

## Information Circular

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# Communication dated 2 March 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the Nuclear Activities of Iran

1. The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 2 March 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), attaching a letter dated 19 February 2007 addressed to the Director General from the Resident Representative of Iran concerning the nuclear activities of Iran.
2. The Note Verbale and, as requested therein, its attachment, are circulated herewith.

*In the name of God*



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ

*Permanent Mission of  
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to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*

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No. 028/2007

2 March 2007

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency's Secretariat and has the honor to request the letter of Ambassador and the Permanent Representative of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19/2007 dated 19 February 2007 addressed to the Director General on the Iran nuclear issues to be circulated among the Member States and publish it as an INFCIRC document and make it available to the public through the IAEA website.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency's Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.



Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination  
Attn: Mr. Vilmos CSERVENY  
Director,  
IAEA, P.O. Box 100,  
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No. 019/2007

19 February 2007

Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the Agency's letter no. MBA-IRA-30/2007-1 dated 15-02-2007 and to inform the followings:

1. The International Atomic Agency shall be the sole and pivotal authority in the investigation of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. Interference of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on Iran's nuclear issues has no legal basis and considering the extensive co-operation with the Agency's the involvement of the UNSC does not have any justification in accordance with the Agency's Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards. This course of action is not only unhelpful for the resolution of the issue but would lead to further complication.
3. While the Islamic Republic of Iran does not ask for anything beyond its inalienable rights which is stipulated in the NPT, it has however the intention to fulfill its obligations under this Treaty, provided that it shall benefit from the exercise of such rights. According to the Article IV of the NPT; "*Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination*". In addition, "*...all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy*". But some countries, specifically certain Nuclear Weapons States, not only have failed to fulfill their obligations and undertakings for the cessation of the nuclear arm race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the Article VI of the NPT but also have denied other NPT Parties to benefit from their legal and inalienable rights for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. The IAEA is the sole technical and professional organization in providing services and co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Converting the Agency to a political body will deviate it from its statutory objectives. In accordance with the Article III of the Statute, out of seven functions on which the Agency is authorized, only one is on Safeguards. The remaining six functions are related to the promotional activities.
5. In order to remove the ambiguities and misunderstandings regarding its nuclear program, and implementing maximum transparency, the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken the following numerous measures vis-à-vis the IAEA:
  - Close collaboration even beyond its legal obligations with the IAEA;

- Over 2000 man-day inspections on its nuclear activities and facilities during the last 3 years which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA;
- Voluntary suspension of the uranium conversion and enrichment related activities, assumed to be temporary, which was, however, continued for two and half years, with the aim of confidence building, where such measures have not being envisaged in any of the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and even the Additional Protocol;
- It is essential to note that, following such voluntary suspension, a new verification regime for verifying the suspension, was established and conducted by the Agency in Iran, which has no precedence in the history of the IAEA;
- In this context a clear distinction has to be made between voluntary measures and legal obligations in order to prevent that such voluntary measures not to be turned into legal and Safeguards obligations.
- Signature of the Additional Protocol in 2003 and Voluntarily implementation of the Additional Protocol from December 2003 until February 2006;
- Granting full and unlimited accesses to all nuclear materials and facilities, particularly to the enrichment facility in Natanz and the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan;
- Granting more than 26 complimentary accesses to 55 locations in accordance with the Additional Protocol;
- Granting access to military sites (over 20 cases), where the results of the inspections proved the allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran to be baseless;
- Submission of over 1300 pages of initial declarations in accordance with Additional Protocol on 21 May 2003. The declarations have been updated and verified by the Agency;

6. In addition to the above measures, since the last report of Your Excellency (GOV/2006/64), in November. 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran in the continuation of its cooperation with the Agency, has facilitated the verification activities with in over 132 man-day inspections. Regarding the enrichment facilities in Natanz, PFEP (IRM) and FEP (IRN), as well as the ongoing construction activities of the Heavy Water Research Reactor IR40 (IRP), some of the performed inspection activities are as follows:

- FEP (IRN):

15 inspections amounting to 38 man-day inspections; conducting Design Information Verification (DIV) and installation of 7 new surveillance cameras, which are all in operation, and the application of the Agency's metal seals at 22 sensitive points in the facility;

- PFEP (IRM)

13 inspections amounting to 29 man-day inspections conducting: Interim Inventory Verification (IIV) and Design Information Verification (DIV);

- IR40 (IRP)

Two times inspections (four man-day)

Design Information Verification (DIV) during construction of the IR40;


7. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been and still is, complied with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Agency inspections have been conducted without any obstacle, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran including those on enrichment, being in full compliance with the Agency's Statute, NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, are under the full and continuous Agency's Safeguards surveillance cameras inspection and in full compliance with the Agency's Statute, NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

8. As already been stated in several occasions, the 40 MW Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR40) is intended to substitute the 5MW Tehran Research Reactor, where its normal lifetime has already been passed. This reactor is mainly involves in production of radioisotopes for medical and agricultural application.

9. Regarding the few remaining outstanding issues, it has to be recalled that, as was duly reflected in the letter of 27 April 2006, H.E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, expressed to Your Excellency, the Islamic Republic of Iran's full readiness and willingness to negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing with the issues in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the United Nation Security Council. In this context, it is prepared to regulate the future co-operation on the basis of the negotiated verification arrangements.

10. It is evident that the achievement of the aforementioned prospects is merely feasible through negotiation. In this respect, while appreciating the valuable efforts of Your Excellency and others, the Islamic Republic of Iran, on its part, is prepared to enter into constructive, but not a superficial, negotiation, aimed at resolving the outstanding issues.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ali Asghar Soltanieh  
A.A. Soltanieh

Ambassador, Resident Representative

H.E. Dr. Mohammad El-Baradei  
Director General,  
IAEA