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Safety

**SAFETY RULES FOR US STRATEGIC
BOMBERS**

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This instruction implements AFD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. It applies to operations with B-52H and B-2A aircraft and nuclear weapons dedicated for use with the aircraft. **Section A** assigns responsibilities. **Section B** contains each nuclear weapon systems' safety rules. The safety rules in **Section B** may only be changed or supplemented using procedures in AFI 91-102, *Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules*. This instruction does not apply to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. See **Attachment 1** for abbreviations and acronyms used in this instruction. Records Disposition. Ensure that all records created by this AFI are maintained and disposed of IAW AFMAN 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule*.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

Included general safety rules from DoD 3150.2-M, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual*. Removes references to B-1B as nuclear certified weapons system.

Section A—Authority, Limitations, and Responsibilities

- 1. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).** The Chairman, JCS direct the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, to implement the safety rules.
- 2. Temporary Limitations.** The Air Force may impose restrictions on application of safety rules.
- 3. Functional Responsibilities.**
 - 3.1. The Commander, Air Force Safety Center:
 - 3.1.1. Ensures that the safety rules work, providing maximum safety consistent with operational requirements.

- 3.1.2. Ensures that units follow the safety rules.
- 3.2. Using Major Commands (MAJCOM):
 - 3.2.1. Ensure that their units follow the safety rules.
 - 3.2.2. Ensure that all safety standards and procedures agree with the approved safety rules.
 - 3.2.3. Inspect for compliance.
- 3.3. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) ensures that its manuals, checklists, and technical orders do not conflict with the safety rules.

Section B—Safety Rules

4. General Guidance. Per DoD 3150.2M DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, general safety rules apply to all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems. General safety rules primarily apply safety policy and shall be included as part of the Air Force's safety rules package.

- 4.1. Safety rules always apply, even during war.
 - 4.1.1. Nuclear weapons shall not be intentionally exposed to abnormal environments except in an emergency.
 - 4.1.2. Nuclear weapons shall not be used for training or for troubleshooting (i.e. to confirm the existence of a fault, aid in fault isolation, or verify that a fault has been corrected) except as explicitly allowed by a specific safety rule.
 - 4.1.3. Only certified procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations, authorized by the appropriate level of authority, shall be employed to conduct nuclear weapon system operations.
 - 4.1.4. The total number of personnel performing nuclear weapon system operations shall be held to the minimum consistent with the operations performed.
 - 4.1.5. At least two authorized persons must be present during any operation with a nuclear weapon, except when authorized by a specific safety rule; i.e., alert fly. They must be able to detect incorrect or unauthorized procedures in the task being performed. They must also have knowledge of and understand applicable safety and security requirements.
 - 4.1.6. Personnel that have physical access to nuclear weapons must be qualified under the PRP, in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.42, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*.
 - 4.1.7. Physical security will be maintained, in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.41, *Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons*.
 - 4.1.8. Nuclear weapons will be transported as determined by the Combatant Commander or the Military Department, in accordance with DoD Directive 4540.5. Additionally, the following safety guidance applies:
 - 4.1.8.1. Movement(s) will be kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements.
 - 4.1.8.2. Custody and accountability transfers during logistic movements shall be by courier receipt system to ensure positive control

4.1.9. Permissive Action Link (PAL) operations shall be in accordance with plans and procedures prescribed by the applicable Combatant Command and technical publications.

4.1.10. Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made utilizing nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed upon by the Department of Defense and/or DoE before the conduct of an operational test.

4.1.11. Deviations from safety rules are permitted in an emergency, except as follows:

4.1.11.1. U.S. custody must be maintained until receipt of a valid nuclear control order that permits transferring U.S. nuclear weapons to non-U.S. delivery forces.

4.1.11.2. Nuclear weapons shall not be expended unless a valid, properly authenticated nuclear control order conveying release or expenditure authority is received.

4.1.11.3. Jettisoning of nuclear weapons is permitted in the event of an emergency, and is to be accomplished according to plans and procedures prescribed for the area of operations.

4.1.11.4. NOTE: DoD Directive 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, December 23, 1996, defines an emergency as "an unexpected occurrence or set of unexpected circumstances in which personnel or equipment unavailability, due to accident, natural event, or combat, may demand immediate action that may require extraordinary measures to protect, handle, service, transport, jettison, or employ a nuclear weapon."

5. Specific Guidance.

5.1. Do not fly the weapon system until authorized.

5.2. Nuclear weapons may be used for exercises when their use is specifically authorized by Commander, Strategic Command or designated authority except as restricted elsewhere in this instruction.

5.3. These rules, weapon system features, operational controls, and technical procedures, ensure that US strategic bombers meet the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards in AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, and DoD Directive 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*.

5.4. Temporary Limitations. The US Air Force may impose more stringent restrictions on the application of safety rules.

5.5. Do not load nuclear and conventional weapons on the same aircraft.

5.6. The following weapons are authorized:

5.6.1. B-52H:

5.6.1.1. AGM-86B/W80-1

5.6.1.2. AGM-129A/W80-1

5.6.1.3. B61-7

5.6.1.4. B83-0, -1

5.6.2. B-2A:

5.6.2.1. B61-7, -11

5.6.2.2. B83-0, -1

6. Nuclear Identification:

- 6.1. Develop procedures to distinguish an AGM-86B or AGM-129A missile that has a nuclear warhead from one that does not.
- 6.2. Weapon Shapes and Containers. Develop procedures to:
 - 6.2.1. Distinguish nuclear bombs from test or training shapes.
 - 6.2.2. Identify containers that contain nuclear warheads.

7. Nonnuclear Assurance. Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made using nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed on by the DoD and/or DOE before the conduct of an operational test. This applies to test assemblies which:

- 7.1. Resemble War Reserve assets, and
- 7.2. Will be flown on a combat delivery aircraft.

8. Troubleshooting and Use of Equipment, Procedures, and Checklists:

- 8.1. Do not use nuclear weapons to troubleshoot faults.
- 8.2. Use only equipment (e.g. hardware, software, etc.) and procedures that are consistent with US Air Force-approved publications for nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon system operations.
- 8.3. Training is prohibited with nuclear weapons loaded on the aircraft. This includes simulation and partial simulation mode training.
- 8.4. The offices of primary responsibility for publications must ensure applicable publications conform to weapon system safety rules and meet the DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards.
- 8.5. Do not modify the aircraft monitoring and control system, suspension or release systems, associated handling and test equipment, or any other aircraft system that affects nuclear surety without Air Force Safety Center approval IAW procedures as outlined in applicable AFIs.

9. Security Criteria. AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*, DoD C-5210.41-M, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)*, and Air Force Supplement apply.**10. Tamper Control and Detection.** AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*, applies.**11. Personnel Reliability.** AFI 36-2104, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, and DoD Directive 5210.42, *Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, apply.**12. Basic Weapon Configurations.** Verify that the AGM-86B/W80-1, AGM-129A/W80-1, B61-7, B61-11, B83-0, and B83-1 are safe using applicable technical orders. These are the proper configurations:

- 12.1. AGM-86B/W80-1:

12.1.1. Warhead arming device safing pin is installed and the device indicates safe (white S on green background).

12.1.2. Rotary separation switch pin is installed (red band is not visible). (Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data.)

12.2. AGM-129A/W80-1:

12.2.1. Arm/disarm device indicates safe (white S on green background).

12.2.2. Separation switch pin is installed. (Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data.)

12.2.3. B61-7, -11 and B83-0, -1. No safety verification actions required.

13. Basic Aircraft Configurations:

13.1. B-52H. Retain these configurations:

13.1.1. Install operationally coded Code Enabling Switch and disable the Interconnecting Box, unless in receipt of valid execution order, prior to aircraft generation.

13.1.2. Aircraft with Common Strategic Rotary Launcher (CSRL) Mated with B61-7, B83-0, and B83-1 Gravity Bombs or AGM-86B/W80-1 Missiles:

13.1.2.1. Pilot's Missile/Munitions Consent Panel:

13.1.2.1.1. Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.2.1.2. Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.2.2. Weapon Control Panel:

13.1.2.2.1. Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.2.2.2. Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.2.2.3. Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3. Aircraft with Pylon-Carried AGM-86B/W80-1 and AGM-129A/W80-1 (with or without CSRL):

13.1.3.1. RCD disconnected with the cover closed, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.2. The guards on the left and right Pylon Jettison Consent switches down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.3. Pylon jettison control indicators show PYLON LOCKED.

13.1.3.4. Pilot's Missile/Munitions Consent Panel:

13.1.3.4.1. Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.4.2. Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.5. Weapon Control Panel:

13.1.3.5.1. Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.5.2. Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.5.3. Pylon Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.1.3.5.4. Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.2. B-2A. Retain these configurations:

13.2.1. Rotary Launcher Assembly (RLA) mated with B61-7, B61-11, B83-0, and B831 bombs. Mixed nuclear loads are authorized.

13.2.1.1. Weapon Jettison Panel:

13.2.1.1.1. ALL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down.

13.2.1.1.2. SEL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down.

13.2.1.2. Pilot's Consent Panel:

13.2.1.2.1. NUC UNLK ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.2.1.2.2. NUC PA ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.2.1.3. Mission Commander's Consent Panel:

13.2.1.3.1. NUC UNLK ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

13.2.1.3.2. NUC PA ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed.

14. Cruise Missile Operations:

14.1. Mission Planning:

14.1.1. Develop mission profiles so that the required g-maneuver occurs as late in the mission as practical.

14.1.2. Strategic Mission Planning System operations must ensure that all missions against pre-planned targets terminate within the target area.

14.2. Fueling:

14.2.1. Perform fueling and defueling operations in the Integrated Maintenance Facility's (IMF) fueling room only.

14.2.2. If fuel is in the fuel set, only perform operations involving the missiles fuel system or the fuel set in the IMF fueling room.

14.2.3. When fuel is in the fuel set, close fuel room doors. *EXCEPTIONS:* The automatic fire door may be open. Personnel access doors may be opened to enter and exit.

15. Storage, Maintenance, Testing, Ground Transportation, Mating, Demating, Loading and Unloading:

15.1. Store nuclear weapons in US Air Force-approved, locked, and secured facilities. Nuclear weapons operations and storage in the IMF must be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with operational requirements.

15.2. Maintain basic weapon configurations (paragraph 12.).

15.3. With missiles on a pylon, install the ejector safing pin. When pylons are installed on the aircraft, ensure pylon jettison safing pins are installed. (Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data.)

15.4. For rotary launchers, verify CSRL/RLA ejector safing mechanism lockpin is engaged and CSRL/RLA ejector safing mechanism levers indicate locked.

15.5. Fuel aircraft for the assigned mission before loading nuclear weapons.

15.6. Do not load an aircraft unless it is capable of performing its assigned mission.

15.7. After weapons are loaded, only routine servicing and minor maintenance of the aircraft are authorized.

15.8. Perform fuel management actions on loaded aircraft only as necessary to support a particular aircraft's assigned mission.

16. Logistics Movement of Nuclear Weapons by Cargo Aircraft: Perform in accordance with AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.*

17. Ground Operations Involving Nuclear Weapon-Loaded Aircraft:

17.1. Maintain nuclear weapons and aircraft in their basic configuration. (Paragraph 12. and 13.).

17.2. Electrically verify safe status of the weapons with the applicable aircraft stores management system after weapons upload.

17.3. After completing the upload and postload functions, apply power to a loaded nuclear weapon only for authorized permissive action link (PAL) operations, command disable (CD) operations, or to monitor the weapon. *NOTE:* Keep weapon monitoring to a minimum.

17.4. Apply power to a nuclear weapon-loaded aircraft only to:

17.4.1. Perform maintenance or preflight operations.

17.4.2. Monitor the weapons or ejector rack locks.

17.4.3. Start or run engines.

17.4.4. Monitor the radio.

17.4.5. Perform authorized PAL, CD, or coded switch operations.

17.5. Do not start or run engine(s) unless:

17.5.1. Checking aircraft status.

17.5.2. Performing maintenance.

17.5.3. Conducting practice alerts, exercises, inspections, evaluations, taxiing, and flying operations.

17.6. Engine starts and engine runs must:

17.6.1. Be kept to a minimum.

17.6.2. Be done by at least two authorized and qualified aircrew members. (Two-Person Concept applies.)

17.7. Aircraft towing:

17.7.1. Keep towing to a minimum.

17.7.2. Two authorized and qualified individuals must be in the cockpit during towing. (Two-Person Concept applies.)

17.8. Taxi.

17.8.1. Keep taxiing to an absolute minimum consistent with operational requirements. Taxi aircraft, if necessary, only for practice alerts, exercises, inspections or evaluations, flying operations, and increased alert postures.

17.8.2. At least two authorized and qualified aircrew members must be in the aircraft during taxiing. (Two-Person Concept applies.)

17.9. Perform fuel management only as necessary to support an aircraft's assigned mission requirements.

17.10. Use applicable technical orders to conduct maintenance and weapon load changes.

18. Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Nonstrike Configuration:

18.1. Conduct only when:

18.1.1. Directed by appropriate authority.

18.1.2. Nuclear weapons are in their basic configurations (see paragraph 12.).

18.1.3. The aircraft is in its basic configuration (see paragraph 13.).

18.2. Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible.

18.3. If loss of the aircraft is anticipated, Command Disable the weapons if the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit.

18.4. B-52H:

18.4.1. With bombs mated to a CSRL, or cruise missiles loaded, disconnect the CES and attach the connector to the storage receptacle.

18.4.2. When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders.

18.4.3. Do not apply missile power. Keep application of missile interface unit power to a minimum.

18.5. B-2A:

18.5.1. Retain Command Disable capability.

18.5.2. Maintain PAL locked.

18.5.3. When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders. Command Disable weapons if time and conditions permit.

19. Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Strike Configuration:

19.1. Conduct only when:

19.1.1. Directed by appropriate authority.

19.1.2. Launch for survival has been ordered under positive threat of imminent attack.

19.1.3. Authorized to fly in a strike configuration as part of a deployment or dispersal.

19.2. Keep nuclear weapons in their basic configurations (paragraph **12.**) until authorized to prearm.

19.3. Keep the aircraft in its basic configuration (paragraph **13.**) until authorized to prepare weapons for release.

19.4. When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals. Ensure PAL is locked and Command Disable the weapons if the aircraft is capable, and time and conditions permit. Operate the controls by following approved checklists.

19.5. Do not operate the safety-wired controls required for a prearmed release or enter the Unique Signal Generator (USG) code until authorization to expend nuclear weapons is received and weapon preparation for release checklist is required.

19.6. Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible.

19.7. If loss of the aircraft is anticipated, relock PAL and Command Disable the weapons if the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit.

20. Coded Switch Procedures. Use plans and procedures prescribed by proper authorities.

21. PAL Procedures:

21.1. Use PAL codes and PAL controllers only as directed by appropriate authority.

21.2. For aircraft with cockpit PAL control, relock PAL if a strike mission is terminated or aborted.

22. CD Procedures. Use CD codes and CD equipment only as directed by appropriate authority.

KENNETH W. HESS, Major General, USAF
Chief of Safety

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

DoD Directive 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon Systems Safety Program*
DoD 3150.2-M, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual*
DoD Directive 4540.5, *Logistic Transportation of Nuclear Weapons*
DoDD 5210.41, *Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons*
DoD C-5210.41-M, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)*, and Air Force Supplement
DoDD 5210.42, *Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program*
AFPD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*
AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*
AFI 36-2104, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*
AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*
AFI 91-102, *Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules*
AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*
AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*
AFMAN 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command
ALCC—Airborne Launch Control Center
ALCS—Airborne Launch Control System
ASG—Auxiliary Status Generator
AUTO—Automatic Launch Command
CD—Command Disable
CDA—Coder-Decoder Assembly
CDB—Command Data Buffer
CMCC—Computer Memory Confidence Check
CMSC—Computer Memory Security Check
CSRL—Common Strategic Rotary Launcher
D-BOX—Distribution Box
DoD—Department of Defense

DSAP—Data Store and Processor
EAP—Emergency Action Procedures
ECC—Emergency Combat Capability
EP—Enable Panel
EWO—Emergency War Orders
GMR—Ground Maintenance Response
HDA—Head Disk Assembly
ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICPS—ICBM Code Processing System
ILCS—Improved Launch Control System
IMF—Integrated Maintenance Facility
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
JS—Joint Staff
LCC—Launch Control Center
LCP—Launch Control Panel
LECGSP—Launch Enable Control Group Signal Panel
LF—Launch Facility
LFNA—Launch Facility Not Authenticated
MAJCOM—Major Command
MCC—Missile Combat Crew
MCG—Memory Controller Group
MCU—Mechanical Code Unit
MF—Medium Frequency
MK—Mark
MOSR—Missile Operational Status Reply
PAL—Permissive Action Link
RADMO—Radio Mode
REACT—Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting
RLA—Rotary Launcher Assembly
RS—Reentry System
RV—Reentry Vehicle
SCD—Secure Code Device

SCS—Safety Control Switch

SCSC—Squadron Code Sumcheck

SDU—Secure Data Unit

SecDef—Secretary of Defense

SELM—Simulated Electronic Launch--*Minuteman*

SELP—Simulated Electronic Launch--*Peacekeeper*

URD—Unit Reference Designator

USDA—Unique Signal Device Assembly

VKA—Volatile Keying Assembly

WCPS—Wing Code Processing System

WSC—Weapon System Controller

WSP—Weapon System Processor