

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Volume I

Part I

Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.

Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is a common responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty and remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek nor receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

4. The Conference recalls that the non-nuclear-weapon States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.
5. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of States parties to the full and effective implementation of the Decisions and the Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.
6. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.
7. The Conference recalls the commitment by all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
8. The Conference underscores the necessity of the full implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
9. The Conference emphasizes the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the process of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article VI and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs

Safeguards

10. The Conference reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
11. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations. The Conference emphasizes that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.
12. The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA's safeguards. The Conference also underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA's Statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties. In this regard, the Conference calls upon the States parties to extend their cooperation with the IAEA.
13. The Conference recognizes the role of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, in accordance with the UN Charter as well as Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and by taking appropriate measures as necessary.

14. The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the provision of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty.
15. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear cooperation.
16. The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference considers that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
17. The Conference emphasizes that there is a distinction between the legal obligations of States and voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of safeguards and aimed at confidence building, bearing in mind the obligation of States to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements.
18. The Conference recalls the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference welcomes the fact that 172 States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and that six additional States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference urges the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.
19. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
20. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) provides, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole.
21. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighboring States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among their member States and in contributing effectively to the non-proliferation regime.
22. The Conference bears in mind that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force or applied provisionally, the additional protocol is a legal obligation for that State.
23. The Conference notes that, for a State with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement, and an additional protocol in force or being otherwise applied, IAEA safeguards can provide increased assurances regarding both the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities for a State as a whole. The Conference notes that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.
24. The Conference stresses the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its mandate and its authority in

accordance with its Statute to provide assurances about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and, where relevant, additional protocols.

25. The Conference welcomes the fact that 124 State parties have brought additional protocols into force and that 23 of these States parties have brought the additional protocol into force since the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force in conformity with their national legislation and policy.

26. The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on IAEA and States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

27. The Conference welcomes the fact that 60 States parties have amended their small quantities protocols and 5 other States parties have rescinded their small quantities protocols. The Conference also welcomes the fact that 17 States parties accepted the revised small quantities protocol since the 2010 Review Conference and urges all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as appropriate as soon as possible.

28. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of the IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

29. The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, as appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards agreements.

30. The Conference recognizes that the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States' obligations under the Treaty.

31. The Conference stresses the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the IAEA's Statute and its confidentiality regime. The Conference notes the steps taken by the IAEA's Secretariat to protect classified safeguards information and that the Secretariat will continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

32. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards are functioning. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

33. The Conference emphasizes the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness and integrity of IAEA safeguards, and stresses that safeguards implementation should remain technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and objective. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the assurances contained in paragraph 24 of the IAEA General Conference resolution GC(58)/RES/14 and welcomes the clarifications and additional information provided by the IAEA Secretariat in 2014 on The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State Level, following the intensive consultation process between the Secretariat and Member States, and also the intention of the Secretariat to continue to engage in open and active dialogue with States on safeguards matters. The Conference notes that the focus of the IAEA for the immediate future is on updating existing State-level approaches for States under integrated safeguards and that State-level approaches will be progressively developed and implemented for other States. The Conference encourages States parties to support the IAEA, in close consultation and coordination with State and/or regional authorities, in this activity.

34. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by all States parties.

35. The Conference welcomes efforts to strengthen safeguards and notes the IAEA's Secretariat activities in verifying and analyzing information provided by Member States on nuclear supply and procurement in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.

36. The Conference welcomes additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities and to enhance the related technology base, including the modernization of its Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. It notes the assistance provided by Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA, including through Member State Support Programme, to facilitate capacity building, including related research and development, and implementation of safeguards. The Conference welcomes the fact that such assistance will continue to be provided towards that end.

37. The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA Statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA. The Conference also encourages States concerned to promote early consultations with the IAEA at the appropriate stage on safeguards relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.

38. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the IAEA's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

Nuclear Security

39. The Conference recognizes that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests with that State. The Conference recalls that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

40. The Conference stresses the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The Conference calls upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well protecting sensitive information. In this regard the Conference encourages all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series publications.

41. The Conference reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security. The Conference welcomes the contribution made by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the development of the Nuclear Security Series publications. The Conference also welcomes the outcome of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, organized by the IAEA in Vienna in July 2013, in particular the Ministerial Declaration, and the organization of the next international conference on nuclear security in 2016.

42. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue to assist States upon request in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. The Conference also encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance is needed and requested, including through the IAEA services in the field of nuclear security, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs), International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

43. The Conference welcomes the recent accessions to the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in

accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

44. The Conference stresses the importance and primary responsibility of all States parties to improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their national territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations. The Conference notes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including the IAEA's activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. The Conference calls upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear material throughout their national territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

45. The Conference expresses concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The Conference recalls the obligation of all States to implement fully the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and also recalls the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

46. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

47. The Conference recognizes the central role of the IAEA in developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance documents and the need for the involvement of all states in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner. The Conference notes the role that international processes and initiatives, including the Nuclear Security Summits, could play in the area of nuclear security. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue in coordination with Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

Export controls

48. The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

49. The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their Commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and for States parties, also fully respecting article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement effective national rules and regulations. The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

50. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

51. The Conference underlines that any supplier arrangement should continue to be transparent and to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

52. The Conference recalls that the 1995 Extension and Review Conference affirmed that new supply

arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

53. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

54. The Conference encourages all States parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

55. The Conference welcomes cooperation among States parties and assistance available, including through the IAEA, to promote and implement high standards of safeguards, nuclear security and export controls. The Conference encourages States parties in a position to contribute to such efforts to do so. The Conference also encourages States parties in need of assistance to make use of the assistance available.

Article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs

56. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that this right constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Treaty. In this connection, the Conference confirms that each State party's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies, should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

57. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so should also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States parties or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for their development needs, in accordance with Article IV.

58. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

59. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular State parties that are developing countries, to the fullest possible access to nuclear materials, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty are to be encouraged. They would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.

60. The Conference underlines the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through the development of effective and efficient programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: nuclear energy and technical cooperation

61. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. Moreover, the Conference emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is one of the core objectives enshrined in the Statute of the IAEA. The Conference encourages all States parties to actively cooperate among themselves, and through the IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

62. The Conference reaffirms that the unimpeded exercise of the inalienable right in accordance with article IV of the Treaty is essential to maintain the balance between rights and obligations of States Parties under the Treaty, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

63. The Conference thus encourages, to the extent possible, transparency and inclusiveness in export control policies which should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing States parties to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

64. The Conference acknowledges that competent human resources are a key component for all nuclear power programmes, including new and expanding ones. The Conference underlines that partnerships and collaboration with the IAEA, as well as amongst States parties, make a valuable contribution to developing such capacity. The Conference welcomes initiatives directed at expanding nuclear knowledge and expertise, as well as training in the field of nuclear energy.

65. The Conference recognizes that science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, are an indispensable element in achieving social and economic development for all States parties.

66. The Conference underlines that IAEA activities in the field of nuclear power and non-power applications have contributed in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

67. The Conference calls upon Member States to cooperate through, and support fully, enhanced international cooperation, including the efforts of the IAEA, to expand the extent that nuclear sciences and applications are utilized to promote sustainable development for States parties, taking into account, in particular the needs of developing countries, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and, when adopted, the post-2015 development agenda.

68. The Conference encourages States parties and relevant organizations in a position to do so to provide assistance, in particular to States parties that are developing countries, in order to enhance access to nuclear science and technology, through various measures including capacity-building, the provision of equipment, strengthening regional networking and regional cooperation frameworks and facilitating cooperation among developing countries.

69. The Conference reaffirms that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and ongoing implementation of, safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties' national legislation and respective international obligations.

70. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

71. The Conference welcomes the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project, which is central to the IAEA's efforts to provide opportunities for nuclear applications in broader areas and to enhance the access of States parties, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The Conference welcomes the contributions already pledged by countries in support of the ReNuAL project and calls upon all States parties to provide the necessary financial and other support for this project. The Conference further notes that the ReNuAL project is scheduled to commence during the course of 2015, and supports appeals for timely, additional funding to make possible the projects scheduled for commencement.
72. The Conference encourages all States parties and relevant organizations to strengthen their public communication activity, considering that education and public communication play an important role in disseminating information to, and raising the awareness of, the public in general on the utility of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
73. The Conference welcomes efforts by States parties to encourage national, bilateral and international activities to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
74. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA, and stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to States parties, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account, for the sustainment and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development in areas such as electricity production, human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, and the use of nuclear techniques in environmental protection, water resources management, industry, food security, nutrition and agriculture.
75. The Conference underscores the importance of IAEA assistance, in particular to developing countries that are States parties, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the IAEA, and, in this regard, calls on the IAEA to maintain an appropriate balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the IAEA, and to consider the increasing demand for technical cooperation by States parties, especially by developing countries.
76. The Conference acknowledges the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), to enhance the application of nuclear science and technology in many States parties, in particular, in those that are developing countries, and recognizes the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the IAEA TCP. The Conference calls on the IAEA Member States to make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are assured, predictable and sufficient to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute.
77. The Conference notes that the IAEA TCP, as one of the main vehicles for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA Statute and guiding principles, as contained in INFCIRC/267, and in accordance with relevant directives of the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors.
78. The Conference notes the ongoing collaborative efforts by the IAEA and its Member States, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.
79. The Conference acknowledges the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) as a flexible mechanism to mobilize additional resources for IAEA programmes, and complements the TCF together with other extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA. The Conference welcomes the contributions already pledged by Parties and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities, as well as the IAEA's Resource Mobilization efforts, and

encourages those States parties and relevant organizations in a position to do so to provide necessary assistance and contributions, including to the PUI, as well as to promote cooperation to this end. Such additional resources can contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and, when adopted, the post-2015 development agenda.

80. The Conference recognizes that regional cooperative arrangements for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the technical cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific and the Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, as well as the strategy for the IAEA technical cooperation programme in the European region.

81. The Conference acknowledges that each State party has the right to define its national energy policy.

82. The Conference recognizes that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals.

83. The Conference notes the Second Regional Conference on Energy and Nuclear Power in Africa organized by the IAEA in Cape Town, South Africa in May 2011, the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, organized by the IAEA in Cooperation with the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency in Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation in June 2013, and the Third Conference on Energy and Nuclear Power in Africa, co-organized by the IAEA and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation in Mombasa, Kenya in April 2015.

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle

84. The Conference notes the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in the Russian Federation in December 2010 for the use of IAEA Member States, as well as the establishment of an IAEA owned and operated LEU Bank, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 and welcomes Kazakhstan's offer to host the IAEA LEU Bank.

85. The Conference notes discussions undertaken under the auspices of the IAEA or other regional or international forums to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities to create, in a non-discriminatory and transparent fashion, mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Such approaches, without restricting States parties' rights under the Treaty and without any prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, should address the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including the application of IAEA full scope safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security norms, in a manner wholly consistent with the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, acknowledged in article IV of the Treaty.

Nuclear safety and security

86. The Conference recognizes the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, as well as the important issue of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a sustainable manner, while also recognizing the continuing international efforts to address those issues. Nuclear fuel suppliers are encouraged to work with and assist recipient States, upon request, in the safe and secure management of spent fuel.

87. The Conference recognizes that the development of an appropriate infrastructure to support the safe, secure and efficient use of nuclear power, in line with relevant IAEA standards and guidelines, is an issue of central importance, especially for States that are planning for the introduction of nuclear power.
88. The Conference emphasizes the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop a robust national, technical, human resource, and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all reactor and fuel cycle activities consistent with IAEA standards, guidelines, and recommendations at a very early stage of the process.
89. The Conference encourages all States, in particular those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to do so.
90. The Conference encourages bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote cooperation on future approaches to nuclear power such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation and the Generation IV International Forum, and encourages further development of nuclear reactor technologies that are safer, more economic, more resource efficient, and reduce proliferation risks.
91. The Conference stresses the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While nuclear safety and nuclear security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play a key role in the development of safety standards and nuclear security guidance.
92. The Conference recognizes that nuclear safety and nuclear security have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment, while acknowledging the distinctions between the two areas, and affirming the importance of coordination in this regard.
93. The Conference recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States and reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation on nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its statutory functions and longstanding expertise.
94. The Conference stresses that any possible review of the IAEA safety standards should be carried out within the IAEA in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner.
95. The Conference underscores the need to facilitate the effective participation of all interested Member States in the IAEA Safety Standards Committees given their importance.
96. The Conference emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security should be in conformity with relevant articles under the Treaty including the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
97. The Conference encourages the efforts of the IAEA, as well as of other relevant forums, in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. The Conference encourages the continuous improvement of nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety and appropriate subsequent actions, by recognizing the role that further analyses of the lessons learned from past experience have to play in reinforcing national, regional and international nuclear safety frameworks that serve for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

98. The Conference welcomes the activities of the IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors. The Conference further welcomes the work of the IAEA, including in the organization of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of Member States through the Technical Cooperation Programme.

99. The Conference acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear installations, and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and spent fuel and radioactive waste management, as well as an independent and effective regulatory body.

100. The Conference encourages efforts to assist States parties upon request in implementing IAEA safety standards, bilaterally and through the IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase awareness in those fields, through the participation of States parties, in particular those from developing countries, in training, workshops, seminars and capacity-building in a non-discriminatory manner. The Conference underlines the fundamental importance of sustainable programmes, through national, regional and international efforts, for education and training in nuclear radiation, transport, waste safety and nuclear security, while focusing on building institutional capacity and technical and managerial capabilities in States parties.

101. The Conference welcomes the efforts made by the IAEA in the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The Conference notes the outcomes of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, hosted by the IAEA in June 2011, including the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear Safety, the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in December 2012 and the work towards publishing the Fukushima Report, taking into account the findings by UNSCEAR,¹ and other relevant international organizations, to share the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 for further improvement of global nuclear safety.

102. The Conference notes that the IAEA's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety has served as a significant benchmark in guiding a comprehensive and coordinated national, regional and international approach to strengthening nuclear safety, and reaffirms the importance of robust implementation of the Action Plan, including through international cooperation. The Conference also emphasizes the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfill the actions contained in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

103. The Conference notes the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, adopted by consensus at the Diplomatic Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in February 2015, noting in particular the principles contained therein to guide the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as appropriate, in the implementation of the objective of the Convention on Nuclear Safety on how new nuclear power plants are to be designed, sited and constructed as well as how comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are to be carried out periodically and regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime, and also noting the decisions of Contracting Parties contained therein on inter alia the reporting and review mechanisms.

104. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so, to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

¹ The 2013 report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation on "Levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami".

105. The Conference encourages States parties to strengthen their national, bilateral, regional and international emergency preparedness and response mechanisms, as appropriate, to facilitate timely information exchange during a nuclear emergency, and improve bilateral, regional and international cooperation to that effect.

106. The Conference notes that the IAEA plays a key role, supported by States, in facilitating international cooperation with regard to preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies. The Conference encourages States to make use of the various services and activities offered by the IAEA to improve preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies.

107. The Conference notes the principles and objectives of the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, and underlines the important role of the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

108. The Conference encourages States parties to strengthen the national and multinational efforts to recover orphan sources and maintain control of disused sources, and further encourages States parties to consider developing arrangements, as practicable, to permit the return of disused sources to the supplier States.

109. The Conference encourages States parties concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible. The Conference welcomes efforts to use non-highly enriched uranium technologies for the production of radioisotopes, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes.

110. The Conference notes the efforts to apply best practices and basic principles, as promoted by the IAEA, in mining and processing, including those related to environmental management of uranium mining.

111. The Conference encourages States parties to promote the sharing of best practices in the areas of nuclear safety and nuclear security, taking into account confidentiality of the information concerned, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

112. The Conference notes the attention to problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with former nuclear weapons programmes, and all aspects of remediation, including, where appropriate and technically and economically feasible, safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas.

113. The Conference encourages all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in these affected areas, while noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard.

Safe transport of radioactive materials

114. The Conference recognizes that, historically, the safety record of civilian transport, including maritime transport, of radioactive materials has been excellent, and stresses the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety of international transport.

115. The Conference reaffirms maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments.

116. The Conference welcomes the IAEA standards for the safe transport of radioactive material and affirms that it is in the interest of all States parties that the transportation of radioactive materials continues to be

conducted consistent with IAEA safety and security standards and guidelines. The Conference takes note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea and, in this regard, welcomes continuing efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

117. The Conference notes the guidelines on best practices for Voluntary and Confidential Government-to-Government Communications on the transport of MOX Fuel, high level radioactive waste and, as appropriate, irradiated nuclear fuel by sea, and encourages the continuation of the positive dialogue process between shipping and coastal States aimed at improving mutual understanding, confidence-building and enhanced communication in relation to the safe maritime transport of radioactive material, taking into account necessary confidentiality for security purposes. The Conference notes the Tabletop Exercise to be conducted within the Framework of the Dialogue between Coastal and Shipping States in June 2015.

Armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes

118. The Conference considers that attacks or threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and could raise serious issues pertaining to international law, and therefore calls upon all States parties, pursuant to action 64 of the 2010 Action plan, to abide by the decision of the IAEA General Conference of 18 September 2009, GC(53)/DEC/13, on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

Nuclear liability

119. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 April 2015.

120. The Conference recalls the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, the Joint Protocol Related to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention and the protocols amending these conventions, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, and notes that these conventions can provide the basis for establishing a worldwide nuclear liability regime based on the principles of nuclear liability law.

121. The Conference stresses the importance of having effective liability mechanisms in place to ensure prompt compensation for damage to people, property and the environment as well as actual economic loss due to radiological accident or incident during transport of radioactive material, including maritime transport, and notes the application of the principles of nuclear liability, including strict liability, in the event of a nuclear accident or incident during the transport of radioactive material.

Article V

122. The Conference affirms that the provisions of article V of the Treaty with regard to the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs

123. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

124. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the importance of the full implementation by all States parties of article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference.

125. The Conference reaffirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and to completely implement their nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps and the plan of action on nuclear disarmament, that were agreed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

126. The Conference reaffirms that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

127. The Conference notes the agreement by the nuclear-weapon States on a common reporting framework and the submission of their national reports at the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in 2014 and at the 2015 Review Conference, pursuant to the relevant actions of the conclusions and recommendations agreed at the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference welcomes the further information provided by some nuclear-weapon States with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories.

128. The Conference notes the meetings of the nuclear-weapon States held in Paris (2011), Washington (2012), Geneva (2013), Beijing (2014) and London (2015), which fostered dialogue and common approaches amongst themselves to strengthen the Treaty and the continuation of this process and related bilateral efforts. The Conference notes the submission of a glossary of key nuclear terms, which does not alter the definitions or meanings of any nuclear terms in international treaties, international commitments or national laws or regulations.

129. The Conference recognizes and welcomes the steps taken to implement the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the significant reductions in deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, as well as their dismantling nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

130. The Conference also notes the fulfilment as declared by the United Kingdom of its commitment made in 2010 to further reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons, as well as the completion of its planned reductions in the number of operationally available nuclear warheads. The Conference notes the reaffirmation as declared by China to keep its nuclear weapon capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and of its policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons at any time. The Conference further notes the actions taken as declared by France on nuclear disarmament, including the completion of reductions by one-third of the air-borne component of its nuclear forces and the irreversible dismantlement of its production facilities for fissile material for nuclear weapons.

131. The Conference reaffirms the importance of all States applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

132. The Conference notes with concern that, despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral nuclear arms reductions, the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States still amounts to several thousands and many hundreds remain on high alert. The Conference stresses in this regard that

reductions in deployments and in operational status are welcome but cannot substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons as required under article VI of the Treaty. The Conference notes concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States regarding programmes for the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons as well as the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapon systems.

133. The Conference recognizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

134. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, and affirms the importance of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

135. The Conference reiterates its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

136. The Conference acknowledges the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

137. The Conference notes the growing interest during the 2010-2015 review cycle of non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the conferences that were held in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014), which added to the knowledge of non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society of the catastrophic consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation and the associated risks posed by nuclear weapons.

138. The Conference notes the various joint statements delivered at the Review Conference that addressed humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, including by Austria on behalf of 159 States parties on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and by Australia on behalf of 26 States parties on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference also notes the statements by the nuclear-weapon States and by Japan on behalf of 76 States parties on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Conference further notes the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

139. The Conference notes the Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austria and supported by 93 States parties, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which met at the level of Heads of State or Government.

140. The Conference affirms that the use of nuclear weapons would have immediate and long-term consequences, which are significantly graver than many States parties previously understood. The Conference notes that those States parties consider that no State or international organization could adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by such use.

141. The Conference recalls the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.

142. The Conference expresses its concern that since the 2010 Review Conference the Conference on Disarmament has not commenced substantive work on any agenda item in the context of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

143. The Conference notes the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on nuclear disarmament held on 26 September 2013 and the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/68/32 on Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament.

144. The Conference notes the efforts and discussions pursued within the United Nations General Assembly related to revitalizing the multilateral disarmament machinery, including the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/66 on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.
145. The Conference also notes the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/56 on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which established an open-ended working group.
146. The Conference takes note of the work of the group of governmental experts, established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/53 on a Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
147. The Conference welcomes that 183 States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and that 164 States, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited instruments of ratification. In this respect, the Conference welcomes the ratification of the CTBT since the 2010 Review Conference by Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq and Niue.
148. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date, recalling the responsibility of all State signatories to promote that Treaty.
149. The Conference further reaffirms the importance of the CTBT as a vital multilateral instrument for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference recognizes the importance to promote and achieve the entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. The Conference welcomes the efforts by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission toward the completion and provisional operationalization of the on-site inspection regime and encourages it to build upon the achievements at the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan.
150. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference recalls United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and the relevant protocols established pursuant to nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognizing that treaty-based unconditional and conditional security assurances are available to such zones.
151. The Conference notes the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory, unconditional, legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, including an internationally legally binding instrument, and recognizes the need to fully honour and uphold all existing security assurances given unilaterally and multilaterally.
152. The Conference welcomes efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will contribute to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, including the new and continuing initiatives pursued by Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The Conference notes additional proposals for concrete and practical measures for disarmament verification.
153. The Conference welcomes the increased and positive interaction with civil society during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

154. The Conference recognizes that accelerated efforts are required to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and timelines as set forth in the present document:

1. The Conference emphasizes that deep concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons are a key factor that should continue to underpin efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and that awareness of these consequences should lend urgency to efforts by all States leading to a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference affirms that, pending the realization of this objective, it is in the interest of humanity and the security of all peoples that nuclear weapons never be used again.
2. The Conference calls for the pursuit of all effective measures for the full implementation of article VI.
3. The Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.
4. The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking, to reduce further and eliminate, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of location, including through negotiations as well as unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.
5. The Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons with a view to concluding such negotiations as soon as possible. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the Russian Federation and the United States of America addressing all issues related to strategic stability in the nuclear disarmament process.
6. The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon States to engage over the course of the next review cycle, with a view to achieving rapid reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.
7. The Conference calls upon all States concerned to continue to review their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies over the course of the next review cycle, with a view to reducing further the role and significance of nuclear weapons therein.
8. The Conference urges the nuclear-weapon States to continue undertaking all efforts necessary to comprehensively address the risks of unintended nuclear detonations, including, but not limited to, protection of command and control systems against potential cyber threats.
9. The Conference encourages the consideration of further practical measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.
10. The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon States to build upon and expand their efforts to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, including by intensifying their discussions on definitions and terminology related to nuclear weapons, with a view to facilitating and accelerating nuclear disarmament.
11. Welcoming the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States in a common reporting framework, the Conference encourages further detailed reporting. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to

provide regular reports on their nuclear disarmament-related undertakings in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 action plan and further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to continue their engagement on a standard reporting form and to report to the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, encouraging them to take into account the following items, without prejudice to national security: (i) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes. The Conference agrees that the 2020 Review Conference and the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee should allocate specific time to review the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States.

Towards the fulfillment of action 20 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference calls upon States parties to increase the quality, quantity and consistency of their reports as a contribution to enhanced transparency and to report on their efforts to implement all aspects of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

The 2020 Review Conference will review the progress made in implementing this reporting mechanism and consider next steps in this regard.

12. Recalling action 6 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.
13. Recalling action 7 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, to immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.
14. The Conference encourages all States concerned to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to review any related reservations and interpretive declarations over the course of the next review cycle with a view to their withdrawal. The Conference encourages the parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States to continue to engage constructively in order to resolve outstanding issues.
15. In reaffirming actions 10 to 14 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference calls upon the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to take individual initiatives to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other State to do so. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty and against the backdrop of, inter alia, widespread concerns regarding the impact on health and the environmental consequences resulting from nuclear tests and, in particular, the effects on children's and women's health, all States commit to cease and refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action, including those at former nuclear test sites, that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and to maintain moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions. The Conference recalls that the CTBT will provide an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

16. Recalling action 15 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, to immediately begin negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. These negotiations should take into account, in particular, all substantive work undertaken during the past review cycle.
17. The Conference encourages all States, including in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, taking into account the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of verification, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, including through the new and continuing initiatives pursued under the leadership of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification initiated by the United States of America.
18. In light of the 70th year since the end of the tragic devastations of World War II, the Conference encourages all States, including in cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, local governments, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the private sector, to continue and intensify efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education to raise awareness of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and directly sharing the experiences of the people and the communities affected by nuclear weapons to know their humanitarian impact. The Conference also encourages all States to make use of new information and communication technology in these efforts.
19. The Conference recommends that the United Nations General Assembly establish at its seventieth session an open-ended working group to identify and elaborate effective measures for the full implementation of article VI, including legal provisions or other arrangements that contribute to and are required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The legal provisions could be established through various approaches, including a stand-alone instrument or a framework agreement. Without prejudice to the prerogative of the United Nations General Assembly to determine the methods of work of its subsidiary bodies in accordance with its rules of procedure, the Conference recommends that the open-ended working group conduct its work on the basis of consensus. The Conference encourages all States to engage in this open and inclusive process.

Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

155. The Conference reaffirms the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms its support for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

156. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference welcomes the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012, concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. The Conference also welcomes the increased cooperation amongst the parties to the zones. The Conference notes the convening of the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia in 2015.

157. The Conference welcomes the progress toward ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and the continuing efforts in this regard of the parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties look forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.

158. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to bring into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

159. The Conference underlines the importance of the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East.

South Asia and other regional issues

160. The Conference expresses concern about other regions in Asia where nuclear stockpiles pose challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the shared goals of a world without nuclear weapons and, in this regard, urges restraints and relevant efforts to help create the conditions for regional and global disarmament.

161. The Conference strongly deplores the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests, as required by the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces, which undermines the global nonproliferation regime.

162. The Conference recalls that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty, reiterates the international community's opposition to its possession of nuclear weapons, and strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and return, at an early date, to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards. The Conference expresses serious concern about its ongoing nuclear activities, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease all such activities immediately as required by the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

163. The Conference emphasizes the importance of full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. In this regard, the Conference calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with its United Nations Security Council obligations and take concrete steps to honor its relevant commitments. The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption so as to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond to diplomatic efforts aimed at creating favorable conditions for the resumption of Six-Party Talks.

The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

164. The Review Conference reaffirms its support for the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. The 1995 Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was extended indefinitely without a vote in 1995. States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

165. The Review Conference reaffirms that the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference remains an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and on the basis of which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote, remains valid until it is fully implemented.

166. The Review Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Review Conference calls on Israel, as a State belonging to the Middle East, as well as non-regional States India, Pakistan and South Sudan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve the universality of the Treaty at an early date.

167. The Review Conference recalls the steps adopted at the 2010 Review Conference in order to launch a process leading to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

168. The Conference notes the efforts of the facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution. The Conference deeply regrets that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (hereinafter "the conference") did not take place in 2012 and reaffirms that it is necessary to redouble the efforts aimed at holding the conference at an early date.

169. The Review Conference notes the overwhelming support expressed by the States parties to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. To that end, the Review Conference agrees on the following actions:

- i. The conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution.
- ii. The Review Conference entrusts the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene the conference no later than 1 March 2016, to which all States of the Middle East² will be invited. The conference will aim at launching a continuous process of negotiating and concluding a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region.
- iii. The co-sponsors will provide support for the preparatory process for the conference and the follow-up steps leading to establishment of the zone.
- iv. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution and all other States parties ensure that the conference will not be postponed.
- v. In order to ensure adequate preparation and a successful outcome of this conference, the Review Conference urges all States of the Middle East, to engage without delay in direct consultations through preparatory meetings to which all States of the region shall be invited.
- vi. The purpose of these consultations is to reach a consensus on the agenda of the conference. As soon as the agenda is agreed, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will convene the conference within 45 days.
- vii. All substantive decisions emerging from the preparatory process and the conference will be made by consensus by the States of the region.
- viii. In order to facilitate the process, the Review Conference requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations by 1 July 2015 to appoint a special representative. The special representative and the co-sponsors of the 1995

² States of the region defined as members of the League of Arab States, Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel.

Resolution, in consultation with the States of the Middle East, will spare no effort to ensure successful preparations for the conference and its outcome.

- ix. In addition to participation by the States of the region, the nuclear-weapon States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO), Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC-ISU) and the League of Arab States (LAS) will be invited to attend the conference as observers.
- x. The conference shall define follow up steps leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
- xi. States should assist the preparation of and holding of the conference as well as follow up steps by contributing the necessary funds to enable the Secretary-General of the United Nations to proceed with the arrangements as outlined above in accordance with established United Nations financial regulations.

170. The Review Conference welcomes the efforts taken by the European Union, IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO and BWC-ISU aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

171. The Review Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

172. The Review Conference further recognizes the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

Article VIII

173. The Conference reaffirms the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, and notes the relevant discussions undertaken in the 2010 Review Conference.

174. The Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity in the review cycle of the Treaty, and, in this context, notes the proposal that past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs of the Main Committees of the Review Conferences consult with the incoming President and Chairs of the Main Committees, if necessary, regarding practical matters related to their responsibilities. Participation in these meetings will be voluntary and will not affect the costs assessed to States parties.

175. The Conference calls for increased efficiency in the review process by considering the consolidation and streamlining of the work of the meetings, including the length and frequency of Preparatory Committee meetings. The Conference encourages interactive substantive discussions. The Conference recognizes the potential efficiency gains of using digital recordings and calls on the Secretariat to provide information pertaining to the various aspects of its use, including practices of other international organizations, to States parties at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee. The Conference encourages the continuing use of the PaperSmart platform.

176. The Conference further recognizes the importance of enhanced engagement with civil society, academia and experts; as well as making possible use of alternative meeting locations to promote the participation of States parties from all regions, while giving due consideration to cost implications.

Article IX

177. The Conference welcomes the accession to the Treaty by the State of Palestine in 2015, without prejudice to the positions of States parties, bringing the total number of States that have become parties to the Treaty to 191, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

178. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence is essential for the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty and calls upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to it without further delay and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.

179. The Conference encourages South Sudan to accede, as soon as possible, to the Treaty.

180. The Conference calls upon States to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

Article X

181. The Conference reaffirms that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

182. The Conference affirms States parties' commitment not to reinterpret any provision of the Treaty.

183. The Conference also reaffirms that notice of withdrawal shall be given to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance and shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

184. The Conference emphasizes that, without prejudice to the sovereign right to withdraw, States parties should undertake efforts to uphold the objective of universality and preserve the integrity and credibility of the Treaty through following an incentive based approach by balanced, full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all Treaty provisions by all States parties at all times.