence" of the nuclear weapons program, Gen Musharrzif's government is trying to build political support for lslamabad to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the same time. In May, the US and Pakistan will resume talks on the future of Pakistan's nuclear programn and a possible lifting of the US sanctions.    GP


Again Two Newcomers to the Nuclear Club?

CIA Director John McLaughlin spread rumours that the number of owners of nuclear weapons has again increased. On April 23, he argued that "we still cannot account for all of North Korea’s plutonium [and] say for sure that nuclear weapons related work is not going on somewhere else" [than at the Yongbon nuclear plant]. "Indeed, the North probably has one or two nuclear bombs" he concluded. McLaughlin’s statement represents a departure from the US intelligence communities’ earlier strategy to comment on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. It was known for years that the Yongbon facilities are likely to have produced sufficient unaccounted weapons grade material for one or two nuclear weapons prior to the US-North Korean Framework Agreement ending the production. However, in order not to add oil to Asia’s fires after the Indian and Pakistani 1998 nuclear tests during the Clinton Presidency, such analysis was never made public.

The second new owner of nuclear warheads to be named is Ossama bin Laden’s terrorist group Al Qaida. It is said to own about twenty nuclear weapons. The weapons reportedly were obtained via Chechen rebels who raided Russian nuclear installations for weapons, components and nuclear technology. The claim is an old one. Based on Russian and Saudi intelligence sources it was made in 1999 by Yosef Bodansky, then a researcher at the US Congress House Task Force for Counter-terrorism, who also authored a book on bin Laden. Unfortunately, Ossama bin Laden was unavailable for comment when the PENN-Newsletter tried to clarify whether there was any real sensation to report. ON


DU-Weapons in Space?

As if the world wasn’t crazy enough US military planners have begun thinking about space-based weapons made from depleted uranium to attack hardened deep underground facilities. The idea is simple. Conventional ammunitions used to destroy underground bunkers do have natural limitations to their penetration capabilities. A GBU-28 bomb can penetrate about 100 feet of soil or 20 feet of concrete. While nuclear weapons have a greater explosive power and thus could be used to attack targets even more deeply buried, their ‘disadvantage’ is radiation and collateral damage. Both types of weapons suffer from the problem that their speed at impact needs to be limited, otherwise the weapon would be damaged and function no longer. Space based weapons with depleted uranium penetrator rods could travel and impact at much higher speed. They do not need explosives, their destructive effects being solely based on kinetic energy. If modern guidance technology could make space-based DU-penetrators sufficiently accurate they could be used to attack bunkers buried several hundred feet below surface, goes the argument of researchers at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, drawing on earlier assessments done by the USAF Defense Science Board. However, those suggesting this option are well aware that they’d face the need to first destroy some arms control targets, before they could make their idea a legal option. ON


A Defence Minister Council for the EU?

As Defence News reported in its issue of 19th March, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana proposed that the fifteen Defence Ministers of the EU should meet independently of their Foreign Ministry counterparts. The institutionalisation of such a committee would be necessary for the EU’s development of an effective military crisis-management capability. Solana has declared that without the institutionalisation of a formal Council of Ministers in the defence domain, no coherent policy can be made.

Solana’s proposal provoked some cautious criticism by Chris Patten, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations. He commented that "although we have made spectacular progress in some areas, it will be some time before we have a single foreign and security policy." Nevertheless, various independent analysts agree with Solana that Defence Ministers should have their own council. Yves Boyer, deputy director of the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris, pointed out that with the EU’s planned 60.000-strong rapid reaction force off the scene, a decision to institutionalise a Defence Minister Council must be discussed soon. In the context of the ongoing restructuring of Europe’s defence industries, Jean Paul Herbert from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris questions whether the EU can have a European defence industrial capability without united policies to make use of it. However, it is not only French experts to make the point. The reknowened Dutch Clingendael Institute recommended a septarate EU Council of Defense Ministers as early as in November last year. The problem would be to separate the areas of competence between a potential Defence Minister Council on the one hand and the Council of the Foreign Ministers on the other.   TB


Arms Control Researchers – Spies in Russia?

Igor Sutyagin, an arms control specialist at the USA-Canada Institute of Strategic Studies, was arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB, successor to the KGB) on 27th October 1999 and brought to the FSB’s Kaluga regional office, where he remains in custody. Following Sutyagin’s arrest, the FSB searched the apartments of two other researchers who worked together with Sutyagin: Joshua Handler, a US citizen writing his PhD on arms control issues, and Pavel Podwig, a researcher at the Center for Arms Control Studies in Moscow. Finally, the FSB issued formal charges against Sutyagin, accusing him of having passed state secrets to the British firm "Alternative Futures Consultancy", which advises investors on Russian industries. However, the FSB has not revealed the nature of the information Sutyagin gave to the firm, merely saying that the company is a cover for British intelligence. After various delays, the trial began on February 27, 2001 with the reading of the charges and Igor Sutyagin’s testimony. Since the trial was held behind closed doors, no facts are known to the public.

Sutyagin’s colleagues agree that he had not had access to state secrets and that he was using only openly available sources. So far, no secret document has been found in his possession.

Cases such as Sutyagin’s have led some to suppose that with former KGB agent Putin’s accession to power, the influence of the FSB on the Russian political sphere is growing. Upon his election, President Putin promoted many of his former colleagues to high ranking government posts.

The trial is attended by actions of some NGOs, like the American Association for Advancement of Science and others, which are active in supporting Sutyagin. It seems difficult for the Putin government to accept a stable civil society which controls its actions and to guarantee the freedom of press.   TB



  • Country Report


PENN Netherlands

The defining development for the nuclear policy of the Dutch government has been the paragraph 32 report. It has basically been used within the Netherlands as proof that the government is indeed committed to its NPT obligations. Hence the presentation of the report at the NATO ministerial in Brussels in December 2000 was a defining moment for the NGO community. The basic question was whether this document would provide any political leverage for all those who wanted to see a shift in NATO nuclear policy, or whether it would prove to be yet another political gesture to stem the anti-nuclear weapons opposition which had been deployed fairly effectively lately in a number of NATO countries and at the United Nations by the New Agenda countries.

The document turned out to be a peculiar mixture of both. On the one hand, the practical measures proposed by the writers amounted to little more than a call for increased transparency, or taking up the subject of tactical nuclear reductions in certain negotiating forums with Russia. There were no moves away from NATO nuclear policy - indeed, it was reaffirmed. On the other hand, reflecting the huge diplomatic effort by the New Agenda Coalition and others, the NPT final document (May 2000) was explicitly quoted, including the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament of the working program. The inherent contradiction in the entire document – supporting NATO nuclear policy on the one hand, and the NPT promises for nuclear disarmament on the other – remained. This contradiction was transferred into the Dutch political arena, when minister of foreign affairs van Aartsen presented his report on the NATO ministerial meeting to the foreign affairs committee of the lower house in February 2001. Interestingly enough, the nuclear tasks of the F-16 attack aircraft of the Dutch air force at Volkel air base were explicitly acknowledged for the first time. In January, the documentation systematically collected by anti-nuclear weapons activists about Volkel was published in an extensive article in the national weekly Vrij Nederland. The probable locations of the bomb vaults were marked on a detailed ministry of defence map published in the paper. The factual knowledge of the presence of the bombs was not new, the additional data was. Since NATO policy decrees that there can be no confirmation or denial, a compromise was chosen: the aircraft with the nuclear task was identified, while the bombs and their location were not.

Since the dithering course of the Dutch government on NATO nuclear policy was not entirely unexpected, the Dutch anti-nuclear weapons coalition chose the occasion of a parliamentary debate to present their anti-nuclear weapons statement to the Dutch parliament. The criticism uttered in various briefings to Parliament and by the NGO representatives presenting the document was reflected to some degree in the debate about the ministerial report in parliament. Jan Hoekema, foreign affairs spokesman of one of the three parties of the governing coalition, stated that the paragraph 32 document was an anti-climax. "The will in NATO to make real progress towards nuclear disarmament does not seem to be so great."

Two opposition parliamentarians (GreenLeft and Socialist Party) extensively criticised the para 32 document. Even the spokeswoman of the Christian Democrat opposition party stated that there was a tension between NATO nuclear policy and the confidence building measures and arms control. Since the National Missile defence debate had been receiving extensive publicity in Holland, there were also numerous comments on that subject. As a result, the minister produced a further document two months later, in which he covered missile defence and the Dutch position on it in more detail. In that letter to parliament he wrote that the US government has assured him that it would consult with the allies on its missile defence plans. He also reported that he had pointed out to the North Atlantic Council on 27 February that the Dutch were already involved in the development of Theatre Missile Defence, certain types of which could be the correct response to the threat. He also said that a multilateral approach is to be preferred to a unilateral one, and that a more effective non-proliferation and arms control policy should be given priority.    KK


Austria´s Neutrality and the Treaty of Nice

The Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria states: “For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria, of her own free will, declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal. In order to secure these purposes, Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory.”

But since Austria joined the EU some six years ago, several influential lobbies and the heads of the Austrian military establishment are working hard to alter this situation. At the moment, the future of Austria’s security policy hangs in the balance between the ruling coalition´s desire for an immediate accession to NATO and the opposition who want the country to remain at minimum non-aligned. The government put for the first time a possible NATO-accession on the agenda in the agreement between both parties on governing Austria in February 2000: “Austria will work to establish comprehensive institutional relations as well as effective co-operation between the European Union and NATO. Austria will deepen her own relations with NATO in accordance with the needs of her security and her full and equal participation in the European security architecture. The option of membership at a later date is open.”

Whereas during the Cold War even an accession to the European Community was considered incompatible with Austria’s status of permanent neutrality, this understanding has been reduced to the conditions mentioned expressis verbis in the Constitutions: No membership in a military alliance and no foreign troop or weapons deployments on Austrian soil. In the second Gulf War of 1991, Austria allowed overflights of allied forces and transition of material. During the Kosovo War, Austria’s air space remained closed for airraids and was only opened after a UN mandate was achieved at the end of the war.

Austria committed herself to the full spectrum of the Petersberg missions and therefore amended the Constitution by adding Article 23f. This article states that all decisions to be made with regard to the Petersberg missions of the EU (Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty) - which include missions from peacekeeping to fighting wars - need not be based on any parliamentary process or decision. Those decisions can be made on the simple voting of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. Some observers have concluded that this widening of the range of possible military missions spells the end of Austria´s neutrality. The government has promised 2.000 troops for the EU´s Rapid Reaction Force, and by that fully participating in the newly created EU military planning process. Furthermore, the current government has declared its intention to open up the possibility to act militarily in absence of a UN mandate: “Austria will be enabled to support peace operations of other international organisations that are carried out without a pertinent UN Security Council resolution but in compliance with the principles of the UN Charter in order to prevent humanitarian disasters or to put an end to severe and systematic human rights violations.” (ÖVP/FPO treaty on governing Austria, Feb 2000).

In the meantime, a new threat analysis and a follow up draft of a new security doctrine have been published by the military establishment in early 2001. The threat analysis is more or less cribbed from NATO as familiar catchphrases such as ‘rogue states’, ‘proliferation of WMD’ and ‘missile threats’ appear throughout. In addition two laws concerning the future of Austria’s security and defence policy are currently in the parliamentary queue: a law on governing the import, export and transit of war material, and another on foreign troop deployment. It remains to be seen whether the opposing SPÖ and the Green Party will agree the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. Without the Social Democrats voting in favour ratification will not be possible. Both the SPÖ and the Greens seem to be trying to hand the question of Austria’s security and defence policy back to the shoulders of the UN-Charter. GS



  • PENN - Suggested Readings


On the eve of the sixth Summit meeting between the EU and Russia, Clara Portela published a Research Note assessing the emerging security relationship be-tween both parties: “EU-Russia co-operation in the security domain: Problems and Opportunities”, BITS Research Note, 01.2. The paper points out that, although largerly unperceived by the general public, much has been done in the last two years to bolster EU-Russia co-operation in the security field. The document can be found at our website in the publications section. There you can also find our other suggested readings. (online version here)

Earlier, Ira Bernhof has prepared a German language paper on the perspectives of the relationship be-tween Russia and the EU entitled “Europa und Rußland - Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick”, BITS Briefing Note 01.1.(online version here)

Clara Portela is preparing a brief Policy Note headlined “The CESDP’s Civilian- Military Mismatch”, BITS Policy Note 01.3, pledging for more attention to be focused on the development of the European Union’s civilian instruments for crisis management, with a view to the Göteborg European Council.


EU-Russia Archive

We have put another database online: the EU–Russia Archive on cooperation in the security domain (EURA). It is divided into four sections: A) Official documents, B) Research studies, C) Parliamentary Reports and D) Basic Policy Documents (of the Russian Federation). Please follow this link to the EURA archive.



  • Diary

Date Event

7-8 June

Brussels: NATO Defense Ministes & NATO-Russia PJC Defense Ministers Meetings

14 June--13 July

Geneva: 62nd Session of the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission

11-16 June

Europe: First visit of the new U.S. President Bush

13 June

Brussels: Informal NATO-Summit

13 June-18 July

Geneva: 23rd Session of START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

14-15 June

Stockholm & Göteburg: U.S. - E.U. Summit

15-16 June

Göteborg: Meeting of the European Council

16 June

Slovenia: US-Russia Summit (Presidents Bush and Putin to meet for the first time)

01 July

BelgianEU: Presidency begins

07-10 July

Paris: OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

18 July

Genoa: G-8 Foreign Ministers

20-22 July

Genoa: G-8 Summit; Presidents Bush and Putin to meet again

30 July-14 Sept

Geneva: Conference on Disarmament, Part III

26-27 September

Naples, Italy: Informal Meeting Of Defence Ministers

(follow this link to go to our online version)


BITS would like to thank the W. Alton Jones Foundation for its generous support for the PENN program for the fifth year.


ViSdP / Responsibility at BITS: Otfried Nassauer (ON), Clara Portela (CP), editor, Sebastian Meyer, assistant editor, and authors indicated: Frida Bloom (FB) – Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS), Thomas Busch (TB) – BITS, Karel Koster (KK) - PENN Netherlands, Markus Nitschke (MN) - BITS, Gerd Piper (GP) – BITS, Georg Schöfbänker (GS) - Austrian Information- Center for Security Policy and Arms Control (AISA)

ISSN 1434-4262