

Joint Pub 3-05



# Doctrine for Joint Special Operations



17 April 1998



# PREFACE

## 1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint special operations across the full range of military operations. It also provides guidance for commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare special operations forces (SOF) to conduct the missions and collateral activities herein described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions appropriate for SOF.

## 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

## 3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DENNIS C. BLAIR  
Vice Admiral, US Navy  
Director, Joint Staff

Intentionally Blank

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	vii
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	
• Purpose .....	I-1
• Special Operations .....	I-1
• Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations .....	I-2
• Special Operations Objectives .....	I-3
• Characteristics of Special Operations .....	I-4
• Special Operations and the Principles of War .....	I-4
CHAPTER II	
FORCES AND MISSIONS	
SECTION A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES .....	II-1
• Special Operations Forces .....	II-1
• Characteristics of SOF .....	II-2
SECTION B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS .....	II-2
• SO Principal Missions .....	II-2
• Special Operations Collateral Activities .....	II-11
• The Primacy of the Mission .....	II-13
CHAPTER III	
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL	
• General .....	III-1
• Assignment of SOF .....	III-1
• Command and Control of SOF in Theater .....	III-2
• SOF Support to US Ambassadors .....	III-5
• C2 of PSYOP and CA Forces .....	III-6
• SOF Deconfliction and Coordination .....	III-7
• SOF Liaison Elements .....	III-7
• Summary .....	III-8

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

- General ..... IV-1
- SOF in the Strategic Planning Process ..... IV-1
- SOF Support to Mobilization Planning ..... IV-1
- Theater Strategic and Campaign Planning ..... IV-2
- Theater SOC Support to the Theater Campaign ..... IV-2
- SOF in the Targeting Process ..... IV-3
- SOF Mission Planning ..... IV-4
- Operations Security ..... IV-5
- Military Deception ..... IV-5
- Summary ..... IV-5

CHAPTER V

PREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

- General ..... V-1
- SOF Training Responsibilities ..... V-1
- Intelligence Support of SOF ..... V-2
- Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of SOF ..... V-3
- SOF Logistic Support ..... V-3
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of SOF ..... V-4
- PSYOP and CA Support of SOF ..... V-5
- Public Affairs Support of SOF ..... V-5
- Legal Support of SOF ..... V-5
- Space Support of SOF ..... V-5
- Combat Camera Support of SOF ..... V-6
- Medical Support of SOF ..... V-6

APPENDIX

- A References ..... A-1
- B Administrative Instructions ..... B-1

GLOSSARY

- Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ..... GL-1
- Part II Terms and Definitions ..... GL-3

FIGURE

- I-1 Principles of War ..... I-5
- II-1 Special Operations Forces Truths ..... II-3
- II-2 Special Operations Principal Missions ..... II-4
- II-3 Civil Affairs Operations ..... II-10
- II-4 Special Operations Collateral Activities ..... II-11

III-1	Theater-Level SOF Command and Control .....	III-3
III-2	SOF Subordinate Joint Force C2 and Liaison .....	III-4
IV-1	Campaign Plan Objectives for SOF .....	IV-2
IV-2	SO Operational Mission Criteria .....	IV-3
V-1	Examples of SOF Intelligence Requirements .....	V-3
V-2	Space-Based Support to SOF .....	V-6

Intentionally Blank

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Introduction to Joint Special Operations**
  - **Discusses the Forces and Missions Used in Joint Special Operations**
  - **Describes Organization and Command and Control**
  - **Covers the Planning for Joint Special Operations**
  - **Discusses the Preparation and Support of Joint Special Operations Forces**
- 

### An Introduction to Joint Special Operations

*Special operations (SO) have become an integral part of a theater campaign across the range of military operations.*

**The successful conduct of special operations (SO) rely on individual and small unit proficiency** in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The **small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency** (for short periods of time) of special operations forces (SOF) operational units provide the United States with **feasible and appropriate military responses**. These responses do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces. Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation, **they routinely require joint support and coordination**. In addition to being conducted across the full range of military operations, SO may be focused on the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war. **SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations**. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. Alternatively, SO may be principally offensive, of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical, and often time-sensitive targets. **The principles of war** (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security,

surprise, and simplicity) **apply to SO** in the same way they apply to conventional operations. SO planners must understand the principles of war and how they relate to SO. Planners must also understand the synergistic affect of SO integration into conventional missions.

### Forces and Missions

*Success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually requires units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units.*

The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special units with limited, highly-focused capabilities. **The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces.** Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities. **SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.**

**SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine principal missions:** direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and information operations. SOF's principal missions are enduring and will change infrequently; however, SOF's collateral activities will shift more readily because of the changing international environment. **SOF frequently conduct the following seven collateral activities:** coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, countermine activities, foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and special activities. SOF are not manned, trained, and equipped for collateral activities. SOF conduct collateral activities using the inherent capabilities resident in their primary missions. SOF may be tasked by the **National Command Authorities (NCA), joint force commanders, US ambassadors, or other government agencies** to perform missions for which it is the best-suited among available forces, or perhaps the only force available.

## Organization and Command and Control

*Successful execution of SO require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous command and control.*

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF based in the United States are under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command. SOF assigned to a theater are under the COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander may exercise this authority through a Service component command, functional component command, or subordinate joint force. Normally, **command and control (C2) of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command.** The identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment. C2 of SOF is executed through one or more of the following: theater special operations command (SOC), joint special operations task force, or other component commanders of a joint force. Forces assigned to support ambassadors or country teams will be under the operational control of the geographic combatant commander upon entering the theater. Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and CA C2 relationships are structured to support both SO and conventional forces. **Deconfliction and coordination** with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SOF commanders. To fully integrate with conventional operations, **SOF must maintain effective liaison** with all components of the joint force that may impact the conduct of SOF activities in order to ensure that unity of effort is maintained and risk of fratricide is minimized.

## Planning for Joint Special Operations

*Special operations forces (SOF) are involved in all three types of planning for joint operations: campaign, deliberate, and crisis action.*

Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that **SOF planners must be involved throughout the planning process** and that bringing SOF in early to the process can significantly improve the SOF contribution to the overall operation. Given the small size of SOF operational units and the type of missions normally conducted, **detailed planning must be conducted by those who will execute the mission.** SOF capabilities should be taken into consideration in the development of national security strategy. SOF offer the

NCA a set of uniquely trained and equipped (and regionally oriented, if necessary) forces that can be tailored to execute a range of overt and low-visibility activities designed to contain or resolve crises. In addition, SOF can be integrated into conventional campaigns. **SOF capabilities and apportionment are outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).** The JSCP apportions resources to combatant commanders based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. **The Services are charged with maintaining reserve forces and preparing for the expansion of capabilities in time of war.** As part of that responsibility, the Services prepare detailed mobilization plans containing the identification of the actual forces.

*The geographic combatant commander will describe his concept for SO in the theater campaign plan.*

**The geographic combatant commander for each theater refines broad national or alliance strategic guidance into a theater strategy or campaign plan.** This document provides guidance for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and apportioned US forces (including SOF) and the forces of allied nations, to achieve national and alliance strategic objectives. **The theater SOC participates in the development of theater campaign plans, operation plans, and operation plans in concept format.** These plans translate the geographic combatant commander's concept of SOF employment into a sequence of integrated SOF activities. **Detailed mission planning, based on specific, comprehensive, current strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence is vital to successful execution of SOF missions** and, potentially, the very survival of the SOF element. SOF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area to include geographic, political, social, economic, and environmental conditions. **Operations security is important to SOF activities** in denying information of intelligence value to hostile or even friendly agencies that could cause direct or indirect mission compromise. **The execution of some SOF missions may require, or be enhanced by, deception operations.** SOF may be employed in conducting or supporting military deception operations.

---

## Preparation and Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

*SOF require training, equipment, and support that are tailored to specific mission requirements, yet are flexible enough to respond to changing employment parameters.*

SOF require a combination of basic military training and specialized skill training to achieve operational proficiency. SOF specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness. **Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital** in determining SOF mission objectives, identifying relevant targets, and mission planning and execution. The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations. **Counterintelligence support must also be considered** in protecting sensitive SOF missions across the range of military operations. **Meteorologic and oceanographic support services are critical** to the success of SOF missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental intelligence should be included in the decision making process. **The theater SOC commander** (or, when a joint task force is established, the joint force special operations component commander) **determines logistics requirements** for SOF in-theater for the geographic combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the following: Service support, joint in-theater support, or SO-peculiar support.

*Command, control, communications, and computers support to SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable.*

SOF command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support consists of **multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment** that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. **SOF C4 systems must be interoperable** with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, as well as with allies and host nations. **The theater SOC integrates PSYOP and CA support of joint SOF activities.** CA and PSYOP support provide the SOF commanders and their indigenous counterparts the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments of the population to enhance the probability of mission success. The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that **thorough and accurate public affairs guidance be developed** during the

operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most operations. In addition, commanders must seek **legal review** during planning and execution of SOF missions. As space-based support to military operations continues to improve, SOF commanders and planners must be aware of **potential space support** for their operations and the integration of SOF with space assets.

### CONCLUSION

This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint special operations across the full range of military operations. It also provides guidance for commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare SOF to conduct the missions and collateral activities herein described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions appropriate for SOF.

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

*“First, break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of our military, the wall that some people will try to build higher. Second, educate the rest of the military — spread a recognition and understanding of what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that you do it. Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of our military capabilities.”*

ADM William J. Crowe, USN  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Address during the USSOCOM Activation  
Ceremony, 1 June 1987

### 1. Purpose

**This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services and the combatant commands** to prepare for and conduct special operations (SO). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) of special operations forces (SOF) when assigned to a joint task force (JTF). More **specific operational guidelines** are provided in Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures,” Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

### 2. Special Operations

a. **SO are operations conducted by** specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These **operations are conducted** across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. **Political-military**

**considerations** frequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. **SO differ from conventional operations** in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SO have become an **integral part of a theater campaign** across the range of military operations. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the **majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO must complement** — not compete with — **conventional operations.**

c. The successful conduct of **SO relies on individual and small unit proficiency** in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate **military responses. These responses do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation** normally associated with employment of



*Special operations forces are made up of individuals highly proficient in specialized combat skills.*

inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.

d. **SO can be conducted directly** against an enemy by forces acting in a single engagement such as a raid against a critical communications node, **or indirectly**, for example, by organizing, training, and supporting an indigenous force for foreign internal defense (FID) or unconventional warfare (UW), **or through the use of psychological operations (PSYOP)** to influence the opposing military or the local civilian populace. In either case, the results are normally disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

e. **SO Are Inherently Joint.** Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation, they routinely require joint support and coordination.

### 3. Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations

a. **Military operations are conducted across a range consisting of two general states: war and military operations other than war (MOOTW).** (Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”) This model

assists the geographic combatant commander in articulating strategic situations within a theater that are described by a variety of political, economic, and military conditions. Although the following discussion of SO applicability to the states within the range of military operations describes each in discrete terms, in actual circumstances **there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins.** The model gives the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the joint force commander (JFC) the **ability to describe any strategic situation in clear terms and allows the JFC to define needs,** devise strategies, and project resources to meet the threat.

b. **SO are not bound by any specific environment. The principles by which SO are planned and conducted apply equally to both war and MOOTW.** In war, SO can be conducted during the preconflict, conflict and, of increasing importance, postconflict phases of the campaign. **In MOOTW, the overarching objective is often restoring stability to a country or region.** This can take the form of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) after a natural or manmade disaster, taking care of fleeing refugees, or some form of peace operation. Small SO units

accomplish these objectives generally indirectly through operations that assist the host nation (HN) authorities, other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or coalition partners in restoring peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or providing disaster relief assistance. SOF are regularly employed in mobile training teams (MTTs), joint and combined exercises, professional development program seminars, and other military to military activities which are a **vital part of theater engagement strategies**.

#### 4. Special Operations Objectives

In addition to being conducted across the full range of military operations, **SO may be focused on the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war**. (See Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," for a detailed discussion on the levels of war.)

a. **National strategic objectives are directed toward the attainment of national or multinational objectives**. The NCA designates national objectives and sanctions the military means to achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SO may be conducted under the direct supervision of the NCA.

b. **Theater objectives are established by geographic combatant commanders, based on national objectives, and are an integral part of the theater campaign plan. Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater objectives and lead directly to theater success**. SO provide the joint force commander with a selective, flexible deterrent option or crisis response capability to achieve his operational objectives.

c. Although normally targeted at strategic and operational objectives, **SO may be conducted in support of conventional force tactical objectives as well**.

#### SO STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Examples of SO with strategic implications are the British SO Executive operation to destroy the German heavy water production at Vemork, Norway in 1943 (and hence nullify the German capability to manufacture atomic weapons) and the US raid to rescue the prisoners of war at Son Tay, North Vietnam in 1970.

#### SO OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Examples of SO with operational implications are the employment of Office of Strategic Services operational detachments to organize behind-the-lines resistance in France and Burma in World War II and the German neutralization of the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael by a surprise attack by glider in 1940.

#### SO TACTICAL SUPPORT TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Examples of SO tactical support to conventional operations include the seizing of tactical objectives in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE, and the use of the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams to clear boat lanes for amphibious landings in all theaters during World War II.

## 5. Characteristics of Special Operations

a. **SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations.** SO can be designed and conducted to **influence the will of foreign leadership** to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. This may involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, **SO may be principally offensive**, usually of high physical and political risk, and **directed at high-value**, critical, and often time-sensitive targets. Such operations rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently employ deception to achieve success. These missions are routinely clandestine in nature and offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first attempt fail.

### b. Special Operations

- SO normally require operator-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the area where the mission is to be conducted. **Rigorous training and rehearsals** of the mission are integral to the conduct of the operation.
- SO are often conducted at great distances from operational bases employing **sophisticated communication systems** and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.
- **SO frequently require discriminate and precise use of force.** This may require development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Department of Defense (DOD) forces.

## 6. Special Operations and the Principles of War

The principles of war apply to SO in the same way they apply to conventional operations. However, in some cases, specific principles have varied emphasis in the conduct of SO, primarily because SO are conducted by small units that seldom work with large formations or sizable reserves. SO planners must understand the principles of war — and how they relate to SO. The principles are an important doctrinal foundation and are essential to understanding and mastering warfare (See Figure I-1).

a. **Objective.** SO are best employed when they directly support the commander's objectives. The focus of each SO is the **execution of a mission** that accomplishes a strategic or operational objective for the JFC.

b. **Offensive.** The lethal application of SO are **inherently offensive in nature** because they seek to strike or engage an adversary to compel or deter his actions.

c. **Mass.** SO concentrate the effects of combat power at **critical times** and in discriminate places to achieve decisive results.

d. **Economy of Force.** SOF cannot employ their limited resources on secondary or nonessential tasks. Economy of force is critical to the successful conduct of SO given the small size and lack of redundant capabilities inherent in SO tactical units.

e. **Maneuver.** Maneuver is essential to SO in order to **strike enemies where and when they are most vulnerable** and to avoid their strengths.

f. **Unity of Command.** SO require unity of command to **integrate and synchronize SOF** with every aspect of the campaign plan.




Figure I-1. Principles of War

SO C2 architecture is often tailored for each mission to achieve this end.

g. **Security.** SO planning and execution **require high levels of security** to protect the clandestine nature of missions, often conducted in remote or denied areas. At the same time, SOF must balance security concerns with the need to rehearse and to integrate operations with other committed forces. In addition, proper security planning and execution is essential to SOF force protection. Given their size, SOF units are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units.

h. **Surprise.** Surprise is often the **key to the conduct of successful SO** and to employed SOF survivability. SOF must achieve surprise to the extent that the enemy cannot react effectively prior to mission accomplishment.

i. **Simplicity.** Although SO may require sophisticated and often unorthodox methods and equipment, the plans that drive its employment **must be simple and direct** in order to facilitate understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and adapt to changing situations.

### OPERATION JUST CAUSE

On the night of 19-20 December 1989, SOF, organized into a 4,400-man joint special operations task force (JSOTF), spearheaded Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. US Army Rangers conducted predawn airborne seizures of critical airfields. Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) were employed to block possible escape routes of Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega, by denying him the use of his Learjet at Paitilla Airport and disabling a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) patrol boat in Balboa Harbor. Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft provided aerial insertion, pinpoint target interdiction, and aerial fire support. Army special forces (SF) set up a surveillance and antiarmor blocking position at the Pacora River bridge and conducted other operations to disable critical Panamanian telecommunications sites. SF and SEALs also conducted direct action raids and roll-up operations against Noriega's infrastructure. The JSOTF accepted Noriega's surrender at the Papal Nunciatura after an 11-day standoff. Subsequent to the initial assaults, Spanish-speaking SF soldiers — often backed up by Air Force Special Operations Forces gunships, Rangers, and conventional forces — were used to convince scattered PDF cuartels to surrender peacefully. Army and Air Force psychological operations units communicated a call for surrender to PDF units, "dignity battalions," and other hostile parties via radio, television, print, and loudspeaker. As Operation JUST CAUSE gave way to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, special operations forces and civil affairs units were employed to reconstitute the country's political, economic, and security infrastructure.

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

## CHAPTER II

### FORCES AND MISSIONS

*"It is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones."*

**Maurice de Saxe**  
**Mes Reveries, iv, 1732**

#### SECTION A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

##### 1. Special Operations Forces

a. Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually has required units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such units to be employed in unconventional ways, for which the enemy often was unprepared.

b. Conventional units are normally not specially trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO; any wholesale change in their capabilities would restrict their ability to respond to a broad range of threats. The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of **special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities**.

c. **Forces specifically designated as SOF include:**

- **US Army.** Special forces, Ranger, special operations aviation (SOA) (rotary-wing), PSYOP and civil affairs (CA) units of the Active component (AC) and Reserve component (RC);
- **US Navy.** Naval special warfare (NSW) units to include sea-air-land teams (SEALs), SEAL delivery vehicle teams, special boat units, and patrol coastal ships of the AC and RC; and
- **US Air Force.** SOA (fixed- and rotary-wing), special tactics teams, PSYOP, and FID units of the AC and RC.

d. In accordance with title 10 United States Code (USC) section 167, additional units or forces may be designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

e. **Other units capable of conducting or supporting SO.** Designated SOF are principally structured to be the **force of choice** for SO under most circumstances. However, **under certain circumstances, conventional forces may** be capable of conducting a

#### US ARMY'S ALAMO SCOUTS IN WORLD WAR II

Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commanding the 6th Army, recognized the recurring need for deep reconnaissance against operational targets to precede his attacks against Japanese positions in the Southwest Pacific. The Alamo Scouts took carefully selected people and gave them extensive training for these operations. In all, the Scouts conducted more than 100 missions, providing a great deal of intelligence with the loss of no personnel to enemy action.

### UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

During World War II, the US Navy also recognized that it had a recurring requirement for operational reconnaissance to determine both the suitability and the level of fortification of beaches being considered for amphibious assaults. No existing force could provide this information so the Navy created UDTs to carry out these missions. The UDTs conducted reconnaissance missions in support of every amphibious operation, from the January 1944 landing at Kwajalein during Operations FLINTLOCK until the end of the war.

specific special operation. Although not designated as SOF, these forces receive enhanced training and equipment to support or conduct SO on a mission-specific basis. These forces include:

- Designated Navy surface, subsurface, and aviation elements;
- Designated Air Force airlift, strike, and tanker elements; and
- Designated Fleet Marine Force units and forward-deployed Marine air-ground task forces such as Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable).

## 2. Characteristics of SOF

a. **The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces.** Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities.

- Most SOF **personnel undergo careful selection processes** or mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities.
- SOF are composed of mature and experienced personnel, many of whom

maintain a **high level of competency** in more than one military specialty.

- Selected SOF are **regionally oriented** for employment; cross-cultural communications skills are a routine part of their training.

b. **SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.** Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces so that they can achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The **special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF** also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise focused use of force (See Figure II-1).

## SECTION B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

### 3. SO Principal Missions

Pursuant to 10 USC 164, 10 USC 167, and the Unified Command Plan, **eight activities have been designated as principal SO missions for SOF.** Pursuant to CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” and Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) directive, **information operations** (IO) has

## SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TRUTHS




Figure II-1. Special Operations Forces Truths

been designated as the **ninth principal** SO mission for SOF. **SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish the nine principal missions shown in Figure II-2.**

### a. Direct Action (DA)

- **Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF** or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, SOF or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations.
- **Activities falling within the DA mission include the following.**

- **Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults** — operations designed to achieve specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results of strategic or operational significance. They frequently occur **beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems** and selective strike capabilities of conventional forces. Such operations typically involve an attack on critical targets such as the interdiction of lines of communications (LOCs) or other target systems; the location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or material; or the seizure, destruction, or neutralization of enemy facilities in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival.

- **Standoff Attacks** — attacks by weapon systems or IO capabilities. Standoff attacks can be **conducted by air, maritime, or by ground** platforms or units. When the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat



Figure II-2. Special Operations Principal Missions

forces, these attacks can be performed as independent actions.

•• **Terminal Guidance Operations** — operations are conducted to direct munitions at designated targets.

•• **Recovery Operations** — operations to locate, recover, and restore personnel or material held captive, isolated, or threatened in areas sensitive, denied, or contested to friendly control. SO recovery missions are often **characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis**. These operations employ unconventional tactics, techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

•• **Precision Destruction Operations** — operations against targets where minimal collateral damage is acceptable, requiring highly sophisticated and/or timed detonation of specific amounts of explosives emplaced in exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision destruction operations are conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first strike success or when the contents of the facility must be destroyed without damage to the facility.

•• **Anti-Surface Warfare** — operations conducted against enemy surface targets, including combatants.

•• **Amphibious Warfare** — operations launched from the sea by naval and

**landing forces** against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. They include preassault cover and diversionary operations, naval gunfire support, initial and/or terminal guidance for landing craft, surf observation, obstacle clearance, and other advance force operations.

•• **Mine Warfare — the strategic and operational use of mines and their countermeasures.** Operations include offensive and defensive mine laying, detection of enemy minefields, and detection and neutralization of very-shallow water mines.

**b. Special Reconnaissance (SR)**

• Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to **obtain or verify**, by visual observation or other collection methods, **information concerning** the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or **potential enemy** or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It

includes target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance.

• Even with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by human intelligence resources in the target area. SOF’s highly developed capability to get in and out of hostile or denied areas and to communicate over long distances makes **SR feasible against operational and strategic targets** in both urban and rural environments that are beyond the range of conventional reconnaissance forces. SR includes the following.

•• **Environmental Reconnaissance —** operations conducted to collect and report **critical** hydrographic, geological, and meteorological **information**.

•• **Armed Reconnaissance — locating and attacking targets of opportunity**, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along assigned ground communication



*Special operations forces have a highly developed capability to get in and out of hostile or denied areas.*

routes. Armed reconnaissance is **not conducted** for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets.

•• **Coastal Patrol and Interdiction** — area denial, interdiction, support, and intelligence operations in coastal regions. Its **objective is to halt or limit the enemy’s warfighting capability** by denying movement of vital resources over coastal and riverine LOCs. Seaward perimeter and harbor security and escort duties are typical support operations. Coastal patrol and interdiction may be a stand-alone mission or may support other fleet and joint efforts such as riverine, amphibious assault, blockade, and counterdrug operations.

•• **Target and Threat Assessment** — operations conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to permit effective employment of weapons or the survey of a target to measure the results of a conventional or nuclear, biological, and chemical strike.

•• **Poststrike Reconnaissance** — missions undertaken for the purpose of **gathering information** used to measure results of a strike.

### c. Foreign Internal Defense

- Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- **SOF’s primary contribution** in this interagency activity is to **organize, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces**. The goal is to enable these forces to **maintain the HN’s internal stability**, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to

address the causes of instability. Internal stability forms the shield behind which a nation-building campaign can succeed. Successful FID missions can lead to operational or strategic successes for US foreign policy. FID activities include the following.

•• **Aiding and Assisting HN Military** — operations to train HN military individuals and units in basic infantry and maritime skills, provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills.

•• **Providing Population Security** — supervision of tactical operations conducted by HN military units to neutralize and destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil population, and protect the civil population. As a subset of FID, designated SOF units may also train select HN forces to perform counterterrorist missions.

(For more details on FID, see Joint Pub 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).”)

### d. Unconventional Warfare

- **A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations**, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion,

sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).

- **SOF support strategic and operational goals** with the capability to advise, assist, organize, train, and equip indigenous forces and resistance movements. Working in local languages, SOF assist indigenous forces with training, intelligence, communications, PSYOP operations, civic action projects, and medical support. These activities can either be conducted in support of conventional forces — acting as a force multiplier in an integrated theater campaign — or as part of a stand-alone unconventional operation. UW includes the following.

- **Guerrilla Warfare** — military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominately indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. **It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement.** Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities.

- **Subversion** — activity designed to **undermine** the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or

morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

- **Sabotage** — an **act or acts with intent to injure**, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

- **Support to E&E Networks** — an activity that **assists military personnel** and other selected persons to: move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control; avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control; and, once captured, escape.

e. **Combatting Terrorism (CBT)**

- **Actions**, including antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and

**FID SUPPORT TO EL SALVADOR**

During the brutal civil war (1979-1991) in El Salvador small contingents of special forces and other special operations forces (SOF) worked face-to-face with El Salvadoran counterparts under austere conditions and the constant threat of death or injury to help lay the groundwork for the defeat of the communist Farabundo Marti Liberation Front and for the subsequent signing of peace accords in February 1992. SOF were, in fact, so successful in earning the respect of government forces and rebels alike that the rebel leadership insisted that SOF play a major role in 1991 in the disarmament and demobilization of the combatants during the “peace phase” which ended the war. Special forces and other SOF working in a foreign internal defense role thus helped achieve a major US foreign policy success and made a significant contribution to peace in Latin America.

**SOURCE: Multiple Sources**

counterterrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), **taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.**

- **SOF's role in CT is to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents.** When directed by the NCA or the appropriate combatant commander, designated units may conduct or support CT missions that include hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organizations, and attack of terrorist infrastructure. AT includes those activities that are designed to protect people and facilities from terrorist and other attacks to their security. When requested by the Services or other government agencies, **SOF provides training and advice** on reducing vulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats. When directed, **SOF can augment existing security forces** to protect important persons and events. CBT activities include the following.

- **Recovery of Hostages or Sensitive Materiel from Terrorist Organizations** — operations conducted to secure hostages and/or sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring speed, shock, surprise, and violent action. The **safety of the hostages and preventing destruction** of the sensitive materiel is an essential mission requirement.

- **Attack of Terrorist Infrastructure** — preemptive strikes conducted against terrorist organizations with the **objective of destroying**, disorganizing, or disarming terrorist organizations before they can strike targets of national interest.

- **Reduction of Vulnerability to Terrorism** — response to requests from the Services and other government agencies for training and advice on how

to reduce vulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats. This also includes **evaluation of the adequacy of existing physical security systems** and defensive activities conducted to ensure the physical security of important persons.

(For more details on AT, see Joint Pub 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”)

### f. Psychological Operations

- Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to **influence** their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. **The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives.**
- As a force multiplier, PSYOP is **one of the most effective weapons available to a commander.** It can reduce casualties on both sides by reducing the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy, creating dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, encouraging surrenders or defections, or promoting resistance or inducing within a civilian populace a lack of support for a hostile regime.
- Each geographic combatant commander is responsible for conducting **PSYOP programs in peacetime.** Such efforts are designed to create a favorable image of the friendly government, of the United States, and of the Armed Forces of the United States; encourage support for democratic institutions, human rights, regional stability, and counterdrug activities; and assist a HN in explaining and publicizing humanitarian and civic action projects to local citizens. Used

effectively as part of an integrated theater campaign or global strategy, **PSYOP can reduce the probability of conflict**, reduce the damage if conflict does occur, and speed the transition to normality in the postconflict phase.

- **SOF conduct PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.** Taking advantage of their language and culture skills, indepth knowledge of the region, and understanding of interagency operations, SOF units provide the geographic combatant commander with a broad range of PSYOP capabilities to be employed independently or in support of a larger theater campaign. These capabilities include the following.

- **Developing, Producing and Disseminating Programs** — PSYOP units design, develop, produce, and disseminate programs that support tactical, operational, and strategic goals. PSYOP products may contain general information, safety warnings such as mine awareness, surrender appeals and instructions, or appeals for public support of an upcoming or ongoing operation (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation). PSYOP planners choose the product, action, or combination thereof most likely to influence the target audience. These products may include: (1) Printed material such as handbills, leaflets, posters, and even comic books in native language promoting US and HN activities; (2) Radio and/or TV broadcasts ranging from commercials and public service announcements to documentaries and news broadcasts, which can be delivered by either ground based or airborne means; and (3) Loudspeaker broadcasts disseminating general information such as the location of food distribution points and medical attention, requests for host government

support, surrender appeals, or harassment.

- **Coordinating and Directing PSYOP Programs** — PSYOP support national policy goals with programs developed for and approved by higher authority. PSYOP personnel coordinate PSYOP efforts with the chain of command to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the program.

- **Producing PSYOP Studies and Estimates** — PSYOP personnel produce and maintain PSYOP studies and estimates for the joint force commander. They advise supported commanders on the psychological impacts of their courses of action (COAs). They identify the enemy PSYOP effort and the susceptibilities of friendly forces.

- **Providing Support to HN Assistance Operations** — During civil-military operations, PSYOP personnel may work with CA or conventional units to promote civic action projects either by or in support of the host government.

(For more detailed discussion of PSYOP, see Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”)

g. **Civil Affairs**

- **The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities**, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

- Prior to hostilities and in peacetime, CA units may help a nation create or improve its own infrastructure, thereby precluding grievances from flaring into war. During hostilities, the **primary role of CA is to ensure that civilians do not interfere with operations.** The **secondary role is protecting and caring for civilians** in a combat zone and assisting the commander in fulfilling his legal and moral obligations to the civilian population.
- CA operations include providing advice and assistance, as shown in Figure II-3.

(For more detailed discussion of CA, see Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”)

**h. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

- CP refers to actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. The major objectives of DOD CP policy are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and missile capabilities, (i.e., “preventive defense”); roll back proliferation where it has occurred; deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems; and adapt US military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems.
- The continued spread of WMD technology can foster regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and potent weapons. SOF provide unique capabilities to **monitor and support** DOD CP policy. If directed, **SOF can conduct or support** DA, SR,



**Figure II-3. Civil Affairs Operations**

CBT, and IO missions to deter and/or prevent the acquisition or use of WMD, roll back proliferation where it has occurred, and operate against the threats by WMD and their delivery means in order to defeat them. SOF are tasked with organizing, training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of US Government (USG) CP objectives.

**i. Information Operations**

- IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information

systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation and the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information warfare is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval.

- The following **SO missions support IO**: DA, SR, PSYOP, CA, and FID. The ever increasing requirement for SOF to participate in MOOTW is based upon inherent capabilities that may be employed in peacetime to deter a crisis, control crisis escalation, project power, or promote peace. An adversary's nodes, links, human factors, weapon systems, and data are particularly lucrative targets, capable of being affected through the use of lethal and nonlethal applications of coordinated SOF IO capabilities.

(For more details on IO, see Joint Pub 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.")

#### 4. Special Operations Collateral Activities

SOF's principal missions are enduring and will change infrequently; however, **SOF's collateral activities will shift more readily because of the changing international environment**. SOF are not manned, trained, and equipped for collateral activities. SOF conduct collateral activities using the inherent capabilities resident in the primary missions. SOF frequently conduct the following **seven collateral activities** (Figure II-4).



Figure II-4. Special Operations Collateral Activities

- **Coalition Support.** Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners and US military forces. It includes training coalition partners on tactics and techniques, assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, and establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support. SOF teams assigned to coalition units often provide the JFC with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC C2. This activity was first employed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and has been critical in subsequent multinational operations. Past success in these operations in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations has made it likely that coalition

support will become an **important aspect of future multinational operations.**

b. **Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).** CSAR involves a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or MOOTW. Joint doctrine states that each Service and the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are **responsible for performing CSAR for their respective forces.** SOF maintains an inherent and/or organic capability to conduct self personnel recovery and/or CSAR within its core mission force structure. When CSAR requirements exceed theater joint CSAR (JCSAR) capabilities, **SOF may be directed** (on a case-by-case basis) **to perform JCSAR missions.** However, JCSAR taskings will be conducted at the expense of core SOF mission readiness and/or capabilities. The unique ability of SOF to penetrate hostile defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night or in adverse weather make **SOF highly suited for this mission.** Based on these capabilities, the JFC may task SOF to participate in the Joint Search and Rescue Center.

(For more details on CSAR, see Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”)

c. **Counterdrug (CD) Activities.** CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. The CD mission is very similar to FID and UW missions. Using their skills in cross-cultural communication, SOF train HN CD forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations. SOF CD activities are in support of the geographic combatant commander’s regional CD campaign plan or the US ambassador’s country-specific CD plan. PSYOP units, as part of the geographic

combatant commander’s overt peacetime PSYOP program, provide tailored CD-specific PSYOP support to regional CD activities. **CA units support US and HN efforts abroad by assisting in the planning, and organizing of CD operations.**

(For more details on CD, see Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations.”)

d. **Countermine (CM) Activities.** **CM activities attempt to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices.** Using their organic engineering and demolition capability, SOF teams train HN forces in techniques to locate, recognize, and safely dispose of mines and other explosive devices. PSYOP teams assist HN governments in the development and execution of public education programs designed to reduce risks to noncombatants through public awareness of the land mine problem. CA teams work with the United States and HN government representatives to develop a viable and sustainable HN **demining and/or mine awareness infrastructure.**

(For more details on CM, see Joint Pub 3-15, “Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.”)

e. **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** FHA involves programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration; the assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. SOF units are well-suited to perform FHA

activities in remote areas because of their **rapid deployability, regional orientation, organic communications, and ability to sustain operations** under adverse environmental conditions. SOF can assess the needs of an area quickly and communicate this assessment to a JFC or ambassador to assist in designing a plan to alleviate suffering. In support of FHA, **CA is particularly important in organizing civilian infrastructure**; PSYOP is integral to fostering popular support. Participation in FHA **requires significant interagency coordination**.

(For more details on FHA, see Joint Pub 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.”)

f. **Security Assistance (SA)**. SA consists of groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended), or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. **The primary SOF role in SA is to provide MTTs and other forms of training assistance**. Personnel conducting SA are prohibited by law from performing combatant duties. SOF are particularly effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation, communications, mobility, and expertise developed for FID and UW missions. SA is a **particularly valued mission** because SOF train themselves in skills useful in

operations other than war while they train or otherwise assist foreign military forces.

g. **Special Activities**. **Special activities are actions conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives; these activities are planned and executed so that the role of the USG is not apparent or acknowledged publicly**. SOF may perform any of their primary missions during special activities, subject to the limitations imposed by Executive Order 12333. Special activities require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight.

## 5. The Primacy of the Mission

**SOF may be tasked** to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces or the only force available. When **assigned a mission** by a controlling headquarters, that mission becomes the mission and the **focus of the assigned unit**, even if it is not a primary mission or a common collateral activity. Under these circumstances, SOF provide the tasking commander with a candid assessment of its capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with employment in nontraditional missions. When tasked to do these missions, SOF execute with the same professionalism demanded of primary missions. In an ideal world, SOF would be used only in operations for which they are specifically trained and equipped. In reality, circumstances often dictate the use of SOF for other missions.

### OPERATIONS RESTORE DEMOCRACY AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY

The utility of special operations forces (SOF) in a changing national security environment is seen clearly in Operations RESTORE DEMOCRACY and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti. SOF were an integral part of the US effort to restore order to Haiti, even before the commitment of ground forces. Four months prior to the US military intervention that implemented the restoration to power of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, SOF's new and versatile Patrol Coastal (PC) class ships joined the fleet in enforcing United Nation's trade sanctions.

Twelve weeks prior to the peaceful arrival of US troops, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) EC-130E "Commando Solo" psychological operations broadcast aircraft were used effectively to broadcast daily 4-hour programs designed to reduce the volume of refugees leaving the country and to help increase support for the return of President Aristide. In the final weeks preceding the United States's efforts, AFSOC aircraft also airdropped 8.4 million leaflets over towns across Haiti.

The US Atlantic Command's theater Special Operations Command established a training camp in Puerto Rico for the international police monitors and multinational force contingents. US Army special forces provided coalition support teams to these contingents.

SOF had primary responsibility for invasion plans, with a significant number of SOF units operating from a variety of bases — in the United States, at a forward staging base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and from the aircraft carrier *America*. These units would have conducted forcible-entry operations to facilitate the follow-on introduction of conventional forces. Once the need for use of force was obviated, and peaceful occupation was underway, French- and Creole-speaking special forces teams were dispatched throughout the island to help create the conditions necessary for the reintroduction of civilian rule. These small teams operated in more than 730 towns and villages, helping the population create local police, judiciary, and civil government structures to establish law and order and promote stability.

In addition to special forces troops, civil affairs personnel were instrumental in helping the Haitians establish a civil infrastructure. Reserve component civil affairs personnel were called to active duty to provide critical expertise, including duty as executive level ministerial advisors.

To support these lightly armed forces, other SOF units — including AFSOC AC-130 Spectre gunships and US Army Rangers — provided rapid reaction forces that deterred military or paramilitary challenges to the restoration effort.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

## CHAPTER III

### ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

*“The qualities which commonly make an army formidable are long habits of regularity, great exactness of discipline, and great confidence in the commander.”*

Samuel Johnson, 1709-1784

#### 1. General

a. SOF may be assigned to either USCINCSOC or a geographic combatant commander. Operational control (OPCON) of SOF may be exercised by a variety of commanders at all levels within a joint force. Normally, C2 of a special operations force is exercised by SOF. Regardless, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

- Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command;
- Avoid frequent transfer of OPCON of SOF between commanders;
- Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations;
- Integrate SOF in the planning process; and
- Match mission capabilities with mission requirements.

b. **SOF are most effective when fully integrated into the overall campaign plan (war or MOOTW).** Given the ability of SOF to operate (1) unilaterally, (2) independently as part of the overall campaign, or (3) in support of a conventional commander, effective integration is **dependent on a robust C2 structure**. Successful execution of SO require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2. The limited window of

opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions require a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 **may be tailored** for a specific mission or operation.

c. The Secretary of Defense designates combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) through the “Forces for Unified and Specified Command” document. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF based in the continental United States are under the COCOM of USCINCSOC. SOF assigned to a theater are under the COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander may exercise this authority through the commander of a subordinate joint force, Service component command, or functional component command.

d. In that SOF can be assigned to various commanders within the joint force, **liaison** between all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever assigned, **is vital to fratricide prevention and the effective employment of SOF.**

#### 2. Assignment of SOF

a. **SOF in the United States.** Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, **all SOF based in the United States are assigned to USCINCSOC.** USCINCSOC exercises COCOM over those

forces through Service component commanders, functional component commanders, or its subordinate unified command.

- As a supporting commander, USCINCSOC provides SOF to the commanders of other combatant commands for operational employment. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, USCINCSOC normally transfers forces to a supported geographic combatant commander. When this transfer will be permanent, the forces will be reassigned with the gaining combatant commander exercising COCOM over the reassigned forces. When this transfer will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining combatant command with the geographic combatant commander normally exercising OPCON over the attached forces.
- In certain situations, the NCA may direct USCINCSOC to plan and conduct a SO as the supported commander. The NCA, however, could choose to exercise OPCON directly over SOF for a particular operation without any intervening levels of command, depending upon the urgency or political sensitivity of the mission.

b. **SOF in Theater.** SOF assigned to a theater are under COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander normally exercises COCOM of all assigned and OPCON of all attached SOF through the theater special operations command (SOC). However, the geographic combatant commander may choose to exercise COCOM of SOF through other subordinate commanders. **To aid unity of effort, the gaining commander should assume joint operational reporting responsibilities for assigned SOF** (See Figure III-1).

c. **SOF under non-US command.** When directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographic combatant commanders may place **SOF units under the OPCON of a non-US combined forces commander**. In such instances, OPCON of operational US SOF units would be exercised by a US commander within the combined command structure.

### 3. Command and Control of SOF in Theater

Normally, C2 of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. C2 of PSYOP and CA forces, based on their unique role in the theater, are discussed separately from C2 of other SOF (see paragraph 5 of this chapter). **The identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment.** C2 of SOF is executed through one or more of the following.

a. **Theater SOC.** To provide the necessary unity of command, each geographic combatant commander has established a **subunified command to serve as the functional SO component** for the theater. The theater SOC performs broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities that are of strategic and operational importance to the geographic combatant commander. The theater SOC normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached SOF in theater. **The theater SOC commander has two principal roles.**

- **Theater SO Advisor.** The theater SOC commander advises the geographic combatant commander and the other component commanders on the **proper employment of SOF**. The theater SOC commander may develop specific recommendations on assignment of SOF in theater and opportunities for SOF to




Figure III-1. Theater-Level SOF Command and Control

support the overall theater campaign plan. The theater SOC commander may be dual-hatted as a special staff officer in the theater staff. In this case, the SOC commander may appoint a **deputy** as representative to the theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.

- **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).** When the geographic combatant commander designates a JFC, the theater SOC may be designated as the JFSOCC.

**b. SOF Operational C2**

- **JFSOCC.** The JFSOCC (or joint special operations task force [JSOTF] commander, if established) is the commander within a JTF responsible for making recommendations on the proper

employment of SOF, planning and coordinating SO, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2 capabilities.

- **Joint Special Operations Task Force.** At the recommendation of the theater SOC commander, the JFC may establish a JSOTF. **A JSOTF is a temporary joint SOF headquarters established to control SOF of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations or to accomplish a specific mission.** Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriate when SOF C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater SOC staff. A JSOTF is normally formed around elements from the theater SOC or an existing SOF unit with augmentation

from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may also be specifically established as a joint organization and deployed as a complete package from outside of the theater. The theater SOC commander may form a JSOTF and then pass tactical control (TACON) to a Service or functional component requiring SOF support. When a JSOTF is formed and augmented by one or more foreign units the designation becomes Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force.

- **The JFSOCC (or JSOTF commander) will control assigned SOF as well as any conventional forces** provided by the JFC in support of specific missions. The

JFSOCC or JSOTF commander exercises C2 of assigned SOF through a number of organizations (See Figure III-2). They include the following.

- **Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC).** The JSOACC is the commander within the JFSOCC (or JSOTF) staff responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional, non-SO air activities. The JSOACC normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and




Figure III-2. SOF Subordinate Joint Force C2 and Liaison

support the assigned joint SOA assets. The JSOACC may be subordinate to the JFSOCC (or JSOTF commander) or to any non-SO component or directly subordinate to the JFC.

•• **Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) and/or Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU).** Naval SOF assigned to the JFSOCC or JSOTF (or Navy component commander) are normally under the C2 of an NSWTG or NSWTU. The NSWTG plans, conducts, and supports SO in support of fleet commanders and JFSOCCs (or JSOTF commanders). The NSWTU is a subordinate unit of a NSWTG.

•• **Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).** The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with land and maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conducts operations in conjunction with a conventional force. It collocates with the command element of the supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the JFSOCC (or JSOTF commander). The SOCCE can also receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters.

c. **Other Component Commanders of a Joint Force.** SOF may be under the OPCON or TACON or in support of Service or functional component commanders. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. (e.g., NSW forces assigned in support of Navy component and/or fleet commander). **The most important consideration is to maintain as intact the**

**SOF chain of command** so the gaining commander can have available appropriate levels of command and control for the assigned or attached SOF forces. Commanders at all levels should **ensure that SOF are employed within existing capabilities** and that support arrangements allow for administrative and SOF-peculiar logistic requirements.

The assignment of SOF air assets is an example of the geographic combatant commander's direction for SOF employment and command relationships. To assure centralized control and decentralized execution to all SOF-assigned missions, the JFC may designate that all SOF air assets remain under the OPCON of the JFSOCC. The JFSOCC may pass TACON of available SOF air assets to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) or other component commanders when appropriate. Regardless of SOF aviation C2 arrangements, SOF aviation operations must be closely coordinated with the JFACC in order to ensure airspace deconfliction, flight safety, and operations security (OPSEC).

## 4. SOF Support to US Ambassadors

a. Requests for SOF may also be initiated by an embassy's country team. The **specific request may originate with the ambassador, defense attaché, or military assistance group commander.** The requests are passed to the geographic combatant commander for determination of the appropriate response.

b. If the forces are available in theater from theater-assigned forces, and there are no restrictions on their employment (e.g., counterdrug operations), the request can be approved by the theater SOC commander. If there are insufficient forces available in theater, the geographic combatant commander



*SOF may be requested to support US ambassadors or country teams.*

will request that the Secretary of Defense approve a deployment order for USSOCOM forces through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **The Joint Staff will ensure that the proper interagency coordination is completed.** Once the request has been approved (following coordination by all concerned — State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the geographic combatant commander in whose theater the deployment will take place), specific SOF units or individuals are deployed.

c. With few exceptions, SOF deployed to support ambassadors or country teams will be **under the OPCON of the geographic combatant commander** upon entering the theater. The geographic combatant commander will normally exercise OPCON through the US military assistance advisory group commander or the chief of the in-country security assistance organization, who keeps the ambassador informed of plans and activities during the deployment. **Under no circumstances will SOF operate** in a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility, or in an ambassador’s country, **without their prior notification and approval.**

## 5. C2 of PSYOP and CA Forces

Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and CA C2 relationships are structured to support **both SO and conventional forces.**

a. The broad range of PSYOP activities, conducted across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with the requirement to fully integrate with interagency activities as well as with conventional forces **mandates that PSYOP relationships be distinct from other SO forces. The focus of PSYOP is broader** than just those activities conducted by the theater SOC, and its C2 must be such that it allows for direct access to the JFC and full integration at all levels. C2 of PSYOP forces is normally executed by the establishment of a **joint psychological operations task force** directly under the JFC. (For further discussion of C2 for PSYOP forces, see Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”)

b. **CA forces also directly support the overall campaign of the geographic combatant commander.** CA forces may be employed during peacetime and during preconflict, conflict, and postconflict stages of an operation. CA forces must also be able

to **fully integrate with interagency activities** and conventional forces. Effective integration with local and HN authorities as well as PVOs and NGOs requires a **C2 structure that is directly linked to the JFC**. CA forces are normally attached to supported units. (For further discussion of C2 for CA forces, see Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”)

## 6. SOF Deconfliction and Coordination

a. Deconfliction and coordination with conventional forces are always **critical concerns for SOF commanders**. SOF are often employed in advance of conventional operations. **Effective coordination is vital** in the transition from advance operations involving SOF to follow-on operations and to ensure that the timing and tempo of the overall campaign is maintained.

b. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, the **JFC may establish a joint special operations area (JSOA)**. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for **use by a JFSOCC (or JSOTF) for the conduct of SO**. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area. When a JSOA is designated, the JFSOCC (or JSOTF) is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.

c. While establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent operations assists in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide, the **JFC should always evaluate the value of isolating SOF** against the greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign plan.

## 7. SOF Liaison Elements

a. To fully integrate with conventional operations, **SOF must maintain effective liaison with all components of the joint force** that may impact the conduct of SOF activities. To support this effort, SOF provide a variety of liaison officers (LNOs) ranging from individual SOF liaisons to small cells of joint SOF personnel supporting the JFC, Service, and functional component commanders. SOFLNOs, wherever located, are **responsible for coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of SOF missions in the component’s operational area**.

b. **SOF LNOs ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support information** both to aid mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, PSYOP, CA, and other theater-operational issues based on ongoing and projected SOF missions. These efforts are **crucial to maintaining the geographic combatant commander’s unity of effort**, coordination of limited resources and assets, and the campaign tempo.

c. SOF C2 organizations such as a NSWTG and/or NSWTU or SOCCE may act as (or provide) LNOs for SOF with their respective Service components. Additionally, the following elements are specifically organized to provide SOF liaison within the joint organization.

- **Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)**. The JFSOCC provides a SOLE to the JFACC (or appropriate Service component air C2 facility) to coordinate and synchronize SOF air and

surface operations within the joint air operations center (JAOC). The SOLE chief, serving as the JFSOCC's representative to the JFACC, places LNOs throughout the JAOC staff. The SOLE coordinates, integrates, and deconflicts all SOF air and surface activities through the JFACC's air tasking order and airspace control order.

- **Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD).** The SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force (MEF) commander with regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. The SOCOORD is the functional staff element of the corps (or MEF) G3. With augmentation, it can function as the J-3

SOD if the corps (or MEF) is established as a JTF.

## 8. Summary

As identified in this chapter, various organizational structures may be established for employment of SOF. Certain arrangements might be more commonly used during war or extended operations, while others may be better suited for peacetime or contingencies of relatively short duration. However, the **choice of organization for employment of SOF should depend upon specific objectives**, security requirements, and the operational environment. C2 of SOF is normally exercised by SOF. SOF will provide the appropriate liaison to facilitate integration at all levels of the joint force.

# CHAPTER IV

## PLANNING FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

*“Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end.”*

Clausewitz

### 1. General

SOF are involved in **all three types of planning processes for joint operations:** campaign, deliberate, and crisis action. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that SOF planners must be involved throughout the planning process and that bringing SOF in early to the process can significantly improve the SOF contribution to the overall operation. Given the small size of SOF operational units and the type of missions normally conducted, **detailed planning must be conducted by those who will execute the mission.**

### 2. SOF in the Strategic Planning Process

a. **SOF capabilities should be taken into consideration in the development of national security strategy and national military strategy.** SOF offer the NCA a set of uniquely trained and equipped (and regionally oriented, if necessary) **forces that can be tailored** to execute a range of overt and low-visibility activities designed to contain or resolve crises. In peacetime, SOF support national security policy by providing a **capability to prevent or deter aggression** and acts of intimidation or terrorism that may hinder US military, political, economic, or social interests or security. Along with USSOCOM, geographic combatant commanders should ensure that SOF are reflected in the development of the Defense

Planning Guidance and other national strategic documents.

b. **SOF capabilities and apportionment is outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).** The JSCP apportions resources to combatant commanders based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. SOF force apportionment to geographic combatant commanders for contingency planning is contained in CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplemental to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1996.” USSOCOM identifies specific units to be allocated to the combatant commanders’ joint operation plans (OPLANs).

### 3. SOF Support to Mobilization Planning

The Services are charged with maintaining reserve forces and preparing for the expansion of capabilities in time of war. As part of that responsibility, the Services prepare **detailed mobilization plans** containing the identification of the actual forces. Upon recommendation from the other combatant commanders, USSOCOM must **ensure that SOF RC forces are properly reflected in these plans.** This is particularly critical in those mission areas where a significant percentage of the force is in the RC (e.g., CA, PSYOP). **Early recognition of the need for reserve forces is the key to effective mobilization planning.**

#### 4. Theater Strategic and Campaign Planning

a. The geographic combatant commander for each theater **refines broad national or alliance strategic guidance** into a theater strategy or campaign plan. This document provides **guidance for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and apportioned US forces (including SOF) and the forces of allied nations to achieve national and alliance strategic objectives.**

b. The geographic combatant commander will describe his concept for SO in the theater campaign plan (See Figure IV-1).

#### 5. Theater SOC Support to the Theater Campaign

a. **The theater SOC participate in the development of theater campaign plans, OPLANs, and operation plans in concept**

**format (CONPLANs).** These plans translate the geographic combatant commander’s concept of SOF employment into a sequence of integrated SOF activities. The theater SOC maintains a **theater perspective** on the campaign plan and how each component commander intends to support that campaign. Based on guidance from the geographic combatant commander, the **theater SOC develops a supporting plan** to allocate forces for operational tasks, including support of component and subordinate JFCs. The theater SOC also **identifies and anticipates** theater operational and environmental services as well as intelligence **requirements** that SOF could address, and then develops and recommends pro-active SOF activities that might satisfy those requirements.

b. To assist in both planning and execution of SOF missions, the **theater SOC must maintain liaison elements** at appropriate levels of each major theater subordinate



Figure IV-1. Campaign Plan Objectives for SOF

command. **This coordination is vital in assisting in the deconfliction of SOF and conventional activities**, determining target selection and apportionment for both conventional and SOF requirements and aiding in the integration of SOF into the overall campaign plan.

## 6. SOF in the Targeting Process

a. As stated above, the theater SOC provides recommended SOF activities to the combatant commander in support of the theater campaign objectives. The JFSOCC may also **identify potential SOF missions** to the JFC to be considered in the joint targeting process. Once assigned a mission, SOF will plan and execute accordingly. However, to avoid the misapplication of SOF, **commanders should evaluate potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability** early in the planning cycle and prior to target assignment.

b. To provide clear guidance to commanders for planning and executing SO, the following set of **operational mission criteria** has evolved from combat experience (See Figure IV-2).

- **Is this an appropriate mission for SOF?** SOF should be used against those key strategic or operational targets that require SOF’s unique skills and capabilities. If the targets are not of operational or strategic importance, then SOF should not be assigned. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces.
- **Does this mission support the theater campaign plan?** If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, then there are probably more appropriate missions available for SOF.
- **Is this mission operationally feasible?** SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and **should not**




Figure IV-2. SO Operational Mission Criteria

**be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities.** Planners must take into consideration the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly in hostile territory.

- **Are the required resources available to support the mission?** Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. **Support can include** airlift, intelligence, communications, and logistic support. Even though a target may be vulnerable to SOF, **deficiencies** in supportability **may affect the likelihood for success** or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.
- **Does the expected outcome justify the risk?** Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF



*Commanders should evaluate all SO operational mission criteria in considering mission advisability.*

and ensure that the **benefits of successful mission execution are measurable** and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission. **Assessment of risk** should take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

c. All commanders should be familiar with these criteria and apply them to all operational planning. If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” then the mission should not be undertaken.

### 7. SOF Mission Planning

a. **Detailed mission planning** based on specific, comprehensive, and current intelligence **is vital to successful execution**

of SOF missions and, potentially, the very survival of the SOF element. SOF personnel must have a **thorough knowledge of the operational area**, to include geographic, political, social, economic, informational, military, and environmental conditions. For some missions, SOF operators must also know the language, customs, and ethnic and religious affiliations and antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution. This level of **area orientation** is best achieved through previous **operational experience**, MTTs, deployments for training in the area or, at a minimum, **intensive pre-employment study** of the intended operational area.

b. **SOF missions must be planned completely** — insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction — **prior to committing the force**. The **nature of the target**, enemy situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area **will dictate the size and capabilities of the assigned force**, the nature of the tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, logistics requirements, and the size and composition of the command and support structure.

c. **Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces that either host or support their activities**. This is especially true during time-critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forced entry operations, they must be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of weapons, communications equipment, and shipboard logistics.

d. Regardless of the level of security involved, **key planners** from all disciplines (e.g., intelligence, fire support, communications, logistics, PSYOP) **must be involved in all phases of SOF mission planning**.

## 8. Operations Security

a. **OPSEC** is a process for identifying and managing indicators of friendly actions. OPSEC is important to SOF activities because it denies an adversary critical information of intelligence value that might otherwise be deduced from unclassified information, evidence, or observables associated with the planning and conduct of military activities. When combined with traditional security programs, OPSEC enables SOF to achieve essential secrecy. OPSEC is an integral part of all phases of an operation but is especially important in regards to effective SOF employment.

b. The need for strict security must be balanced against the need for coordinated planning, execution, and deconfliction of these activities with other operations. OPSEC contributes to coordinated planning, execution, and deconfliction by identifying and then controlling only that information which, in the hands of an adversary, could enable the enemy to cause the SOF operation to fail.

## 9. Military Deception

a. Most SOF missions rely on secrecy and surprise for mission success. However, the execution of some SOF missions may require, or be enhanced by, **deception operations**. Such deception initiatives **may serve as diversionary operations** to focus enemy attention away from actual targets and objectives or deny recognition of SOF.

b. SOF may be employed in conducting or supporting military deception operations. Military deception operations that use or support SOF should not inadvertently heighten the enemy awareness of SOF operations.

## 10. Summary

a. To be most effective, **SOF must be integrated into the overall theater campaign**. The theater SOC commander is responsible for recommending SOF missions and identifying SOF support requirements during the planning process. SOF planners must be **involved throughout the planning process** and should be brought in early to facilitate effective employment of SOF.

b. SOF missions are often high risk operations, have limited windows of execution, and require first time success. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may force specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographical, or force size constraints upon the employed and supporting forces. Commanders must evaluate the appropriateness of SOF for a specific mission, the risk attendant to the SOF unit, and the potential adverse affect of mission failure. Given the limited size and sustainability of SOF, **adequate support is vital to the success of the mission and must be properly planned for** — prior to the commitment of the force.

c. While some SOF missions (particularly those in permissive environments) may be less

### SOF MILITARY DECEPTION SUPPORT

An example of SOF military deceptions operations in support of the conventional campaign is the placing of explosives on approach beaches in Kuwait by SEALs during Operation DESERT STORM as a feint of a Marine amphibious assault. This fake attack was supported by PSYOP leaflets leading the Iraqi command structure to believe that the assault was real.

complex, SOF planners are not excused from **thorough planning of the operation**, gaining knowledge of the cultural aspects of the operational area, and developing a range of **appropriate alternative means** to accomplish the mission should the

operational environment change during employment.

d. **The keystone of SOF mission planning is that the operational element executing the mission MUST plan the mission.**

# CHAPTER V

## PREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

*“Closely allied to the confidence which is due to good leadership is that which is caused by the feeling of being supported.”*

**Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart**  
**Thoughts on War, 1944**

### 1. General

SOF require training, equipment, and support that are **tailored to specific mission requirements yet are flexible** enough to respond to changing employment parameters. The joint character of SOF also **requires support arrangements** across Service lines and emphasis on the frequently extraordinary support required to sustain operations that are often independent and remote. Further, SOF must be able to exploit the full range of available national support systems such as those offered by emerging technologies and space-based assets.

### 2. SOF Training Responsibilities

SOF require a **combination of basic military training and specialized skill training** to achieve operational proficiency. SOF-specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness. Many SOF skills are perishable and must be maintained throughout an operational deployment. **Training responsibilities for SOF** are outlined below.

a. **The Services are primarily responsible for all basic individual military skill training** and common professional military education (PME) for personnel programmed for assignment to SOF units.

b. **USCINCSOC is charged by title 10, USC Section 167 with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings** as described herein and ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. SO-peculiar individual, continuation, and professional training and PME are the direct responsibility of USCINCSOC. Component commanders of USSOCOM design and monitor upgraded and continuation training programs to meet the warfighting requirements of the geographic combatant commanders. Joint training of SOF is the **shared responsibility** of USCINCSOC and the geographic combatant commanders.

c. **Through the theater SOC and in coordination with USCINCSOC, geographic combatant commanders should articulate SO joint mission-essential tasks required to support theater campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs.** USCINCSOC will develop and resource the SO-specific training architecture. USSOCOM component commanders then develop supporting mission-essential tasks for USCINCSOC validation and implement training programs to meet validated requirements.

Geographic combatant commanders conduct joint exercises, some CJCS-sponsored, which are supported and monitored by USCINCSOC. Such exercises stress SOF under conditions resembling the

operational environments in which they will be tasked. Further, these **exercises build and reinforce the regional area orientation** required to support theater campaign plans. This orientation, including language and cultural familiarity, is labor-intensive and may take years of preparation for units to reach full capability.

d. As the operational commanders of in-theater SOF, theater SOC commanders have the best perspective concerning ongoing and projected missions for deploying SOF. **The use of mission letters can greatly assist USCINCSOC in the execution** of responsibilities for the preparation for employment in a specific theater.

Mission letters serve as a formal link between theater missions and the training of USCINCSOC-assigned, theater-apportioned SOF. Mission letters should be developed for specific units designated for deployment to the theater and provided to the unit commander in a timely manner to influence the unit's predeployment training program.

### 3. Intelligence Support of SOF

a. **Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital** in identifying relevant targets, COA development and mission planning and execution. **The ability to interface with theater and national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SOF mission success.** SOF mission accomplishment may hinge on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF, when formed, must have these same interfaces.

b. **The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations.** SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage the enemy (See Figure V-1).

c. **Intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires an expanded focus of**



*Support, both of intelligence and material, is essential for successful SO planning.*



Figure V-1. Examples of SOF Intelligence Requirements

**the standard scope of intelligence functions.** This is particularly true in FID operations. Intelligence must contain aspects related to political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships as well as enemy and friendly forces and target specific data.

d. SOF missions are particularly **sensitive to HN and enemy collection efforts.** Counterintelligence support must also be considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions across the range of military operations. Commanders at all levels should be well informed on the capability and effectiveness of HN intelligence and security services to collect information on SOF units and personnel.

e. More specific guidance on intelligence support to SOF is provided in Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special

Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures,” and the Joint Pub 2-0 series of publications.

#### 4. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of SOF

**Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services are critical to the success of SOF missions.** From initial planning through execution, **environmental intelligence should be included in the decision making process.** Unique local conditions may expedite a particular COA or make it impossible. A study of general climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the operational area may provide the commander with the information necessary to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific operations. Potentially, the execution decision may turn on **exploiting certain adverse weather and METOC conditions** to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper operations. However these decisions often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while the weapons systems are operating near their environmental limits, they do not exceed them.

With the increased reliance of the military on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can provide information that will allow the SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems.

#### 5. SOF Logistic Support

The theater SOC commander (or the JFSOCC when a JTF is established) determines **logistics requirements** for SOF in-theater for the geographic combatant

commander. **Logistic support for SOF units** can be provided through one or more of the following.

a. **Service Support.** The logistic support of SOF units is the **responsibility of their parent Service**, except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the SOC or JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. **SOF logistic support includes** the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities, and services.

b. **Joint In-theater Support.** **The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution.** When the theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the geographic combatant commander will determine if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements may also be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy requirements. SOF often require **nonstandard arrangements** when operating in locations geographically separated from established theater Service support infrastructures. Geographic combatant commanders and theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the theater SOC, are responsible for **ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided.**

c. **SO-Peculiar Support.** SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are **defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement.** Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and

services belongs to USCINCSOC. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and **in coordination with theater Service components.**

(For additional discussion of SOF logistic support, see Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” and the Joint Pub 4-0 series of publications.)

## 6. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of SOF

a. **Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support to SOF must be global,** secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be **flexible** so that it can be tailored to any mission, and it must add value to the SO warrior’s operational capability. **C4 systems support the full range of SO worldwide.** SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit must have a **variety of methods** for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. **C4 systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit** on the ground, in the air, or at sea.

b. **SOF C4 support consists of** multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. C4 systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control at high national levels. To provide for necessary control, **SOF C4 systems must offer seamless connectivity** from the lowest to the highest levels.

c. **SOF C4 systems must be interoperable with each other**, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs. They **must integrate** not only with state-of-the-art systems, but also must be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations.

(For more detailed discussion on C4 support to SOF, see Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” and the Joint Pub 6-0 series of publications.)

### 7. PSYOP and CA Support of SOF

The theater SOC submits requests for PSYOP and CA support to the supported commander in chief (CINC), who consolidates and validates all requests for PSYOP and CA support and submits them to the Joint Staff for a deployment order or as part of an overall OPLAN. PSYOP and CA support may be provided to the theater SOC based on mission requirements, availability, and priorities established by the CINC or JTF commander. **CA and PSYOP support provide** the SOF commanders and their indigenous counterparts **the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments** of the population to enhance the probability of mission success.

(For more detailed discussion of PSYOP and CA support to SOF, see Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”)

### 8. Public Affairs Support of SOF

The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that

**thorough and accurate public affairs (PA) guidance be developed** during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most operations. **PA planning must accurately reflect the objective of the mission** to domestic audiences consistent with the overall PSYOP effort, and with strategic and tactical OPSEC requirements. The commander having operational authority should develop proposed PA guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and government agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.


(For further information, see Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”)

### 9. Legal Support of SOF

SOF missions frequently involve a **unique set of complex issues**. There are Federal laws and Executive Orders, Federal agency publications and directives, and theater rules of engagement (ROE) that may affect SOF activities. These **guidelines become especially critical during sensitive peacetime operations** when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements may affect mission planning and execution. Commanders must seek legal review during all levels of planning and execution of SOF missions, to include planning of the theater ROE.

### 10. Space Support of SOF

As space-based support to military operations continues to improve, **SOF commanders and planners must be aware of potential space support** for their operations and the integration of SOF with space assets. Current SOF use of space-based capabilities are shown in Figure V-2.



**Figure V-2. Space-Based Support to SOF**

## 11. Combat Camera Support of SOF

Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support PSYOP operations and other special operations missions. Many teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used to show allies, adversaries, and civilian populations the effects of US operations and to counter enemy disinformation with on-screen or gun camera evidence.

## 12. Medical Support of SOF

SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel provide

emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the team level. Medical support provided to SOF units in the area of operations is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this capability depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover the lack of internal capability or to meet requirements for additional medical assets (i.e., advanced trauma life support, surgical intervention, evacuation, and medical logistics). Certain operations may also require special security requirements, to be put in place as to not compromise the names of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system.

(For additional discussion of SOF medical support, see Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations.")

## APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 3-05 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by:
  - a. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
  - b. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.
2. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."
3. Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States."
4. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
5. Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."
6. Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
7. Joint Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."
8. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
9. Joint Pub 3-05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures."
10. Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures."
11. Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."
12. Joint Pub 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)."
13. Joint Pub 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism."
14. Joint Pub 3-07.4, "Joint Counterdrug Operations."
15. Joint Pub 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance."
16. Joint Pub 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations."
17. Joint Pub 3-15, "Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare."

18. Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”
19. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
20. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
21. Joint Pub 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.”
22. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
23. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”
24. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”
25. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”
26. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.”
27. CJCSI 3110.01B, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1996.”
28. CJCSI 3110.05A, “Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1996.”
29. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplemental to JSCP FY 1996.”
30. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP.”
31. CJCSI 3210.01 “Joint Information Warfare Policy.”
32. JCSM-71-87, 29 May 1987, “Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command.”
33. MCM 1196, 17 Jan 96, “Unified Command Plan (UCP).”

# APPENDIX B

## ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

### 3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-05, 28 October 1992, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

### 4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ5//  
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

## 5. Distribution

- a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.
- b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
- c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

By Military Services:

- Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL  
1655 Woodson Road  
Attn: Joint Publications  
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181
- Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center  
2800 Eastern Boulevard  
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896
- Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point  
700 Robbins Avenue  
Bldg 1, Customer Service  
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
- Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base  
Albany, GA 31704-5000
- Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)  
2100 2nd Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20593-0001

- d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

# GLOSSARY

## PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active component
AT	antiterrorism
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CBT	combatting terrorism
CD	counterdrug
CINC	commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM	countermine
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CP	counterproliferation
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CT	counterterrorism
DA	direct action
DOD	Department of Defense
E&E	evasion and escape
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
HN	host nation
IO	information operations
JAOC	joint air operations center
JCSAR	joint combat search and rescue
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications

## Glossary

---

MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MTT	mobile training team
NCA	National Command Authorities
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSW	naval special warfare
NSWTG	naval special warfare task group
NSWTU	naval special warfare task unit
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PME	professional military education
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
RC	Reserve component
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	security assistance
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SO	special operations
SOA	special operations aviation
SOC	special operations command
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCOORD	special operations coordination element
SOF	special operations forces
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SR	special reconnaissance
TACON	tactical control
USC	United States Code
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Air Force special operations forces.** Those active and reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area assessment.** The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area oriented.** Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Army special operations forces.** Those active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**civil administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with

the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**civil affairs.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**clandestine operation.** An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified

or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combat search and rescue.** A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combatting terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combined joint special operations task force.** A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign

countries and more than one US Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (This term and its definition is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**command and control warfare.** The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information operations in military operations. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-13.)

**conventional forces.** Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterdrug.** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterterrorism.** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**deception.** Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**direct action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**evasion and escape.** The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. Also called E&E. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force multiplier.** A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition are included for information and are proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.6.)

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**guerrilla force.** A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**guerrilla warfare.** Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-13.)

**information warfare** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-13.)

**insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force air component commander.** The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will

recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint psychological operations task force.** A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. The joint psychological operations task force assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. The joint psychological operations task force may have conventional or special operations psychological units assigned or attached to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (This

term and its definition is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**joint special operations area.** A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable).** A forward deployed, embarked US Marine Corps unit with enhanced capability to conduct special operations. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) is oriented toward amphibious raids, at night, under limited visibility, while employing emission control procedures. The Marine

expeditionary unit (special operations capable) is not a Secretary of Defense designated special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities and/or by the theater commander, may conduct hostage recovery or other special operations under in extremis circumstances when designated special operations forces are not available. Also called MEU(SOC). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobile training team.** A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (This term and definition is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**National Command Authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national security.** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**naval special warfare.** A designated naval warfare specialty which conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent application of force. Also called NSW. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish

missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are: a. permissive environment — operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct; b. uncertain environment — operational environment in which host-government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations; and c. hostile environment — operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems;

b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**paramilitary forces.** Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**raid.** An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Rangers.** Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sabotage.** An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sea-air-land team.** A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral and riverine environments. Also called SEAL team. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special activities.** Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives which are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special boat unit.** Those US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support naval special warfare, riverine warfare, coastal patrol and interdiction, and joint special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft designed primarily for special operations support. Also called SBU. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special forces.** US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**special operations command.** A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and

its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**special operations forces.** Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special operations liaison element.** A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air. Also called SOLE. (This term and its definition is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**special operations-peculiar.** Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations mission support for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. This includes standard items used by other DOD forces but modified for special operations forces (SOF); items initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adapted for use as Service-common by other DOD forces; and items approved by the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission but not normally procured by USCINCSOC. Also called SO-peculiar. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**special reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection

methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special tactics team.** An Air Force team composed primarily of special operations combat control and pararescue personnel. The team supports joint special operations by selecting, surveying, and establishing assault zones; providing assault zone terminal guidance and air traffic control; conducting direct action missions; providing medical care and evacuation; and, coordinating, planning and conducting air, ground, and naval fire support operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**subversion.** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level

at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)


**terrorism.** The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unconventional warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**weapons of mass destruction.** In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Intentionally Blank

# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 3-05** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

