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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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VOLUME 1**



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Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control

***PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE
OPERATIONS***

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction replaces AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*, and implements AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*, and is consistent with AFPD 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*, and portions of AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, and T.O. 11N-45-51 series, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*. It establishes the requirements and guidance for wartime and peacetime logistic airlift of DoD nuclear and nuclear-related cargo. This AFI may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this publication must be routed to AMC/A3N for coordination prior to certification and approval. It applies to all personnel, especially planners, aircrews, controllers, security forces and maintenance personnel, involved in nuclear airlift and wartime/peacetime nuclear logistics movements. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) does not apply to the ANG and AFRC. PNAF shoring kit requirements are detailed in AMCI 24-101, Vol 11, *Cargo and Mail Policy*.

Submit suggested improvements to this instruction on AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, through MAJCOM channels to AMC/A3N, 402 Scott Drive, Unit 3A1, Scott AFB, IL, 62225-5302 or by email to AMC.A3N@amc.af.mil.

This publication requires the collection and or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act (PA) of 1974. The authorities to collect and or maintain the records prescribed in this publication are Title 37 *United States Code*, Section 301a and Executive Order 9397, *Numbering System for Federal Accounts Relating T.O. Individual Persons*, November 22, 1943 and *E.O. 9397 (SSN)* as amended by Executive Order 13478, Amendments to Executive Order

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Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1. Objective. Guidance contained in Volume 2, 3, and 4 of this instruction series is written exclusive of each other based upon the mission to be executed. Specifically, guidance from one of these Volumes does not apply to any of the other Volumes. This Volume prescribes the organization and basic guidance for planning, scheduling, controlling, executing, and supporting nuclear cargo airlift Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM). It includes standard procedures to be used by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) aircrews, maintenance personnel, and all other entities supporting a PNAF mission.

1.2. Key Words Explained

- 1.2.1. "Will" and "shall" indicate a mandatory requirement.
- 1.2.2. "Should" is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.
- 1.2.3. "May" indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.
- 1.2.4. "Note" indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., which are considered essential to emphasize.

1.3. Responsibilities. AMC, Nuclear Operations Division (AMC/A3N), is the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this instruction. Unless otherwise specified in cited source references, AMC/A3 is the waiver authority for the procedures unique to this publication and 18 AF/CC is the authority for specified mission planning and execution waivers.

1.4. Distribution. The following individuals and agencies associated with supporting or executing nuclear airlift operations will maintain a copy of this instruction:

- 1.4.1. Commanders of nuclear capable logistics units (PNAF/ Munitions Squadron (MUNS)/ Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS)).
- 1.4.2. Operations, logistics, and safety staff agencies.
- 1.4.3. Security Forces units.
- 1.4.4. PNAF airlift squadron(s)/units.
- 1.4.5. Each individual PNAF aircrew member.
- 1.4.6. Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) for nuclear accounts.
- 1.4.7. Custodial unit Civil Engineering, Readiness and Emergency Management, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units.
- 1.4.8. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) and applicable nuclear MAJCOM IGs.

1.5. Protecting Classified Information.

- 1.5.1. Use caution at all times to avoid compromising classified information. Adhere to all available classification guidance.

1.5.2. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy, CG-W-5, *Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide*, TCG-WPMU-2, *Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Weapon Production and Military Use*, Airlift Request, Mission Setup Message, and nuclear transportation technical orders govern the classification of nuclear mission information. Restricted data and formerly restricted data are not normally releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN). Do not send this type of information to any agency (civilian or military) of a foreign government unless directed to do so by an authoritative publication such as the SWOG.

1.5.3. Do not use terms in unclassified text that reveals nuclear or classified cargo is aboard a specific aircraft or mission or at a specific location.

1.5.4. Do not talk around classified information. Use only the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name when discussing a particular mission in unclassified media or via open lines. Do not use the term "PNAF" or "special weapons mission" in conjunction with the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name. Do not associate line numbers with any of the shipping information that reveals actual nuclear cargo data (e.g., nuclear cargo or package name, net explosive weight (NEW), dimensions, or weight).

1.5.5. Do not talk about any aspect of a PNAF SAAM unless the other person has an appropriate security clearance and a definite need-to-know. This applies even after a mission is complete.

1.6. Releasing Information. Only appropriate commanders and public affairs officers may release information about nuclear mishaps to the public or news media. Public Affairs will ensure timely and uniform implementation of DoD approved policies as referenced in DoDI 5400.13, *Public Affairs Operations*, and AFI 35-104, *Media Operations*, to establish and conduct efficient and effective procedures for the release of nuclear activity information to the public, including news media (domestic, international), to include nuclear operations, accidents, IND incidents, or nuclear weapon significant incidents.

1.7. Nuclear Transportation Working Group and PNAF Working Group

1.7.1. Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG).

1.7.1.1. IAW DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons* and AFPD 21-2, *Munitions*, the NTWG provides a forum to resolve issues pertaining to efficient, safe, and secure transportation of nuclear cargo.

1.7.1.2. AF/A10 is the service lead to this meeting in order to present the Air Force position on NTWG agenda items as well as discuss current topics involving Air Force nuclear transportation issues.

1.7.1.3. AF/A10 will limit participation from MAJCOM, Air and Space Operations Center (AOC), and Unit personnel to the minimum deemed necessary to support discussions on specific issues. Agencies will be invited by AF/A10 as necessary.

1.7.2. PNAF Working Group (PWG)

1.7.2.1. This action officer-level forum provides a venue to vet issues, enhance cross-organizational communication, and a means to formally coordinate a standardized Air Force position ahead of discussions with other agencies.

1.7.2.2. The PWG will meet the day prior to the Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG), semi-annually, or as required.

1.7.2.3. AF/A10-O will chair this action officer-level meeting to establish the Air Force position on NTWG agenda items as well as address current topics involving the PNAF mission.

1.7.2.4. AF/A10-O will direct membership from HAF, AMC, USAFE, AFGSC, and AFMC. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center/Nuclear Weapons Logistic Division (AFNWC/NCL), as service logistics agent, 618 AOC (TACC) (*also known as "Tanker Airlift Control Center" or "TACC"*), as central planning node, and AF/A5XP, Foreign Clearance Program (FCP) Office, as foreign clearance office, will be permanent invited observers. Other agencies will be invited as necessary. AF/A10-O PWG OPR will approve attendees.

1.7.2.5. Topics for the PWG will include, but are not limited to: NTWG agenda items, projected movements, Logistic Movement inspection trends, and Policy Updates at HAF/DoD/CJCS level. Other topics may be added with approval by AF/A10-O.

1.7.2.6. AF/A10-OA, Aircraft Nuclear Operations Branch will act as executive secretary to hold and follow up on action items.

1.8. Nuclear Airlift Monitor (NAM).

1.8.1. MAJCOM NAM. MAJCOMs tasked with oversight responsibilities of certified PNAF-capable unit(s) will maintain a NAM function on their headquarters staff.

1.8.1.1. The MAJCOM NAM manages and implements nuclear airlift policies and procedures for the Command.

1.8.1.2. The MAJCOM NAM continuously monitors and evaluates nuclear airlift guidance, making improvements as required, and collaborates with subordinate units and other nuclear agencies in developing and approving DoD nuclear-related regulations and policies.

1.8.1.3. The AMC NAM (AMC/A3NA), in coordination with the Headquarters Air Force functional (AF/A10-O) and the AMC Nuclear Surety Manager (NSM) (AMC/SEW), represents the USAF and AMC at DoD and Joint meetings pertaining to nuclear airlift and provides technical advice to staff agencies and AMC aircrews on procedures regarding nuclear cargo loading, equipment, or airlift.

1.8.2. PNAF Unit NAM. PNAF certified nuclear capable units will maintain a NAM function within their staff.

1.8.2.1. The PNAF Unit NAM officer is established to manage and implement nuclear airlift policies and procedures for the unit, ensure proper crew/personnel training, currency, and qualification, and develop crew makeup for each PNAF SAAM and Training mission.

1.8.2.2. The Unit NAM continuously monitors and evaluates nuclear airlift guidance, recommending improvements as required, and collaborates with the MAJCOM NAM and other nuclear agencies in developing other DoD nuclear-related regulations and policies.

1.8.2.3. Selection. The commander of each PNAF squadron/unit will select and assign an officer to this duty.

1.8.2.4. Duties include, but are not limited to:

1.8.2.4.1. Prepare the predeparture briefing for aircrews.

1.8.2.4.2. Debrief Aircraft Commanders.

1.8.2.4.2.1. Document and maintain file copies of post mission debriefs for 1 year.

1.8.2.4.2.2. Provide copies of mission debriefs to AMC/A3N within 14 calendar days of mission completion.

1.8.2.4.3. Review and process Special Assignment Airlift Mission Reports (SAAMREPs).

1.8.2.4.4. Maintain PNAF mission kits.

1.8.2.4.5. Management of PNAF crews (training, scheduling, upgrades, etc.).

1.8.2.4.6. Attend wing Nuclear Surety Working Group (NSWG) and Nuclear Surety Council (NSC) meetings.

1.8.2.4.7. Maintain file copies of completed DD Forms 1911 on file for 6 months.

1.8.2.4.8. Send AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*, to the wing Nuclear Surety Manager (NSM) after review.

1.8.2.4.8.1. Provide copies of the AF Form 527F to AMC/SEW and A3N within 14 days of mission completion.

1.9. PNAF Safety Rules.

1.9.1. Per DoDD 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, general safety rules apply to all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems. Safety rules always apply, even during war.

1.9.2. PNAF missions will comply with AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*. Refer to AFI 91-115 for a complete list of safety rules and accepted deviations allowed during emergency situations.

1.10. Logistics Movement and Handling of Nuclear Cargo.

1.10.1. PNAF is the aircraft and aircrews that provide peacetime logistical airlift support for the movement of nuclear cargo or nuclear components.

1.10.2. Nuclear weapons security rules apply at all times. Refer to DoD S-5210.41-M, *DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, and AFMAN 31-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, for a complete list of security rules, accepted waivers, and deviations allowed.

1.10.3. DoD nuclear cargo and Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Special Nuclear Material (SNM) will not be combined on the same mission.

1.10.4. All nuclear cargo air movements will be made with qualified PNAF aircrews unless waived or directed by SECDEF.

1.10.5. Additional landings with nuclear cargo aboard will not be made for the sole purpose of loading or offloading DoD nuclear-related or general cargo.

1.10.6. DoD nuclear-related cargo should be consolidated with established nuclear cargo SAAMs when possible. If unable, a SAAM equal to the appropriate priority will be established.

1.11. Aircrew Operational Reports. The reporting requirements in this instruction are exempt from licensing IAW AFI 33-324, *The Information Collections and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections*.

1.12. Mission Tasking. All nuclear airlift missions will be processed through established USTRANSCOM SAAM requirements and 618 AOC (TACC) tasking procedures.

1.12.1. In addition to the SAAM request to USTRANSCOM, the AFNWC/NCL will provide an Airlift Request to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD.

1.12.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD, will validate all nuclear Airlift Requests.

1.12.3. 618 AOC (TACC) will task the appropriate unit(s) to execute the nuclear airlift mission.

1.12.4. AFNWC/NCL will provide AMC/A3N with a PNAF capabilities and support memorandum annually. This request will allow PNAF unit to plan accordingly.

Chapter 2

MISSION MANAGEMENT

2.1. General. This Chapter provides guidance in planning and scheduling nuclear airlift missions. OPSEC is essential at all times and in all mission correspondence. Nuclear airlift mission success relies upon reliable, qualified, and prepared aircrews and support personnel during all phases of a mission (from planning through execution). As a critical function of reliability, crew morale is essential to enduring nuclear airlift mission success.

2.2. Planning and Scheduling Criteria. Nuclear surety, national security, and mission compliance with Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSR) are the most important considerations when scheduling a mission.

2.2.1. Deliver nuclear cargo by the most efficient route to minimize the number of landings and handling of nuclear cargo.

2.2.1.1. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)* applies.

2.2.1.2. Missions transporting nuclear cargo must be planned and executed to avoid heavily populated areas to the maximum extent possible. This consideration must not cause such an additive amount of time to generate additional air refueling or crew requirements.

2.2.2. Mission planners, squadron/unit Nuclear Airlift Monitor (NAM), aircrew, shipper, and receiver personnel will coordinate on all scheduled operations and sequences of events.

2.2.3. Plan missions to ensure onloading and offloading of nuclear cargo, ground crew operations, and convoy movement times occur during daylight hours. Exceptions to this policy must be approved by the US installation wing commander, or for MUNSS locations, MUNSS commander and host nation installation commander.

2.2.4. To avoid overloading host base security and support agencies, do not normally schedule more than one nuclear-laden aircraft to transit the same airfield each day. More than one mission a day may only be scheduled if approved by the US installation wing commander, or for MUNSS locations, MUNSS commander and host nation installation commander.

2.2.5. Mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Replacing, Staging, and Swapping sequence of events (SOE) and procedures for a particular mission. See paragraph 2.12 for additional execution guidance.

2.2.6. Aircrew scheduling requirements/limits in AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3, *C-17 Operations Procedures*, and this Volume of this instruction apply. Due to the critical importance of safely transporting nuclear cargo, the portion of any mission from the beginning of Crew Duty Day (CDD) until the aircrew is no longer required per DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, is further restricted as follows:

2.2.6.1. When nuclear cargo is airlifted, all PNAF duties will be accomplished within the PNAF CDD. When PNAF duties are complete or the PNAF CDD has expired, aircrew

may only perform non-nuclear ground/flight duties within the remaining Crew Duty Time (CDT) IAW AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3.

2.2.6.1.1. Basic PNAF CDD. Limited to 16+00 hours (regardless of crew composition).

2.2.6.1.2. Augmented PNAF CDD. Limited to 20+00 hours for missions scheduled for aerial refueling (A/R) or a C17 mission using the extended range tank in lieu of an A/R. If a scheduled A/R is canceled after crew alert and the crew was alerted for a 20-hour crew duty day, PNAF CDD will not exceed 20+00 hours.

2.2.6.2. Basic and Augmented PNAF CDDs include ground time for loading and offloading of nuclear cargo and terminates when the aircrew is no longer required per DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. Additionally, the operating crew must develop a work-rest plan to mitigate Operational Risk Management (ORM) factors.

2.2.6.3. The 18 AF/CC is the waiver authority for PNAF scheduling requirements and CDD limits associated with this instruction. Waivers may be requested by either the operating wing or the 618 AOC (TACC).

2.2.6.4. Ensure adequate ground time is available for proper crew rest prior to executing a nuclear airlift mission segment.

2.2.6.4.1. Before home station departure or crew replacement, stage, or swap, crew duty periods will not exceed 16+00 hours unless crews are afforded a minimum of 24+00 hours ground time prior to alerting for a nuclear airlift mission.

2.2.6.4.2. During non-nuclear PNAF mission segments (no nuclear or nuclear-related cargo transported, unloaded, or offloaded), CDT will be IAW AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3. These segments will not be planned to exceed a basic 16+00 hour CDD unless ground time at the nuclear loading location is at least 24+00 hours prior to executing a nuclear PNAF mission segment.

2.2.6.5. Ground Operations. Required ground operations vary greatly depending upon the cargo type, quantity, and overall complexity of the operation. Therefore, planners will develop the mission itinerary with detailed input from the operating squadron/unit prior to publishing the Mission Setup Message.

2.2.6.5.1. Remain Over Night (RON). Aircrew fatigue and morale have immeasurable impacts on nuclear surety. Crew rest locations should be selected not only for mission requirements, but also to provide a suitable atmosphere for crew rest.

2.2.6.5.2. To ensure crew and installation support personnel are focused solely upon the offload operation, PNAF missions will normally be scheduled to crew rest at the conclusion of a nuclear airlift segment. **Note:** If custodial installation aircraft support is inadequate for RON conditions between offload and onload operations, a repositioning leg is authorized to a suitable installation.

2.2.6.5.2.1. Normal ground time between arrival and departure is 17+15 hours. If both an offload upon arrival and onload prior to departure are scheduled, ground time should be a minimum of 20+15 hours. Planners may adjust ground time to satisfy known mission requirements, but ground time will never be less than 16+30 hours.

2.2.6.5.2.2. PNAF missions carrying nuclear cargo will not be scheduled to RON at an en route location. With the exception of emergency divert situations, nuclear cargo laden aircraft will only RON at installations with adequate support.

2.2.6.5.2.3. USAFE/A3/10 approval is required to RON with nuclear cargo aboard (Hot RON) in the USAFE Area of Responsibility (AOR).

2.2.6.5.2.4. Refer to the SWOG for additional RON guidance.

2.2.6.5.3. En route Stop (Non-RON). Normal ground time for loading and offloading is 3+15 hours. Planners must adjust this time based on the type and quantity of cargo being transported, ground support available, and anticipated complexity of on/offload procedures. Do not pad ground or flight times to avoid delays or cut times to remain within PNAF CDD constraints.

2.2.6.6. Pre/Depositioning Mission Segments.

2.2.6.6.1. PNAF missions will not be planned to flow from or into another equal or higher priority mission without approval of the 18 AF/CC.

2.2.6.6.2. Due to stringent maintenance preparation for mission aircraft, schedule only the minimum number of legs required to position the aircraft at its onload location. If a stop is planned, it must be at an en route station able to provide suitable support if necessary.

2.2.6.6.3. PNAF missions will be scheduled to crew rest at the conclusion of a nuclear airlift mission prior to returning to home station or other follow on non-nuclear mission tasking. The PNAF Aircraft Commander may request a quick turn or an early return to home station through normal channels.

2.2.6.6.4. On depositioning legs without nuclear or nuclear-related cargo, the operating airlift wing may return the aircraft and crew to home station on training time. If the operating wing elects to operate on training time, aircrews will coordinate their intentions with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC prior to their depositioning leg. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners will not recut the mission, but must be notified, and a change to the Mission Setup Message will not be made. When requested by the operating mission wing, training time should be planned into Mission Setup Message prior to mission launch from home station to minimize coordination efforts during the nuclear airlift-tasked portion of the mission.

2.2.7. Schedulers, planners, and operating crews must also consider the following:

2.2.7.1. DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil> or <http://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil>, which also includes a Classified Supplement.

2.2.7.2. Host military command restrictions.

2.2.7.3. Airfield restrictions, operating hours, Prior Permission Required (PPR), etc.

2.2.7.4. User capability (hours of operation, security, etc.).

2.2.7.5. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

2.2.7.6. Deconflict mission itinerary with non-support messages IAW AFI 21-203, *Nuclear Accountability Procedures*.

2.2.7.7. Planning considerations found in DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of US Nuclear Weapons*.

2.3. Air Refueling (A/R).

2.3.1. A/R should be planned to reduce ground exposure of nuclear cargo at bases without established authorized weapons storage areas (WSA) and to avoid the increased safety and security risks inherent in additional approaches, landings, takeoffs, and departures. Plan these missions to be accomplished non-stop between onload and offload installations. PNAF missions will only A/R when necessary to make destinations and suitable alternates with required contingency fuel.

2.3.2. Mission planners will coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOKS for tanker support. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOPSA will coordinate altitude reservations with the appropriate altitude reservation facility. Plan a backup 24-hour slip in tanker support and altitude reservations, if applicable.

2.3.2.1. Include the following information in the tanker request and A/R supplement:

2.3.2.1.1. Airborne or manned ground spares for each primary tanker.

2.3.2.1.1.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD mission planners will determine the best option to meet the requirements of that particular mission segment. The mission planners will coordinate the information with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOKS for planning. If an airborne spare is used, the spare might not be required to offload fuel.

2.3.2.1.1.2. A/R planners should coordinate spare tankers at a separate location outside the primary's weather pattern. 618 AOC (TACC)/DDO3 will ensure notifications, restrictions, and requirements are passed to the operating tanker wing(s).

2.3.2.1.1.3. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD mission planners will provide the operating tanker crew a briefing concerning mission OPSEC, SWOG routing, and other relevant restrictions via secure means.

2.3.2.1.1.4. To minimize en route times and CDD, use single primary and alternate tankers for each planned A/R to the maximum extent possible. Mission planners and tanker units will only split the planned offload of fuel across multiple tankers if a single tanker is incapable of providing all the total required fuel.

2.3.2.1.1.5. A single KC-10 tanker may backup two KC-135 tankers if the offload is sufficient and does not exceed A/R performance charts. A different refueling altitude and routing along the altitude reservation (ALTRV) or A/R track may need to be coordinated and approved before substituting a KC-135 with a KC-10.

2.3.2.1.2. SWOG restrictions apply to the tanker(s) when refueling.

2.3.3. To prepare for the unlikely event of an unsuccessful A/R, PNAF support bases and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations identified in the Mission Setup Message will stand by to support emergency diverts until released by 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC.

2.3.3.1. Ensure the pre-coordinated emergency divert location is prepared to receive a nuclear-laden aircraft in the event of an emergency divert. Wing commanders at these designated bases will ensure the capability to provide security for potential emergency divers of nuclear-laden aircraft IAW the Mission Setup Message and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. Should the A/R be aborted, 618 AOC (TACC) will notify the pre-coordinated emergency divert location and confirm host nation notification/coordination.

2.3.3.2. Do not attempt to contact the crew in flight to determine successful completion of the A/R unless no message has been received from the crew after 15 minutes past the anticipated completion of the air refueling. Contact the crew if a high priority message or emergency order must immediately be transmitted. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners or XOCG will notify the appropriate pre-coordinated emergency divert location and release ground support personnel after the A/R is successfully completed.

2.3.4. If the Aircraft Commander determines at any time that the planned A/R is not necessary, they must cancel A/R at the earliest opportunity. The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

2.3.5. A/R over open ocean areas at least 12 nautical miles (NM) off shore.

2.3.5.1. The A/R must be accomplished as safely, efficiently, and expediently as possible.

2.3.5.1.1. Accomplish only those maneuvers required for transferring the mission required fuel. Example: Receiving the required onload from the primary tanker only. Additional events during A/R beyond those necessary to onload required fuel, including training by tanker and/or receiver crews, are prohibited at all times.

2.3.5.1.2. Do not conduct A/R upgrade training on missions carrying nuclear cargo.

2.3.5.1.3. If the PNAF Aircraft Commander is a current Instructor or Evaluator in the aircraft, they may refuel from either seat, regardless of who is occupying the other seat.

2.3.5.2. Current and qualified PNAF Aircraft Commander certified pilots may perform air refueling on nuclear cargo-laden missions, provided the designated PNAF mission Aircraft Commander is occupying the other seat.

2.3.6. The Aircraft Commander will provide the post-A/R report to the controlling C2 cell via appropriate means within 15 minutes after completing an A/R.

2.3.7. To minimize crew fatigue and negative nuclear surety implications, aircrews will only accomplish one offload of nuclear cargo after an A/R segment.

2.4. Mission Planning/Coordination.

2.4.1. Cargo Clearances. The AFNWC/NCL will transmit cargo clearance requests as required by the SWOG. A copy of the request will be forwarded to the 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners.

2.4.2. Overflight Clearances. Mission planners will coordinate overflight clearances as required by the SWOG and country specific Letters of Understanding.

2.4.3. Diplomatic Clearances. Mission planners will coordinate Diplomatic Clearances as required by the SWOG and the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide.

2.4.4. Plan nuclear airlift mission itineraries with the utmost care. Consider factors such as weather, routing, overflight rights, suitable alternate/emergency airfields, host base capabilities, anticipated onload/offload times, fuel requirements, CDT, PNAF CDD, and aircrew fatigue factors. Refer to the SWOG for additional information.

2.4.5. An initial “soft” itinerary will be transmitted to applicable units approximately 30 days prior to mission execution. Units will acknowledge and provide required responses within 3 duty days of receipt.

2.5. Mission Setup Message (Content, Classification, and Distribution).

2.5.1. Mission planners will prepare a classified Mission Setup Message for all missions transporting nuclear cargo. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners will send Setup Message at least 15-calendar days before home station departure. (See Attachment 3 for a sample message). Support requirements will be coordinated by secure means at all times.

2.5.2. The classified Mission Setup Message is the sole source of mission information to users and host bases.

2.5.3. Mission Setup Messages will be classified according to mission destinations, overflight classification designated by the SWOG, or the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy.

2.5.3.1. PART I will be unclassified.

2.5.3.2. PART II will be classified. All paragraph classifications will be marked in accordance with DoDM 5200.01, Vol 2.

2.5.4. At a minimum, the Mission Setup Message will contain the following information:

2.5.4.1. PART I *Unclassified*

2.5.4.1.1. SAAM Number.

2.5.4.1.2. Mission Itinerary.

2.5.4.2. PART II *Classified*

2.5.4.2.1. Hazardous Cargo Information. Use T.O. 11N-20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Material Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations*, line numbers (including LLCs and trainers). For items not listed in T.O. 11N-20-11 include hazardous cargo information required by AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*.

2.5.4.2.2. Security Requirements

2.5.4.2.3. Specific station requirements. To preclude misunderstanding by host base support personnel, special requirements will be written in plain language with a clear and detailed description of the sequence of ground operations.

2.5.4.2.4. PNAF Courier Officer Listing

2.5.4.3. Information may be added or modified as long as messages are in standard format (Attachment 3).

2.5.5. Distribution of Mission Setup Message

2.5.5.1. Mission Setup Messages will be distributed to the operating unit, all stations (including pre-coordinated emergency divert locations) identified on the mission itinerary, Command and Control entities, participating MAJCOMs and COCOMs, Air Force, Joint Staff, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

2.5.5.2. Requests to receive Mission Setup Messages should be made to AMC/A3N.

2.5.5.2.1. Approved requests will be forwarded to 618 AOC/XOOOD with the correct SIPR organizational and/or individual email addresses.

2.5.5.2.2. Organizations or individuals approved for receipt of the Mission Setup Message will annually validate approval by the end of each fiscal year (FYXX) with the applicable MAJCOM.

2.5.6. Mission Setup Message (Station Support Requirements Acknowledgement and 24-Hour Confirmation):

2.5.6.1. All stations listed on the mission itinerary will send an acknowledgement of ability to support/non-support the mission itinerary and/or the applicable special requirements listed in Part II of the Mission Setup Message.

2.5.6.1.1. The Acknowledgement of Station Support Requirements message will use a standard format. (AF Form 527D)

2.5.6.1.2. Paragraph 7 of the Mission Setup Message will state when acknowledgement needs to be received by the mission planners, operational unit, and the 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2. Mission planners will provide three working days for stations to send an acknowledgement to an original Mission Setup Message.

2.5.6.1.3. A station only needs to send acknowledgement for the most current Mission Setup Message, i.e., when a change to a Mission Setup Message is released before a station has sent the acknowledgement for the previous message.

2.5.6.2. A 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will be sent by all en route stations and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations as listed in the mission itinerary. A station with multiple itinerary entries on the same day can be combined on one 24-Hour message. A station with a single entry spanning two consecutive days and no additional entries on the second day need only send one 24-Hour message.

2.5.6.2.1. The 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will use a standard format. (AF Form 527E)

2.5.6.2.2. The 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will be sent to the mission planners, operational unit, and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 no later than 24-Hours prior to station arrival. If 24-Hours prior falls on a non-duty days then the message will be sent the first duty day prior. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 will make a final voice confirmation of support from the 24-Hour POC listed on the acknowledgement and confirmation messages.

2.5.6.2.3. A station only needs to send a 24-Hour Confirmation of Support message for the most current Mission Setup Message, i.e., when a change to a Mission Setup

Message is released before a station has sent the 24-Hour Confirmation for the previous message.

2.6. Changes to Mission Setup Message.

2.6.1. Changes to Mission Setup Messages must be kept to a minimum. Should changes be absolutely necessary the following guidance will apply:

2.6.1.1. All changes will be coordinated and distributed IAW paragraph 2.5.5. and acknowledged IAW para 2.5.6.

2.6.1.2. Separate messages will be used for each change. Change messages will be in the original format with a clear statement advising the reason for change and all changes will clearly identify the information that is changed.

2.6.1.3. Changes will not be generated solely to correct non-critical typographical errors. Write-in changes to Mission Setup Messages are not permitted.

2.6.2. Requesting Changes to the Mission Setup Message.

2.6.2.1. Requests to change a mission setup must come from the requesting unit's Wg/CC and be submitted to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD for coordination.

2.6.2.2. Stations that submit a non-support acknowledgement message will also send a request for change to the Setup Message.

2.6.2.3. Requests to change the mission itinerary by greater than 2 hours will not be accepted within 10 days of mission execution.

2.6.2.4. Missions enter execution 24-Hours prior to scheduled home station departure and are complete after the last active leg of the mission itinerary. Changes to the mission setup will be issued automatically for the following:

2.6.2.4.1. Mission is delayed more than 2 hours by maintenance, weather, or other factors.

2.6.2.4.2. Change to cargo information that does not impact the itinerary or timing beyond 2 hours.

2.6.2.4.3. Aircraft Divert

2.6.2.4.4. A change will not be issued solely to cancel an A/R.

2.6.3. Waiver authority is 618 AOC (TACC)/CC. **Note:** Waiver requests that do not contain the following information below will be denied:

2.6.3.1. Name, grade, unit and title of requester.

2.6.3.2. Date of request.

2.6.3.3. Mission number of affected mission.

2.6.3.4. Detailed reason the change is necessary.

2.6.3.5. Date and time the required change was discovered.

2.6.4. When changes to the itinerary are necessary after a mission has started, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOG-DDO2 will coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD nuclear airlift

mission planners to publish changes to the Mission Setup Message and forward to the aircrew with an information copy to the operating wing. To avoid delay of a mission, voice confirmation of changes between 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG-DDO2 and the aircrew are acceptable but should be used as a last resort only. Change to the Mission Setup Message will be forwarded to all stations and the operating wing using the format in Attachment 3.

2.7. Additional Airlift Requirements.

2.7.1. If changes to nuclear/nuclear-related cargo are approved before the mission starts, the Mission Setup Message will be changed through normal channels via procedures listed in paragraph 2.6.

2.7.2. Attachment 3 lists the types of nuclear and nuclear-related materials and associated handling requirements. The AFNWC/NCL will schedule nuclear and nuclear-related cargo missions via the Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule (NOSS). Any changes to the AFNWC/NCL SAAM Airlift Request must be coordinated between 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCD and the AFNWC/NCL. Coordination must be accomplished as soon as additional cargo is identified.

2.7.3. Only nuclear cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request may be accepted.

2.7.3.1. If a discrepancy is identified between the nuclear cargo, the Mission Setup Message, or the Airlift Request, contact 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCD planners through the Consolidated Control Center (CCC). 618 AOC (TACC) will immediately contact AFNWC/NCL to resolve any discrepancies. AFNWC/NCL will identify to 618 AOC (TACC) acceptable actions, e.g. serial number of nuclear cargo transposed. AFNWC/NCL will recommend if the nuclear cargo should be accepted by AMC Courier or should remain at the shipping unit and transported on a future mission. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny nuclear cargo.

2.7.3.2. If AFNWC/NCL, 618 AOC (TACC), and the aircrew resolve the discrepancy and the decision is made to move the nuclear cargo, AFNWC/NCL will issue a new Airlift Request and 618 AOC (TACC) will issue a new SAAM Setup Message. The aircrew will not depart without a hard copy of the modified Airlift Request and Setup Message.

2.7.3.3. If a discrepancy is identified at the arrival/offload location, it will be resolved prior to offloading nuclear cargo.

2.7.4. Cargo:

2.7.4.1. Opportune cargo may be carried on unsanitized positioning legs, but do not change the route of flight to solely accommodate the movement of cargo.

2.7.4.2. Nuclear cargo will only be scheduled and airlifted if a loading procedure is published in T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*. Accident/incident response or ENAO may dictate non-standard procedures to be used; however, appropriate T.O. procedures will be used to the maximum extent possible. AMC is not authorized to waive this requirement for PNAF operations.

2.7.4.3. Unused space aboard nuclear cargo missions may be used for general cargo if:

2.7.4.3.1. The user approves the cargo to be aboard.

2.7.4.3.2. Extra landings will not be required.

2.7.4.3.3. The added weight will not adversely effect fuel requirements, aircraft center of gravity (CG), etc.

2.7.4.3.4. It is compatible with the nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. Use the hazardous material compatibility chart in AFMAN 24-204(I), *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, for air transportation to determine compatibility of nuclear cargo, major assemblies, and nuclear components with other explosive and hazardous materials.

2.7.4.3.5. It will not cause additional handling and movement of nuclear cargo. Nuclear-related and general cargo (if jettisonable) must be loaded so it may be jettisoned, if necessary, without disturbing the nuclear cargo. **Note:** Time permitting aircrews should jettison general cargo before jettisoning nuclear-related cargo, and unclassified nuclear-related cargo before classified nuclear-related cargo.

2.7.4.3.6. It will not cause security problems, including aerial port onloading and offloading.

2.7.4.3.7. Cargo is thoroughly searched and sanitized before loading aboard the aircraft.

2.7.4.3.8. After search and sanitization, it is stored in a secure manner.

2.7.4.4. Foreign nationals (non-US persons/citizens) will not be used to load or offload nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. Additionally, foreign nationals will not be used to load or offload general cargo when nuclear and nuclear-related cargo is already aboard the aircraft.

2.8. Passengers, Mission Essential Personnel, and Flying Crew Chief.

2.8.1. Passengers:

2.8.1.1. After the aircraft is sanitized, passengers will not be carried until all nuclear cargo legs have been accomplished. After the last nuclear cargo sortie, passengers may be carried on any mission segment in which the aircraft is empty or only carrying general or unclassified nuclear-related cargo.

2.8.1.2. When nuclear and/or classified nuclear-related cargo is aboard, only the following passengers may be carried as necessary to accomplish the PNAF mission:

2.8.1.2.1. Couriers, shipper escorts, permissive action link (PAL) teams, authorized inspectors, flying crew chiefs, and security forces personnel authorized in the Airlift Request or by separate message. All personnel lists must be provided to the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to home station departure.

2.8.2. Mission Essential Personnel (MEP):

2.8.2.1. MEPs must meet the basic requirements of applicable AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3, AMCI 11208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, and AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*. Commanders at all levels must rigidly minimize the number of extra people on nuclear missions and inside nuclear mission exclusion areas.

- 2.8.2.1.1. Individuals requesting MEP authorization will provide the approving authority, their Social Security Number (SSN), security clearance, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) status, specific mission for which MEP is requested, and reason for participating in the mission. MEP's requiring escort by the PNAF crew must provide notification to the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to home station departure. This ensures escort officials are properly added to the mission and are prepared to execute their duties IAW the mission plan. MEPs will be kept to a minimum.
- 2.8.2.1.2. MEP procedures and approval will be IAW AFI 11-401. MEP authority is granted for specific individuals on specific missions. MEP authority will not be used as blanket approval on all nuclear airlift missions nor will it constitute personnel travel clearance required by the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. Inspector and observer lists will be approved by AMC/A3 after coordination through AMC/A3N. Lists may remain valid for up to a year, and must be renewed annually or when personnel changes dictate.
- 2.8.2.1.3. Classify requests appropriately if a specific mission or location is included. Approve requests for MEP based on security clearance, need-to-know, space available on the aircraft, and valid in-flight or ground duty to perform.
- 2.8.2.1.4. Without a specific in-flight duty, individuals requesting MEP to observe onload and offload operations will not be approved if any other transportation is available.
- 2.8.2.1.5. Commanders of tasked operating wings and NAFs may authorize MEP status for people under their command. All others must be approved by AMC/A3.
- 2.8.2.1.6. AMC/A3 validated MEP letters will be transmitted via message from AMC/A3N, and approved by the owning PNAF Operations Group Commander.
- 2.8.2.2. IAW AFI 11-401, the PNAF Operations Group Commander is the final authority of MEP status on nuclear airlift missions operated by their wing. MEPs must be on official orders, and fall into the following categories:
- 2.8.2.2.1. Commanders, supervisors of PNAF aircrews and related programs: Vice commanders, operations group commanders, deputy operations group commanders, and PNAF squadron/unit commanders and operations officers.
- 2.8.2.2.2. PNAF certified aircrew flight examiners from the operating PNAF parent wing or MAJCOM.
- 2.8.2.2.3. Chiefs of Safety and Nuclear Surety Managers (NSM) from the parent wing and MAJCOM performing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits (NSSAV) or augmenting Functional Expert Visits (FEV).
- 2.8.2.2.4. AMC nuclear operations staff personnel performing FEVs, augmenting NSSAVs, or escorting authorized DVs. Crewmembers and guests are either part of the crew or on MEP status, but not both for any given mission day.
- 2.8.2.2.5. MAJCOM inspector general, Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA), Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC), DTRA, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and AMC Nuclear Surety office inspectors and augmentees conducting

inspections/observations. **Note:** AFIA, AMC/IG, DTRA, USSTRATCOM, and AMC/SEW offices are responsible for distributing and maintaining current authorization letters. Updated letters will be sent via email which have been digitally signed to AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG and 4 AS/DOOMS offices as soon as changes occur to ensure authenticity.

2.8.2.3. MEP authorization (individual orders or MAJCOM/NAF message) will have the approval authority, security clearance, SSAN, mission number, and reason for participating in the mission. Orders will not specify a particular mission number. Classified mission details will be transmitted via classified means (i.e. SIPRnet, Secure Fax, etc.).

2.8.2.4. Persons traveling as MEP will be briefed by the operating squadron/unit (or Aircraft Commander when joining the mission en route) on specific mission information needed to accomplish their assigned task. Briefing will include familiarization on applicable security and safety standards and emergency procedures.

2.8.2.5. MEPs must be positively identified by a service or agency official identification card.

2.8.2.6. The aircrew Courier must verify the MEP's PRP status prior to executing the tasked mission. Certified individuals must have an appropriate annotation in their MEP authorization. A valid Two-Person Concept (TPC) team must escort individuals not certified under PRP.

2.8.2.7. Travel orders for MEPs will cite the MEP authority and be presented to aircrew before mission operation.

2.8.2.8. MEP authority provides direct access to the mission aircraft without processing through passenger service section; therefore, the aircrew is responsible for manifest and anti-hijacking procedures for MEPs. The Loadmaster will annotate all MEPs on a DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*.

2.8.2.9. MEPs on PRP status and designated by the aircrew Courier may be authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area around the aircraft. MEPs certified under PRP and knowledgeable in the task to be performed may be used as part of a two-person team.

2.8.2.10. MEP verification. Aircraft commanders will not allow anyone to fly on a nuclear mission unless they are convinced of the person's identity and the legality of their authorization.

2.8.2.10.1. If there is any doubt or suspicion, regardless of rank or position, diplomatically but firmly deny access to the aircraft and cargo.

2.8.2.10.2. Unless an MEP is personally known, do not accept just a set of orders as authorization. Verify and confirm the orders through other channels. For example, MAJCOM IG, AFIA, AFSEC, DTRA, and AMC Nuclear Surety inspectors are identified on a master inspector's list/letter that is carried in the aircraft nuclear mission kit. If required the Aircraft Commander will call outside offices for verification.

2.8.3. Flying Crew Chiefs (FCC). Flying crew chiefs are not normally required on PNAF missions. FCCs may be scheduled on nuclear missions at the discretion of the PNAF wing commander.

2.8.3.1. FCCs need not be PRP-certified, but must possess a final Secret security clearance. Ensure PRP status is noted on the aircrew entry authority list (EAL).

2.8.3.2. FCCs will attend the squadron/unit's nuclear mission briefing. The FCC will be briefed individually by the nuclear airlift monitor or designated representative before attending the nuclear mission briefing. This briefing must cover security precautions and no-lone zone procedures in sufficient detail to prevent inadvertent violations by the FCC. Stress nuclear safety precautions to include specific precautions in Chapter 8.

2.8.3.3. FCCs will not seal mission aircraft, nor will they be allowed unescorted access to aircraft containing nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. Do not leave the FCC in sole custody of the aircrew mission kit or aircrew sidearms. **Exception:** When servicing and maintenance are required, the FCC may seal empty nuclear mission aircraft. Aircraft will be sanitized before subsequent loading of nuclear cargo.

2.9. PNAF Structure.

2.9.1. PNAF is composed of specially selected and trained aircrews assigned to PNAF-certified wings that have passed an initial nuclear surety inspection and meet the recurring inspection and training requirements for nuclear surety.

2.9.2. PNAF-certified wings will maintain a prescribed number of qualified aircrews as determined by their respective MAJCOM. The PNAF Operations Group Commander will notify AMC/A3T and AMC/A3N when PNAF crew force falls below the wing's Designed Operational Capability (DOC) required levels. Attached crewmembers may be PNAF-qualified and counted towards the number of crews at the squadron/unit commander's discretion.

2.10. PNAF Aircrew Qualification and Certification.

2.10.1. Flying Qualifications: Crewmembers who occupy a primary PNAF crew position when nuclear cargo is airlifted will be qualified according to AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 2, *C-17 Aircrew Evaluation Criteria*, and current in both the mission aircraft and recurring PNAF training requirements according to AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 1, *C-17 Aircrew Training* and AFI 11-237, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Training* (to be replaced by AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Airlift Training*).

2.10.2. "Qualified" means: PRP-certified or Interim-Certified IAW DoDD 5210.42-R and AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, with a minimum final SECRET clearance, PNAF certified IAW AFI 11-237, and current in their current PNAF crew position. Additional crewmembers and supervisors of aircrews not meeting the above requirements will not occupy a primary crew position with nuclear cargo aboard.

2.10.3. Nuclear Handling Qualifications. No one will handle nuclear cargo or perform duties requiring PNAF certification unless they:

2.10.3.1. Are certified in the respective PNAF crew position. Trainees are authorized access to nuclear cargo for the sole purpose of observing certified personnel performing required tasks.

2.10.3.2. Are PRP-certified or Interim-Certified IAW DoD 5210.42R and AFMAN 10-3902.

2.10.3.3. Have, as a minimum, a final SECRET clearance with Restricted Data (RD)/Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).

2.10.3.4. Know and understand the Two-Person Concept (TPC) as it applies to PNAF operations.

2.10.3.5. Are current in Nuclear Surety training and PNAF academics.

2.10.3.6. Have received Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) training IAW AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program*.

2.10.3.7. Are current and qualified in CDS training IAW AFI 21-205(S), *Command Disable System*.

2.10.4. PNAF Training. Crewmembers in training for PNAF certification/qualification must be interim or formal certified under PRP, have as a minimum a final SECRET clearance with Restricted Data (RD)/Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) and accomplished PNAF academic and Nuclear Surety training.

2.10.5. PNAF Evaluations. Interim PRP crewmembers may receive their PNAF evaluations. Initial evaluations will not be completed on missions carrying nuclear cargo.

2.10.6. PNAF Certification. PNAF squadron/unit commanders will certify each nuclear airlift qualified crewmember, including themselves, senior ranking commanders, and attached crewmembers. All crewmember certifications will be reviewed by the OG/CC and approved by the Wg/CC. Document all certifications in the Review and Certification Board minutes in accordance with AFI 11-202, Vol 2, *Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program*, the appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and on the individual crewmember's certification sheet. Crewmembers will not perform PNAF duties with nuclear cargo until certification is approved by the Wg/CC.

2.11. Aircrew Complement. Use Table 2.1. for minimum aircrew complement on nuclear and nuclear-related cargo airlift missions.

Table 2.1. Aircrew Complement.

Crew Position ^{1, 2, 3}	C-17
PNAF Aircraft Commander	1
PNAF Courier ⁴	1
PNAF Co-Pilot	1
PNAF Loadmaster	2
Additional PNAF Certified Crewmember ⁵	1

Notes:

Note 1. PNAF qualified and certified in accordance with paragraph 2.10.

Note 2. Non-PNAF flight examiners will not administer evaluations on PNAF missions.

Note 3. Squadron/unit commanders will ensure the appropriate crew complement is assigned to meet mission requirements IAW applicable portions of this instruction and AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3.

Note 4. List authorized Courier officers in the Mission Setup Message. Do not annotate on the flight authorization.

Note 5. An additional PRP-certified crewmember will be assigned on missions requiring the Two-Person Concept (TPC).

2.12. Aircrew Replacement, Staging, and Crew Swap.

2.12.1. Do not replace PNAF crewmembers unless absolutely necessary. Avoiding Courier replacement is especially critical due to briefing requirements, letters of introduction, Courier identification, and custody receipt. See Chapter 6 for specific procedures if a Courier is replaced.

2.12.2. Aircrew Staging. Pre-position PNAF aircrews at forward/en route locations to maximize throughput in large scale (multi-mission) movements. This practice eliminates pre-and de-positioning legs. It may involve swapping aircrews at an en route location with nuclear cargo aboard, but will not involve handling of nuclear cargo at the en route location used. All planned stage crews will participate in the predeparture briefing at home station IAW paragraph 3.2. During execution, crewmembers will brief counterparts on unique mission aspects not covered during the predeparture mission briefing.

2.12.3. Crew Swap. A crew swap is defined as using pre-positioned crews to initiate or complete a nuclear mission. This option may only be used when absolutely necessary to avoid crew duty day waivers, to maximize surety, and only after all normal scheduling options are exhausted.

2.12.3.1. When used prior to mission departure, a pre-positioned crew may pre-flight, pre-position the aircraft, and onload nuclear cargo via normal procedures. The pre-positioned crew will then transfer custody of the cargo and mission responsibilities over to the main operating crew to execute the primary mission segment.

2.12.3.2. When used after mission arrival, a pre-positioned crew may receive custody of nuclear cargo and mission responsibilities from the primary crew then offload the cargo, post-flight, and re-position the aircraft as necessary via normal procedures.

2.12.3.3. Additional crews (either swapped or pending swap) may not deadhead with nuclear cargo aboard or remain in the restricted area during loading/unloading operations.

2.12.3.4. Mission planning. Mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Swap SOEs and procedures for a particular mission.

2.12.3.4.1. Unit mission planners will ensure the appropriate number of PNAF crews are scheduled to complete the mission.

2.12.3.4.2. Create a separate EAL for each crew. All crewmembers from each crew will be listed on each EAL. The EALs will annotate the Aircraft Commander and Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) for each respective crew. Example: One EAL will annotate the upload crew's Aircraft Commander/SVA and the other will annotate the

main operating crew's Aircraft Commander/SVA. Both EALs will list all crewmembers from the upload and operating crews. Crews will depart home station with only their crew's EAL.

2.12.3.4.3. Create one set of crew orders that includes all crews. Ensure appropriate remarks are made on orders as to when the respective Aircraft Commander will assume command. Each crew will depart home station with the same set of orders.

2.12.3.4.4. All planned swap crews will participate in the predeparture briefing at home station IAW paragraph 3.2. During execution, crewmembers will brief counterparts on unique mission aspects not covered during the predeparture mission briefing.

2.12.3.5. During execution, only one crew may be in the exclusion area during the handling of the nuclear cargo between the crew and the logistics installation personnel. Example: Upon arrival at download location with engines shutdown, the operating crew's Courier will receive the security briefing, authenticate the operating crew's EAL, and process the download crew into the area. Both crews will enter the aircraft, provide/receive mission, aircraft, security, and cargo briefings, transfer sidearms, classified material and equipment, CDS codes, and nuclear cargo. The operating crew will proceed to the ECP with the download crew's Courier. The operating crew's Courier will collect all previously authenticated EALs from the EC and brief the EC that the download Courier is now the SVA. The download Courier will authenticate the download crew's EAL, outprocess the operating crew, and authenticate all guest EALs. The download crew will perform the remaining of the download as normal.

2.12.3.6. PNAF crews will use AMC/A3N developed checklist(s) to aid in crew swap mission planning and execution.

Chapter 3

PREDEPARTURE REQUIREMENTS

3.1. Aircrew Mission Planning. Aircrew mission planning has a measurable effect on nuclear surety. The Aircraft Commander, Courier officer, primary Loadmaster, and trainees in each respective crew position shall begin a mission information review and inter-organizational coordination NLT three duty days prior to crew entering Pre-Mission Crew Rest for home station departure. At a minimum, ensure the following have been completed prior to the departure brief:

- 3.1.1. Review the AFNWC/NCL Airlift Request.
- 3.1.2. Review the Mission Setup Message and current changes as necessary.
- 3.1.3. Review onload and offload methods to be used at each station. (Coordinate with unit and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD)
- 3.1.4. Prepare a list using AMC Form 292, *C-17A Special Loading Equipment Receipt*, of required equipment and coordinate this information to an APS representative and place a copy in the Mission book. Specific items to consider:
 - 3.1.4.1. Shoring required for primary and alternate loading methods to be used.
 - 3.1.4.2. Additional tie down chains and devices.
 - 3.1.4.3. Empty 463L pallets.
 - 3.1.4.4. Bridge plates or truck loading ramps.
 - 3.1.4.5. Wheeled prybars.
- 3.1.5. Prepare a detailed load floor plan including exact tiedown patterns for each mission leg with nuclear cargo. Use AF Form 4114, *C-17A Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet*, as appropriate, for each floor plan.
- 3.1.6. Review all mission requirements at each station to determine locations/situations where security will be provided by the aircrew.
- 3.1.7. Review availability and desired delivery dates (DDD) of cargo.
- 3.1.8. Prepare a Sequence of Events (SOE) for each shipping/receiving installation. SOEs will be formally coordinated between aircrew and primary shipping/receiving installations during pre-mission planning prior to aircrew home station departure.

3.2. Predeparture Briefing. The squadron/unit NAM or a designated representative (Deputy NAM, PNAF Deputy Chief, or PNAF Chief) will conduct a predeparture briefing for aircrew members before each nuclear airlift mission. The Aircraft Commander and Courier will brief anyone who joins the mission en route.

- 3.2.1. Briefings will include, but are not limited to:
 - 3.2.1.1. Classification of briefing, cargo, and en route locations of nuclear cargo.
 - 3.2.1.2. Mission Setup Message and local FRAG.
 - 3.2.1.3. Itinerary.

- 3.2.1.4. Airfield restrictions such as NOTAMs, gross weight limits, operating hours, parking, approved waivers, PPRs, previous problems, etc.
- 3.2.1.5. Air refueling mission segments (including restrictions and post-A/R reporting).
- 3.2.1.6. Intelligence (See paragraph 7.5.).
- 3.2.1.7. Aircraft commander's briefing (see AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3).
- 3.2.1.8. Courier's briefing:
 - 3.2.1.8.1. Applicability of Two-Person Concept (TPC).
 - 3.2.1.8.2. PRP qualification of each crewmember, MEPs, etc.
 - 3.2.1.8.3. Security profiles at each station and expected crewmember duties.
- 3.2.1.9. Loadmaster's briefing (primary mission Loadmaster):
 - 3.2.1.9.1. Cargo information:
 - 3.2.1.9.1.1. Nuclear cargo.
 - 3.2.1.9.1.2. Nuclear-related cargo (LLC, trainers, etc.).
 - 3.2.1.9.1.3. General cargo.
 - 3.2.1.9.1.4. Dash-16 primary and alternate loading methods.
 - 3.2.1.9.1.5. Loading duty assignments.

3.3. PNAF Aircrew Nuclear Mission Kits.

3.3.1. Nuclear mission kits will contain:

3.3.1.1. Publications:

- 3.3.1.1.1. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3.
- 3.3.1.1.2. AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules For Nuclear Logistics Transport By The Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*
- 3.3.1.1.3. AFI 16-610, *Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)*.
- 3.3.1.1.4. T.O. 11N-45-51, *Transportation of Nuclear Materiel*.
- 3.3.1.1.5. T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD), *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*.
- 3.3.1.1.6. T.O. 11N-45-51B, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*.
- 3.3.1.1.7. T.O. 11N-20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Material Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations (C-RD)*.
- 3.3.1.1.8. T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*.
- 3.3.1.1.9. T.O. 1C-17A-16-1CL-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*.

3.3.1.2. Forms:

- 3.3.1.2.1. AFNWC/NCL Airlift Request.

- 3.3.1.2.2. Mission Setup Message and any changes.
 - 3.3.1.2.3. Entry Authority List.
 - 3.3.1.2.4. AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.
 - 3.3.1.2.5. AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*.
 - 3.3.1.2.6. DD Form 2825, *Individual Receipt*, AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*, or other official receipt form.
 - 3.3.1.2.7. DD Form 1911, *Materiel Courier Receipt*.
 - 3.3.1.2.8. DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest* (not required if item is included in the normal mission kit).
 - 3.3.1.2.9. SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*.
 - 3.3.1.2.10. Blank cargo manifests.
 - 3.3.1.2.11. AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*.
- 3.3.1.3. Letters:
- 3.3.1.3.1. Lists of persons authorized to receive nuclear cargo (include lists for certified alternate airfields).
 - 3.3.1.3.2. U.K. Letter of Understanding.
 - 3.3.1.3.3. Official Courier identification letters.
 - 3.3.1.3.4. Request for waiver to customs and agriculture boarding requirements.
 - 3.3.1.3.5. Security acknowledgment letters.
 - 3.3.1.3.6. Current MEP authorization letters of AMC/IG, AFIA, DTRA, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety, and MAJCOM Nuclear Operations (i.e. AMC/A3N) personnel.
 - 3.3.1.3.7. Sequence of Events letters.
- 3.3.1.4. Serialized security seals and tamper tape (not required if items are included in the normal aircraft mission kit).
- 3.3.2. Each PNAF squadron/unit will maintain a number of kits commensurate with the number of PNAF aircrews assigned. Each kit will meet the requirements of AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*, for protecting classified material aboard the aircraft. Attach a clear plastic shield with the prescribed DoDM 5200.01, Vol 3, *DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*/AFI 31-401 certification for Courier material inserted. Number kits using the wing designator and kit number (i.e.: 62AW #1).
- 3.3.3. The Courier officer will conduct an inventory of the kit, accept custody of the classified material, and sign an AF Form 310, prior to home station departure. Account for all classified material after the mission.
- 3.3.4. At en route crew rest stations, store the PNAF mission kits in a suitable document storage facility (command post, communications center, security forces classified holding area, base ops, etc.). Obtain a receipt (DD Form 2825, AF Form 1297, or other official

receipt) for the kit when released to any agency. When transferring kits between stage or replacement Couriers, the Couriers will conduct an inventory of the kit. Use an AF Form 310 to transfer custody of classified documents.

3.3.4.1. PNAF mission kits may be stored overnight in the aircraft provided:

3.3.4.1.1. The aircraft is sealed.

3.3.4.1.2. A full-time US guard, military, or sworn government civil servant, who is present to perform a policing function (Not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "Protection Level 1 (PL-1)" restricted area). Refer to AFI 31-401 for additional information on protecting classified material on aircraft.

3.3.4.1.3. Only PNAF aircrew, not including the crew chief or other MEPs, are authorized to access the aircraft.

3.3.4.1.4. Security personnel are informed classified material is aboard (security forces do not guard classified material unless associated with the required priority level).

3.3.4.2. If a customs agent requests to inspect the contents of the PNAF mission kit, present the Identification of an Official Courier letter (Attachment 4.1.). If there are problems, contact the nearest US military agency for assistance.

3.4. Aircrew/Security Team Arming.

3.4.1. Security of the nuclear assets is the primary concern for PNAF aircrews. Limit exposure to the maximum extent possible.

3.4.1.1. All PNAF crewmembers will be issued weapons commensurate with mission requirements.

3.4.2. Nuclear Mission Segments:

3.4.2.1. Aircrew will arm in accordance with AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, and authorized by AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*.

3.4.2.2. Aircrew will wear the sidearm exposed when directly involved in protecting nuclear cargo, except when prohibited by host country policy listed in DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. Conceal or stow sidearm at all other times.

3.4.3. On positioning and depositioning mission segments, comply with AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3.

3.4.4. During RONS, PNAF crews will store their weapons IAW AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3.

3.5. Personal Requirements. Each PNAF crewmember will carry a copy of AFI 13526 on all nuclear missions. Additionally, each Loadmaster will carry a copy of T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 on all nuclear missions.

Chapter 4

EN ROUTE OPERATIONS

4.1. General. This Chapter outlines en route operational procedures to be used by aircrews and command and control centers (CCC). Included are procedures for communications, cargo loading and offloading, aircraft emergency divers, and crew rest.

4.2. Special Considerations When Transporting Nuclear Cargo.

4.2.1. Aircraft transporting nuclear cargo are prohibited from approaching within an unsafe distance of unfriendly border. Positive measures will be used to prevent overflight or landing in unfriendly territories or countries where such actions are prohibited. Refer to the SWOG for additional information.

4.2.2. To the maximum extent possible, avoid flying over populated areas. Approach, landing, and takeoff tracks are excluded from this limitation. If in the Aircraft Commander's judgment, a request to avoid heavily populated areas would place aircraft in greater danger by conflicting with traffic in crowded airspace, comply with air traffic control (ATC) normal routings. Be careful of ATC instructions that may cause flight into unauthorized areas. Do not reveal the purpose of the mission merely to proceed via flight-planned route.

4.2.3. Aircrew members shall not consume alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of crew show time on active legs carrying nuclear cargo.

4.2.4. Current and qualified PNAF Aircraft Commander certified pilots may perform the takeoff and landing on nuclear cargo-laden missions, provided the designated PNAF mission Aircraft Commander is occupying the other seat.

4.2.5. Keep the time nuclear cargo is outside secure storage to a minimum. Coordinate fully with support agencies, shippers, and receivers. Keep them informed of mission progress and intentions.

4.2.6. When nuclear cargo is aboard, do not land early unless absolutely necessary and base agencies have been notified. If a takeoff at the published departure time would generate an early arrival (due to unexpected en route winds, etc.), stay on the ground where security is known and established. Coordinate with proper CCC and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD for later takeoff time. If an early arrival cannot be avoided en route, ensure mission requirements are passed to the arrival base and are completely understood. Get confirmation (names, initials, etc.) from the destination that the requirements are received and will be coordinated. At a minimum, ensure the security forces have been notified and can provide support. If possible inform 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD of the early arrival.

4.2.7. Security Alternate Fuel. When fuel planning for nuclear and nuclear-related mission segments, include sufficient fuel (10,000 pounds for C-17) to permit departure from destination and climb to an appropriate altitude to level off with "required overhead" fuel. List this fuel in the "stored fuel" on the appropriate fuel planning form according to AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3. Security alternate fuel is designed for all missions to allow the Aircraft Commander the option of departure from an immature or deteriorating security situation. This is in addition to all other required fuel. Do not offload nuclear or nuclear-related cargo

to allow for security alternate fuel. General cargo will be offloaded to allow for security alternate fuel.

4.2.8. Flight Planning. Enter "hazardous cargo," "inert devices," or both if applicable and the mission number in the "remarks" section of the DD Form 175, *Military Flight Plan*, or in the "other information" section of the DD Form 1801, *DoD International Flight Plan*. **Note:** LLCs with line numbers and certain Type 3 trainers and JTAs are hazardous cargo.

4.2.9. On air refueled mission segments, use the pre-coordinated emergency divert location designated in the Mission Setup Message if at all possible. If a different emergency divert location is necessary, inform the controlling CCC as soon as possible so the duty controller can advise the new emergency divert location. Before takeoff, the Aircraft Commander must ensure the new emergency divert location confirms security is available.

4.2.10. Aircraft Firefighting Support Requirements when transporting, loading or unloading nuclear cargo or nuclear-related cargo:

4.2.10.1. Fire protection during engine starts, servicing, taxi, takeoff and landing will be provided in accordance with T.O. 11N-20-11 or Engineering Liaison Office Publication 1 (ELO-1) for host nation fire departments.

4.2.10.2. At Air Force bases, do not display hazardous cargo placards (explosives category 1.1, etc.). The host will determine use of placards at other bases.

4.3. Aircraft Preparation.

4.3.1. Do not service or perform aircraft maintenance during nuclear cargo loading or unloading operations (concurrent servicing). Refer to AFI 91-115 for specific aircraft maintenance requirements and considerations. The nuclear cargo convoy will not normally depart the storage site until the aircraft is serviced, security is established, and the aircrew is ready for loading.

4.3.2. Ensure appropriate T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 and T.O. 1C-17A-9, *Loading Instructions*, preloading checklists are complete prior to commencing onload of nuclear cargo.

4.3.3. During loading, offloading and servicing, fire protection must be provided according to T.O. 11N-20-11.

4.3.4. The necessary aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and support equipment will be pre-positioned at the designated parking area before aircraft arrival. The equipment will be inspected for serviceability, fully serviced, and sanitized before placement at the parking area. Ensure AGE equipment is positioned so that it does not block taxi routes or avenues of exit for the aircraft.

4.4. Two-Person Concept (TPC). See AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Program*, for TPC and no-lone zone guidance and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 3, Enclosure 9 for exclusion area guidance.

4.4.1. Aircrews will apply TPC when airlifting nuclear cargo. As the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA), the aircrew Courier will ensure an exclusion area is established, aircrew and security personnel are briefed on exclusion area procedures and individual responsibilities, and enforce TPC. While it is the Courier's primary responsibility, compliance and enforcement are everyone's concern regardless of who has physical

possession of nuclear cargo. **Note:** An individual may enter a lavatory within an exclusion area without continuous direct observation by the remaining TPC team.

4.4.2. Individual TPC team members must be certified under their respective service-directed PRP and thoroughly briefed on the location of the exclusion area. They must be familiar with the safety and security requirements of the task to be performed. The TPC team must be a minimum of two PRP-certified individuals. Two interim certified individuals will not form a TPC team.

4.4.3. A TPC team will escort persons not certified under PRP and comply with applicable escort ratios IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. Non-PRP individuals will be kept to a minimum, taking into account the nuclear cargo, mission complexity, crew work/rest cycles, expected visitor activity, and ability to effectively control all visitors. It is the Courier's responsibility to ensure anyone who has access, understands and complies with the rules in the exclusion area.

4.4.4. Two-Person Concept for Inspectors:

4.4.4.1. Upon proper identification and authentication of inspector's EAL, PRP-certified inspectors may be authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area by the aircrew Courier.

4.4.4.2. During an inspection, a PRP-certified inspector will not form a TPC team with an inspectee. PRP-certified inspectors will form an independent TPC team to ensure the inspection doesn't impact the aircrew performance of duties.

4.5. Cargo Acceptance and Transfer.

4.5.1. The Courier will accept and transfer custody of nuclear cargo in accordance with T.O. 11N-45-51 and Chapter 6. Only nuclear cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request may be accepted and handled. If cargo differs from the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3.

4.5.2. Aircrew will not accept opportune or non-nuclear cargo on PNAF SAAMs without prior MAJCOM coordination through AFNWC/NCL. AFNWC/NCL will provide this to 618 AOC (TACC) via AFNWC/NCL SAAM Airlift Request which in turn will be published in the Mission Set-up Message.

4.5.3. Custody and Physical Possession. Custody of nuclear cargo is transferred upon signing the DD Form 1911 regardless of physical possession. The Courier and shipper/receiver will agree on when custody transfer occurs. Possession occurs at the pre-determined point when the aircrew or receiver physically "takes" each individual piece of cargo. Munitions personnel assisting in loading operations do so under the control of and on behalf of the Courier. Before the transfer begins, the Courier, shipper or receiver, and the Senior SF representative (SNCO or Officer) will agree on where each piece of cargo will go in case of attack, e.g., if cargo chains are broken, the cargo may be brought aboard for defense. The Courier is responsible for the safety and security of each item in their physical possession regardless of custody, and conversely, the Courier still has custody of items regardless of physical possession.

4.6. Loading and Offloading Procedures. Nuclear cargo will be loaded only on a mission capable aircraft serviced and prepared for loading. The aircrew is responsible for safe and proper

loading of nuclear cargo. The Aircraft Commander will personally monitor all loading operations of nuclear cargo by direct reference to T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-16-1CL-1.

Note: Do not load nuclear cargo on PNAF aircraft unless a loading procedure is published in T.O. 1C-17A-16-1.

4.6.1. The primary mission Loadmaster, in coordination with the Aircraft Commander, will direct loading, tie down, load distribution, and shipping preparation of nuclear cargo.

4.6.2. Use T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9 procedures for loading and offloading. The appropriate T.O. by type of cargo is specified in T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD) and Attachment 2. No deviations to these T.O. procedures are authorized. Weapon configurations will be as directed for shipment in the weapon dash -1 T.O. (S-RD).

4.6.3. Before each onload and offload, the Aircraft Commander and primary mission Loadmaster will ensure everyone understands their duties. Shippers or receivers may be asked to help, but will be thoroughly briefed and must comply with AMC aircrew procedures while cargo is in the crew's custody or physical possession.

4.6.4. Use nuclear weapon protective covers as much as possible to minimize visual exposure. Host installations shall consider prohibiting restricted area photography for force protection or OPSEC concerns. If local installations prohibit photography, procedures for gaining photography authorization will be included in the installation defense plan.

4.6.5. Aircrew may touch nuclear cargo as necessary to facilitate onload, offload, and inflight duties IAW T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, T.O. 1C-17A-9, and T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD). Avoid excessive handling of nuclear cargo. Handle only one item or package of nuclear cargo at a time. When hand-carrying, use both hands if practical.

4.6.6. Forecast or actual inclement weather (high winds, ice storms, etc.).

4.6.6.1. Onload and offload may be delayed due to local policies or the Aircraft Commander's judgment.

4.6.6.2. Do not load nuclear cargo containing explosives when an electrical storm is within 5 miles unless cargo would be safer inside aircraft.

4.6.6.3. During the shipper's brief, the Courier and MASO will coordinate procedures establishing custody and security of nuclear cargo when the aircraft is partially on/offloaded and weather has temporarily ceased operations.

4.6.7. Aircraft Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) should only be used if a sufficient power cart is not available, if required for avionics cooling, or to heat the aircraft in cold weather.

4.6.8. Maintain a 30-inch space between general or nuclear-related cargo and the nearest nuclear cargo.

4.6.9. Loadmaster will determine what cargo is jettisonable. This is a physical determination with reference to limitations of AFMAN 24-204(I), T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9. Loadmaster will ensure crew is aware of all cargo that is non-jettisonable.

4.7. Ground Emergencies.

4.7.1. Anyone observing an unsafe act or condition during any ground phase of the nuclear mission will immediately stop the operation. Correct the condition before operations are

resumed. Report all ground emergencies to the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC). While the aircraft commander retains responsibility for the aircraft, the OSC is responsible for coordinating incident response actions and will integrate into the installation Incident Command System (ICS) structure.

4.7.1.1. If an accident occurs during handling and the case remains intact, notify the local safety office and evacuate non-essential personnel as briefed. Do not ship items which have been exposed to abnormal conditions unless specifically authorized.

4.7.1.2. If nuclear cargo is dropped or otherwise damaged during handling and the case is ruptured, take the following steps immediately:

4.7.1.2.1. Coordinate emergency actions through the OSC, security forces, and fire department. Notify tower or ground control requesting them to notify the local support United States EOD team immediately and declare a ground emergency.

4.7.1.2.2. Evacuate nonessential persons upwind, if possible, a minimum of 2,500 feet or as briefed.

4.7.2. Security Emergencies. Coordination and planning prior to mission arrival and during initial communications between the aircrew and Senior Security Forces Representative (SSR) are essential to ensure security of nuclear cargo. The Nuclear Weapon Security Standard will be maintained, which is: denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; preventing loss of custody; and preventing, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts.

4.7.2.1. If confronted with hostile force, deadly force is authorized to protect nuclear cargo. Resist any attempt by a hostile force to capture nuclear cargo to the fullest extent possible.

4.7.2.2. Consider any attack on aircraft loaded with nuclear cargo, including a hijacking attempt, as an attack against nuclear cargo.

4.7.2.3. Should hostages be used to gain access to, as cover for removal, or to thwart recovery of nuclear cargo, the welfare and safety of hostages should be considered in determining actions to be taken. However, the presence of hostages shall not deter taking decisive, prompt, and effective action that includes using deadly force to recover nuclear cargo and to prevent unauthorized access to or removal of nuclear cargo.

4.7.2.4. If attacked, take the following actions:

4.7.2.4.1. If attack occurs during onload or offload, execute the plan as briefed between crew and SSR. If the decision is made to load, then load the nuclear cargo as fast and as safely as possible.

4.7.2.4.2. If the Aircraft Commander determines the aircraft is airworthy and the taxi and departure routes are safer than remaining in place, attempt to make an immediate takeoff with the cargo IAW predetermined courses of action with the SSR.

4.7.3. Some weapons have a command disable system (CDS) that internally destroys the capability of a weapon to achieve a significant nuclear yield.

4.7.3.1. CDS codes and at least one individual knowledgeable in CDS procedures will remain on the aircraft until Type I security is established after arrival and when ropes and stanchions are removed until departure.

4.7.3.2. CDS is the only disablement procedure PNAF aircrews are authorized to use.

4.7.3.3. CDS authorization, protection of codes, and procedures for execution will be IAW T.O. 11N-45-51 and AFI 21-205(S).

4.8. Procedures for Crossload Transfer of Nuclear Cargo. An aircraft change may be necessary during a nuclear airlift mission due to maintenance or other unforeseen problems. This could occur at home station, en route, or at an emergency divert location. Aircraft change may require a crossload of the nuclear cargo to keep it moving to its final destination. In the event such a transfer must occur, the following procedures will help ensure a safe, secure transfer of nuclear cargo from one aircraft to another.

4.8.1. Whenever possible, crossloads will be performed by personnel who are trained and certified for handling and transportation tasks IAW AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures*. In emergency divert situations where no certified personnel are present, PNAF aircrew members are authorized to perform PNAF aircraft crossloads according to AFI 91-115.

4.8.2. Do not begin crossload of nuclear cargo until the replacement aircraft has been fully configured, fueled, preflighted, sanitized, and appropriate security requirements are in place.

4.8.3. One PNAF Courier will maintain custody of the nuclear cargo throughout the crossload. Any transfer of custody will occur before or after the crossload.

4.8.4. PNAF aircrew will ensure the safest and most secure environment for any nuclear cargo involved in the crossload. Use nuclear weapon protective covers as much as possible to minimize visual exposure. The covers will be removed immediately prior to inspecting weapons and subsequently commencing loading/offloading operations for each individual weapon (when the aircrew takes possession of each weapon).

4.8.5. Use a single Protection Level 1 (restricted) area around the two aircraft to the maximum extent possible. Receiving aircraft will be sanitized according to requirements in Chapter 5 before being parked in the same Type I area as the broken aircraft.

4.8.6. Aircrew will be responsible for the transfer operation. They will work closely with the base commander or on-scene coordinator, shipper or receiver, munitions, security, intelligence, and transportation personnel.

4.8.7. The Aircraft Commander and Courier will conduct briefings with all personnel participating in aircraft crossload. The briefings will include an overview of the crossload operation and each participant will be briefed on individual duties. The Courier officer will brief security, cargo, and no-lone zone requirements. The primary Loadmaster will brief loading/offloading duties as required during the operation.

4.8.8. The Courier will coordinate with the SSR to ensure security requirements are understood and security is adequate before commencing the crossload operation. The Courier will also ensure the no-lone zones are briefed and understood by all participants.

4.8.9. Use T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9 procedures for loading and offloading. The appropriate T.O. by type of cargo is specified in T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD) and Attachment 2. No deviations to these T.O. procedures are authorized. Weapon configurations will be as directed for shipment in the weapon dash -1 T.O. (S-RD).

4.8.10. If PNAF aircrew transfers cargo to a new aircraft and crew, the original aircrew is responsible for offloading, and the new crew is responsible for loading the new aircraft. The new aircrew will have custody of nuclear cargo at the time of transfer in writing on the DD Form 1911. The original aircrew will maintain physical possession and responsibility for each item during offload until physically transferred to the accepting aircrew during onload. Couriers will ensure everyone in the loading and offloading process clearly understands who is in charge of each item and its disposition at all times.

4.8.10.1. The primary Loadmaster of the new aircraft, with coordination of the Aircraft Commander, will direct the nuclear cargo movement operation to the new aircraft.

4.9. Departure Procedures.

4.9.1. Destination Support Confirmation.

4.9.1.1. Aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard must not take off until all destinations and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations acknowledge that they are capable of meeting security requirements.

4.9.1.2. Before beginning each day's operation, check with the MAJCOM CCC for the status of stations to be transited that day. CCC will review the mission folder to ensure all stations on the day's itinerary have confirmed security and support requirements. CCC will use all other sources available, e.g., airfield threat security evaluations file, etc., to evaluate the security status of en route stations. CCC must be prepared to rapidly appraise security for a nuclear mission and provide any changes to the crew immediately. If security is questionable or a 24-Hour confirmation of support message has not been received, CCC will immediately attempt to confirm security, holding departure to the suspect station until security is confirmed. If the 24-Hour confirmation of support message is not available, call the destination base directly. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD can help provide base contacts and telephone numbers.

4.9.2. Engine-Start Notification. Before engine-start, the PNAF aircrew will give the controlling agency (ground or tower) the parking location, approximate engine-start time, and announce there is hazardous cargo aboard the aircraft. Ensure a fire truck is standing by, in accordance with T.O. 11N-20-11.

4.9.3. Release of Security. When directed by the Aircraft Commander, the Courier officer will direct security guards to remove any barriers outlining the restricted area. The security force will maintain surveillance of the aircraft until it is airborne and be available for recall 30 minutes thereafter, or as otherwise coordinated in the Mission Setup Message.

4.9.4. Departure Message:

4.9.4.1. Once airborne, the aircrew will contact the CCC directly via aircraft radio or phone patch with their departure time and estimated time of arrival (ETA).

4.9.4.2. CCC will notify destination point of contact (identified in their acknowledgment message) by the most expeditious means available and pass aircraft type, mission

number, tail number, and ETA. Insist security forces be notified. If CCC is unable to contact destination, they will advise the Aircraft Commander. The Aircraft Commander will make the final decision to land or divert to a pre-coordinated emergency divert location. If there is a reasonable doubt the security of nuclear cargo could be jeopardized if the aircraft lands, divert to a suitable alternate that can provide security. **Note:** OPSEC procedures are extremely important during this process. Make every effort to avoid "signatures" of a nuclear cargo mission. Avoid discussions that could reveal the purpose of the mission.

4.9.4.3. For missions with short en route times or several quick stops that would make departure calls to destinations impractical, CCC may phone destinations before aircraft is airborne.

4.10. CCC Coordination.

4.10.1. The PNAF aircrew must keep 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG advised of mission progress. If ETA changes by more than 15 minutes, the arrival destination must be informed as soon as possible.

4.10.2. Releasing Pre-coordinated Emergency Divert Locations.

4.10.2.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will develop Mission Setup Message support requirements for applicable pre-coordinated emergency divert locations. Bases will be tasked to support the unlikely event of an emergency divert for any reason (ex: Weather, A/R, maintenance, etc.). 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will coordinate with the operating unit during mission planning to establish standby posture requirements and key time points/related mission milestones (completion of A/R, ETP passage, etc.).

4.10.2.2. The Aircraft Commander will contact the 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 when passed the key time points/related mission milestones. Upon concurrence with the Aircraft Commander, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 will contact the pre-coordinated emergency divert location command post to release the installation's standby requirements.

4.10.3. Aircraft Divert. The Aircraft Commander will inform 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG as soon as possible after coordinating any divert with air traffic control agencies. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will notify the pre-coordinated emergency divert location, appropriate en route agencies, host nation authorities, and the original destination to advise them the aircraft is diverting.

4.11. Arrival Procedures.

4.11.1. In-Flight Notification:

4.11.1.1. At least 30-minutes before ETA, contact one of the following in this order: (1) command post, (2) base operations, or (3) control tower. If required, pass the SAAM number and verify the base is prepared for the aircraft arrival. Request the ETA be passed to appropriate support agencies, including the agency specified as single point-of-contact in the security acknowledgment message.

4.11.1.2. If the arrival base does not have hazardous cargo information, request the following be relayed immediately to the crash-fire protection agency and other support agencies as appropriate:

- 4.11.1.2.1. Aircraft call sign, type, and mission number.
 - 4.11.1.2.2. ETA.
 - 4.11.1.2.3. DoD explosives hazard class and division.
 - 4.11.1.2.4. Request for special handling (isolated parking, security, etc.).
 - 4.11.1.2.5. Line numbers (if requested).
- 4.11.1.3. On legs with no hazardous cargo aboard, pass the call sign, mission number, and any special requests to the appropriate agency at least 30-minutes before ETA.
- 4.11.2. Taxi and Parking. It is the Aircraft Commander's responsibility to make host airfield operations aware of the need for isolated parking. It is a host base responsibility to ensure the taxi route and parking spot meet the quantity-distance separation requirements of AFMAN 91201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, and T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD). An explosive (nuclear)-laden aircraft is classified as an above ground unbarricaded storage magazine.
- 4.11.3. Arrival Message. Contact CCC with unclassified arrival information as soon as possible after landing. CCC will dispatch arrival message. The Aircraft Commander will ensure land times have been transmitted to appropriate C2 facilities as soon as possible after landing (verify via local AMCCs/CPs or confirmation the aircraft's automated reporting system has sent both and 'On the Deck' and 'In Blocks' notifications). If notification is in question or has not been sent, contact CCC with unclassified arrival information as soon as possible after landing. CCC will dispatch arrival message.
- 4.11.4. Security. Immediately upon block-in, the Courier designated aircrew members will deplane. Keep doors closed and delay preparation for nuclear cargo transfer until adequate security is established IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. **Note:** If security forces do not meet the aircraft, the Aircraft Commander must decide whether the nuclear cargo would be more secure airborne. Consider such factors as fuel aboard, weather, local air traffic density, local security threat, and prospects for obtaining proper security support within a reasonable time. If necessary, depart destination base and orbit overhead until assured of proper security support or divert.
- 4.11.4.1. The Courier and security forces will confirm the DTGs of the Security Briefing Worksheets and local threat assessment (see paragraph 5.10). Only brief applicable changes and any schedule changes, maintenance problems, or any other situation that will affect loading times, convoy times, or security status. Any questions about forms or cargo will be resolved before accepting cargo.
 - 4.11.4.2. Ensure all agencies supporting the mission are informed of the sequence of ground operations.
- 4.11.5. On-Scene Coordinator. The Aircraft Commander or Courier will meet the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) after security is established.

4.12. Divert to Alternate Airfield.

- 4.12.1. Refer to the SWOG for additional guidance on divert locations, unscheduled landing, and inadvertent overflight procedures. If controlling CCC determines security at destination is inadequate, they will contact aircrew by the most expeditious means and direct divert to a

location with adequate security. If security is questionable, a decision to continue to destination should be based on host-theater logistics and security forces concurrence.

4.12.2. If pre-coordinated emergency divert locations cannot be used or as listed in the SWOG, alternate locations may be considered according to the SWOG priority and the following:

4.12.2.1. Be under US military control.

4.12.2.2. Have adequate security. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 and the SWOG contain additional information on security guidance for PNAF emergency divers.

4.12.2.3. Should have a nuclear storage capability. Consider the type of cargo to be handled, e.g. Army units are not certified to handle and maintain Air Force nuclear weapons. Every attempt should be made to store nuclear cargo on the aircraft while at non-nuclear emergency divert location or at a location without nuclear storage capacity during entire ground time. This might be unacceptable from a security, maintenance, or host base or theater point of view.

4.12.3. Ensure the route to be flown to the divert location is compatible with the SWOG.

4.12.4. If aircraft maintenance is the cause or a contributing factor for an emergency divert, consider maintenance capability at the alternate location. Security support and possible nuclear storage capability are the most important factors.

4.12.5. If the divert location is in CONUS or a US military base in a foreign country, use procedures in the SWOG as well as the following additional guidance:

4.12.5.1. Have controlling CCC relay hazardous cargo information and coordinate arrangements for security, storage, etc. Give 30-minute in-flight notification.

4.12.5.2. If unable to contact CCC or if CCC cannot contact alternate base, request security forces meet the aircraft in the 30-minute notification call.

4.12.6. If the airfield is in a foreign country, but not under US military control, contact controlling CCC and relay the aircraft call sign, mission number, aircraft type, airport of intended landing, ETA, and reason for the emergency divert. Request assistance from nearest Air Force base, American Embassy, or consulate. Landing in any foreign country is extremely sensitive and will be handled as quietly as possible with the agency controlling the field. Keep mission as inconspicuous as possible while still protecting nuclear cargo. Use procedures in the DoD FCG to protect the sensitivity, which states, "US military aircraft are sovereign instrumentalities." When cleared to overfly or land in foreign territory, it is US policy to assert that military aircraft are entitled to privileges and immunities which customarily are accorded warships. These privileges and immunities include, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary: exemption from duties and taxation; immunity from search, seizure, and inspections (including customs and safety inspections); or other exercise of jurisdiction by the host nation over aircraft, personnel, equipment, or cargo aboard.

4.12.6.1. Air Force Aircraft Commanders will not authorize search, seizure, inspection, or similar exercises of jurisdiction enumerated above by foreign authorities except by direction of Air Force headquarters or the American Embassy in the country concerned. Diplomatically, but firmly, deny any access to aircraft by foreign officials and attempt to have US officials in the country resolve the problem.

4.13. Emergency Procedures. During any emergency, aircrew must take every precaution to protect lives and property. The following emergency procedures apply:

4.13.1. Pass the following information to appropriate ATC agency and request it be passed to the divert location:

4.13.1.1. Aircraft call sign, nature of the emergency and landing intentions.

4.13.1.2. Aircraft position and ETA to destination.

4.13.1.3. Number of personnel aboard.

4.13.1.4. Fuel aboard.

4.13.1.5. Hazardous cargo is aboard.

4.13.2. Make a 30-minute prior-to-arrival radio call to the destination base to include:

4.13.2.1. Line numbers (if base is under U.S. control-or understands T.O. 11N-20-11).

4.13.2.2. Location of the cargo.

4.13.2.3. A statement that "negative hazardous cargo is aboard" when aircraft carries inert devices only.

4.13.2.4. A description of the physical appearance and location in the aircraft of inert devices when mixed loads of hazardous material and inert devices are aboard.

4.13.3. If an emergency requires an immediate landing and the Aircraft Commander must choose between communication security and flight safety, then safety will take precedence. Classified information may be disclosed only to the extent necessary for safety of flight.

4.13.4. Jettisoning Nuclear Cargo. The Loadmaster will identify which cargo is and is not jettisonable. In an emergency, the Aircraft Commander bears obligation to jettison cargo or crash-land where the least amount of damage will result. Activate CDS if applicable before jettisoning or crash landing. Record coordinates of each jettisoned item. Observe jettison restrictions in the SWOG.

4.13.5. Lightning Strikes. Any time an aircraft transporting nuclear cargo is struck by lightning or has a significant static discharge that could affect the nuclear cargo or components, inspect cargo and take the following actions:

4.13.5.1. If there are signs of damage, land as soon as possible where a USAF EOD team is available that can provide initial evaluation of the weapons condition. Isolate aircraft with cargo aboard and request USAF EOD support. If USAF EOD support is not available then request support from the nearest Service EOD team that can provide initial evaluation of the weapons condition. Initiate official request for USAF EOD support to the weapons custodial installation for USAF EOD support.

4.13.5.2. If there are no signs of damage continue the flight to the scheduled destination and have the weapons inspected by USAF EOD team and nuclear weapons personnel as soon as possible.

4.13.5.3. File an accident, incident, or deficiency (AID) report IAW AFMAN 91-221, *Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports*.

4.14. Border Clearance Procedures.

4.14.1. Purpose. To give aircrews border clearance procedures when carrying nuclear cargo or warheads, LLCs, and classified nuclear support materiel.

4.14.2. Policy and Procedures. Border clearance is the responsibility of the Aircraft Commander.

4.14.2.1. Use general border clearance procedures in AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3.

4.14.2.2. Prepare cargo manifests (DD Form 1385, *Cargo Manifest*) for customs officials on all cargo. The shipper will supply manifests for unclassified non-nuclear cargo. Loadmasters will prepare manifests for nuclear cargo and other classified cargo. List this cargo as classified ordnance, classified electronics equipment, classified test equipment, or similar wording which best describes it. Descriptions must not associate cargo with nuclear material. These manifests must include number of units, weight, and cubic displacement in feet.

4.14.2.3. Waivers of Customs and Quarantine Boarding. A letter will be prepared and reproduced in the format depicted in Attachment 4.2. with appropriate organizational letterhead.

4.14.3. The Aircraft Commander will tactfully request US customs and agriculture quarantine inspectors accept a waiver for boarding and examination of aircraft because of the classified cargo aboard.

4.14.3.1. If the waiver is denied and the aircraft is at an en route location, the Aircraft Commander will request a "permit to proceed" to the final destination.

4.14.3.2. If the waiver or "permit to proceed" is denied, the inspectors will comply with entry control guidance IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 and be escorted using a TPC team. Ensure that all serial numbers, as a minimum, are covered before letting the inspectors board to get a full customs and quarantine clearance. If possible, cover all weapons completely.

4.14.4. Do not allow foreign customs or other local government officials in the aircraft. If they insist on boarding, refuse entry in the most diplomatic, but positive manner. Contact the base commander if on a US military base or the air attaché if on a non-US base and ask for help. In all cases, notify CCC as soon as possible.

4.14.5. When filing a flight plan into a base that does not have customs or agriculture quarantine inspectors readily available, request customs and/or agriculture inspectors meet the aircraft by contacting the arrival base command post/AMCC. Determine hours of operations of customs facilities and comply with any requirements for advance notification. In a divert situation, give as much lead-time as possible to arrange for customs and agriculture inspectors.

4.15. Crew Rest Procedures. Before entering crew rest at an en route station, the Aircraft Commander will ensure the aircraft is sealed (as required) and a sequence of events is distributed to appropriate support agencies for follow-on operations. Provide command post and 618 AOC (TACC) contact information during crew rest in the case of an emergency.

4.16. Itinerary Deviation.

4.16.1. As soon as it is apparent a mission will deviate from published itinerary, notify the appropriate CCC of ETA for remaining en route stations on that day's itinerary. CCC will immediately notify destination points of contact and appropriate diplomatic clearance authorities by telephone. Passing timely and accurate information to destination is extremely important.

4.16.2. If a mission deviates by two or more hours from last published itinerary, the CCC will coordinate with the Aircraft Commander and XOOD to send a mission change message (Attachment 3). Points of contact at bases scheduled to be transited, the pre-coordinated emergency divert location, and tanker unit (if applicable), and appropriate en route agencies will also be advised by secure means of new times. Do not launch until CCC has determined subsequent stations for that day can accept the mission in accordance with the revised plan. If the aircrew coordinates directly with the shipper or receiver, advise CCC.

4.16.3. Mission Change Message:

4.16.3.1. The mission planning section will coordinate mission change message with the Aircraft Commander. Attempt to return mission to its original itinerary by adjusting ground times if possible. Do not sacrifice proper crew rest to return to the original schedule; however, do not perpetuate small delays by using originally planned ground times if less time will provide adequate crew rest.

4.16.3.2. The Aircraft Commander will relay revised information to CCC. CCC is responsible for checking times for conflicts with other missions, notifying the pre-coordinated divert location, tanker unit (if applicable), appropriate en route agencies, and remaining bases. The mission planning section will draft and send any message traffic required. Take care to ensure classified information is not compromised.

4.16.3.3. Use Attachment 3, format, and classify the mission change message the same as original Setup Message or in accordance with the SWOG. Include hazardous cargo information if changed from the Setup Message. Changes to overflight information messages required by the SWOG will normally be made as directed in the SWOG or Letters-of-Agreement (LOA).

4.16.3.4. Include all addressees in the Mission Setup Message including the aircrew's current location, divert locations, and remaining bases. Omit stations already transited.

4.16.4. Unscheduled Hot RON. Mission delays may force the aircrew into an unscheduled Hot RON. If it becomes apparent to an Aircraft Commander the crew will not be able to proceed to the next destination and complete the offload within remaining CDT, he or she will immediately contact AMC CCC and request authority for either:

4.16.4.1. An extension to crew duty day.

4.16.4.2. Permission to offload cargo and attempt the mission at a later time.

4.16.4.3. Permission to Hot RON at current location, emergency divert location, or destination airfield. Do not proceed to destination if the mission will arrive without sufficient time to complete offload (if one is planned) unless destination base has confirmed through CCC they can support the Hot RON. At USAFE bases, USAFE/A3/10 approval is required for a Hot RON. CCC will coordinate Hot RON requests through USAFE/A3/10NM.

Chapter 5

SECURITY

5.1. General. Security standards for nuclear cargo, aircraft sanitization, EALs, and emergency security actions are listed in DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

5.2. Threat and Vulnerability. When nuclear cargo is outside secure storage areas, they are susceptible to accidental damage and to terrorist attack. Take every action to reduce the time nuclear cargo spends outside a secure storage area.

5.3. Types of Security. The degree of security protection will vary according to the cargo. DoD security requirements are broken into two categories, Type I security and Type II security. Refer to DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 for a full description of Type I and Type II security. **Note:** When discussing security requirements with another service, a detailed description may be necessary.

5.4. Protection Standards. Nuclear cargo requires Type I security. Aircrew will ensure security meets DoD and Air Force standards when transporting nuclear cargo.

5.5. Type I Exclusion Area Procedures. Entry into an area containing nuclear cargo must be controlled. Specific aircrew procedures for exclusion area around aircraft are:

5.5.1. Type I Entry Control and Authority. All personnel requiring entry into the exclusion area will be on an EAL IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. EALs will list only the minimum number of personnel necessary for the mission, enhancing the control and access to the area. The Courier will ensure all EALs are retrieved from the entry controller prior to aircraft departure.

5.5.2. Personnel and vehicles requesting entry into the exclusion area will be processed prior to aircraft arrival and will be placed into a sanitized secure holding area. This will allow for the Courier to validate the personnel and equipment after landing and streamline ground times.

5.5.3. Every effort should be made to streamline operations but not at the cost of surety. Emphasis is on safety, surety, efficient ground times, and minimal exposure of nuclear cargo.

5.5.4. Convoy Arrival at Aircraft. Aircrew will be ready to start loading as soon as the convoy arrives. Ensure area is large enough to accommodate safe maneuvering of nuclear cargo carrying vehicles.

5.5.5. The exclusion area will be IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9. Do not raise, lower, or change any part of the area without coordination and approval of both the Courier officer and host security forces.

5.5.6. Contraband is defined in DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. PNAF aircrews transporting nuclear cargo are authorized government issued and personal cell phones, computers, other electronics devices, and other general cargo. Aircrew should minimize the number of devices used to accomplish the mission and will comply with AFMAN 91-201 or specific Nuclear Certification Impact Statement requirements. The aircrew Courier remains the ultimate authority for all equipment allowed to be in the exclusion area. Government and personal electronic devices must meet the following conditions:

5.5.6.1. Government issued cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices assigned to C-17 aircrew are authorized to be used aboard the aircraft if the systems perform a unique, mission-essential function. However, if a system performs a backup or redundant function, it will not be used unless the primary system(s) are not functioning. If not required for mission execution as previously stated, the equipment will be turned off, battery removed (if possible), and remain stowed on the aircraft when nuclear cargo is aboard.

5.5.6.2. Personal cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices carried by C-17 aircrew are authorized to be used aboard the aircraft if the government issued electronic equipment is not functioning. If not required for mission execution as previously stated, the equipment will be turned off, battery removed (if possible), and remain stowed on the aircraft when nuclear cargo is aboard. If the battery cannot be removed, the item will be placed in an approved Radio Frequency Shielded Bag and stowed.

5.6. Sanitized Aircraft. Sanitize aircraft before carrying nuclear cargo. Sanitization is a thorough check for unauthorized explosives or stowaways and should be done at the most logical station, normally at the first onload location. It can also be accomplished at an en route station when several stops are made before unloading nuclear cargo. When approved by the Aircraft Commander and Courier officer and coordinated with host base, Type II security may be dropped for an empty aircraft during RON. Aircraft will be provided random checks by security forces as a PL3 resource. Before loading nuclear cargo, aircraft will be sanitized, a restricted area re-established, and Type I security provided.

5.6.1. Sanitization Procedures. Aircrews will conduct a thorough visual inspection and appropriate aircraft dash-1 preflight or through-flight inspection to search for explosives, suspicious devices or packages, or unauthorized persons. When available, an explosive detection dog (EDD) or portable explosive detection devices will be used to sanitize the aircraft and crew baggage. Do not delay the mission if an EDD is not available. If a suspicious device or explosives are found during the aircrew search, cordon off the area and request support from the nearest military EOD unit. During periods of inclement weather, crew bags may be sanitized inside the aircraft.

5.6.2. If an aircraft is changed during the mission the new aircraft must be sanitized.

5.6.3. Providing Type II security on a sanitized aircraft maintains the sanitization, and precludes the need to re-sanitize before loading nuclear cargo. **Note:** Consider removing Type II security if extended servicing or maintenance is required. Resanitize before unloading nuclear cargo if Type II requirements are removed.

5.6.3.1. The aircraft will be sealed.

5.6.3.2. Type II security will be maintained (not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "PL1" restricted area, e.g., an AFGSC alert area).

5.6.3.3. Only the aircrew (not including the crew chief) are authorized unescorted access to the aircraft.

5.6.3.4. Security personnel are informed that Type II security material is aboard. **Note:** Do not request security support merely to guard the PNAF Aircrew Nuclear Mission Kit.

5.7. Emergency Diverts of Nuclear-Laden Aircraft. CONUS and OCONUS bases should handle emergency diverts using support plan (SPLAN) procedures for receiving nuclear-laden aircraft. The pre-coordinated emergency divert location will maintain standby forces to receive nuclear-laden aircraft IAW an SPLAN that complies with current DoD and Air Force guidance.

5.8. Sealing Aircraft. Normally, seal nuclear mission aircraft during crew rests and extended en route delays. During RONs at normal AMC maintenance airfields, sealing is at the discretion of the Aircraft Commander. If sealing for security purposes, have a security force representative verify seals during sealing and opening the aircraft. If sealing for maintenance or non-security purposes, make every effort to comply with host base security procedures, but as a minimum have two aircrew members verify all seals and record the seal number. Each time aircrew or other authorized persons enter the aircraft, the aircraft will be resealed by aircrew or other authorized persons when they depart.

5.8.1. Tape emergency escape hatches, paratroop doors, maintenance/ditching hatches, etc., on the interior to show evidence of forced or unauthorized entry. The crew entrance door(s) and any under floor access will be closed and sealed by a serialized security seal.

5.8.2. After the crew door has been sealed, wipe the area clean around the seal and provide the seal number to security forces and command post, as required.

5.8.3. Upon return, verify the seal number and inspect seals inside the aircraft according to DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

5.8.4. In the event of forced entry or evidence that seals on aircraft have been tampered with:

5.8.4.1. Ensure all evidence remains untouched.

5.8.4.2. When the aircraft is empty, report the incident to base command post who will notify security forces, EOD, and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Request an immediate investigation.

5.8.4.3. When nuclear cargo is aboard report the incident to base command post who will notify security forces, EOD, and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Assume the weapon has been tampered with and follow procedures outlined in DoD 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, DoDI 3150.10, *DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents*, and AFI 10-2518, *Nuclear Weapons Accident and Incident Response*. Request an immediate investigation.

5.8.4.4. After investigation is complete and aircraft is released by EOD and security forces, perform a thorough preflight and send appropriate reports IAW AFMAN 91-221.

5.9. Security Acknowledgment Letter. Security acknowledgment letters are a means of transferring security responsibility to host base security forces. Couriers may use the letter in Attachment 4.4. after determining security requirements while the crew is not at the aircraft.

5.10. Security Briefing Worksheet. The Courier will use the security briefing worksheet (AF Form 527A) to coordinate security details with the host base security forces. Host base SF will coordinate with host base AFOSI (if applicable) to provide the requested information and the local threat assessment for events that might impact the mission. Place a Date Time Group (DTG) on the briefings, and send to each other via secure means. Follow up with a secure voice phone call to the host base to work out any details if required. All coordination will be completed NLT two duty days prior to mission departure from home station IAW AFI 21-203.

Chapter 6

CUSTODY TRANSFER PROCEDURES

6.1. General. This Chapter expands on Courier requirements and nuclear cargo custody procedures in T.O. 11N-45-51. The Courier is final authority for cargo security, except during airborne emergencies when the Aircraft Commander rules that safety-of-flight is paramount. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny nuclear cargo.

6.2. Courier Designation and Certification.

6.2.1. All PNAF Aircraft Commanders must be Courier-qualified.

6.2.2. Requirements for being a Courier are in T.O. 11N-45-51.

6.2.3. Identify Couriers to shippers in writing. Identification will include the Courier's name, rank, and security clearance. Normally, this identification is in the Mission Setup Message; however, it may be a separate message sent by 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD via email after they validate the information. This may occur when Couriers are replaced during mission execution. Verify the Courier's identification by using the Common Access Card (CAC). **Note:** "Identification of an Official Courier Letter" (Attachment 4.1.) is for use during border clearance and does not satisfy any of the above requirements.

6.3. Persons Authorized to Sign for Nuclear and DoD Nuclear-related Cargo.

6.3.1. Each organization that ships or receives nuclear material is required to publish a list of those persons authorized to sign for cargo according to T.O. 11N-45-51 and AFI 21-203. The Courier will have the appropriate Certification of Personnel to Receipt for Classified Material NLT ten days prior to home station departure. If letter changes are required while the mission is en route, the organization making the change will fax or email the corrected copy to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD who will in turn forward to the Courier. Couriers will only release nuclear and nuclear-related cargo to authorized persons.

6.3.2. Identify shipper/receivers by cross-referencing data IAW T.O. 11N-45-51.

6.4. Courier Responsibilities. The Courier is responsible for receipt, custody, security, safety, and delivery of nuclear and nuclear-related cargo to authorized receivers. Specific Courier responsibilities include:

6.4.1. Have written instructions that specify nuclear and nuclear-related cargo to be shipped (Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request).

6.4.2. Have a list of authorized receivers.

6.4.3. Receive the shipper's briefing.

6.4.3.1. The Courier will use the AF Form 527B for briefing requirements. The shipper may use the example brief provided in AF Form 527C or a locally developed brief provided all briefing requirements IAW 11N-45-51 are met. Prior to the aircraft's departure from home station, the Courier and shipper will complete the written briefings, place a DTG on them, and send it to each other via secure means. If needed, the Courier will contact the shipper via email or phone to clarify details. All coordination will be completed NLT two duty days prior to home station departure.

6.4.3.2. The Courier and shipper will confirm the DTGs of the briefings and only brief applicable changes. Any questions about forms or cargo will be resolved before accepting cargo.

6.4.3.3. When cargo is equipped with a CDS, ensure that the Courier and one additional crewmember are knowledgeable of performing CDS procedures. If anyone requests a briefing on CDS procedures, the shipper will brief as described in T.O. 11N-45-51, section 5 prior to departing. The shipper will provide CDS codes to the Courier as soon as the Courier signs the DD Form 1911. The CDS codes and at least one individual knowledgeable in CDS procedures will remain on the aircraft when ropes and stanchions are removed prior to departure and until Type I security is established after arrival. The Courier will verify that CDS has not been activated on weapons that do not have sealed command disable panels. Do not accept a CDS-equipped weapon without CDS codes unless all of the following exist: the Setup Message/Airlift Request indicated shipment of a disabled weapon, the disablement indicator (pin) is verified, and the weapon is documented on the DD Form 1911 remarks section as being disabled and without CDS codes.

6.4.3.4. If the Aircraft Commander and primary mission Loadmaster were not present for the shipper and Courier briefing, the Courier will brief them on hazards or nature and special handling instructions before loading.

6.4.4. Before accepting and loading nuclear and nuclear-related cargo, the Courier, shipper, and primary Loadmaster will inspect cargo. Delay removing nuclear weapon covers until just before inspecting/loading. Covers (if applicable) must be removed prior to loading due to safety concerns during loading and offloading operations.

6.4.4.1. Inspect cargo for general conditions. Check the following as applicable: weapon(s) securely attached to bolster; pressure relief valves; tie-down and winching attachments; number and integrity of seals; condition of bolster tires/wheels; and condition of casters, wheels, and carrier brakes. Deficiencies affecting safety must be corrected before accepting cargo.

6.4.4.2. Document minor damage, e.g. scratches, scrapes, small dents, etc., in the remarks section of the DD Form 1911. Have the shipper initial entry.

6.4.4.3. Inspect all containers to verify condition of seals. Request the shipper replace any broken or missing seals. Have the shipper verify the condition of the seals for palletized LLCs. If broken or missing seals cannot be replaced and the integrity of the container is suspect, reject the container. If the container is accepted with broken or missing seals and the integrity is not suspect, annotate the exact condition on DD Form 1911.

6.4.4.4. Nuclear and nuclear-related cargo presented for shipment must be exactly as described by the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request. If nuclear cargo differs from the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3. Serial numbers must also agree with those listed on DD Form 1911 and the cargo diplomatic clearance approval message, if required.

6.4.5. Accept custody of nuclear cargo by signing DD Form 1911 and release custody only on signature of positively identified authorized receivers or a replacement Courier. Do not sign for cargo that the Courier cannot maintain custody of and/or inspect.

6.4.6. The Courier is responsible for enforcing TPC.

6.5. Documentation. Shippers are required to provide properly completed DD Forms 1911. Instructions for the forms are in T.O. 11N-45-51. On mission termination at home station, return completed DD Forms 1911 to the squadron/unit. DD Forms 1387, *Military Shipment Label*, are required on LLCs by T.O. 11N-45-51. DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*, is required on all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number.

6.6. Replacement Courier.

6.6.1. If the Courier must be replaced while a mission is in progress, custody must be transferred to either a replacement Courier or a qualified Courier on the crew. The rest of the stations to be transited must be notified of the Courier change by message from the appropriate CCC or parent wing if the Courier was not previously included in the Mission Setup Message.

6.6.2. If a replacement Courier is not available, Courier duties may be assumed in the following order of precedence:

6.6.2.1. Courier Qualified Extra Pilot. In this case, the mission may proceed to where a replacement Courier is available or complete the mission if the additional pilot workload will not detract from Courier duties.

6.6.2.2. Aircraft Commander. As a last resort, use the Aircraft Commander as the Courier when it is more important from a security standpoint to move the mission than to wait for a replacement Courier. The primary consideration is always cargo security.

6.6.3. In an aircraft mishap, when the Courier and/or another Courier-qualified crewmember cannot perform duties, the highest ranking surviving crewmember will automatically assume Courier duties.

Chapter 7

NUCLEAR AIRLIFT MISSION SUPPORT

7.1. General. Nuclear airlift missions are one of the most important missions in the airlift system. Airlift priority of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) given to special weapons missions is 1A3 (CJCSI 4120.02C, *Assignment of Movement and Mobility Priority*), which is preceded only by presidential support, presidential-approved, and combat troop support missions. Priorities are used to fill Airlift Requests. All mobility agencies will support the missions according to the JCS priority. Support will involve all aspects of the mission, to include security, EOD, maintenance, fuel, aircrew transport, and billeting. Bases that belong to other MAJCOMs or services fall under AFJI 11-204. It requires base commanders to establish a written plan or directive to ensure priority support.

7.2. Nuclear Airlift Support. Bases with an operational PNAF wing and those that support PNAF missions will have a written plan or instruction to support these missions. In addition, plans at bases that regularly receive requirements to support loaded PNAF aircraft will also comply with AFJI 11-204. **Note:** Chapter 4 and the SWOG contain additional information on emergency divert locations.

7.3. Responsibilities.

7.3.1. Bases requiring a written instruction or plan to support nuclear missions will ensure the following is specified:

7.3.1.1. A single focal point to handle information on the mission.

7.3.1.2. The base communications procedures to notify the appropriate agencies of an inbound aircraft. Bases must be able to respond to a short-notice emergency divert.

7.3.1.3. Taxi routes and parking spots.

7.3.1.4. Security force procedures (equipment, response times, etc.).

7.3.1.5. Priority maintenance and aerial port support.

7.3.1.6. Priority crew transportation, billeting, and messing.

7.3.1.7. Fire-fighting support requirements in T.O. 11N-20-11.

7.3.1.8. EOD capability and responsibilities (notification procedures, response, and equipment requirements).

7.3.1.9. Emergency Management procedures, defined in the Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2.

7.3.2. The installation commander or OSC will be present for shipments and receipts of nuclear cargo to personally ensure priority support.

7.3.3. In addition to the support plan, installation commanders will ensure all support requirements are coordinated with appropriate base support agencies.

7.3.4. Commanders of USAFE units in tenant status will arrange priority support with their hosts.

7.4. Command and Control. Nuclear airlift missions place demands on the command and control system over and above normal operations. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD planners will ensure a "Y" is in the CLOSE WATCH block. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will monitor the status of each mission. Additionally, missions carrying nuclear cargo will be continuously tracked during execution. Specific responsibilities are:

7.4.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will maintain ready access to the SWOG and the DoD FCG, understand overflight procedures and restrictions, and in coordination with tanker planning section, coordinate tanker support, and obtain ALTRV approvals. Flight planning branch will validate computer flight plans (CFP) for compliance with the SWOG and DoD FCG restrictions, EURO Control Route Availability Document (RAD), ALTRV routings, and avoid heavily populated areas then transmit to the current C2 system. Mission planning section confirms diplomatic clearances and ensures alternates on CFPs are capable of supporting PNAF missions.

7.4.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will assist PNAF Aircraft Commanders in determining the best divert location for a nuclear mission. In accordance with the Mission Setup Message and this instruction, notify the selected divert location of all required support needed to meet the aircraft when it lands. When the Aircraft Commander informs 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG that he or she has selected a different divert location from the one pre-coordinated via the Mission Setup Message, the duty controller must then coordinate with the new divert location and advise the pre-coordinated divert location it is no longer under consideration as a divert option. When time permits, use guidance for mission change message in paragraph 2.6.

7.4.3. AMC/A7S and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will actively monitor security status of bases that nuclear airlift missions are scheduled to transit. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will be prepared to confirm each day's itinerary with Aircraft Commanders when they check in. Mission Setup Message will request a support confirmation message be sent from each base on the itinerary to appropriate CCC 24-hours before arrival at each base. Use this message to confirm security before allowing aircraft to proceed. Only attempt contact with the destination base to confirm support via non-secure means if the 24-Hour confirmation of support message has not been received.

7.4.4. Mission planning section will prepare and send mission change messages IAW paragraphs 2.6 and/or 4.16.3 after coordination with the Aircraft Commander. Check for conflicts with other nuclear missions and include hazardous cargo information if load is changed.

7.4.5. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will act as the point of contact between shippers or receivers and aircrew during the mission. Pass updates to down line bases as requested by the Aircraft Commander.

7.4.6. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will ensure nuclear airlift missions delayed for maintenance problems get immediate and priority support.

7.4.7. AMC Command Center will prepare and submit Operational Report 3 (OPREP-3) covering nuclear mission incidents according to paragraph 10.1 and JCS Pub 6.

7.5. Intelligence Support. Intelligence support is an essential element of the PNAF mission. It requires constant attention and adherence to procedures to successfully ensure PNAF safety and

security. To ensure PNAF missions and aircrews receive timely intelligence threat information, these procedures will be followed.

7.5.1. Home Station OSS/IN will:

7.5.1.1. Monitor planned PNAF missions for pre-mission intelligence briefing requirements and remain aware of off-station missions that could require en route Intelligence support.

7.5.1.2. Provide pre-mission intelligence briefings to PNAF aircrews IAW AFI 14-2C-17 Vol 3, *C-17 Unit Intelligence Procedures*.

7.5.1.2.1. Intelligence pre-mission briefings will be IAW AFI 14-2C-17 Vol 3, and must include the following:

7.5.1.2.2. Airborne and surface threats from potential hostile countries.

7.5.1.2.3. Terrorist and sabotage threats.

7.5.1.2.4. Other activity along route that might impact mission.

7.5.1.2.5. All source Foreign intelligence collection and criminal threats.

7.5.1.3. Debrief PNAF aircrews on their return as required and report mission results IAW the Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive (MIRD).

7.5.2. AMC/A2 will provide support IAW AFI 14-2C-17 Vol 3 and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. AMC/A2 will:

7.5.2.1. In coordination with AFOSI 3 FIR, disseminate a PNAF mission threat summary message for each PNAF mission using the PNAF Mission Setup Message addressee list. This message will assess the threat levels for each scheduled stop. This message will be disseminated no later than 24-hours prior to scheduled mission departure. Lead for Intelligence support (OSI or A2) will vary depending on mission itinerary.

7.5.2.2. Monitor PNAF missions worldwide and provide intelligence updates and threat warnings to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOZ and home station OSS/IN as necessary.

7.5.2.3. As needed, provide intelligence threat updates and terrorist advisories to Setup Message addresses during mission execution.

7.5.3. Where AMC intelligence personnel are not available, host base intelligence unit or theater air command intelligence staff will provide threat data to an en route mission.

Chapter 8

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

8.1. General. This guidance outlines maintenance procedures for aircraft used to carry nuclear cargo. It applies to all maintenance and operations personnel who support or conduct nuclear airlift missions.

8.2. Aircraft Selection and Preparation. Nuclear airlift missions are assigned JCS priority 1A3. Aircraft selected to fly these missions must not have any uncorrected history of repeat or recurring malfunctions on systems identified as mission capable IAW the Minimum Essential Subsystem Listing (MESL) Home Station Departure (HSD) Air Refueling Conventional (ARC) and be the most reliable aircraft for PNAF. Mission aircraft selected for a PNAF mission must meet the stringent criteria in this paragraph. The criteria are essential to preclude potential mission delays while the aircraft is in the mobility system. Missions are extensively coordinated and delay has a serious effect on nuclear surety.

8.2.1. Maintenance Operations Officer/Superintendent has the overall responsibility for aircraft selection, PNAF maintenance team selection, and aircraft preparation and will:

8.2.1.1. Select PNAF maintenance teams from highly experienced technicians who are motivated and qualified in their career field for their specific aircraft.

8.2.1.2. Coordinate with MOS Plans, Scheduling and Documentation Section to schedule aircraft for PNAF missions.

8.2.1.3. Oversee aircraft selection process.

8.2.1.4. Select a Senior Maintenance Representative (SMR) highly experienced on the C-17 to oversee and execute all aircraft preparation functions. The SMR must be an appropriately qualified maintenance officer, senior NCO, or civilian equivalent IAW AFI 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, as supplemented.

8.2.1.5. The operating wing may use an automated product (e.g. Excel Spreadsheet or Access Database) to maintain oversight of the aircraft preparation events, manage aircraft maintenance preparation actions, and provide leadership with preparation status. If used, the automated product will be approved by the wing NSM.

8.2.2. Aircraft Selection: Select the safest, most reliable aircraft available for PNAF missions. Aircraft will be selected by the unit not later than 48-hours before aircraft departure to accomplish inspections, servicing, maintenance, cleaning, and configuration. Select aircraft for PNAF missions based on the following:

8.2.2.1. Do not select aircraft that have a history of uncorrected repeat or recurring system malfunctions on any system identified in the aircraft MESL/ARC. All aircraft systems that will be used during PNAF missions must be classified mission capable in accordance with aircraft MESL for HSD/ARC. PNAF aircraft will not have any restrictions on systems and subsystems identified in the MESL for HSD/ARC that will be used during PNAF missions.

8.2.2.2. Aircraft will be equipped with equipment to enable continuous tracking by Command and Control agencies.

8.2.2.3. If a time change item is projected to come due during a PNAF Mission, replace it before departure. Aircraft engine time changes may be exceeded by 10 percent or 100 hours, whichever is greater, as prescribed in T.O. 2-1-18, *Aircraft Engine Operating Limits and Factors Operating Limits and Pipeline Times*.

8.2.2.4. All urgent action or interim routine safety time compliance technical orders (TCTOs) or one-time inspections will be accomplished before departure according to T.O. 00-5-15, *Air Force TCTO System*.

8.2.2.5. Tires with cuts deeper than 1/2 of the embossed tire cut limit, cuts which exceed 4/32inch deeper than the wear mark and tread groove without an embossed cut limit, or cuts of more than 1/2-inch in length will be replaced before PNAF missions. All cuts will be measured from the bottom of the nearest groove at the immediate vicinity of the cut. If a cut extends into the cord body, the tire will be replaced as prescribed In T.O. 4T-1-3, *Inspection, Maintenance Instructions, Storage, And Disposition Of Aircraft Tires And Inner Tubes*.

8.2.2.6. Aircraft selected will not have fuel leaks or seepage limits greater than 1/2 of the allowable limit in T.O. 1-1-3, *Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks, and Fuel Cells*.

8.2.2.7. Aircraft selected will not have hydraulic or oil leakage limits greater than 1/2 of the allowable limits in mission design series (MDS) specific technical orders.

8.2.2.8. Consider all available safety and structural enhancements when selecting an aircraft.

8.2.2.9. If an aircraft has evidence of a fuel tank fire, the aircraft will not be scheduled for or continue on a PNAF mission.

8.2.2.10. AFTO Form 781, *Arms Aircrew/Mission Flight Data Document* series forms must be reviewed to ensure no discrepancy exists that would keep aircraft from being used on a nuclear airlift mission, e.g. discrepancies with winch, tie-down equipment, rails, etc.

8.2.3. The PNAF SMR will:

8.2.3.1. Ensure aircraft are prepared for PNAF missions.

8.2.3.2. Review and validate accuracy of aircraft documentation (e.g., aircraft forms, CAMS/GO81 histories, time change items, special inspections, scheduled/unscheduled delayed discrepancies, outstanding time compliance technical orders, and engine data trend analysis). **Note:** Ensure aircraft documentation is cleared correctly IAW T.O. 00-20-1, *Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Inspection, Documentation, Policies and Procedures*, and the MAJCOM supplement.

8.2.3.3. Check CAMS/GO81 aircraft histories for completed repeat/recurring maintenance actions and required operational checks. Re-verify repeat/recurring discrepancies with questionable, incomplete actions or operational checks.

8.2.3.4. Ensure PNAF aircraft has a current preflight inspection.

8.2.3.5. An SMR will personally inspect aircraft for cleanliness (especially in tie down ring pans), proper configuration, and mechanical condition.

8.2.3.6. After aircraft has been prepared and inspected, a SMR will clear the aircraft forms by entering the following in the AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*, Corrective Action Block: "Aircraft prepared IAW appropriate directives." Until this is done, the aircraft is not mission ready.

8.2.4. PNAF Maintenance Team. The PNAF aircraft preparation maintenance team will:

8.2.4.1. Accomplish all inspections, maintenance, and servicing with the most highly qualified technicians available. For those aircraft with flying crew chiefs, they must be involved in the overall aircraft preparation, to ensure maintenance continuity during PNAF missions.

8.2.4.2. Perform a preflight inspection IAW T.O. 00-20-1 and any applicable AMC Supplements no later than 24-hours before mission departure.

8.2.4.3. Ensure all systems that will be used during the mission are operational in accordance with the command weapon system MESL, HSD/ARC.

8.2.4.4. Check C-17 stabilizing struts for proper operation, servicing, and leaks.

8.2.4.5. Ensure tiedown rings are clear of any debris that would prevent a chain or tiedown device from being attached. Replace any unserviceable tiedown rings that cannot be repaired IAW appropriate technical data.

8.2.4.6. Service winches in accordance with appropriate T.O. guidance.

8.2.4.7. Properly configure the aircraft and ensure all equipment specified by the wing operations directives will be aboard, including serviceable engine/inlet covers.

8.2.4.8. Ensure Aerial Port Squadron (APS) verify cargo tie down equipment has been inspected IAW T.O. 13C2-1-1, *Operation, Maintenance, and Test Instructions for Cargo Tie-Down Equipment*.

8.2.4.9. All liquid/gaseous oxygen/nitrogen will be serviced to capacity as prescribed in MDSspecific technical orders.

8.2.5. Required Equipment for aircraft departing home station. PNAF wings will establish local procedures for ensuring the equipment and shoring specified by the aircrew is delivered to the aircraft in sufficient time to allow for inventory and receipt before departure, to include but not limited to:

8.2.5.1. Two grounding wires, each 100 feet long.

8.2.5.2. Three sets of aircraft chocks (six total).

8.2.5.3. Shoring and special equipment as specified in paragraph 3.1.4.

8.2.5.4. PNAF aircraft will have two cases each of hydraulic fluid and engine oil.

8.3. General Maintenance and Servicing.

8.3.1. Preflight validity period will be IAW T.O. 00-20-1.

8.3.2. Refer to AFI 91-115 for limitations and procedures related to fueling, maintenance, and servicing.

8.3.3. Fuel servicing guidance for explosive loaded aircraft is contained in T.O. 00-25-172, *Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding*. For each mission leg, the aircraft shall be refueled before being loaded with nuclear material to reduce the severity of a mishap. Cargo aircraft loaded with transportation-configured explosives may be refueled at aircraft explosive cargo parking areas, commonly called hot cargo pads. If fuel servicing is necessary with nuclear cargo aboard, ensure firefighting support requirements (fire extinguishers, Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting vehicle, etc.) are available and positioned IAW AFI 91-115 and T.O. 11N-20-11.

8.3.4. Aircrew must control all maintenance activities on aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard.

8.3.5. Do not perform maintenance that increases the probability of fire on an aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard.

8.3.6. Complete fuel or oxygen servicing, and any loading of external chaff or flares before loading nuclear cargo.

8.3.7. Do not load flares or chaff unless required for the PNAF mission.

8.3.8. Do not transport replenishment chaff or flares.

8.3.9. Do not service aircraft or use integral jacking during nuclear cargo loading or unloading.

8.3.10. Do not jack with nuclear cargo aboard. **Exception:** Using aircraft integral jacking procedures to lift one set of landing gear for minor maintenance that includes a tire change is authorized.

8.4. En route Maintenance.

8.4.1. Close coordination between MAJCOM CCC, USAFE AMOCC, 618 AOC (TACC), maintenance, and Aircraft Commander is required at all times, especially when PNAF aircraft has a maintenance problem.

8.4.2. Safety and security of nuclear cargo must be considered at all times when coordinating maintenance support. The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

8.4.3. Use weapon system MESL to determine status of PNAF aircraft. A Maintenance Operations Control (MOC) senior controller will personally monitor maintenance support for PNAF missions while on their station.

8.4.4. Maintenance support of nuclear airlift missions will take precedence over missions with lesser priorities.

8.4.5. When a replacement aircraft is required en route, every effort must be made to select an aircraft to meet the criteria in paragraph 8.2.

8.4.5.1. The aircraft may be selected from the nearest location consistent with mission requirements.

8.4.5.2. Spare aircraft selected from other locations will only be selected after coordination with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG.

8.4.5.3. Open discrepancies must not adversely affect or delay a PNAF mission. Special aircraft preparation entries in the AFTO Form 781A are not required.

8.4.5.4. New aircraft must be sanitized according to Chapter 5, as required for the mission.

8.5. Safety Precautions and Personnel Requirements.

8.5.1. If nuclear cargo is aboard, perform maintenance only in the presence of the aircrew, who will ensure proper safety precautions are used. Take the following safety precautions, as well as any others deemed necessary:

8.5.1.1. Use only equipment, procedures, and checklists that are consistent with US Air Force approved publications for any operation directly associated with nuclear cargo.

8.5.1.2. Approved publications must conform to the safety rules in AFI 91-115 and DoDD 3150.2.

8.5.1.3. Ground aircraft in accordance with MDS specific technical orders and T.O. 00-25-172.

8.5.1.4. Aircraft parking areas must satisfy explosive quantity-distance criteria. Consult the local explosive safety officer when in doubt.

8.5.1.5. If cargo compartment access is required, the aircrew will cover the items to the maximum extent possible. As a minimum the item serial numbers will be covered.

Chapter 9

POST MISSION REQUIREMENTS

9.1. General. This Chapter describes procedures for reporting and solving problems encountered on nuclear airlift missions and for identifying outstanding host base support to nuclear airlift missions.

9.2. Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP). This report is used to correct deficiencies in equipment, procedures, or support. It is a way to monitor, evaluate, and continually improve operational policies and procedures. The Aircraft Commander may submit a report on a mission, or the squadron/unit nuclear airlift monitor may submit a report when multiple missions encounter the same problem.

9.2.1. Do not use the SAAMREP in place of other reports, e.g., hazard reports, DULL SWORD reports, material deficiency reports (MDR), or command operational reports, such as AMC Form 43, *AMC Transient Aircrew Facilities Comment*, or AMC Form 54, *Aircraft Commander's Report on Services/Facilities*.

9.2.2. Prepare the SAAMREP in message format as illustrated in Attachment 5.1. Include enough details to identify deficiencies and clearly state problem areas. As a minimum, include names, organizations, date, time, and place. The report should be in sufficient detail to stand alone. Separate reports by problem area and location to assist in timely resolution. Include a statement in the report that the on-scene coordinator was informed of the problem. When a report results from multiple missions encountering the same problem, indicate who was contacted at the location about the problem.

9.2.3. Classify the report (if necessary).

9.2.4. Report Processing:

9.2.4.1. The squadron/unit NAM will ensure reports are prepared in accordance with paragraph 9.2.2. Significant problems that are solved on the spot through aircrew involvement or at squadron/unit level may be submitted as reports "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY." In these cases, label the report "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY," assign it a unit number, and file it with other SAAMREPs. Send a copy of the report to AMC/A3N to facilitate MAJCOM monitoring of the entire PNAF.

9.2.4.2. The squadron/unit commander must endorse "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY" reports and reports up-channeled to the parent wing and MAJCOM. Information addressees on up-channeled reports are AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD, AMC/SEW, the parent wing NSM, SEW, and PNAF squadron/unit. The commander or operations officer of the base where the problem occurred must be an information addressee on report.

9.2.4.3. The wing Nuclear Surety Manager reviews the report and determines Wing Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

9.2.4.4. The squadron/unit NAM will send the report to AMC/A3N for action within 14 days of mission completion. If AMC/A3N determines it is the appropriate level for

problem resolution, they take responsibility from the initial report and notify subordinate levels.

9.2.5. Each level acts on reported problems within 5 duty days from receipt. Include all previously addressed information addressees on correspondence related to the problem.

9.2.6. Each agency, regardless of level, maintains a log or file of SAAMREPs showing the date received, the agency the report was sent to and date, and brief comments about its status.

9.2.7. The final action agency sends response directly to AMC/A3N with all other levels as information addressees via message format as illustrated in Attachment 5.2. If AMC/A3N is the final action agency, send the response to the initiating squadron/unit, with all other levels as information addressees. AMC/A3N will forward the completed SAAMREP to AMC/SEW and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD for review of recommended actions. AMC SEW will determine if the report should be forwarded to the AMC Nuclear Surety and Operations Council (NSOC) for command level oversight of recommended actions.

9.2.8. The squadron/unit NAM debriefs the individual who submitted the report on the problem resolution.

9.2.9. SAAMREPs are maintained for 2-years from the month of close-out.

9.2.10. The preferred method of solving problems is for the Aircraft Commander to identify and solve them immediately with local personnel and the chain of command.

9.2.11. The squadron/unit NAM keeps mission debrief records and "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY" reports on file so the unit can effectively show a recent problem was not an isolated incident and warrants a separate SAAMREP.

9.3. AF Form 527F, Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support. Send AF Form 527Fs to AMC/SEW to recognize outstanding host base supports of nuclear airlift missions. AMC/SEW awards the Annual Nuclear Surety Certificate of Appreciation.

9.3.1. The Aircraft Commander or designated representative completes AF Form 527F covering each DoD installation that supports his or her aircraft while carrying nuclear and nuclear-related cargo.

9.3.2. Do not use AF Form 527F in lieu of the SAAMREP or other reports to identify and solve problems.

9.3.3. Classify AF Form 527F according to Mission Setup Message only if the base being rated is not on the numerical listing of bases published by AMC/A3N. When using the numerical designation for base location, be sure the narrative does not contain classified information.

9.3.4. If possible, provide a copy of AF Form 576F to the on-scene coordinator. Do not include location or numerical listing on that copy.

9.3.5. Squadron/unit NAM will provide copies of the AF Form 527F to AMC/SEW and A3N within 14 days of mission completion.

Chapter 10

REPORTING NUCLEAR MISHAPS

10.1. General. Aircrews are responsible for initiating mishap reports should a mishap occur involving nuclear and nuclear-related cargo in their custody. Reportable events involving nuclear cargo range from a condition that could degrade nuclear safety to the loss or destruction of nuclear cargo. These events require a report IAW AFMAN 91-221 and are categorized as nuclear accidents, incidents, or deficiencies (AID). Nuclear AIDs are identified with the flag words which are covered in AFMAN 91-221. Refer to the SWOG for additional guidance for overseas mishaps.

WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS
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Attachment 1

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AMCI 11-208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, 1 June 2000

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T.O. 2-1-18, *Aircraft Engine Operating Limits and Factors Operating Limits and Pipeline Times*, 01 January 2003

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T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD), 51B, 51, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Material*, 10 December 2010

T.O. 13C2-1-1, *Operation, Maintenance, and Test Instructions for Cargo Tie-Down Equipment*, 8 December 2009

Prescribed Forms

AF Form 527A, *Security Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527B, *Courier Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527C, *Shipper's Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527D, *Acknowledgment of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 527E, *24-Hour Confirmation of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*

Adopted Forms

AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*

AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*

AF Form 1199, *Air Force Entry Control Card*

AF Form 4114, *C-17A Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*

DD Form 175, *Flight Plan, Military*

DD Form 1385, *Cargo Manifest*

DD Form 1387, *Shipment Label, Military*

DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*

DD Form 1801, *International Flight Plan, DoD*

DD Form 1911, *Material Courier Receipt*

DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*

DD Form 2825, *Internal Receipt*

SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*

AMC Form 43, *AMC Transient Aircrew Comments*

AMC Form 292, *C17A Special Loading Equipment Receipt*

AMC Form 54, *Aircraft Commander's Report on Services/Facilities*

AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*

AFTO Form 781, *ARMS Aircrew/Mission Flight Data Document*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A/R—Air Refueling

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFJI—Air Force Joint Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFNWC/NCL—Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center/Nuclear Logistic Division
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
AFSEC—Air Force Safety Center
AGE—Aerospace Ground Equipment
AID—Accidents, Incidents, or Deficiencies
ALTRV—Altitude Reservation
AMC—Air Mobility Command
AOC—Air Operations Center
AOR—Area of Responsibility
APU—Auxiliary Power Unit
ARC—Air Refueling Conventional
ATC—Air Traffic Control
AW—Airlift Wing
CAC—Common Access Card
CC—Commander
CCC—Consolidated Control Center (618 AOC (TACC)/XOC)
CDS—Command Disable System
CDD—Crew Duty Day
CDT—Crew Duty Time
CFP—Computer Flight Plans
CG—Center of Gravity
COMSEC—Communications Security
CONUS—Continental United States
C-RD—Confidential Restricted Data
DDD—Desired Delivery Date
DoD—Department of Defense
DOE—Department of Energy
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAL—Entry Authority List
ECP—Entry Control Point
EDD—Explosive Detector Dog

ENAO—Emergency Nuclear Airlift Operations
EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ETA—Estimated Time of Arrival
FCC—Flying Crew Chief
FCG—Foreign Clearance Guide
FCP—Foreign Clearance Program
FEV—Functional Expert Visit
FRAG—Local Fragmentary Order
FRD—Formerly Restricted Data
GDSS—Global Decision Support System
HSD—Home Station Departure
INRAD—Intrinsic Radiation
ICAO—International Civil Aeronautical Organization
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
LLC—Limited Life Component
LOA—Letter of Agreement
MAJCOM—Major Command
MASO—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer
MDR—Material Deficiencies Report
MDS—Mission Design Series (e.g., C-17)
MEP—Mission Essential Personnel
MESL—Mission Essential Subsystem Listing
MHE—Materials Handling Equipment
MIRD—Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive
MOC—Maintenance Operation Control Center
MUNS—Munitions Squadron
MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadron
NAF—Numbered Air Force
NAM—Nuclear Airlift Monitor
NEW—Net Explosive Weight
NHC—Negative Hazardous Cargo
NLT—No Later Than

NM—Nautical Miles
NOFORN—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOSS—Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule
NSC—Nuclear Surety Council
NSM—Nuclear Surety Manager
NWRM—Nuclear Weapons Related Material
NSSAV—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit
NTWG—Nuclear Transportation Working Group
OCONUS—Outside the Continental US
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP—3 – Operational Report 3
ORM—Operational Risk Management
OSC—On-Scene Coordinator
OSI—Office of Special Investigations
PAL—Permissive Action Link
PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
PPR—Prior Permission Required
PRP—Personnel Reliability Program
PWG—PNAF Working Group
RD—Restricted Data
RON—Remain Over Night
SAAM—Special Assignment Airlift Mission
SAAMREP—Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report
SECDEF—Secretary of Defense
SMR—Senior Maintenance Representative
SOE—Sequence of Events
SSN—Social Security Number
SVA—Sole Vouching Authority
SWOG—Special Weapons Overflight Guide
S-RD—Secret Restricted Data
S-FRD—Secret Formerly Restricted Data
TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TCTO—Time Compliance Technical Order

TPC—Two Person Concept

UHF—Ultra High Frequency

USAFE—United States Air Force in Europe

VHF—Very High Frequency

WSA—Weapons Storage Area

WSSR—Weapon System Safety Rules

Terms

Class II Components.—Weapon components composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear released during detonation.

Custody.—The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, weapons and their components. Custody also includes maintaining accountability for weapons and their components.

Handling.—Physically maneuvering weapons either directly or indirectly by people.

Inert Devices.—Devices not containing hazardous materials, but closely resembling nuclear item or explosive items that are classified as hazardous.

Logistics Movement.—The transport of nuclear weapons in connection with supply or maintenance operations. Under certain specified conditions, combat aircraft may be used for such movements.

Nuclear Airlift Mission. A SAAM tasked to transport Nuclear or DoD Nuclear—Related cargo.

Nuclear Cargo.—Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and Class II nuclear components prepared for logistics movement.

Nuclear—Related Cargo. Nuclear training and test weapons, non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, limited life components (LLC), and equipment associated with the logistics movement of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapon.—A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration that, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.—Those aircrews, aircraft, and other functions that provide for peacetime support of logistical airlift of nuclear weapons and nuclear components.

Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).—All domestic requirements and those requiring special or delivery at points other than those within the established channel airlift route patterns and those that require special handling due to weight or size of the cargo, the urgency or sensitivity of movement, or other special factors.

Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG). A United States Air Force— developed AFI, applicable to all elements of the DoD, which delineates areas authorized for overflight by United

States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and the specific security classification for overflight of foreign countries.

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS & REQUIREMENTS

Table A2.1. Cargo Requirements

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept ¹	Cargo Classification	Security Required ¹	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WARHEADS, AND RELATED COMPONENTS / KITS

War Reserve Weapons (Bombs, Warheads, Missiles)	Yes	Yes	Yes	S-RD	Type I	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class II Nuclear Components (H1343)	Yes	Yes	See T.O. 11N-45-51A	C-RD or S-RD	Type I	No	Yes	Yes
Limited Life Components (LLCs)	No	Yes	No	C-RD or S-RD	Type II	No	Yes ²	Yes
H1700 With or Without Components	No	Yes	No	Unclassified - S-RD	Type II	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base Spares Group X Kits	No	No	No	Unclassified	PL3	No	No	No

NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELATED TRAINING UNITS

Bomb Dummy Units (BDU)	No ³	No	No ³	Unclassified	PL3 ³	No	No	No
Munitions Dummy Unit (MDU)	No ³	No	No ³	Unclassified	PL3 ³	No	No	No
Type 3A, B, C, and D Trainers	Yes	Yes	No	Normally Secret-RD ⁴	Type II	No	No	Yes
Type 3E Trainers (OCONUS Only)	Yes	Yes	No	Unclass ⁵	PL3	No	No	No

Attachment 2 NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS & REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept ¹	Cargo Classification	Security Required ¹	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
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OTHER MAJOR ASSEMBLIES (OMA) /JOINT TEST ASSEMBLIES(JTA)⁶

Joint Test Assemblies	Yes	Yes	No	S-RD	Type II	No	Yes	Yes
OMA (e.g. CTU, VFA, ITMU, TTTU)	Yes	See Note 6	No	Unclassified – S-RD	PL3 ⁶	No	Yes ²	Yes for OCONUS

Notes:

Note 1. In accordance with this table or as required by the user, whichever is more restrictive.

Note 2. Required when transported to/from OCONUS. Once in-theater, non-PNAF USAFE or AMC aircrews and aircraft may transport LLCs, other Type II cargo, and OMAs. Ref: TO 11N-45-51A.

Note 3. May simulate / execute equivalent WR weapon requirements for exercise or training purposes or per unit request.

Note 4. Type 3A, B, C, D trainers are NWRM and require positive inventory control. Ref: AFI 20-110

Note 5. Type 3E load trainers are not NWRM. Ref: AFI 20-110

Note 6. OMA's may include but are not limited to, Joint Test Assemblies (JTA), Compatibility Test Units (CTU), Vibration Fly Around Units (VFA), Instrumented Test Measurement Units (ITMU), and Thermal Telemeter Test Units (TTTU). Transportation requirements will be determined by AFNWC/NCL. Security requirements will vary, handle IAW security classification.

Attachment 3

MISSION SETUP MESSAGE

This attachment depicts an example Mission Setup Message. Planners may deviate from this format as necessary to accommodate mission-specific requirements and ensure proper information is thoroughly coordinated between all agencies executing or supporting the tasked mission.

Figure A3.1 – Sample Set-up Message

----- [START OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE] -----

****618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON MISSION: ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON DSN 779-4584. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG AT DSN 779-3366/3367 TO REACH THE ON-CALL PLANNER. 24-HourS PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG STE 779-0324-3366/3367. ****

(U) MMM SAAM: 0000-00 // DTG: DD0000Z MMM YY // Call Sign: REACH 0000

(U) Part I is UNCLASSIFIED, Part II is classified (*Identify classification*)

PART I (*Use this section to describe the unclassified / releasable mission data*)

(U) Close Watch SAAM 0000-00 operated by C-17; itinerary follows (all dates calendar MMM YY; all times ZULU):

(Indicate information for all installations transited or tasked for support and any aerial refueling tracks in the provided blocks. Arrival/Departure info will be depicted in DD/hhmm format, Ground Time / Event Duration will be in hh+mm format. Indicate key Unclassified information in the Remarks blocks)

Station / Event	ICAO	Arrival/ Start Time	Ground Time/Event Duration	Departure/ End Time	Remarks

Notes: (*Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below*)

Note 1. The air refueling track is not a published track and has no specific identifier. This is the GDSS identifier used for non-published air refueling tracks.

Note 2. The active portion of the mission is complete at this station. The remaining itinerary may change without need to create a Setup Message change.

PART II (*Use this section to describe the classified support and cargo requirements*)

- 1. (U)** *Indicate mission priority here. For example “JCS Priority is 1A3.”*
- 2. (U)** *Indicate type of cargo being transported IAW the appropriate parts of this instruction. For example “This mission transports Nuclear (and/or Nuclear Related) cargo.” Furthermore, indicate the following: “Priority support is required by AFJI 11-204, A/R 95-27. Specific requirements are identified by station in paragraph (indicate appropriate*

paragraph).”

3. Use this section to describe the cargo hazards for each location tasked to support. (U)
Hazardous cargo on-board for arrival at station:

STATION	T.O. 11N-20-11 LINE NUMBER ¹

Notes: : (Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below)
Note 1. Shippers: DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling Data/Certification, are required on all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number.
Note 2. Not a scheduled landing. Hazardous cargo information only for divert situation.

4. (U) Types of Security (*List only the Security references*)
- 4.1. (U) Type I -- Security IAW to DoDD 5210.41; Enclosure 9, DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; (AFMAN 31-108Vol 3_AFGM1)
- 4.2. (U) Type II -- Security IAW DoDD 5210.41; Enclosure 9, DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; (AFMAN 31-108Vol 3_AFGM1)
5. (*Identify Classification*) **Special Requirements for Each Station** (*Indicate requirements for all installations transited or tasked for support in separate paragraphs with sub-paragraphs detailing the following if appropriate for each installation:*
- 1) Fuel, MHE, or equipment requirements
 - 2) Clarify if specific waivers or command authorizations are granted/approved at each installation
 - 3) Crew requirements for billeting or vehicles
 - 4) Requirements for security by location [Type I, Type II, standby/divert support, etc.]
 - 5) EDD requirements when necessary
 - 6) Fireguard requirements where necessary
 - 7) Support / SF release coordination
 - 8) PPR requirements, to include a suspense for receiving the PPR
 - 9) Message acknowledgment expectations

(Separately identify de-positioning itinerary installation information after the following statement)

****THE ACTIVE PORTION OF THIS MISSION IS NOW COMPLETE. THE REMAINING PORTION OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS INFORMATIONAL ONLY AND MAY CHANGE WITHOUT CREATING A SETUP MESSAGE CHANGE.****

6. (U) Courier Officer will be one of the following (*these individuals are authorized to sign and receipt for nuclear weapons/DOE/NNSA specified cargo*):

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>

7. (U) Acknowledgement and Confirmation Messages

- 7.1. (U) Send acknowledgement of the station support requirements listed in this classified message *NLT DD MMM/0000Z*. Send to the following SIPR addresses 618 TACC/XOC-DD02 (TACC.XOC.DD2@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); 618 TACC/XOOON SAAM MISSIONS (TACC.XOOON@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); tasked unit organizational account (e.g. 4AS.DOOMS.MCCHORD@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL). Blank acknowledgement and 24-Hour confirmation forms were included with this message. Please complete the appropriate form for Acknowledgement or confirmation.
- 7.2. (U) Send acknowledgement messages for any subsequent changes to the Setup using the proper form in para. 7.1., except use “**Acknowledge Change X to Setup MMM SAAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. Fill in the Change Number block of the form with appropriate number.
- 7.3. (U) Send a confirmation message 24-Hours (or last duty day) prior to the aircraft scheduled arrival at your location. Use the proper form listed in para. 7.1, except use “**24-Hour Confirmation MMM SAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY (CHANGE X)**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. **Your station may be required to send multiple 24-Hour confirmations if the mission will transit your base on different days.**

8. (U) Send required briefings to tasked unit NLT COB DD MMM YY.

9. (U) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON POC's are [NAME], [NAME], and [NAME].

****ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON STE DSN 312-779-4584****

DERIVED FROM: TCG-WPMU-2, 09/2004 & SPECIAL WEAPONS OVERFLIGHT GUIDE, 08/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: [NAME]

Exempt from Automatic Declassification - FRD

----- **[END OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE]** -----

Attachment 4

PNAF FORMS

Figure A4.1. Identification of an Official Courier Letter.

<p>MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN</p> <p>FROM: (Appropriate Wing/CC)</p> <p>SUBJECT: Identification of an Official Courier</p> <p>1. (Rank) (Name), (SSN), USAF, is acting in an official capacity as Courier for (organization) and is carrying one mission kit in support of this assigned mission. Documents in this kit will be used during temporary duty in conjunction with this mission and returned to (organization) when the mission terminates.</p> <p>2. The inscriptions on the cover, "OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION, EXEMPT FROM EXAMINATION," and the signature of the Courier's commander further identify this kit.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Wing Commander Signature Official Signature Block</p>
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Figure A4.2. Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination.

<p>MEMORANDUM FOR CUSTOMS AND QUARANTINE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Date)</p> <p>FROM: (Aircraft Commander)</p> <p>SUBJECT: Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination</p> <p>Office (base name—port of entry)—I hereby certify that aircraft (type and number), based at (name and location of base), is carrying classified cargo, and I request a waiver of customs and quarantine boarding and examination. I further certify that all baggage (crew and passenger) has or will be offloaded and made available for customs examination, and that the aircraft has been sprayed in accordance with AFJI 48-104, Quarantine Regulations of Armed Forces, or as requested by the quarantine inspector.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Signature of Aircraft Commander) (Rank)</p>

Note: Use official stationary header

Figure A4.3. Mission Sequence of Events Checklist (Sample).

MEMORANDUM FOR HOST BASE AGENCIES (Date)

FROM: Courier Officer

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events Checklist (Mission Number)

1. This checklist is to be used to coordinate the support activities for the departure of aircraft tail number _____ on _____ (date). (Indicate time as Zulu or local.)

- a. Crew legal for alert (LFA) time _____
- b. Aircrew will show at aircraft not later than _____
- c. Fuel will be available not later than _____ (refuel time _____)
- d. EDD team will be available NLT _____ (preflight & MWD time _____)
- e. Security established not later than ¹ _____
- f. Convoy start time not later than ² _____
- g. Time required to convoy (security forces estimated) _____
- h. Loading start time ³ _____
- i. Time required to load cargo (aircrew estimated) _____
- j. Start taxi and takeoff _____
- k. Scheduled departure time _____

2. Contacts:

- a. Shipper (name, rank, telephone): _____
- b. Security forces (name, rank, telephone): _____
- c. Aircrew Courier (name, rank, contact point): _____
- d. On scene coordinator or senior officer (name, rank, telephone):

Remarks: (Maintenance/servicing requirements, special requests, load sequence, EDD time, etc)

Notes:

Note 1. Security should be established NLT convoy start time.

Note 2. Aircraft maintenance, servicing, preflight and sanitization should be completed no later than convoy start time.

Note 3. Cargo should arrive at the aircraft not later than 10-minutes before load time.

2. Access List(s)

Attachment 5

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSION (SAAM) REPORTS (SAAMREP)

Figure A5.1. Example of Original Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP).

APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION		
		OPERATING SQUADRON/UNIT CC
		PARENT WING Current Operations
	INFO	618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD
	INFO	USAF/A5XP (OCONUS Location)
		USAFE/A10 (if USAFE-related SAAMREP)
		PARENT MAJCOM A3N/A10
		PARENT MAJCOM SEW
		PARENT WING SEW
		HOST BASE/AGENCY CC/DO/POC

(APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION)

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSION REPORT - (UNIT REPORT SEQUENCE NUMBER) (U)

1. (U) UNIT NR: (SQUADRON/UNIT PLUS SEQUENCE NUMBER).
2. (U) MISSION IDENTIFICATION:
 - A. (U) AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER.
 - B. (U) MISSION NUMBER.
 - C. (U) MISSION DATES.
3. (CLASSIFICATION) GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS ENCOUNTERED: (SECURITY, LOGISTIC, SHIPPER, COMMUNICATION, LOADING EQUIPMENT, ETC.).
4. (U) ON-SCENE COORDINATOR INFORMED OF PROBLEM. (YES OR NO) IF NO, STATE WHY.
5. (CLASSIFICATION) SPECIFIC COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS:
6. (U) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: (NAME/RANK/ORGANIZATION).
7. (CLASSIFICATION) INITIAL ENDORSEMENT: (SQUADRON/UNIT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS).

Figure A5.2. Example of Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP) Response.

APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION	
	ACTION OFFICE
	NEXT ACTION OFFICE
	INFO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD
	USAF/A5XP (OCONUS Location)
	USAFE/A10 (if USAFE-related SAAMREP)
	PARENT MAJCOM A3N/A10
	PARENT MAJCOM SEW
	INTERMEDIATE LEVELS ADDRESSED ON ORIGINAL REPORT
	LOWER LEVELS ADDRESSED ON ORIGINAL REPORT
<p>(APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION)</p> <p>FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954</p> <p>REF A (ACTION OFFICE AND DATE TIME GROUP OF ORIGINAL REPORT)</p> <p>REF B (REFERENCE ANY AND ALL OTHER MESSAGES CONCERNING THE SUBJECT REPORT)</p> <p>1. (U) UNIT NR: (SEE ORIGINAL MESSAGE)</p> <p>2. (CLASSIFICATION) SPECIFIC COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS/ACTIONS/ENDORSEMENTS:</p> <p>3. (U) ENDORSER: (NAME/RANK/ORGANIZATION)</p> <p>4. (U) REQUEST EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE TO AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD, AND MESSAGE ORIGINATOR.</p> <p>Officer's Name, Rank, Office Symbol, DSN Phone</p> <p>Commander's Name, Rank, XX OG/CC, DSN Phone</p> <p>APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION STATEMENT</p>	