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OF THE AIR FORCE**

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Operations Support

**IMPLEMENTATION OF AND
COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW START
TREATY**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, and the DoD Foreign Clearance Program, and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*, by providing guidance directly associated with Air Force implementation of, and compliance with, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or the New START Treaty (NST). It applies to all Air Force organizations (including Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) responsible for implementing and complying with arms control agreements, specifically those organizations involved with the hosting of NST inspections at Air Force facilities, those organizations responsible for providing NST-mandated notifications, those organizations that provide logistics support to the U.S. and foreign NST inspection teams, and those organizations responsible for protecting U.S. Air Force equities from the vulnerabilities associated with the NST implementation and verification regime. This Air Force Instruction (AFI) may be supplemented by subordinate organizations, but all supplements must be routed to AF/A5XP for coordination prior to certification and approval. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, Table 1.1 for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. This Instruction is consistent with AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*, and Air Force priorities for the Nuclear Enterprise. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for*

Change of Publication; route AF Form 847 from the field through appropriate chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This Instruction is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. The previous version’s publication preceded the entry into force of New START. This revision modifies language to reflect current NST implementation activities and the updated roles and responsibilities for each Air Force organization responsible for implementing and complying with arms control agreements. This version also eliminates language provided solely for the preparation of NST entry into force.

This revision updates AFI 16-608 IAW AFI 33-360 (see Table "Tier Waiver Authorities"), refining Wing-level duty requirements and identifying the waiver authority for these requirements.

Chapter 1—OVERVIEW	4
1.1. General.	4
1.2. Introduction.	4
1.3. New START Treaty Verification.	5
1.4. New START Treaty Accountable Systems and Facilities.	6
Table 1.1. Existing Types of Accountable Air Force Weapons Systems*	6
Table 1.2. Air Force Facilities Subject to Type One Inspections	6
Table 1.3. Air Force Facilities Currently Subject to Type Two Inspections	7
Table 1.4. Declared Support Facilities	7
Chapter 2—ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY	8
2.1. DoD Relationships.	8
2.2. Headquarters United States Air Force (USAF) Responsibilities.	9
2.3. Waiver Authority.	12
Chapter 3—MAJCOM & WING COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES	13
3.1. General MAJCOM Responsibilities.	13
3.2. Specific MAJCOM Responsibilities.	14
3.3. MAJCOM TCO Responsibilities.	15
3.4. MAJCOM Inspection Responsibilities.	16
3.5. MAJCOM Arms Control Training and Awareness.	17

3.6.	MAJCOM Resource Management Responsibilities.	17
3.7.	General Wing/Unit Treaty Responsibilities.	18
3.8.	Wing/Unit Exhibition Responsibilities.	19
3.9.	Wing/Unit Inspection Responsibilities.	19
3.10.	Wing/Unit Education, Training and Exercises.	20
Chapter 4—REPORTING		21
4.1.	General.	21
4.2.	Notifications.	21
4.3.	Database Reporting.	21
4.4.	Treaty Compliance Officer Reports.	21
4.5.	Treaty Compliance Certifications.	21
4.6.	NST Reporting Deviations.	22
Chapter 5—SAFETY AND SECURITY		23
5.1.	General.	23
5.2.	Host Unit Security.	23
5.3.	Operational Security (OPSEC).	24
Chapter 6—OTHER INSPECTION RELATED REQUIREMENTS		26
6.1.	Inspection Team Arrival Procedures.	26
6.2.	Asylum Requests.	26
6.3.	Public Affairs (PA).	26
6.4.	Protocol.	26
6.5.	Host Unit Local Activities.	27
6.6.	Local (Base) Escorts.	27
6.7.	Medical and Dental Support / Mortuary Services.	28
6.8.	Lodging and Dining.	28
6.9.	Transportation.	29
Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION		30
Attachment 2—COMPONENTS OF COMPLIANCE PLAN		34

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. General.

1.1.1. This document is UNCLASSIFIED.

1.1.2. **Strict adherence to New START Treaty (NST) requirements and use of standard operating procedures for NST activities is paramount.**

1.1.3. The New START Treaty (NST) and its associated Protocol and Annexes are the primary references for addressing questions related to compliance. In cases where clarification is required, guidance shall be requested from Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Strategic Plans and Policy Division (AF/A5XP). Units at all levels will adhere to NST requirements. (T-0; see AFI 33-360, Table 1.1, for Tier approval information).

1.1.4. This document will be reviewed by the OPR at a minimum of every four years per AFI 33-360. (T-1)

1.1.5. This guidance describes processes, provides procedural guidance, and specifies Headquarters, Major Command (MAJCOM), and unit responsibilities for implementation of and compliance with the NST. This includes coordination and execution of inspections, training, financial oversight, reporting, and utilization of assets and personnel.

1.1.6. The NST-declared AF facilities referenced in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 are subject to NST inspections. (T-0)

1.1.7. Affected MAJCOMs (see paragraph 3.2.) will develop supplements, implementation, or compliance plans and procedures to execute this guidance and coordinate plans and procedures with Air Staff. (T-0)

1.2. Introduction.

1.2.1. The NST entered into force on 5 February 2011 and has a duration of ten years. It may be extended for a period of no more than five years by mutual agreement of the Parties.

1.2.2. The purpose of the Treaty is to increase transparency and mutual trust, enhance predictability and stability, and to reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms, and their associated warheads, of both the United States and the Russian Federation. Although the Treaty does not define the term "strategic offensive arms," "strategic" indicates that the forces covered are those of intercontinental range. "Offensive" is in contrast to defensive in nature, such as ballistic missile defense systems. The Treaty requires the Parties to mutually and transparently reduce their nuclear forces over a period of seven years, but allows each Party the flexibility to determine its own force structure.

1.2.3. The NST established the following central limits:

1.2.3.1. 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers;

1.2.3.2. 1550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

1.2.3.3. 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

1.2.4. The first and second central limits are intended to limit the deployed strategic forces of each Party. Deployed delivery vehicles are ICBMs in launchers, SLBMs in launch tubes and nuclear equipped heavy bombers. The third central limit is intended to limit the ability to “break out” of the Treaty limits by constraining the number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and non-deployed heavy bombers. Non-deployed launchers are empty ICBM and SLBM launchers and test silos, and non-deployed heavy bombers are test heavy bombers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments located at repair or production facilities.

1.2.5. Air Force warheads counted against the central limits of the Treaty include all reentry vehicles (nuclear and conventional) emplaced on Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs. Each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments under the NST counts as a single warhead against the central limits.

1.2.6. Existing weapons systems shall be operated in a manner consistent with NST obligations. This shall be done in a Joint manner to support the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and to ensure that the number of accountable items remain within the NST central limits. (T-0)

1.3. New START Treaty Verification.

1.3.1. Verification of the NST will be carried out using on-site inspections, national technical means (NTM) of verification, unique identifiers (UID), data exchanges, and notifications.

1.3.2. On-Site Inspections. Each Party may conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each treaty year. These inspections are divided into two groups.

1.3.2.1. Type One Inspections. Type One inspections are conducted at the operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and focus on both deployed and non-deployed strategic arms. Each Party is allowed to conduct up to ten Type One inspections each treaty year.

1.3.2.2. Type Two Inspections. Type Two inspections are focused on non-deployed strategic arms and conducted at facilities such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities. Type Two inspections may also be used to confirm the conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms and to determine whether eliminated facilities are being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Each party is allowed to conduct up to eight Type Two inspections each treaty year.

1.3.3. National Technical Means. The use of NTM (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) supplements on-site inspections to monitor compliance with treaty provisions. The NST precludes Parties from interfering with NTM or using methods of concealment that might impede verification via NTM.

1.3.4. Unique Identifiers. Each deployed and non-deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber subject to the Treaty is required to be labeled with a unique alpha-numeric identifier visible to the inspecting party.

1.3.5. Data Exchange. The Treaty requires the Parties to exchange aggregate data on their strategic offensive arms and related facilities 45 days after entry into force (EIF) and biannually thereafter.

1.3.6. Notifications. The Treaty obligates each Party to provide notifications related to changes to data contained in the NST database, movement of accountable items, inspection activities, changes in deployed/nondeployed status, conversion or elimination activities, and ICBM/SLBM launches.

1.4. New START Treaty Accountable Systems and Facilities.

1.4.1. Air Force facilities directly affected by the NST include those designated as NST points of entry (POE), ICBM Bases, Air Bases, Storage Facilities, ICBM Repair Facilities, Conversion or Elimination Facilities, Test Ranges and Formerly Declared Facilities (FDF). The NST also indirectly impacts other declared facilities. Air Force weapon systems directly impacted by the NST include ICBMs, ICBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

1.4.2. Article III of the NST lists existing types of strategic offensive arms at the time of treaty signature. Since then, the Air Force has removed some systems from accountability. Table 1.1 below lists accountable Air Force weapons systems as of the date of this AFI publication.

Table 1.1. Existing Types of Accountable Air Force Weapons Systems*

Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM
Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM
B-52H Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
B-2A Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
* The Minuteman II (MM II) ICBM, B-52G heavy bomber, and B-1B heavy bomber were initially listed as existing types, but are no longer accountable under the Treaty. Although B-1B heavy bombers no longer count toward the Treaty limits, they remain subject to Type Two inspections.

1.4.3. At EIF, the Air Force declared 14 facilities subject to on-site inspections under NST. A list of these facilities shall be updated according to Part Two of the Protocol to the NST.

1.4.3.1. Table 1.2. lists Air Force facilities that are currently subject to Type One inspections.

Table 1.2. Air Force Facilities Subject to Type One Inspections

F.E. Warren AFB, WY (ICBM Base)
Malmstrom AFB, MT (ICBM Base)
Minot AFB, ND (ICBM Base)
Barksdale AFB, LA (Air Base)
Minot AFB, ND (Air Base)
Whiteman AFB, MO (Air Base)

1.4.3.2. Table 1.3. lists Air Force facilities currently subject to Type Two inspections.

Table 1.3. Air Force Facilities Currently Subject to Type Two Inspections

Barksdale AFB, LA (Air Base)*
Camp Navajo, AZ (Storage Facility for ICBMs)
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Conversion or Elimination Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Storage Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Dyess AFB, TX (Formerly Declared Facility)
Ellsworth AFB, SD (Formerly Declared Facility)
F.E. Warren AFB, WY (ICBM Base)**
Hill AFB, UT (Repair Facility for ICBMs)
Malmstrom AFB, MT (ICBM Base)**
Minot AFB, ND (Air Base)*
Oasis Complex, UT (Storage Facility for ICBMs and SLBMs)
Vandenberg AFB, CA (Test Range)
* Verify B-52H conversions.
** Verify ICBM launcher eliminations.

1.4.4. While not inspectable, the supporting facilities in Table 1.4 are declared under the NST.

Table 1.4. Declared Support Facilities

ATK Launch Systems - ICBM, UT (Production Facility for ICBMs)
Boeing Plant, Wichita, KS (Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Edwards AFB, CA (Heavy Bomber Flight Test Center)
Kodiak Launch Complex, AK (Space Launch Facility)
Northrop Plant, Palmdale, CA (Production Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Boeing Plant, Palmdale, CA (Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Tinker AFB, OK (Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers)
Vandenberg Space Launch Complex, CA (Space Launch Facility)
Wallops Flight Facility, VA (Space Launch Facility)
Whiteman AFB, MO (Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers)

1.4.5. No other currently deployed Air Force weapons or delivery systems are affected. However, the NST has provisions for declaring new types of strategic offensive arms and new facilities during the duration of the Treaty, as required.

1.4.6. The NST includes provisions for exchanging numerical and technical data concerning treaty-accountable items and activities concerning their placement and posture, as well as exhibitions, inspections, and demonstrations to assist in the verification of exchanged data.

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY

2.1. DoD Relationships.

2.1.1. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is responsible for overall coordination of NST policy for DoD and represents the Secretary of Defense on NST matters in the Interagency process involving other Federal agencies. (DoDD 2060.1)

2.1.2. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is responsible for oversight of DoD implementation of, and compliance with, arms control agreements, including the NST. The Deputy Director, Treaty Compliance (USD(AT&L)/PSA/TC) serves as the Treaty Manager for the NST. (DoDD 2060.1). Additionally, USD(AT&L)/PSA/TC chairs the NST Compliance Review Group (CRG), which addresses NST compliance concerns and the NST Implementation Working Group (NST-IWG), which monitors and coordinates DoD implementation activities.

2.1.2.1. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has the overall lead for NST escort missions to U.S. facilities and NST inspection missions at Russian Federation facilities. As such, DTRA determines team composition and provides mission commanders, deputy mission commanders, weapons systems experts, trained linguists, and other representatives required to support escort and inspection missions and other NST activities. DTRA may require Air Force support, including airlift, to facilitate these missions.

2.1.2.2. The DTRA Team Chief is the Mission Commander for NST escort missions and is responsible for the conduct of the mission. The DTRA Team Chief serves as the senior U.S. Government representative during these missions, regardless of his/her relative seniority, and is empowered to directly interact and communicate with Russian inspectors during NST escort missions.

2.1.2.3. Coordinating with Unit Treaty Compliance Officers (TCOs), DTRA is responsible for transporting Russian NST inspection teams to facilities designated for inspection within the Treaty-prescribed time limits.

2.1.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as the interface between the Combatant Commands and the other Departments and Agencies within the U.S. Government. MAJCOMs fulfilling roles as Joint Functional Component Commands will continue to directly support Combatant Commands on arms control matters as necessary and will also ensure HAF is fully included in arms control related operational activities. AF/A5XP is the AF interface with the Joint Staff concerning all activities related to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements, to include Air Force NST implementation and compliance. AF/A10 shall lead engagement with the Joint Staff on the development of an NST-compliant force structure and oversee execution of force structure reductions, in coordination with AF/A5XP.

2.1.4. The Air Force is a supporting Service in accordance with Undersecretary of Defense Memorandum: *Planning Guidance for New START Treaty Compliance*.

2.2. Headquarters United States Air Force (USAF) Responsibilities.

2.2.1. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) shall ensure billets are properly assigned and allocated to support treaty compliance offices and activities.

2.2.2. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF/A2) shall provide intelligence information concerning foreign threats in relation to NST activities.

2.2.2.1. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) shall ensure the availability of properly trained and certified individuals to support all NST inspections involving potential use of radiation detection equipment (RDE).

2.2.3. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans & Requirements (AF/A3/5) is the Air Force Central Authority for compliance with arms control agreements, including the NST.

2.2.3.1. AF/A3/5 shall provide oversight toward ensuring all non-nuclear combat operations involving the use of NST-accountable forces are conducted in a treaty compliant manner.

2.2.3.2. AF/A3/5 shall raise MAJCOMs questions and concerns about Air Force operations, or contemplated operations employing NST-accountable forces to the Chair of the NST CRG for compliance assessment before such operations are initiated.

2.2.3.3. AF/A3/5 shall provide updates on NST implementation and compliance activities to the Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB), Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration (NIRI) Board, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Secretary of the Air Force, as necessary.

2.2.3.4. On behalf of A3/5, AF/A5XP manages all aspects of the Air Force arms control process, including management of NST compliance (IAW AFD 16-6, AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, and AFI 16-603, *Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*). AF/A5XP shall:

2.2.3.4.1. Oversee NST-related requirements as the Air Force Treaty Implementation Manager.

2.2.3.4.2. Participate in and represent the Air Force at the NST IWG meetings and activities. When invited, participate as technical advisor in Interagency and international meetings, such as the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

2.2.3.4.3. Review all appropriate acquisition plans and testing documents, as well as periodic reviews of Air Force acquisition programs related to NST-accountable forces/installations for compliance.

2.2.3.4.4. Provide, in coordination with DTRA, training to the Air Force network of Treaty Compliance Officers (TCOs) on the NST, as requested by MAJCOMs. AF/A5XP will include NST training in the annual Arms Control Course.

- 2.2.3.4.5. Provide training through the Air Force Central Node (AFCN) for personnel responsible for the origination or review and approval of NST notifications contained in Sections I through VII of the Annex on Notifications.
- 2.2.3.4.6. Coordinate with DTRA and MAJCOMs to schedule and conduct NST mock inspections.
- 2.2.3.4.7. Submit, to the Joint Staff, notifications required by the NST for forwarding to the Department of State for transmittal.
- 2.2.3.4.8. Coordinate and submit conversion and elimination plans for Air Force Treaty-accountable strategic delivery systems for approval by the CRG.
- 2.2.3.4.9. Coordinate all Air Force notifications and data submissions related to telemetric information. Work with JCS/J5 to ensure the Air Force telemetry plan is synchronized with the U.S. Navy telemetry plan.
- 2.2.3.4.10. Submit, to the Joint Staff, NST simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of Air Force inspectable facilities, changes to such diagrams and diagrams associated with new inspectable facilities declared after EIF.
- 2.2.3.4.11. Function as the Program Element Monitor (PEM) within the Arms Control Program Element (PE) 35145F for all arms control treaties and agreements' related costs, including NST. Infrastructure-related costs to support Treaty Compliance Offices, including associated manpower are funded through the Arms Control PE 35145F. The PEM provides guidance to the TCOs/MAJCOM Resource Managers on the POM process, FinPlan updates, and critical timelines, when available.
- 2.2.3.4.12. Host, as needed, NST Workshops with participants from the NST-affected MAJCOMs, NST TCOs, and Air Staff.
- 2.2.3.4.13. Establish manpower requirements and manage authorizations and personnel to support required MAJCOM and base Treaty Compliance Offices.
- 2.2.3.4.14. Establish and sustain a capability to access and/or integrate data from appropriate sources to determine, on an as-needed basis, the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and warheads using NST counting rules. This information will serve purposes that include responding to Air Force (and higher) leadership inquiries about the numerical status of forces at the time requested as well as general oversight of compliance with established numerical constraints on Air Force systems. Appropriate data sources may include other HAF offices, USSTRATCOM, MAJCOMs, and existing Air Force or DoD-wide databases amended as necessary to ensure accurate and timely information appropriate to the aforementioned purposes.
- 2.2.3.4.15. The Air Force Central Node (AFCN), functioning as an adjunct to AF/A5XP, manages all aspects of Air Force NST reporting and associated requirements, including providing guidance and support for NST notification processing (IAW AFI 16-608 and the NST Reporting Workbook) during normal duty hours. After hours, the AFGSC Command Center will fulfill these duties. The AFCN will:

2.2.3.4.15.1. Serve as the releasing authority for Air Force NST notifications.

2.2.3.4.15.2. Develop, maintain and administer the NST Reporting and Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES) User Training Course. The formal ACES curriculum will be taught in one of three methods: (1) AFCN will travel to instruct ACES at the location in need of training, (2) The Trainee will travel to AFCN location for training, or (3) AFCN will coordinate with the unit in need of the training for an on-line, virtual training session using web based conference tools, such as Defense Connect On-Line (DCO).

2.2.3.4.15.3. Develop, maintain, and publish the NST Reporting Workbook.

2.2.3.4.15.4. Conduct monthly validation of Air Force data resident in the NST Database.

2.2.3.4.15.5. Analyze Air Force NST notifications, collect and report resultant statistical accuracy and error data.

2.2.3.4.15.6. Serve as the interface between Air Force NST reporting nodes and DTRA ACES support issues.

2.2.3.4.15.7. Ensure the accuracy of the NST database in order to support submission of the biannual updates to the database.

2.2.4. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Mission Support (AF/A4/7) shall coordinate logistical support with the MAJCOMs to ensure treaty implementation and compliance activities are fully supported. This includes necessary logistic and engineer support to ensure conversion and/or elimination of NST-accountable systems is accomplished as directed. AF/A4/7 shall ensure all deployed and non-deployed NST-accountable items are properly accounted for while in Air Force possession, even if diverted for other purposes.

2.2.5. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs (AF/A8) shall factor NST-required force reductions and limitations into all future Air Force strategic plans. AF/A8 shall also incorporate NST implementation and force reduction requirements into the Air Force programming process, in coordination with AF/A5XP.

2.2.6. The Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) shall ensure nuclear operations policy and guidance complies with the NST. AF/A10 shall oversee the force structure development and execution process for implementation of the NST in coordination with AFGSC, AFMC, and AF/A5XP.

2.2.7. The National Guard shall ensure that any NST-limited items such as converted heavy bomber aircraft that are transferred from the active force remain configured in an NST-compliant manner until they are eliminated in accordance with the treaty or the treaty is no longer in force.

2.2.8. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) shall ensure appropriate acquisition and testing documents for acquisition programs involving strategic nuclear forces are submitted to AF/A5XP for NST compliance review.

2.2.9. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Security and Special Program Oversight (SAF/AAZ), in coordination with AF/A5XP, shall ensure all special

access programs are in compliance with the NST. SAF/AAZ will ensure special access programs are protected against unnecessary or inadvertent exposure during NST verification activities. A treaty representative from SAF/AAZ will be on-site to support applicable NST inspections.

2.2.10. The Office of the Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC) shall provide legal advice to HAF regarding NST treaty implementation and compliance activities and coordinate this advice with AF/JA as appropriate.

2.2.11. The Directorate of Public Affairs (SAF/PA) shall interface with the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs and provide requested support as necessary to DoD and Air Force public affairs and strategic communications actions relative to the implementation of and compliance with the NST.

2.3. Waiver Authority. When complying with official policy, guidance, and/or procedures, the unit may request a waiver. The fundamental aim of a waiver must be to enhance mission effectiveness at all levels, while preserving resources and safeguarding health and welfare. When a commander approves a waiver, the commander is communicating to subordinates and superiors that the commander accepts the risk created by non-compliance. Each requirement mandated for compliance at the Wing level found within this Instruction is tiered, signifying the appropriate waiver authority to the requirement (e.g. T-0, T-1, T-2, or T-3). See AFI 33-360 paragraph 1.9 for waiver process and a detail description of the standardized waiver authority levels.

Chapter 3

MAJCOM & WING COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1. General MAJCOM Responsibilities.

3.1.1. MAJCOM arms control duties and responsibilities are derived from AFPD 16-6, AFI 16-601 and AFI 16-603.

3.1.2. All MAJCOMs shall ensure any proposed modifications to NST-accountable items are submitted to AF/A5XP for treaty compliance review prior to approval and funding.

3.1.3. Each MAJCOM with NST-accountable items or inspectable facilities shall:

3.1.3.1. Develop and maintain—through the MAJCOM TCO—a MAJCOM supplement or NST Compliance Plan and ensure each of its units implementing NST provisions submit NST Compliance Plans. The Compliance Plan must comply with and complement guidance issued by higher headquarters, the DoD, and the United States Government (USG).

3.1.3.1.1. Plans must address all assigned wings and units affected by NST verification and implementation activities and shall identify plans to ensure compliance with each applicable obligation and provision of the NST. Plans will also include requirements for completing and maintaining facility protection plans and vulnerability assessments for units subject to NST inspection.

3.1.3.1.2. The MAJCOM NST Compliance Plan will define procedures for adherence to the NST and articulate MAJCOM guidance for compliance with the NST. **NOTE:** This requirement is only applicable to those MAJCOMs having within their infrastructure, wings/units designated to support NST activities, i.e., ACC, AFMC, AFGSC, AFSPC, and AMC.

3.1.3.1.3. Plans shall define applicable rules/directives and task affected wings to support treaty requirements.

3.1.3.2. Ensure units with NST inspectable assets or facilities remain prepared to support NST inspections. This includes being prepared to receive, store, transport, and return radiation calibration sources for NST-permitted RDE.

3.1.3.3. Submit simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of all NST inspectable facilities to AF/A5XP. These diagrams must meet the requirements of Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities. MAJCOMs shall submit any updates or changes to NST site diagrams to AF/A5XP for approval. AF/A5XP will provide JCS/J5 changes to site diagrams to be provided through diplomatic channels.

3.1.3.4. Ensure subordinate units comply with Treaty and NST notification guidance.

3.1.3.5. Coordinate requests for NST training inspections through AF/A5XP with DTRA.

3.1.4. MAJCOMs must submit annual requests for funding under the Arms Control PE 35145F in accordance with instructions provided separately.

3.2. Specific MAJCOM Responsibilities.

3.2.1. Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) are responsible for maintaining compliance with NST provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in their command. Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and United State Air Force Europe (USAFE) are not the lead commands for any NST-accountable items or inspectable facilities but may be required to provide support. Even though a MAJCOM may not own any NST-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, they may be required to develop future plans to support NST requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

3.2.2. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) Responsibilities. AFGSC shall ensure all assigned forces and installations affected by the NST are operated in a treaty compliant manner, until the treaty is no longer in effect, or the systems are removed from accountability in accordance with the NST.

3.2.2.1. The AFGSC Command Center shall serve as the first level of review for all Air Force-originated NST notifications, and will:

3.2.2.1.1. Ensure sufficient trained personnel are available to support notification processing requirements on a continuous basis.

3.2.2.1.2. Ensure the accuracy and timeliness of all NST notifications IAW the Treaty and NST Reporting Workbook guidelines.

3.2.2.1.3. Add notification reference information, when required, and forward notifications for additional processing IAW the Treaty and NST Reporting Workbook guidelines.

3.2.2.1.4. Appoint a primary and alternate Point of Contact for local training of Command Center personnel supporting NST notification processing. These individuals will:

3.2.2.1.4.1. Serve as trusted agents for the request of ACES user accounts.

3.2.2.1.4.2. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local ACES training NLT 90 days from being assigned and complete the ACES-NST Initial User training course within 180 days of assignment. After the initial local ACES instruction, newly assigned personnel can request an ACES account, but will not process notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal ACES training) until completing the formal ACES-NST Initial User Course. Every effort should be made to complete this training as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification.

3.2.2.1.4.3. Oversee local procedures training in support of NST notification processing.

3.2.2.1.4.4. Declare, to AF/A5XP (AFCN), new user readiness to begin operational processing of NST notifications.

3.2.3. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Responsibilities.

3.2.3.1. AFMC shall ensure logistical support and maintenance of all NST-accountable items are conducted in a manner compliant with NST requirements until the item is removed from accountability in accordance with the treaty, or until the treaty is no longer in force.

3.2.3.2. AFMC shall also work with AFGSC, ACC, and AFSPC to ensure that any conversions or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with NST procedures.

3.2.4. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Responsibilities. In connection with implementing the NST telemetry regime, AFSPC shall participate in the mission planning as well as launch day activities and post-mission creation of required products for all NST accountable launches subject to potential exchange of telemetric information and related materials. AFSPC shall provide recommendations to AFGSC on the advisability of exchanging these telemetry-related materials with the Russian Federation.

3.2.5. Air Mobility Command (AMC) Responsibilities. AMC shall provide airlift to support the Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency inspector and escort operations as requested through U.S. Transportation Command.

3.2.6. Air Combat Command (ACC) Responsibilities. ACC shall operate assigned converted heavy bombers in a manner consistent with NST commitments and obligations. ACC shall ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the Command's possession remain in their NST-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted NST-accountable aircraft without A3/5 approval.

3.2.7. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Responsibilities. The Air Force Reserve shall operate heavy bomber aircraft that are transferred from the Active Force in a manner consistent with NST commitments and obligations. The Air Force Reserve shall ensure converted heavy bombers in the Command's possession remain in their NST-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted NST-accountable aircraft without A3/5 approval.

3.3. MAJCOM TCO Responsibilities.

3.3.1. MAJCOM TCOs play a crucial role ensuring the Air Force meets its arms control obligations. They provide a critical link between subordinate wings/units, the MAJCOM, and the HAF. Their responsibilities include:

3.3.1.1. Develop and coordinate compliance guidance for subordinate wings and units.

3.3.1.2. Review and coordinate on higher headquarters Directives and Instructions. MAJCOM TCOs will participate in the review and coordination of Air Force arms control implementation, compliance, and guidance.

3.3.1.3. Ensure subordinate wings/units implement DoD, higher headquarters and MAJCOM policies on arms control treaties and agreements.

3.3.1.4. Coordinate with MAJCOM programs that may impact treaty compliance.

3.3.1.5. Coordinate and monitor contractual agreements to ensure work is completed according to treaty specifications.

3.3.1.6. Provide training and guidance for wing/unit personnel on NST implementation and compliance activities.

3.3.1.7. Serve as the focal point for NST matters as they affect the MAJCOM.

3.3.1.8. Ensure MAJCOM Command Post Controllers have current notification formats and use proper reporting procedures to notify subordinate wings/units and tenant organizations of upcoming NST events.

3.3.1.9. Develop contingency plans to ensure NST inspector rights guaranteed by the Treaty are executable under furlough, sequestration, or possible government shut down periods. These contingency plans would include alternatives to ensure transportation, billeting, dining, medical, and full access to all inspectable areas is still available.

3.3.1.10. Ensure standardized compliance procedures throughout their command and maintain and review subordinate wing/unit compliance plans.

3.4. MAJCOM Inspection Responsibilities.

3.4.1. Each MAJCOM and its subordinate units must have a 24-hour point of contact for NST notifications. Notifications of the arrival of a Russian inspection team in the U.S. affect all Air Force units associated with the applicable point of entry. Notification of the designated inspection site will further affect the designated facility.

3.4.2. MAJCOM TCOs will keep AF/A5XP informed of any activity at inspectable Air Force facilities that could impact NST activities, e.g., runway closures, air shows, major exercises/operations that impact OPSEC, ramp space or billeting challenges, etc. AF/A5XP will ensure that applicable agencies are aware of this information.

3.4.3. If present during an inspection, MAJCOM treaty personnel primarily serve as observers. The DTRA Escort Team Chief is the Mission Commander for NST escort missions and is responsible for the conduct of the mission. The DTRA Escort Team Chief serves as the senior U.S. Government representative during these missions, regardless of his/her relative seniority, and is empowered to directly interact and communicate with Russian inspectors during NST escort missions. However, MAJCOM treaty personnel are MAJCOM representatives and can be consulted if a situation arises that requires MAJCOM input.

3.4.4. While MAJCOM TCOs are in an observer's role, they may help the base meet NST requirements by interfacing with the wing/unit TCO.

3.4.5. By directing all MAJCOM TCO inputs to the wing/unit TCO, the treaty team is assured of having a single base point of contact for working issues and requesting support.

3.4.6. MAJCOM TCOs shall not interfere with the DTRA Escort Team's role in the treaty compliance process and shall not interact with Russian inspectors unless specifically requested to do so by the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

3.4.7. MAJCOM TCOs, if present at an inspected facility during an NST escort mission, shall not directly represent USG, DoD or Air Force positions to either the DTRA Escort Team or to Russian inspection team members during the execution of the NST escort mission, including cultural activities, unless the MAJCOM TCO is acting in the capacity of the wing/unit TCO, or unless asked by the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

3.4.8. MAJCOM TCOs must have a current understanding of existing USG, DoD, and Air Force positions/guidance relating to the hosting of NST activities on U.S. territory.

3.4.9. If questions arise, the MAJCOM TCO should coordinate with their chain of command and/or AF/A5XP for clarification. The MAJCOM TCO will advise the wing/unit TCO with responses to communicate to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

3.4.10. Identification and prevention of any prohibited activity when the DTRA Escort Team and Russian inspection team members are at an inspectable Air Force facility during an NST escort mission shall be in accordance with USG, DoD and/or Air Force guidance and shall be the responsibility of the DTRA Escort Team, supported by the wing/unit TCO, in direct support of treaty compliance.

3.4.11. The MAJCOM TCO shall promptly notify his/her chain of command, including AF/A5XP, of any prohibited activity reported by his/her wing/unit TCOs during NST activities at inspectable Air Force facilities, the circumstances of those activities, and the resultant actions taken.

3.5. MAJCOM Arms Control Training and Awareness.

3.5.1. MAJCOM TCOs will ensure subordinate wing/unit TCOs and MAJCOM personnel receive appropriate NST training. Training can be accomplished by attending the Air Force Arms Control Overview Course, the ACES-NST Initial User training course, Air Force-level NST workshops, utilizing the AF/A5XP Portal Training site, attending MAJCOM-level arms control workshops, and by participating in U.S.-only mock inspections and training visits.

3.5.2. Arms Control Courses. DTRA offers a semi-annual NST orientation course, as well as other relevant arms control courses, in the Washington, DC area. MAJCOM and wing/unit TCOs are highly encouraged to participate. These courses are announced in advance to all MAJCOMs.

3.5.3. Conduct mock inspections and training visits. U.S.-only mock inspections are valuable training activities for the escort mission teams, local base personnel and logistics support activities as well as those personnel involved in the notification process. They validate operational procedures and base NST Compliance Plans, logistic support capabilities, security procedures and hosting responsibilities. They provide opportunities for base TCOs and base facilities to operationally train in a near “real-world” environment. Base TCOs should strive to make these exercises as “real” as possible; taking time, manpower, cost and mission team requests/desires into consideration.

3.6. MAJCOM Resource Management Responsibilities.

3.6.1. MAJCOM TCOs function as resource managers and monitor arms control funding and manpower. Successful execution requires close coordination between MAJCOM TCOs, base TCOs, and appropriate financial management counterparts. Budgeting and manpower requirements differ from base to base and MAJCOM to MAJCOM. Effective resource management is necessary to ensure sufficient funding and proper program execution.

3.6.2. MAJCOM TCOs act as command resource manager for PE 35145F and they work closely with the HAF PEM.

3.6.3. Resource managers are responsible for managing resources and budgeting funds for MAJCOM arms control activities and ensuring MAJCOM wing requirements are included in

budget submissions. The MAJCOM treaty office and FM work with the field units to build a spend plan.

3.6.4. AF/A5XP validates the MAJCOM Spend Plan by rationalizing the NST requirements within the Air Force arms control budget.

3.6.5. Unit TCOs provide their requirements to the MAJCOM TCOs, who consolidate these requirements and submit them to AF/A5XP. MAJCOM TCOs must ensure that all subordinate wing/unit requirements are identified and defended, when necessary.

3.6.6. MAJCOM TCOs must also ensure that all requirements comply with fiscal requirements in the DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R V5, AFI 65-601 V1, *Budget Guidance and Procedures*, and AFI 65-603, *Official Representation Funds*.

3.6.7. MAJCOM TCOs are responsible for monitoring manpower authorizations and identifying requirements. Most wing, some MAJCOM, and other arms control billet authorizations are centrally managed by AF/A5XP. These billets are not under the control of MAJCOM planners. Moving or reclassifying a billet requires coordination with and concurrence from AF/A5XP. In accordance with AFPD 16-6 and AFI 16-601, MAJCOM planners must identify arms control requirements to AF/A5XP sufficient to support MAJCOM headquarters and subordinate wing/unit arms control requirements.

3.7. General Wing/Unit Treaty Responsibilities.

3.7.1. Wing/unit TCOs serve as NST notification originators and ensure unit-originated NST notifications comply with all Treaty requirements and are of the highest quality with regard to accuracy and timeliness.

3.7.1.1. All newly-assigned personnel whose duties include the preparation, review or transmission of NST notifications must receive local ACES training NLT 90 days from being assigned and complete the ACES-NST Initial User training course within 180 days of assignment. After the initial local ACES instruction, newly assigned personnel can request an ACES account, but will not process notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal ACES training) until completing the formal ACES-NST Initial User Course. Every effort should be made to complete this training as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification. (T-2)

3.7.1.2. TCOs must maintain proficiency in NST Reporting and ACES operation(s) and shall take steps to ensure that personnel originating notifications at the Wing/Unit have a working knowledge of NST notification requirements and procedures. See NST Reporting Workbook for proficiency requirements. (T-2)

3.7.2. As the local facility expert on the NST, TCOs are required to perform dynamic, comprehensive analysis of the impact of NST activities on the base, tenant units, separately located facilities, and associated missions. This requires all TCOs to have a detailed knowledge of the NST relative to their facilities. In this role, TCOs answer questions regarding the NST as well as identify and explain the effect this treaty will or may have on the facility's military and commercial activities. (T-2)

3.7.3. Duties not directly related to treaty activities shall not be assigned when they directly interfere with TCO duties. (T-1)

3.7.4. Each wing/unit which is host of an NST inspectable facility will have an NST compliance plan applicable to that facility. Air Force facilities declared under the NST that are not subject to on-site inspections or any NST reporting requirements do not require a compliance plan. Wing/unit compliance plans shall be coordinated with their parent MAJCOM and MAJCOM will provide to AF/A5XP for review. (T-0)

3.7.5. The wing/unit NST Compliance Plan shall detail the logistics support to facilitate NST inspection activities to ensure all NST timelines are met. (T-2) Suggested components of a wing/unit compliance plan are contained in [Attachment 2](#).

3.8. Wing/Unit Exhibition Responsibilities.

3.8.1. Units hosting NST Exhibitions shall conduct a mock exhibition in coordination with AF/A5XP prior to the actual exhibition. (T-2)

3.8.2. Local units shall provide digital photography services in support of NST Exhibition photography requirements. Units shall be capable of producing photographs meeting the requirements of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities. (T-0)

3.8.3. AF/A5XP is responsible for obtaining photographs of all exhibited items and declared distinguishing features necessary to support the exhibition prior to the arrival of Russian inspectors. Local units shall support AF/A5XP in obtaining such photographs.

3.9. Wing/Unit Inspection Responsibilities.

3.9.1. Wing Commanders are responsible for ensuring Russian Federation inspection teams are afforded their full treaty rights under NST while protecting U.S. national security interests. (T-0)

3.9.2. Wing/Unit TCOs are responsible for facilitating DTRA Escort Teams in fulfilling inspection obligations. This involves coordination from a variety of supporting activities such as: Base Ops, transportation, dining and billeting, force protection, security and OPSEC units, aircraft services (fuel, water, air, de-icing, lavatory, flight meals, and parking), protocol and public affairs, medical and recreational services, meeting/conference rooms and communications availability, and escorting. Host unit local activities are outlined further in Chapter 6.5. (T-2)

3.9.3. Wing/Unit TCOs should work closely with their base functional POCs to identify possible problems and recommend solutions.

3.9.4. Wing/Units shall make every effort to facilitate ground support to ensure compliance with applicable treaty timelines.

3.9.5. Wing/Unit TCOs should keep the AF/A5XP informed of major base/community events that could impact NST inspection operations as soon as possible. Airfield maintenance, air shows, exercises, inspections, weather events (e.g., hurricane staging support), etc., may limit transportation options, support personnel availability and billeting availability and can affect the ability to host NST activities.

3.9.6. NST inspection activities, by treaty design, are typically short-notice events. TCOs may only have 24 hours notification or less that they are required to host a Russian inspection team. Routine training of escorts and awareness briefings for wing leadership are a key to the success of the event.

3.9.7. Upon site designation, the Unit TCO will receive a call from the DTRA Escort Team. The Unit TCO shall provide NST-required information to the DTRA Escort Team Chief on the number of accountable items located at the inspection site and additional logistical information, e.g., arrival time. (T-0)

3.9.8. No later than one hour after designation of the inspection site, the designated unit's TCO shall ensure that all applicable NST pre-inspection restrictions are implemented. The TCO shall notify the DTRA Escort Team Chief immediately if any pre-inspection restriction cannot be fulfilled or sustained. (T-0)

3.9.9. The DTRA Escort Team shall meet in-coming Russian inspectors at the point of entry and transport them to the facility designated for inspection. Upon arrival at the airfield associated with the inspection site, the inspected unit shall provide local escort support to the DTRA escorts. (T-1)

3.9.10. The DTRA Escort Team Chief serves as the official NST national escort and is empowered to interact directly with Russian inspectors. Air Force local escorts will provide subject matter expertise to support inspections and ensure Air Force policies and weapons system safety rules are observed. Local escort support is outlined further in Chapter 6.6. (T-1)

3.9.11. Disputes concerning inspection activities shall be addressed at the DTRA-local Air Force escort level. If local personnel (either wing command/staff or DTRA) are unable to resolve disputes, formal resolution shall be requested through AF/A5XP using command channels. (T-0)

3.9.12. The unit TCO shall complete a pre-inspection briefing for the Russian inspection team within one hour of the team's official arrival at the inspected facility. This briefing shall provide all NST-required information including annotated site diagrams and will include the information required to be provided to the national escorts. (T-0)

3.9.13. The unit TCO, in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief, shall ensure that Russian inspectors and their DTRA escorts are transported to items designated for inspection within the timeframes specified in the NST. (T-0)

3.9.14. The unit, in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team, shall provide continuous escort of Russian inspectors at all times. The unit TCO shall coordinate security and counter-intelligence support as part of the unit's compliance plan. (T-1)

3.10. Wing/Unit Education, Training and Exercises.

3.10.1. Education, training, and mock inspection activities should thoroughly prepare facilities for NST inspection activities. They should focus on the timeline for the event, providing a timely and accurate pre-inspection briefing, and focus on facility and escort responsibilities, safety, OPSEC, and impacts/vulnerabilities to the wing/unit.

3.10.2. Unit TCOs shall develop and maintain facility training programs that are flexible and applicable to specific unit needs and requirements. (T-2)

3.10.3. Unit TCOs will develop pre-arrival training/security briefs for local escorts. These briefs will be approved through the appropriate MAJCOMs and provided to AF/A5XP for review. (T-2)

Chapter 4

REPORTING

4.1. General.

4.1.1. Reporting is closely linked to database maintenance and notifications within the NST. This requires careful tracking of deployed and non-deployed Air Force treaty-accountable assets and scrupulous reporting.

4.2. Notifications.

4.2.1. MAJCOMs and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) shall provide notifications IAW Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications to the Air Force Central Node via ACES. Most notifications are passed between the Parties through the established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. NST has four notifications in the Annex to be employed by inspectors while in-country conducting inspections. These will be passed from the Inspectors to the DTRA national escorts. In addition, NST contains provisions for the parties to address situations where there are no pre-established notifications. Should such situations arise during the course of an inspection on an Air Force installation, whether initiated by the Russian inspectors or at the behest of the unit, it will be addressed through the established command channels and escalation processes. (T-0)

4.3. Database Reporting.

4.3.1. The NST establishes a database of information concerning items of inspection that the Parties exchange twice annually in March and September. NST notifications will be handled primarily through the ACES reporting network.

4.3.2. In addition, some NST notifications require concurrent reporting through separate channels to support distinct but complimentary databases. U.S. STRATCOM's Force Status/Readiness (FSR) database is one such system. As such, the TCO and local FSR representative will coordinate to ensure that NST force status changes are reflected in the same manner in both ACES and FSR, consistent with established reporting procedures.

4.4. Treaty Compliance Officer Reports.

4.4.1. Post-inspection reports by the unit TCO shall be prepared within seven days following an inspection, exhibition, or demonstration. These reports will be forwarded through the MAJCOM and provided to AF/A5XP, who will distribute as necessary. (T-2)

4.5. Treaty Compliance Certifications.

4.5.1. From time-to-time the Secretary of Defense may request Air Force certification of compliance with NST. Such requests will subsequently be sent to all MAJCOMs. Each MAJCOM will certify command compliance with NST. Certifications will be sent to AF/A5XP who will compile them with other required certifications from SAF/AQ and SAF/AAZ and combine them into an Air Force certification. The AF/A3/5 will certify Air Force operational and acquisition compliance with NST in response to the Secretary of Defense.

4.6. NST Reporting Deviations.

4.6.1. A reporting deviation is identified as providing incorrect information, or failing to provide the required information, in an NST notification format. An example would include omitting a reference, or providing an incorrect reference, in an NST Format 3 notification regarding the movement of a heavy bomber or ICBM. All NST reporting deviations will be managed IAW procedures outlined in the NST Reporting Workbook.

Chapter 5

SAFETY AND SECURITY

5.1. General.

5.1.1. Compliance with the NST is mandatory. However, such compliance does not authorize violations of operational safety or security requirements. Adherence to existing Air Force safety and security directives and proper advance planning should prevent situations from arising where inspection rights conflict with established procedures. It may be necessary to reassess such requirements as a result of the NST and change requirements to allow compliance with the NST.

5.1.2. Should situations arise where inspection rights conflict with established safety and security procedures, the unit TCO shall consult with the DTRA Escort Team Chief to resolve the situation in such a way as to accommodate NST compliance within the bounds of safety and security standards. (T-1)

5.1.3. Ensuring personnel safety remains the highest priority of all escorts. Safety standards will not be relaxed or compromised in the course of inspections.

5.1.4. OPSEC and COMSEC standards will apply during inspections. The mission of inspection escorts is to ensure that compliance with these standards is maintained while allowing the inspection team to satisfy their treaty rights. Disagreements on-site will default to protecting information until the DTRA Team Chief and unit leadership agree on a process, or escalate the matter through the appropriate chain of command for resolution.

5.1.5. Program Protection Plans and Security Vulnerability Assessments. Commanders will ensure that protection plans account for base or facility vulnerabilities associated with NST inspection activities. (T-1)

5.1.6. Security Classification of NST Information. U.S. information provided to inspectors during inspections will be classified in accordance with existing DoD classification guidance. As a general rule, DoD classified information is not provided to inspectors, however, some information when aggregated will become classified. DoD security classification guides will regulate sharing.

5.2. Host Unit Security.

5.2.1. Russian Inspectors have specific diplomatic rights, privileges, and immunities as outlined in the Protocol to the NST (Part Five, Section II), and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. The person of the inspector is inviolable, meaning for example that he or she can't be subjected to a pat-down or other search, and is not subject to arrest or detention. Inspectors are not subject to U.S. criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction. Similarly, the Inspectors' papers, correspondence, and personal property are immune from search and seizure in U.S. territory, as is the aircraft transporting the Inspectors to and from points of entry.

5.2.2. The Russian inspection team is greeted by the DTRA Escort Team Chief at the POE. Luggage and equipment belonging to the assigned Russian Inspector(s) will include personal property and papers which the Treaty protects. At the POE, DTRA and U.S. Customs

personnel will identify and distinguish the luggage and equipment belonging to persons who do not share the same privileges and immunities. Searches of the visiting Inspectors and/or their property are prohibited, and any questions regarding searches shall be directed to the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-0)

5.2.3. As a courtesy and to avoid revealing security procedure information to the visiting team, DTRA Escort Team members, their luggage, and hand-carried items are exempt from searches, unless dictated by a specific base security situation (see DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V1, *The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V2, *General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*, and DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V3, *Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements*).

5.2.4. It is Air Force policy that if no specific threat exists against the inspection team or the host unit before or during their visit, additional security requirements are neither warranted nor appropriate. Treatment of the inspection team as distinguished visitors will be sufficient.

5.2.5. It is Air Force policy that the local base escort team has the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection and safety of inspection team members and for limiting access to them by non-essential personnel. (T-1)

5.2.6. If a threat arises before or during the visit of an inspection team, the host unit will react appropriately, inform the DTRA Escort Team Chief (prior to arrival if possible), and brief the arriving team of the situation, the precautions they should take, and the protective measures being taken by the base. (T-1)

5.2.7. If a threat exists during an NST activity at a host unit, considerations should be taken to billet the inspection team on base and limit/restrict their movement as much as possible, depending on the threat. If a credible threat exists to NST activities and movement is required to off-base locations, base Security Forces will advise the AFOSI and local law enforcement agencies. (T-1)

5.2.8. If a credible threat exists, treaty activities may be restricted to on-base, with Security Forces personnel posted on the boundaries of areas used for lodging, dining, and other treaty activities. Off-base activities will require coordination with local law enforcement. This information must be passed expeditiously to AF/A5XP. If required, a recommendation to consider terminating the inspection and removing the inspectors from the area will be passed by the Air Staff to the USG Interagency.

5.3. Operational Security (OPSEC).

5.3.1. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of Air Force missions to successful adversary collection and exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces during all phases of operations (see AFI 10-701, *Operations Security*).

5.3.2. Wing personnel shall ensure vulnerability assessments of their facilities that are subject to NST inspections remain current.

5.3.3. Facility personnel should guard against the possibility that someone may attempt to gather information on our abilities, capabilities, operations, intentions, personnel and organizations. It is incumbent on facility personnel to be observant and diligent in protecting

information that might be used to compromise our security, while at the same time being courteous and pleasant.

5.3.4. If inquiries or actions of a Russian inspection team member raise suspicions, the host-unit's escort shall notify the TCO, who shall in turn notify the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Base security force representatives and AFOSI shall be notified of any suspicious situations. (T-2)

Chapter 6

OTHER INSPECTION RELATED REQUIREMENTS

6.1. Inspection Team Arrival Procedures.

6.1.1. The Wing Commander, or designated representative, should meet the visiting escort and inspection teams upon arrival to the unit being inspected.

6.1.2. Local base escorts and appropriate security forces, if necessary, should be immediately available to support the arriving teams. Provisions should be made to expedite transportation of personnel to the next event (Welcome/Arrival briefings, stop at billeting, etc.) and movement of equipment to the appropriate location.

6.2. Asylum Requests.

6.2.1. Should any foreign national inspection team member or visitor express a desire to seek asylum in the U.S. to USAF personnel, that individual shall discretely inform the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Requests for asylum will be handled in accordance with existing guidance and procedures in accordance with AFI 51-704, *Handling Requests for Asylum and Temporary Refuge*. (T-1)

6.3. Public Affairs (PA).

6.3.1. Hosting units shall accommodate media coverage of NST activities IAW DoD "Principles of Information," DoD Directive 5122.05 *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA))*, SAF/PA, DTRA/PA, MAJCOM/PA and OASD(PA) guidance. (T-0)

6.3.1.1. Unit PA offices will comply with established higher level PA guidance and shall develop an internal information plan to accommodate this guidance as appropriate and share with MAJCOM/PA. (T-0)

6.3.2. In the event of an asylum request or death of an inspection team member, all queries will be referred to the Department of State. No local comments, confirmations, etc., will be made. (T-1)

6.4. Protocol.

6.4.1. Hosting Russian NST inspection missions is a national, legal obligation. The foreign team must be afforded the opportunity to exercise their rights under the NST. The host units must facilitate the conduct of the inspection activity. (T-1)

6.4.2. Reception of the visiting NST teams must be polite, courteous and accommodating. (T-2)

6.4.3. In the event a U.S. dignitary, VIP, or flag officer accompanies the inspection activity, appropriate protocol accommodations must be afforded him or her. Coordinate these procedures with the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-2)

6.4.4. Nearly all NST activities include a formal dinner or function outside of treaty requirements. These may be coordinated by the TCO, host unit Protocol Office and the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Appropriate host unit representation, at a level commensurate

with the visibility of the activity, should be in attendance. These events will not be open to the media.

6.4.4.1. Gifts and/or mementos, if exchanged at these events, should be purchased and accounted for using Official Representation Funds (ORF), identified in the unit's annual budget submission in coordination with the wing/unit commander. ORF expenditures must adhere to AFI 65-603. (T-0)

6.4.4.2. Unit TCOs should coordinate with the DTRA Escort Team Chief prior to any gift exchange to determine the appropriate level of gift and to avoid duplication.

6.5. Host Unit Local Activities.

6.5.1. Units hosting NST activities may be called upon to support or facilitate leisure time activities for members of the inspection team. Creativity, ingenuity, and flexibility on the part of the TCO are encouraged. Remember that not all Russian inspectors will speak English, so coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief for appropriate linguistic services is crucial to the success of an activity.

6.5.2. On-base activities may include, but are not limited to, visits to the Base Exchange and/or Commissary, Class Six store, clothing sales, Officer and/or Enlisted Clubs, cafeterias and fast food establishments, museums or displays, or other recreational facilities. If the Base Exchange and/or Commissary are visited, the TCO will be responsible for crowd control and will coordinate with the facility manager to provide a separate check-out lane if required. (T-2)

6.5.2.1. As guests of the U.S., Russian inspection team members will be authorized the use of the Base Exchange and Commissary, Class Six store, convenience stores, and Officer and/or Enlisted Clubs. At the clothing sales store, only non-issue military clothing/items may be purchased. The hosting unit TCO will notify any of these facilities prior to the arrival of the inspection team. (T-2)

6.5.3. Off-base activities include shopping, tourist and recreational activities, etc. Any off-base activity, including when the teams are housed off-base, will require notification to AFOSI and base Security Forces to ensure appropriate coordination with local, state or federal authorities. Off-base security falls under the jurisdiction of the local, state or federal authorities, and will not be provided by base security forces. (T-1)

6.5.3.1. The DTRA Escort Team has primary responsibility for all visiting NST personnel during all activities.

6.5.3.2. If requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief, the TCO may provide, as available, local base escorts and drivers to facilitate movement off-base.

6.6. Local (Base) Escorts.

6.6.1. Local escorts are necessary to assist the DTRA Escort Team and to facilitate NST activities/events when Russian inspectors are visiting their base.

6.6.2. Local escorts shall be site-knowledgeable base representatives designated as points of contact for the DTRA Escort Team.

6.6.3. Host units will provide local escorts to support NST activities. Local escorts will report to the TCO and be relieved of all other assigned responsibilities while performing escort duties associated with NST activities. (T-2)

6.7. Medical and Dental Support / Mortuary Services.

6.7.1. Host units are expected to provide or arrange for emergency/non-elective medical/dental care as necessary and as requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief for inspection and/or escort team members to accomplish their duties, to save lives or to stabilize injuries. Military treatment facilities shall be used unless competent medical authority deems otherwise. (T-2)

6.7.2. If transportation to a local civilian medical facility is required, the host unit's medical escort will accompany the individual and the DTRA escort and stay with them at the local facility until care is rendered. The host unit should be prepared to accommodate a national escort (DTRA) to accompany the individual should evacuation be necessary. The military medical staff will coordinate care with the civilian facility as required. The DTRA Escort Team Chief shall be kept apprised of the patient's condition and treatment at all times. (T-2)

6.7.3. Transportation to an appropriate Point of Exit (POX), if required, shall be accomplished via usual air evacuation procedures after coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief and Russian Inspection Team Chief. (T-2)

6.7.4. Arrangements for mortuary services shall be in accordance with Air Force regulations, local and state laws, foreign preferences, and in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-0)

6.7.5. All medical care provided by USAF through military personnel or facilities to a non-U.S. citizen affiliated with NST inspection activities shall be billed according to any relevant agreements with the sending state, to the extent these are in effect where the care was provided. Any medical care not covered by agreement with the sending state shall be billed to DTRA. (T-1)

6.8. Lodging and Dining.

6.8.1. Host unit TCOs shall coordinate lodging and dining requirements/desires with the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-2)

6.8.2. DTRA preference for lodging NST teams is on-base or in a single off-base hotel that can accommodate both the entire U.S. escort and Russian inspection teams. Coordination for off-base lodging, if arranged by the host-unit TCO, shall be through the base Lodging Office. (T-2)

6.8.3. In the event of a threat situation, lodging will likely be arranged in on-base facilities. This may involve creativity due to the short notice nature of NST activities and the relatively large size of the escort and inspection teams.

6.8.4. For on-base lodging, certain precautionary measures may be taken in preparing the rooms, but extraordinary measures are not necessarily appropriate. The TCO should coordinate with the DTRA Escort Team Chief regarding requirements for lodging (such as housekeeping services, telephones, security protection and availability of a 24-hour on-site contact).

6.8.5. Local travel shall be reimbursed IAW wing/unit local travel instructions. (T-2)

6.8.6. Meals, both on- and off-base, shall be coordinated between the TCO and the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-2)

6.8.7. DTRA Escort Team members will pay for their own accommodations and meals, while the DTRA Escort Team Class "A" Agent will pay for the Russian inspection team members. (T-2)

6.8.8. Local escort personnel on a meal card must follow guidance in the DFAS-DE Manual 7073-1. (T-0)

6.8.9. The TCO should work with the DTRA Escort Team for box lunch arrangements if requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Payment for box lunches will typically be in advance. The TCO will coordinate with the DTRA Escort Team to accommodate this payment. (T-2)

6.9. Transportation.

6.9.1. Host unit TCO will coordinate transportation requirements with the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-2)

6.9.1.1. NST activities are conducted on a strict timeline. Transportation must account for road closures, base gate security procedures, and traffic situations to ensure adherence to this timeline. Transportation will account for weather delays and unanticipated events as best they can, and the NST activity will have to accommodate these situations. (T-2)

6.9.1.2. The TCO should attempt to accommodate the DTRA Escort Team Chief's requests for transportation support for off-base and cultural activities for the Russian inspection team as much as practical, within existing policies/guidelines/restrictions. In cases where Wing Commander approval is required for the type of activity or location, the TCO will facilitate that request. (T-2)

6.9.2. The number and size of vehicles required shall be determined by the activities being performed.

6.9.2.1. For initial arrival, departure and movement to/from lodging for the first/last time, a separate van or truck for luggage/equipment should be provided, if necessary.

6.9.2.2. For full team movements, such as to cultural events, a VIP coach/bus may be appropriate.

6.9.3. A cadre of qualified drivers will need to be available for the duration of the NST activity. (T-2)

BURTON M. FIELD, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Operations, Plans & Requirements

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

DoD Directive 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, January 9, 2001 (certified current as of November 24, 2003)

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Air Force Instruction 16-603, *Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, 25 January 2011

Air Force Instruction 65-601, Vol. 1, *Budget Guidance and Procedures*, August 2012

Air Force Instruction 65-603, *Official Representation Funds-Guidance and Procedures*, 17 February 2004

Air Force Manual 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008

USD(AT&L) Memo, *Planning Guidance for New START Treaty Compliance*, 2 August 2010

New START Treaty Reporting Workbook, 13 February 2013

Adopted Forms

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC—Air Combat Command

ACES—Arms Control Enterprise System

AETC—Air Education and Training Command

AF—Air Force

AF/A1—Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel & Services

AF/A2—Air Staff Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Directorate

AF/A3/5—Air Staff Operations, Plans and Requirements Directorate

AF/A4/7—Air Staff Logistics, Installations and Mission Support Directorate

AF/A5XP—Air Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Division

AF/A8—Air Staff Strategic Plans and Programs Directorate

AF/A9—Air Staff Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Directorate

AF/A10—Air Staff Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office Directorate

AF/JA—Air Force Judge Advocate General

AFCN—Air Force Central Node

AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFSOC—Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSPC—Air Force Space Command
AMC—Air Mobility Command
BCC—Bilateral Consultative Commission
COMSEC—Communications Security
CRG—Compliance Review Group
DoD—Department of Defense
DOS—Department of State
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DV—Distinguished Visitor
EAL—Entry Access Lists
EIF—Entry Into Force
FDF—Formerly Declared Facility
FMR—Financial Management Regulation
HAF—Headquarters Air Force
IAW—In Accordance With
ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAJCOM—Major Command
NCO—Non-Commissioned Officer
NGB—National Guard Bureau
NST—New START Treaty
NST IWG—New START Treaty Implementation Working Group
NTM—National Technical Means
O&M—Operations & Maintenance
OPSEC—Operations Security
ORF—Official Representation Funds
PA—Public Affairs
PACAF—Pacific Air Forces
PE—Program Element
PEM—Program Element Monitor
PK—Peacekeeper

POE—Point of Entry

POX—Point of Exit

RDE—Radiation Detection Equipment

SAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SAF/AAZ—Air Force Special Access Program Central Office

SAF/AQ—Air Force Acquisition

SAF/GC—Air Force General Counsel

SAF/GCI—Air Force General Counsel, International Affairs

SAF/PA—Air Force Public Affairs

SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SSBNs—Ballistic Missile Submarines

TCO—Treaty Compliance Officer

TDY—Temporary Duty

UID—Unique Identifier

USAF—United States Air Force

USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe

USD(P)—Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

USD(AT&L)— - Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

USG—United States Government

VIP—Very Important Person

Terms

For a full list of NST terms and their definitions— Refer to the NST Protocol, Part 1.

Attachment 2

COMPONENTS OF COMPLIANCE PLAN

A2.1. The wing/unit NST compliance plan should include (but is not limited to) base support procedures, escort requirements, notifications and reports, procedures to notify local personnel and affected organizations, security provisions, billeting and transportation requirements, protocol and public affairs procedures.

A2.2. An important component of the compliance plan is the base activity checklists, which are needed for recording required actions. The NST compliance plan identifies offices/organizations responsible for providing logistics support to the visiting escort and inspection teams. The final plan should include a list showing all tasked organizations including other tenant organizations.

A2.3. Suggested components of a compliance plan:

A2.3.1. Force Support. This includes lodging, dining, and mortuary services. Lodging and dining arrangements will always need to be planned in advance. Consult with the DTRA START/Nuclear Division for lodging requirements.

A2.3.2. Security. This section needs to include high and low threat security procedures for escorts, guards, inspector entry into controlled areas, operations security (OPSEC), and communications security (COMSEC). (**Note:** Inspectors must not view normal security procedures.)

A2.3.2.1. If a known threat to the inspection is recognized, high threat options will be imposed. These could include measures such as posting guards and implementing entry control points requiring Entry Access Lists (EAL) granting the escort and inspection teams and local escorts authorized access to inspection sites and support facilities. Low threat options may allow implementation of normal distinguished visitor procedures.

A2.3.2.2. OPSEC procedures such as limiting access and controlling travel routes should be included. Weapons handling and storage areas, flight lines and other areas of sensitive operations must be protected.

A2.3.2.3. COMSEC concerns, e.g. how inspectors are allowed to communicate with their Embassy/consulate, must be included in your preparations. For example, have local escorts work with the DTRA Escort Team to establish appropriate communications links for use by inspectors.

A2.3.3. Medical. Arrangements for emergency/non-elective medical treatment of mission team members must be included. DTRA is responsible for the cost of all medical treatments and is billed accordingly.

A2.3.4. Communications. This section must include public address systems for ceremonies/briefings, contact between local escorts, methods for inspectors to contact their Embassies, contact between inspection team subgroups, or other treaty-specific items.

A2.3.5. Transportation. All personnel transportation requirements, arrival through departure, and equipment/baggage handling to include special handling instructions for inspection equipment are included in this section. The TCO will attempt to accommodate the DTRA Escort Team Chief's requests for support of transportation for off-base and cultural activities

for the Russian inspection team, within existing guidelines/restrictions. In cases where Wing Commander approval is required for the type of activity or location, the TCO will facilitate that request.

A2.3.6. Funding. Considerations include specific billing and payment procedures. Ensure the DTRA Escort Team Chief, or his/her designated liaison, knows what is required in advance. Coordinate with base activities for items DTRA may request to accomplish their responsibilities. Coordinate with the MAJCOM TCO and PEM, preferably in advance of incurring expenses, for reimbursement of expenses not paid by DTRA, or that DTRA will not pay. If DTRA is not able to fund a TCO request, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) dollars may be pursued at the discretion of the local wing/unit commander as long as the requirement is authorized IAW financial regulations.

A2.3.7. Public Affairs. Clearly established ground rules on control of media movement and actions are necessary to prevent interference with inspections. The USG and DoD posture for NST inspections is "passive." A "passive posture" means TCOs can respond to inquiries, but not actively promote media activities. The NST limits mass media coverage of inspection activities to the point of entry. Any public affairs activity, including photography (e.g., team photo), at an inspection facility shall be pre-coordinated with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

A2.3.8. Personnel. Personnel include base escorts, facility managers, baggage details, measurement teams, weapon load teams and inspection support staff. Support staffs are individuals working real-time contingencies while the treaty office is busy with inspectors; support staff should have a representative from each key support and inspection organization.

A2.3.9. Training. TCOs are responsible for ensuring all base players in an NST activity are well trained and able to perform their duties, including suitability of local escorts. Not everyone is suited to perform escort duties. While no specific certification is required, TCOs should ensure experienced, mature individuals are selected. At the discretion of the unit TCO, select senior airmen, NCOs, senior NCOs, officers, or civilians will be used as local escorts. Commander support in maintaining the required number of trained escorts is very important. In most cases, periodic refresher training is desirable and necessary. At other times, just-in-time training of local personnel may be all a base can complete due to limited availability of personnel. Bases should have a goal of maintaining a pool of trained personnel, as continuity promotes a high level of efficiency and support for complying with treaty procedures.

A2.3.10. Safety/Security. Upon arrival at a host airfield the TCO must present a safety/security briefing to the visiting DTRA escort and Russian inspection teams. This briefing shall be conducted as part of the Treaty-mandated pre-inspection procedures. The briefing should be adapted to the local environment and should provide a perspective of the base and facilities to be used by the teams, weather conditions the teams should expect, base security policies, escort procedures and local policies, and whom to contact should any visiting person need assistance. The briefing must be developed in advance and coordinated with AF/A5XP. (**Note:** The TCO shall apply the same safety/security procedures to the Russian inspection teams, DTRA Escort Teams and local escorts.)

A2.3.11. Prohibited Activity. Identification of any prohibited activity during an NST escort mission at an inspectable facility shall be in accordance with USG, DoD, and/or Air Force

policy/guidance and shall be the responsibility of the DTRA Escort Team, supported by the wing/unit TCO, in direct support of treaty compliance.

A2.3.12. Protocol. If requested, protocol will assist the TCO in making arrangements for distinguished visitors (DVs), arranging off-base meals, hosting reception and departure functions, closing ceremonies, and memento exchanges.

A2.3.13. Cultural Activities. At the DTRA Escort Team Chief's request, pre-coordinate and facilitate leisure activities such as tours, shopping, and recreational opportunities. Work with affected support services: Transportation, Base Exchange, Commissary, Recreational Services and affected civilian establishments. The participation of wing/unit personnel in cultural activities is at the discretion of the DTRA Escort Team Chief, the wing/unit commander, and the wing/unit TCO.