

Joint Pub 4-05.1



# Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup



11 November 1998



# PREFACE

## 1. Scope

This publication provides the techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and monitoring Reserve Component mobilization and demobilization. It is the companion document to Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

## 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

## 3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DENNIS C. BLAIR  
Vice Admiral, US Navy  
Director, Joint Staff

Intentionally Blank

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	vii
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	
• Background .....	I-1
• Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process .....	I-1
• Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities .....	I-1
• Document Organization .....	I-3
CHAPTER II	
PLANNING	
• Purpose .....	II-1
• Mobilization Planning .....	II-2
• Deliberate Planning .....	II-2
• Crisis Action Planning .....	II-8
CHAPTER III	
RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING	
• Purpose .....	III-1
• Background .....	III-1
• Conduct Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination .....	III-1
• Inform Senior Leadership on Reserve Component Potential .....	III-3
• Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components .....	III-5
• Prepare Decision Packages .....	III-6
CHAPTER IV	
EXECUTION	
• Purpose .....	IV-1
• Background .....	IV-1
• Execution .....	IV-2
• Functional View .....	IV-2
CHAPTER V	
MONITORING AND REPORTING	
• Purpose .....	V-1
• Background .....	V-1
• Monitoring .....	V-2
• Reporting .....	V-6

# Table of Contents

---

## CHAPTER VI DEMOBILIZATION

• Purpose .....	VI-1
• Background .....	VI-1
• Preliminary Actions .....	VI-1
• Planning .....	VI-3
• Execution .....	VI-6

## APPENDIX

A Mobilization Activity Summaries .....	A-1
B Legal Authorities for Mobilization .....	B-1
C Levels of Mobilization .....	C-1
D References .....	D-1
E Administrative Instructions .....	E-1

## GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .....	GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions .....	GL-3

## FIGURE

I-1 Subprocesses of the Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process .....	I-2
I-2 The Mobilization Staff Officer .....	I-3
I-3 Organizational Roles for Manpower Mobilization .....	I-4
II-1 Accessibility and Use of the Reserve Components .....	II-1
II-2 Deliberate Planning Process .....	II-3
II-3 Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements .....	II-5
II-4 Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary (Appendix 5, Annex A) (FDO Execution) .....	II-6
II-5 Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary (Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution) .....	II-7
II-6 Planning Consequences .....	II-9
II-7 Reserve Component Role in Crisis Action Planning .....	II-10
III-1 Mobilization Staff Officer Tasks .....	III-2
III-2 Service Mobilization Policy .....	III-4
III-3 Level of Response .....	III-5
III-4 Reserve Component Decision Making Process .....	III-6
III-5 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Why Reserve Components? .....	III-7
III-6 Documents of a Reserve Component Callup Decision .....	III-8
III-7 Reserve Component Decision Making Process (Subsequent Callup or Transition from Presidential Selected Reserve Callup to Partial Mobilization) .....	III-9
III-8 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority (PSRC) Decision Making Timeline .....	III-10
III-9 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Lessons Learned .....	III-11

---

IV-1	Manpower Mobilization Execution Process .....	IV-3
IV-2	Functional View of Mobilization Process .....	IV-4
IV-3	Who Requested Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority .....	IV-4
IV-4	Management of Reserve Component Callup .....	IV-5
IV-5	Operation Joint Guard Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority Execution Timeline .....	IV-6
V-1	Monitoring and Reporting .....	V-2
V-2	Inter-Organizational Information Flow .....	V-3
V-3	Monitored Areas .....	V-4
V-4	Display of Mobilization Data .....	V-5
V-5	Mobilization Reporting Information Flows .....	V-7
V-6	Information Required by Congress for Partial Mobilization .....	V-9
VI-1	Demobilization Activities .....	VI-2
VI-2	Demobilization Policy Issues .....	VI-3
VI-3	Demobilization Planning Functions .....	VI-4
A-A-1	Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning .....	A-A-1
A-B-1	Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making .....	A-B-1
A-C-1	Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution .....	A-C-1
A-D-1	Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting .....	A-D-1
A-E-1	Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization .....	A-E-1
B-1	Legal Authorities for Mobilization .....	B-2
C-1	Levels of Mobilization .....	C-1

Intentionally Blank

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes Reserve Component (RC) Forces**
  - **Describes RC Manpower Mobilization Process**
  - **Covers RC Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities**
  - **Lists and Describes the Subprocesses of Manpower Mobilization**
- 

### Introduction

*The Total Force Policy combines active, Reserve, National Guard, military retirees, and civilian forces into an integrated implementation plan.*

Reserve and National Guard forces are collectively referred to as **Reserve Component (RC) forces**, and are not only required to help fight and win the nation's wars, but also are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflict prevention. **RC manpower mobilization** is the process of augmenting the active forces with units and individuals from the Services' RC forces. The various organizational levels — Joint Staff, Services, supported and supporting commanders in chief (CINCs) — have a role in the manpower mobilization process either as a provider or receiver of forces or as a supporting player.

### Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities

*Many of these responsibilities overlap and require close coordination during mobilization.*

**Mobilization staff officers (MSOs)** and **planners** play a critical role in manpower mobilization. There are also specific mobilization responsibilities assigned to the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting CINCs. **United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) functions as a joint force provider.** Its role allows it to look broadly at the supported CINC and the Service components under its command who resource the CINC's requirements, total forces available, and actual or potential missions to ensure optimum use of forces. When requested by the supported CINC, USACOM integrates force requirements that more than one Service is able to provide, such as engineers, security, and/or medical support. **United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the**



**force provider for special operations forces.** USSOCOM mobilizes its forces and coordinates with the Services to obtain mobilization support. The **US Transportation Command** provides strategic and theater mobility forces, and the **US Coast Guard** provides security units and personnel for port operations.

### Subprocesses of Manpower Mobilization

*The Reserve Component manpower mobilization process has five primary subprocesses: planning;*

**RC requirements planning** formulates a timely, specific, and comprehensive integration of total RC requirements. In **deliberate planning**, the total requirement for RC forces to support the operation plan (OPLAN) must be developed. The **five basic steps** of the deliberate planning process include initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and development of supporting plans. The **outputs** of the deliberate planning process are the **RC requirements summary tables**. These tables become Appendix 5, Annex A, of the OPLAN, and provide the numerical basis for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization. Crises frequently occur for which there is no plan; therefore, there is no developed Appendix 5, Annex A. Virtually all of these crises require RC support and most will require authority for involuntary callup. Action agencies will usually solicit volunteer RC support prior to requesting involuntary callup, but plans that require RC support must include requests for implementation of mobilization authorities. Early MSO involvement is essential during **crisis action planning** (CAP) due to the compressed timeframes and the lead times involved in executing callup. The same information required for a deliberate OPLAN must be determined for RC support of a crisis action plan. The main difference is that the process happens much more quickly and the estimates for RC requirements may be broad rather than precise.

*decision making;*

The MSO executes a series of responsibilities, chief among them being preparation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff RC Callup Decision Package. **Pre-mobilization review and coordination** occurs during possible crisis and mobilization scenarios when firm facts do not exist. During the situation development and crisis assessment phases of CAP, the MSO should be available and involved, but only to the point that the likely questions and requirements are known. Early in the operation, **MSOs need to inform the senior leaders of mobilization options based on requirements**. MSOs should provide information on forces available, mobilization requirements, lead times, and the procedures for obtaining a Reserve callup, should one prove necessary. Senior

leaders need to be briefed on the policies and laws governing RC activation. RC mobilization and deployment **policies need to be interpreted** and may need modification to satisfy the requirements of a crisis. **Decision packages** need to be prepared which begin with a request (normally by the supported CINC, but which may be made by a Service, supporting CINC, or the Joint Staff, to callup RC forces). If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees that mobilization is required, the Chairman tasks the Joint Staff MSO to prepare the RC Callup Decision Support Package.

*execution;*

**Execution** is decentralized. Once the Services issue orders within the Secretary of Defense's guidance and ceilings, **most mobilization activity takes place at units, mobilization stations, and transportation centers**. The MSOs monitor the mobilization process, make recommendations for improvement, and seek to optimize the use of human and materiel resources. From the MSO perspective, manpower mobilization execution **involves two centers of activity**. The first is the **distribution of executive orders and the delegation of authorities and notification procedures** necessary to actually order RC units and individuals to active duty. The second is a group of **management activities** that respond to the changing requirements and performance of the mobilization. During execution, **MSOs provide technical advice and assistance** to those with functional responsibilities; **monitor the implementation of decisions**; and **make periodic reports to the leadership** on the performance of the mobilization process.

*monitoring and reporting;*

**Monitoring and reporting** is an integral part of manpower mobilization. **The timely and accurate collection, analysis, and transmission of information is important** to ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations. **The Joint Staff, the Services, and CINCs comprise the communication interfaces** for the monitoring and reporting phase. Most of the mobilization **information flow** supporting operations is directly between the **supported CINC** and the **Services**.

**Monitoring involves gathering and analyzing data** to determine the status of forces and of the mobilization operation. To manage the mobilization system, the MSO monitors various facets of manpower mobilization such as source determination for filling requirements, arranging for the mobilized forces' deployment and/or redeployment, and demobilizing the units or individuals. MSOs have numerous reports and information systems available to monitor operations. **Reporting involves**

**extracting and compiling information that is obtained from monitoring activities, then providing the data** to appropriate organizations that are involved with mobilization and demobilization. The MSO responds to formal and informal reporting requirements.

### *and demobilization.*

Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, **demobilization is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and execution.** Often considered only at the end of an operation, **demobilization may occur during an operation** for the following reasons: expiration of authorized service time; changes in the forces required; or political considerations. **Mobilization and demobilization may occur simultaneously.** Consequently, each Service must ensure that demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meet all contingencies. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major impacts: **degradation to supported operations** and **reduced support for the RC program.**

There are **three primary groups of demobilization activities:** preliminary actions, planning, and execution. **Preliminary actions** set the stage for planning and executing a successful demobilization. Primarily, they involve establishing and disseminating broad guidance that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans. **Demobilization planning** involves reviewing policies and establishing procedures to demobilize. During this phase, planners determine operational support requirements and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning function is divided into two subactivities: planning the demobilization force and planning the demobilization support. During **execution**, MSOs constantly tailor the demobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. They staff recommendations and obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the demobilization support structure.

## CONCLUSION

This publication provides the techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and monitoring RC mobilization and demobilization.

# CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

## THE TOTAL FORCE

*“The Total Force requires the unique contributions of each of its Active and Reserve Components and its Civilian employees. All elements of the Total Force must be appropriately organized, modernized, trained, and integrated...”*

**Reserve Components.** *The Reserve Components, in addition to being essential participants in the full range of military operations, are an important link between the Armed Forces and the public. Mobilization of the Reserve Components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will. Guardsmen and reservists are not only integrated into war plans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. National Guard and other Reserve Component elements also provide the NCA with a strategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expand our Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rotational base to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the Active Components.”*

**National Military Strategy of the United States:  
Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy For A New Era  
1997**

## 1. Background

The **Total Force Policy** combines active, Reserve, National Guard, military retirees, and civilian forces into an integrated implementation plan. **Reserve and National Guard forces are collectively referred to as Reserve Component (RC) forces**, and are not only required to help fight and win the nation’s wars, but also are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflict prevention. **RC manpower mobilization** is the process of augmenting the active forces with units and individuals from the Services’ RC forces. The various organizational levels — Joint Staff, Services, supported and supporting commanders in chief (CINCs) — have a role in the manpower mobilization process either as a provider or receiver of forces, or as a supporting player. The integration of mobilization in the planning

process will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment process.

## 2. Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process

The RC manpower mobilization process has five primary subprocesses: **planning, decision making, execution, monitoring and reporting, and demobilization** (See Figure I-1). This publication discusses each subprocess in subsequent chapters.

## 3. Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities

This section briefly defines the **mobilization staff officers’ (MSOs’) and planners’ roles**. As shown in Figure I-2, the




Figure I-1. Subprocesses of the Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process

MSO must have a variety of skills. Figure I-3 outlines the mobilization responsibilities of the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting CINCs. Many of these responsibilities overlap and require close coordination during mobilization.

a. **United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) functions as a joint force provider.** Its role allows it to look broadly at the supported CINC and the Service components under its command who resource the CINC's requirements, total forces available, and actual or potential missions to ensure optimum use of forces. **USACOM recommends sourcing from the following organizations:** Forces Command for the Army; Air Combat Command for the Air Force; Atlantic Fleet for the Navy; Marine Forces Atlantic for the Marine Corps; and the Department of Transportation for the Coast Guard. When requested by the supported CINC, **USACOM integrates force requirements that more than one Service is able to provide** such as engineers, security,

and/or medical support. USACOM assigns responsibility to its subordinate commands in coordination with the Service(s) and the supported CINC.

b. **United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the force provider for special operations forces.** USSOCOM mobilizes its forces and coordinates with the Services to obtain mobilization support.

c. **United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the single manager within the Department of Defense (DOD) for planning and operations for DOD transportation for other than Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets.** USTRANSCOM is responsible for providing air, sea, and land transportation for DOD users in times of both peace and war. Under DOD Directive (DODD) 5158.4, "United States Transportation Command," USTRANSCOM is directed to exercise combatant command



**Figure I-2. The Mobilization Staff Officer**

(command authority) of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Air Mobility Command (AMC). MTMC, MSC, and AMC rely on the RC to meet surge lift requirements. Early access to the RC during a developing crisis is necessary to effectively meet surge lift requirements.

#### **4. Document Organization**

Each of the following chapters cover one of the **five subprocesses of manpower mobilization**. Paragraphs within each chapter identify the **subordinate activities** and **tasks** that make up these subprocesses. **Responsible organizations** are annotated in brackets at the end of the task discussions.

**The five appendixes contain specific reference material.** Appendix A, “Mobilization Activity Summaries,” summarizes the activities and tasks associated with the five manpower mobilization subprocesses. Appendix B, “Legal Authorities for Mobilization,” reviews the legal authorities that may be used to implement mobilization. Appendix C, “Levels of Mobilization,” indicates the number of forces and the duration of active duty authorized for different requirements such as partial and full mobilization. Appendix D, “References,” lists some of the documents that may be useful in manpower mobilization. Appendix E, “Administrative Instructions,” provides document distribution and feedback change instructions.

<b>ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES FOR MANPOWER MOBILIZATION</b>	
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mobilization Responsibilities</b>
Joint Staff	<p>Monitors the mobilization process to determine operational impacts. Ensures that mobilization system capability assessments are integrated into operational decision making:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Adjudicates resource allocations</li> <li>● Determines mobilization levels</li> <li>● Obtains authorities</li> <li>● Seeks cross-Service efficiencies</li> <li>● Educates leadership</li> <li>● Tracks the status of mobilization through military manpower mobilization and accession status reports (MOBREPs) provided by the Services</li> </ul>
Service	<p>Responsible under Title 10 to acquire, train, and equip forces and support organizations with RC requirement by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Providing trained, equipped, and ready units and individuals</li> <li>● Sourcing time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) requirements</li> <li>● Determining RC requirements to assist in mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment, and providing to the supported CINC for inclusion in the operation plan (OPLAN)</li> <li>● Developing mobilization and demobilization policies and plans</li> <li>● Developing mobilization systems to support CINC requirements</li> <li>● Managing mobilization and/or demobilization and report status to the Joint Staff via MOBREPs</li> </ul>
Supported CINC	<p>The supported CINC's primary role in the manpower mobilization process is establishing requirements for forces. These requirements are articulated in the TPFDD associated with each OPLAN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Develops time-phased list of force requirements</li> <li>● Collects data from the Services for other organizations with RC requirements to deploy, backfill, assist in mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment and move the force; and compiles data in Appendix 5, Annex A of the OPLAN</li> <li>● Determines casualty factors and medical evacuation policies upon which to base replacement flow</li> <li>● Determines host-nation support and other US force offsets</li> <li>● Reports availability of units and individuals for demobilization</li> <li>● Supports reception and retrograde of units and individuals</li> <li>● Coordinates and reviews Service and Service component commanders' RC mobilization plans</li> </ul>
Supporting CINC	<p>The supporting CINCs have two mobilization roles, one as a receiver of forces and the second as a provider of manpower and logistic support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Develops time-phased list of force requirements</li> <li>● Reports availability of units and individuals for demobilization</li> <li>● Provides manpower and materiel support as tasked</li> <li>● Coordinates and reviews Service and Service component commanders' RC mobilization plans</li> </ul>

Figure I-3. Organizational Roles for Manpower Mobilization

## CHAPTER II PLANNING

*"Long and careful deliberations promise great safety in war, whereas hasty and impetuous generals usually commit serious blunders."*

**Emperor Maurice**  
**The Strategikon**  
**600 AD**

### 1. Purpose

This chapter explains **RC requirements planning**. As shown in Figure II-1, accessibility to and use of the RC is critical. The timely, specific, and comprehensive integration of total RC requirements into plans provides the following benefits.

a. **Early apportionment** of RC combat, combat support and/or combat service support forces, and the cross-leveling and redistribution of RC equipment.

b. **Increased visibility** of RC capabilities (such as logistics enabling capabilities) and specialty support (such as civil engineering, civil affairs, and medical).




Figure II-1. Accessibility and Use of the Reserve Components



- c. **Improved accessibility** to RC forces.
- d. **Increased efficiencies** to the force providers (Services and supporting CINCs).

## 2. Mobilization Planning

The following provisions of law and Defense Department policy ensure that Service mobilization plans are fully integrated with joint campaign and operation plans (OPLANs).

a. **Military Departments.** Title 10 United States Code (USC), “Armed Forces,” clearly assigns the Secretaries of the Military Departments the responsibility and authority necessary to conduct all affairs of their departments, including the functions of mobilizing and demobilizing. The Department of Defense and the Military Departments issue policy and guidance to support functional areas of mobilization planning at all levels.

b. **Combatant Commanders.** The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in his 6 September 1996 memorandum, “Assignment of Forces,” established as a matter of DOD policy, the authority that combatant

commanders may exercise over assigned RC forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training is Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO). He further established that TRO includes the authority to “coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned RC forces.” The Secretary of Defense directed that his annual “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum will reflect this policy guidance.

## 3. Deliberate Planning

*“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.”*

**Napoleon  
1769 - 1821**

a. In deliberate planning, the total requirement for RC forces to support the OPLAN must be developed. Figure II-2 depicts the **basic steps of the deliberate planning process and one of the outputs of that process, the RC requirements summary tables.** These tables become Appendix 5 to Annex A, of the OPLAN. **The RC requirements summary tables list the**



*Once TPFDD requirements are determined, component sourcing should be completed in order to accurately estimate RC units and manpower required.*

# DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS




Figure II-2. Deliberate Planning Process

**aggregate RC support necessary for the execution of all phases of the OPLAN, and are used as the numerical justification for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization.**

b. **The Five Basic Steps of the Deliberate Planning Process.** The basic steps of the deliberate planning process as depicted in Figure II-2 include the following: **initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.** Each step of the RC requirements process (in context with the deliberate planning process) is described in subsequent subparagraphs. Process stakeholders are identified at the end of each paragraph.

- **Initiate Deliberate Planning.** The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides for the apportionment of major combat forces and selected special operations forces (SOF). These and other force requirements are broadly defined by the supported CINC's strategic concept and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) letter of instruction (LOI) to guide plan development. During the "Initiate Deliberate Planning" phase, the following steps are accomplished.

- **Consider implications of RC use** and provide input or feedback on RC requirements and assumptions to the staffing of high-level guidance documents such as the JSCP; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.13, "Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan;" and the Defense Planning Guidance [All].

- **Participate in the planner's development of the supported CINC's TPFDD LOI** and related actions to ensure that RC mobilization guidance

and taskings are visible and fully understood [All].

- **Review the LOI** to ensure that a stated requirement for production of Appendix 5 to Annex A, based on the OPLAN TPFDD is included [Supported CINC].

- **Concept Development.** During this phase, the MSO becomes familiar with the CINC's strategic concept and TPFDD LOI and checks each for consistent RC planning factors such as unit readiness, equipment on hand, personnel training, assumptions, and feasibility. If there are inconsistencies, the MSO provides immediate feedback to the supported CINC. The product of this phase is the supported CINC's total force requirement [All].

- **Plan Development.** During plan development, the process to source the plan TPFDD occurs (See Figure II-2). The Services select units to meet the time-phased requirements of the supported CINC. When the Services source a plan TPFDD, the deliberate planner, with the MSO's advice, adds an important dimension to the sourcing process by considering where Service capabilities reside. These selected units may be active forces, a combination of active and RC, or even combinations that include civilian and contractor support. After requirements are determined, there must be a concerted effort to identify component sourcing, either active or RC, to increase the accuracy of specifying the total RC units and manpower required. At the end of this phase, the draft TPFDD is available. Normally, this provides the bulk of the RC requirement and enables the supported CINC MSO to create the draft RC Requirements Summary Tables for Appendix 5 to Annex A, of the associated plan. At this point, the

TPFDD is sourced and considered final. However, the RC requirements summary tables in Appendix 5, Annex A, must still be finalized by each Service using TPFDD data. The Services and supporting CINCs give the supported CINC draft data that must be compiled and included in the supporting plans to complete the RC requirement (See Figure II-3). Once a plan is completed, the original mobilization assumptions are either validated or refuted [Services and supported CINC].

- **Review of Operation Plans.** In this phase, the Joint Staff, with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate as the lead, conducts a formal review of the OPLAN. The Logistics Directorate (J-4) MSO reviews the RC requirements summaries and supporting data.
- **Develop Support Plans.** During this phase, supporting CINCs and Services finalize requirements in several areas:

movement of the force, mobilization and deployment support, sustainment operations, and backfill capabilities. These requirements are reduced to TPFDD data. The TPFDD data is used to identify specific RC units to be mobilized to support the deployment and sustainment of forces. [Supporting CINCs, Services, supported CINC].

- c. **RC Requirements Summary Tables.** The summary tables identify RC forces and support forces required to accomplish the following: deploy to the CINC’s area of responsibility (AOR); move the force; assist in mobilization, deployment, and sustainment; and backfill departing Active component (AC) units and individuals. **Decision makers need CINC and Service estimates of total RC requirements at the beginning of a crisis.** Too often, war planners are unaware of the total RC requirement to support the OPLAN under development. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats




Figure II-3. Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements

and Guidance),” JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,” require completion of Appendix 5 to Annex A, to OPLANs. The RC requirements summary depicts these total RC requirements. Appendix 5 to Annex A should contain the number of RC requirement summaries necessary to support requests for mobilization legal authorities. For instance, if the flexible deterrent option (FDO) phase of the plan requires Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority (PSRC) and a subsequent phase requires partial mobilization, separate RC requirements summaries must be prepared for each of these phases to support the requests for PSRC and subsequently for partial mobilization. It is not necessary to prepare a separate RC requirement summary for each FDO in the OPLAN. Mobilization planners analyze FDOs in the aggregate to determine the point at which PSRC becomes necessary and prepare one summary to support the request. These summaries provide senior leadership with the data required to determine the level of mobilization necessary to execute various phases of the plan. Figure II-4 is an example of a CINC’s RC requirements summary to support an FDO associated with an OPLAN. This summary would be used by the MSO to justify a recommendation to request a PSRC. Figure II-5 is an example of a CINC’s RC

requirement summary to support the execution of the entire OPLAN. The total RC requirement is over 200,000 reservists, indicating that partial mobilization authority is necessary to execute this OPLAN.

- **Flexible Deterrent Option.** FDO execution may require PSRC. Provide RC requirements summaries as required in CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),” for FDO(s) determined most likely to require sourcing of forces from the RC.

- **FDO Determination.** The supported CINC coordinates with the Services, supporting CINCs, and other agencies to determine which FDO or combinations of FDOs within a plan have RC requirements. Even though the CINC’s concept for deploying forces as part of an FDO may include active forces only, RC forces still may be required to support continental United States (CONUS)-based operations such as transportation support and lines of communications openings [All].

- **FDO RC Requirements Summary.** Based on the FDO(s) selected, the MSO compiles RC requirements and

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY (Appendix 5, Annex A) (FDO Execution)								
OPLAN 1234		X	FDO(s) RC26			PLAN EXECUTION		
S V C	RC IN AOR	MOVE THE FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN		BACKFILL		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERVICE	
			IMA	OTHER	CONUS	OCONUS		
A	0	1,200	310	900	700	350	3,460	
N	0	300	33	1,200	600	220	2,353	
AF	0	1,300	140	1,550	990	20	4,010	
M	0	25	60	90	270	150	595	
CG	0	0	3	15	0	10	28	
TOTALS		0	2,825	546	3,755	2,560	750	10,436

Figure II-4. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary (Appendix 5, Annex A) (FDO Execution)

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY (Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)							
OPLAN <u>1234</u>		FDO(s) _____			X PLAN EXECUTION		
S V C	RC IN AOR	MOVE THE FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN		BACKFILL		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERVICE
			IMA	OTHER	CONUS	OCONUS	
A	174,300	550	2,350	5,300	1,100	1,350	184,950
N	21,400	3,200	83	2,200	6,200	1,220	34,303
AF	5,300	31,300	840	1,550	990	205	40,185
M	11,600	5	120	210	770	3,150	15,855
CG	1,430	180	0	25	0	0	1,635
TOTALS 214,030		35,235	3,393	9,285	9,060	5,925	276,928

**Figure II-5. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary (Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)**

completes the table as is done for complete plan execution [All].

- **Operation Plans.** Appendix 5 to Annex A of OPLANs will explain the underlying assumptions of each RC requirements summary (i.e., RC requirements for FDO execution are additive or inclusive).

- **RC in AOR.** During the plan development phase (following CINC submission of total force requirements and development of a draft TPFDD), the Services calculate and provide the supported CINC with two sets of data that produce the RC manpower numbers in the “RC in AOR” column: (1) **RC unit personnel in TPFDD.** Self-explanatory [Services, supported CINC]; and (2) **RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD.** This number is calculated to provide the best estimate of the RC portion of TPFDD non-unit personnel. This includes planned fillers and replacements, who may not all come from the AC, particularly if planning the second of two major theater wars (MTWs). For example, if 10,000 fillers and replacements are planned for deploying units, a planner might estimate that 2,000 of these would be RC. This

could be based on pre-determined assumptions such as physical location of active or RC forces; time to callup and deploy RC forces; duration of decisive force in plan execution; or requirements to consider another MTW. Even though the plan and the TPFDD may not specify active or RC for fillers and replacements, the MSO provides the planner with assistance to define the RC portion of this requirement to complete the table [Services, supported CINC].

- **Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment, and Backfill.** During the supporting plans phase, the Services, supporting CINCs, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies define their non-TPFDD requirements to support complete plan execution. The Services coordinate with these organizations to identify actual RC forces needed to meet these requirements. (1) **Move the Force.** Enter the RC units and individuals required to support the strategic operations of MTMC, MSC, AMC, and USTRANSCOM [All]. (2) **Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment.** (a) **Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).** Enter the number of IMAs required to support the Services,



*In order to move the force effectively, decision makers need Service estimates of total RC requirements at the beginning of a crisis.*

DOD agencies, the Joint Staff, and CINC staffs[All]. (b) **Other.** Enter the RC units required to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the force, such as medical, dental, security, and mobilization processing site staffs; air and/or sea departure control groups; maintenance support activities; and Coast Guard port safety and security units forces. Aggregate the estimates of the RC portion of any non-unit personnel — fillers and replacements — for the “Move the Force” and “Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment” categories required to support CONUS organizations [Services]. (3) **Backfill.** Enter RC units and individuals required to replace deploying units and/or individuals in both CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) categories (For example, Army RC medics needed to deploy to Europe to fill unit and individual billets vacated by active duty medics sent to an AOR in Asia) [All].

#### 4. Crisis Action Planning

*“In military practice one must plan quickly and carry on without delay, so as to give the enemy no time to collect himself.”*

*“I work in minutes, not in hours.”*

**Field Marshal Prince  
Aleksandr V. Suvotov  
1729 - 1800**

a. **Crises frequently occur for which there is no plan;** therefore, there is no developed Appendix 5, Annex A. Virtually all of these crises require at least voluntary RC support and some may require an RC callup. **Early MSO involvement is essential** during crisis action planning (CAP) due to the compressed timeframes and the lead times involved in executing callup. Political events may dictate that the authority to involuntarily recall the RC, may not be given before C-Day. CINCs and Services should budget and plan



to access select RC early deploying individuals and units via voluntary recall procedures. The planning consequences of failing to plan RC augmentation are shown in Figure II-6.

b. **Figure II-7 depicts the steps of CAP.** Once a course of action (COA) is selected, the supported CINC's total force requirement begins to take shape. As in deliberate planning, the Services source the CINC's requirements, determining which requirements will be sourced with RC assets.

c. **The same information required for a deliberate OPLAN must be determined for RC support of CAP.** The main difference is that the process happens much more quickly and the estimates for RC requirements may be broad rather than precise. The Services use force requirements developed by supported and supporting CINCs to source

the RC in the AOR, move the force, provide mobilization support, and backfill. The supported CINC assembles this data [All].

d. **During CAP, C-day and even D-day may precede the development of final force requirements.** Requirements may increase if unforeseen tasks emerge or the civilian leadership assigns additional missions to the military. MSOs, planners, and decision makers should not define the RC requirement too precisely or narrowly in the early stages of a crisis. Experience has shown that **the requirement will grow**. A tradeoff exists between accuracy and speed. Strategic **speed and flexibility** demand that the MSO gain timely approval of the callup request so that units and individuals can be alerted, assembled, trained, validated, and deployed to meet the CINC's operational timelines. Using lessons learned from past experiences, MSOs must be able to make rapid estimates




Figure II-6. Planning Consequences






Figure II-7. Reserve Component Role in Crisis Action Planning

of requirements in order to make timely decisions. MSOs must be able to articulate the strategic costs of spending limited time to further refine the requirement numbers [All].

e. **Security and MSO Access.** MSOs should be read into and briefed on the operation at the first consideration of RC

utilization. Utilization of the RC force requires the same or greater consideration and planning as use of active forces. Security classification and compartmentation are not reasons to exclude the MSO from planning. The special capabilities resident in the RC make MSO involvement critical to ensure proper planning [All].

Intentionally Blank

# CHAPTER III

## RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING

*“Wars are paid for by the possession of reserves.”*

**Thucydides**  
**Peloponnesian Wars**  
**404 BC**

### 1. Purpose

This chapter describes the **activities that influence the decision** to call RC forces to active duty. It discusses the specific actions required to produce and coordinate the RC callup decision package, and highlights other mobilization-related events where the MSO can contribute to the decision making process.

### 2. Background

Joint Pub 5-03.1, **“Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),”** defines the process for both deliberate and crisis action planning. This chapter discusses, in general terms, the various responsibilities of the MSO, with special emphasis on preparation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) RC Callup Decision Package. RC callup decision making activities are discussed in the sequence in

which they may occur during a crisis; however, the potential exists for simultaneous actions. Annex B of Appendix A, “Chapter III, Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making,” identifies the key tasks for each involved organization.

### 3. Conduct Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination

a. Though a specific request for mobilization may not exist, the MSO must keep abreast of developments and be aware of potential mobilization scenarios. This is a continuous, informal process that may or may not result in a decision to mobilize RC assets. During the situation development and crisis assessment phases of CAP, the MSO should be made available and involved, but only to the point that the likely questions and requirements are known. During this period, the MSO confirms the mobilization points of contact (POCs) network; evaluates



*The MSO obtains information to monitor and report on the RC callup status.*

assumptions pertaining to use of RC in appropriate plans; reviews lessons learned from similar operations; develops answers to “what if” questions; and reviews projected RC requirements.

b. The following **MSO’s routine tasks** are conducted with a sense of urgency due to the potential crisis (See Figure III-1).

- **Understand the Procedural and Statutory Requirements.** In preparing to brief leaders on procedural and statutory requirements for RC callup, the MSO reviews Title 10 USC; the Services’ mobilization plans; and lessons learned from previous operations (Appendix D, “References,” also lists useful reference documents on manpower mobilization). The statutes applicable to RC callup are complex. The review of applicable legal authorities must be conducted with the

assistance of legal counsel [Joint Staff and/or Services].

- **Review and Update Projected RC Requirements.** As the planning and operations communities develop information on the requirement for RC forces, the supported CINC (along with the Services) updates the planning information in Appendix 5 to Annex A, of the anticipated plan, if available. A request for RC callup should contain as a minimum: RC requirements in CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),” Appendix 5 to Annex A format; a recommendation for the level of force mobilization (i.e., PSRC or full or partial mobilization); and the expected duration of the proposed callup [Joint Staff, supported CINC, and/or Services].




Figure III-1. Mobilization Staff Officer Tasks

- **Coordinate Reporting Requirements.** As the crisis escalates, the MSO obtains information to be able to monitor and report on the RC callup status. MSOs also coordinate with the Services' POCs to ensure that accurate information is available for senior-level manpower mobilization reports. Chapter V, "Monitoring and Reporting," covers the details on reporting mobilization activities [Joint Staff, Services, and/or supporting CINC].
- **Review SecDef, CJCS, and Service Secretaries' Guidance for RC Callup.** The MSO coordinates mobilization guidance [All].
- **Review Lessons Learned and Remedial Action Programs.** Joint Universal Lessons Learned System from previous operations and Service remedial action programs provide historical mobilization challenges valuable to MSOs [Joint Staff, Services, and/or CINCs].
- **Determine Sources of Immediate Manpower Augmentation.** Early in a crisis, many organizations need manpower augmentation. The MSO contributes to the augmentation decision by knowing the authorities for each alternative and the assets available, and providing the pros and cons of the various alternatives. Some manpower alternatives are as follows:
  - Volunteers including voluntary tours of active duty for special work (10 USC 12301[d]) [Services];
  - Fifteen-day involuntary callup authority (includes unit members and IMAs) (10 USC 12301[b]) [Services];
  - Involuntary callup of retirees (10 USC 688) [Services]; and
  - **PSRC.** Recent experience with the use of PSRC shows that authority was granted in a timely manner that allowed for effective mission accomplishment; however, this occurs only when PSRC requests could be fully justified and included detailed RC requirements [All]. NOTE: Section 511, FY98 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amends 10 USC 12304 (Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority) to allow involuntary activation of up to 30,000 members (within the 200,000 authority) of a new sub-category of Individual Ready Reserve, as defined by FY98 NDAA change to 10 USC 10144.

#### 4. Inform Senior Leadership on Reserve Component Potential

*"When one has a good reserve, one does not fear one's enemies."*

**Richard I, King of England**  
**Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal**  
**1220**

a. Early in the operation, **MSOs need to inform the senior leaders on the mobilization requirements and procedures.** MSOs should provide information on forces available, mobilization requirements, lead times, and the procedures for obtaining a Reserve callup, should one prove necessary. Senior leaders need to be briefed on the policies and laws governing RC activation.

b. **The MSO performs the following actions** in preparing the leadership to address mobilization issues.

- **Review Mobilization Plans, Policies, and Procedures.** Some useful mobilization reference publications are listed in Appendix D, "References." As a minimum, the MSO needs to review the following publications [All].

- Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”
- Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”
- CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- Appropriate Service mobilization plans (for example, Army Mobilization and Operation Planning and Execution System, the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan, the Air Force War and Mobilization

Plan, Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan, and the Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan). Service Reserve forces employment preferences are shown in Figure III-2.

- DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves.”
- DOD Instruction (DODI) 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves.”
- DODI 1100.19G, “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures.”




Figure III-2. Service Mobilization Policy

- **Review Legal Authorities.** Appendix B, “Legal Authorities for Mobilization,” gives the MSO a ready reference to the appropriate legal authorities that are invoked to execute mobilization actions. Appendix C, “Levels of Mobilization,” shows the levels of mobilization to support various operations. MSOs must consult with their Judge Advocate to confirm the interpretation and application of these legal authorities [All].
- **Review Civilian Mobilization Plans and Policies.** The MSO needs to be familiar with the legal authorities and procedures for the mobilization of civilians. The following documents provide necessary guidance.
  - DODD 1400.31, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution” [All].
  - DODD 1400.32, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency

Planning Guidelines and Procedures” [Services].

## 5. Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components

As shown in Figure III-3, RC mobilization and deployment policies may need modification to satisfy the requirements of a crisis. An available asset may not be appropriate for the crisis; for example: (1) individuals assigned to a unit apportioned to an OPLAN TPFDD, or who are not physically qualified, or who have documented personal hardships; (2) only Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve Volunteers are accessible under PSRC and only Ready Reserve are accessible under partial mobilization; (3) generally RC personnel assigned to units should be mobilized and demobilized as a unit (see 10 USC 12301 [c]); and (4) Governor’s consent is required to mobilize National Guardsmen volunteering for active duty or ordered to active duty for short tour (15 days




Figure III-3. Level of Response



or less) (see 10 USC 12301 [b] or [d]) [Services].

### 6. Prepare Decision Packages

a. **The formal callup process begins with a request** (normally by the supported CINC, but that may be made by a Service, supporting CINC, or the Joint Staff) to callup RC forces. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees that mobilization is required, **the Chairman tasks the Joint Staff MSO to prepare the RC Callup Decision Support Package.** Figure III-4 depicts the actions.

Figure III-5 shows the reasoning for RC during the Iraq crisis of Feb 98.

b. The following tasks describe the **sequence of events** that produce the completed package.

- **Prepare Decision Package.** The Joint Staff MSO coordinates and integrates Service mobilization requirements. Based upon the consolidated requests, the MSO prepares the mobilization decision package for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recommends a COA




Figure III-4. Reserve Component Decision Making Process

## FEB 98 IRAQ CRISIS: WHY RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) ?

- **Total Force Policy** –Greater dependence upon RC
  - Active component capability committed
  - Limited capability only available in RC
- **Immediate Callup: (400 Personnel)**
  - Biological integrated detection system
  - Commando Solo aircraft
  - Port security
  - Mobile inshore undersea warfare
- **Timely response for follow-on requirements:**
  - Mobility
  - Volunteer transition/retention
  - Individuals (staff augment, backfill, medical)

Figure III-5. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Why Reserve Components?

to the President through the Secretary of Defense. **Figure III-6 lists the documents required in the decision package.** The Services apportion RC assets, according to Appendix 5 to Annex A requirements to the CINC's OPLAN [Joint Staff and/or Services].

- **Staff Decision Package.** The Joint Staff MSO sends the decision package to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff Directorates, supported and supporting CINCs, USTRANSCOM, USACOM, USSOCOM, the Services, and the Secretary of Transportation for Coast Guard, for validation. This coordination develops consensus on the level of mobilization and avoids multiple requests for additional callup authorities [Joint Staff].
- **Forward Coordinated Decision Package to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The MSO forwards the coordinated decision package, through the Director of the Joint Staff, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman then presents the request to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation to forward it to the President [Joint Staff].
- **Prepare Decision Package for Additional or Subsequent Callup.** After the initial approval of the RC callup, there may be additional RC requirements later in the operation. Also, an extended operation which exceeds the legal limits of 270 days for PSRC or 24 months for partial mobilization may require an RC forces' rotation. The

## DOCUMENTS OF A RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION PACKAGE

### *A complete Decision Package includes:*

- ✓ *Joint Staff Form 136 cover sheet*
- ✓ *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)*
- ✓ *SecDef memo to the President with four enclosures:*
  - Letter to Speaker of the House*
  - Letter to President of Senate*
  - Draft Executive Order for callup*
  - Draft Executive Order for stop-loss (if appropriate)*
- ✓ *Draft SecDef memo to Service Secretaries*
- ✓ *Draft SecDef memo to Secretary of Transportation and/or Coast Guard*

**Figure III-6. Documents of a Reserve Component Callup Decision**


callup ceilings may have to be adjusted to accommodate the rotation. If the National Command Authorities (NCA) places a limit (for example, less than the 200,000 maximum in the case of a PSRC) on the callup authority, the NCA must approve any requests for increases. A similar principle applies to the 1,000,000 Service member limit under a partial mobilization. **Figure III-7 shows the progression of a subsequent callup request and to move from a PSRC to a partial mobilization.** The coordination of the decision package for a subsequent callup is the same as the initial one [Joint Staff].

- **Prepare Decision Package for Transition from PSRC to Partial Mobilization.** The PSRC authority, title 10 USC 12304, may be used to provide

initial RC support requirements for a potentially larger or longer war, contingency operation, or military operations other than war (MOOTW). PSRC is intended to assist during the period in which the situation evolves into either a larger operation or is resolved.

- Figure III-7 shows the decision package progression for execution of partial mobilization when PSRC already has been approved. **Partial mobilization requires a Presidential or Congressional declaration of national emergency.** If a national emergency has not been declared by the time of the partial mobilization request, the MSO — coordinating with the legal advisors — includes the draft declaration in the decision package.

## RESERVE COMPONENT DECISION MAKING PROCESS (SUBSEQUENT CALLUP OR TRANSITION FROM PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP TO PARTIAL MOBILIZATION)




**Figure III-7. Reserve Component Decision Making Process (Subsequent Callup or Transition from Presidential Selected Reserve Callup to Partial Mobilization)**

•• When partial mobilization is declared, decision makers need to determine whether to include PSRC into the partial mobilization. **Including PSRC does the following:** (1) Limits total callup to one million, rather than

1.2 million; (2) Restarts the clock, for 24 months, for any members of the Selected and Individual Ready Reserve serving on active duty under PSRC; and (3) Enables worldwide redeployment of Reserves and National Guard, serving

under PSRC, which limits support to a specific contingency. This is significant if the PSRC is in support of MOOTW and the action requiring partial mobilization occurs in another theater.

•• Figure III-8 shows the timeline for PSRC authority approval during the Iraq crisis of February 1998. Figure III-9 shows the lessons learned from the crisis.



**Figure III-8. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority (PSRC) Decision Making Timeline**

## FEB 98 IRAQ CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

- Presidential approval timely when request justified
  - RC accessibility no longer an issue
- National Command Authorities want Reserve Component (RC) requirements quantified
- RC requirements still not being planned in accordance with Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
- Combatant commander's role in mobilization
  - Operation plan (OPLAN) assumption of mobilization is not enough
  - RC Appendix in OPLAN critical to timely execution
- Fidelity of system improved, BUT:
- ***MORE DETAILED INFORMATION DEMANDED!!***

Figure III-9. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Lessons Learned

Intentionally Blank

## CHAPTER IV EXECUTION

*“Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.”*

Sun Tzu  
The Art of War, 400-320 BC

### 1. Purpose

This chapter describes the **roles and activities during execution** of manpower mobilization.

### 2. Background

**Execution is the implementation of the best plans and decisions available to the leadership at the time.** Execution is decentralized. The Services issue orders to units and/or individuals within the guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. Most of the actual mobilization activity takes place at units, mobilization stations, and transportation centers. The MSOs monitor the mobilization process, make recommendations for improvement, and seek to optimize the use of human and materiel resources. From the MSO perspective,

manpower mobilization execution **involves two centers of activity.** The first includes actions necessary to order RC units and individuals to active duty, such as distribution of executive orders, delegation of authorities, and notification procedures. Congressional delegations and oversight committees must be notified of the units to be mobilized and their locations. Units and individuals must be notified of their mobilization and public affairs announcements must be made. The sequence and timing of these announcements are of paramount importance to senior leadership. Close coordination at all levels is necessary to prevent misinformation and confusion during execution. The second group represents actions necessary to effective management of the mobilization process and includes responding to changing requirements and actual performance of the mobilization.

#### DECISION TO ACTIVATE, MOBILIZE, AND DEPLOY RESERVES — THE GULF WAR

9 August 1990, (7 days after Iraq invaded Kuwait), as RC volunteers were supporting the initial phases of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the Defense Department began planning for a possible RC callup to support the evolving strategy. It quickly became apparent that Reserve forces would be needed for deployment to the Persian Gulf to meet Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) requirements; to backfill positions in the US and other theaters vacated by AC personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia; and for essential CONUS-based missions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, Department of Transportation, and the USCG worked together in coordination with Central Command (CENTCOM) to ensure various policy and operational issues during the mobilization process were dealt with as quickly and efficiently as possible.



... The activation and deployment of RC forces and their full integration into the Active structure were accomplished with no significant problems. In part, this was caused by ensuring the welfare of Reserve members, thereby allowing them to concentrate on mission assignments. Prompt action by OSD in seeking Congressional support for changes in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act was necessary to ensure equal treatment of Reservists called up under Title 10 US Code 673b. Ultimate amendment of those statutes ensured the welfare of Reservists and their families. While the Services took steps to mitigate the trauma Reservists felt from family separation through a variety of family support activities, employers of activated Reserve members were generally supportive of US goals in the Persian Gulf crisis and their Reserve employees' absence from the workplace. Finally, the activation of Reservists from all walks of life and every state in the union, as well as their full integration into the plans to enforce the United Nations resolutions against Iraq, helped the American public to understand the seriousness of the Persian Gulf crisis and to ensure their support for the operation.

**SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress, Appendixes A - S  
April 1992**

### 3. Execution

The top portion of Figure IV-1 represents the **first center of activity**. It is triggered by the product of the decision making process, the Decision Support Package. The output in Figure IV-1 is the Services' execution of OSD guidance in support of the CINC, and represents the **other center of activity** for the MSO: the management of the mobilization process.

### 4. Functional View

Figure IV-2 is the **MSO's functional view of mobilization execution**. The mobilization community already has planned, implemented, and adjusted the mobilization system prior to the issuance of the Presidential Executive Order to call up the RC. Figure IV-3 shows which commands requested PSRC and subsequent approval status during the last contingencies. During execution, **MSOs provide technical advice and assistance** to those with functional responsibilities; **monitor the implementation**

**of decisions; and make periodic reports to the leadership** on the performance of the mobilization process. MSOs also recommend further adjustments to RC policies as dictated by mobilization events.

a. The uncertainties of plan execution preclude a detailed list of tasks, but **experience suggests the following**.

- Ensure that TPFDD is updated as CINC requirements change. Under CAP, TPFDDs may not pre-exist [CINC/Services].
- Coordinate with the appropriate public affairs officer, legal counsel, and legislative affairs advisor. Keep them informed throughout the execution of mobilization [Joint Staff, CINCs, and/or Services].
- Ensure that theater-unique requirements are known to the supporting CINCs [CINCs/Services].




Figure IV-1. Manpower Mobilization Execution Process

- Continue to coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance [Joint Staff and/or Services].
- Manage the callup against Service ceilings [Services].
- Monitor and adjust the callup procedures for units and individuals. The President may invoke “Stop Loss” during any period reservists are serving on active duty under title 10 USC 12301, 12302, or 12304. The President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any active or reserve member who is determined to be essential to national security [Services].
- b. Figure IV-4 shows the **number of RC personnel called up over time**, compared to the mobilization authority imposed ceiling (the stepped line on the chart). Also, there may be self-imposed time limitations on the callup period, less than those authorized. The President, the Secretary of Defense, or Service





Figure IV-2. Functional View of Mobilization Process

### WHO REQUESTED PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY?

Year	Operation	Requesting Authority	Approval:
1989	JUST CAUSE	CINCSOUTH	
1990	DESERT SHIELD	SECDEF/CJCS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1992	PROVIDE HOPE	CINCSOC	
1994	UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	CINCACOM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1994	VIGILANT WARRIOR	CINCCENT	
1995	JOINT ENDEAVOR	CINCEUR/USAF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1998	IRAQ	USA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Figure IV-3. Who Requested Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority?


## MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP



**Figure IV-4. Management of Reserve Component Callup**

Secretaries may impose those limitations to manage the callup effectively.

c. Figure IV-5 shows the Operation Joint Guard PSRC execution timeline.



**Figure IV-5. Operation Joint Guard Presidential Selected Reserve  
Callup Authority Execution Timeline**

# CHAPTER V

## MONITORING AND REPORTING

*“When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army.”*

**Napoleon  
Maxims of War  
1831**

### 1. Purpose

This chapter describes the **monitoring and reporting activities** in the manpower mobilization process. It discusses the **joint community interfaces** and the **reports required** to report on the status of units and individuals.

### 2. Background

a. Monitoring and reporting is an integral part of manpower mobilization (See Figure V-1). **The timely and accurate collection, analysis, and transmission of information is important** to ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations. Accurate and timely reporting is also necessary because of high levels of public and political interest in the


involuntary order to active duty of Guard and Reserve members.

b. **The Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs comprise the communication interfaces** for the monitoring and reporting phase. This chapter discusses some of the information flow challenges and denotes the organizations responsible for working issues. The origin of information flow within any particular organization is not described in detail.

c. **Figure V-2 shows the inter-organizational information flow.** Most of the mobilization information flow supporting operations is directly between the **supported CINC** and the **Services**. As the joint force provider, **USACOM** intervenes in the process if joint Service problems arise and need to be



*To ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations, the timely and accurate collection, analysis, and transmittal of information is important.*



**Figure V-1. Monitoring and Reporting**

resolved. For SOF, USSOCOM essentially plays the same mobilization role as the Services do for other types of forces.

b. MSOs have numerous **reports and information systems available** to monitor operations. Some of these are as follows.

### 3. Monitoring

a. **Monitoring involves gathering and analyzing data** to determine the status of forces and of the mobilization operation. To manage the mobilization system, **the MSO monitors various facets of manpower mobilization**, such as source determination, for filling requirements, arranging for the mobilized forces' deployment and/or redeployment and demobilizing the units or individuals. These monitoring efforts improve the MSO's ability to manage the manpower mobilization system.

- The Services submit the **military manpower mobilization and accession status report (MOBREP)** to the Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1). This message format contains tabular data on the pre-mobilization strength of the armed forces, categories of RC personnel who have been notified to report, and those who have reported for active duty.
- The Services give the Joint Staff MSO input to prepare the report to Congress as required by title 10 USC, under partial




Figure V-2. Inter-Organizational Information Flow

mobilization. The report covers the units mobilized, their location, mission, and performance, the necessity of such unit(s) mobilized, and such other information as the President may require. This report is filed on the first day of the second fiscal year quarter after the quarter in which the first unit is ordered to active duty under the partial mobilization, and on the first day of each succeeding six-month period thereafter for so long as the unit or units are on active duty.

- The **Global Command and Control System (GCCS)** is our nation's conventional, joint, automated command and control (C2) system. GCCS supports the Joint Planning and Execution Community via the use of an integrated set of analytic tools, flexible data transfer, and robust communications capabilities.

Although developed initially as a C2 system and not tailored to the MSO's needs as a "planner's tool", the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)** provides access to valuable information such as JOPES TPFDDs, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), and unit structure data. GCCS has several report generation capabilities, including an ad hoc query feature, that the MSO can use to search for specific information needs. The GCCS links C2 from the NCA down to the joint task force and component commanders.

- The MSO monitors **situation reports (SITREPs)** and other message traffic for actions or information with mobilization implications. Service MSOs have information systems that they are able to



review for the status of forces, mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

c. **Areas that are monitored** — force requirements, sourcing, mobilization execution, information and reporting requirements, and demobilization schedules (See Figure V-3) — **are discussed in the following paragraphs.**

- **Monitor Force Requirements.** Since manpower requirements change throughout the operation, force definition is a dynamic process that impacts the mobilization system. The TPFDD transmits the supported CINC’s requirements; however, the supporting CINC’s requirements go directly to the Services and are not immediately

available to the joint community. Service and Joint Staff MSOs monitor changes to assess the impact on mobilization and the influence on the sourcing process. MSOs coordinate with deliberate planners in peacetime and with operations personnel during a crisis to help identify requirements [Services, Joint Staff].

- **Monitor Sourcing.** MSOs monitor force assignments against requirements to look for indications of mobilization problems such as difficulties with policies, unit readiness, and unit structure that may hamper meeting the required delivery date. To help identify these situations, MSOs use the GCCS to review unit TPFDD and SORTS data [All].




Figure V-3. Monitored Areas

• **Monitor Mobilization Execution Status.** During execution, the MSO monitors the mobilization process, identifies problems, and participates in their resolution. Interfacing with mobilization community members, the MSO monitors and manages the flow of personnel through the pipeline. The MSO compares mobilization activities against the legal authorities invoked and monitors the duration of active duty, the size of the callup, and the RC mix. Figure V-4 depicts a way to display and analyze some of the data. The MSO works unresolved problems with USACOM, the requester, or the supporting CINC. The Joint Staff MSO reviews the MOBREP submitted by the Services and SITREPs submitted by the supported CINC to identify manpower concerns, including mobilization requirements,

shortfalls, and other callup contingencies [All].

• **Determine Information Requirements and Assign Reporting Requirements.**

To obtain the right information, the Joint Staff MSO informs the CINC's, Services, and other Joint Staff sections of the format and frequency of special information requirements. The MSO coordinates with the following organizations. [All].

•• Joint Staff and/or J-4 for RC logistics enabling capabilities, engineering support, medical professionals, and the status of RC units that support USTRANSCOM and USACOM. Coordination with the Services may also be required to determine the status of personnel mobilization in these skills.




Figure V-4. Display of Mobilization Data

Services should also keep CINCs informed as to the status of their identified personnel mobilization requirements.

- Other Joint Staff directorates such as J-1 for IMAs; Intelligence Directorate for RC intelligence; Operations Directorate (J-3) for RC special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations; Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate for RC communications capabilities.
- Other governmental agencies with national security responsibilities such as the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Selective Service System, and Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- **Monitor Unit and Individual Demobilization Schedules.** The Services are primarily responsible for establishing and tracking the RC forces' demobilization schedules. Service MSOs need to provide demobilization information to all affected commands for adequate planning and release of units. At all levels, MSOs should maintain their own schedules and monitor the Services to ensure consistency. The MSOs coordinate with operations personnel to provide adequate support for ongoing operations. Chapter VI, "Demobilization," covers the activities involved with demobilization [All].

### 4. Reporting

a. **Reporting involves extracting information** that is obtained from monitoring activities; then, **providing the data** to appropriate organizations that are involved with mobilization and demobilization. The MSO responds to formal and informal reporting requirements. The **formal requirements** are those specified in statutes or directives such as reporting to Congress,

the Joint Staff, or the Services. The following three formal reports are generated: Appendix 5 to Annex A, of each OPLAN which lists the total RC requirements; the MOBREP; and during partial mobilization, the President's report to Congress. Figure V-5 illustrates the information flow for these reports. **Informal or special case reporting** may be required in response to Congressional requests and queries. Future rotation plans, mobilization capability or status requests, limitations on reservists, seasonal or personal information, and redeployment and demobilization plans may be required to fulfill informal or special case reporting requirements [All].

b. Once the Services begin to order RC units and individuals to active duty, the joint reporting process, described in Joint Pub 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions," begins. **Joint reporting entails reporting on people and units.** The **MOBREP** shows people available and/or mobilized. After direction from the Joint Staff, the Services daily (or as otherwise directed) submit the MOBREP to the Joint Staff, J-1, as described in CJCSM 3150.13, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Personnel Manual" (formally Joint Pub 1-03.17). Units update the **SORTS data base** which is available for review through GCCS [Services].

c. The following four areas require reporting.

- **Problems in Providing Forces.** The Services must notify the requester and the Joint Staff if they are unable to provide RC forces by the specified dates. Then, the Joint Staff can attempt to resolve the problem. This is not a formal report, but is required promptly to ensure expeditious resolution [Services].
- **RC Forces No Longer Required.** All organizations monitor their missions to determine when RC capabilities are no longer required or if it is feasible to

# MOBILIZATION REPORTING INFORMATION FLOWS




Figure V-5. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows

provide other means of support. Organizations with releasable RC forces inform the appropriate Service; in turn, the Service coordinates with USACOM/ USSOCOM to ensure that the forces are not needed elsewhere [All].

• **Mobilization Information to J-3 Director of Operations As Required.**

The J-4 MSO coordinates with the J-3 briefing team to ascertain the information needed. The following types of information may be requested.

- The total number of RC personnel mobilized and deployed for each operation order being executed [Services].



*The MSOs coordinate with operations personnel to provide adequate support for ongoing operations.*

- The number of RC personnel who are moving the force, assisting in mobilization, deployment, and sustainment, and those backfilling positions split out by CONUS and/or OCONUS [Services].
- A time-phased line graph that shows the status of RC mobilization, which includes the SecDef ceilings and the number actually mobilized in relation to an unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins (C-Day) [Joint Staff].
- **Demobilization Schedules.** The Services are primarily responsible for the execution of demobilization. According to the supported CINC's priorities, the Services will notify the organizations, who have RC forces assigned, of the planned demobilization dates and the time the forces must be released for outprocessing and transportation [Services].

d. **Presidential Reports to Congress**

- **PSRC.** Whenever the President authorizes the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Department of

Transportation to order any units or members of the selected and individual ready reserve to active duty under PSRC, a written report shall, within 24 hours after exercising such authority, be submitted to Congress setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action taken and describing the anticipated use of these units or members. This report will be drafted by the Joint Staff. The Services and CINCs will provide information as requested from the Joint Staff to aid in compiling this report.

- **Partial Mobilization.** 10 USC 12302 (d), requires that once the President declares a national emergency and authorizes partial mobilization, this report must be submitted to Congress on the first day of the second fiscal year quarter in which the first unit is ordered to active duty, and on the first day of each 6-month period as long as the unit or units are on active duty. Figure V-6 shows the information required in the report.

- **Provide Input For Report to Congress.** The Joint Staff J-3 tasks the Services to provide input data for this report. The tasking specifies the

suspense dates, establishes the format, and includes requirements for any additional information that the President or Secretary of Defense wants to give to Congress. The Services and other organizations submit the information to the Joint Staff, J-4 MSO, who prepares the report [Joint Staff].

•• **Prepare the President’s Report to Congress.** The Joint Staff, J-4 MSO staffs the report for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If delegated

authority by the Secretary of Defense, the report shall be signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report includes the following information: (1) CJCS memo to Secretary of Defense with enclosures (include copy of title 10 USC 12302 and any SecDef memo that delegated that authority); (2) Memo for the President; (3) Letter for the Speaker of the House; (4) Letter for the President of the Senate; and (5) CINC, Military Departments and Coast Guard inputs (See Figure V-6).

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY CONGRESS FOR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	
Information	Responsible Agency
Necessity to order or retain units on active duty	Supporting and supported CINCs and the Services for RC units remaining under their control
A statement of the mission of the unit	Support CINC
An evaluation of the unit’s performance of that mission	CINC and/or Services
Where each such unit is deployed at the time of the report. List areas to which deployed, such as CONUS or CINC AOR.	CINC and/or Services
Other information the President deems appropriate	As specified by the Secretary of Defense or SECTRANS

Figure V-6. Information Required by Congress for Partial Mobilization

Intentionally Blank

## CHAPTER VI DEMOBILIZATION

*“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”*

**Resolution of the Continental Congress  
Disbanding the Continental Army,  
2 June 1784**

### 1. Purpose

This chapter describes **the MSO’s role in the demobilization process**. Only the manpower portion of the demobilization process is discussed. Chapter IV of Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” describes all facets of the demobilization process.

### 2. Background

a. RC units and individuals are released from active duty under the demobilization process. Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, **demobilization is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and execution**.

b. Often considered only at the end of an operation, **demobilization may occur during an operation** for the following reasons — expiration of authorized service time; changes in the forces required; or political emphasis to demobilize forces. Mobilization and demobilization may occur simultaneously. Consequently, **each Service must ensure that demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meet all contingencies**.

c. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major impacts: **degradation to supported operations** and **reduced support for the RC**

**program**. Demobilization needs to be integrated into the redeployment. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” states that “From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the postconflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations.”

d. **Figure VI-1 shows the three primary groups of demobilization activities** — preliminary actions, planning, and execution. Planning is divided further into plan demobilization force and plan demobilization support. **The remainder of the chapter discusses these three activities**.

A summary of these activities and the specific tasks the MSO accomplishes is found in Annex E of Appendix A, “Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization.” This summary is a reference of the tasks that must be accomplished at each organizational level to avoid poorly planned and executed demobilization operations.

### 3. Preliminary Actions

**Preliminary actions** set the stage for planning and executing a successful demobilization. Primarily, it involves **establishing and disseminating broad guidance** that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans.



# DEMobilIZATION ACTIVITIES




Figure VI-1. Demobilization Activities

a. **Establish Demobilization Concepts and Policies.** MSOs assist in selecting units for demobilization, defining the process, and integrating demobilization into the operation planning and execution system. **DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves,” establishes demobilization policy.** This directive states that “members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be retained on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary. They shall receive priority for redeployment from the area of operations over active component units, and be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible, consistent with operational requirements.” This directive includes the following additional policies:

- units activated as a unit should be demobilized as a unit;
- medically clear personnel should be demobilized with their unit; and
- to the extent feasible and consistent with operational requirements, follow-on missions should be assigned to active

component forces rather than callup of demobilized RC units.

Figure VI-2 gives examples of demobilization policy issues and Appendix D, “References,” lists other documents that provide mobilization guidance [All].

b. **Provide Input to the JSCP on RC Forces’ Demobilization.** MSOs address issues such as demobilization support requirements, assumptions on release of forces, RC support of redeployment operations, and times necessary to conduct demobilization. Broad references to demobilization may be appropriate for inclusion in the JSCP while more detailed assumptions and guidance should be included in CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,” published subsequent to each JSCP [All].

#### 4. Planning

**Demobilization planning** involves **reviewing policies** and **establishing procedures** to demobilize. During this phase, planners determine operational support



Figure VI-2. Demobilization Policy Issues

requirements and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning function is divided into **two subactivities**: Plan Demobilization Force and Plan Demobilization Support (See Figure VI-3).

a. **Plan Demobilization Force.** This activity establishes the **criteria for selecting forces** for demobilization, selecting units, and developing a time-phased schedule. This is essentially the same thought process followed during execution. **Tasks in planning the demobilization force include the following.**

- **Provide Guidance.** The supported CINC, supporting CINCs, and Services make the decision to release units and individuals for demobilization. Coordinating with the Services, the MSOs develop recommendations and publish guidance for selecting and approving units for release. Current DOD policy gives priority to RC units for redeployment based upon operational constraints. However, each situation is different and decisions must be made to ensure equity [All].

- **Determine Redeployment and Demobilization Strategy.** The Services develop broad concepts for demobilization that are the basis for subsequent detailed planning. These areas include ports, demobilization stations, equipment return policies, medical processing and follow-up, personnel support requirements, and equipment disposition.

•• **MSOs must consider carefully those functional areas where most, if not all, of the capability is in the RC.** If additional units must be mobilized, shortages of the capability could exist. For example, units may not be available to provide a rotational base in the functional area; in that case, with the onset of another operation, the RC may not be able to support both contingencies.

•• **Equipment retrograde has manpower implications.** Equipment may be returned from the mission location directly to the unit or may be sent to a processing center for refurbishment. Sometimes equipment may remain in the theater or be




Figure VI-3. Demobilization Planning Functions



*Equipment retrograde considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment.*

transferred to other nations. These considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. The MSOs must incorporate these decisions into demobilization plans.

- **Develop Tentative Demobilization Schedule.** The Services create a tentative demobilization schedule based on the assumed level of mobilization. This schedule is used to develop more detailed plans and to estimate resource requirements. Likewise, the commands where the RC forces will be assigned develop schedules to determine support requirements and to ensure the continuation of specific capabilities. MSOs must ascertain if replacement units are required; if they are, the MSOs then coordinate with force planners to

schedule the overlap with the replacement units [Services, CINCs].

b. **Plan Demobilization Support.** In this second subactivity the MSOs consider the specific forces, such as medical, logistics, and transportation, needed to **support demobilization**; also, they develop more detailed demobilization procedures. During this effort, the MSOs must address the following support issues: backfill, ports, demobilization stations, equipment retrograde, processing, and redistribution, outprocessing procedures, and leave policies. **The demobilization support tasks are as follows.**

- **Determine Redeployment Support Requirements.** Having determined the RC forces required to support the redeployment of units and individuals, supported CINCs coordinate with force planners to incorporate these additional requirements into the TPFDD. Other organizations coordinate their requirements with the Services [CINCs].
- **Determine Required Outprocessing.** The Service MSOs allot the time and resources necessary for personnel, finance, and medical processing accomplished at the transportation hubs and demobilization stations. They ensure that these factors are integrated into planned movement schedules and that organizations with RC forces are given the information. The Service MSOs also plan for the homecoming support and ceremonies [Services].
- **Determine, Source, and Approve Forces Needed to Support Demobilization.** The Services and CINCs develop and source the additional manpower needed to support the redeployment; to backfill for departing units; and to support homecoming activities within CONUS. After the Services approve the additional requirements, these must be integrated





*The supported CINC must notify the Services, Joint Staff and supporting CINC's when units or individuals are no longer required.*

demobilization plans with the appropriate organizations to verify that the users understand the demobilization concept and to enable them to modify their plans and operations [All].

- **Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements.** Since demobilization is a fluid situation, the MSOs continue to review changing operational requirements which may result in units being demobilized or extended. The supported CINC must notify the Services, Joint Staff, and supporting CINC's when units or individuals are no longer required or when it is feasible to use alternative manpower sources. If the requirement continues to exist, the appropriate Services, supported CINC, and supporting CINC's must request authority to extend the active duty period or obtain rotational units for replacement [Services, CINC's].
- **Seek Demobilization Approval.** The supported CINC identifies units and individuals no longer required to support operations in the redeployment plan.

Based on the redeployment plan, each Service will develop a demobilization list which is then disseminated within the Service for action. Authority to approve the demobilization list will depend on the Service and the particular operation that may be delegated [Services].

- **Develop Demobilization Schedule.** Working closely with the affected organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule. The schedule includes forces to be demobilized, specific demobilization times, and projected release dates from theater, ports, and demobilization stations. When the schedule is complete, the Services ensure that organizations with RC forces review the schedule and update their supporting plans [Services].
- **Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations.** The MSOs start monitoring and reporting on RC units from the beginning of mobilization and these activities continue through demobilization. This tracking is necessary to obtain information to keep the leadership and Congress apprised of

RC actions during the operation. Chapter V, “Monitoring and Reporting,” covers this function in detail [Joint Staff, Services].

- **Highlight Critical Support Issues in SITREPs and Other Forums.** Using the SITREPs, other JOPES reports, special functional reports or news groups, the MSOs surface conflicts and critical issues to the leadership and the appropriate organization. The MSOs’ early action enables the responsible individuals and commands to resolve issues expeditiously before they become roadblocks to further activities [All].
- **Terminate Legal Authorities.** Once RC forces are no longer on active duty in support of the operation, the Joint Staff informs the Secretary of Defense that there is no longer a need for RC forces in support of the operation. The Secretary of Defense may terminate the authorization to order RC forces to active duty (if such authorization was granted

or delegated to the Secretary of Defense), direct the Services to terminate the order to activate RC forces, or inform the President so that the Presidential authorization may be withdrawn. This authority automatically is terminated if the President or Congress retracts the original declaration of national emergency. The same legislation that authorizes mobilization implements certain emergency authorities and capabilities. These depend upon the original mobilization authority continuing for their enforcement. Examples of this legislation include those which suspend certain laws pertaining to the promotion, separation, and retirement of active duty personnel (stop loss) and the suspension of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Until the need for supporting or related authorities is eliminated, planners should urge the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not to rescind the order or declaration authorizing the callup [Joint Staff].

# APPENDIX A

## MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

- Annex A Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning
- B Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making
- C Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution
- D Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting
- E Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization



## MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

This appendix contains annexes with activity summaries corresponding to related chapters in the guide. These summaries show subordinate activities, tasks, and responsible organizations for the mobilization subprocess discussed in that chapter. Use these summaries to review required tasks. Refer to the specific chapter for details on how to accomplish the tasks. The annexes are:

- Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning (Annex A);
- Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making (Annex B);
- Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution (Annex C);
- Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting (Annex D); and
- Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization (Annex E).

CHAPTER II ACTIVITY SUMMARY: PLANNING				
Mobilization Planning Community	Develop Concept	Develop Plan	Develop Supporting Plan	Analyses
<b>Common Activities (For all)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provide pre-planning input</li> <li>● Provide CINC strategic concept feedback</li> <li>● Plan participation</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determine levels of mobilization necessary to support projected RC force requirements</li> <li>● Answer questions on the justification of RC callups</li> <li>● Validate or refute defense planning guidance and/or JSCP planning assumptions</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Confirm tasking for RC requirements summary</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review completed Appendix 5, Annex A for complete operation plan and most probable FDO</li> </ul>
<b>Service</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Source specific RC units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● RC in AOR</li> <li>● RC unit personnel in TPFDD</li> <li>● RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD</li> <li>● Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment</li> <li>● Backfill</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
<b>Supported Command</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Draft, coordinate and issue the TPFDD LOI</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Comply with requirement for completion of Appendix 5, Annex A to operation plan</li> <li>● FDO determination</li> </ul>	
<b>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands TRANSCOM Components JTF</b>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Move the Force</li> <li>● Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment</li> <li>● Backfill</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

Figure A-A-1. Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RC CALLUP DECISION MAKING							
Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
<b>Common Activities (For all)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify POC network</li> <li>Convene preliminary meetings focused on “what if” questions using current information</li> <li>Analyze lessons learned from similar crises</li> <li>Consider potential supporting requirements</li> <li>Manage media relations and coordinate with public affairs officer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct meetings and/or briefings on RC mobilization policies: availability, mobilization and deployment criteria, callup procedures, and the different categories of RC and their potential use</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review and modify callup instructions and procedures</li> <li>Recommend modifications and exceptions to policy</li> <li>Coordinate with legal counsel</li> <li>Review JAG policies and/or procedures for “conscientious objectors” and Soldiers and Sailors Act</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estimate ability of mobilization activities to meet plan schedule</li> <li>Identify capability shortfalls</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review unfunded mobilization requirements</li> <li>Coordinate with resource area proponents for adjustments to internal funding priorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiate planning for the return of RC to civilian status</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Respond to information requests as appropriate</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Become familiar with RC Callup procedures</li> <li>Review Appendix 5, Annex A, of operation plan</li> <li>Be prepared to recommend level of callup</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review legal authorities in 10 USC</li> <li>Review mobilization plans, policies, and procedures</li> <li>Brief leadership on callup authorities and specific qualities of Reserve Components</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify opportunities for joint use of Service mobilization assets</li> <li>Monitor the development of RC deployment criteria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Confirm monitoring and reporting systems: coordinate reporting requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC assets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC demobilization facilities and assets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prepare Draft Decision Package</li> <li>Staff Draft Decision Package with Services</li> <li>Forward Package to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</li> </ul>

Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RC CALLUP DECISION MAKING (cont'd)							
Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
<b>Service</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review monitoring and reporting requirements</li> <li>Consider sources of immediate manpower augmentation</li> <li>Start planning for demobilization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Service mobilization doctrine for unit and individual callup</li> <li>Review civilian mobilization plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop deployment criteria consistent with the needs of the CINC</li> <li>Review Service Readiness Processing policies</li> <li>Validate policies for use of civilians, contractors, and other non-DOD agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Validate projected RC requirements in Appendix 5, Annex A, of OPLAN within DOD guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate with program assessment and budget office to raise visibility of unfunded mobilization requirements</li> <li>Recommend changes to eliminate shortages</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine redeployment criteria for RC unit equipment and personnel</li> <li>Coordinate with National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate on Draft Decision Package</li> </ul>
<b>Supported Command</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure RC OPLAN support requirements are projected</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure theater-unique requirements are known to force providers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review mobilization doctrine and policy</li> <li>Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Validate projected RC requirements in Appendix 5, Annex A, of OPLAN</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support efforts to adjust funding priorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop redeployment priorities and schedule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate on Draft Decision Package</li> </ul>
<b>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands TRANSCOM Components JTF</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review RC requirements projected by CINC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review RC requirements to move force, backfill displaced units, and assist in the mobilization and deployment process</li> <li>Brief leadership on RC mobilization doctrine</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review mobilization doctrine and policy</li> <li>Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Validate projected RC requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support efforts to adjust funding priorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review demobilization doctrine</li> <li>Support redeployment and/or demobilization operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate on Draft Decision Package</li> <li>Begin to evaluate need for subsequent RC augmentation</li> </ul>

Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making (cont'd)

<b>CHAPTER IV ACTIVITY SUMMARY: EXECUTION</b>	
<b>Mobilization Planning Community</b>	<b>Execution</b>
<b>Common Activities (For all)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Coordinate with public affairs officer</li> <li>● Monitor unit and individual mobilization schedules</li> <li>● Review missions needed to be supported to ensure all requirements have been met</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor force requirements</li> <li>● Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance</li> </ul>
<b>Service</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance</li> <li>● Monitor and adjust callup procedures for individuals</li> <li>● Manage the callup against ceilings</li> <li>● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as CINC requirements change</li> <li>● Notify Congressional Delegations for callup prior to public affairs announcement</li> </ul>
<b>Supported Command</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers</li> <li>● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change</li> </ul>
<b>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components JTF</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change</li> <li>● Ensure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers</li> </ul>

Figure A-C-1. Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution

Intentionally Blank

<b>CHAPTER V ACTIVITY SUMMARY: MONITORING AND REPORTING</b>		
<b>Mobilization Planning Community</b>	<b>Monitoring</b>	<b>Reporting</b>
<b>Common Activities (For all)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor the status of mobilization</li> <li>● Monitor unit and individual demobilization schedules</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Gather information to respond to various requests</li> <li>● Report RC forces no longer needed</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor force requirements</li> <li>● Determine any special information requirements and assign reporting requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Direct Services provide input for Report to Congress (partial mobilization)</li> <li>● Prepare Report to Congress</li> <li>● Provide mobilization information as required</li> <li>● Review MOBREP</li> </ul>
<b>Service</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor force requirements</li> <li>● Monitor sourcing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Enter data into RC Apportionment tables</li> <li>● Submit MOBREP to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</li> <li>● Report on problems in providing forces</li> <li>● Submit input data to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Presidential Report to Congress</li> </ul>
<b>Supported Command</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Enter data into RC Apportionment tables</li> </ul>
<b>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components JTF</b>		

Figure A-D-1. Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting



Intentionally Blank

**CHAPTER VI ACTIVITY SUMMARY: DEMOBILIZATION**

Mobilization Planning Community	Preliminary Actions	Planning		Execution
		Plan Demobilization Force	Plan Demobilization Support	
<b>Common Activities (For all)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Establish demobilization concepts and policies</li> <li>● Provide input to the JSCP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provide guidance</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Educate the leadership</li> <li>● Review and modify demobilization concepts and support plans</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Staff</b>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations</li> <li>● Validate support and rotational requirements</li> <li>● Resolve any conflicts in resource alignment</li> <li>● Propose that the NCA rescind legal authorities</li> </ul>
<b>Service</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determine redeployment and demobilization strategy</li> <li>● Develop demobilization schedule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determine required outprocessing</li> <li>● Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations</li> <li>● Monitor changing requirements and theater backfill requirements</li> <li>● Execute demobilization schedule</li> <li>● Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</li> <li>● Seek demobilization approval</li> <li>● Solve or adjudicate conflicting resource claims</li> </ul>
<b>Supported Command</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Develop tentative demobilization schedule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determine redeployment support requirements</li> <li>● Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Offer candidates for demobilization</li> <li>● Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</li> <li>● Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs</li> </ul>
<b>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components JTF</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Develop tentative demobilization schedule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determine redeployment support requirements</li> <li>● Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Offer candidates for demobilization</li> <li>● Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</li> <li>● Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs</li> </ul>

Figure A-E-1. Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization

Intentionally Blank

## APPENDIX B

### LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR MOBILIZATION

Figure B-1 describes the legal authorities that are available for execution of mobilization actions. Selective mobilization, Presidential Selected Reserve Callup, partial mobilization, and full or total mobilization authorities are described, and the actions required to obtain them, and the authority to obtain them is identified.

LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR MOBILIZATION			
LEVEL OF MOBILIZATION	DESCRIPTION	ACTION REQUIRED	AUTHORITY
Selective Mobilization  (Volunteer Callup)  (Service Secretary Callup)	Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves at any time under Title 10 USC 12301 (d). Units and individuals in an active status in an RC may be called without consent for not more than 15 days a year under 10 USC 12301 (b). Regular Retirees and Retired Reserve members with 20 years of active service may be ordered to active service involuntarily under 10 USC 688. Consent of State Governors or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard is required for National Guard members serving under 10 USC 12301 (b) or (d).	Publish order to active duty.	10 USC 331 10 USC 332 10 USC 333 10 USC 688 10 USC 12301 10 USC 12406
PSRC  (Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force)	Units and individuals of Selected and Individual Ready Reserve; limited to 200,000 (including up to 30,000 IRR) at any one time (all Services) for up to 270 days without consent of the members.  President must report to Congress within 24 hours of circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used to perform any of the functions authorized by Chapter 15 or 10 USC 12406, or to provide assistance in time of serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.	Presidential Executive Order to invoke authority. President delegates authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.  The Secretary of Defense may exercise stop loss authority IAW E.O. 12728.	10 USC 12304  10 USC 12305
Partial Mobilization  (War or national emergency)	Ready Reserve units and individuals (NG and Reserve); limited to 1,000,000 (all Services) at any one time not more than 24 consecutive months.	Presidential executive order declaring a national emergency. President delegates authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.  If not previously ordered, the President will usually invoke stop loss. The Secretary of Defense may exercise stop loss authority IAW E.O. 12728.	50 USC 1631 10 USC 12302  10 USC 12305 10 USC 671a 10 USC 671b
Full or Total Mobilization  (War or national emergency)	National Guard and Reserve units, members of the Selected, Ready, and Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The period of active service may be for the duration of the war or emergency plus 6 months.	Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency. The Secretary of Defense may exercise stop loss authority IAW E.O. 12728.	10 USC 671a 10 USC 671b 10 USC 12301 10 USC 12305 10 USC 12306 10 USC 12307

Figure B-1. Legal Authorities for Mobilization

# APPENDIX C

## LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

1. This appendix addresses the levels of mobilization available to support operations. Figure C-1 summarizes the levels, the number of forces authorized for mobilization, the duration of active duty, and the applicable sections of the US Code.

2. The level of mobilization required to support an operation depends on a number of the following factors:

- Size of the operation;
- Duration of the operation;
- AC and/or RC mix of required forces;
- Quantity of forces required from the RC; and
- Location of forces in the RC.




Figure C-1. Levels of Mobilization

Intentionally Blank

# APPENDIX D

## REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 4-05.1 is based upon the following primary references:

### 1. Legal Authorities

- a. The Constitution of the United States of America.
- b. United States Code:
  - (1) Title 3, “The President.”
  - (2) Title 10, “Armed Forces.”
  - (3) Title 14, “Coast Guard.”
  - (4) Title 32, “National Guard.”
  - (5) Title 37, “Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.”
  - (6) Title 50, “War and National Defense.”

### 2. DOD

- a. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
- b. DOD 3020.36-P, “Master Mobilization Plan.”
- c. DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves.”
- d. DODD 1400.31, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution.”
- e. DODD 1400.32, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures.”
- f. DODD 5158.4, “United States Transportation Command.”
- g. DODI 1100.19G, “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures.”
- h. DODI 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves.”



### 3. Joint

- a. Contingency Planning Guidance.
- b. CJCSI 3110.03, “Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- c. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- d. CJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- e. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- f. CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
- g. CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.”
- h. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).”
- i. CJCSM 3150.13, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Personnel Manual,” (formerly Joint Pub 1-03.17).
- j. Joint Pub 1-03, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions.”
- k. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”
- l. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
- m. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”
- n. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations.”
- o. Joint Pub 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.”
- p. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”
- q. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”
- r. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”
- s. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

- t. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”
- u. Joint Military Net Assessment.
- v. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
- w. National Military Strategy of the United States of America.

#### **4. Service**

- a. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan.
- b. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System.
- c. Army, FM 100-17, “Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.”
- d. Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan.
- e. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan.
- f. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan.
- g. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan.

Intentionally Blank

# APPENDIX E

## ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

### 3. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/  
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

## 4. Distribution

- a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.
- b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
- c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL  
1655 Woodson Road  
Attn: Joint Publications  
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center  
2800 Eastern Boulevard  
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: Distribution of unclassified new and newly revised joint publications will be limited to providing to US Navy commands the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) CD-ROM and download from the Joint Doctrine Internet Homepage (e.g., [www.dtic.mil/doctrine](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine)). (Individual commands will then be able to print copies as needed for training and operations. Hardcopy distribution of classified joint pubs will continue.)

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base  
Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)  
2100 2nd Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20593-0001

- d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

# GLOSSARY

## PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active component
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
CAP	crisis action planning
CINC	commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
COA	course of action
CONUS	continental United States
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
FDO	flexible deterrent option
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LOI	letter of instruction
MOBREP	military manpower mobilization and accession status report
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSO	mobilization staff officer
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	major theater war
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OPLAN	operation plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

## Glossary

---

POC	point of contact
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
RC	Reserve Component
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SITREP	situation report
SOF	special operations forces
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TRO	Training and Readiness Oversight
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USC	United States Code
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

## PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**active duty for special work.** A tour of active duty for reserve personnel authorized from military and reserve personnel appropriations for work on active or reserve component programs. This includes annual screening, training camp operations, training ship operations, and unit conversion to new weapon systems when such duties are essential. Active duty for special work may also be authorized to support study groups, training sites and exercises, short-term projects, and doing administrative or support functions. By policy, active duty for special work tours are normally limited to 179 days or less in one fiscal year. Tours exceeding 180 days are accountable against active duty end strength. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**backfill.** RC units and individuals recalled to replace deploying active units and/or individuals in the continental United States and outside the continental United States. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**c-day.** See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an

arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**concept plan.** An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**crisis action planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**d-day.** See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Defense Planning Guidance.** This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandum by the Military Department and Defense agencies. Also called DPG. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**deliberate planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified



in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**demobilization.** The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Flexible Deterrent Option.** A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The Flexible Deterrent Option is the means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political and military measures) are implemented into the planning process. Also called FDO. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**full mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Global Command and Control System.** Highly mobile, deployable command and control system supporting forces for joint and multinational operations across the range of military operations, any time and anywhere in the world with compatible, interoperable, and integrated command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence systems. Also called GCCS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**individual mobilization augmentee.** An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an active component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Individual Ready Reserve.** A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some training and who have served previously in the Active Component or in the Selected Reserve and have some period of their military service obligation remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and promotion with or without pay. Also called IRR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the

conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) contains guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. These assignments take into account the capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP directs the development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the combatant commanders. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.**

The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobilization.** 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other

national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobilization base.** The total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization materiel reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, and standby legislation and controls. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobilization site.** The designated location where a Reserve Component unit or individual mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and employment. This differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a military installation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobilization staff officer.** The action officer assigned the principle responsibility or additional duties related to RC mobilization actions. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**mobilization station.** The designated military installation to which a Reserve Component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an aerial port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national emergency.** A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be

undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation plan.** Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more

---

detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**partial mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority.** Provision of a public law (Title 10, US Code Section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 270 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Ready Reserve.** The Selected Reserve, Individual Reserve, and Inactive National Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), sections 10142, 12301, and 12302). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**required delivery date.** A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations. Also called RDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**reserve.** 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Reserve Components.** Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States are: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c.

the Naval Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RC. (This term and its definition modify the current term and definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**Selected Reserve.** Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. All Selected Reservists are in an active status. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**selective mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**time-phased force and deployment data.**

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)


**times.** (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed

to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. **a. C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. **b. D-day.** The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. **c. F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. **d. H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. **e. L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. **f. M-day.** The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. **g. N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. **h. R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. **i. S-day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). **j. T-day.** The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). **k. W-day.** Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**total mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 4-05.1** is in the **Logistics** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

