

**10 MARCH 1998**

**Command Policy**



**NUCLEAR SURETY (NS) STAFF ASSISTANCE  
VISIT (SAV) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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OPR: HQ USAFE/LGWN (Maj Matthews)

Certified by: HQ USAFE/LGW (Lt Col Walecka)

Pages: 39

Distribution: F

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This instruction implements AFPD 90-2, *The Inspector General—The Inspection System*. This instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for conducting nuclear surety (NS) staff assistance visits (SAV). It provides guidance to all levels of command participating in the NS SAV process and contains templates for use by Headquarters United States Forces in Europe (USAFE) NS SAV teams and subordinate units to successfully prepare for and conduct an NS SAV. It applies to designated USAFE directorates, 3rd and 16th Air Force staff agencies, parent wing main operating bases (MOB) (when augmenting the NS SAV team), and all USAFE units participating in the NS SAV program. Attachment 1 is a glossary of references, abbreviations and acronyms, and supporting information; Attachment 2 is a sample general NS SAV report information submission; Attachment 3 is a sample final report; Attachment 4 is a sample executive summary; Attachment 5 is a sample AF Form 1768, **Staff Summary Sheet**; Attachment 6 lists unit POCs; Attachment 7 contains a template for site access message; Attachment 8 is a template for AF Form 3908, **Military Airlift (MILAIR) Request**, Attachment 9 contains a template for unit simulations/deviations; and Attachment 10 is a sample unit itinerary. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

**1. Scope .** The NS SAV program provides commanders with an evaluation for their unit's nuclear surety readiness. The NS SAV team observes how the unit conducts day-to-day operations and administers nuclear surety program management. The objective is twofold: To determine if higher headquarters guidance is clear and unambiguous, and to determine if the unit is properly applying sound guidance. The NS SAV may serve as a guide to prepare for an upcoming nuclear surety inspection (NSI); however, an NS SAV only provides a "snapshot." The scope and depth of the SAV are not sufficient to provide a complete assessment of all areas subject to inspection. The NS SAV also provides an opportunity for resolution and clarification of issues between the unit and headquarters functional managers.

**2. General Information .** The NS SAV team assesses all nuclear plans, programs, and procedures according to USAFEI 90-201, *USAFE Nuclear Surety Inspection Program*. A complete listing of all areas subject to evaluation by the team (critical and non-critical) is included at Attachment 3, Sample Final Unit Report.

2.1. Each unit receives an annual NS SAV, usually in the anniversary month of its last NS SAV and no earlier than 6 months prior to their NSI. Since the 731st Munitions Support Squadron (731MUNSS, Araxos AB, Greece) is on a 12-month NSI cycle (due to its status as a remote assignment), its NS SAV occurs on a more frequent basis. The 731MUNSS will receive an NS SAV twice a year at an interval of no less than 4 months prior to its NSI and within 4 months of its latest NSI.

2.2. Exceptions may be granted for NS SAVs to occur outside of regular intervals due to mission or other circumstances beyond the unit's control (i.e., participation in deployments, contingencies, etc.). Unit commanders should request an exception to policy by message, through the normal chain of command, to the Munitions Division (HQ USAFE/LGW), HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//LGW// not later than 60 days prior to the team's original arrival date. Explain why adjustment is necessary and provide alternate dates (coordinated with host-nation command for MUNSS). Units will provide information copies to 3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//LG// and 52LG SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//CC// for Northern Region. Southern Region bases send an information copy to 16AF AVIANO AB IT//LG// and 31LG AVIANO AB IT//CC//.

2.3. An NS SAV team consists of a team chief and 20 to 25 team members. The specific size and composition of the team depends on the needs of each unit. A normal NS SAV team composition is provided in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Composition**

<b>OFFICE</b>	<b>AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY</b>
TBD	Team Chief
LGW	Weapons maintenance, loading, munitions operations/control, weapons storage and security system (WS3), technical operations, storage practices, logistics movements, nuclear ordnance commodity management (NOCM)
LGM	Aerospace ground equipment
LGT	Fleet management
OL-ELO	Engineering liaison; aircraft certification
SFO	Security/custody
CEO	Lightning protection, generators, facilities
CEX	Fire protection; explosive ordnance disposal (MOB only)
SEW	Weapons safety/surety program management; nuclear certified equipment (NCE); electromagnetic radiation (EMR)
DPX	Personnel reliability program; personnel
SGO	Personnel reliability program; medical
AOS/AOT	Command and control

AOS/DOV	Aircrew acceptance; publications and technical orders; weapons acceptance, training, and aircrew testing
USAFE CSS/SCB	Communications maintenance and operations (Communications Security (COMSEC), Base Intrusion Security System (BISS), land mobile radio (LMR), electromagnetic radiation (EMR), Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3)

2.4. Each unit NS SAV is normally 1 week in duration. The team reserves Saturday or Sunday to travel, with Monday through Friday set aside for a comprehensive review of all nuclear programs and contingency exercises. The team chief conducts an inbrief (preferably on Sunday) and an outbrief (by noon Friday after all assessments and validations are complete) with the wing or unit commander and designated unit staff. Direct interaction between team chief, all evaluators, the wing or unit commander, and their respective staffs is highly encouraged to ensure the NS SAV efficiently accomplishes its objectives.

### 3. Responsibilities .

3.1. The Directorate of Logistics (HQ USAFE/LG) is the focal point for all nuclear surety oversight activity on the USAFE staff. In this role, HQ USAFE/LG will provide guidance to HQ USAFE/LGW as overall administrator of the NS SAV process. HQ USAFE/LG:

3.1.1. Ensures team chiefs are appointed and trained for each NS SAV.

3.1.2. Ensures HQ USAFE/LGW centrally manages, budgets, administers and controls funds associated with the NS SAV program.

3.2. HQ USAFE/LGW is the administrator of the NS SAV program. HQ USAFE/LGW will ensure all procedures necessary to effectively govern the NS SAV program remain current and are included in this instruction. Specific duties and responsibilities are as follows:

3.2.1. Plan, organize, coordinate, direct, and follow-up on activities affecting the NS SAV program.

3.2.2. Develop, coordinate, and distribute the annual NS SAV schedule. Send a copy to each numbered air force (NAF), wing, unit commander, and USEUCOM staff directorate after receiving approval from all parties. Complete all actions by 1 Sep of each year.

3.2.2.1. Resolve potential conflicts between a scheduled NS SAV and unit taskings.

3.2.3. Manage and control NS SAV program funds as directed by HQ USAFE/LG and the Office of Financial Management and Comptroller (HQ USAFE/FM).

3.2.3.1. Budget, schedule, and centrally administer all NS SAV expenditures.

3.2.3.2. Forecast annually for NS SAV funding requirements and document in the HQ USAFE/LG Financial Plan.

3.2.4. Publish all orders pertaining to NS SAVs.

3.2.5. Formally request volunteers through HQ USAFE/LG to serve as NS SAV team chiefs, as required.

3.2.5.1. Provide team chiefs with pre-departure oversight and training on the NS SAV process.

3.3. Weapons Maintenance (HQ USAFE/LGWN) provides management and oversight of the NS SAV program. Specifically, the NS SAV program manager will:

3.3.1. Develop and maintain current databases on the subjects described in the following paragraphs and maintain continuity guides and trip books for future reference.

3.3.1.1. Identify all potential team members, by functional area. Include each member's name, rank, social security account number, security clearance, line badge number (as appropriate), identification card number or RAPIDS, passport number (as appropriate), and place of birth.

3.3.1.2. Maintain a list of all NS SAV locations. Maintain current directional maps and brochures on each location to include: Hotels, rest areas, airports, car and van rental locations, restaurants, etc.

3.3.1.3. Maintain a list of key personnel assigned to each location (wing commander, executive officer, wing readiness and inspection (CVR) point of contact (POC), host-nation or MUNSS commander, MUNSS readiness and inspection POC, etc.).

3.3.1.4. Maintain a roster of team chiefs selected for each NS SAV.

3.3.2. Accomplish the following administrative actions in preparation for, during, and after each NS SAV:

3.3.2.1. Obtain unit points of contact (POC) at least 60 days prior to the NS SAV.

3.3.2.2. Compile a team roster (essential for the country clearance message) at least 50 days prior to the NS SAV.

3.3.2.3. Prepare and release all country clearance and site access messages according to the provisions in DoD 4500.54-G, *The Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*, and ACED 80-6 Volume II/ED 60-12 (NC) *Nuclear Surety Management*, (see Attachment 7, Sample Site Access Message). The USAFE POC listed on the messages must not be included as a member on the trip. POC must be available to answer questions and send corrections (if required) to the unit during the NS SAV.

3.3.2.3.1. Send request for country clearance to the appropriate embassy at least 30 days prior to the team's anticipated arrival in Greece, Turkey, and Italy.

3.3.2.3.2. Send site access message at least 45 days prior to the NS SAV team's anticipated arrival according to ACED 80-6 Volume II/ED 60-10, *Nuclear Surety Management (NU)*, paragraph 3-28 (see Attachment 7).

3.3.2.3.3. Verify the NS SAV team has received country clearance and site access prior to the pre-departure meeting (7 days in advance).

3.3.2.4. Provide administrative support to the team chief prior to, during, and after NS SAV. Maintain an appropriate NS SAV kit. Each kit will contain a disk for each functional area team member (formatted with the sample executive summary, detailed unit report, outstanding performers, etc.). Also include separate disks with the team chief in and out briefings and copies of the last unit NSI (if unclassified) and NS SAV reports.

3.3.2.4.1. Brief each team chief on their role and responsibilities. Provide an up-to-date assessment of actions complete or open prior to the team chief's pre-departure meeting.

Set up and convene the pre-departure meeting at least 7 days prior to the team's departure. Ensure the following areas are covered: list of team members and unit points of contacts; schedule of events, travel and billeting arrangements; current THREATCON briefing per Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI); weather; team chief comments; currency rates of exchange, etc.

3.3.2.4.2. Ensure reports are compiled according to formats in Attachments 3 and 4 and are released in the required time frame.

3.3.2.4.3. Schedule the team chief's "hot wash" to the installation LG on or about the 3rd day after return from an NS SAV. "Hot wash" should be scheduled well in advance of NS SAV.

3.3.2.5. Obtain a current agenda and list of simulations and deviations from the unit POC. Distribute this information to all NS SAV team members for review and comment before the pre-departure meeting. Review both documents to ensure all nuclear surety-related areas are included (see Attachment 9, Unit Simulations/Deviations Template, and Attachment 10, Sample Unit Itinerary).

3.3.2.5.1. Ensure that the unit's simulations and deviations are discussed and finalized at the pre-departure meeting. The team chief will take the finalized copy to the unit commander for signature.

3.3.2.6. Secure billeting and travel arrangements at least 30 days prior to the NS SAV team's departure. Ensure on-base billeting is reserved when coordinating the SAV schedule with each wing. Verify the per diem and lodging rates and availability of government messing facilities for the area. Try to schedule travel and billeting to facilitate travel to the location on Sunday and return on Friday.

3.3.2.6.1. When arranging travel, use the most economical method and sources of transportation to get the team smoothly and comfortably to and from its destination. When practical, contract government leased transportation (vans instead of rental cars), APEX fares, and dedicated airlift rather than commercial air, etc.

3.3.2.6.2. If requesting Category B, military airlift (Greece, Turkey, Italy, and England), complete an AF Form 3908, **Military Airlift (MILAIR) Request to Secure Dedicated Airlift**, from Special Airlift (24th AOS/AOOS). The form must be signed by HQ USAFE/LGW or HQ USAFE/LG. Accomplish this action at least 30 days prior to the NS SAV (see Attachment 8, Sample AF Form 3908).

3.3.2.6.3. If dedicated airlift is not an option, contact Ramstein AB Scheduling Airline Ticket Office (SATO) to arrange commercial airlift for the team. Request a blocked booking for the entire team to take advantage of the APEX fare. Pick up tickets and make available to team members at least 2 days prior to departure.

3.3.2.6.4. If flying commercial air from Frankfurt Main, arrange ground transportation to and from Frankfurt Main with the 415th Base Support Battalion Airport Shuttle Service (Vogelweh), DSN 489-7723.

3.4. Team Chiefs. Team chiefs provide overall direction to the NS SAV. HQ USAFE/LGW will provide personnel and expertise to accomplish most of the administrative tasks identified in this section.

3.4.1. HQ USAFE/LG will fulfill most of the team chief requirements for NS SAVs. Officers in the grades of Major or Lt Colonel may serve as team chiefs for a MUNSS NS SAV; Colonels may be team chiefs for either a MUNSS or MOB NS SAV. To provide consistency and continuity to the program, HQ USAFE/LGWN normally will serve as the permanent MUNSS NS SAV team chief. However, officers in the grades of Lt Colonel and Colonel assigned to the Office of Security Forces (HQ USAFE/SF), Office of Safety (HQ USAFE/SE), Office of the Civil Engineering (HQ USAFE/CE), Office of Personnel (HQ USAFE/DP), Office of Communications and Information (HQ USAFE/SC), and the Directorate of Operations (HQ USAFE/DO) may be required to serve as team chiefs for MOBs and MUNSS.

3.4.2. Team chiefs will make themselves available to receive an orientation and specific training from HQ USAFE/LGW on the NS SAV process.

3.4.3. Team chiefs will contact the appropriate wing or MUNSS commander to determine specific areas of concern.

3.4.4. In conjunction with HQ USAFE/LGW, team chiefs will ensure the size and composition of the NS SAV team and verify that the scope of the NS SAV meets the needs of the unit.

3.4.5. Team chiefs will conduct an NS SAV team meeting at least 7 days prior to the team's departure. Pre-departure meeting should cover the following areas:

3.4.5.1. The schedule of events. Coordinate contingency exercises (emergency evacuation, command disablement, fire response, and denial-recapture) among the team members to minimize conflicts, meet required objectives, etc. These are no-notice exercises that will not be scheduled by the unit (see Attachment 10).

3.4.5.2. A review of the unit simulations and deviations. Ensure that all team members have reviewed the unit simulations and deviations and understand them. Once approved, the scenario is set for the NS SAV.

3.4.5.3. Final travel arrangements and billeting. Confirm that everyone has orders, knows the location and departure show times, and any other unique pre-departure requirements.

3.4.5.4. Communicate the game plan to the team. Let the team know what to expect (i.e., professionalism, self-initiative, tenacity, personal conduct and standards of behavior, etc.). Discuss if and when team meetings are to be conducted each day.

3.4.5.5. Country and local threat conditions. Request AFOSI provide a briefing to the team on this subject during the pre-departure meeting.

Emphasize the team's purpose, which is to train and assist the unit.

3.4.6. Conduct the NS SAV.

3.4.6.1. Prepare and present the in-brief with the wing or MUNSS commander and designated staff. Use the HQ USAFE/LGW briefing templates.

3.4.6.2. Serve as NS SAV team liaison with wing or MUNSS leadership and key personnel.

3.4.6.3. Assess senior leadership and key personnel involvement in each unit process during the NS SAV. Employ the experience and expertise of senior members on the NS SAV team. Record findings and assessments in the executive summary and detailed unit report under the section, Program Management (see Attachment 3).

3.4.6.4. Resolve scheduling conflicts as they occur during the visit.

3.4.6.5. Conduct NS SAV team meetings, as required.

3.4.6.6. Advise the wing or MUNSS commander of significant issues discovered during the NS SAV and recommend corrective actions.

3.4.7. After the NS SAV, team chief will:

3.4.7.1. Prepare the final report (see Attachments 3 and 4). Outbrief the wing or MUNSS commander using the template provided by HQ USAFE/LGW. Provide the unit commander a draft copy of the detailed unit report before departure.

3.4.7.2. Provide a "hot wash" to the HQ USAFE/LG or Deputy HQ USAFE/LG not later than 3 workdays after completing the NS SAV. The NS SAV program manager will set up the meeting before team departure.

3.4.7.3. Ensure final versions of the executive summary and detailed unit report are forwarded to HQ USAFE/LG for signature and release not later than 5 workdays after completing the NS SAV.

3.5. Team members. Team members are responsible for personal travel and temporary duty- (TDY) related preparations. Each member should ensure he or she has travel orders, a passport, military identification, and line badge (if applicable).

3.5.1. Team members will examine applicable portions of the proposed schedule of events to ensure all desired scenarios are presented in logical sequence and that the timing is correct. Conduct each NS SAV consistently against a formal checklist or list of objectives. While SAVs are less formal, general objectives should focus on unit training, self inspection, compliance with USAF and MAJCOM directives, public law (safety and security) and the ability of the unit to accomplish its assigned mission. Additionally, team members should address overall leadership and management.

3.5.2. Team members will attend the NS SAV team pre-departure meeting.

3.5.3. Team members will provide inputs as required during team meetings and in preparation of the written report.

3.5.4. NS SAV team members will not depart before the end of a unit evaluation without proper authority (permission from the NS SAV team chief).

3.6. Numbered Air Force (NAF) LG Responsibilities. NAFs will develop an NS SAV program to ensure management oversight and guidance are provided to all units under their functional control. NAFs are encouraged to ensure site visits are conducted to review both nuclear surety related areas (except for programs prohibited by higher headquarters directive; i.e., Communications Security/ two-person control (COMSEC/TPC)) and functional areas not normally assessed during an NS SAV.

3.6.1. Ensure units subject to an NS SAV are properly equipped to correct and prevent recurrence of Critical discrepancies discovered during an NS SAV.

3.6.2. Designate functional experts to augment the USAFE NS SAV team, as required. Augmentees will function as members of one cohesive team and provide inputs to the executive summary and unit detailed SAV report.

3.6.3. Assist the units in developing a plan to systematically correct all problems identified during an NSI or NS SAV.

3.6.4. Provide HQ USAFE/LG with a summary of corrective actions taken by the unit for all open Critical discrepancies discovered during an NS SAV every 30 days until they are closed.

3.7. Parent Wing LG Responsibilities. Develop an NS SAV program to ensure management oversight and guidance are provided to all units under their functional control. Parent wings are encouraged to conduct visits to review both nuclear surety related areas (except for programs prohibited by higher headquarters directive; i.e., COMSEC/TPC) and functional areas not normally assessed during an NS SAV. Common discrepancies include, but are not limited to: Technical order management, basic administration, overdue precision measurement equipment laboratory (PMEL) calibrations, poorly administered composite tool kits, and deficient on-the-job (OJT) and training records. Send HQ USAFE/LG (address) and HQ USAFE/LGW a courtesy copy of all MUNSS assistance visit reports.

3.7.1. Establish a program to ensure Critical findings identified during an NS SAV are effectively tracked and resolved in a timely manner.

3.8. Unit Responsibilities.

3.8.1. Unit Commanders will forward progress reports on Critical findings through their chain of command to HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//LG// via message every 30 days until issues are resolved. Include HQ USAFE/DO, SF, DP, FM, SV,SC, XP, CE, and SE as information addressees.

3.8.2. Establish a procedures/readiness flight according to AFI 21-204, USAFE Supplement 1 (for MUNSS). Similar support for MOBs will be provided by the wing readiness office. This office will serve as the wing or unit liaison with the HQ USAFE/LGWN Program Manager and provide the following support for NS SAVs:

3.8.2.1. Unit POC to HQ USAFE/LGWN at least 60 days prior to NS SAV.

3.8.2.2. Billeting and transportation, as required.

3.8.2.3. Administrative and communications requirements for the team (arrange for a team workcenter, computers, telephones, etc.).

3.8.2.4. Site access message and an entry authorization listing for the team to wing or unit security forces personnel prior to the start of an NS SAV.

3.8.2.5. Trusted agent for the employment of contingency exercises and operations (i.e., emergency evacuation, command disablement, logistic movements, fire response, and denial-recapture). Develop scenarios to effectively test the unit's ability to conduct these exercises and conduct contingency exercises on a periodic basis.

3.9. Checklists. Each functional directorate listed in the following paragraphs will provide checklists for use by units and the Inspector General (HQ USAFE/IG). The checklists are only guides, and are not considered the sole determining factor of program review requirements. Each unit should ensure it has the latest version of all applicable checklists. A copy also shall be provided to HQ USAFE/IG, and the unit, for use during an NSI. USAFE functional directorates are responsible for providing the following checklists and for ensuring they are reviewed annually. All checklists will be submitted to HQ USAFE/LGW in FormFlow or MS Word format.

- 3.9.1. Logistics.
- 3.9.2. Security Forces.
- 3.9.3. Communications.
- 3.9.4. Personnel (PRP).
- 3.9.5. Command and Control.
- 3.9.6. Civil Engineering.
- 3.9.7. Safety.

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**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS*****References***

DoD 4500.54-G, *The Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*

USAFEI 90-201, *USAFE Nuclear Surety Inspection Program*

ACED 80-6 Volume II/ED 60-10, *Nuclear Surety Management (NU)*

ACED 80-6 Volume II/ED 60-12 (NC) *Nuclear Surety Management*

***Abbreviations***

**AFOSI**—Air Force Office of Special Investigation

**BISS**—Base Intrusion Security System

**CA/CAA**—Custodial Agent/Custodial Agent Augmentee

**CDS**—Command Disable System

**COMSEC**—Communications Security

**CTK**—Consolidated Tool Kits

**ECM**—Electronic Countermeasures

**EE**—Emergency Evacuation

**EMR**—Electromagnetic Radiation

**FMC**—Fully Mission Capable

**FOA**—Forward Operating Area

**GOV**—Government Owned Vehicle

**JOI**—Joint Operating Instruction

**LMF**—Local Monitoring Facility

**LMR**—Land Mobile Radio

**LPS**—Lightning Protection System

**LSC**—Load Standardization Crew

**MHU**—Munitions Handling Unit

**MOB**—Main Operating Base

**MUNSS**—Munitions Support Squadron

**NAF**—Numbered Air Force

**NOCM**—Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management

**NS**—Nuclear Surety

**NS SAV**—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit

**NSI**—Nuclear Surety Inspection

**PAS**—Protective Aircraft Shelter

**PNAF**—Primary Nuclear Airlift Forces

**PRP**—Personnel Reliability Program

**RAPIDS**—Real-Time Automated Processing Identification System

**RMF**—Remote Monitoring Facility

**SATO**—Scheduling Airline Ticketing Office

**SCP**—Shelter Control Panel

**SLM**—Senior Load Monitor

**SOI**—Squadron Operating Instruction

**TBD**—To Be Determined

**TPC**—Two-Person Control

**TTH**—Tools, Test, and Handling

**USAFE**—United States Air Forces Europe

**WS3**—Weapons Storage and Security System

**Attachment 2****GENERAL NS SAV REPORT INFORMATION**

**A2.1.** NS SAV reports shall be prepared in two versions; the Executive Summary (Attachment 4, Sample Executive Summary) and the Detailed Unit Report (Attachment 3, Sample Final Report). The Team Chief (in conjunction with HQ USAFE/LGW) shall ensure the team prepares both versions of the report according to the format. Templates are available from HQ USAFE/LGW for all briefings and reports. Each wing or unit commander will receive a "draft" copy of the detailed report at the end of the NS SAV before the team leaves the unit.

**A2.2.** Correct both versions of each unit report and place in electronic distribution within 5 workdays after the completion of each trip. The Executive Summary will be prepared for HQ USAFE DS/CV/CC only. It provides the HQ USAFE/CC/CV with a summary describing the health of the unit and offers concise feedback on the key strengths and weaknesses of the unit. Distribute to all applicable headquarters staff agencies, NAF staff agencies, and the evaluated unit. *Exception:* HQ USAFE/IG shall be excluded from the detailed report distribution list to avoid potential conflicts of interest.

**A2.3.** Team chiefs should use the inputs provided by each functional team member to build both versions of the unit report. Team members are normally given a 3 1/2 inch diskette at the first team meeting to document their findings and observations. The disk is formatted to include the following: The Executive Summary; the Detailed Report; and Outstanding Performers.

**A2.4.** Team members will include all nuclear surety-related PROBLEMS or OBSERVATIONS in the detailed report. Designate discrepancies of a critical nature with an asterisk (\*) followed by PROBLEM, and a description of the discrepancy. Reference all noted discrepancies (specific AFI, USAFEI, AFMAN, T.O. page and paragraph) along with a RECOMMENDATION on how to correct the problem.

A2.4.1. PROBLEMS are findings that were materially affecting, or had the potential to materially affect, the management or execution of a particular function.

A2.4.2. OBSERVATIONS are those conditions that do not seriously detract from effective nuclear surety management, but when corrected, serve to enhance the function and efficiency of nuclear surety-related operations. These deficiencies are not nuclear surety-related but require corrective action nonetheless. *Note:* If corrections to OBSERVATIONS will serve to enhance operations, then include them in the report.

**Attachment 3**  
**SAMPLE FINAL REPORT**

**A3.1. SAV Final Report Format.** Use the following template to report NS SAV team findings. Attach an AF Form 1768, **Staff Summary Sheet**, for formal coordination through applicable USAFE staff agencies. This template is patterned for all units (modify accordingly for main operating base or MUNSS reports). Prepare this report in Times New Roman, 12 pitch, using the outline described in Figure A3.1. Figure A3.2. provides a format for reporting outstanding performers. Figure A3.3. provides detailed information about completing the report format outlined in Figure A3.1.

**Figure A3.1. Detailed Staff Assistance Visit Report Format**

**DETAILED STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORT**

**UNIT, LOCATION**

**DATE OF SAV**

USAFE conducted a Surety SAV of the (organization name), from (date) to (date) to evaluate plans, programs, and procedures in the following key areas:

Paragraph Number	Subject
1.	Program Management
2.	Program Administration
3.	*Nuclear Control Order Procedures-Command Post Operations
3.1.	*Emergency Actions
3.2.	Operational Reporting
4.	*Nuclear Control Order Procedures -Aircrew Performance
4.1.	Training
4.2.	Publications
4.3.	Certification
4.4.	Weapons Acceptance Procedures
4.5.	Testing
4.6	*PNAF Procedures
5.	*Emergency Exercises
5.1.	Emergency Evacuation
5.2.	Command Disablement System
5.3.	Fire Department Response
5.4.	*Weapons Recapture
6.	*Technical Operations
7.	*Weapons Loading and Mating

- 7.1. \*Load Crew Proficiency
- 7.2. Armament Systems
- 7.3. \*Aircraft Systems Reliability
- 8. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
- 9. \*Use Control
- 10. Tools, Test, and Handling Equipment
- 11. \*Storage Practices
- 12. Condition of Facilities
- 13. \*Explosive and Active Material Limits
- 14. \*Security
  - 14.1. \*Security Force Performance
  - 14.2. \*Entry and Circulation Control
  - 14.3. \*Physical Security Systems
  - 14.4. Plans
  - 14.5. MUNSS Units
- 15. Nuclear Surety Program
  - 15.1 Weapons Safety Office
  - 15.2 Training
  - 15.3 Subordinate-level Programs
- 16. Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management
- 17. \*Personnel Reliability Program
  - 17.1. Military Personnel Flight Support
  - 17.2. \*Squadron PRP
  - 17.3. \*Munitions Support Squadrons PRP
    - 17.3.1. Parent Base Support
    - 17.3.2. \*Unit PRP
- 18. \*Logistics Movements
- 19. \*Communications
  - 19.1. Intrusion Detection System
  - 19.2. Security Communications
  - 19.3. \*Emergency Action Communications
  - 19.4. TPC COMSEC Team
- 20. MUNSS Support Agencies
  - 20.1. MUNSS Liaison
  - 20.2. Parent Base Weapons Safety
  - 20.3. Other Agencies

An Asterisk (\*) indicates NSI Critical areas designated by USAFEI 90-201. This report includes all findings no matter how minor. Please exercise brevity when preparing inputs to the report. Try to keep all inputs direct and to the point.

**Figure A3.2. Format For Reporting Outstanding Performers**

**OUTSTANDING PERFORMERS**

The following personnel are recognized for making a significant contribution toward the success of the (unit designator). Their performance and professionalism far exceeded the efforts of their contemporaries. Their procedures, task knowledge, and support to the overall mission were exceptional and above USAFE standards.

RANK	NAME	ORGANIZATION	DUTY TITLE
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**Figure A3.3. Detailed Instructions for Completing Staff Assistance Visit Report Format**

**Note:** When areas are not assessed, leave the heading but put the following words “Area not assessed.”

**1. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.** Use the format listed below for all areas of the report

Lead in Paragraph can be 3-7 lines

**STRENGTHS (Heading for all applicable main areas)**

List strengths here.

**AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT (Heading for all applicable main areas)**

List problems here in the format listed below

**PROBLEM: (Heading for all applicable main areas)** State the actual problem and specific AFI/ USAFEI/OI/TECH ORDER reference here). Designate CRITICAL problems with a \*\*\* asterisk.

If the problem has more than one deficiency (i.e., the 11N Technical Order account was deficient), include it after the reference. For example:

List other problems here that caused the deficiency.

Make sure they all relate to the actual deficiency

**RECOMMENDATION: (Heading for all applicable main areas).** List your recommendation for actions required to resolve or help correct this deficiency.

**OBSERVATION: (Heading for all applicable main areas).** Those condition which do not seriously detract from the management effectiveness but would, if corrected, enhance particular functions.

**2. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION.**

3. NUCLEAR CONTROL ORDER PROCEDURES-COMMAND POST OPERATIONS. (CRITICAL)

3.1. Emergency Actions (EA) (CRITICAL)

3.2. Operational Reporting

4. NUCLEAR CONTROL ORDER PROCEDURES-AIRCREW PERFORMANCE (CRITICAL)

4.1. Training

4.2. Publications

4.3. Certification

4.4. Weapons Acceptance Procedures

4.5. Testing

4.6. PNAF Procedures (CRITICAL)

5. EMERGENCY EXERCISES. (CRITICAL)

5.1. Emergency Evacuation

5.2. Command Disablement System

5.3. Fire Department Response

5.4. Weapons Recapture (CRITICAL)

6. TECHNICAL OPERATIONS. (CRITICAL)

7. WEAPONS LOADING AND MATING. (CRITICAL)

7.1. Load Crew Proficiency (CRITICAL)

7.2. Armament Systems

7.3. Aircraft Systems Reliability (CRITICAL)

8. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD). (MOB Only)

9. USE CONTROL. (CRITICAL) No deficiencies were noted in this area. (Use this sentence UNLESS problems were noted in this area.

10. TOOLS, TEST, AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT. Include nuclear certified equipment comments here.

11. STORAGE PRACTICES. (CRITICAL)

12. CONDITION OF FACILITIES.

13. EXPLOSIVE AND ACTIVE MATERIAL LIMITS. (CRITICAL)

14. SECURITY. (CRITICAL)

14.1. Security Force Performance (CRITICAL)

14.2. Entry and Circulation Control (CRITICAL)

14.3. Physical Security Systems (CRITICAL)

14.4. Plans

14.5. MUNSS Units

- 15. **NUCLEAR SURETY PROGRAM.**
- 15.1. Weapons Safety Office
- 15.2. Training
- 15.3. Subordinate-level Programs
- 16. **NUCLEAR ORDNANCE COMMODITY MANAGEMENT (NOCM).**
- 17. **PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP).** (CRITICAL)
- 17.1. Military Personnel Flight Support
- 17.2. Squadron PRP (CRITICAL)
- 17.3. Munitions Support Squadrons PRP (CRITICAL)
- 17.3.1. Parent Base Support
- 17.3.2. Unit PRP (CRITICAL)
- 18. **LOGISTICS MOVEMENT.** (CRITICAL)
- 19. **COMMUNICATIONS.** (CRITICAL)
- 19.1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
- 19.2. Security Communications
- 19.3. Emergency Action Communications (CRITICAL)
- 19.4. TPC COMSEC Team
- 20. **MUNSS SUPPORT AGENCIES.**
- 20.1. MUNSS Liaison
- 20.2. Parent Base Weapons Safety
- 20.3. Other Agencies

**Attachment 4****SAMPLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**A4.1. Format.** Use the sample shown in Figure A4.1. to summarize NS SAV team findings to HQ USAFE CC/CV/DS only. Attach an AF Form 1768, **Staff Summary Sheet**, for formal coordination through applicable USAFE staff agencies. This template is patterned for all units (modify accordingly for main operating base or MUNSS reports). Prepare this report in Times New Roman, 12 pitch.

**Figure A4.1. Sample Executive Summary****(Unit Designator) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY****(Name of Unit)****(Date)****PROGRAM MANAGEMENT**

Munitions Control was providing solid support for a variety of wing missions. Personnel displayed a sense of urgency during emergency and contingency exercises. Personnel exhibited in-depth job knowledge of both surety related and conventional taskings. Additional training and understanding of their role in WS3 will greatly enhance performance and support their providing to the (unit designator) Wing.

**NUCLEAR CONTROL ORDER PROCEDURES**

Command Post (CP) programs reviewed included the following: Emergency action (EA) documents; use control documents/permissive action link (PAL) cipher materials training certification and controller operations; console operations; physical security/entry control; systems and facilities; communication systems and operational reports. Additionally, emergency evacuation (EE), and emergency destruction (ED), fire response, and recapture scenarios were observed. Eleven controllers were administered a ten-question two-person control (TPC) test. All controllers passed with an average score of XX percent. Two general reports controllers were administered a 20-question open-book general reports test. Both controllers scored XX percent. Two evaluations were administered to separate teams.

**EMERGENCY EXERCISES**

Overall, the wing demonstrated the capability to implement and execute wing OPLANs. (More detail)

**WEAPONS LOADING AND MATING**

A comprehensive review of the Load Monitor Section was conducted using the criteria found in ACED 75-5, ACED 80-6, -91 and -21 series AFIs, and applicable technical orders. Overall unit load monitor personnel displayed . . .

**TECHNICAL OPERATIONS**

Nuclear Maintenance supervision was thoroughly involved in all aspects of the mission. Strong, concerned leadership is continually working issues to ensure Air Force, USAFE, and other higher headquarters guidance is implemented in a safe and secure environment. (More detail)

**EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD)**

All surety-related areas were evaluated and assistance provided as needed. Areas observed were training, certification, publications, tools, equipment, weapons, aircraft operations, and EOD technical operations

for each weapons system for which the team maintains a capability. During the visit . . .

### **STORAGE PRACTICES**

Unit demonstrated the capability to store and maintain weapons according to security requirements. Weapon Storage and Security System code module storage, control, and handling procedures were correctly performed and documented. Assets inspected were maintained . . .

### **FACILITIES**

Include a brief narrative on the condition of the unit's lightning protection system (LPS) program and facility grounding. LPS maintenance personnel . . .

### **SECURITY FORCES**

A review of procedures and security operations was conducted using criteria found in ACE Directive 80-6, Vol. II, Part 2/ USEUCOM Directive 60-12, AFI 31-101, and appropriate USAFE Supplements. Unit personnel were observed while performing both normal security operations and contingency exercise scenarios. (More detail)

### **NUCLEAR SURETY/WEAPONS SAFETY PROGRAM**

The (unit designator) Weapons Safety Office/Additional Duty Weapons Safety Officer (ADWSO) and NCO (ADWSNCO) were providing XXXX management for the overall Wing Nuclear Surety Program. We conducted a comprehensive review of the Wing Nuclear Surety Program using the criteria in ACE Directive 80-6, Volume II/USEUCOM Directive 60-12, 91-XXX series AFIs, and other applicable directives. Overall, the Weapons Safety staff displayed . . .

### **NUCLEAR ORDNANCE COMMODITY MANAGEMENT (NOCM)**

A comprehensive review of management supervision, accountability, plans, procedures, stock control, logistical air movement, Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher headquarters reporting, procedures were conducted for compliance with governing directives. An audit of automated accounting processes for all assigned property to include the Unit Spares Authorization Listing (USAL) was conducted. (More detail)

### **PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP)**

PERSONNEL: PRP. . .

MEDICAL: (More detail)

### **LOGISTICS MOVEMENT**

Include a brief narrative on the overall condition of logistics movement, using criteria found in Vehicle Operations/Maintenance Management 24 series AFIs, AFMANs, and applicable technical orders. The unit provided . . .

### **COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS**

Two-Person Control (TPC) Program. A comprehensive review of the TPC program was conducted using the criteria found in CJCSI 3260.1, EUCOM EAP Volume IV, USAFE Supplements, and AFKAG-31. Overall, . . .

Emergency Action Messages (EAM) Processing. (More detail)

### **COMMUNICATIONS MAINTENANCE**

The Communications Maintenance Element is providing XXX support to the unit. Discuss specific areas reviewed and noted discrepancies here.

**ENGINEERING LIAISON OFFICE (MUNSS Only)**

Provide specific comments here.

**FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Provide specific comments here.

**Attachment 5**

**AF FORM 1768, STAFF SUMMARY SHEET, UNIT DETAILED REPORT**

**A5.1.** Use the AF Form 1768 shown in Figure A5.1. only for the Unit Detailed SAV Report. Figure A5.2. is a sample format for the AF Form 1768, Executive Summary.

**Figure A5.1. Sample AF Form 1768.**

===== CUT HERE

CE	Info
DP	Info
LG	Info
SC	Info
SE	Info
SF	Info
SG	Info
CE	Info
XP	Info
TACP	Info
OL-EL/ELO	Info
AOS/AOT	Info
AOS/AOR	Info
UNIT/CC	Info
NAF/CC	Info
EUCOM/ ECJ5N-CP	Info

----- STAFF SUMMARY

AO: Col (Name)/(office symbol)PD/480-0000

Suspense: Not applicable

Coordination: Not applicable

1. The attached report (Tab 1) provides a detailed analysis of the (unit designator) (date) USAFE NS SAV conducted at (unit designator). The purpose of this visit was to assess the unit's surety requirements. Areas observed included command post operations, communications maintenance, communications security (COMSEC), custody flight, weapons convoy, recapture-denial, lightning protection system (LPS), weapons safety and surety programs, nuclear ordnance commodity management (NOCM), munitions maintenance element, technical operations, storage practices, medical, personnel reliability program (PRP), emergency evacuation, disablement, fire response,

aircrew operations, transportation and nuclear certified equipment, and quality assurance (QA).

SAV team members were drawn from the following USAFE and (other) organizations:

- a. Team Chief: TBD
  - b. Command Post Operations: USAFE AOS/AOT
  - c. Communications Maintenance: USAFE CSS/SCBM
  - d. COMSEC/TPC: USAFE CSS/SCBS
  - e. Custody Flight: SFO
  - f. Facilities/Lightning Protection Systems: CEOI
  - g. Surety Program: SEW
  - h. NOCM, Munitions Flight, and Technical Operations: LGWS, N, and ACP/TACP
  - i. Medical: SGS
  - j. Personnel Reliability Program: DPX
  - k. Transportation: LGT
  - l. Fire Protection: AOS/AOR
  - m. Explosive Ordnance Disposal: CEXE
  - n. Aerospace Ground Equipment LGMM
2. The team provided assistance in all of the areas described. The UNIT/CC, as well as members of the (unit designator), were provided details on areas needing improvement.

ROGER A. BRADY, Brigadier General, USAF

Director of Logistics

Tab

(unit designator) NS SAV Detailed Report

----- Tab, NS SAV Report

(attach WORD.DOC icon here)

**Figure A5.2. Sample of AF Form 1768, Executive Summary**

**AF Form 1768, STAFF SUMMARY SHEET, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Use this SS only for the Executive Summary

===== CUT HERE

DS/CV/CC-- For information only

-----STAFF SUMMARY

AO: Col \*\*\*\*\*/\*\*PD/480-\*\*\*\*

Suspense: Not applicable

Coordination: Not applicable

1. The attached report (Tab 1) is a summary of the \*\*\*\*\*DATE USAFE NS SAV conducted at \*\*\*\*\*UNIT. The purpose of this visit was to assess the unit's surety requirements. Areas observed included command post operations, communications maintenance, communications security (COMSEC), custody flight, weapons convoy, recapture-denial, lightning protection system (LPS), weapons safety and surety programs, nuclear ordnance commodity management (NOCM), munitions maintenance element, technical operations, storage practices, medical, personnel reliability program (PRP), emergency evacuation, disablement, fire response, aircrew operations, transportation and nuclear certified equipment, and quality assurance (QA).

SAV team members were drawn from the following USAFE and \*\*\*\*\* organizations:

- a. Team Chief: TBD
  - b. Command Post Operations: USAFE AOS/AOT
  - c. Communications Maintenance: USAFE CSS/SCBM
  - d. COMSEC/TPC: USAFE CSS/SCBS
  - e. Custody Flight: SFO
  - f. Facilities/Lightning Protection Systems: CEOI
  - g. Surety Program: SEW
  - h. NOCM, Munitions Flight, and Technical Operations: LGWS, N, and TACP
  - i. Medical: SGS
  - j. Personnel Reliability Program: DPX
  - k. Transportation: LGT
  - l. Fire Protection: AOS/AOR
  - m. Explosive Ordnance Disposal: CEXE
  - n. Aerospace Ground Equipment LGMM
2. The team provided assistance in all of the above mentioned areas. The UNIT/CC, as well as members of the \*\*\*\*\*, were provided details on areas needing improvement.

ROGER A. BRADY, Brigadier General, USAF  
Director of Logistics

Tab

\*\*\*\*\*NS SAV Executive Summary

----- Tab, Executive Summary

(Attach WORD.DOC icon here)

## Attachment 6

## UNIT POINTS OF CONTACT

A6.1. Figure A6.1 is a list of unit POCs.

Figure A6.1. Unit POCs

UNIT	POC	PHONE NUMBER (DSN)	FAX NUMBER (DSN)
731 MUNSS Araxos, Greece	Orderly room	632-8396	632-7024
31 FW Aviano AB, Italy	CVI/EET	632-7203	632-8156
852 MUNSS Buechel, Germany	Orderly room	02678-695	02678-703
31 MUNSS Ghedi, Italy	Orderly room	632-7424	632-7300
39 WG Incirlik, Turkey	CVI/EET	676-8448	676-3699
52 MUNSS Kleine Brogel, Belgium	Orderly room (CC)	361-5636 361-5637 ext. 201	0032-1163-4883
48 FW RAF Lakenheath, England	CVI/EET	226-5633	226-2581
86 WG Ramstein AB, Germany	CVR/EET	480-5597	480-9848
752 MUNSS Volkel, Netherlands	Orderly room	0031-4132-76292	031-4132-72417
<b>ADDITIONAL POCs</b>			
3 AF RAF Mildenhall, England	LGW	238-3337	238-3613
16 AF Aviano AB, Italy	LGO	632-8413/4	632-7913

**Attachment 7****SITE ACCESS MESSAGE TEMPLATE**

**A7.1.** Figure A7.1. provides a template for a site access message.

**Figure A7.1. Site Access Message Template**

FROM: USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//(your directorate)//

TO: (Unit being SAVed)

INFO: USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-N//

Applicable NAF

Support Wing (for MUNSS)

Classification (see note 1)

SUBJECT: Site Access (U)

(See Note 1) 1. The following personnel are authorized escorted entry into all controlled, limited, and exclusion areas for the purpose of conducting a USAFE SAV from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_\_\_. All persons have a valid need-to-know and possess security clearances as listed (see notes 2 and 3).

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Rank:</b>	<b>SSN(LAST 6 numbers):</b>	<b>ID number:</b>	<b>Home Station AF Form 1199 number:</b>	<b>Clearance:</b>
--------------	--------------	-----------------------------	-------------------	--	-------------------

2. Identify any unique access requirements such as COMSEC and TPC.

3. The USAFE POC is \_\_\_\_\_, USAFE/\_\_\_\_\_, at DSN: \_\_\_\_\_. (see note 4)

**NOTE 1:** According to ED 60-10, this message must be classified **Confidential** when filled in.

**NOTE 2:** List the term "Rapids" for personnel who have the new ID card.

**NOTE 3:** SAV team members who do not have home station AF Forms 1199 cannot be granted unescorted entry. The message must specify who they are and in a separate section by listing all appropriate information available as listed in paragraph 2. Check here requirement "No unescorted entry without PRP". See IG Cross Tell Lt Col Vela's notes.

**NOTE 4:** The USAFE POC must be someone who is not going on the SAV.

**Attachment 8****AF FORM 3908 TEMPLATE**

**A8.1.** Figure A8.1. is a template for completing AF Form 3908, **Military Airlift (MILAIR) Request.**

**Figure A8.1. AF Form 3908 Template.**

Purpose: To conduct a USAFE Staff Assistance Visit at \_\_\_\_\_. Use of Special Airlift is mandated by the MUNSS Steering Group chairman (the USAFE/CV) to facilitate the integrity of the NS SAV team. The USAFE NS SAV Team's purpose is to evaluate unit nuclear surety and safety programs. The NS SAV Team must arrive as a unit at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_. Finally, limited budget constraints make it difficult to procure commercial transportation to all SAV locations.

Itinerary: (Be specific about departure and arrival times).

Passenger information: (Include first, MI, last name and last 6 of SSAN).

**Note:** Work with AOS closely on completion and tracking.

----- Tab 1, AF Form 3908

Attachment 9

UNIT SIMULATIONS/DEVIATIONS TEMPLATE

A9.1. Figure A9.1. is a template for a simulations/deviations letter. Units will submit a simulations/deviations letter to the NS SAV team POC at least 30 days prior to the first day of the SAV. This allows the SAV team time to review the simulations/deviations during a team meeting for validity and applicability, and return the list to the unit. The unit will present any changes (additions or deletions) for consideration to the team during the NS SAV in-briefing. The NS SAV Team Chief and wing or MUNSS Commander (as applicable) signs the list which is considered official unit simulations/deviations during the NS SAV.

Figure A9.1. Unit Simulations/Deviations Template

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFE/XXX (SI SAV Team POC address)

SUBJECT: Proposed Exercise Simulations/Deviations

FROM: CC

Note: This list is NOT all inclusive and should be used only as a GUIDE. If you require further guidance contact your STAFF FUNCTIONAL AREA for advice.

1. This unit submits the following categorized simulations/deviations for review and approval.

a. Weapons Operations.

(1) Use TYPE 3A and 3E trainers to simulate war reserve assets during transfer, transport, and general maintenance operations.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Simulate markings on trainers and support equipment as WR.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Simulate some contents of H1127 due to non-availability of training items (units must include a list of items that would be contained in the H1127 Bag). The TYPE 3E trainers have no H1127. Treat the items marked "For Training Use Only" as the correct item.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Use an H1125A/H1242 Bolster/Caster Assembly, marked as a trainer, for training/exercise operations. Treat as war reserve and do not rejected for being a training assembly; place only training weapons

in it. Explain different markings to the inspector.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(5) Paint over and lead foil tape TYPE 3E trainer READY/SAFE window to conceal the NORMAL/OVERRIDE switch to simulate ALT 747.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(6) Use the T1564, PAL Simulator and Command Training Program for all PAL operations. Use USAFE Form 57B, **Command Disablement System Code (TRA)**, and standard codes for all CDS operations and to simulate recoding war reserve assets.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

b. Documentation.

(1) Generate messages and reports (i.e., Dull Swords, AVOIDS, OPREP-3, WSRs, SCRs, etc) in one copy and route through respective squadron channels for coordination and approval. Afterwards, present to the inspector to simulate off-base transmission. The inspector to annotates the date and time and initials this copy to verify that the established timing criteria was met. Place a copy in the "Inspector's File" for review.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(2) Make all IRC entries on SF 5700-IRA, **Inspection Record Card**, forms marked "For Training Use Only," unless it is an actual discrepancy.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(3) Use training DD Form 1348-1A, **Issue Release/Receipt Document**, shipping documents for the Receipt/Verification.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(4) An AFTO Form 349, **Maintenance Data Collection Record**, will direct all maintenance tasks. The work orders will specify actions using the TYPE 3A/3E trainer war reserve will not be used for any

operations.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Make a training AFTO Form 349, not officially a part of the aircraft jacket file, part of the load documentation for training annotations. Use the actual aircraft forms for FOA operations.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Pre-Use Inspections.

(1) Prior to use, do equipment inspections and checkouts before each operation. If desired the inspectors can be present during this checkout. If inspectors are not present during the checkout, a sample check of procedures can be performed, upon request.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

d. Logistics Movements.

(1) If NAME CHANGED and general maintenance technical operations were previously observed, subsequent operations will begin with the bolstered TYPE 3E on a trailer in the respective Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS); all previous operations are considered complete. Place the vault down and lock it before beginning the evaluation.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Use a GOV to simulate a Close Watch aircraft if an actual mission cannot be coordinated.

During an inspection, team members may be asked to simulate the aircrew/courier. If inspectors are NOT available the unit will provide personnel.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

e. General Contingencies.

(1) The Fire department will not be on scene, depending on Ops Tempo, for munitions handling or aircraft loading operations involving TYPE 3A/3E trainers. Munitions Control will inform the fire department with simulated line number changes at the appropriate time (except during loads in the load barn). They will be on scene for actual/simulated PNAF aircraft loading/unloading operations.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Portable fire extinguishers will not be operated; technicians will be able to describe proper operation, if requested..

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Emergency Evacuation (EE). Prepare equipment for use on only one training weapon for shipment. Assemble all other equipment to prove on-hand quantities and serviceability. Use a TYPE 3E trainer; do not open vaults or load code storage modules. The Emergency Evacuation Plan (appropriate designation), will be available for review. Perform normal briefings and preparations. Make classified evacuation boxes available and use to simulate the evacuation of associated classified materials. Personnel will brief the purpose, contents, and disposition of simulated materials. Do not remove actual classified material from storage for exercise purposes.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Follow higher headquarters guidance for exercises involving evacuation, disablement, or destruction of classified, COMSEC, or TPC materials. Perform all actions using the TYPE 3A trainer. Terminate CDS exercises after achieving the requirements in USAFEI 21-201. Simulate code storage modules and vault opening operations. Security will recall CA/CAAs and accomplish all preparatory actions according to the SDP.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Do not cut WS3 electrical power without prior coordination with applicable work centers.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

f. Aircraft Loading.

(1) Present two distinct scenarios: Load training facility and WS3 operations. The load training facility is a workcenter instead of an operational shelter and does not contain a vault (if applicable). The team will not perform, but will simulate compliance with the 12-inch LPS rule, post security, perform shelter purges. WS3 operations will be demonstrated using a vault trainer. At non-WS3 units, load a TYPE 3E trainer from the MHU-12/M trailer using standard loading procedures.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Flight Line Operations. During FOA operations, perform all required tasks for inspection. A Load a TYPE 3E trainer from the vault, or MHU-12/M for non-WS3 units.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(2) During all aircraft loading, simulate mission-essential conventional weapons, ECM pods, and fuel tanks as previously loaded. Aircraft forms will reflect entries for simulated loaded munitions. Position ground power units outside the load barn/respective HAS prior to employment for environmental reasons (exhaust fumes). Open HAS shelter doors within operational constraints granted in ACE Directive 80-6 Vol 2/ED 60-10, and the boundary of the exclusion area expanded to encompass the equipment. Position security centered on the edge of the extended boundary until the shelter doors are closed.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(3) Use training crimpers. Advise the inspector when this occurs, and brief, if requested, on the actual crimper's unique die impression.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(4) Use Fully Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft and aircrew certification for used for Strike loading (FOA). Other situations may require loading demonstrations with an aircraft that may not be FMC. Reject items causing an aircraft not to be FMC and annotate appropriately in the aircraft forms.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(5) Do not close aircraft canopies after completing loads in the load barn.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(6) Do not use expended or inert impulse carts during aircraft loading operations. Reject carts only be rejected for defects and not for actions taken to render them INERT. Treat as live munitions. Bring torque deviations for training carts to the inspector's attention.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(7) Do not fill out armament placards; bring required actions to the inspectors' attention.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

g. Security.

(1) Exclude host security during technical operations involving trainers.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Simulate forced entry into the Squadron Command Post, LMF, RMF, a vaulted hardened aircraft shelter, or Munitions Control.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Custody personnel will simulate throwing away keys, destroying vehicle distributor caps, and flattening tires during Denial/Recapture/Recovery exercises.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Custody vehicles will not follow formerly released aircraft as required for real world.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Do not move live explosives and excessive firearms/ammunitions unless absolutely necessary and simulate in appropriate munitions containers. The team will determine evacuation points.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Simulate the following during upgraded THREATCONS:

(a) THREATCON BRAVO

- (1) Centralized parking.
- (2) Notifying local authorities.
- (3) Restricting large military/social gatherings.
- (4) Searching vehicles entering the installation.

(b) THREATCON CHARLIE

- (1) Initiate off-base parking.
- (2) Erect barriers to control traffic.
- (3) Close the club and schools.
- (4) Escort all visitors.

(5) Direct dependents and non-essential personnel to depart the base.

(c) THREATCON DELTA

(1) Inspect all packages entering the base.

(2) Consult local legal authorities.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Simulate the 2,000 foot (610 meter) cordon \*\*\* foot (\*\*\*) meter cordon, during an exercise Broken Arrow scenario. This will allow the proper demonstration of TCP and ECP posting without requiring participation by off-base agencies. It will also minimize interference with normal flying operations.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

h. Communications.

(1) Use a separate USNTS-10 to simulate all operational reserve and bulk reserve SAS material. A separate USNTS-2001 will simulate all operational and bulk reserve PAL material.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Do not destroy Two Person Control (TPC), FRD, or RD materials during emergency destruction exercises. These actions apply squadron-wide.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Do not transmit coordination messages by AUTODIN/SARAH COM to the Controlling Authority/Defense Courier Service during an EE exercise. Make draft messages available for inspection before delivery to the Base Communications Center (BCC) for simulated release.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) When alert conditions require the BCC to implement MINIMIZE, the team will simulate contacting the AUTODIN/SARAH COM Switching Center to continue processing real-world message traffic.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

i. Command Post.

(1) Do not open TPC safes during console evaluations. EAO/EANCOs will independently unlock and relock their side of the appropriate safe (red/white) as dictated by the tasking message.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(2) Simulate the following:

- (a) Cutting electrical power at the Command Post.
- (b) Zeroing FAN-E. KL-43, and Radio Receiver Transmitter values.
- (c) Connecting P-1 of the CT-1504 weapons cable to the weapon; use the T1549.
- (d) Contacting GAF authorities
- (e) Arming all controllers other than the on-duty EA team; wear web belts.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

j. General.

(1) Conduct squadron recalls normally as on-duty recalls, unless directed otherwise by the Commander.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(2) The team will simulate notifying civilian authorities during contingency exercises. SCP, LMF, and RMF controllers will inform inspectors of the actions to take if the situation became real world.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(3) Mission essential personnel will not evacuate the LMF, RMF, Command Post, Munitions Control, and activated FOA during an exercise.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(4) Do not disrupt commercial phone lines.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(5) These areas are considered ..."no play areas" for all exercises

- (a) Dormitories.
- (b) Dining Facilities.
- (c) The Club and Library.
- (d) Command Post sleep room and EA cell.
- (e) LMR/RMF.
- (f) RN radio transmitter site.
- (g) BCC.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. Unit POC information (here).

*-signed--signed-*

*NS SAV Team ChiefWing/MUNSS Commander*

## Attachment 10

## SAMPLE UNIT ITINERARY

**A10.1.** Figure A10.1 is a sample unit itinerary.

**Figure A10.1. Sample Unit Itinerary**

The attached itinerary is a template for unit planning purposes for either an NS SAV or NSI. **NOTE: TIMES PROPOSED ARE FOR REFERENCE AND SHOULD BE USED AS A GUIDE.** Use it as a guide to schedule critical events, in any order to meet organizational needs. Unit POCs should submit a comparable list to the USAFE NS SAV Team POC at least 30 days before their SAV for review and approval. Refer to USAFEI 90-201 for an explanation of critical inspection areas.

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**DAY 1, SUNDAY**

0530 Show Time (Bldg 527)

0600 Team Departs \*\*\*\*\*

1800 Arrive Hotel

TBD Safety In-Brief, receive unit site passes, etc..

TBD Pick-Up Rental Vehicles at \*\*\*\*\*, or GOVs

TBD Review Simulations/Deviations, Team Chief Final Approval

TBD Lightning Protection System (LPS) and Generator program review

**DAY 2, MONDAY**

0800 Wing Inbrief (Wing Conference Room)

0900 Tech OPS (GM/Receipt/Verification/Pal)

0930 Interior Sensors

1000 Aircraft Loads in Load Barn (SLM with LSC MUNSS), or LSC at MOBS

1030 Command Post Testing

1200 Aircraft Loads In Load Barn Continue

1300 Aircrew Training and Publications

TBD Unit PNAF Briefing

TBD LPS Facility Inspection and Grounding Test

**TBD EXERCISE - WILL BE NO NOTICE**

1530 Aircraft Certification Load Barn

1700 Team Meeting

**DAY 3, TUESDAY**

0800 Areas continue inspection

0830 Log Move

0900 Aircrew Academics on Weapon Acceptance Procedures

1000 PNAF

TBD LPS Facility Visual Inspection & Generator Testing/(WSA) Check Perimeter Lights at Night. Ensure generator and LPS testing is coordinated with MOB and MUNSS.

**TBD EXERCISE - WILL BE NO NOTICE**

1700 Team Meeting

**DAY 4, WEDNESDAY**

0800 Areas continue inspection

0830 Tech Ops

0900 Aircrew Upload for Aircrew Weapons Acceptance (HAS)

0900 Command Post Console Evaluation

0900 Exterior Sensors

1000 Aircrew Weapon Acceptance

TBD Generator Testing (Command Post, LMR, RMF, and PAS). Ensure generator and LPS testing is coordinated with MOB and MUNSS.

1700 Team Meeting

**DAY 5, THURSDAY**

0800 Areas continue inspection

0800 Aircraft Upload (FOA) (one aircraft per strike squadron)

1030 Aircrew Acceptance (FOA)

1130 Release (FOA)

1230 Aircraft Download (FOA)

TBD Aircraft Certification (FOA)

TBD Light Checks/Generator

**TBD EXERCISE - WILL BE NO NOTICE**

1500 Aircrew Testing

1700 Team Meeting

**DAY 6, FRIDAY**

0800 Storage Practices

**1000 CC Validation**

1200 CC Outbrief

**DAY 7, SATURDAY**

TBD Depart Hotel (unless the team deems it appropriate to depart after the CC outbrief on Day 6).

Contingency exercises will be conducted as no-notice to the fullest extent possible. The key for each unit CVR is to build a plan to eliminate friction and uncertainty. The team will conduct a comprehensive review of the following programs during the week, in conjunction with the events listed above: Continuity/self-inspection program; contingency plans/JOI/SOI review; training/WS3 equipment records review; CTK/TTH equipment; Weapons Safety, EMR, and LPS; Aircraft Familiarization, Surety training, and Weapons Academic Lesson Plans; PRP/medical records screening; NOCM; COMSEC/TPC materials; Munitions Control; and Security procedures, equipment certification/condition/documentation.

