

Joint Publication 3-31



Command and Control for Joint Land Operations



23 March 2004



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning and conduct of land operations by joint forces under the command and control of a joint force land component commander (JFLCC) in an area of operation. It presents options and considerations for use by a joint force commander (JFC) in designating a JFLCC and forming a functional land component, to include advantages and disadvantages of each option. It also addresses the timing and decision of the JFC to form the component and designate the JFLCC, assignment of subordinate commands, and the authority and responsibilities of the commander. It addresses formation, functions, and organization of the component, and provides joint doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for operations in support of major operations or campaigns by a JFC across the range of military operations. It includes topics that should be considered when developing a joint land operation plan or order. These operations are primarily those involving large forces to include Army corps and Marine expeditionary forces, and those operations outside of an amphibious objective area, if designated.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces

operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. J. Keating', written in a cursive style.

T. J. KEATING
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	v
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	
• Background	I-1
• Joint Land Operations	I-2
• Organizing the Joint Land Force	I-2
• Considerations in Forming a Functional Land Component and Designating a Joint Force Land Component Commander	I-5
CHAPTER II	
FORMING THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT	
• Establishing Authority	II-1
• Defining the Area of Operations	II-2
• Forming the Component	II-2
• Sourcing the Forces	II-3
• Forming the Staff	II-5
• Liaison Requirements	II-5
• Joint Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities and Roles	II-5
• Joint Force Land Component Commander Functions	II-7
CHAPTER III	
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE JOINT LAND FORCE	
• Functional Component Command Authority	III-1
• Joint Force Land Component Commander Command Relationships	III-1
• Liaison	III-6
• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems	III-7
• Multinational Forces	III-7
CHAPTER IV	
PLANS AND OPERATIONS	
SECTION A. PLANS	IV-1
• Planning Considerations	IV-1
• The Planning Process	IV-2
• Planning Products	IV-3
• Planning Handover	IV-3

SECTION B. OPERATIONS IV-4

- Movement and Maneuver IV-4
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance IV-5
- Fires IV-6
- Force Protection IV-10
- Logistic and Personnel Support IV-14
- Special Operations Forces IV-15
- Information Operations IV-15

APPENDIX

A Notional Headquarters Organization A-1

B Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development B-1

C References C-1

D Administrative Instructions D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions GL-4

FIGURE

II-1 Area of Operations: Joint Force Land Component and
Subordinate Commands II-3

II-2 Possible Components in a Joint Force II-4

III-1 Command Relationships with Forces/Capabilities Made Available III-3

A-1 Notional Joint Force Land Component Organization A-1

A-2 Notional Joint Force Land Component Manpower and Personnel
Staff Section A-2

A-3 Notional Joint Force Land Component Intelligence Staff Section A-3

A-4 Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Section A-6

A-5 Notional Joint Force Land Component Logistics Staff Section A-8

A-6 Notional Joint Force Land Component Plans Staff Section A-9

A-7 Notional Joint Force Land Component Command, Control,
Communications, and Computer Systems Staff Section A-10

A-8 Notional Joint Force Land Component Engineering Staff Section..... A-13

A-9 Notional Joint Force Land Component Force Structure,
Resource, and Assessment Staff Section A-15

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides Guidance for Organizing the Joint Land Force**
 - **Discusses Forming the Joint Force Land Component**
 - **Describes Command and Control of the Joint Land Force**
 - **Outlines Considerations for Joint Land Force Plans and Operations**
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Introduction

Land warfare has played a significant and often major role in the resolution of conflicts throughout history.

In the twentieth century, joint and multinational operations have predominantly encompassed the full spectrum of air, land, sea, special operations, and space capabilities. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances has made the application of military power more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate land with other components. As a result, **joint land combat requires an effective and efficient command and control (C2) structure to achieve success.**

Organizing the Joint Land Force

The manner in which joint force commanders (JFCs) organize their forces directly affects the command and control, responsiveness, and versatility of joint force operations.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) organize assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC's vision and concept of operations as well as considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are also key considerations. JFCs can conduct operations through subordinate joint task forces (JTFs), Service components, functional components, or a combination of Service and functional components. If the JFC does not choose to retain control at the JFC level, **there are three primary options available to the JFC for organizing land forces from two or more components.** The options are subordinate JTF; Service components; or functional land component with a joint force land component commander (JFLCC).

Considerations in Forming a Functional Land Component and Designating a Joint Force Land Component Commander

Forming a functional land component is a key organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of land operations.

The JFC may designate a JFLCC and form a functional land component to improve combat efficiency, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction, or control the land scheme of maneuver. Some of the factors to be considered by the JFC in making such a decision are:

Mission. The mission requires that the capabilities and functions of more than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of effort is a primary concern.

Scope of Operations. When the scope of land operations is large in force size and/or battle space, the JFC needs to divide attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated and synchronize those operations. Geographically concentrated land operations may require direction by a JFLCC.

Planning. The formation of a functional land component with a JFLCC integrates planning, beneath the level of the JFC, for land control operations.

Duration. Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant establishing a JFLCC.

Experience. Designating a JFLCC may enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and the execution of land operations required to support joint operations.

Multinational Operations. In multinational operations, land forces may be provided by a variety of national components. Designating a JFLCC provides unity of effort for land operations.

Forming the Joint Force Land Component

The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.

The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; **by providing the JFLCC as a single commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US ground components, but with multinational land forces as well.** The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

Areas of operations are typically defined by the JFC for land and naval forces.

An area of operation (AO) does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the forces or capabilities provided. The JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders. The battlefield geometry should maximize the operational capabilities of all subordinate elements.

As the JFC develops the concept of operations, the Service and functional components develop their supporting plans.

During the development of the concept of operations, the JFC tasks the functional and Service components to provide estimates of forces required. **The JFLCC provides the force estimate in terms of capabilities required rather than specific units.** The JFC, working with the functional and Service components, sources the actual forces needed by the JFLCC. Based upon JFC guidance, Service components designate specific units to report to the JFC, which are assigned a command relationship with the JFLCC. After the forces are designated the JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component commanders, provides recommended phasing of forces to the JFC.

The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and staff have a number of core functions.

The JFLCC and staff plan, direct, and coordinate a number of core functions that are critical to the successful execution of land operations. These functions are movement and maneuver; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); fires; C2; force protection; and logistics. must monitor and may coordinate, and synchronize the Service component support functions (e.g., logistics, personnel support, etc.) that impact joint land operations.

Command and Control of the Joint Land Force

Unity of command and effort is a primary consideration when designating a JFLCC.

Use of the JFLCC is a JFC option for managing the operations of land forces, reducing the requirement for the JFC to oversee and influence every task, thereby allowing the JFC to focus more on the overall joint effort. **The JFLCC must understand the relationship with the JFC, the other components (Service and functional), and the forces/capabilities made available.** The JFLCC may provide support to other components and may similarly receive support from other Service or functional components.

The JFC establishes the command relationships and assignment of forces to accomplish mission objectives. The JFC will also specify the command relationships between the functional components and Service components.

The JFLCC is responsible for land operations as assigned and establishes command relationships for subordinate forces. The JFLCC is responsible for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC operation plan that provides JFLCC's intentions, concept of the operation, and details. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations.

Command relationships and mission accomplishment determine liaison officer requirements.

The JFLCC determines JFLCC liaison officer (LNO) requirements to the JFC and other functional or Service components based upon mission requirements. Liaison between the JFLCC and other organizations (i.e., JFC, functional/Service components, other government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations) is an important consideration when determining manning requirements within the JFLCC staff. **LNOs provide continued and close liaison to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of JFC objectives.**

Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an alliance.

To achieve the most effective C2 and best use of the capabilities of the multinational land forces, **the multinational force commander normally designates a single land component commander (LCC) for land operations.** Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an alliance. How that structure is organized will be based on the needs, political goals, constraints and objectives of the participating nations. The multinational commander has the option of creating an LCC with either an alliance or coalition.

Planning Joint Land Force Operations

Planning complements and enhances joint land force command and control.

Plans are an important way for the JFLCC to communicate with and unify the efforts of the joint land force. Joint land force operational planning links the tactical employment of land forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of operational goals. **The focus of JFLCC planning is on operational art** — the use of military forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

JFLCC operational planning addresses some activities required for conducting joint/multinational land operations. These activities are employment planning which describes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives; sustainment planning which is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity; and, deployment/redeployment planning that includes the development of time-phased force and deployment list, monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at the end of the campaign.

The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and joint land operations is **synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each force to achieve unity of effort**. This requires an understanding of these capabilities and limitations across all staff functions, but it is particularly important in the joint planning group (JPG). The JPG must have knowledgeable members from each Service in all functional areas. With these key personnel and appropriate LNOs from the major subordinate commands in place, the planning process provides sufficient consideration of the capabilities of each Service.

Conducting Joint Land Force Operations

The JFLCC is responsible for operational movement and maneuver of land forces necessary to contribute to the success of the JFC's campaign, and directs the land force in performance of operational tasks.

The JFLCC states operational requirements and provides continuous feedback to ensure optimum intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to operations.

The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes fires and their effects in order to set the conditions for success on the battlefield.

As a responsibility of command, not a separate mission, the JFC considers all elements of force protection.

The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates land movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage or a mobility differential over the adversary. The purpose is to achieve the objectives assigned in the theater or subordinate campaign plan. The objective for operational maneuver is usually to gain the positional advantage over an adversary center of gravity or decisive point.

The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for the land component, prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces, and provides representation for the land component and its subordinates at the JFC's daily joint targeting and coordination boards. The staff incorporates and synchronizes all ISR efforts, including human intelligence and counterintelligence efforts with the JFC's staff. The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for adversary ground forces intelligence, target development, and combat assessment. The first option for filling JFLCC ISR gaps should be to request augmentation from theater and/or national assets.

The JFLCC's agency for fires and their effects is a fire support coordination center. A fire support coordination center reviews the JFC's guidance and intent, and makes recommendations for the JFLCC to achieve them. The fire support coordination center applies this guidance as it shapes the battlespace for the land component's current and future fights. The JFLCC's focus is on shaping those adversary formations, functions, facilities and operations that could impact on the JFLCC area of operations.

Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. The JFLCC will set appropriate

threat conditions for his AO equal to or more restrictive than the JFC's baseline threat condition.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides guidance for the planning and conduct of land operations by joint forces under the C2 of a JFLCC in an area of operation. It presents options and considerations for the use of a JFC in designating a JFLCC and forming a functional land component, to include advantages and disadvantages of each option. It also addresses the timing and decision of the JFC to form the component and designate the JFLCC, assignment of subordinate commands, and the authority and responsibilities of the commander. It addresses formation, functions, and organization of the component, and provides joint doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for operations in support of major operations or campaigns by a JFC across the range of military operations. It includes topics that should be considered when developing a joint land operation plan or order. These operations are primarily those involving large forces to include Army corps and Marine expeditionary forces, and those operations outside of an amphibious objective area, if designated.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

“... there will be war, the aim of war is some measure of control...the pattern of war is not predictable, and...the ultimate tool of control in war is the man on the scene with a gun.”

Rear Adm. J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power*

1. Background

a. **The land component commander (LCC) is not new to the Armed Forces of the United States.** The LCC was used during World War II in several theaters. For example, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, United States Marine Corps, commanded US Army and Marine Corps forces in the Marianas Island campaign. US forces also served under a multinational LCC, British Field Marshal Montgomery, during the Normandy invasion in 1944. Frequently, officers serving as theater commanders attempted with varying degrees of success also to serve as a multinational LCC.

b. Battles such as those at Kasserine Pass in 1943, the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, and the Yalu in late 1950 were fought without unifying land operations under a single component for command and control (C2). These operations contrast with unified land operations in North Africa following Kasserine Pass, the arrangements used for the Normandy Invasion in 1944,



British General Sir Harold Alexander, LTG George S. Patton, and RADM Alan G. Kirk inspect invasion task force for Operation TORCH off the coast of North Africa. Alexander was to become the land component commander of the allied forces in March 1943. (Official US Navy photograph).

and the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. In these operations a separate land component headquarters (HQ) successfully ensured proper coordination with other components and reduced the joint force commander's (JFC's) requirement to pay detailed attention to land operations, thus allowing greater focus on the overall joint effort.

2. Joint Land Operations

Land warfare has played a significant and often major role in the resolution of conflicts throughout history. In the twentieth century, joint and multinational operations have predominantly encompassed the full spectrum of air, land, sea, special operations, and space capabilities. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances has made the application of military power more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate land operations with other components. As a result, **joint land combat requires an effective and efficient C2 structure to achieve success.**

3. Organizing the Joint Land Force

a. The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the C2, responsiveness, and versatility of joint force operations. **JFCs organize assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC's vision and concept of operations (CONOPS) as well as considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T).** Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are also key considerations. JFCs can conduct operations through subordinate joint task forces (JTFs), Service components, functional components, or a combination of Service and functional components.

"JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces."

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

b. Under certain conditions, the JFC may elect to retain control of joint operations within the joint force HQ. In those instances, the JFC would retain command authority and responsibility and use the JFC staff to assist in planning and coordinating operations. **If the JFC does not choose to retain control at the JFC level, there are three primary options available to the JFC for organizing land forces from two or more components.** The options are listed below.

- (1) Subordinate JTF.
- (2) Service components.
- (3) Functional land component with a joint force land component commander (JFLCC).

PERSIAN GULF WAR EXAMPLE OF JOINT FORCE COMMANDER RETAINING CONTROL OF LAND FORCES

The Saudis had insisted on commanding all Arab forces. Yet the need to maintain unity of command called for establishing a land component commander in charge of all ground forces.... Political sensitivities argued against placing Arab forces under an American land commander. Technically, CENTCOM [Central Command] did not control Arab-Islamic forces, and Khalid was Schwarzkopf's political equal....

Schwarzkopf's practical and philosophical obsession with trading tail for teeth presented another argument against creating a separate LCC [land component commander]. If he approved another headquarters to control both ARCENT [Army Forces Central Command] and the Marines, and perhaps the Arab forces, he would create another staff layer complete with a four-star general and all the staff accoutrements that go along with it. In retrospect, a few hundred more soldiers might seem insignificant, but at the time resources were stretched so thin that another major headquarters in Saudi Arabia was out of the question.

Schwarzkopf made the tough decision to retain the land component commander responsibility for himself, with Waller [LTG Calvin A. H Waller, USA was the CENTCOM deputy commander] serving as his primary assistant for ground combat issues. The decision created numerous challenges and difficulties. Though Yeosock [LTG John J. Yeosock, USA was the Third Army commander] was clearly charged with commanding the two US corps, Schwarzkopf was within his rights as the LCC in going directly to the corps commanders with instructions. From the other direction, the two corps commanders dealt directly with Yeosock. Lieutenant General Charles Horner, as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), could go directly to the CINC [combatant commander], whereas Yeosock competed with the Arab command and the Marines for Schwarzkopf's attention. This rather convoluted arrangement certainly went against the principles of simplicity and unity of command. That it was made to work as smoothly as it did was attributable to the powerful personalities and professionalism of the senior commanders.

**SOURCE: Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Jr.,
Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994.**

c. Each option has advantages and disadvantages that the JFC and staff must consider prior to a decision to organize under a particular option. The following advantages and disadvantages are not all-inclusive but highlight some of the more important issues.

(1) **Subordinate JTF.** The advantages are:

- (a) Unity of command and effort.
 - (b) Joint staff.
 - (c) Authority of a JFC including the authority to organize subordinate functional components.
- (2) The disadvantages are:
- (a) Separate JTF commander/staff required.
 - (b) Lead-time required to establish headquarters before execution.
- (3) **Service components**, the advantages are:
- (a) Simplified C2.
 - (b) Requires no change in structure.
 - (c) JFC directly integrates land control operations with other operations.
 - (d) Less time to establish prior to execution.
- (4) The disadvantages are:
- (a) Staff not integrated, liaison only.
 - (b) Potential for ineffective use of assigned forces due to tasking and mission redundancies.
 - (c) JFC focus on the land battle.
 - (d) Potential for JFC to lose focus on the operational interface.
 - (e) No single focus for land forces.

“The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and the scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

(5) **Functional land component.** The advantages are:

- (a) Unity of effort.
- (b) Integrated staff.
- (c) Single voice for land forces (consolidated picture of land force capabilities to the JFC, staff, and boards).
- (d) Single battle concept and focus of effort for land operations (an aspect of the plan rather than a function of coordination either horizontally or vertically).
- (e) Synchronized/integrated land force planning and execution (prioritization and therefore deconfliction of competing land force requirements).

(6) The disadvantages are:

- (a) JFLCC normally retains Service component responsibilities to the JFC (requires split focus of the staff).
- (b) Challenge of integrating staffs.
- (c) Lead-time required to establish headquarters before execution.
- (d) Sourcing the staffs.

“We can make a land component command arrangement work. There will be no more occasions in the Central Command’s area of operations where Marines will fight one ground war and the Army fights a different ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component commander.”

General Anthony C. Zinni
Commander in Chief Central Command
March 2000

4. Considerations in Forming a Functional Land Component and Designating a Joint Force Land Component Commander

The JFC may designate a JFLCC and form a functional land component to improve combat efficiency, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction, or control the land scheme of maneuver. **Forming a functional land component is a key organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of land operations.** The following are some of the factors to be considered by the JFC in making such a decision.

a. **Mission.** The mission requires that the capabilities and functions of more than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of effort is a primary

concern. Land forces are competing for limited joint force assets. The JFLCC contributes to the combat efficiency, prioritization and control of joint force assets, scheme of maneuver, and joint fires, as the situation requires. The JFLCC provides direction and control of land operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN LEBANON AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, command and control relationships presented few problems, at least on paper. The chain of command in the 1958 crisis ran from Washington through a commander in chief of a specified command...who early in the intervention designated a ground forces commander over both Army and Marine units in Lebanon. Similarly, during the Dominican Republic intervention, the chain of command ran from the NCA [national command authorities] and JCS [joint chiefs of staff] through the commander in chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) to a joint task force commander, who later relinquished operational control to a ground force commander, LTG Bruce Palmer. As COMUSFORDOMREP [Commander US Forces Dominican Republic], Palmer controlled all US units in country, to include special forces from the 7th and 8th Special Forces Groups. Grenada should have followed a similar pattern, except that CINCLANT, the supported commander, chose not to implement the CONPLAN (concept plan) that called for a ground force commander. The result was confusion as to who was in charge of ground operations on the island.

Extracted From: "Some Thoughts on US Interventions Since World War II." by Dr. Larry Yates, *Reading, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.*

b. Scope of Operations

(1) When the scope of land operations is large in force size and/or battlespace, the JFC needs to divide attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominate and synchronize those operations. It may be advantageous, therefore, to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. **A functional land component may be designated anytime the forces of two or more Military Departments operate in the same dimension or medium.** For situations involving smaller forces that require Army/Marine Corps integration refer to Field Manual (FM) 3-31.1, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-36, *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*.

(2) **Geographically concentrated land operations may require direction by a JFLCC.** Although dispersed objectives, different lines of operation, and support might better be addressed by other organizational options, such as a subordinate JTF or a Service component, a JFLCC can ensure that coordination and integration remains focused on achieving JFC's objectives.

(a) **Level of Operations.** Regardless of size, when the scope of the operation requires an operational level command to directly link land control operations to campaign or strategic objectives, a JFLCC can provide the linkage.

(b) **Span of Control.** The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge the JFC's span of control and ability to oversee and influence each task. Having a JFLCC allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances component interaction at that level. The JFC has other responsibilities in the operational area that may require greater focus.

c. **Planning.** The formation of a functional land component with a JFLCC integrates planning beneath the level of the JFC for land control operations. While this integrated planning is focused on employment, the JFLCC also integrates planning of deployment, transition, and redeployment. In addition, the designation of a JFLCC enhances the integration and synchronization of operational maneuver with fires by making the JFLCC the controlling commander in his area of operations (AO).

d. **Duration.** Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant establishing a JFLCC. The duration of operations must be worth the costs in terms of leadtime, personnel and staff training, command, control, communications, computer and intelligence architecture, and impact on flexibility. The decision to constitute a JFLCC should be made early enough in the JFC's planning cycle to facilitate establishment and preparation of the headquarters for land operations and allow time for generation of a comprehensive plan for the application of landpower in support of the JFC.

e. **Experience.** Designating a JFLCC may enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and the execution of land operations required to support joint operations.

f. **Multinational Operations.** In multinational operations, land forces may be provided by a variety of national components. Designating a JFLCC provides unity of effort for land operations.

For a more detailed discussion of multinational operations see Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

WORLD WAR II EXAMPLE OF CONSIDERATIONS USED IN ORGANIZING LAND FORCES

Unity of command was the firm foundation upon which AFHQ (Allied Force Headquarters) was constructed. As noted by Eisenhower:

“Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and “unity of command” has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command

of different nationality or different service . . . I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.”

General Eisenhower had to fight to obtain the unity of command that he sought.

The principle of unity of command when translated into practice tended to concentrate authority. For example, MTO [Mediterranean Theater of Operations] was established by expanding [sic] North African Theater of Operations and bringing more forces under its control. However, there were also factors at work, which encouraged the dispersion of authority. One was the limit of time and energy possessed by one person, General Eisenhower. Eisenhower created the position of deputy theater commander in the American theater in order to free himself from as many administrative burdens as possible. Another problem was the inefficiency caused by the great distances between decision-makers and the geographical areas of their responsibilities. AFHQ’s decision to decentralize a number of tasks to AAI [Allied Armies Italy] in 1944 was due in part to the distance between Algiers and central Italy.

SOURCE: Dr. Gary J. Borge, “Larger Units in North Africa and Mediterranean,” in Gary L. Bounds, *Larger Units: Theater Army—Army Group—Field Army*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1985.

CHAPTER II

FORMING THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT

“We can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help them win, if God forbid, that even becomes necessary.”

Congressman Bill Nichols, Hearings for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986

1. Establishing Authority

a. The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; **by providing the JFLCC as a single commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US ground components, but with multinational land forces as well.**

See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), for additional doctrinal guidance on establishing the JFLCC.

b. **The JFC can establish functional component commands and define the authority and responsibilities of the functional component commanders** based upon the CONOPS, and may alter this authority during the course of an operation. Normally, the authority to establish functional component commands does not include forming subordinate functional commands.

c. The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

“The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

2. Defining the Area of Operations

- a. AOs are typically defined by the JFC for land and naval forces.

See *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* and *JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

- b. An AO does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the forces or capabilities provided. The JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders. The battlefield geometry should maximize the operational capabilities of all subordinate elements.

- c. When considering geometry, **there may be forces or components made available to the JFLCC (e.g., the Marine Corps forces [MARFOR]) that may operate in additional dimensions.** In the case of the MARFOR this may be due to organic fixed-wing aviation assets, but such requirements may also emerge for other forces, such as those using rotary-wing aviation assets.

- d. **The JFLCC may subdivide some or all of the assigned AO.** These subordinate commander AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous depending on the JFLCC's assignments and missions/objectives. When the JFLCC's subordinate commanders are assigned contiguous AOs, a shared boundary separates the tactical units assigned to those designated subordinate commanders. When subordinate commanders are assigned noncontiguous AOs, the tactical units assigned to those designated subordinate commanders do not share a common boundary. Operation JUST CAUSE and ENDURING FREEDOM are examples of operations with noncontiguous AO. The intervening area between land forces within the joint force land component AO remains the responsibility of the JFLCC. Figure II-1 depicts an example of an AO for the joint force land component and subordinate commands with contiguous and noncontiguous AOs.

3. Forming the Component

- a. **Normally the JFLCC will also be a Service component commander.** In this case the JFLCC may have a separate Army force (ARFOR) or MARFOR commander and headquarters responsible for the administrative control of the respective Services in the land component. The JFLCC continues to be responsible for Service component functions. This arrangement has the potential to overtask the JFLCC's staff during the performance of its dual role. It may be advantageous for the JFLCC to delegate as many of the Service component related duties as practical to a subordinate Service force headquarters.

- b. Within the JFLCC headquarters, the commander/chief of staff and key members of the staff (manpower and personnel staff section [J-1] through command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems staff section [J-6]) should be fully integrated with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the JFLCC (see Figure II-2). The commander




Figure II-1. Area of Operations: Joint Force Land Component and Subordinate Commands

designated as the JFLCC will normally provide the core elements of the staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing functional land component operations.

4. Sourcing the Forces

a. **The forces required for the JFLCC to accomplish mission objectives are typically identified during the deliberate planning process and approved by the JFC.** The Forces for Unified Commands memorandum assigns forces to the combatant commander. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportions major combat forces to combatant commanders for deliberate planning. During the crisis action planning process, forces are allocated to combatant commanders, and may differ from those apportioned for deliberate planning process.




Figure II-2. Possible Components in a Joint Force

b. As the JFC develops the CONOPS, the Service and functional components develop their supporting plans. During this process, the JFC tasks the functional and Service components to provide estimates of forces required. **The JFLCC provides the force estimate in terms of capabilities required rather than specific units.** The JFC, working with the functional and Service components, sources the actual forces needed by the JFLCC. **Based upon JFC guidance, Service components designate specific units to report to the JFC, which are assigned a command relationship with the JFLCC.** After the forces are designated, the JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component commanders, provides recommended phasing of forces to the JFC. The JFLCC does not control the land force portion of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Based on the Service and functional component recommendations, the JFC develops the integrated TPFDD and assigns required delivery dates.

5. Forming the Staff

a. **Once the JFC designates a JFLCC, the headquarters is organized according to the mission and forces made available. Normally, it is built around an existing headquarters staff.** The core staff needs to be augmented with additional staff officers and subject matter experts, representative of the subordinate forces, as soon as practical. Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization,” depicts a notional JFLCC headquarters organization. The standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the organization from which the JFLCC is designated normally form the baseline for the JFLCC’s SOP.

b. While we retain the staff system that dates back to General Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force of World War I, we must recognize in doctrine that this organization must adapt to meet the demands of joint warfare at the operational level. Using the existing staff sections as a start point, the staff may be organized into groups that reflect the following operational tasks: operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics, operational command and control, and operational protection. The focused efforts of the staff in these functionally organized operating system groupings enables the commander and senior staff to maintain situational awareness across the operating systems, which contributes to sound decision making during the course of the campaign.

6. Liaison Requirements

The JFLCC’s liaison requirements include, as a minimum, liaison with other components of the joint force, either functional or Service. The commander may require additional liaison with other organizations such as joint force HQ, major subordinate commands, and multinational land forces not assigned to the command. The liaison teams or individuals represent the sending commander to the gaining commander and staff. (See also Chapter III, “Command and Control of the Joint Land Force.”)

For detailed information on liaison functions, see JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

7. Joint Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities and Roles

The JFLCC’s overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ forces/capabilities made available for tasking in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The responsibilities of the JFLCC include, but are not limited to the following.

a. Advising the JFC on the proper employment of forces/capabilities made available for tasking.

b. Developing the JFLCC’s joint land operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD) in support of the JFC’s CONOPS and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces. (See Appendix B, “Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development.”) The JFLCC issues planning

guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed course of action (COA). The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical times and places to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical goals.

c. Directing the execution of the land operation as specified by the JFC, which includes making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces/capabilities made available. The JFLCC coordinates changes with affected component commanders as appropriate.

d. Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other components and supporting agencies.

e. Evaluating the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction operations and forwarding these results to the JFC to support the combat assessment (CA) effort.

f. Synchronizing and integrating movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in support of land operations.

g. Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.

h. At the direction of the JFC, establish a rescue coordination center (RCC) to coordinate and control component recovery missions involving isolated personnel. Coordinate through the joint search and rescue center (JSRC) for special operations forces (SOF) non-conventional assisted recovery and unconventional assisted recovery options, if necessary.

i. Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations within the land AO, such as suppression of enemy air defenses, suppression of threats to maritime operations, etc.

j. Coordinate with other functional and Service components in support of accomplishment of JFC objectives.

k. Providing an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as determined by the JFC.

l. Supporting the JFCs information operations (IO) by developing the IO requirements that support land-control operations and synchronizing the land force IO assets when directed.

m. Establishing SOPs and other directives based on JFC guidance.

n. Providing inputs into the JFC-approved joint area air defense plan and the airspace control plan.

o. Integrating the JFLCC's C4 systems and resources into the theater's C4 system architecture and synchronizing the JFLCC's C4 requirements, coordination issues, and capabilities in the joint planning and execution process.

8. Joint Force Land Component Commander Functions

a. The JFLCC and staff plan, direct, and coordinate a number of **core functions** that are critical to the successful execution of land operations. These functions are listed below.

- (1) Movement and maneuver.
- (2) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
- (3) Fires.
- (4) C2.
- (5) Force protection.
- (6) Logistics.

b. The JFLCC and staff must monitor and may coordinate, and synchronize the **Service component support functions** (e.g., logistics, personnel support, etc.) that impact joint land operations.

See Chapter III, “Command and Control of the Joint Land Force,” Chapter IV, “Plans and Operations,” and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List for more details on these functions.

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CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE JOINT LAND FORCE

“And to control many is the same as to control few.... Order or disorder depends on organization.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

1. Functional Component Command Authority

Functional component commanders perform operational missions with authority derived from the JFC, who may be a combatant commander or a subordinate JFC such as a JTF commander. **Functional components have specific delegated authority over forces or capabilities made available to them, but this does not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC.**

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND AUTHORITY

“Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability made available to them as delegated by the establishing JFC.”

“Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force.”

“The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise.”

“The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC.”

SOURCE: JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

2. Joint Force Land Component Commander Command Relationships

Unity of command and effort is a primary consideration when designating a JFLCC. Use of the JFLCC is a JFC option for managing the operations of land forces and reducing the requirement for the JFC to oversee and influence every task, thereby allowing the JFC to focus more on the overall joint effort. The JFLCC must understand the relationship with the JFC, the other components (Service and functional), and the forces/capabilities made available. **The JFLCC may provide support to other components and may similarly receive support from other Service or functional components.**

a. The JFC establishes the command relationships and assignment of forces to accomplish mission objectives. The JFC will also specify the command relationships between the functional components and Service components.

b. **The JFLCC is responsible for land operations as assigned and establishes command relationships for subordinate forces.** The JFLCC is responsible for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC OPLAN that provides JFLCC's intentions, concept of the operation, and details. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations.

(1) **Command Relationships with the JFC. The JFLCC reports directly to the JFC and advises the JFC on the proper employment of land forces assigned, attached, or made available.** The JFC has the authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

(2) **Command Relationships Between Components.** The JFC may also establish support relationships among components. **The JFC determines not only how to organize the joint force into components, but also how each component relates to the others.** Support relationships afford an effective means to ensure unity of effort of various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time.

(3) **Functional Component Supporting and Supported Relationships. The JFLCC will be the supported commander for operations conducted within the AO when designated by the JFC and may be the supporting commander for some functions.** Similar relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders, such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the JFLCC and the joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFC's needs for unity of command and unity of effort dictate these relationships. Close coordination is necessary when the JFLCC provides joint suppression of enemy air defenses in support of JFACC operations.

(4) **Command Relationships with Forces/Capabilities Made Available.** The JFLCC will normally be a Service component commander. **As Service component commander, the JFLCC exercises operational control (OPCON) over the respective Service forces. As a functional component commander, the JFLCC may exercise tactical control (TACON) over forces or capabilities made available for tasking, or receives support as determined by the JFC** (see Figure III-1).

(a) Once the JFLCC is designated and forces/capabilities are made available, the operational requirements of subordinate commanders are prioritized and presented to the JFC. However, Service component commanders remain responsible for their Military Department Title 10 responsibilities, such as logistic and personnel support, training and Service intelligence operations.




Figure III-1. Command Relationships with Forces/Capabilities Made Available

(b) The JFLCC collaborates with other components to facilitate support and to coordinate the planning and execution of assigned land operations. The JFLCC receives and integrates component liaison teams. See also paragraph 3, *Liaison*, below.

(5) Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) Considerations

(a) A MPF provides rapid response to regional contingencies and consists of the maritime pre-positioning ship squadron, Navy support element, and Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) fly-in echelon. **An MPF is an option for the deployment of land forces made available to a JFLCC.** The MPF will be assigned to a functional or Service commander as appropriate and perhaps based on the phase of the operation. For example, the deployment order may assign the MPF to a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) or numbered fleet commander during transit and then transfer this MPF to the JFLCC upon reaching the port of debarkation within the JFLCC's AO. **There is no single formula to incorporate an MPF into a naval, joint, or multinational effort;** organization depends on mission, force capabilities, tactical situation, and phase of the operations.



General of the Armies John J. Pershing decorates Marine Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, USMC, who commanded the Army's 2nd Division in WW I. (U.S. Army photo)

(b) The MAGTF commander's mission becomes the basis for all further MPF operation planning and must support the JFC's overall objectives. The landing force's CONOPS ashore is derived from the assigned mission. The JFLCC must be prepared to receive and integrate planning and liaison personnel from both the MAGTF commander and the commander, maritime pre-positioning force. Without this close coordination between the JFLCC and MPF staffs, the MAGTF may not be able to effectively influence the land battle upon completion of the arrival and assembly phase of the MPF operation. Once the MAGTF commander reports that all essential elements of the MAGTF are combat ready, the establishing authority terminates the MPF operation and the MAGTF commander executes the assigned mission.

See also Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.3/MCWP 3-32, Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) Operations.

(6) Army Pre-positioned Afloat (APA) Considerations

(a) APA is the expanded reserve of equipment for an armor brigade, theater-opening units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks aboard forward deployed ships. APA operations require airlift of an Army heavy brigade with logistic support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies positioned aboard APA ships. Their purposes are listed below.



US soldier in the Dominican Republic following the intervention.

1. To project a heavy force early in a crisis that is capable of complementing other early arriving forces.
2. To rapidly reinforce a lodgment established by Army early-entry forces and/or by amphibious assault elements, such as an Army light division or a MAGTF.
3. To protect key objectives.
4. To commence port operations to support the introduction of follow-on forces.
5. To be prepared to conduct subsequent operations across the range of military operations.

(b) During preparation for APA operations, an initiating directive from higher authority will specify the command relationships. The Army Service component commander (ASCC) — the senior Army operational-level commander assigned to a combatant command — is responsible for planning APA operations. Thus, an ASCC and staff must plan in detail the task organization and activities for each phase of the operation to ensure minimal disruption of C2 during phase transition. The ASCC will designate which heavy brigades participate in the APA program, and make recommendations for their employment to the JFC. **Upon completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), APA operations are**

conducted under command of a JFC, who may assign the APA to a JFLCC. As with the MPF, the JFLCC must receive and integrate planners and liaison personnel.

(c) The APA mission focuses on expeditious deployment, assembly, and employment of the heavy brigade forces to meet the supported commander's requirements. It may also include tasks in support of other operations in the objective area. The mission order usually delineates the general AO, the heavy brigade's required tasks, the general time period for the deployment, required time for operational capability, time constraints on deployment operations — for example, availability of aircraft — and the estimated duration of operations.

See also FM 100-17-1, Army Pre-Positioned Afloat Operations.

3. Liaison

Command relationships and mission accomplishment determine liaison officer (LNO) requirements. **The JFLCC determines JFLCC LNO requirements to the JFC and other functional or Service components based upon mission requirements.** Liaison between the JFLCC and other organizations (i.e., JFC, functional/Service components, other government agencies [OGAs], and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) is an important consideration when determining manning requirements within the JFLCC staff. LNOs provide continued and close liaison to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of JFC objectives. LNO teams may represent the JFLCC at various meetings of joint force and component boards, centers, and cells. These include the joint planning group (JPG), IO cell, joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), and civil-military operations center. The gaining unit should first identify and define requirements for LNOs/teams. There may be specific requirements for an LNO or liaison team that include rank, Service, weapon system specialty, and experience. There may be unique administrative requirements to include medical, training, passport/visa, country clearances, interpreter skills, and uniform/equipment. The gaining unit should plan to integrate the LNOs/teams and provide support to include billeting/messing, workspace, administrative/service, publication/documents, and equipment for follow-on movements/deployments. The LNOs/teams should plan to provide Service unique communication equipment computers, mobile phones, and radios. **Examples include an air component coordination element (ACCE) and the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD).** The Air Force component commander establishes an ACCE to interface and provide liaison with the JFLCC. The ACCE assists the JFLCC staff in planning air supporting and support requirements. The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of requirements for airspace control measures, joint fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs), and close air support (CAS). The ACCE is not an air support operations center or tactical air control party (integrated US Air Force units within an Army Corps echelon and below), but can also perform many air support planning functions. The BCD is the ARFOR liaison to the JFACC and is responsible for synchronizing ground operations with joint air operations.

See JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, and Air Land Sea Application Center JTF Liaison Handbook.

4. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

The combatant commander, through the JFC and functional/Service components, ensures effective, reliable, and secure C4 system services consistent with the overall joint campaign plan. As driven by the mission, the foundation of the C4 system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC.

a. **The JFLCC provides standardized direction and guidance on C4 matters to the JFLCC subordinate commanders and any other communications supporting elements, as these matters affect the operational mission.** The JFLCC establishes C4 responsibilities for units assigned, attached, and forces made available for tasking. The Service component commands have the overall responsibility for providing C4 to their own forces unless otherwise directed. Communications hardware and software is a Service component responsibility.

b. The JFLCC utilizes existing theater communications systems that are established and managed by the combatant commander. Theater systems may need to be supplemented based on operational need. This provides theater-wide voice, data, and message connectivity between all components and elements. In addition, these systems address unique communications connectivity requirements that provide for the appropriate interface between land forces and other components and C2 that permits timely execution of assigned missions.

c. Communications are established as specified in the OPLAN and/or OPORD (generally found in Annex K).

d. The JFLCC J-6 provides functional expertise to the JFLCC concerning C4 matters. The J-6 focuses on C4 issues affecting land operations assigned to the JFLCC. Routine C4 management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate Service component commands. Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization,” provides additional information regarding the organization and responsibilities of the J-6 staff.

5. Multinational Forces

a. To achieve the most effective C2 and best use the capabilities of the multinational land forces, **the multinational force commander normally designates a single LCC for land operations.** Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an alliance. How that structure is organized will be based on the needs, political goals, constraints and objectives of the participating nations. The multinational commander has the option of creating an LCC within either an alliance or coalition.

(1) In alliance operations, such as those conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there are normally existing land commands that serve as the JFLCC or alliance LCC.

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.2, Land Operations, provides further information on the doctrine for planning, preparing, and executing NATO (alliance or coalition) land component operations.

(2) In coalition operations, the multinational commander can establish a LCC from an existing command organization or through establishment of a new command made up of various command staffs.

b. Whether the LCC is for multinational operations under the structure of an alliance or a coalition, the JFLCC must consider many issues with particular attention to the following listed below.

(1) **Command Authority.** Higher authority and agreements with participating nations will determine the command authority over forces provided to the LCC. Unity of effort must be a key consideration. The multinational staff must have rapport with, respect for, and knowledge of partners, and patience. Liaison and coordination centers will enhance C2.

“Establishing and implementing Coalition command relationships was difficult and a matter of great concern for all nations contributing forces to the Coalition. National, ethnic, and religious pride, along with politics and public perception, played as large a role in determining these relationships as did military requirements.”

**Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,
Final Report to Congress
April 1992**

(2) **Intelligence.** Classification and disclosure issues will require early planning and resolution. A certain degree of access must be coordinated early on to enable adequate secure communication and information sharing.

(3) **Communications.** Varying degrees of technological capabilities may constrain activities. Technologically challenged nations will require C4 and ISR equipped LNO teams to support them.

(4) **Integration of Forces/Capabilities.** Understanding the capabilities of multinational forces is essential to assigning missions. Government agencies will work with multinational commands.

(5) **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Differing national laws and treaties will impact on ROE. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities should be addressed early in the planning process and may require early resolution and consensus building. Differences in interpretations need to be reconciled as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies.

(6) **Logistics.** Although logistics is normally a responsibility of each contributing nation, economy of force considerations requires adaptability and planning with centralized control. Funding authorities should be identified early.

JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provides further information on multinational command and control. See also JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

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CHAPTER IV PLANS AND OPERATIONS

“. . . no plan of operation can extend with any prospect of certainty, beyond the first clash with the hostile main force. Only a layman can pretend to trace throughout the course of a campaign the prosecution of a rigid plan, arranged beforehand in all its details and adhered to to the last.”

Helmuth Graf Von Moltke (The Elder), 1800-1891

SECTION A. PLANS

1. Planning Considerations

Plans are an important way for the JFLCC to communicate with and unify the efforts of the joint land force. Planning complements and enhances joint land force C2. Joint land force operational planning links the tactical employment of land forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of operational goals. **The focus of JFLCC planning is on operational art** — the use of military forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

a. **Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed and should influence the adversary disposition before combat.** It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

b. JFLCC operational planning addresses some activities required for conducting joint/multinational land operations. These activities are listed below.

(1) Employment planning which describes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives.

(2) Sustainment planning which is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

(3) Deployment/redeployment planning that includes the development of the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at the end of the campaign.

(4) Support the geographic combatant commander’s effort in planning the exit strategy from the campaign.

(5) Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations should be factored into all phases (particularly the planning phase) of joint land operations.

See JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, and FM 3-100.4./Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11B.

2. The Planning Process

JFLCC planning tasks include the following.

a. Preparing and coordinating required land component OPLANs or OPORDs in support of assigned JFC missions.

b. Coordinating land component planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational headquarters as required.

c. Developing land component COAs within the framework of the JFC-assigned objectives or missions, forces available, and the commander's intent.

d. Determining land component force requirements and coordinating land force planning in support of the selected COAs. The JFLCC conducts planning using the planning processes of the command that forms the core of the headquarters. While almost all headquarters use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning cycle described in joint planning publications, the specific steps in the process may have different names and somewhat different activities. The JFLCC's staff, provided by Services other than the core of the headquarters and integrated into the core staff, must quickly adapt to the planning processes and battle rhythm of the staff they are joining.

e. **The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and joint land operations is synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each force to achieve unity of effort.** This requires an understanding of these capabilities and limitations across all staff functions, but it is particularly important in the JPG. The JPG must have knowledgeable members from each Service in all functional areas. With these key personnel and appropriate LNOs from the major subordinate commands in place, the planning process provides sufficient consideration of the capabilities of each Service.

f. Staff elements from the JFLCC headquarters are the nucleus around which the JPG is normally built. It includes personnel from each of the primary coordinating, functional, and special staff elements, LNOs and, when necessary, planners from the JFLCC's subordinate commands or multinational land forces. The JPG develops and disseminates staff planning guidance and schedules. It confirms the process and products to be developed and delivered to support the JFLCC planning effort. The JPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for future operations. (See also Appendix A, "Notional Headquarters Organization.")

g. **Generally the JFLCC will perform deployment planning; however, the validating authority for Service component TPFDDs will be the JFC.** When the JFLCC has been designated in advance of an operation and any associated deployment, the JFLCC will influence

the deployment process for those units that will be employed by the JFLCC upon completion of integration. In practical terms, this influence involves analyzing the force generation requirements to determine the required dates for each force or capability made available to the JFLCC. Further, priorities may be established by the JFLCC to aid the JFC in allocating limited lift or port capabilities in a way that best supports the JFLCC's CONOPS.

h. When conducted, the force deployment planning performed by the JPG deployment cell must be in concert with the JPG's operational planning. The deployment planners require visibility on the capabilities and sequencing priorities associated with a COA or CONOPS to ensure they are transportable and the deployment requirements are relayed to the JFC. The JFLCC's planning staff must remember that the timing and sequencing priority may be affected by the JFC's overall concept of deployment.

3. Planning Products

JFLCC OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), and OPORDs convey how the land force helps achieve the JFC's mission. The plans developed by the JFLCC describe the intended conduct of land operations that support the attainment of JFC's objectives. The JFLCC's plan incorporates elements of operational art and fundamentals of joint/multinational warfare to support the range of military operations.

a. The OPORD describes the synchronization of specific tasks that result in an effective employment of joint/multinational land force capabilities for a major operation.

b. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and OPORDs are distributed internally to the land force for action and externally to the JFC for approval and Service and functional component commands for information. If OPLANs, CONPLANs, or OPORDs describe a branch or sequel to the current plan, they are distributed externally to the JFC for approval and to the Service and other functional component commanders for information.

c. Planning products are distributed simultaneously to all JFLCC subordinate commanders. This allows them to adequately evaluate the impact of future plans and operations from an operational perspective; however, the Service component commands must be concurrently involved in order to assess and plan for support to the JFLCC.

See also Appendix B, "Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development."

4. Planning Handover

Upon completion of the planning products and orders, the JPG organizes to conduct a planning handoff. **Once plans are prepared and execution begins, the JPG focus shifts to planning future operations, e.g., branches and sequels, while handing-off the current plans to the operations staff for execution.** This requires an organizational strategy to transfer responsibilities and products from the planners to those responsible for execution. Key to the success of the plans handoff is the requirement that the organization responsible for execution

has enough resources, experience, and understanding of the plan (branch or sequel) to effectively execute it. Experience has shown that the current operations cell is often too immersed in ongoing operations to plan outside the current 24-hour period. This may require the organization of a separate current plans cell or may require the JPG to decrease its planning horizon. However, a decrease in the JPG planning horizon will have a negative effect on the JFLCC's ability to conduct in-depth future planning.

See also JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

SECTION B. OPERATIONS

“Without definite military authority in control throughout the action, there exists only a bloody brawl.”

Harry Hobert Turney-High, *Primitive Warfare*

5. Movement and Maneuver

The JFLCC is responsible for operational movement and maneuver of land forces necessary to contribute to the success of the JFC's campaign, and directs the land force in performance of operational tasks. **The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates land movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage or a mobility differential over the adversary.** The purpose is to achieve the objectives assigned in the theater or subordinate campaign plan. The objective for operational maneuver is usually to gain the positional advantage over an adversary center of gravity (COG) or decisive point.

a. Key JFLCC movement and maneuver considerations are listed below.

(1) The JFLCC normally assumes control of forces from the Service component upon completion of their RSOI in theater. The JFLCC must have the requisite C2 capability to effectively employ the force.

(2) The JFLCC must effectively integrate the different capabilities, requirements, and limitations of the forces and capabilities assigned.

(3) The notional JFLCC's staff organization (see Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization”) provides for the integration of staff officers from each Service into each section of the JFLCC's staff. It is essential that each Service participate in the planning process of all movement and maneuver to ensure consideration of Service-unique capabilities and limitations.

(4) A key to maximizing capabilities is to understand the maneuver requirements of each assigned force. This requires detailed and continuous coordination with other components and careful consideration of FSCMs and boundaries.

- b. The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the following:
- (1) Force structure and organization for combat.
 - (2) Integration and employment of multinational land forces.
 - (3) Personnel recovery force requirements to support the land forces.
 - (4) Land force scheme of maneuver and fire support to support the JFC's CONOPS.
 - (5) Priorities of effort for land forces.
 - (6) Designating the FSCMs and AO boundaries for subordinate commanders.
 - (7) Intelligence collection priorities.
 - (8) Joint fires to support the land forces.
 - (9) Joint fires to support other components.
 - (10) Space support to the land force.
 - (11) Airspace requirements and recommended airspace control measures.
 - (12) Interdiction targets or objectives within the JFLCC's operational area.
 - (13) Special operations support to the land force.
 - (14) Forces to provide consequence management during the conflict or to eliminate a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) capability.

6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

a. **The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for the land component, prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces, and provides representation for the land component and its subordinates at the JFC's daily joint targeting and coordination boards.** The staff incorporates and synchronizes all ISR efforts, including human intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) efforts with the JFC's staff. The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for adversary ground forces intelligence, target development, and CA. The JFLCC states operational requirements and provides continuous feedback to ensure optimum ISR support to operations. The first option for filling JFLCC ISR gaps should be to request augmentation from theater and/or national assets. This is essential:

- (1) To support the commander.

- (2) To identify, define, and nominate targets.
- (3) To support operational planning and execution.
- (4) To avoid surprise and increase battlespace awareness.
- (5) To assist friendly deception efforts.
- (6) To evaluate the results of operations.
- (7) To assess opponent's vulnerability.

(8) To coordinate the use of the electronic frequency spectrum for electronic attack and communications.

(9) To provide quick reaction for preemption of adversary CBRNE weapon use or to facilitate focused defense actions if CBRNE weapons are employed.

Appendix A, "Notional Headquarters Organization," describes a notional intelligence staff section (J-2) organization.

b. Offices, Centers, and Teams. While not all of the offices, centers, or teams available may be required, a JFLCC may request a national intelligence support team, joint interrogation and debriefing center or joint document exploitation center.

More detailed discussions of intelligence are found in the JP 2-0 series on intelligence.

7. Fires

a. General. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes fires and their effects in order to set the conditions for success on the battlefield. The JFLCC's primary agency for fires and their effects is a fire support coordination center. A fire support coordination center reviews the JFC's guidance and intent, and makes recommendations for the JFLCC to achieve them. The fire support coordination center applies this guidance as it shapes the battlespace for the land component's current and future fights. **The JFLCC's focus is on shaping those adversary formations, functions, facilities and operations that could impact on the JFLCC area of operations.** The JFLCC has four primary goals associated with these operations.

(1) Facilitating both operational and tactical maneuver by suppressing the adversary's deep-strike systems, disrupting the adversary's operational maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in adversary positions.

(2) Isolating the battlefield by interdicting adversary military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

(3) Destroying or disrupting critical adversary C2 capabilities.

(4) Limiting the destruction of adversary formations, functions, and facilities to the minimum required to achieve both the JFLCC's and the JFC's guidance and intent, enabling potential exploitation or use in continuing or future operations.

b. **Resources.** The JFLCC's primary means to attack targets are operational fires and interdiction. Potential resources available are listed below.

(1) Maneuver forces (i.e. regiments, brigades, divisions).

(2) Air.

(3) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).

(4) IO.

(5) SOF.

(6) Engineer assets.

(7) Naval surface fire support.

c. **Targeting.** Targeting is executed and applied at all levels within the joint force to incorporate the wide variety of capabilities to achieve desired effects. Effective coordination, deconfliction, prioritization, synchronization, integration, and assessment maximize the potential for targeting effects. Decisions to modify missions or direct attacks that deviate from the planned activity must be based on the commander's guidance. These decisions are made with the understanding of the perspective and target priorities of other component targeting effects throughout the campaign. Components must have effective joint targeting procedures that ensure:

(1) Compliance with JFLCC's objectives, guidance, and intent.

(2) Coordination and synchronization of attacks.

(3) Rapid response to time-sensitive targets.

(4) Minimal duplication of effort.

(5) Expeditious CA.

(6) Common perspective of all targeting efforts.

(7) Fratricide avoidance.

(8) Input to the JFLCC as the arbiter of target priorities.

(9) Compliance with the law of armed conflict and ROE.

d. **Joint Targeting Process.** The JFLCC conducts targeting within the joint targeting process. A primary consideration in organizing this framework is the joint force's ability to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize joint targeting efforts. The structure established by the JFLCC must facilitate the joint process and is based on METT-T. In addition, the joint force must react to rapidly changing events. Likewise, it should execute all phases of the joint targeting process efficiently and continuously. The joint targeting process cuts across traditional functional and organizational boundaries. Operations, plans, and intelligence are the primary staff functions involved with the targeting process, but considerations, such as logistics, weather, legal, and communications may also affect joint targeting decisions. Close coordination, cooperation, and communication are essential. **The JFLCC develops guidance that directs and focuses operation planning and targeting to support the CONOPS and comply with applicable ROE.** In the event of conflict of targeting priorities as well as ROE, changes may be requested from the JFC.

See JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, for more information.

e. **Fires Synchronization and Coordination.** The JFLCC uses the operations directorate (normally referred to as the JFLCC's operations directorate staff section [J-3]) to synchronize and coordinate fires. These functions and responsibilities are listed below.

(1) Advise on the application of operational fires.

(2) Identify requirements for fires from other components (air interdiction/CAS/naval surface fire support).

(3) Review and comment on the JFACC's air apportionment recommendation.

(4) Identify assets for JFC allocation (e.g., ATACMS/attack helicopters), when available.

(5) Advise on fires asset distribution (priority) to land forces.

(6) Develop JFLCC targeting guidance and priorities.

(7) Develop target lists and FSCMs.

(8) Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of JFLCC deep attacks and strikes.

(9) Integrate and synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires.

(10) Coordinate for all planned airspace requirements within JFLCC's assigned AO.

f. **Targeting Coordination Board.** The JFLCC may organize a targeting coordination board to function as an integrating center to accomplish targeting oversight functions or as a JFLCC-level review mechanism for fires, from lethal and nonlethal weapons. In either case, it must be a joint activity with appropriate representatives from the other components, subordinate units, and the JFLCC's staff. JFLCC targeting responsibilities are listed below.

(1) To retain authority and responsibility to direct target priorities for land operations and coordinate subordinate units effort.

(2) To provide clear guidance and objectives for JFLCC operational planning and targeting.

(3) To update JFLCC mission planning guidance, intent, and priority intelligence requirements.

(4) To direct the formation, composition, and specific responsibilities of a JFLCC targeting coordination board to support land operations.

(5) To review target selection for unnecessary adverse impacts, such as collateral or environmental damage and potential intelligence gains or losses.

(6) Subordinate unit responsibilities are listed below.

(a) To identify requirements and nominate targets to the JFLCC.

(b) To provide representation to the JFLCC targeting coordination board.

(c) To recommend priorities for battle damage assessment collection requirements to the JFLCC.

OPERATION ICEBERG, THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA

The Battle of Okinawa is an early example of the joint force land component command in operation. During the battle, several innovations, specific to the circumstances of the campaign, were implemented. Among these was Tenth Army's (LCC) reservation of "the right to assign target and unit priorities, allocating and/or moving assets to where they would have the most beneficial effect on the ground campaign." During the campaign, "Army and Marine artillery were used interchangeably."

SOURCE: LTC James S. Gavitt, "The Okinawa Campaign: A Case Study." Individual Study Project, Carlisle, Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1991, pp. 96-97.

“The integration of operational fires by air assets, sea-based precision guided munitions, and land based long range fires, in conjunction with a forceful land attack is proving to be devastating to Iraqi military forces. That integration is a key component of General Franks’ plan.”

**Brigadier General Vince Brooks, Deputy Director of Operations,
CENTCOM, 4 April, 2003**

g. **Other Component Target Coordination Responsibilities.** The JFLCC and other component commanders (e.g., JFACC, JFMCC, joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC]) develop plans to accomplish the JFC’s objectives. **Synchronization, integration, allocation of resources, and matching appropriate weapons to particular targets are essential targeting functions for the component commanders.** All component commanders subordinate to the JFC should have a basic understanding of each component’s mission and scheme of maneuver to support the JFC’s campaign plan. Therefore, the JFLCC provides a description of the support plan through the liaison elements to the Service and functional components. This basic understanding promotes unity of effort through the coordination and deconfliction of targeting efforts between components, multinational forces, and other agencies. The ACCE located with the JFLCC provides this valuable assistance and liaison from the JFACC and assists the JFLCC in planning and synchronizing operational fires.

8. Force Protection

As a responsibility of command, not a separate mission, the JFC considers all elements of force protection. Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the



Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, Tenth Army and Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepperd Jr., Commanding General, 6th Marine Division in Okinawa.

adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. **The JFLCC will set appropriate threat conditions for his AO equal to or more restrictive than the JFC's baseline threat condition.**

a. **The JFLCC may be designated as the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) by the JFC.** As such, the JFLCC designated the JRAC will be responsible for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area (JRA) in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint operational area.

See JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

b. **CBRNE Defense.** The JFLCC may need to conduct these defensive operations as part of force protection. Equipment, intelligence, reporting, reconnaissance, decontamination, and personnel requirements will come into play. **CBRNE defense is included in consequence management planning.**

(1) The CBRNE threat warning system is employed by the JFLCC to provide subordinate commanders with information from which they can establish appropriate unit defense measures. This system consolidates the most current intelligence estimates regarding the adversary's offensive capabilities, intent, and activities, and recommends measures to be employed to combat this threat.

(2) **The JFLCC J-3 establishes the CBRNE threat condition in coordination with the J-2 and JFLCC CBRNE officer.** Once established, the threat condition is disseminated via J-2 and J-3 channels. Actions associated with each threat condition are recommended, not directive in nature. They are based on current CBRNE defense doctrine but should be assessed in context of the unit's situation and mission.

(a) CBRNE threat conditions are not synonymous with the mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels. Threat is only one of the factors commanders consider when determining the appropriate MOPP level.

(b) The JFLCC, in coordination with and with the approval of the JFC, establishes close relationships with US departments and agencies within its AO. Networks are established with diplomatic missions and country teams within the AO. These sources may provide valuable intelligence on the likelihood of adversary intent to introduce CBRNE weapons/weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They may also produce data on the political and psychological implications, as well as military aspects of effectively countering CBRNE weapon/WMD beyond that provided by organic or other supporting military intelligence sources. The JFLCC may be required to establish search and recovery task forces as part of a comprehensive effort to locate and secure residual CBRNE capabilities. Additionally, **the JFLCC may conduct sensitive site exploitation** consisting of a related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit

personnel documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.

See also JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

c. **Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats.** The JFC establishes guidance and objectives to protect against air and missile threats. **The JFLCC ensures that defensive counterair operations (DCA) conducted by land forces are planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint area air defense plan.** The JFLCC may employ the Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) to perform those planning and C2 functions. The AAMDC is an Army C2 headquarters tailored for joint operations and is capable of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing joint theater missile defense operations. The commander of the AAMDC normally commands its subordinate echelon-above-corps air defense artillery brigades, and functions as a special staff officer for the ARFOR (or JFLCC, if appointed). For complex DCA operations, the area air defense commander (AADC), with the approval of the JFC, may appoint the AAMDC commander as the assistant or deputy AADC to assist in the integration and synchronization of operations across the joint force to effectively counter air and missile threats.

For additional guidance see JP 3-01, Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats and JP 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.

d. **Antiterrorism (AT) Measures.** A comprehensive JFLCC AT program will seek to identify and reduce the risk of loss or damage of personnel and resources which may be targeted by terrorists and to develop procedures to detect and deter planned terrorist actions before they take place. These measures also encompass the reactive or tactical stage of an incident, including direct contact with terrorists to end the incident with minimum loss of life and property. For assets under the control of the JFLCC, an appropriate division of responsibilities is coordinated with the JFC. **The AT program stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures.** The program addresses the following:

- (1) Threat analysis and threat reduction.
- (2) Installation or unit criticality and vulnerability assessments.
- (3) Threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities.
- (4) Information security.
- (5) Operations security (OPSEC).
- (6) Personnel security.
- (7) Physical security.

- (8) Crisis management planning.
- (9) Employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents.
- (10) Continuous training and education of personnel.

See also JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

e. **Defensive Information Operations.** Defensive IO integrate and coordinate protection and defense of information and information systems (which include C4 systems, sensors, weapon systems, infrastructure systems, and decision makers). Conducted through information assurance, physical security, OPSEC, counterdeception, counter-propaganda operations, CI, electronic warfare, and special information operations, IO personnel coordinate defense IO objectives to support the JFLCC's intent and CONOPS. The JFLCC is responsible for effectively integrating defensive IO. See also IO below in paragraph 11.

f. **Physical Security Measures.** Physical security measures serve to deter, detect, and defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include barriers and perimeter standoff space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

See also JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, and JP 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.

g. **Operations Security Measures.** Effective OPSEC measures minimize the signature of JFLCC activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Terrorist activity is discouraged by varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

See also JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

h. **Law Enforcement and Other Measures.** The JFLCC may be tasked to assist in the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crimes within the assigned AO. Security of high-risk personnel and personnel security are other aspects of force protection that will require JFLCC attention.

i. **Personnel Recovery.** As a component commander the JFLCC is responsible for maintaining a RCC that coordinates with the JSRC.

9. Logistic and Personnel Support

Joint personnel functions include personnel, pay input, religion, and legal support services (see JP 1-series publications). Logistic functions are: supply, maintenance, health services, transportation, services, and civil engineering. (See JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support in Joint Operations*, and other JP 4-series publications.)

a. **Authority.** In joint operations, the geographic combatant commander, exercising directive authority for logistics through the subordinate JFCs, Service components, and DOD agencies (primarily US Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency), ensures effective and efficient execution of personnel and logistic services consistent with the overall campaign plan or OPOD. A combatant commander's directive authority for logistics is not intended to:

- (1) Usurp Service responsibility for logistic support.
- (2) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.
- (3) Disrupt effective procedures, efficient use of facilities, or organization.

b. **Staff.** The JFLCC J-1 and logistics (J-4) staff sections provide critical functional expertise to the commander in the areas of personnel and logistics. These staffs focus on key personnel and logistic issues that may have an adverse affect on the land operations portion of the joint campaign. Generally, they manage by exception only. **Routine administrative/personnel and logistic management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate Service component commands.**

See Appendix A, "Notional Headquarters Organization," for more information on JFLCC J-1 and J-4 staff organization and responsibilities.

c. **Responsibilities.** Each Service is responsible for the logistic and personnel support of its own forces, except when support is by agreement with national agencies, multinational partners, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The supported combatant commander determines if common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. **The JFLCC would make recommendations about personnel and logistic support to the JFC commensurate with priorities developed for land force operations.** While each Service retains authority for logistic and personnel support of its forces, the JFC will ensure support is coordinated and integrated throughout the operation.

d. **Common-User Logistics (CUL).** Service component forces, especially the Army, are often required to provide significant levels of theater/joint operations area (JOA)-wide support to other Service components, multinational partners, OGAs and NGOs. Army echelon-above-corps support units, such as the theater support command normally provide theater/JOA-wide CUL support requirements, but these are carried out by the ARFOR commander and are not a JFLCC responsibility. The MARFOR may provide limited CUL support to other Service component forces based on the plan. **In some cases, the JFLCC may coordinate CUL support**

for the land component, however, the authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC's OPCON or TACON, unless the combatant commander delegates directive authority to the JFLCC for a common support capability. The JFLCC J-4 staff ensures that JFLCC-directed CUL requirements do not conflict or interfere with combatant commander-directed JOA-wide CUL requirements.

See JP 4-07 Joint Doctrine, Techniques and Procedures for Common User Logistics.

e. **Boards and Centers.** The JFLCC is not routinely the lead for JFC-level logistic boards and centers. The JFLCC J-4 normally participates in selected combatant commander/JFC boards and centers that are of critical importance to the successful execution of land operations. **The theater-joint transportation board and the joint movement center are transportation-related boards and centers that may have significant impact on land operations** and are examples of higher level joint logistics boards on which the JFLCC may want representation. Other boards and centers of significant importance to the JFC include the joint material priorities and allocation board and the joint petroleum office. To ensure proper focus, the JFLCC participation in these boards needs to be treated as separate and distinct from the Service component participation in these same boards and centers. The JFLCC will not normally convene separate joint logistics boards and centers except when needed to coordinate critical CUL support within the JFLCC AO.

10. Special Operations Forces

The special operations command and control element (SOCCE) is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with land operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or commander, joint special operations task force [COMJSOTF] as appropriate). The SOCCE normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support of a conventional force. It collocates with the command element of the supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions as directed by the JFSOCC (or COMJSOTF). The SOCCE can also receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. A command relationship is typically established between the SOCCE (and any forces under its control) and the supported conventional commander (normally either TACON or support), but OPCON remains with the establishing SOF commander.

See also JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

11. Information Operations

The JFLCC should organize to plan and conduct IO to shape the operational environment. **An IO point of contact or IO officer should be designated.** This officer or an assistant will interface with the joint force IO cell to provide component expertise and act as a liaison for IO matters between the joint force and the component. These representatives also may serve as members of one or more of the supporting organizations of IO, such as the special technical operations cell. Since computer network

attack (CNA) can be used for force application, the JFLCC IO point of contact recommends CNA targets for JFLCC approval and, if required, nomination to the joint force IO cell in a manner consistent with target nominations for other weapons systems. Service and functional components requesting specific IO support from sources internal or external to the JFC normally should request such support through the respective joint force component headquarters to the JFC IO cell. Service IO organizations (e.g., Air Force Information Warfare Center, 1st Information Operations Command (Land), Fleet Information Warfare Center) also may provide support to the IO cell through the appropriate Service component commanders. See also JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* and the Force Protection paragraph in this chapter. Though not part of IO, public affairs operations are an important related aspect of information operations. The JFLCC must plan for and conduct these operations in concert with IO.

See also JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

APPENDIX A NOTIONAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

1. General

The JFLCC's staff is organized based upon the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because creating a new staff would be very time consuming and inefficient, the staff organization will most likely be derived from an existing command structure. The most likely candidates are an Army corps, a MAGTF (most likely a Marine expeditionary force), Army Service component command or, when separately constituted, a numbered army. Augmentees from the other Services are integrated into the core staff to form the JFLCC's staff. Ideally, the JFLCC and the deputy JFLCC would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize employment of the forces. Figure A-1 depicts a notional staff organization.




Figure A-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Organization

2. Notional Staff

While Figure A-1 depicts a notional staff organization, it is not prescriptive. The practical assumption is that the actual staff organization is based on the staff organization of the corps, MAGTF, or army that forms the core of the staff with some staff members being dual-hatted. Therefore, the actual location of certain sections (e.g., engineer) and the specific special staff vary according to the organization of the core staff and METT-T.

3. Manpower and Personnel Staff Section

The J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the JFLCC for personnel service support and personnel administration. The majority of personnel and administrative actions are handled via the Service components through the JFC J-1. The JFC J-1 is responsible for monitoring current and projected unit strengths by daily personnel status, casualty, and critical reports of personnel shortages. The JFC J-1 analyzes these reports for any impact on land operations. These reports would be routinely provided from the ARFOR and MARFOR component manpower or personnel staff officer to the JFC with copy furnished to the JFLCC J-1. NOTE: The JFLCC J-1 is not in the formal personnel reporting chain. A notional J-1 organization is provided in Figure A-2.




Figure A-2. Notional Joint Force Land Component Manpower and Personnel Staff Section

4. Intelligence Staff Section

The primary role of the J-2 is to provide intelligence support to the JFLCC. A notional organization of the JFLCC J-2 staff is detailed in Figure A-3. The following intelligence-related actions are the responsibility of the J-2 staff.

- a. Maintaining an intelligence watch in the operations and intelligence (O&I) center.
- b. Coordinating and maintaining technical control over specialty, multidiscipline intelligence and CI support to the commander and subordinate elements.




Figure A-3. Notional Joint Force Land Component Intelligence Staff Section

c. Establishing an all-source intelligence cell in, or adjacent to, the O&I center. The all-source cell is supported, as required, by coalition intelligence assets (if available) that remain under national control.

d. Completing an initial intelligence estimate and maintain updates as required by the operational situation.

e. Establishing and maintaining an intelligence collection management and request for information (RFI) management system.

f. Completing coalition all-source analysis and dissemination.

g. Establishing and maintaining adversary and hostile databases to support operations and planning.

h. Acting as central point of contact for intelligence RFIs from subordinate staffs.

i. Providing the higher headquarters joint intelligence center/joint intelligence support element with a prioritized list of RFIs. Tracking outstanding RFIs and ensuring answers are directed correctly when received from supporting agencies.

j. Coordinating the assignment and tasking of intelligence resources from forces made available.

k. Establishing a targeting cell within the all-source cell as necessary to support the component deep operations cell.

l. Assisting other staff in developing and refining priority information requirements.

m. Planning and coordinating ISR operations along with the J-3 staff.

n. Planning and coordinating CI (including combatting terrorism) operations.

o. Developing Annex B (Intelligence) to the (land forces) OPLAN/OPORD.

p. Providing regular intelligence summaries and reports, per higher direction, to the following:

(1) Higher headquarters (JFC).

(2) Coalition national headquarters and other addressees designated by them (if coalition operation).

(3) Adjacent and subordinate units.

(4) Any subordinate specialty units.

q. Coordinating intelligence command, control, and communications requirements with the J-6.

r. Coordinating overall security of the O&I center. Tasks critical to operational security are listed below.

(1) Maintaining access rosters from all coalition/US units for all individuals authorized access to the O&I center.

(2) Maintaining digital topographic data to support the common operating picture and provide terrain analysis in support of the military decision-making process.

(3) Prioritizing the JFLCC's intelligence requirements, to include reviewing the commander's critical information requirements to ensure that intelligence requirements for production, collection, and support to force protection are identified and processed.

(4) Ensuring the intelligence support to targeting and CA is performed, to include analyzing the adversary situation to identify, nominate, and assess those vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations. The J-2 provides appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the JFLCC, JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOCC, JTCB, and other components.

(5) Developing support operations to include intelligence and CI.

(6) Supporting force protection.

(7) Executing intelligence battle handover using established procedures for exchange of critical intelligence data.

(8) Providing indications and warnings support to IO.

5. Operations Staff Section

The J-3 is responsible for the coordination, integration, synchronization, and execution of all operations. The J-3 staff assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibilities for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and ending when operations are completed. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. The current operations section must have the ability to look out to at least 72 hours for the upcoming commander's decision points. This will allow future operations to conduct planning from the 72 hours out to one week from the current point in time and write the fragmentary orders that direct action based on decision criteria as they are modified by an understanding of the common operational picture. Failure to achieve this standard will tend to draw everyone into the close fight. These sections play an invaluable role during the

execution of operations by proposing COAs to address adversary actions or to take advantage of situations. Figure A-4 depicts a notional J-3 staff organization. Its responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following tasks.

- a. Organizing the operational aspects of the headquarters.
- b. Recommending JFLCC organization.




Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Section

c. Recommending ROE.

d. Developing plans and orders and exercising staff supervision or cognizance over the conduct of the following:

- (1) Operational land combat operations.
- (2) Coordination of operational maneuver.
- (3) Synchronization and integration of fires.
- (4) Synchronization and integration of SOF and OGAs.
- (5) Integration of ACCE into JFLCC staff.
- (6) Rear area protection and security.
- (7) IO, to include C2 warfare.
- (8) Antifratricide measures.
- (9) Civil-military operations.

(10) Personnel recovery to include the establishment of the component RCC and the establishment of the JSRC if directed by the JFC.

- (11) Air command and control within a designated AO.
- (12) ISR.
- (13) Space operations.
- (14) Humanitarian assistance.
- (15) Mine warfare operations (land).
- (16) Disaster relief operations.

e. Coordinating security of the O&I center.

f. Coordinating security guards activities.

g. If established, J-3 Plans is responsible for long-range plans.

6. Logistics Staff Section

The JFLCC J-4 formulates and implements logistic plans within the AO for forces assigned or attached to the land force. The J-4 oversees the implementation of these plans by monitoring the logistic requirements of the components and performs analysis for logistical impacts on land operations. A notional JFLCC J-4 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-5. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-4.

- a. Monitoring and coordinating logistic functions and requirements.
- b. Advising JFLCC about logistic matters affecting joint, combined, and multinational support to land operations.
- c. Preparing and/or assisting the Service component logistics officer on the concept of logistic support for the AO and the logistic annexes of JFLCC OPLANs and OPORDs.




Figure A-5. Notional Joint Force Land Component Logistics Staff Section

d. Recommending to JFLCC, within the guidelines established by the JFC, priorities for the allocation of logistic resources among assigned forces within the AO.

e. Participating in joint/multinational logistic boards and centers that directly impact on land operations.

f. Maintaining liaison with the other JFLCC staff, agencies, and JFC counterparts to keep abreast of the current logistics, operational, and intelligence situations.

7. Plans Staff Section

JFLCC plans staff section (J-5) operational planning addresses activities required for conducting land force operations. The J-5 future plans section retains its focus on future planning during the course of the campaign — either the next phase of the operation or the future decision points. A notional J-5 staff is depicted at Figure A-6. J-5 responsibilities for the employment and sustainment of land forces are listed below.

a. Employment planning prescribing how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives.

b. Sustainment planning directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required for the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

c. Deployment/redeployment planning, including TPFDL development, monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at campaign’s end.

d. Support the JFC’s effort in planning the campaign exit strategy.




Figure A-6. Notional Joint Force Land Component Plans Staff Section

8. C4 Systems Staff Section

The J-6 staff coordinates theaterwide voice, data, and message connectivity between all components and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-6 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-7. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-6.

- a. Advises the JFLCC and staff on all C4 systems matters.
- b. Maintains status of communications to obtain an operational profile of the C4 network to identify problem areas and solutions.
- c. Oversees the establishment of a systems control (SYSCON) center to support top-level network control and management within the operational area and gives direction and mission guidance.




Figure A-7. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Staff Section

- d. Prepares and reviews C4 systems plans, policies, annexes, and operating instructions, as required, for JFLCC operations.
- e. Requests the necessary communications support resources through the JFC J-6.
- f. Identifies C4 systems shortfalls to JFC J-6 for sourcing.
- g. Tasks subordinate components for C4 systems support as required.
- h. Plans, coordinates, and activates, when required, C4 systems facilities to provide rapid and reliable communications in support of the JFLCC.
- i. Submits request for intertheater communications security package use to the JFC and issues communications security (COMSEC) call-out message.
- j. Validates, consolidates, prioritizes, and forwards ultra-high frequency tactical satellite requirements to the JFC for channel allocation.
- k. Establishes, supervises, and revises, as necessary, the communications operating procedures pertaining to the unique JFLCC communications facilities.
- l. Conducts COMSEC management.
- m. Ensures that sound COMSEC principles are adhered to and ensures in-place availability of essential operation codes, authentication systems, and keying materials.
- n. Receives, reviews, and advises the JFLCC of COMSEC monitoring reports provided by COMSEC monitoring teams.
- o. Develops unique JFLCC signal operating instructions requirements and provides to JFC for review/coordination prior to dissemination.
- p. Consolidates and validates radio frequency requirements from components/warfighting elements and coordinates requests with the JFC.
- q. Provides guidance and assistance to supporting and assigned forces on all telecommunications and data systems matters for which JFLCC J-6 has jurisdiction.
- r. Consolidates and validates unique JFLCC telecommunications service requirements from components and coordinates with the appropriate agencies.
- s. Directs and conducts exercise/contingency planning.
- t. Determines user communications requirements.

- u. Develops critical circuit lists.
- v. Develops prioritized listing of systems/circuits for initial activation and provides to the SYSCON center for activation management.
- w. Develops prioritized listing of systems/circuits for deactivation and provides to the SYSCON center for management.
- x. Maintains understanding of future planning direction.
- y. Coordinates commercial satellite rights for military systems.
- z. Formulates guidance and policy for all communication assets supporting the JFLCC not already addressed by the JFC.
- aa. Conducts information assurance operations as part of the computer network defense program for JFLCC networks.

9. Engineering Staff Section

The engineering staff section (J-7) coordinates engineering effort between all components and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-7 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-8. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-7:

- a. Monitoring and coordinating engineering functions and requirements.
- b. Conducting traditional JFC activities and theater security cooperation planning.
- c. Conducting deliberate planning.
- d. Providing support for exercises, and conducting exercise planning.
- e. Recommending the allocation of engineer resources in the AO.
- f. Coordinating designs and missions for construction in the AO.
- g. Providing long-term theater facility master planning and programming.
- h. Planning and monitoring base camp master planning and construction.
- i. Providing environmental oversight.
- j. Monitoring the RSOI of engineer forces in the AO.
- k. Monitoring countermine operations.




Figure A-8. Notional Joint Force Land Component Engineering Staff Section

- l. Serving as the repository of minefield and unexploded ordnance data in the AO.
- m. Maintaining situational awareness of critical engineer class IV supplies in the AO.
- n. Planning and monitoring facilities related to displaced persons and detention in coordination with the Provost Marshall.
- o. Coordinating rear area damage control.

10. Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Staff Section

The force structure, resource, and assessment staff section (J-8) coordinates force structure, resources, and assessments. Functional components should consider staffing finance and resource management functions separately, since many unique types of issues will arise during JFLCC operations. These include reimbursement for foreign government support, currency control, weapons for cash, pay support for host nation employees, day labor, enemy prisoners of war and

civilian internees. Finance operations are disbursing, military pay, commercial vendor (contracts), pay, and travel pay. Resource management for JFLCC operations comprises fund control, cost capturing, and cost reporting. Commanders and planners should consider cash and funding authority as commodities needed to support force deployment operations. Service components provide resource management support directly to assigned forces. Some support requirements and special missions cross Service boundaries but are better supported and controlled by a specific Service component because of the nature of the assigned mission.

a. The JFLCC may designate J-8 with the finance and resource management functional responsibilities listed below.

(1) Serves as principal financial advisor to the JFLCC for finance operations and resource management.

(2) Ensures the JFLCC exercises appropriate fiscal oversight and control of JFLCC resource management and finance operations. Acts as focal point within the land component for all issues related to financial service and resource management.

(3) Represents the JFLCC in identifying JFLCC resource and financial service needs to the JFC, component commands, and Services as appropriate.

(4) Participates in OPLAN/OPORD development for JFLCC operations.

(5) Prepares a resource management appendix to operation plans and orders issued by the JFLCC.

(6) Establishes AO resource management responsibilities.

(7) When needed, coordinates specific resource management functions or special support requirements.

(8) Provides estimates of resource requirements to the component commands, the Services and the JFC as appropriate.

(9) Maintains positive channels of communication with resource management and financial service counterparts at the component commands, the JFC, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and other supporting agencies.

(10) Coordinates funding requirements and financial service support.

(11) Establishes positive controls over funding authority received.

(12) Develops, submits, and validates requirements as necessary in support of resource management requirements.

(13) Develops internal review processes, controls, and measures applicable to component resource managers as well as relevant to internal staff procedures.

b. A notional JFLCC J-8 organization is depicted in Figure A-9.

11. Civil-Military Operations Staff Section

The JFLCC may establish a civil-military operations staff section (J-9) separate from the J-3 because of the many challenging issues that will arise during JFLCC operations involving civil-military operations, interagency coordination, foreign humanitarian assistance, host-nation support, as well as coordination with international organizations and NGOs. The JFLCC may designate a J-9 with the responsibilities listed below.

a. Principal advisor and makes recommendations about civil-military cooperation, to include the impact of psychological operations on the civilian population.

b. Assists and makes recommendations relating to civil-military operations.

c. As required, coordinates with other government agencies.

d. Plans provision of wartime host-nation support, nation assistance, and makes recommendations for foreign internal defense. Participates in OPLAN/OPORD development for JFLCC operations and prepares Civil-Military Operation Annex.




Figure A-9. Notional Joint Force Land Component Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Staff Section

e. Advises the commander and assists major subordinate commands in interaction within government agencies, and populations.

f. Recommends policy for civil affairs activities and prepare, implement, and supervise the execution of civil affairs plans. Prepares estimates and conducts surveys and studies in support of civil affairs activities. Determines the requirements for resources to accomplish civil-military activities to include civil affairs unit(s), personnel, and equipment.

g. Plans for the conduct of security assistance activities and foreign humanitarian assistance. In conjunction with the J-4, arranges host nation sustainment support for land forces or, when directed, other services.

h. When required, plans for civil administration activities to support the restoration of civil authority.

i. When directed, establishes liaison with international organizations and NGOs.

APPENDIX B

JOINT LAND OPERATION PLAN AND ORDER DEVELOPMENT

1. Purpose

This appendix provides example topics that should be considered when developing a joint land operation plan or order. SOPs may differ in the degree of detail and emphasis. For formats of actual plans and orders refer to CJCSM 3122.03A *Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*.

2. Topics

a. **Situation.** The general politico-military environment of the operation that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan include tactical information for phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or related plans. Designate the trigger event that signals execution. The two main intelligence topics include the following.

(1) A summary of information concerning the AO, which consists of:

(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/cultural factors.

(b) Specific localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

(2) A description of the adversary, which consists of:

(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of adversary activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistic capabilities, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational COGs, and vulnerabilities.

(b) Factors of immediate concern such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, and mobility.

(c) Information about the military strengths of adversary nations or potential parties to the conflict. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training or combat experience, and affiliation with major hostile powers.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Information that may affect the operation. Include mission and applicable higher level, joint, or multinational commander's intent and desired end state.

(2) The roles of other forces, commands, agencies, or organizations that may affect operations.

(3) The organization of the land forces to support the JFC's CONOPS and the authorities provided by the JFC in respect to forces and capabilities provided to the JFLCC.

(4) Tasks of supporting friendly forces, commands, or government agencies.

(5) For an operation with several phases, any changes by phase in an annex.

c. **Assumptions.** A summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the plan becomes an order. Include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

(1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.

(2) US policy for the region such as the application of the *War Powers Act*.

(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

(4) Impact of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.

(5) Adequacy of interagency support.

(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required actions.

(7) Availability of resources.

(8) Warning times, times and locations of anticipated hostile actions. The timing of political decisions in friendly nations, the conditions and timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

d. **Legal Considerations.** Especially background authorities for the operation and any legal constraints or restraints.

e. **Mission**

(1) A clear, concise statement of what is to be achieved, where, when, and by whom for the overall operation.

(2) Essential tasks assigned by the JFC and tasks derived from the commander's analysis and understanding of the intent of the JFC.

f. Execution

(1) Commander's Intent. An expression, in general terms, of the commander's visualization of the purpose and end state of the operation overall and by phase. Examples are restoration of an international boundary initially, defeat of adversary armed forces in a subsequent phase, and clearing of hostile armed forces from a given geographical area. This links the mission to the CONOPS and guides all subordinate activities.

(2) Concept of Operations. The commander's visualization of how the mission will be accomplished. At the operational level, divide the concept into what the commander will specify the end state to be for each phase so that subordinates know the intent for each phase. The trigger event for the transition between phases is normally the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander's end state. The commander and subordinates can also execute sequels within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Topics for each phase of the operation may include the following.

(a) Preparation.

(b) Staff organization and augmentation, establishing liaison with the host nation, with the combatant command responsible for the target area, with other combatant commands (especially those involved in force projection operations), with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate US agencies, OGAs and NGOs.

(c) Status-of-forces agreements, constraints, and ROE for the proposed operation with the host nation, in coordination with Department of State and appropriate embassies and country teams.

(d) Intermediate staging bases in the target region and repositioning of supplies and equipment.

(e) Operations to support political and diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse.

(f) Warning orders.

(g) The commander's concept to attain the end state for this phase.

(h) The commander's schemes of operational maneuver, including decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations when appropriate.

(i) Operational fires to include phased fire support to show complex arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and targeting. Include air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support.

(j) Air and missile defense, information operations, engineer support, rear operations and force protection, Provost Marshal functions, public affairs, and space operations.

(k) Tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this phase.

(l) The initial location and tasks for the reserve. Possible employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and sequels.

(m) Coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the theater will impact on operations, include that impact here. Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units involved in operations in depth.

(3) Execution. It can be composed of several phases (deter/engage; seize initiative; decisive operations; transition). Topics include the following:

(a) The commander's concept in detail to attain the phase's end state. Narration of the step-by-step execution of the phase specifying exactly which subordinate and supporting units will accomplish each operational or tactical task.

(b) The scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment scheme, to attain initial objectives.

1. The scheme for forcible insertion of combat elements.

2. Necessary C2 elements and their accompanying support.

(c) Changes in the form of maneuver.

(d) Changes in the nature of the operation.

(e) Major regrouping of forces.

(f) Significant changes in adversary capabilities.

(g) The employment of fires necessary to attain initial objective.

1. Targeting priorities and priorities of fire.

2. Air support, field artillery support, and naval surface fire support.

3. Joint interfaces such as the JTCCB and the BCD.

(h) Air and missile defense (includes critical asset list/defended asset list by phase of operation).

- (i) IO.
- (j) Engineer support.
- (k) Rear area operations.
- (l) Force protection.
- (m) Provost Marshal functions.
- (n) Public affairs.
- (o) Space operations.
- (p) Direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.
- (q) Location and tasks for the reserve and employment of the reserve in branches and sequels.
- (r) Coordinating instructions that apply to two or more elements.
- (s) Link-up procedures between the force and forces already in the operation.

(4) Consolidation. Results of a successful end state for the final phase of a contingency. It does not contain the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander includes instructions for the:

- (a) Redeployment of forces.
- (b) Deployment of civil affairs, military police, engineer, medical, or other types of units necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in case a continuing US military presence is required.
- (c) Modification of the residual force's relations with US Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the transition to peacetime stability.
- (d) Elimination, if required, of the adversary's CBRNE capabilities post-hostilities.

NOTE: Though listed sequentially, Phase II and Phase III are often planned concurrently and may overlap.

(5) Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands. Tasks that encompass two or more phases of the major operation for each major subordinate command.

(6) Coordinating Instructions. Instructions appropriate to two or more phases of the operation.

(a) Airspace management procedures and formation of an airspace C2 cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.

(b) Operational fires planning guidance.

(c) Force protection guidance. Include the MOPP levels and integration of active and passive defense warning systems to include any civil defense requirements.

(d) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(e) Limiting factors such as provisions of treaties, agreements, and conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort.

(f) ROE.

(g) Resource management guidance.

(h) Operational planning guidance.

(i) Space operations planning guidance.

(j) Public affairs operations and guidance.

g. **Logistics.** Operational support instructions that are of primary interest to the elements being supported. A JFLCC without an inherent logistic organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the ASCC or other Service components for detailed procedures on how subordinate elements may receive support from Service support organizations. The JFLCC describes those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of the force. If a support organization such as an Army Theater Support Command is placed under command of a JFLCC, include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan. Even without an integral support organization, the JFLCC may choose to include the following subjects:

(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.

(2) Submission of materiel status reports.

(3) Controlled supply rate for ammunition (Class V).

(4) Designations of lines of communications.

(5) Labor policies (use of enemy prisoner of war, civilian labor).

- (6) Medical evacuation policies.
- (7) Reconstitution.
- (8) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.
- (9) Noncombatant evacuation operation.
- (10) Civil affairs, host nation and NGO, OGA considerations.
- (11) Public affairs.

(12) Labor, transportation, and facilities from host nations and friendly third countries. Detailed procedures for making use of these resources.

(13) Procedures for JFLCC support of contingency forces from the continental US or other theaters.

h. Command and Signal

(1) Command. Information concerning command post locations, succession of command, and liaison requirements.

(2) Signal. Communications procedures and priorities such as radio silence, communications-electronics operating instructions, codes, and interface with joint or multinational forces.

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APPENDIX C REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-31 is based on the following references.

1. Law, Policy, and Joint Documents

- a. Title 10 and 32, US Code, as amended.
- b. *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 111)*.
- c. *The Nunn -Cohen Amendment to the 1987 DOD Authorization Act (10 USC 167)*.
- d. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.
- e. DOD Directive 5100.3, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.
- f. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*.
- g. CJCSM 3500.04b, *Universal Joint Task List*.
- h. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*.
- i. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- j. JP 1-0, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
- k. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
- l. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- m. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- n. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
- o. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- p. JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*.
- q. JP 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*.
- r. JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

- s. JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*.
- t. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- u. JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*.
- v. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.
- w. JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*.
- x. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.
- y. JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- z. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- aa. JP 3-08 I, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I*.
- bb. JP 3-08 II, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II*.
- cc. JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*.
- dd. JP 3-09.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Laser Designation Operations*.
- ee. JP 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*.
- ff. JP 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*.
- gg. JP 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*.
- hh. JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*.
- ii. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
- jj. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
- kk. JP 3-17, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations*.
- ll. JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*.
- mm. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
- nn. JP 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities*.

- oo. JP 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- pp. JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment Operations*.
- qq. JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Control of Airspace in the Combat Zone*.
- rr. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
- ss. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.
- tt. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.
- uu. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.
- vv. JP 3-61, *Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs Operations*.
- ww. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support in Joint Operations*.
- xx. JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*.
- yy. JP 4-07, *Joint Doctrine, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics*.
- zz. JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.
- aaa. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.
- bbb. JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.
- ccc. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.
- ddd. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*.
- eee. JP 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*.
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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AAMDC	Army air and missile defense command
ACCE	air component coordination element
AJP	Allied joint publication
AO	area of operations
APA	Army pre-positioned afloat
ARFOR	Army forces
ASCC	Army Service component command
AT	antiterrorism
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
BCD	battlefield coordination detachment
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	combat assessment
CAS	close air support
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CI	counterintelligence
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CNA	computer network attack
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COMJSOTF	commander, joint special operations task force
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CUL	common-user logistics
DCA	defensive counterair
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	field manual
FSCM	fire support coordinating measure
HQ	headquarters
IO	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-1	manpower and personnel staff section
J-2	intelligence staff section
J-3	operations staff section
J-4	logistics staff section
J-5	plans staff section
J-6	command, control, communications, and computer systems staff section
J-7	engineering staff section
J-8	force structure, resource, and assessment staff section
J-9	civil-military operations staff section
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JRA	joint rear area
JRAC	joint rear area coordinator
JSRC	joint search and rescue center
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
LCC	land component commander
LNO	liaison officer
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
MOPP	Mission-oriented protective posture
MPF	maritime pre-positioning force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NWP	naval warfare publication
O&I	operations and intelligence
OGA	other government agency
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan

OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
RCC	rescue coordination center
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standing operating procedure
SYSCON	systems control
TACON	tactical control
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON (JP 1-02)

air component coordination element. An Air Force component element that interfaces and provides liaison with the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces. The air component coordination element is the senior Air Force element assisting the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The air component coordination element is responsible to the joint force air component commander and coordinates with the joint force land component commander's staff, representing the joint force air component commander's needs in either a supporting or supported role. Also called ACCE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

amphibious objective area. A geographical area, (delineated for command and control purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of

the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 102)

armed forces. The military forces of a nation or a group of nations. (JP 1-02)

Armed Forces of the United States. A term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. See also United States Armed Forces. (JP 1-02)

Army Service component command. Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command. Also called ASCC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified; e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

command. 1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. Also called CMD. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements. A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key sub components are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

component. 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally, a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. 2. In

logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. Also called COMP. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. The delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (JP 1-02)

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Also called DCA. (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 1-02)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Also called DS. (JP 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

force. 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

general support. 1. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. 2. A tactical artillery mission. Also called GS. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

integration. 1. In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (JP 1-02)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense. Also called JSCP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

joint theater missile defense. The integration of joint force capabilities to destroy enemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence measures. Enemy theater missiles are those that are aimed at targets outside the continental United States. Also called JTMD. (JP 1-02)

land control operations. The employment of ground forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate) to achieve military objectives in vital land areas. Such operations include destruction of opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vital land lines of communications, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of land operations. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force. The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of

forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. Also called MAGTF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary force. The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. Also called MEF. (JP 1-02)

Military Department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Also called MILDEP. (JP 1-02)

Military Service. A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and which operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The Military Services are: the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also called NGOs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (JP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

sensitive site exploitation. A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. Also called SSE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

standing operating procedure. A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called SOP. (JP 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02)

subordinate unified command. A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned operational area. Also called subunified command. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and

control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)

Unified Action Armed Forces. A publication setting forth the policies, principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Military Departments or Service elements thereof are acting together. Also called UNAAF. (JP 1-02)


unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Unified Command Plan. The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP. (JP 1-02)

United States Armed Forces. Used to denote collectively only the regular components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-31** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

