

# Islamic Republic of I R A N

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful

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**Statement by  
The Islamic Republic of Iran  
on Nuclear Disarmament and Negative Security Assurances  
at the Main Committee I of the 2010 NPT Review Conference  
New York, 7 May 2010**

**Mr. Chairman,**

At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chair of the Main Committee I.

My delegation also would like to associate itself with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

**Mr. Chairman,**

In the course of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a package of rights and obligations was introduced, according to which, inter alia, on the one hand, non-nuclear-weapon States have undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to place their nuclear facilities under the safeguards. On the other hand and in return, nuclear-weapon States have undertaken not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to move towards nuclear disarmament and eliminate all nuclear weapons.

In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely on several conditions. Nuclear disarmament and security assurances were among the main elements of the package for those conditions.

With the adoption of the practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, including in particular the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty”, hopes for the implementation of this fundamental pillar of the NPT were renewed. Thus, the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT have become essential measures in the direction of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Although the 2005 Review Conference’s failure to come up with a consensus document is largely considered as a sad setback in this direction, the practical steps adopted by



consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference still constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the NPT Review Conference.

This NPT Review Conference should examine national reports of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to their obligation undertaken to implement article VI of the Treaty, including the measures adopted by them to implement the 13 practical steps.

Regrettably, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising. Despite the obligations under article VI and commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995 NPT extension Conference as well as their unequivocal undertaking of NPT 2000 Review Conference, the continued development, deployment and maintaining of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States still threaten the international peace and security.

Notwithstanding the recent escalation in the rhetoric about the nuclear armaments' cut-down, lack of practical steps in this field and the continued effort to expand missile defense after abrogation of the ABM Treaty are among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the agreements of the 2000 Conference. Although the international community has noted the NEW START in April 2010, provisions of this treaty do not go beyond the decommissioning of nuclear weapons, and its parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons. According to the Final Document of 2000 NPT Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States should place fissile material of their decommissioned weapons under IAEA safeguards to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Moreover, no verification mechanism has been envisaged in the aforementioned treaty. It therefore does not take into account the principles of "increased transparency", "diminishing role for nuclear weapons" and "irreversibility", which were agreed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Conference.

Likewise, during the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". In spite of that, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

**Mr. Chairman,**

The Islamic Republic of Iran along with other Members of the NAM group strongly believes that in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached regarding the fulfillment of nuclear disarmament obligations, and in order to assure the international community on the real reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the NPT Review Conference should establish a standing Committee to ensure and verify implementation of commitments made with regard to Article VI obligations.

It should also be highlighted that any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Needless to say, that such reduction in the number of nuclear weapons can never be a substitute to the main obligation of nuclear weapon States, namely total elimination of nuclear arsenals. As we stated before, a real change in Nuclear Posture is conceivable when the emphasis on the old doctrine of nuclear deterrence would be removed completely.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed last year, the international community rightly expects that statements on the reduction of nuclear weapons be materialized and implemented in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite of the pledges by the US administration, a review of the new developments in the US nuclear policy shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis of its new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy, new extraordinary budget allocated to the modernization of the US arsenals, lack of tangible measure toward ratification of CTBT, and raising new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in that document, are clear indications of the continued policy of this nuclear weapon State to evade from its obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenals.

The new NPR by the United States which provide for the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, stipulate the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which is in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the NPT in 1968 and its indefinite extension in 1995.

This is also a matter of regret that despite of the high expectation of the international community towards the realization of the US pledges on nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, a new extraordinary budget of several billions of dollars has been allocated to modernize the US arsenals. This bill was a blow to all optimism created by the new Administration rhetoric and a big setback for the NPT Review Conference success.

· Ironically, the US NPR stipulates for conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile system while this country itself has been claiming for a long time that ballistic missile has no use other than WMD delivery.

The other worrisome developments are the United Kingdom's Trident plan and the new announcements by France on the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals and justifying it as "a key element in Europe's security." It appears that these countries in defiance of its international obligation are seeking new roles and justifications for its nuclear forces in order to the continue retention of them.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference has an urgent task to address the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to alleviate these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of research, development, modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for

the research, development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries.

**Mr. Chairman,**

In accordance with Article I of the NPT, "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly". Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. Therefore, the real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons remain intact. Ironically, not only some nuclear-weapon States do not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals, and give no real and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear States parties, they also threaten to use their weapons against NPT States parties.

The new US NPR has clearly confessed such violation namely deployment of the US nuclear weapons in the EU territories and the Review Conference must seriously address this case of non-compliance. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear-weapon States and non-parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for NPT Parties. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under Article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext including the security arrangements or military alliance.

In its Article III, paragraph 2, the NPT obliges all States to refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Accordingly, the NPT Review Conference must reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to the Israeli regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security.

On this ground, the United States is considered as a non-compliant Party in its undertakings under the provisions of the NPT because of continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime of Israel and strongly supporting this regime by imposing inaction on the United Nations Security Council on the acknowledgement of the Israeli Prime Minister of their nuclear arsenal.

The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States regarding the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant fora constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Although the actual nuclear testing moratorium (but not simulation testing) has been maintained, some efforts had been under way to reduce the time necessary to resume a nuclear test, which puts into question the commitment to the so-called moratorium. The international community highly expects that the US as a major nuclear weapon state implement its commitments under the Final Document of 2000 NPT Review Conference in which the ratification of CTBT has been envisaged as a practical step toward nuclear disarmament.

While new issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation threats and the possible role of the terrorist groups in proliferation should duly be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of preserving nuclear weapons and ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations by certain Nuclear Weapon States.

The international community could not wait forever to witness the total elimination of the nuclear weapons. To this end, the 2010 NPT Review Conference should adopt a clear timeframe for the full implementation of Article VI. The Conference should adopt a decision which sets a deadline for complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, within a specified timetable. In this regard, we firmly support the NAM proposal that the year 2025 must be the date for total elimination of the nuclear weapons.

In this context, we are also of the firm belief that early negotiation a Nuclear Weapons Convention shall be started. In this regard we reiterate our call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhuman weapons. Till the conclusion of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, the nuclear weapon States must fulfill their obligations under the NPT and refrain from:

- Any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons,
- Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States,
- Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities,
- Deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries,
- Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

The General Assembly in its 64<sup>th</sup> Session also adopted a resolution (A/RES/64/31) entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" in which the GA called *inter alia* for practical steps, to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament, increased transparency, and diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies in a way that promotes international stability and based upon the principle of undiminished security for all. These required measures by international community could be considered as a basis for the Review Conference for further elaboration.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Now, let me turn to the issue of security assurances.

In the early 1980s, all five nuclear-weapon States, in response to the international demands for an unconditional and legally binding treaty on negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as a first limited step, accepted some qualified undertakings not to use such weapons against States parties to the NPT and those which have renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons.

In early April 1995, this pledge was reaffirmed through unilateral statements by nuclear-weapon States and on 11 April 1995, just days before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, UN Security Council Resolution 984 was adopted in this regard.

The unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council resolution were duly taken note of, in a package of decisions, by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The international community should not await the deployment or even threat of use of such weapons to react. Such policies and practices seem to have learned no lesson from the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is abhorrent that the threats and dangerous doctrine of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states were officially proclaimed by the United States and NATO.

Moreover, the new doctrines such as the US Nuclear Posture Review and recent increasing in the number of cases in which some high officials of certain nuclear-weapon States have threatened non-nuclear weapon States (such as those threats made by the US), all have put the States Parties to the NPT more than ever under the real threat of possible use of nuclear weapons.

The 1995 unilateral statements and the subsequent UN Security Council resolution are inseparable parts of the deal in the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the efforts undermining multilateral achievement in the field of disarmament and other, is now seriously undermining the very credibility of the NPT.

**Mr. Chairman,**

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that nuclear weapons should not imply political clout and capability to shape and influence world events or change the decisions of sovereign States. Certain nuclear weapon States have tried to create smokescreens in the international fora, including the NPT Review process to deflect attention from their abysmal record and policies.

The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed, in the second paragraph of its section on Article VII, the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding and unconditionally security assurances by the five nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty to the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear

proliferation regime and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the Review Conference.

In the light of this agreement, the NPT Review Conference shall prepare recommendations on unconditional negative security assurances to all NPT non-nuclear weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis. The failure of the past Review Conferences to produce such recommendations on the security assurances necessitates a concrete measure to be taken by 2010 NPT Review Conference to revitalize the international efforts in this regard. Any proposal on the conditional security assurances under the pretext of non-proliferation concern is doomed to fail.

Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an Ad-Hoc Committee to work on a draft of a legally binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons and providing unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to this Review Conference for its consideration and adoption.

As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and NSA, we believe that as suggested by the NGO community, the 2010 NPT Review Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference “decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited.”

In order to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran also held an International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation on 17-18 April 2010 in Tehran, which inter alia examined the current challenges towards the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments and finding mechanisms to realize the lofty goal of nuclear weapons free world. In a message to the Tehran Conference, our Supreme Leader emphasized that “we believe that, besides nuclear weapons, other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, also pose a serious threat to humanity.... We consider the use of such weapons as *haram* (religiously forbidden) and believe that it is everyone’s duty to make efforts to secure humanity against this great disaster”.

In Conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that maintaining the established delicate balance between three pillars of the NPT is vital to preserve the credibility and integrity of the NPT. Non-Nuclear Weapon States could not accept any new obligation pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by Nuclear Weapon States.

Thank you, for your attention.