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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2, *Inspector General - The Inspection System*, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, and Technical Order (TO) 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*. It provides guidance and procedures for Air Force inspection and nuclear surety programs. Only this instruction may establish service-wide inspection requirements. Ensure that all records created by this AFI are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 37-123, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records and Information Management System (AFRIMS) disposition schedule found at <https://afrims.amc.af.mil>.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This interim change 2007-3 to AFI 90-201 adds reference to the survey application process for the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Healthcare (AAAH), updates verbiage for HSIs to include standardizing re-inspection window for Active Duty (AD) and ARC units graded “Unsatisfactory” or “Marginal” to 18 months, and adds the requirement for MAJCOM/SG or equivalent to conduct a SAV within 6-months for AD and ARC units scoring poorly, modifying paragraphs 4.3.1. through 4.3.6. and adding AAAHC, AD and ARC to the Abbreviations and Acronyms section (Attachment 1). This interim changes also incorporates administrative change 1 which changes reference to SAF/IGI to SAF/IG in paragraph 3.3.1.1.2. and 3.8.2. and Table 3.1. as well as changes OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG// to OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG// in Attachment 3. A bar ( | ) indicates a revision from the previous edition.

Chapter 1— RESPONSIBILITIES 4

- 1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG). ..... 4
- 1.2. Secretary of the Air Force, General Counsel (SAF/GC). ..... 4
- 1.3. Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE). ..... 4

1.4.	Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (HQ USAF/XOI). .....	5
1.5.	All Other Secretariat and HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS). .....	5
1.6.	Major Commands (MAJCOM). .....	5
1.7.	Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) .....	6
1.8.	The Civil Engineer (HQ USAF A7/C). .....	7
<b>Chapter 2— AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS</b>		<b>8</b>
2.1.	General Guidelines .....	8
2.2.	Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). .....	9
2.3.	Compliance Inspection (CI). .....	11
2.4.	Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). .....	12
2.5.	Other Inspections. .....	13
2.6.	Inspection Scoring and Reporting. .....	13
Table 2.1.	Cause Codes and Explanations .....	14
2.7.	Special Interest Item (SII) Program. .....	15
2.8.	Air Force Inspector’s Course. .....	17
2.9.	Inspection Report Handling. .....	17
2.10.	Inspection Scheduling and Coordination. .....	18
2.11.	Gatekeeper Functions. .....	18
2.12.	Best Practices. .....	19
<b>Chapter 3— AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) PROGRAM</b>		<b>20</b>
3.1.	NSI Program Guidance .....	20
3.2.	Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). .....	20
3.3.	Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). .....	21
3.4.	Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI). .....	22
3.5.	Nuclear Inspection Criteria and Areas. .....	22
3.6.	Nuclear Inspection Rating System. .....	34
3.7.	Reinspection of Deficient Areas. .....	34
3.8.	Actions on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Inspection Reports. ....	35
3.9.	Nuclear Inspection Reports .....	36
Table 3.1.	NSI Report Recipients .....	37

<b>Chapter 4— AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) PROGRAM ELEMENTS</b>	<b>38</b>
4.1. Eagle Look Management Reviews. ....	38
4.2. Compliance Inspection (CI). ....	38
4.3. Health Services Inspection (HSI). ....	39
4.4. Field Inspection. ....	41
4.5. Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI). ....	41
4.6. TIG Brief Magazine ....	41
4.7. Report Handling. ....	42
4.8. Forms Adopted. ....	42
<b>Attachment 1— GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Attachment 2— INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR MISSION                   CHANGES</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Attachment 3— MESSAGE FORMATS FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Attachment 4— AF NUCLEAR WEAPON SECURITY INSPECTION GUIDE</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Attachment 5— READINESS INSPECTIONS</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Attachment 6— COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Attachment 7— AIR FORCE BEST PRACTICE REPORTING FORMAT</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>Attachment 8— EAGLE LOOK TOPIC PROPOSAL FORMAT</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>Attachment 9— AOC READINESS INSPECTIONS</b>	<b>83</b>

## Chapter 1

### RESPONSIBILITIES

**1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG).** Reports on force readiness to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF). Approves inspection policy and oversees the Air Force inspection system. Serves as the Air Force point of contact for notification of evaluations by Air Force-level and non-Air Force organizations. As required, directs assessment of any Air Force program or operation, including Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) organizations and units. Informs commanders on the Eagle Look management review process and solicits review topics and sponsors from the Secretariat, Air Staff, and Major Commands (MAJCOMs). Provides comments to MAJCOMs, direct reporting units (DRUs), and field operating agencies (FOAs) on the adequacy of their Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), Compliance Inspection (CI) and Nuclear Surety Inspection programs. Approves Air Force Special Interest Items (SIIs). Chairs the Air Force Intelligence Oversight (IO) Panel and provides quarterly reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

1.1.1. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). Conduct inspections/assessments, management reviews, and investigations as directed by SAF/IG (see [Chapter 4](#)).

1.1.2. SAF/IG Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI). Manages Air Force inspection policy (including plans, guidance, and procedures) and provides oversight of inspection policy implementation. Provides SAF/IG analysis on the adequacy of MAJCOM ORI, CI, and Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) programs. Observes all inspection areas in [Chapter 2](#), [Chapter 3](#), and applicable attachments, the MAJCOM IG's deliberative process (i.e., IG in-briefs, team meetings, etc.) and inspection-related portions of unit/wing leadership debriefs. Prepares an executive summary (in coordination with the Air Force Inspection Agency and MAJCOM IGs) for SAF/IG following each observed NSI. Coordinates on requests for waivers or deferments of nuclear inspections required by [Chapter 3](#) of this AFI. Provides a summary and analysis of inspection results and trends for inclusion in recurring IG briefings to CSAF. Provides feedback to Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) and Air Force Safety Center, Weapons Safety Division (AFSC/SEW) on action items generated as a result of their role in inspection oversight. Manages and administers the USAF Inspectors Course to MAJCOM Inspector General teams.

**1.2. Secretary of the Air Force, General Counsel (SAF/GC).** Acts as legal counsel for all Air Force Intelligence Oversight (IO) issues. Provides advice to intelligence components on questions of legality or propriety.

**1.3. Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE).** Oversees the nuclear surety program with SAF/IG.

1.3.1. Air Force Safety Center, Weapons Safety Division (AFSC/SEW). Manages the safety aspects of Air Force nuclear surety policy (including the AFI 91-series publications and specific parts of other directives such as AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material*, etc.) and provides oversight of nuclear surety policy implementation. Reviews critical and major nuclear surety deficiencies identified in MAJCOM NSI reports.

1.3.1.1. Provides augmentees for NSIs when requested by the MAJCOM. Provides nuclear surety-related oversight support of NSIs, Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSIs) and Initial

Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSIs) when requested by SAF/IGI. Oversees 25 percent of the total annual MAJCOM-conducted NSIs and provides observer(s) when DTRA/AO inspects Air Force units. Scheduling: AFSC will coordinate each NSI visit with the respective MAJCOM IG Gatekeeper and will honor the IG Trusted Agent system to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection. Intervention: In the course of directly observing MAJCOM inspectors conducting their activities, AFSC/SEW observers will not intervene in the inspection process unless the safety, security, or reliability of a resource is in jeopardy and the MAJCOM inspectors fail to take appropriate actions to correct the situation. Feedback: Since these visits are not inspections, reports are not prepared, however, the AFSC team chief will provide SAF/IGI a brief, unrated, written account of observations identifying possible areas for improving the NSI process. AFSC concurrence with MAJCOM IG team findings is not required.

1.3.2. In support of AFIA/IO, provides augmentees in performance of nuclear surety-related oversight of NSIs, Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSIs) and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections (INSIs) by overseeing 25 percent of the total annual MAJCOM-conducted NSIs per paragraph 1.4.1 below.

**1.4. Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (HQ USAF/XOD).** Develops policy to ensure the proper supervision and control of Air Force intelligence activities. Maintains AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, which provides guidance on the scope and applicability of the Air Force Intelligence Oversight Program.

**1.5. All Other Secretariat and HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS).** Submit and sponsor Eagle Look management review topics. Review MAJCOM inspection criteria upon request of the Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI). Provide functional guidance on readiness and compliance items subject to inspection/assessment.

**1.6. Major Commands (MAJCOM).** Establish inspection programs consistent with command mission requirements to assess unit readiness, compliance, and other Air Force inspection program elements outlined in **Chapter 2** and ensure deficiencies identified during inspections are corrected. Develop inspection criteria and, as applicable, provide to the AFRC IG and the National Guard Bureau IG for review. Send an electronic version of MAJCOM supplements to this instruction to SAF/IGI at [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil). Provide functional guides/checklists (with references), as required for readiness and compliance items subject to inspection. Designate a point of contact (Gatekeeper) for notification of evaluations by all Air Force and non-Air Force organizations. Submit proposed Eagle Look management review topics and a quarterly schedule of projected inspection activity to the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) for coordination.

1.6.1. MAJCOMs with Nuclear-Capable Assigned/Gained Units. Develop NSI criteria and NSI checklists (with references). Include all applicable functions listed in paragraph **3.5**. Send a copy of proposed criteria, checklists, and changes to HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G SE, Kirtland AFB NM, 87117-5670, for review and/or approval. Publish approved criteria as a MAJCOM supplement to this instruction and send an electronic version to SAF/IGI at <mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil>. Conduct inspections required by this AFI. Provide the inspected unit a report within 30 calendar days. For all critical and major deficiencies, ensure final NSI reports include the complete description of each validated deficiency, the root cause, and the impact of the deficiency on the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems. Send a message and formal report on all nuclear

inspections to the addressees listed in [Attachment 3](#) and [Attachment 4](#) and paragraph [3.9](#). (as applicable). Include details on all limiting factors (LIMFACS), critical and major deficiencies, corrective actions immediately applied, and deficiencies or unusual situations that affect the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. Comply with [Chapter 3](#) (paragraph [3.8](#).) on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) inspection reports. Appoint a Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) monitor to track corrective actions for all discrepancies in DTRA inspection reports.

1.6.1.1. Develop NSI criteria and NSI checklists (with references). Include all applicable functions listed in paragraph [3.5](#). Send information copies of criteria, checklists, and changes to both HQ AFIA/IO and HQ AFSC/SEW, at 9700 Avenue G SE, Kirtland AFB NM, 87117-5670. Publish approved criteria as a MAJCOM supplement to this instruction and send an electronic version to SAF/IGI at [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil).

1.6.1.2. Send a message and formal report on all nuclear inspections to the addressees listed in [Attachment 3](#) and [Attachment 4](#) and paragraph [3.9](#). (as applicable). Include details on all limiting factors (LIMFACS), critical and major deficiencies, corrective actions immediately applied, and deficiencies or unusual situations (normally classified, see AFI 31-407, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy* and/or the *Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide*, CG-W-5 to make an appropriate decision) that affect the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems.

1.6.1.3. Comply with paragraph [3.8](#). for Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) inspection reports. Appoint a Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) monitor to track corrective actions for all deficiencies identified in DTRA inspection reports.

1.6.1.4. Annually, NLT 1 August submit a list of certified nuclear-capable units to SAF/IGI. SAF/IGI will consolidate MAJCOM inputs and submit the listing to DTRA/CSTI in accordance with TO 11N-25-1 NLT 30 September.

1.6.1.5. Additionally, provide changes to certification status throughout the inspection year as a result of inspections (i.e. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections, NSI failures and re-inspects) or mission changes withdrawing nuclear certification to include mission relief. Notify all offices listing in [Table 3.1](#). via message report.

**1.7. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA)** will conduct inspections/assessments and management reviews as directed by the SAF/IG.

1.7.1. AFIA/IO, in coordination with SAF/IGI, provides oversight assessments to MAJCOM/CCs and The Inspector General (TIG) on the consistency of MAJCOM nuclear surety inspections. Conducts in-depth trend analysis, assesses the sufficiency of corrective actions to inspection findings, and provides finding status and metrics to personnel in the AF nuclear surety arena.

1.7.2. As AF clearinghouse for MAJCOM responses to DTRA Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspection findings, reviews critical and major nuclear surety deficiencies identified in DTRA inspection reports. Requests clarification of deficiencies. Reviews MAJCOM actions taken to correct these deficiencies and endorses them to DTRA. In cases where AFIA or DTRA non-concurs, AFIA/IO returns corrective action responses to MAJCOM for clarification. Seeks consultative assistance from AFSC/SEW as needed.

1.7.2.1. Provides nuclear surety-related oversight of NSIs, Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSIs) and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections (INSIs) by overseeing 25 percent of the total annual MAJCOM-conducted NSIs. Additionally, provides observer(s) when DTRA/CSTI inspects Air Force units under the auspices of TO 11N-25-1. AFIA will coordinate each NSI visit with the respective MAJCOM IG Gatekeeper and will honor the IG trusted agent system to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection. In the course of directly observing MAJCOM inspectors conducting their activities, AFIA/IO team members will not intervene in the inspection process unless the safety, security, or reliability of a weapon is in jeopardy and the MAJCOM inspectors fail to take appropriate actions to correct the situation. At the conclusion of each inspection visit, the AFIA team chief will provide SAF/IGI a brief, unrated, written account of observations identifying areas for improving the NSI process. Specific areas to be addressed in each report include:

- a. Whether the MAJCOM inspectors were qualified and trained.
- b. Whether current MAJCOM IG checklists and inspection guides were used.
- c. Whether there were any contentious issues in the conduct of the inspection.
- d. Whether policy and guidance was clear and being implemented as intended.
- e. Whether the MAJCOM IG validation process with the inspected unit and staff was sufficient and effective.
- f. Whether the inspection team sufficiently documented the inspection results.
- g. An overall assessment of the inspection results.
- h. A review of the MAJCOM team's deliberate process from inspection work-up to publication of the final report.

As a final note, AFIA concurrence with MAJCOM IG team findings is not required.

1.7.3. Coordinates the proposed DTRA NSI inspection schedule for AF units.

**1.8. The Civil Engineer (HQ USAF A7/C).** Develops policy to ensure the proper supervision and control of the Air Force Emergency Management Program. Maintains AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations*, and develops and maintains related publications, training products and inspection criteria. Provides support for development of the USAF Inspectors Course.

## Chapter 2

### AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

**2.1. General Guidelines .** Independent inspections are conducted by MAJCOM IGs, AFIA, and functional staffs to provide the SECAF, CSAF, and MAJCOM/CCs status reports on unit efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, and nuclear surety. In this regard, MAJCOMs will establish inspection programs consistent with MAJCOM mission requirements to inspect unit readiness, compliance, nuclear surety and other inspection program elements outlined in this chapter. They will develop applicable guidelines, procedures, and criteria for conducting these inspections.

2.1.1. **Inspection Footprint.** It is Air Force policy to minimize the inspection footprint to the maximum extent practical. The use of sampling techniques (using standard mathematically valid statistical models), combined inspections, credit for unit activity in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, and other measures of sustained performance may be accomplished as deemed appropriate by individual MAJCOMs. Whenever practical, IG teams may deploy to forward locations and headquarters during exercises and contingency operations to evaluate processes and performance. Inspectors may observe, but will not interfere with real world activities, unless a serious situation dictates or when input has been thoroughly coordinated with host base and affected unit commanders.

2.1.2. **Inspection Alignment with AEF Rhythm.** In order to ensure inspection programs adapt to the current AEF environment, MAJCOMs will, when possible, align inspection schedules with the AEF flow. Inspection schedules will be coordinated/deconflicted with known major AEF deployments (more than 20 percent of a wing's assigned personnel deployed). Unless requested by the commander, units will not be inspected within 30 days of a major AEF deployment or within 30 days after their return. MAJCOMs will submit a Quarterly AEF Alignment Report when unit inspections are conducted during a unit's AEF window. Reporting of inspection alignment need only be done by exception. Additionally, if a MAJCOM must conduct a "non-aligned" inspection, notify SAF/IGI by email with a brief explanation of why the inspection was performed during a unit's AEF window encompassing an AEF deployment.

2.1.3. **Inspection Guides.** MAJCOM functional staffs will develop inspection checklist items (with references) for use by command IG teams and installation exercise evaluation teams (EET). MAJCOM IGs will ensure critical items requiring direct IG evaluation are clearly annotated. Inspection guides may be published to a web site or included in a formal MAJCOM Sup to this AFI. Whatever the choice of publication, guides will be current within 90 days of the publication of the last AFI or MAJCOM supplement--whichever comes later. The MAJCOM IG will coordinate with staff functionals and post the location of the current guide with its effective date.

2.1.4. **Grading System.** Inspection team chiefs may assign ratings that accurately reflect observed performance regardless of statistical outcomes. Specific criteria are designed as a guide and are not a substitute for the judgment of the inspector. However, when ratings differ significantly from established criteria, the rationale should be explained.

2.1.5. **Validation.** Each MAJCOM will establish a validation process and ensure all inspectors are aware of MAJCOM procedures and expectations regarding validation. Confirming initial observations, deficiencies, and conclusions gives the inspected unit an opportunity to clarify and/or rebut those observations, thereby avoiding misunderstandings and improving accuracy. Validation is most

effective when initiated at the inspector level. Policy interpretation will be resolved by the appropriate MAJCOM functional OPR. Once deficiencies are validated, they become “findings.”

#### 2.1.6. Installation Exercise Program Office.

2.1.6.1. Organization. The wing/installation commander determines whether the exercise program falls under the CV, XP or IG. Manpower authorizations are not earned for the installation exercise program and staffing must be obtained from within organizational resources. SAF/IG recommends using the guidelines in paragraph 2.1.6.2. to staff the office. These numbers are over and above the wing/installation IG and senior enlisted assistant for matters relating to complaints and fraud, waste and abuse.

2.1.6.2. Staffing. Staff the office with one officer (O-4 or civilian equivalent) and one enlisted (E-7 or civilian equivalent) position. Provide one additional person for each 1,500-wing/installation personnel increment above 1,000. Staff the first increment position with an enlisted person (E-7 with information management background preferred) and the second position with an officer (O-3). Staff all subsequent positions with an enlisted person (E-7). Add one additional enlisted position (E-7) if unit has a nuclear mission. All positions may be filled using higher-grade level, equivalent grade civil service civilian, or by contract personnel with skills and experience equivalent to the core position.

2.1.6.3. Training. Prior to evaluating wing/installation activities, EET members will complete the core training outlined in AFI 10-2501. Additional training may be required when directed by the EET Chief or to enable EET members to meet specialized team, functional area, host-nation, or local requirements or standards. EET members may attend the Air Force Inspectors Course as outlined in Para 2.8."

## 2.2. Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).

2.2.1. Execution. ORIs are conducted to evaluate and measure the ability of units with a wartime, contingency, or force sustainment mission to perform assigned operational missions (e.g., Designed Operational Capability (DOC), Air Force Worldwide Unit Type Code System (AFWUS), Mission Essential Task List (METL), and/or mission statement associated taskings and assigned OPLAN taskings, etc.). For scheduling purposes, MAJCOMs may conduct ORIs in two phases. Phase I will evaluate the unit's transition from peacetime readiness into a wartime posture and the unit's ability to maintain and sustain essential home station missions during and after the deployment of mobility forces. Phase II will evaluate the unit's ability to meet wartime taskings. USAFE may substitute a unit's NATO Tactical Evaluations (TACEVAL) for ORI credit.

2.2.1.1. Scenarios. IG teams should attempt to create a realistic environment for evaluation while ensuring safety is not compromised. ORI scenarios should evaluate both sustained performance and contingency response. Since units must be ready to meet the full range of potential assigned taskings, IGs should periodically assess these units against robust OPLAN taskings. Whenever practical, scenarios may be combined with those of other MAJCOMs, exercises, and contingency events.

2.2.1.2. Major Graded Areas. Units with a wartime or contingency mission will be evaluated in four major areas: initial response, employment, mission support, and the ability to survive and operate (ATSO) in a hostile environment. These four areas are presented in Attachment 5 along with applicable subareas. MAJCOMs may modify major graded areas to account for the variety of

wartime or contingency missions that exist. IGs will apply the common core readiness criteria (described in paragraph 2.2.4.) to each of the applicable major graded areas and sub-areas and supplement them, as required, to develop comprehensive inspections.

2.2.1.3. Performance. IG teams should focus on mission performance. Academic testing should not be used as a primary measure of readiness unless it serves a specific inspection objective, or hands-on performance cannot be observed.

2.2.2. ORI Frequency. Although optimum frequency for readiness inspections varies among MAJCOMs, an outer boundary of no more than 60 months (i.e., 3 AEF Cycles) between Operational Readiness Inspections is required. MAJCOM commander approval is required to exceed this time period. Inspections scheduled within 120 days of the 60-month interval do not require a waiver. For Air Reserve Component (ARC) units, advance notice will be approximately one year.

2.2.3. ORI Grading. The five-tier rating system (consisting of Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory as defined in [Attachment 1](#)) will be used for major graded areas and overall wing performance.

2.2.4. Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC). CCRC represent seven basic, over-arching readiness criteria that all MAJCOM IGs will apply to each area of their respective ORIs. Each CCRC has one or more associated questions to facilitate its use by inspectors.

2.2.4.1. Threat. Is the unit able to implement and sustain appropriate measures to meet changing force protection condition, alarm, information, air defense, and homeland security threat advisory conditions, as appropriate for the threat and unit location?

2.2.4.2. Safety. Does the unit safety program facilitate unit readiness?

2.2.4.3. Security. Were appropriate physical security measures employed throughout the exercise? Were OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the exercise? Were proper COMSEC materials available, as specified in tasked operations plans, to ensure mission accomplishment? Were INFOSEC, COMPUSEC, and OPSEC employed to deny the enemy information?

2.2.4.4. Communications and Information. Were these operations effective?

2.2.4.5. Training. Were units properly trained and equipped to perform wartime duties?

2.2.4.6. Operational Risk Management (ORM). Were units applying ORM principles and concepts to assess the risks associated with their daily mission?

2.2.4.7. Emergency Management (EM). Did the installation establish a single integrated EM Program to coordinate and organize unit efforts to manage, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the direct and indirect consequences of CBRNE and conventional weapon attacks, major accidents and natural disasters?

2.2.5. Contracted Functions. As a minimum, identify those contracts that are critical for the unit to accomplish its mission, sample the contractor's performance (through the Quality Assurance Personnel) as compared to the Performance Work Statement (PWS) requirements and evaluate the adequacy of PWS as written to satisfy mission requirements. Ensure the Quality Assurance Program and Performance Plan provide effective oversight of the contract and PWS. Refer to [Attachment 5](#) for the applicable major graded areas and subareas and apply the CCRCs to determine which contracts to assess during the readiness inspection to ensure unit capability to accomplish the unit mission.

2.2.5.1. Grading and Report. Contracted support activities grades will be five-tier and results integrated into the overall unit ORI report. MAJCOMs are encouraged to focus on the results of the contracted activity in support of the unit mission and to identify strengths and weaknesses. The report is not releasable to the individual contractors; however, Contracting Officers may provide contractors with the findings annotated that relate directly to the contractor's performance per the specific contract.

2.2.5.2. Findings. The Contracting Officer, Quality Assurance Program Coordinator, and Quality Assurance Personnel will review findings associated with contractor performance prior to inclusion in the Readiness Inspection report. If feasible, the Contracting Officer or Quality Assurance Personnel should accompany the IG during inspections. Findings will be tracked per applicable MAJCOM guidance until closeout.

2.2.5.3. Inspector Training. Prior to inspecting contracted support activities, inspectors and augmentees will complete Phase I (Basic Contract Oversight) training IAW AFI 63-124. Additional MAJCOM or Phase II contract specific training needed to facilitate the inspection is highly recommended.

2.2.5.4. Contractor Relations. Only the contracting officer can take formal action against the contractor for noncompliance or direct contractors to correct deficiencies identified during inspections. Develop and implement safeguards to prevent unnecessary contractor claims resulting from contracted activities inspections.

2.2.5.5. Quality Assurance Personnel and the Performance Plan. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Quality Assurance Program on satisfying mission requirements. Ensure quality assurance personnel training, contract management, and assessment of contractor performance in accordance with the performance plan.

2.2.6. Nuclear ORI (NORI). While conducting a NORI, applicable areas of nuclear surety will be inspected as a subset of the overall readiness inspection. Where applicable, nuclear surety criteria will be applied IAW **Chapter 3** and reported in a separate area of the ORI report or as a separate report. The MAJCOM IG team chief is responsible for determining the impact of nuclear surety deficiencies on the overall rating for the ORI. For units assigned to USAFE, NATO Strike Evaluations (STRIKE EVALS) may be substituted for NORI credit.

2.2.7. Air and Space Operations Center ORI (AOC ORI). While conducting an AOC ORI, inspect CCRCs and applicable areas in **Attachment 9**.

### **2.3. Compliance Inspection (CI).**

2.3.1. Execution. CIs are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas identified by senior Air Force and MAJCOM leadership as critical or important to assess/assure the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties, or significant mission impact.

2.3.2. CI Frequency. Historical data has shown that excessive periods between major inspections can result in conditions that significantly degrade effective and efficient mission accomplishment. Although optimum frequency for compliance inspections varies among MAJCOMs, an outer boundary of no more than 60 months (i.e., 3 AEF Cycles) between unit compliance inspections is required. MAJCOM commander approval is required to exceed this time period. Inspections scheduled within 120 days of the 60-month interval do not require a waiver.

2.3.3. CI Grading. Three-tier grading (e.g., in compliance / in compliance with comments / not in compliance) is usually sufficient to assure adequate oversight of each common core compliance area. However, each MAJCOM will determine its own grading scale.

2.3.4. Common Core Compliance Areas. During CIs, MAJCOM IGs will evaluate each common core compliance area (CCCA) based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, Combatant Commands, Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable Air National Guard Instructions. Functional Area Manager (FAM) evaluations may suffice in lieu of IG inspections provided the FAM evaluations meet or exceed the requirements of the CCCAs contained in this directive. In addition, if the IG elects to incorporate FAM evaluations into the inspection process, the MAJCOM IG staff will coordinate with the FAM on the evaluation checklists prior to the evaluation and will review the results following the evaluation. The MAJCOM IG will also publish the results of FAM evaluations in the next MAJCOM IG inspection report for that unit. Minimum Air Force-level CCCAs are outlined in [Attachment 6](#). MAJCOM/ DRUs should supplement this general guidance as required.

2.3.5. Contracted Functions. Sample the contractor's performance (through the Quality Assurance Personnel) as compared to the Performance Work Statement (PWS) requirements and evaluate the Quality Assurance Program to ensure effective oversight of the contract. MAJCOM functional checklists will be tailored to address differences between Air Force checklists and PWS requirements. As a minimum, evaluate the Quality Assurance Personnel and Performance Plan for contracts servicing Air Force-level CCCAs outlined in [Attachment 6](#). Inspection of contracted functions not outlined in [Attachment 6](#) may be added at MAJCOM discretion.

2.3.5.1. Grading and Report. The Quality Assurance Program will be inspected and the contracted function will be graded; however, individual contractors will not be graded. An adequate sampling of contracted activity, coordinated through the Quality Assurance Personnel, will be observed to sufficiently evaluate the Quality Assurance Program. Findings generated during the inspection will be annotated in the overall report. The report is not releasable to the individual contractors; however, Contracting Officers may provide contractors with the findings annotated that relate directly to the contractor's performance per the specific contract.

2.3.5.2. Findings. The Contracting Officer, Quality Assurance Program Coordinator, or Quality Assurance Personnel will review findings associated with contractor performance prior to inclusion in the Compliance Inspection report. The Contracting Officer and/or Quality Assurance Personnel should accompany the IG during inspections. Findings will be tracked per applicable MAJCOM guidance until closeout.

2.3.5.3. Inspector Training. Prior to inspecting contracted support activities, inspectors and augmentees will complete Phase I and Phase II training. Additional MAJCOM contract specific training needed to facilitate the inspection is highly recommended.

2.3.5.4. Contractor Relations. Only the contracting officer can take formal action against the contractor for noncompliance or direct contractors to correct deficiencies identified during inspections. Develop and implement safeguards to prevent unnecessary contractor claims resulting from contracted activities inspections.

**2.4. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI).** Refer to guidance in [Chapter 3](#).

**2.5. Other Inspections.** The following are examples of additional inspection requirements MAJCOM/CCs may establish to evaluate various mission elements. These should be kept to the minimum necessary consistent with mission requirements.

2.5.1. Unit Self-Inspection. MAJCOMs should establish self-inspection program guidelines for subordinate units. The intent is to provide commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and to complement external inspections and assessments.

2.5.1.1. Self-inspection programs should be tailored to each unit's structure and mission, and contain mechanisms that ensure adequate coverage of the organization's mission, resources, training, and people programs. Mechanisms may consist of periodically administered checklists, quality control reviews, internal audits, functional inspections, management information systems, numerical summaries, analysis programs, etc.

2.5.2. Weapons Safety Inspection (WSI). A WSI may be conducted as a subset of an ORI, CI, or NSI. Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and explosives safety standards (AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards* and AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program and the Installation Comprehensive Management Plan* (CEMP) 10-2).

2.5.2.1. Inspect a statistically valid sampling of Air Force munitions/weapons facilities (e.g., storage, maintenance, flight line) and work areas. As a minimum include: Program Management (evaluate effectiveness and completeness of unit inspection documentation, staff training, commander involvement with risk assessment, security, safety violations and projected corrective actions), Task Proficiency (evaluate technical operations based on unit mission requirements, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) taskings, emergency management, and support functions as applicable), and Explosive Safety (review explosive safety site plans to ensure explosives storage and maintenance facilities are properly sited; review waivers exemptions, and deviations IAW AFMAN 91-201).

2.5.3. Federal Recognition Inspection (FRI). The gaining MAJCOM must make a federal recognition inspection of a state unit when the unit is being considered for federal recognition or when asked to do so by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Conduct the FRI according to ANGI 90-201, Chapter 5. A FRI of a detachment is not needed if the parent unit is federally recognized. The FRI should include the unit and the detachment, if the detachment is part of a state unit to be federally recognized. As soon as a satisfactory FRI is complete on a unit, the gaining command assumes the responsibility assigned in AFI 10-301, *Responsibilities of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces*.

**2.6. Inspection Scoring and Reporting.** For NSIs, see [Chapter 3](#). For ORIs, UCIs, and NORIs, use the following guidelines for scoring and reporting inspection performance:

2.6.1. Findings. Findings are validated deficiencies and will be tracked until closed out and assigned a cause code (see paragraph [2.6.3](#) below). In addition, assign one of the following deficiency levels to each finding:

2.6.1.1. Critical Finding. Any deficiency that results or could result in widespread mission impact or failure. Critical deficiencies usually result in an "Unsatisfactory" or "Not in Compliance" rating for the specific area and could result in an overall unit "Marginal," "Unsatisfactory," or "Not in Compliance" rating (for NSIs, see [3.5.1.2.1.1](#) for additional guidance). Critical findings will be closed out at MAJCOM level.

2.6.1.2. Major Finding. Any deficiency that has or could have significant mission impact. The deficiency may cause a unit to be rated “Unsatisfactory” or “Not in Compliance” in one or more inspection areas (for NSIs, see 3.5.1.2.1.2. for additional guidance). Major findings will be closed out at MAJCOM level.

2.6.1.3. Minor Finding. Any deficiency that is procedurally incorrect but has only modest mission impact. Minor deficiencies are tracked and closed out at the installation level.

2.6.2. Recommended Improvement Area (RIA). An identified process, product, or capability which could be improved by a suggested course of action. An RIA is not a finding.

2.6.3. Cause Codes. For SAF/IG data tracking purposes, all findings will be assigned a cause code in the inspection report. See Table 2.1. below for cause codes and explanations.

**Table 2.1. Cause Codes and Explanations**

Category	Root Cause
Oversight	<b>A.1 – Inadequate Supervision:</b> A1.1 – Experience: Error committed despite adequate training & guidance A1.2 – Training: Insufficient supervisor training A1.3 – Lack of attention-to-detail A1.4 – Supervisor aware, but delayed action A1.5 – Supervisor aware, but ignored established guidance
	<b>A.2 – Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Environment</b>
	<b>A.3 – Funding Shortage</b> A3.1 – Unit misprioritized funding A3.2 – Parent unit provided inadequate funding A3.3 – Cause of funding shortage unknown
Personnel	<b>B.1 – Training Shortfall:</b> B1.1 – Training course/guidance not available or inadequate B1.2 – On-the-Job training inadequate
	<b>B.2 – Inexperienced / Unqualified Personnel</b>
	<b>B.3 – Lack of Attention-to-Detail</b>
	<b>B.4 – Aware, but Ignored Established Procedures or Guidance</b>
Manning	<b>C.1 – Manning Inadequate to Accomplish Task or Mission Needs:</b> C1.1 – Insufficient number of assigned personnel C1.2 – Insufficient personnel with appropriate PRP-certification or security clearance C1.3 – Insufficient personnel due to TDY/deployment
Guidance	<b>D.1 – Complexity of Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment</b>
	<b>D.2 – No/Inadequate Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment</b>
	<b>D.3 – Incorrect Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment</b>
	<b>D.4 – Outdated/Non-current Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment</b>
	<b>D.5 – Conflicting Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment</b>

Category	Root Cause
Equipment/Tools	<b>E.1 – Equipment Reliability:</b> E1.1 – Attributed to equipment defect or design flaw E1.2 – Attributed to inadequate equipment maintenance
	<b>E.2 – Inadequate / Unavailable Support:</b> E2.1 – Base-Level support E2.2 – HHQ-Level support
	<b>E.3 – Accountability inadequate</b>
Safety	<b>F.1 – Operations Not Conducted in a Safe/Efficient Manner and Error/Unintended Consequences Attributed to:</b> F1.1 – Perceptual Error F1.2 – Slip in attention or distraction F1.3 – Knowledge-based error F1.4 – Training
	<b>F.2 – Violation/Deliberate Act with Intended Outcome</b>
Other	<b>G – Explain in Clear Text</b>

2.6.3.1. DELETED.

2.6.3.2. DELETED.

2.6.3.3. DELETED.

2.6.3.4. DELETED.

2.6.3.5. DELETED.

2.6.3.6. DELETED.

2.6.3.7. DELETED.

2.6.3.8. DELETED.

2.6.3.9. DELETED.

2.6.4. Tenant-host base findings. When a unit MAJCOM IG identifies and assigns a finding against a function performed by another MAJCOM unit on the same installation, the inspecting MAJCOM IG will be responsible for notifying the owning MAJCOM IG of the finding. This will be accomplished via a separate memo with courtesy copy to both the tenant and host base units. Once notified, the owning MAJCOM IG will be responsible for status tracking and notifying the inspecting MAJCOM IG when corrective action is complete/finding resolved. (See para 3.8. for reporting, tracking and closure reporting of DTRA-identified NSI findings).

## 2.7. Special Interest Item (SII) Program.

2.7.1. Purpose. Air Force-level SIIs provide a means to focus management attention, gather data, and/ or evaluate the status of specific programs and conditions in the field. SIIs also provide feedback

from the field that functional staffs use to enhance decision-making and policy adjustments. Active Air Force-level SII's should not exceed more than five at any given time.

#### 2.7.2. Responsibilities.

2.7.2.1. SAF/IGI: Manage the SII program, coordinate SII topic proposals, and obtain SAF/IG approval. Following approval, distribute to MAJCOM IGs and AFIA, correlate returned data, prepare SII reports (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0008) as required, and forward these reports through SAF/IG to the sponsoring agency.

2.7.2.2. SII Sponsors: Identify potential Air Force-wide SII topics and submit topic proposals to SAF/IGI at [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil) or DSN 225-1531. Proposals may be submitted by sponsors at any level, however, MAJCOM or HQ DCS coordination is required prior to formal submission. See paragraph 2.7.3. for SII format.

2.7.2.3. MAJCOM/NGB IGs and AFIA: Ensure that MAJCOM-level SII's do not conflict with Air Force-level SII's. Upon request from SAF/IGI, provide feedback on the perceived value, need, and inspectability of SII topic proposals. In lieu of specific instructions to the contrary, comply with the following general guidance:

2.7.2.3.1. SII Inspections: MAJCOM IGs and AFIA should inspect all active SII's during each formal inspection. IG remarks are important to the SII process and should be annotated IAW specific instructions attached to each SII.

2.7.2.3.2. SII Reports: MAJCOM IGs and AFIA will document the results of SII inspections as a separate section of the evaluation/inspection report or as a stand-alone report. MAJCOM IGs and AFIA will forward consolidated quarterly and final reports to SAF/IGI at [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil). These consolidated reports should include unit inspected, location, date of inspection, a copy of the inspection checklist results for each inspected unit, and an extract of the SII portion of each inspected unit's inspection report. SAF/IGI will then consolidate these MAJCOM inputs and forward to the SII Sponsor.

2.7.2.4. Wing/unit personnel: Obtain SII information via MAJCOM IG or SAF/IGI at <http://www.ig.hq.af.mil/igi/index.htm>, or [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil), as needed. Wings/units not inspected during the active period of this SII will conduct a one-time self-inspection and report results to their MAJCOM IG for their fourth quarterfinal report. FOA/DRU units not scheduled for an inspection during the active period of an SII will report their results to AFIA.

2.7.3. Format. Upon request, SAF/IGI will provide potential sponsors with additional information on the purposes and uses of Air Force-level SII's, an initial assessment of each topic proposal's applicability, and assistance crafting and coordinating the formal proposal. Submit SII topic proposals in the following format:

2.7.3.1. Subject and POCs. Specify the proposed title of the SII and include the name, rank, office, and DSN phone number for each of the SII's sponsors.

2.7.3.2. Purpose. Provide a clear, concise statement of the SII's goals and objectives.

2.7.3.3. SII Category. Identify the category requested (i.e., long-term or short-term). A long-term SII is normally active for one year (may be extended on a case-by-case basis). Long-term SII's are used when an issue is pervasive and is of major importance Air Force-wide or when evaluating compliance in a specific area. A short-term SII is normally active less than one year. Short-term

SIIs are used when an issue has a limited scope. In some cases, these issues may be analyzed from past inspection data or from results of a one-time survey or unit self-assessment. In the case of a one-time unit self-assessment, MAJCOM/FOA/DRU IGs should validate unit results during each inspection that occurs while the SII is active.

2.7.3.4. Background and Rationale. Provide sufficient background information to give inspectors an insight into the problem and include the rationale (i.e., the reason the SII is needed) behind the SII.

2.7.3.5. Inspection Guidance. Identify a start date and end date to frame the time the SII will be active. Specify grading criteria. Normally, a simplified grading scale (e.g., SATISFACTORY/UNSATISFACTORY) is appropriate. Include precise criteria inspectors will use to determine grades, based on the sponsor-provided inspection guide. Clearly identify any critical criteria (failure of criteria is an overall UNSATISFACTORY).

2.7.3.6. Reporting Guidance. SAF/IGI will establish the specific instructions for the MAJCOM/FOA/DRU IG SII reports.

2.7.3.7. SII Inspection Guides. Include a comprehensive inspection guide for units to apply in self-inspections and MAJCOM/FOA/DRU IGs to inspect the SII topic. This guide should include specific questions and procedures for evaluating the topic. Ensure that compliance-oriented questions are solidly grounded in specific regulatory guidance (e.g., DoDI, AFI, etc.) and include the applicable reference with each question.

**2.8. Air Force Inspector's Course.** SAF/IGI is responsible for the content of and conducting the Air Force Inspector's Course. The Inspectors Course provides the SAF/IG perspective on the inspection process. The course is designed primarily for newly assigned MAJCOM IG team members, but other MAJCOM-level inspectors and unit-level Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) members can attend on a space-available basis. Additional information regarding the Inspectors Course may be obtained at DSN 225-1531, [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil), or <http://www.ig.hq.af.mil/igi/index.htm>.

2.8.1. MAJCOM IGs are responsible for the content and conducting their command specific (or inspection-specific) training that addresses unique aspects of their mission, with an emphasis on safety. MAJCOM IG team members should receive the Air Force Inspectors Course (and any specialized team, functional area, host-nation or MAJCOM-specific training, if applicable) prior to conducting an inspection.

## **2.9. Inspection Report Handling.**

2.9.1. Classification. Inspectors must mark unclassified reports and portions of reports "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) if they contain FOUO information (AF Supplement to DOD Regulation 5400.7-R, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program*). Mark reports containing classified information as prescribed by DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *DOD Information Security Program*, and AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*.

2.9.2. Releasability. Reports of inspection are privileged documents and the Air Force controls their distribution. The following statement must appear on the cover and in the body of each report: "For Official Use Only. This report/electronic transmission contains internal matters that are deliberative in nature, are part of the agency decision-making process, and/or are otherwise legally privileged, each of which are protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552. Do

not release in whole or part to persons or agencies outside of the Air Force, nor can it be republished in whole or part in any publication not containing this statement, including Air Force magazines and general use pamphlets, without express approval of the Director, SAF/IGI. If you received this message/document in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of this message.” Include similar statements on reports of inspections conducted jointly with inspection teams from DoD agencies. Requests from outside DoD should be accomplished through the FOIA process.

2.9.2.1. Reports may be released in whole or part within DoD at MAJCOM/IG discretion. Summary inspection results may be released for inclusion in base and local newspapers. Contact SAF/IGI for approval to release reports in whole or part outside DoD.

2.9.2.2. MAJCOM IGs will maintain a record of official requests for inspection reports. All inspection reports marked in accordance with paragraph 2.9.2. will be maintained IAW the AFRIMS, Records Disposition Schedule (<https://afirms.amc.af.mil/>). Records should be destroyed IAW DoD Regulation 5400.7-R for FOUO material and IAW AFI 31-401 for classified material.

2.9.2.3. Commanders will ensure the privileged status of inspection reports is protected.

2.9.2.4. See paragraph 4.7. for additional guidance concerning AFIA reports.

2.9.3. Distribution: Within two weeks of the completion of all inspection reports, send an electronic version to either the UNCLAS e-mail [safigi@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:safigi@pentagon.af.mil) or CLASSIFIED (up to SECRET) e-mail to [safigi@af.pentagon.smil.mil](mailto:safigi@af.pentagon.smil.mil). In cases where electronic distribution is inappropriate, mail a hard copy to SAF/IGI at 1500 Wilson Blvd, Suite 110, Rosslyn, VA 22209-2404. Availability of reports on internet sites does not satisfy this requirement.

## 2.10. Inspection Scheduling and Coordination.

2.10.1. Inspectors General will identify a trusted agent authorized to release close hold, no-notice inspection schedules to AFIA/CC. AFIA/CC publishes the combined inspection schedule quarterly. Personnel assigned to the SAF/IGI, AFIA, and AFSC/SEW staffs are designated as trusted agents. Trusted agents will not divulge information to unauthorized personnel. Commanders at all levels must ensure the integrity of the trusted agent system.

2.10.2. MAJCOM IG teams coordinate with MAJCOM Gatekeepers, headquarters staffs, AFIA, and the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) to ensure staff assistance visits (SAVs), audit schedules, and topics do not duplicate or conflict with inspection schedules or topics. AFIA and AFAA will coordinate centrally directed audits and inspection topics to avoid duplication of effort. For ARC units, MAJCOM IGs will coordinate their inspection schedule, frequency, etc. with ARC IGs.

2.10.3. Commanders and staffs notify IG teams of schedule conflicts based on operational or exercise taskings.

2.10.4. Commanders ensure key management personnel are on duty and available to DOD IG, AFIA, or other established IG team inspectors.

## 2.11. Gatekeeper Functions.

2.11.1. SAF/IGI, MAJCOM, and NGB Gatekeepers monitor and deconflict, to the extent practical, the type and amount of evaluation activity in Air Force units.

2.11.2. SAF/IGI Gatekeeper Responsibilities. Serve as the Air Force focal point for notification of Air Force-level and non-Air Force evaluations and assist MAJCOM/NGB Gatekeepers in deconflicting schedules, as necessary. Relay visit notifications to appropriate MAJCOM/NGB Gatekeepers and publish AF Gatekeeper guidance.

2.11.3. MAJCOM and NGB Gatekeeper Responsibilities. Establish a Gatekeeper program.

2.11.3.1. Monitor all evaluation visits to installations to deconflict schedules and minimize impact on field units. MAJCOM Gatekeepers do not have authority to deny access to inspectors/auditors from agencies outside their MAJCOM. If attempts at deconfliction fail, SAF/IGI may assist with external deconfliction. Through authority delegated by the Director, Air National Guard, NGB IG is the OPR for deconflicting gaining-MAJCOM inspection activity with other ANG taskings.

2.11.3.2. Evaluate inspection visit requests to determine if visits are duplicative to on-going or recent efforts of other agencies.

**2.12. Best Practices.** MAJCOM IGs and AFIA inspectors will record observed Best Practices as an unclassified addendum to all inspection reports. Best Practices are designated by the inspection team chief based on coordination with appropriate MAJCOM functional experts. Do not include the privileged document statement on these records, as they will be releasable both within and outside the Air Force unless otherwise directed. Upon validation, send Best Practices to Air Force Manpower Agency (AFMA) IAW **Attachment 7**. The Air Force Best Practices Home Page can be found at <https://www.afma.randolph.af.mil>.

## Chapter 3

### AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) PROGRAM

**3.1. NSI Program Guidance** . Nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. When inspecting a nuclear-capable unit, inspection teams follow the inspection procedures in this instruction, in addition to guidance contained in TO 11N-25-1. Each unit's management of nuclear resources will be evaluated against approved safety, security, and reliability standards. To provide a single source of consolidated inspection guidance, this paragraph combines USAF inspection requirements with DoD guidance extracted from TO 11N-25-1. An annotation [USAF] is included at the end of each subparagraph containing DoD guidance that has been amplified or modified to meet specific USAF requirements.

3.1.1. Final ratings will be based on the guidance in TO 11N-25-1, Section 3.

3.1.2. Evaluate logistics airlift units with nuclear weapons transport missions by observing loading, transporting, unloading, and custody transfer procedures of representative types of weapons. The team should conduct the inspection (other than an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection) during missions involving war reserve (WR) weapons when available. The inspection team will not require the unit to perform additional weapon handling operations if a WR mission is evaluated and rated at least "Satisfactory."

3.1.3. During an inspection, do not use an inspector as part of a unit's Two-Person Concept team (see AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*). During airlift missions and when unescorted entry to restricted areas is authorized, two properly cleared inspectors certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) may form their own Two-Person Concept team.

3.1.4. Whenever possible, evaluate a unit's technical proficiency by using WR weapons due at the time of the inspection for normal maintenance, loading, unloading, or logistics movement. Training weapons or weapon system simulators will be used for inspections when WR assets are not available, when WR weapons are specifically forbidden by Weapon System Safety Rules, DoD, CJCS, or MAJCOM directives, or when reinspection is required following unit decertification. In cases where training weapons or weapon system simulators are used for inspection purposes, they will be treated as WR while under evaluation.

3.1.5. Include in the NSI report all deficiencies that directly affect the safety, security, or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system.

**3.2. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI).** The INSI is designed to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission. It is used to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities, physical security systems or equipment to include lethal and non-lethal denial systems or to evaluate a unit's readiness following significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof (see [Attachment 2](#)). In all cases, the MAJCOM/SEW office working with concerned functionals and in coordination with AFSC/SEW will determine if an INSI is required and document that decision in a memo to the unit(s) to be inspected, the MAJCOM IG and affected staff functionals. The memo will list the specific areas subject to evaluation during the INSI. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) will be certified in accordance with the AF Supplement to DoD S-5210.41M, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*. MAJCOMs determine who, within the MAJCOM staff organization (SF or IG), performs recer-

tification tests required by DoD 5210.41M. In every case, use training weapons to conduct an INSI before WR weapons are placed at the unit or facility. An INSI will be rated “Ready” or “Not Ready.”

3.2.1. The inspection team evaluates a unit's capability to safely and reliably receive, store, transport, secure, maintain, load, mate, lock/unlock, and render safe nuclear weapons or reentry systems. Aircrews, command post controllers, release teams, and missile launch crews must demonstrate their knowledge of weapon acceptance procedures, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control order handling and authentication procedures. The inspection team also examines plans and resources for implementing an advanced readiness posture.

3.2.2. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and nuclear logistics airlift units must receive an INSI “Ready” rating before being considered capable of supporting a nuclear mission.

3.2.3. Phased INSIs may be conducted for large-scale, time-consuming efforts. If phased INSIs are conducted, the responsible MAJCOM prepares an inspection plan to make sure all required areas are initially inspected and sends it to HQ AFSC/SEW for approval. A “Ready” rating must be achieved for the phase of the INSI under evaluation before evaluating the next phase. All phases must be rated “Ready” prior to assuming nuclear operations. If a phased INSI is conducted and each phase is rated “Ready,” the required maximum 18-month period between NSIs starts on the completion date of the first phase.

**3.3. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI).** The NSI is designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards (see applicable areas listed in paragraph 3.5.2.). An NSI may be combined with other MAJCOM inspections to reduce the number of unit inspections. Where two or more MAJCOMs share nuclear surety responsibilities at one base, multi-MAJCOM NSIs (MMNSI) are encouraged to ensure host-tenant responsibilities are fully assessed and properly integrated. Either the host or tenant MAJCOM may perform these inspections with the concurrence of, and augmentation from, the other MAJCOM. Additionally, DTRA, IAW TO 11N-25-1, conducts Joint Nuclear Surety Inspections (JNSIs) on AF units with MAJCOM IG teams.

3.3.1. Frequency of MAJCOM NSIs.

3.3.1.1. Conduct an NSI of each nuclear-capable unit at least every 18 months. Complete all inspection requirements within 18 months after completing the last NSI. Complete all phases within a 120-calendar-day period. Provide the NSI rating when all phases are completed.

3.3.1.1.1. If a unit does not meet the 18-month inspection requirement and is not granted a waiver, they will be decertified. MAJCOM commanders will ensure nuclear weapons are maintained in a safe, secure, and reliable environment until the unit is recertified. Recertification will be accomplished by conducting an INSI.

3.3.1.1.2. Units may be selected at the discretion of the MAJCOM IG to receive a minimum-notice inspection that will key on a unit's ability to perform its nuclear surety mission. Notice will be sent by message to units with information copies to SAF/IG, HQ AFIA/IO, HQ AFSC/SEW, HQ USAF/SEI, HQ USAF/A3SN, HQ USAF/A7S, and HQ USAF/A4M.

3.3.1.2. Conduct a follow-up NSI 90 to 180 calendar days after a new unit successfully completes an INSI and receives nuclear weapons. EOD teams, nuclear airlift units, and certification of new or modified facilities do not require this follow-up NSI.

3.3.1.3. Waiver. Waivers should be the last resort after all other avenues have been exhausted; i.e. conduct NSI earlier than planned or combine with another inspection when applicable. Waiver requests will originate from the responsible MAJCOM/CV to SAF/IG. If SAF/IG concurs, the waiver request will be appropriately staffed and forwarded for CJCS approval.

**3.4. Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI).** The LNSI is limited in scope and does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. It is conducted for a variety of reasons and does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

3.4.1. MAJCOMs conduct LNSIs to:

3.4.1.1. Inspect one or more areas designated by the MAJCOM CC or IG.

3.4.1.2. Reinspect a unit in any area that was rated “UNSATISFACTORY” or “SUPPORT UNSATISFACTORY” during an NSI. Note: The rating for a reinspected area cannot exceed “SATISFACTORY.”

3.4.1.3. Contingency Nuclear Mission Units. Certify a unit with a nuclear contingency mission before deployment IAW [Attachment 2](#).

**3.5. Nuclear Inspection Criteria and Areas.** Nuclear inspection criteria and areas are designed to address all functional areas or operations related to the unit’s nuclear mission. During LNSIs and INSIs, selected areas may be inspected.

3.5.1. Pass/Fail Criteria. Consider carefully all NSI pass/fail criteria when assessing any deficiency (see TO 11N-25-1, Section 3). In general, deficiencies resulting in an “UNSATISFACTORY” must be directly related to an existing condition that creates the credible possibility of compromising safety, security, or reliability of nuclear system.

3.5.1.1. Areas rated “UNSATISFACTORY” under pass/fail criteria may be reinspected prior to inspection team departure. If the area is not reinspected to at least a “MARGINAL” level, the inspected unit must discontinue that portion of the operation until reinspected or corrective measures are implemented and approved by the MAJCOM commander pending reinspection. [USAF]

3.5.1.2. Inspection Scoring and Reporting. Use the following guidelines for scoring and reporting NSI performance:

3.5.1.2.1. Findings. Assign one of the following deficiency levels to each finding:

3.5.1.2.1.1. Critical Deficiency. Any deficiency resulting in, or meeting the criteria for, an “UNSATISFACTORY” condition as defined in TO 11N-25-1, Section 3-2.2.

3.5.1.2.1.2. Major Deficiency. A deficiency that requires immediate, answerable action by the unit or higher agency to prevent an unreliable weapon, or unsafe or insecure environment. The deficiency may cause a unit to be rated “Unsatisfactory” in one or more inspection areas not defined as critical under overall unit pass/fail criteria.

3.5.1.2.1.3. Minor Deficiency. Any deficiency that does not meet the definition of a critical or major deficiency.

3.5.1.2.2. Recommended Improvement Area (RIA). An identified process, product, or capability that could be improved by a suggested course of action. A RIA is not a finding.

3.5.1.3. Cause Codes. For SAF/IG, AFIA/IO, and AFSC/SEW data tracking purposes, all findings will be assigned a cause code in the inspection report. See **Table 2.1.** for cause codes and explanations.

3.5.1.3.1. Oversight. Errors in leadership or supervision at any level.

3.5.1.3.2. Experience. Errors committed despite adequate training, oversight, and guidance.

3.5.1.3.3. Guidance. Inadequate, confusing, or specific written direction that is contradictory or prevents adequate accomplishment of the task.

3.5.1.3.4. Training. Individuals inadequately trained/prepared to accomplish the task.

3.5.1.3.5. Equipment. Support equipment unavailable, inadequate, or inoperable due to circumstances beyond the unit's control. Problems within the unit's control would fall under one of the other areas.

3.5.1.3.6. Other. Isolated events involving deficient actions of individuals not attributable to any of the previous causes.

3.5.2. Nuclear Inspection Areas. An "UNSATISFACTORY" rating in one of the following areas does not automatically result in an overall unit rating of "UNSATISFACTORY" unless it violates the pass/fail criteria.

#### 3.5.2.1. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.

3.5.2.1.1. Management. Evaluate leadership, guidance, communication, and attitude of unit commander and key supervisors. Determine whether deficiencies are the result of individual error or reflect management or supervisory shortcomings. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2. Administration. Evaluate:

3.5.2.1.2.1. Required up-to-date directives and technical publications applicable to the scope of the NSI in accordance with this manual. A check shall be made to ensure that changes are being received and posted, and the unit is not in receipt of unauthorized publications pertaining to nuclear weapons.

3.5.2.1.2.2. Unit Standard Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DOD and USAF requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, non-violent disablement, emergency evacuation, supply support, and logistic movement, as required.

3.5.2.1.2.3. An organizational listing of personnel assigned nuclear weapons duties, including security forces. This listing will be used in conjunction with inspection of the unit to ensure that the unit can safely and securely carry out the assigned nuclear weapons mission.

3.5.2.1.2.4. The control and handling of classified plans, manuals, records, reports, and components directly associated with the scope of the NSI, to include verifiable control procedures (VCP) for permissive action link and other designated coding equipment.

3.5.2.1.2.5. Required records properly maintained and evidence of timely submission of reports pertaining to nuclear weapons.

3.5.2.1.2.6. Accountability and/or custody records, to include courier receipts, shipping documents and records of audit. Designation in writing of accountable and/or custodial officers and verifying officers. Stockpile reporting to include Weapon Status Reports (WSRs), Semi-annual Inventory Reports (SIRs), etc.

3.5.2.1.2.7. Existing host-tenant agreements to determine their adequacy and to ensure they support the efficient execution of the unit's nuclear weapons mission, including the Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) liaison officer. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.8. Unit training to be based upon the performance of the unit in the areas of technical operations, storage, maintenance, safety, security, and logistic movement. If deficiencies exist, a detailed inspection may be made to determine the extent to which training contributes to the deficiency(ies). This inspection point shall not be construed as a requirement for the generation of records not already required by pertinent Service or major command regulations.

3.5.2.1.2.9. Key and Lock Control to include designation in writing, key inventory, audit and transfer procedures, maintenance, and disposition.

3.5.2.1.2.10. Status of approved waivers, exemptions, deviations, and exceptions. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.11. Loading and management to include loading standardization, certification, training programs and schedules, adequacy of maintenance plans, and, for certain non-US delivery aircraft, status, certification procedures and records. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.12. Reentry system mating management to include standardization, training and certification programs, and maintenance plans as required. [USAF]

3.5.2.2. TECHNICAL OPERATIONS. Evaluate each type of assigned weapon to assess safety, reliability and technical performance.

3.5.2.2.1. The unit or activity shall be prepared to demonstrate each technical operation required to accomplish its nuclear weapons mission. Table 2-3 of TO11N-25-1 lists areas subject to inspection during the technical operations portions of NSIs and shall be used by NSI teams to ensure sufficient functional area coverage of technical operations and the readiness of war reserve nuclear weapons. A limited number of operations specified in Table 2-3 may be omitted at the discretion of the team chief or chief inspector when essential; for example, due to operational requirements, area or facility limitations, or other managerial considerations. When units are unable to demonstrate areas to be inspected and operational commitments afford the opportunity, the unit to be inspected shall notify the inspecting organization of the problem or problems through the USAF organization responsible for scheduling the inspection. This notification will be made as soon as the problem is known to permit rescheduling of the inspection if necessary. A notation of the omission or omissions will be included in the inspection report.

3.5.2.2.2. Units having a multiple weapon capability may not be required to demonstrate a complete operation for each area listed in the tables if some of the operations are comparable.

3.5.2.2.3. If training weapons are used, operations must be performed in a safe and secure environment in the same manner as on war reserve weapons. Because of differences between some war reserve weapons and corresponding training items, units using training weapons during NSIs often must perform procedures not required with war reserve weapons. Inspectors

must ensure deficiencies noted during the operations with training items would have occurred if the unit had been working with war reserve weapons. When a trainer is simulated to be war reserve, for the purpose of the inspection, it is war reserve. If the trainer does not meet war reserve standards and in fact is in reject condition, the inspected team shall so identify it; the inspector may then simulate that the deficiency has been corrected and the inspection may continue.

3.5.2.2.4. The operations shall be clearly divided between those conducted under peacetime conditions and those conducted under wartime conditions, and shall be organized so there will be no confusion on the part of the inspected unit when the transition from one phase to the other occurs.

3.5.2.2.5. Certain operations listed individually in Table 2-3 of TO 11N-25-1 may be combined with or be an integral part of other operations. For example, receipt inspections or verification inspections do not always require starting from or ending with a specific configuration. Inspectors approve the starting/ending configuration before the task starts.

3.5.2.2.6. Loading and Mating. Evaluate:

3.5.2.2.6.1. Ability to safely and reliably load aircraft, to include loading and mating, weapons transfer, upload operations, post upload procedures, trailer to weapons mate (if certified) and single weapon exchange. [USAF]

3.5.2.2.6.2. Weapon release system. For custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations, include the US technical load monitor activity. [USAF]

3.5.2.2.7. Reentry System Mating in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Units. Evaluate team adherence to technical data and overall safety and reliability of each assigned weapon system type. [USAF]

3.5.2.3. TOOLS, TEST, TIEDOWN AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT. Tools, test, tiedown, and handling equipment shall be inspected for adequacy, condition, nuclear certification, proper marking, calibration status, and load test, as applicable. [USAF]

3.5.2.4. STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND CONDITIONS OF STOCKPILE. The following areas will be inspected.

3.5.2.4.1. Examine at least 50 percent of the assets in igloo storage and at least 25 percent of assets in depot and weapon storage vaults. Conduct spot inspections of weapons coded for retirement to ensure they are stored in a safe condition and are properly identified as being retired assets. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.2. Weapons, Components, and Ancillary Equipment out of Containers. Inspection shall consist of questioning personnel and examining items in storage. Items shall not be moved or disassembled for the inspection except to the extent allowed for authorized maintenance.

3.5.2.4.3. Weapons, Components, and Ancillary Equipment in Containers. Containers shall not be opened for the purpose of the inspection; however, when the state of maintenance of items or the condition or accuracy of records is suspect, the container shall be opened and a visual inspection of the item and records made. The determination to open containers shall be made by the team chief/senior technical inspector. The opening and resealing of containers

must be within the inspected unit's capability or assistance must be requested from a support unit that has the capability. All seals shall be properly replaced if containers are opened. Condition and marking of containers shall be inspected whether or not they are opened.

3.5.2.4.4. Weapons stored in a weapon storage and security system. The vault shall be opened to allow a full inspection of the weapons.

3.5.2.4.5. Records associated with weapons, components, and ancillary equipment maintained by the inspected unit.

3.5.2.4.6. Compatibility of items stored or maintained.

3.5.2.4.7. Observance of explosives and active material limits of items during storage, maintenance, and transportation. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.8. Adequacy of interior lighting.

3.5.2.4.9. Adequacy of storage and maintenance structures.

3.5.2.4.10. Condition of storage and maintenance structures and loading or launch facilities. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.11. Roads in storage areas and between storage and loading or missile launch areas. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.12. Ground support equipment. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.13. Communications-computer systems. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.14. Utilities. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.15. Number and type of safety and explosive exceptions, waivers/deviations approved, and actions taken to eliminate conditions requiring exceptions or waivers/deviations.

3.5.2.4.16. Nuclear certified hoists that are an integral part of the facility. Critical deficiencies include using lifting, handling, or tiedown equipment which is unserviceable, unauthorized, or has not received mandatory load testing or safety related inspections. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.17. Lightning protection system, records, and demonstration of required system tests.

3.5.2.5. Security. Primary emphasis during this portion of the inspection shall be to evaluate the unit's ability to meet the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard (NWSS) outlined in DoD S-5210.41-M, as supplemented. **Attachment 4** provides USAF guidance for NWSS evaluation to meet these requirements. Secondary inspection emphasis will focus on unit compliance with technical criteria outlined in DoD S-5210.41-M, as supplemented. A sampling of areas and sub-areas in **Attachment 4** shall be examined for compliance with applicable directives and by performance testing referencing Integrated Base Defense (IBD) activities and security standards outlined in the AF Supplement to DoD S-5210.41-M. Inspectors will use **Attachment 4** as their sampling tool and guide in identifying areas for performance testing, compliance validation, and security exercises. Nuclear Weapon Security Exercise Evaluations. MAJCOMs perform a variety of inspections to include NSIs, Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections (NORI) etc, to evaluate a unit's ability to meet the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard (NWSS). In applying the NWSS, this section pulls together requirements from DoD S-5210.41-M, Chapter 9 (including AF Supplement) and TO 11N-25-1, to provide a construct for such an evaluation. MAJCOMs will supplement this

section to ensure their specific operating environments and elements of the published Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) *Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment* (NSTCA) (2005-2015) are addressed while ensuring safe exercise conditions to meet exercise objectives.

#### 3.5.2.5.1. NWSS Exercise Inspection Methodology.

3.5.2.5.1.1. MAJCOM IGs working with their staff functional counterparts will develop realistic nuclear weapon security exercise scenarios to determine a units' ability to meet the NWSS. These scenarios must be congruent with the localized threat environment as articulated by the DIA NSTCA.

3.5.2.5.1.2. Exercise Planning and Execution. For those inspections where a force-on-force (FoF) exercises is planned, MAJCOMs are responsible for sourcing sufficient Opposing Force (OPFOR) members and exercise controllers to conduct the exercise. The MAJCOM IG will determine the exercise scenario, and during a JNSI, will coordinate the scenario with DTRA/CSTI. Scenarios will specify the OPFOR size and capabilities and the IG will inform units of exercise requirements in writing at least 90 days prior to the inspection. OPFOR size and capabilities will not exceed the localized baseline scenarios outlined in the published DIA NSTCA, as it pertains to that installation. All OPFOR, exercise controllers, and IG trusted agents will be under the operational control of the inspecting IG.

3.5.2.5.1.3. Exercise Scenarios. Where applicable, exercise scenarios will use an OPFOR that replicates adversaries identified in the published DIA NSTCA. Likewise, OPFOR capabilities will be matched as best as possible IAW this document to evaluate the unit's integrated effort to meet the NWSS. Use of a simulated engagement system (e.g. MILES), while highly desired in the conduct of these exercises is optional. The following are minimum expectations for security exercises:

3.5.2.5.1.3.1. Operational risk management and safety procedures will be used in planning and execution of security exercises at all levels of command. Ensure distinct separation of exercise play area from real world mission areas using visual identification tools such as safety vest/belts, exercise controllers, safety briefings for trusted agents and normal exercise command and control communication announcements. When exercises are collocated within operational areas, be very careful not to use scenarios that could be interpreted as an actual hostile situation that might cause accidental injury to personnel or jeopardize the security of nuclear resources.

3.5.2.5.1.3.2. Use areas in [Attachment 4](#) as a guide to accomplish compliance validation and to evaluate performance aspects of security exercises. Use of credible inspection sampling techniques is recommended, as not all areas indicated need to be observed.

3.5.2.5.1.3.3. At IG discretion, exercise scenarios resulting in the OPFOR gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons automatically triggers a recapture or recovery exercise, as applicable. Inspectors will ensure both the OPFOR and exercise controllers know the "adversary intentions" for the planned attack (e.g. sabotage weapon, destruction, theft, etc).

3.5.2.5.1.3.4. Participants will apply appropriate INFOSEC and OPSEC measures to safeguard exercise information, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Likewise,

the results of exercises conducted in the context of NSIs, or other like inspections under the auspices of the IG will be appropriately classified, graded, critiqued, and reported for cross-tell purposes within the nuclear community.

3.5.2.5.1.4. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.5. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.6. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.7. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.8. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.9. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.10. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.1.11. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2. Security Deviations. The IG will review the number and types of MAJCOM approved security deviations as well as assess the adequacy of and compliance with, associated compensatory measures.

3.5.2.5.2.1. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2.2. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2.3. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2.4. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2.5. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.2.6. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.3. Performance-based Assessment Methodology. When measuring performance to determine whether a unit meets the NWSS, inspectors shall apply the following methodology during their observation:

3.5.2.5.3.1. Observe and evaluate the integrated execution of security actions and responses (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. Provide performance-based (SATISFACTORY/UNSATISFACTORY) grades for exercises by factoring:

3.5.2.5.3.1.1. The timeliness/quality/strength of security/support force responses. (Did the unit meet the tenets of the NWSS (i.e. Deny access or regain custody)?

3.5.2.5.3.1.2. Execution of applicable plans and TTPs. (Did the unit make sufficient effort to immediately deny access or regain custody?)

3.5.2.5.3.1.3. Effect of active/passive defenses, deployed delay/denial systems, and other technology. (Did the unit use available options to prevent the loss of/deny access to nuclear weapons to the adversary to include destruction of the weapon?)

3.5.2.5.3.1.4. Unit application of integrated base defense activities in the overall effort to meet the NWSS. (Did the unit bring available resources to bear on the event; e.g., technology, TTPs, EOD, etc?)

3.5.2.5.3.2. Determine the effect (outcome) of executed security action(s) and response (performance), in conjunction with the impact of unit compliance with technical criteria and contribution of supporting security systems, as applicable, (see [Attachment 4](#)) to determine if the NWSS was met. For example:

3.5.2.5.3.2.1. Did the unit effectively execute applicable plans and employ sufficient forces in their effort to meet the NWSS?

3.5.2.5.3.2.2. Was unit command and control effective?

3.5.2.5.3.2.3. Did the unit up-channel information in sufficient detail and on time to appropriate higher headquarters agencies?

3.5.2.5.3.2.4. Were unit TTPs and applied security technology effective in meeting the objective?

3.5.2.5.3.2.5. Was unauthorized access denied or weapons custody regained.

3.5.2.5.3.3. Exercise Grading Criteria. This area is rated using pass/fail criteria--see paragraph [3.5.1](#). A SATISFACTORY grade must be based on either successful denial or effective and timely recapture/recovery of affected nuclear weapon(s). Failure of a unit to initially deny unauthorized access or subsequent loss of custody of nuclear weapons does not automatically result in a failing grade for exercises. In these cases, IGs must consider specific nuclear weapon type, site-specific physical delay/denial mechanisms, site topography, climate, location, and adversary objective, as well as the effort of the security/support force to disrupt/delay an adversary's task and cause duress to the adversary as the exercise scenario plays out. Finally, when initial denial fails and the unit is not capable of regaining custody in a timely manner, the unit will be graded UNSATISFACTORY.

3.5.2.5.3.4. Modeling and Simulation. As available and applicable, the inspector may use computer modeling and simulation tools as enablers in determining security effectiveness and as a viable measuring tool for developing and refining response force scenarios based on the published DIA NSTCA.

3.5.2.5.4. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.4.1. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.4.2. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.4.3. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.1. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.2. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.3. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.4. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.5. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.5.6. DELETED.

3.5.2.5.6. DELETED.

- 3.5.2.5.6.1. DELETED.
- 3.5.2.5.6.2. DELETED.
- 3.5.2.5.6.3. DELETED.
- 3.5.2.5.6.4. DELETED.
- 3.5.2.5.7. DELETED.
  - 3.5.2.5.7.1. DELETED.
  - 3.5.2.5.7.2. DELETED.
  - 3.5.2.5.7.3. DELETED.
- 3.5.2.6. SAFETY. The inspection shall be conducted to ensure the adequacy of the following:
  - 3.5.2.6.1. Compliance with the Two-Person Concept.
  - 3.5.2.6.2. Compliance with safety requirements/precautions specified in pertinent directives in the areas of weapons handling, assembly, maintenance, storage operations, logistic movements, explosive safety standards, explosives and active material limits, and weapons system safety rules. [USAF]
  - 3.5.2.6.3. Nuclear Surety Program. Evaluate compliance, programs, and management per AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. [USAF]
  - 3.5.2.6.4. General safety practices. [USAF]
  - 3.5.2.6.5. Unit fire prevention program, practices, procedures, and the overall implementation thereof.
- 3.5.2.7. SUPPLY SUPPORT. The following shall be inspected only as they pertain to nuclear weapons, DOE-furnished components, and items required for maintenance, storage, and handling thereof.
  - 3.5.2.7.1. The status of nuclear weapons associated equipment and authorized repair parts.
  - 3.5.2.7.2. The adequacy of replacement procedures (requisitions and follow-up action).
  - 3.5.2.7.3. The status of authorized and required items of equipment as reflected in the nuclear weapons systems allowance standards/unit spares authorization listing.
  - 3.5.2.7.4. The supply management of nuclear ordnance; WR major assemblies; and related nuclear weapon material for positive accounting, custodial control, and status reporting. [USAF]
- 3.5.2.8. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). The inspection shall be conducted to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of the PRP IAW DoD 5210.42-R, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, as supplemented by the USAF. [USAF] This will be assessed using a balanced inspection approach including a review of records, interviews and other direct contact methods as appropriate. The following shall be examined:
  - 3.5.2.8.1. Procedures to include PRP screening, certification, decertification and continuing evaluation.
    - 3.5.2.8.1.1. Medical and personnel record requirements and documentation.

3.5.2.8.1.2. Investigative and security clearance requirements and documentation.

3.5.2.8.2. DELETED.

3.5.2.8.3. DELETED.

3.5.2.8.4. Training program for all personnel who are part of the PRP.

3.5.2.8.5. Communication process between PRP certified individuals, supervisors, supporting agencies, and certifying officials. This inspection point shall not be construed as a requirement for the generation of additional records not already required by the DoD Directive or USAF Supplement. [USAF]

3.5.2.8.6. DELETED.

3.5.2.9. Logistics Movement. All units supporting or having responsibility for logistics movement of nuclear weapons are subject to NSIs. Wartime emergency re-supply movements will not be evaluated during NSIs. However, noncustodial units will be required to demonstrate an approved procedure for nuclear weapon tiedown of each weapon system for which the units have a stated mission.

3.5.2.9.1. Applicability. For an organization whose sole nuclear weapons responsibility is the transportation of nuclear weapons, only that capability is subject to inspection. For an organization whose sole nuclear weapons responsibility is in the area of providing support (direct or indirect), only those support functions are subject to inspection, and only insofar as they pertain to the execution of nuclear weapons logistic movement during the inspection of a supported unit. For an organization whose logistic movement capability is an inherent part of its overall nuclear capability, the logistic movement functions shall be inspected in conjunction with the NSI of the unit's overall nuclear capability. The following are general categories of logistic movements subject to NSIs and examples of support organizations that may become involved in each category:

3.5.2.9.1.1. Military Airlift Operations. Air Mobility Command (AMC) and supporting commands, as applicable. [USAF]

3.5.2.9.1.2. Convoy operations. Includes operational movements to or from launch facilities and weapon movement activities. Logistics airlift units must demonstrate the ability to provide effective command and control (C2) as well as safely and properly load, transport, unload, and transfer custody of weapons. For ICBM units, the capability to transfer/transport, load/unload, tie-down and transfer custody of weapons for payload transfer missions may be evaluated as a logistics movement. [USAF]

3.5.2.9.1.3. Observance of explosives and active material limits and compatibility of items during transportation. [USAF]

3.5.2.9.2. Scope. All organizations supporting or having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas, as applicable, insofar as it pertains to logistic movement and is included in the inspected unit's mission:

3.5.2.9.2.1. Security (see paragraph [3.5.2.5.](#) and [Attachment 4.](#)).

- 3.5.2.9.2.2. Safety (see paragraph 3.5.2.7.). All aspects of safety as related to logistics movement of war reserve weapons to include equipment and procedure certification and maintenance standards.
- 3.5.2.9.2.3. Qualification and certification of transport, handling, and courier personnel.
- 3.5.2.9.2.4. Equipment for adequacy, condition, maintenance, calibration, and certification.
- 3.5.2.9.2.5. Unit Standard Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DoD and USAF requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, command disablement, emergency evacuation, supply support, and logistic movement, as required. [USAF]
- 3.5.2.9.2.6. Nuclear weapons custody and accountability procedures.
- 3.5.2.9.2.7. Verification of integrity of seals or certification of physical verification.
- 3.5.2.9.2.8. Implementation of the Personnel Reliability Program (see paragraph 3.5.2.8.).
- 3.5.2.9.2.9. Courier personnel briefings and required documentation and instructions.
- 3.5.2.9.2.10. Procedures for notification of shipment to enroute stops, destination(s), and consignees.
- 3.5.2.9.2.11. Nuclear weapon system handling procedures.
- 3.5.2.9.2.12. Security personnel briefing.
- 3.5.2.9.3. Units directly involved with military airlift operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas:
  - 3.5.2.9.3.1. Point of Origin Procedures.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.1.1. Briefings (mission, predeparture, Special Weapons Overflight Guide, and shipping).
    - 3.5.2.9.3.1.2. Acquisition and positioning of opportune cargo.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.1.3. Loading and tiedown procedures.
  - 3.5.2.9.3.2. Enroute Procedures, as applicable.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.1. Weather minimums.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.2. Minimum essential navigational aids and communications equipment.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.3. Emergency and routine enroute stops.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.4. Jettisoning.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.5. Command disablement procedures.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.6. Handling of opportune cargo.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.2.7. Customs.
  - 3.5.2.9.3.3. Destination or Offload Point Procedures, as applicable.
    - 3.5.2.9.3.3.1. Briefings.

3.5.2.9.3.3.2. Offloading.

3.5.2.9.3.3.3. Flight planning (if the carrier is to proceed with nuclear weapons cargo).

3.5.2.9.3.3.4. Customs.

3.5.2.9.3.3.5. Opportune cargo.

3.5.2.9.4. Units directly involved with motor vehicle operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas:

3.5.2.9.4.1. Transfer of cargo, to include precautions against hazards.

3.5.2.9.4.2. Provision of area security when required at origin, enroute, and at destination.

3.5.2.9.4.3. Use of tiedown equipment, safety chains, and security covers, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.4.4. Application of quantity-distance requirements.

3.5.2.9.4.5. Use of warning signs or devices.

3.5.2.9.4.6. Convoy operations, to include communication equipment and procedures.

3.5.2.9.4.7. Command disablement procedures, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.5. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Support. Evaluate PNAF support plans, security support, and logistics movement (see AFJI 11-204, AFI 11-299) for PNAF certified units and installations supporting nuclear airlift missions. [USAF]

3.5.2.10. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD). Evaluate classroom and practical training program, condition of facilities and vehicles, availability, serviceability, and demonstrated use of nuclear support equipment, maintenance of technical orders, operating instructions, Team Chief Guides, AF Form 55, *Employee Safety and Health Record*, AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record*, and other related publications, initial and annual certification and decertification documentation if required, knowledge of hazardous and classified weapons components, and render safe procedures (RSP), and continuation of RSP.

3.5.2.11. Nuclear Control Order Procedures. Evaluate command post, aircrew, Permissive Action Link lock/unlock teams, and missile crew responses to nuclear control orders as well as effectiveness of applicable command and control functions IAW higher headquarters directives. [USAF]

3.5.2.12. EMERGENCY EXERCISES [USAF]

3.5.2.12.1. Emergency Evacuation. Evaluate unit plans and procedures to evacuate WR weapons and associated material. The unit, as tasked by higher headquarters, must demonstrate the ability to effectively and safely perform and report emergency evacuation operations in accordance with higher headquarters directives.

3.5.2.12.2. Command Disablement. Evaluate unit plans and procedures used to meet the primary objective to render weapons tactically useless and for the removal, storage, and destruction of specified WR components according to command directives. The unit must demonstrate the ability to effectively and safely perform and report, in accordance with higher headquarters directives, command disablement actions whether tasked by higher headquarters or to prevent the unauthorized use of WR weapons should hostile forces threaten to seize them.

3.5.2.12.3. Emergency Response: Evaluate the wing/installation's response to a peacetime overt attack to determine how effectively base resources are used to defend against overt attacks on areas where WR weapons or weapon systems may be located (e.g., in storage, in maintenance, in convoy). Use realistic scenarios that are based on the NWSS per para 3.5.2.5. Note: WR weapons will not be used in exercise

3.5.2.12.3.1. Evaluate the response of tasked agencies including initial-response teams, disaster response force (DRF), munitions/maintenance, wing safety, civil engineers, medical, command and control, and follow-on recovery operations (IAW applicable DOD and USAF guidance, the installation security plan, and other documents **specific to denial/recapture/recovery operations**). The evaluation will also consider: 1). The wing/installation's assessment of the threat and immediacy of actions taken during response/recapture/recovery. 2). The effectiveness of the planning, training, and exercising of tasked agencies and/or activities to counter an overt attack or preparations for an overt attack. 3). The use of available wing/installation resources to counter or recover from an overt attack. 4). The command, control, and communications of all forces involved. 5). The implementation of the installation force protection plans. 6). Timeliness and accuracy of required reports.

3.5.2.12.3.2. Although the results of this exercise may affect ratings in other nuclear inspection areas (e.g., MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, SECURITY, EOD, etc.), the intent is to have the Emergency Response results reflected in the wing/installation's rating for EMERGENCY EXERCISES. Like the other major graded areas, the rating for EMERGENCY EXERCISES directly affects the wing/installation's overall rating for the inspection.

3.5.2.12.3.3. This paragraph establishes pass/fail criteria (in addition to those presented in TO 11N-25-1, Section 3) for the Emergency Response exercise. An UNSATISFACTORY rating will be assigned for any of the following: 1). Failure of required response forces to respond within the time limits specified in DOD C-5210.41-M, as supplemented. 2). Failure of response forces to conduct recapture/recovery operations as specified in DOD C-5210.41-M, as supplemented, and CJCSI 3261.02. 3). Failure to re-establish adequate security and access control for a WR weapon or weapon system. 4). If post recovery actions, weapon RSP, or RSP continuation procedures by EOD result in an unsafe or unreliable weapon.

3.5.2.13. USE CONTROL. Evaluate Permissive Action Link, Command Disablement System, and Active Protection System operations per CJCSI 3260.01A, *Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices*, and other applicable higher headquarters directives. [USAF]

**3.6. Nuclear Inspection Rating System.** Assign ratings of "Satisfactory," "Satisfactory (Support Unsatisfactory)" (for deficiencies attributed to outside agencies or higher headquarters), or "Unsatisfactory" for the overall inspection. Base the final rating on the nature, severity, and number of findings noted during the inspection. Use the 5-level rating system described in paragraph 2.2.3. for each applicable evaluated area. For phased NSIs and LNSIs, an overall rating will be assigned upon completing the inspection. Assign "Ready" or "Not Ready" ratings for INSIs.

**3.7. Reinspection of Deficient Areas.** MAJCOMs use the following guidance to determine reinspection policy:

3.7.1. If the overall inspection rating is “Unsatisfactory,” reinspect the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating.

3.7.1.1. Conduct a reinspection (NSI or LNSI) within 90 calendar days for units rated “Unsatisfactory” that do not achieve an overall “Satisfactory” rating on an on-the-spot reinspection.

3.7.2. Before terminating the inspection, the team chief may conduct an on-the-spot reinspection of the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating. If a reinspection is conducted, the message report and the formal report must reflect both the original and reinspection ratings for the overall grade and the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating. An immediate reinspection that yields a minimum rating of “Marginal” in the previously deficient area indicates that the deficiency is sufficiently corrected to permit operations, and a 90-calendar-day follow-up inspection is not required. The following apply when determining if an on-the-spot reinspection is appropriate:

3.7.2.1. Do not reinspect if the failure is due to a systemic problem or a general lack of proficiency within the unit.

3.7.2.2. Do not reinspect if suspension of nuclear weapon operations is in the best interest of nuclear safety, security, or reliability.

3.7.2.3. Reinspect if the “Unsatisfactory” rating was caused by an individual's error and training was adequate.

3.7.2.4. Consider reinspection if the “Unsatisfactory” rating was caused by an administrative error that can be resolved quickly and easily; for example, improper guidance or procedure in a unit instruction, operations plan, or operations order.

3.7.3. For a unit rated “Unsatisfactory” that does not achieve a “Satisfactory” on a reinspection, the MAJCOM commander must approve the unit's use of nuclear weapons. MAJCOMs ensure nuclear weapons are maintained reliably and afforded a safe and secure environment until restrictions are removed by a reinspection.

### **3.8. Actions on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Inspection Reports.**

3.8.1. Units coordinate replies to DTRA (JNSI) and Surveillance Inspection (SI) reports through the appropriate MAJCOM functional manager. Critical/major deficiencies require a description of the unit's corrective action. Minor deficiencies simply require a statement that the corrective action is completed. The MAJCOM CARS program monitor will coordinate the MAJCOM response and forward to the AFIA/IO. An initial response is required 90 days after the date of the final report. If the report is not closed within 180 days of the date of the final report, the MAJCOM CARS program monitor will provide an update every 30 days on open deficiencies until the report is closed. Take corrective action based on the field report provided by the DTRA team at the time of the inspection.

3.8.1.1. If all deficiencies are corrected within 12 months of the final report, provide a letter from the MAJCOM/CV designated representative that the MAJCOM concurs with all corrective actions and requests closure of the DTRA inspection report. If all deficiencies are not corrected within 12 months, provide the closure request letter directly from the MAJCOM/CV.

3.8.2. With an overall “Unsatisfactory” DNSI/JNSI rating, the MAJCOM must evaluate the results and the unit's status to determine if the procedures of paragraph 3.5.1.1. should be invoked. The MAJ-

COM must notify HQ AFSC/SEW and SAF/IG of the evaluation results within 24 hours (by priority message) after the DTRA inspection is completed.

**3.9. Nuclear Inspection Reports** . Provide the results of NSIs in message and formal report formats. Carefully consider classification of the report using classification guides such as AFI 31-407, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy* and/or the *Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide*, CG-W-5 to make an appropriate decision. Include a paragraph reference from the applicable DOD or Air Force instruction or technical order for all deficiencies cited. LNSIs and INSI are normally reported only by message.

3.9.1. Message Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0006). Inspection teams report the results of an NSI, LNSI, and INSI in the formats shown in **Attachment 3**. Do not combine NSI, LNSI, and INSI message reports with other inspection message reports.

3.9.1.1. Use priority precedence when reporting “Unsatisfactory” (NSI and LNSI) or “Not Ready” (INSI) ratings. Even during MINIMIZE, submit an inspection message if the unit is found “Not Ready,” “Unsatisfactory,” or has critical/major deficiencies. Include a description of all critical/major deficiencies (see **Attachment 3** and **Attachment 4**).

3.9.2. Extract Message Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0007). Inspecting teams extract LIMFACs and critical/major deficiencies that are the responsibility of a support activity outside the MAJCOM. Send an Extract Message Report (see **Attachment 4**) as follows:

3.9.2.1. An action copy to the responsible MAJCOM IG and applicable staff agency.

3.9.2.2. Information copies to the responsible organization, its intermediate headquarters, and basic report addressees.

3.9.3. Procedural Responsibility. MAJCOMs establish procedures for processing, tracking, and correcting identified critical/major/minor deficiencies. Deficiencies that are corrected before the inspection is completed do not require processing.

3.9.4. Formal NSI Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0005). The MAJCOM inspection team will:

3.9.4.1. If the formal NSI report will be prepared after the inspection team departs, provide the unit commander enough information to allow corrective action to be taken. List all deficiencies under one of the 13 areas in paragraph **3.5.2**. Deficiencies identified against a Higher Headquarters or other support agency should be put in a separate section (e.g., Tab B) unless the unit shares some of the responsibility for the deficiency.

3.9.4.2. Prepare the formal NSI report according to MAJCOM directives. If applicable, send the entire report, or those parts that report on the supporting unit's functions, to the MAJCOM that provided support. In addition to addressees specified by the MAJCOM, send copies of this report to each of the addressees listed in **Table 3.1**.

**Table 3.1. NSI Report Recipients**

SAF/IG	1500 Wilson Blvd, Suite 110	Rosslyn, VA 22209-2404
HQ USAF/SEI	1400 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1400
HQ USAF/A7SO	1340 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1340
HQ AFSFC/SFO	1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd	Lackland AFB, TX 78236-0119
HQ USAF/A3SN	1480 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1480
HQ USAF/A4M	1030 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1030
HQ AFIA/IO	9700 Ave G SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
NGB-IGD	1411 Jeff Davis Hwy, Suite 11600	Arlington, VA 22202-3231
HQ AFSC/SEW	9700 Ave G SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
US NCCS	Skyline 3, Suite 500 5201 Leesburg Pike	Falls Church, VA 22041-3202
DTRA/CSTI	1680 Texas St SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
NWC	1551 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM, 87117-5617
2 BW/CC	841 Fairchild Ave Suite 100	Barksdale AFB, LA 71110-2270
5 BW/CC	201 Summit Dr Suite 1	Minot AFB, ND 58705-5037
31 FW/CC	Unit 6140 Box 100	APO AE 09604-0100
38 CSW/CC	Unit 3338	APO AE 09094-3338
39 ABW/CC	Unit 7090 Box 110	APO AE 09824-0110
48 FW/CC	Unit 5210 Box 135	APO AE 09464-0135
498 ARSW/CC	1551 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5617
62 AW /CC	100 Main St	McChord AFB, WA 98438-5000
90 SW/CC	5305 Randall Ave Suite 100	F.E. Warren AFB, WY 82005-2266
91 SW/CC	300 Minuteman Dr, Suite 101	Minot AFB, ND 58705-5016
99 ABW/CC	4430 Grissom Ave Suite 110	Nellis AFB, NV 89191-6520
341 SW/CC	21 77th St North Room 144	Malmstrom AFB, MT 59402-7538
377 ABW/CC	2000 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5606
509 BW/CC	509 Spirit Blvd Suite 509	Whiteman AFB, MO 65305-5055
38 MMG/CC	Unit 5000	APO AE 09126
701 MUNSS/CC	Unit 21903	APO AE 09713-6705
703 MUNSS/CC	Unit 6790	APO AE 09717-6790
704 MUNSS/CC	Unit 6345	APO AE 09610
702 MUNSS/CC	Unit 4565	APO AE 09214-4565
498 NSG/CC	1551 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5617
498 MUMG/CC	2000 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5606
708 NSS/CD	1551 Wyoming Blvd SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5617
896 MUNS/CC	8230 Bergstrom Ave	Nellis AFB, NV 89191-6110
898 MUNS/CC	7500 Prairie Rd Bldg 27494	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-6520

## Chapter 4

### AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) PROGRAM ELEMENTS

**4.1. Eagle Look Management Reviews.** An Eagle Look is an independent and objective management review of key Air Force-wide processes requested by senior leadership. Each Eagle Look culminates with a written report and executive briefing, which includes recommendations, results, and follow-up, intended to improve operations, support, and acquisition functions.

4.1.1. Topic Sponsors. Eagle Look topics are provided and sponsored by the Secretariat, HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff, MAJCOMs and other Air Force senior leadership. SAF/IG may sponsor a topic independently.

4.1.2. Topic Selection and Approval. Air Force personnel may forward proposed topics, including background and rationale. Secretariat and HQ USAF offices forward topics directly to AFIA/CC. MAJCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs forward topics that cross MAJCOM lines or apply Air Force-wide to AFIA/CC, who will ensure proposed topics/studies are not redundant. AFIA/CC and SAF/IGI will coordinate with DOD/IG, Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA), and other oversight agencies as applicable. SAF/IG approves the topics. Submit Eagle Look topic proposals IAW [Attachment 8](#).

4.1.3. Methodology. Eagle Looks by nature highlight the most significant issues and provide timely feedback (80% solution) for senior leadership action. They are conducted in accordance with, and conform to, the Quality Standards for Inspections published by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, Mar 93. The Eagle Look process seeks out a representative cross section of Air Force personnel providing policy, leadership and execution of a particular Air Force-wide process or program. These personnel are interviewed to determine how process(es) are or are not working, and how they can be improved. The interview population is carefully selected and interviewed using data collection methods that are unbiased, tailored to the interview population, and tested for validity. After a thorough and objective analysis of the interview data, teams write a draft report that includes findings, recommendations, and observations. The reports undergo multiple internal and external review cycles to ensure they accurately portray the data. A policy of strict non-attribution is followed so that interviewees will feel free to be candid in their responses. As a result, all responses in the report cannot be attributed or traced to any individual. Information is portrayed and discussed in terms of prevalent or significant trends across the Air Force. Prior to publishing the Eagle Look report, findings, observations, and recommendations are briefed to the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Chief of Staff equivalent with opportunity offered for management comments, which are included verbatim in the final report.

4.1.4. Report Follow-up. The purpose of follow-up is to ascertain and compile a historical record of actions taken to address the issues identified in Eagle Look reports. AFIA will conduct follow-up on Eagle Look findings with organizations identified as OPRs for associated recommendations. Follow-up will be conducted at 9 and 18 months after Eagle Look report publication, and will culminate with a letter from TIG back to the OPRs delineating the status of actions taken to address the issues identified in the findings.

**4.2. Compliance Inspection (CI).** AFIA conducts compliance inspections of Air Force-level DRUs and FOAs. These inspections focus on the applicable CCCAs listed in paragraph [A6.2](#), as a minimum, and any

additional CCCAs listed in paragraph [A6.3](#). that are mutually agreed upon by AFIA and the DRU/FOA commander.

4.2.1. AFIA evaluates SIIs during AFIA-conducted compliance inspections and provides results to SAF/IGI.

**4.3. Health Services Inspection (HSI).** HSIs assess the functioning and execution of Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) programs and processes at the local level in order to provide senior leadership with accurate data upon which to base policy decisions. HSIs also assess the ability of Air Force medical units to fulfill their peacetime and wartime missions, including provision of medical care, success in training and equipping deployable personnel, and support of the host wing mission.

4.3.1. Criteria and Inspection Guides. HQ AFIA/SG derives criteria from health care policies of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the office of the Air Force Surgeon General (HQ USAF/SG), various civilian medical oversight agencies [such as the Joint Commission and the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC)], the NGB, and the AFRC. AFIA/SG, based on changes in health care policies, regulatory guidance and coordination with MAJCOM/SG staffs, annually updates the next year's inspection guide and posts to the AFIA website. Inspectors assess sustained performance by reviewing substantiating documents created since the last inspection.

4.3.2. Ratings. Each medical unit receives an overall score with a corresponding rating of Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal or Unsatisfactory as defined in [Attachment 1](#).

4.3.3. HSI Frequency.

4.3.3.1. Active Duty (AD) medical treatment facilities are inspected with an overall AFMS average of 36 months. An HSI is normally conducted simultaneously with a survey by the Joint Commission for bedded medical units and AAAHC for non-bedded medical units. AD units are selected for inspection based upon criteria jointly agreed upon by AFIA, AAAHC and the Joint Commission.

4.3.3.1.1. AD medical units update their AFIA held demographics whenever they become aware of an event that may affect the scheduling process. AD bedded medical units must update their electronic Joint Commission application annually. The Joint Commission also requires a formal self-inspection report using their proprietary format between 15-18 months from the previous survey. AD non-bedded medical units must submit a new application with AAAHC which must be received no later than 90 days prior to their reaccreditation survey date. During the term of accreditation, AAAHC also requires written notification within 30 days of any significant organizational, operational or financial changes that can occur.

4.3.3.1.2. AFIA contacts the MAJCOM IG gatekeeper approximately 90 days prior to a scheduled HSI to ascertain any unannounced MAJCOM planned activities that may interfere with the HSI process.

4.3.3.1.3. MTFs requesting postponement/re-schedule of a scheduled active duty inspection must be forwarded to AFIA/SG for approval following Wing CC (or equivalent), MAJCOM/SG coordination and AF/SG concurrence. MTFs should allow sufficient time to process and coordinate postponement requests ensuring AFIA/SG has appropriate information to make a decision to approve/disapprove the request. Refer to paragraph [4.3.3.3](#). for postponement/re-schedule criteria.

4.3.3.2. ARC units are inspected on average every 48 months not to exceed 60 months from the date of the last HSI. AFIA/SG publishes a calendar year ARC HSI schedule in coordination with AFRC/IG/SG and NGB/IG/SG. In keeping with AF policy regarding inspection footprint, AFIA/SG will, to the greatest extent possible, schedule medical unit HSIs simultaneously with other scheduled wing inspections and assessments (e.g., UCI, ASEV). Note: For purposes of this instruction, NGB/SG is a MAJCOM equivalent.

4.3.3.2.1. Unit requests for postponement/re-schedule of a scheduled ARC or AES HSI must be forwarded to AFIA/SG following MAJCOM coordination and policies. Units should allow sufficient time to process and coordinate postponement requests ensuring AFIA/SG has the time and appropriate information to make a decision to approve/disapprove the request. Refer to paragraph 4.3.3.3. for postponement/re-schedule criteria.

4.3.3.3. Certain events or circumstances may affect inspection scheduling for AD and ARC units. The following are criteria and guidelines units will use to determine if a request for postponement/re-schedule is justified. Any request to postpone an AD inspection exceeding 36 months and an ARC inspection exceeding 60 months requires a waiver from the AFIA/SG.

4.3.3.3.1. A medical unit deploying 20 percent or more of its assigned medical personnel for greater than 90 days will not be inspected 30 days (AD) or 90 days (ARC) following an AEF deployment.

4.3.3.3.2. An ARC unit undergoing a wing-level weapon system conversion (resulting in a significant impact of the medical unit) will be inspected within 6 months after such a conversion.

4.3.3.3.3. A unit change resulting in 50 percent or greater change in personnel authorizations.

4.3.3.3.4. A real-world disaster or contingency operation resulting in the unit relocating or suspending operations.

4.3.3.3.5. A unit participating in a MAJCOM-level inspection (e.g., ORI) involving 40 percent or more of the unit's personnel occurring simultaneously with the scheduled HSI.

4.3.3.4. Follow-up inspections.

4.3.3.4.1. All units receiving an overall rating of "Unsatisfactory" or "Marginal" during an HSI will be scheduled for a re-inspection within 18 months.

4.3.3.4.1.1. The MAJCOM/SG or equivalent will conduct a staff assistance visit within six months to assess status. This report will be forwarded to AFIA/SG.

4.3.3.4.2. For ARC and ARC AE units, the next scheduled HSI will be conducted in conjunction with the next scheduled UCI not to exceed 60 months from the date of the initial unsatisfactory/marginal HSI.

4.3.4. Reports and Follow-up Responses. Reports and Follow-up Responses. An electronic/paper copy HSI report is published and left with the unit and wing commander at the conclusion of the inspection. A final copy is distributed to AF/SG, MAJCOM/SG and other interested staff agencies after review at AFIA.

4.3.4.1. "Programmatic Failure" and "Critical" (Scores of 0 and 1) assessments for all units require a response (close-out or interim update) within 3 months of the inspection. These assess-

ments are expected to be completely resolved within 12 months. Units are required to provide follow-up replies, including estimated completion dates, every 90 days until closure to their respective MAJCOM/SGs (or equivalent) IAW instructions outlined in the HSI final report.

4.3.4.2. "Programmatic Failure" and "Critical" (Scores of 0 and 1) assessments for ARC units and AESs require a response (close-out or interim update) within 6 months of the inspection. Units are required to provide follow-up replies, including estimated completion dates, every 3 months until closure to their respective MAJ-COM/SGs IAW instructions outlined in the HSI final report. These assessments are expected to be completely resolved within 12 months.

4.3.5. Special Emphasis Items (SEI). SEIs are limited studies, performed during HSIs, whose purpose is to gather information on specific issues. Topics to be researched are submitted by field or headquarters personnel to AFIA/SG for approval/disapproval. SEIs are normally terminated within 6-12 months and the results are briefed at the annual IG/SG Summit.

4.3.6. Consultative Visits. AFIA/SG provides Consultative Team Visits to medical treatment facilities prioritized by the MAJCOMS. Individual consultant visits may be requested through the AFIA/SG Support and Consultation Division based on inspection schedule and resource availability.

**4.4. Field Inspection.** As applicable, these inspections provide SAF/IG credible, independent assessments of Air Force operational readiness, efficiency, discipline, morale, economy, and effectiveness, as well as assist in oversight of the Air Force inspection system.

4.4.1. IG Team Augmentation. On request, AFIA inspectors may augment MAJCOM IG teams during inspections of field units. AFIA augmentees do not write a separate report. Rated inspectors with current medical and physiological training prerequisites may fly as observers in unit aircraft when appropriate to their inspection role.

4.4.2. Contingencies and Combat. AFIA inspectors may deploy to forward locations and field headquarters during contingency and/or combat operations to observe processes and recommend solutions to readiness problems beyond the control of the local Air Force field commander. These visits require approval by the appropriate unified command. This is not an inspection, but is an opportunity for an independent and impartial Air Force-level team to analyze systemic readiness problems that may need HQ USAF or higher-level attention. Refer also to War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1, Annex O.

**4.5. Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI).** An IGDI is a high-priority investigation directed by the Inspector General. These investigations are usually time sensitive and findings and recommendations are of significant interest to the Air Force, members of Congress, or the general public. The Inspector General approves all requests for IGDI's.

**4.6. TIG Brief Magazine .** AFIA publishes *TIG Brief* (AFRP 90-1) which provides authoritative guidance and information to commanders, inspectors general, inspectors, and Air Force supervisors and leaders at all levels of command. Anyone may submit articles to AFIA public affairs. Articles should relate anticipated or actual problems, recommendations to improve management, safety, security, inspection or operational techniques, crosstell of lessons learned, best practices, or contemporary issues of interest to the Air Force.

#### 4.7. Report Handling.

4.7.1. Eagle Look Management Reviews may be released in whole or in part to Air Force government offices at AFIA/CC discretion while ensuring the privileged status of the reports is protected. AFIA/MSO will maintain a record of the official requests for Eagle Look Management Reviews whether they are processed by AFIA/CC or SAF/IGI. Summary reports of the management reviews may be published in TIG Brief Magazine or other publications if approved by SAF/IG.

4.7.2. Compliance Inspections and Health Services Inspections are privileged documents and may be released in whole or in part only within DOD with the express approval of AFIA/CC while ensuring the privileged status of the reports is protected. Compliance Inspections and Health Services Inspections are routinely released to the unit, their MAJCOM and the Air Staff. Summary reports of Health Services Inspections may be published within the Air Force if approved by AFIA/CC. AFIA/CC will maintain a record of the official requests for CIs and HSIs.

4.7.3. Inspector General Directed Investigations are privileged documents and may be released in whole or in part by SAF/IG in accordance with AFI 90-301.

**4.8. Forms Adopted.** AF Form 55, **Employee Safety and Health Record**, AF Form 623, **Individual Training Record**, and DD Form 2648, **Preseparation Counseling Checklist**. Maintain and dispose of AF Form 623 in accordance with AFI 36-2201 and DD Form 2648 in accordance with AFI 36-3022.

STEVEN R. POLK, Lt General, USAF  
The Inspector General

## Attachment 1

## GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

**References**

AFI 10-204 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-204/afi10-204.pdf>), *Readiness Exercises and After Action Reporting Program*

AFI 10-245 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-245/afi10-245.pdf>), *Air Force Anti-terrorism Standards*

AFI 10-301 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-301/afi10-301.pdf>), *Responsibilities of the Air Force Reserve Component (ARC) Forces*

AFI 10-2501 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-2501/afi10-2501.pdf>), *Air Force Emergency Management, Planning and Operations*

AFJI 11-204 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afji11-204/afji11-204.pdf>), *Operational Procedures for Aircraft carrying Hazardous Material*

AFI 14-104 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/14/afi14-104/afi14-104.pdf>), *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

AFI 14-119 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/14/afi14-119/afi14-119.pdf>), *Intelligence Support to Force Protection*

AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*

AFI 63-124 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/63/afi63-124/afi63-124.pdf>), *Performance-Based Service Contracts (PBSC)*

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AFPD 90-2 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/90/afpd90-2/afpd90-2.pdf>), *Inspector General—The Inspection System*

ANGI 90-201 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/ang/90/angi90-201/angi90-201.pdf>), *The Inspection System*

AFI 90-301 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/90/afi90-301/afi90-301.pdf>), *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*

AFI 91-101 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/91/afi91-101/afi91-101.pdf>), *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*

AFI 91-104 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/91/afi91-104/afi91-104.pdf>), *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*

AFMAN 91-201 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/91/afman91-201/afman91-201.pdf>), *Explosive Safety Standards*

AFI 91-202 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/91/afi91-202/afi91-202.pdf>), *US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*

AFI 91-204 (<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/91/afi91-204/afi91-204.pdf>), *Safety Investigations and Reports*

DoDD 3150.2 ([http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d31502\\_122396/d31502p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d31502_122396/d31502p.pdf)), *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*

DoDM 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*

DoD 5200.1-R ([http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d52001\\_121396/d52001p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d52001_121396/d52001p.pdf)), *DoD Information Security Program*

**DoDD 5210.42**, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, ([http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d521042\\_010801/d521042p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d521042_010801/d521042p.pdf))

DoD 5210.42-R, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, ([http://www.dtic.mil/whs/regulations/corres/pdf/521042r\\_010801/p521042r.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/regulations/corres/pdf/521042r_010801/p521042r.pdf))

DoD 5400.7-R\_AF Sup ([http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dod/dodr5400.7\\_afsup1/dodr5400.7\\_afsup1.pdf](http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dod/dodr5400.7_afsup1/dodr5400.7_afsup1.pdf)), *Air Force Supplement to DoD Freedom of Information Act Program*

TO 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*

### ***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**AAAHC**—Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Healthcare

**ACO**—Air Control Order

**ACP**—Airspace Control Plan

**AD**—Active Duty

**ADP**—Airspace Defense Plan

**AECT**—Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AOC)

**AECS**—Automated Entry Control System

**AEF**—Air Expeditionary Force

**AFFARS**—Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

**AFFOR**—Air Force Forces

**AFJI**—Air Force Joint Instruction

**AFRIMS**—Air Force Records and Information Management System

**AFSFC**—Air Force Security Forces Center

**AFWUS**—Air Force World-wide Unit Type Code (UTC) Summary

**ALCT**—Airlift Control Team (AOC)

**AMC**—Air Mobility Command  
**AMCT**—Air Mobility Control Team (AOC)  
**AMD**—Air Mobility Division (AOC)  
**AOC**—Air and Space Operations Center  
**AOD**—Airspace Operations Directive  
**AOR**—Area of Responsibility  
**ARC**—Air Reserve Component  
**ARCT**—Air Refueling Control Team (AOC)  
**ART**—AEF Reporting Tool  
**AT**—Agency Tender  
**ATO**—Air Tasking Order  
**BDA**—Bomb Damage Assessment  
**CA**—Critical Asset or Combat Assessment  
**CALM**—Computer Aided Load Planning and Manifesting  
**CAP**—Crisis Action Plan  
**CBRNE**—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives  
**CDD**—Capability Development Document  
**CEMP**—Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan  
**CIP**—Critical Infrastructure Program  
**CJCSI**—Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction  
**CMOS**—Cargo Movement Operating System  
**COA**—Course of Action  
**COCOM**—Combatant Command  
**COOSP**—Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program  
**COD**—Combat Operations Division (AOC)  
**COMPUSEC**—Computer Security  
**COMSEC**—Communications Security  
**CONOPS**—Concept of Operations  
**CPD**—Combat Plans Division (AOC)  
**DIA**—Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DMF**—Deployed Medical Facility  
**DMPI**—Desired Mean Point of Impact

**DRF**—Disaster Response Force  
**ECF**—Entry Control Facility  
**EET**—Exercise Evaluation Team  
**EM**—Emergency Management  
**EOC**—Emergency Operations Center  
**FAR**—Federal Acquisition Regulation  
**FAM**—Functional Area Manager  
**FoF**—Force-on-Force (exercise)  
**FVAP**—Federal Voting Assistance Program  
**GCE**—Groundcrew Chemical Ensemble  
**GSORTS**—Global Status of Resources and Training System  
**HAZMAT**—Hazardous Materials  
**HHQ**—Higher Headquarters  
**HQ AFCESA**—Headquarters, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency  
**HQ USAF/A7C**—Office of The Civil Engineer  
**IA**—Information Assurance  
**IBD**—Integrated Base Defense  
**IBDSS**—Integrated Base Defense Security System  
**INFOSEC**—Information Security  
**IPB**—Intelligence Preparation of the Battle-space  
**ISR**—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
**ISR Division (AOC)**  
**IW**—Information Warfare  
**JAOP**—Joint Airspace Operations Plan  
**JFACC**—Joint Force Air Component Commander  
**JFC**—Joint Force Commander  
**JIPTL**—Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List  
**JOA**—Joint Operations Area  
**LOAC**—Law of Armed Conflict  
**LOGMOD**—Logistics Module  
**MAAP**—Master Air Attack Plan  
**MANPER-B**—Manpower and Personnel System

**MEO**—Military Equal Opportunity

**MEO**—Most Efficient Organization

**MOPP**—Mission Oriented Protective Posture

**MWD**—Military Working Dog

**NARP**—Nuclear Accident Response Plan

**NDAA**—National Defense Authorization Act

**NOSC-D**—Network Operations and Security Center - Deployed

**NSTCA**—Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment

**NWSS**—Nuclear Weapons Security Standard

**NWTI**—Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection

**OMB**—Office of Management and Budget

**OPFOR**—Opposing Force

**PCA**—Post Competition Accountability

**PERSCO**—Personnel Support for Contingency Operations

**PRP**—Personnel Reliability Program

**PWS**—Performance Work Statement

**RDT&E**—Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

**RF**—Response Force

**ROE**—Rule(s) of Engagement

**SABC**—Self-Aid Buddy Care

**SAR**—Search and Rescue

**SARC**—Sexual Assault Response Coordinator

**SD**—Strategy Division (AOC)

**SF**—Security Force

**SOF**—Special Operations Forces

**SPINS**—Special Instructions

**STO**—Space Tasking Order

**STO**—Special Technical Operations

**TACC**—Tanker Air Control Center

**TACEVAL**—Tactical Evaluation

**TACS**—Theater Air Control System

**TAP**—Transition Assistance Program

**TCNO**—Time Compliance Network Order

**TIP**—Trafficking in Persons

**TO**—Technical Order

**TST**—Time Sensitive Targeting

**TTP**—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

**UCMJ**—Uniform Code of Military Justice

**UPRG**—Unit Personnel Record Group

**WOC**—Wing Operations Center

### *Terms*

**Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO)**—Physical threats facing military installations including major accidents, natural disasters, HAZMAT, terrorist use of CBRNE, enemy attack and a broad spectrum of planning, response and recovery actions.

**Air Force Emergency Management Program**—The single, integrated Air Force program to coordinate and organize efforts to manage, prepare for, respond to and recover from the direct and indirect consequences of CBRNE and conventional weapon attacks, major accidents and natural disasters. The primary missions of the EM Program are to save lives, minimize the loss or degradation of resources and continue, sustain, and restore combat and combat support operational capability in an “all hazards” physical threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the program are to support homeland security operations and to provide support to civil and host-nation authorities in accordance with DOD directives and through the appropriate Combatant Command. The program is managed by The Civil Engineer, HQ USAF/A7C.

**Assess**—To appraise or evaluate. Independent evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of a policy, process, or outcome by an organization that did not develop the policy or process.

**Access Deficiencies**—Access occurs when an unauthorized individual(s) has close proximity to a nuclear weapon, weapon system, or critical component in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage the weapon, system, or component. Consider these deficiencies when evaluating all other areas.

**Best Practice**—A superior method or innovative practice that contributes significantly to improved performance of a process.

**Closure**—The process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry and/or port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise.

**Computer Aided Load Planning and Manifesting (CALM)**—Automated Load planning to ensure proper weight and balance of aircraft cargo load as well as optimal use of available cabin limits.

**Cargo Movement Operating System (CMOS)**—Is a transportation system that automates manifesting movement of cargo and personnel. It also provides in-transit visibility.

**Combined Inspection**—The combination of more than one type of inspection into one IG visit.

**Common Core Compliance Area (CCCA)**—Key processes, procedures, or requirements based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, Air Force, MAJCOM, or applicable Air National Guard instructions.

**Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC)**—Criteria that establishes an Air Force-wide common readiness standard for evaluation of like units or organizations.

**Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI)**—A Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

**Eagle Look**—Independent and objective management review of key Air Force-wide processes requested by senior leadership.

**Excellent**—The grade given to indicate performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and relatively free of deficiencies.

**Finding**—For NSIs, ORIs, UCIs, and NORIs, a Critical, Major, or Minor Deficiency.

**Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI)**—A high priority investigation directed by The Inspector General.

**Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI)**—An inspection to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission or to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities or significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

**Logistics Module (LOGMOD)**—Receives and maintains the cargo portion of UTCs and taskings. Maintains detailed records on cargo (i.e. Nomenclature, NSN, weight, cube, dims, etc.) as well as a command and control capability through the Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE) module.

**Limiting Factor (LIMFAC)**—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

**Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI)**—A limited scope inspection, which does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. Conducted for a variety of reasons, it does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

**Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection**—A nuclear surety inspection conducted jointly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and a MAJCOM IG Team.(Reference TO 11N-25-1)

**Manpower and Personnel Module (MANPER-B)**—Receives and maintains the personnel data for UTCs and taskings.

**Marginal**—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet some mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

**Minimum Notice**—Inspection notice given to a unit prior to the inspection; should be the minimum necessary for scheduling and practical preparation time.

**Nuclear-Capable Unit**—A wing, group, squadron, or other designated element that does not necessarily possess nuclear weapons but has a mission to receive, store, handle, test, maintain, transport, load and unload, mate and demate, stand alert, or perform strike missions with nuclear bombs or warheads. An

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team with a level of nuclear capability (full capability nuclear support) maintained by units that support nuclear weapon storage areas, one or more consolidated support bases storing these systems, or a location identified by Air Mobility Command (AMC) as a primary throughput or divert-location. US custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations are nuclear-capable units.

**Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI)**—An inspection to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards.

**Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)**—An evaluation of operational readiness or ability to conduct combat operations in wartime for any unit with a wartime mission. The unit is evaluated on how well it can respond, employ forces, provide mission support, and survive and operate in a combat environment.

**Outstanding**—The grade given to indicate performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. Minimal deficiencies exist.

**Oversight**—The watchful management or supervision of the implementation of policy performed by the agency responsible for development of that policy.

**Readiness**—The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels:

- a. **Unit Readiness**—The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.
- b. **Joint Readiness**—The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his assigned missions.

**Recommended Improvement Area**—An identified process, product, or capability that could be improved by a suggested course of action.

**Resource Availability**—Includes personnel, equipment, or authorized repair parts. Failure results from shortages within the unit's control, preventing required nuclear weapon technical operations.

**Satisfactory**—The grade given to indicate performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

**Special Interest Item (SII)**—A tool to focus management attention, gather data, and assess the status of specific programs and conditions in the field. SIIs are evaluated by IG inspectors using inspection guides and grading criteria provided by the SII sponsoring agency.

**Unsatisfactory**—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

## Attachment 2

## INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR MISSION CHANGES

ITEM	A	B	C	D	E
	Type of change	Primary Unit Functions Affected	Type of Inspection	When Inspected	Remarks
1	Assuming or resuming nuclear mission or relocation of the unit.	All unit functions.	INSI	Before introducing weapons into the unit or resuming tasks.	INSI is required for units who do not meet the 18-month requirement (see Note 4).
2	Certifying new or significantly modified maintenance or storage facilities (see Note 5).	Appropriate inspection areas.	INSI	Before introducing weapons into the new or modified facility.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI. Evaluate design, construction, security policies, and procedures (see notes 1 and 2).
3	Activating new noncombat delivery squadron (PNAF).	Appropriate wing and squadron functions.	INSI	Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	When changing PNAF squadrons within a wing, wing agencies do not require reevaluation during the INSI if their support functions remain unchanged by the squadron conversion.
4	New weapon type.	Maintenance, loading, supply, and EOD.	INSI	Before receiving the first new weapon.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.

ITEM	A	B	C	D	E
	Type of change	Primary Unit Functions Affected	Type of Inspection	When Inspected	Remarks
5	New type of delivery system.	Loading or mating and EOD.	INSI	Before loading or mating to new delivery system.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
6	Certifying or recertifying a unit assigned a contingency nuclear mission.	Applicable functions and programs.	INSI or LNSI (see note 3)	Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	If the unit deploys and handles war reserve weapons during exercises, accomplish the inspection 90 calendar days before deployment.

**NOTES:**

1. An INSI may be conducted on one or more facilities that are typical of new construction at a base. If no other similar structures or facilities are modified after the INSI of typical structures, an inspection of other structures or facilities is not required. If new structures or facilities are located in a specific area (alert area or weapons storage area) and all of the area is affected, inspect the entire area after construction is completed.
2. An INSI of new security intrusion detection systems is required after satisfactory completion of the Phase III testing. Significantly modified intrusion detection systems must be recertified by an INSI or MAJCOM A7S staff. Significant modifications include added, removed, or modified sensors not part of the original certified system, change to source code on computer based intrusion detection system, or installation of new software (this does not include upgrades to existing software that have been properly certified). The responsible MAJCOM must certify the system for operational use.
3. An INSI is required if the unit is being certified for the first time for its contingency nuclear mission or if the 18-month certification is expired. An LNSI may be conducted (in lieu of an NSI) if the unit had an NSI within 18 months, but a subordinate unit requires certification. (EXAMPLE: A wing with two combat delivery squadrons tasked for a contingency nuclear capability receives an INSI, but only one of its two squadrons is certified. An LNSI may be accomplished if the second combat delivery squadron is subsequently tasked to demonstrate capability and the required

certification inspection occurs within 18 months of the wing's last inspection. Under these circumstances, the MAJCOM inspection team must decide whether to accomplish an LNSI or NSI.)

4. An INSI is required if the unit has not had an NSI within the 18-month requirement unless a waiver was approved by SAF/IG. The unit will be decertified and cease all nuclear critical tasks until the INSI is complete. The MAJCOM CC is responsible for insuring the safety and security of all nuclear assets during the interim period between decertification and recertification.
5. Significance of modification will be determined by the responsible MAJCOM functional(s) in coordination with AFSC/SEW and documented IAW paragraph [3.2](#).

### Attachment 3

#### MESSAGE FORMATS FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS

This attachment provides formats for reporting Nuclear Surety Inspection results IAW paragraphs 3.9.1 and 3.9.2. Two formats are provided. Attachment A3.1. is used for reporting NSI, LNSI, and INSI results. Attachment A3.2. is used for reporting critical/major deficiencies that are the responsibility of a support activity outside the MAJCOM

#### A3.1. Message format for Nuclear Surety Inspections.

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)// (Numbered Air Force, if applicable)  
(Base)// CC// (Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SEI/A3S/A7S/A4M// HQ AFSC KIRTLAND AFB NM//  
CC/ SEW// HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/IO//

NCCS SUPPORT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG//

DTRA AO KIRTLAND AFB NM//CSTI//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201

**(NOTE:** Assign a classification according to message content; simply associating an INSI, NSI, or LNSI with specific units is normally unclassified. Refer to applicable classification guides for specific guidance.)

MSGID/GENADMIN/MAJCOM/IG (who is sending the report)//

SUBJ/INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI)REPORT// (or) /NUCLEAR SURETY  
INSPECTION (NSI) REPORT// (or) /LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPEC-  
TION (LNSI) REPORT (Classification) //

(Use appropriate subject.) POC/(name)/(rank)/(office sym)/(location)/TEL: DSN (number)//  
(optional) GENTEX/REMARKS/

1. (Classification) REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for reinspections, refer to the message report and date of the previous inspection.)
2. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: THE (MAJCOM) IG TEAM CONDUCTED AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).

3. (Classification) SYSTEMS INSPECTED AND AREAS OBSERVED: (Identify each weapon system, e.g., MK 12). THE TECHNICAL OPERATION OR OBSERVATIONS CORRESPOND TO AFI 90-201 AND THE (MAJCOM) SUPPLEMENT (Indicate war reserve, e.g., -1A on B61 WR; or training unit, e.g., parachute exchange on B43 TR.). Give the reason for omitting any technical operations required in TO 11N-25-1, Table 2-3. State specific EOD operations observed; e.g., render safe procedures on specific type of weapon. If another unit or command was responsible for EOD or security support, include the following: THE INSPECTION INCLUDED AN EVALUATION OF THE TECHNICAL (EOD or SECURITY) SUPPORT PROVIDED BY (unit, base, and command). (Report findings in paragraphs 5 and 6 below, if applicable.)
4. (Classification) UNIT INSPECTION RATING: [For an INSI: READY or NOT READY; for an NSI or LNSI: SATISFACTORY, UNSATISFACTORY, or SATISFACTORY (SUPPORT UNSATISFACTORY).]
5. (Classification) LIMITING FACTORS: (If any, describe each problem in detail and indicate its effect on the unit mission. Identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action and indicate if the support organization or higher command failed to provide required support. Include appropriate references and describe corrective action taken during the inspection.)
6. (Classification) CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES: (If any, describe as in paragraph 5 above. Identify any deficiency that has a major impact on nuclear surety or is a factor in a less than Satisfactory rating. Include appropriate references and describe any corrective action taken during the inspection.)
7. (Classification) OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION: (Include MAJCOM special subjects related to nuclear surety that were evaluated. Provide concurrence or nonconcurrence statements from DTRA or AFIA for SIs or LNSIs.)
8. (Classification) PROCESSING OF REPORT: (Report processing is required, when a critical/major deficiency is not corrected before the inspection is completed or when the corrective action is an interim measure. If required, specify items to be answered.)

### **A3.2. Message format (Extract) for Nuclear Surety Inspections:**

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)// (Numbered Air Force, if applicable) (Base)//CC// (Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SEI/A3S/A7S/A4M//

HQ AFSC KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/SEW//

HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//IO//

NCCS SUPPORT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201 MSGID/GENADMIN/ACC IG (who is sending the report)//

SUBJ/INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI) EXTRACT REPORT// (or) /NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) EXTRACT REPORT// (or) /LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (LNSI) EXTRACT REPORT// (Classification) (Use appropriate subject.) POC/(name)/(rank)/(office sym)/(location)/TEL: DSN (number)// (optional) GENTEX/REMARKS/

1. (Classification) REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents.)
2. (Classification) THIS EXTRACT REPORT COVERS (LIMITING FACTORS or CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES) NOTED DURING AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) CONDUCTED ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).
3. (Classification) THE (unit) IS A TENANT ON (base). AS OUTLINED IN THE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (give a description of the agreement and the date), THE (organization) WAS RATED (rating). (Include the following, if applicable): THE (organization) HAS NOT FURNISHED ADEQUATE SUPPORT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING (LIMITING FACTORS or CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES):

(Describe the limiting factors or critical/major deficiencies; identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action; and provide appropriate references.)

4. (Classification) (Include remarks, if any.) (If applicable, provide the name of the representative from the MAJCOM not conducting the inspection as follows): THE (MAJCOM) REPRESENTATIVE (name) (CONCURRED or NONCONCURRED) WITH THIS EXTRACT REPORT.
5. (Classification) PROCESSING OF THIS REPORT ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201, PARAGRAPH **3.9.**, (IS/IS NOT) REQUIRED.





AREAS/ITEMS OF INSPECTION	Performance Testing	Compliance Validation	Security Exercises
<b>Boundary Barrier Subsystem</b> - Perimeter Boundary Fencing - Clear Zone Management - Vegetation Control - Final Denial and Perimeter Defensive Positions - Area Warning Signs - Area Vehicle Barriers - Area Openings, Grills and Grates - Secondary Locks and Seals - Area Public Address System - Area Airborne Assault Defenses - Area Lighting Subsystem	    X  X   X  X	  X X X X X X X X X	    X  X   X  X X
<b>Security Facilities Requirements</b> - Site Security Control Center - Alarm Monitor Station - Response Force and Security Force Facilities - Power Sources (Primary, Standby, and Battery) - Use of Hardened Fighting Position (where applicable) - Guard Towers and Shacks (where applicable) - Entry Control Facility (ECF) - Security Gatehouse - SF Armory (Primary and Alternate Locations)	    X X    	  X X X X X X X X X	     X X   X X X X
<b>Recapture/Recovery Operations</b> - Site Plan Execution, TTPs, and Technology Application - Response Time - Facility Breaching Equipment - Back-up Force(s) - Follow On Back Force(s) - Host Nation Integration (as applicable) - Post Recapture/Recovery Operations	 X X X X X X X	  X  X X X X	  X X X X X X X
<b>Motor Vehicle Convoy Operations</b> - Convoy Briefing - OPSEC and Critical Information Management - On Base Movements (as applicable) - Off Base Movements (as applicable) - Limited Area Movement (as applicable) - Posting, Leadership, and Supervision - Weapons/Equipment - Convoy Vehicles - Convoy Communications - Convoy Configuration - Deployment and TTPs - Host Nation Support (as applicable)	 X  X X X X X X X X X X	 X X X X X X X X X X	   X X X X  X X

AREAS/ITEMS OF INSPECTION	Performance Testing	Compliance Validation	Security Exercises
<b>Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Operations</b> - PNAF Area Establishment - Aircraft Arrival/Departure Security Procedures - Entry/Exit Control - Entry Authority List - Physical Security - PNAF Security Posting - Backup Force(s) - RF Armament and Equipment - Tactical Supervision and Leadership - Security Vehicles - Site Plan Execution, TTPs, and Technology Application - On/Off Load Security Procedures - Final Denial Capability - Host Nation Support (as applicable)	X X X   X  X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	  X   X X X X  X X X X X
<b>Emergency Response Exercises</b> - Restricted Area Entry/Exit Control - Personnel/Vehicle Accountability in Security Areas - <b>Host Nation Support (as applicable)</b>	X X X	X X X	X X X
<b>Performance and Integration of Support Forces</b>	X		X
<b>Protection Against Standoff Attack</b>	X	X	X

## Attachment 5

### READINESS INSPECTIONS

**A5.1. Major Graded Areas and Subareas.** Units with a wartime or contingency mission will be evaluated in four major areas: initial response, employment, mission support, and the ability to survive and operate in a hostile environment. IGs will apply the common core readiness criteria (described in paragraph 2.2.4.) to each of the applicable major graded areas and subareas. Major graded areas can be evaluated at either home-station or a deployed location. If evaluated at home station, the IG will provide the simulated wartime scenario.

#### **A5.2. Initial Response.**

A5.2.1. **Command and Control. (C2).** Evaluate the effectiveness of those initial response actions performed by the Wing Battle Staff, the Wing Command Post, the Maintenance Operations Center and other wing C2 agencies which affect the entire unit's ability to respond to initial deployment tasking.

A5.2.1.1. Determine if the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) and Air Expeditionary Force Reporting Tool (ART) reporting is timely, accurate, and properly classified.

A5.2.1.2. Evaluate Unit Manning Document and Deployed Requirements Manning Document for accuracy.

#### **A5.2.2. Employment Readiness**

A5.2.2.1. Evaluate aircraft generation, deployment, and regeneration

A5.2.2.2. Evaluate Operations

#### **A5.2.3. Information Operations (IO)**

A5.2.3.1. Determine if primary, secondary, and tertiary Information Operations points of contact (POCs) have been appointed.

A5.2.3.2. Determine if subordinate unit IO POCs have been designated.

A5.2.3.3. Determine whether POC deployment requirements are consistent with the unit's ability to perform IO plans/tasking.

A5.2.3.4. Determine if the unit has Military Deception plans pre-coordinated and integrated with other IO objectives and ready to implement.

#### **A5.2.4. Deployment Processing.**

A5.2.4.1. Determine if deployment planning is comprehensive, timely, and responsive to taskings.

A5.2.4.2. Evaluate whether the right people process with the required equipment, training, medical clearance, and documents at the right time.

A5.2.4.3. Determine if transportation is used efficiently, e.g., the minimum number of vehicles/aircraft to deploy the required people and equipment.

A5.2.4.4. Determine if the deployment process is efficiently, effectively, and safely executed.

A5.2.4.5. Evaluate whether the unit meets closure requirements.

A5.2.4.6. Determine if all reports are accomplished in the required time.

A5.2.4.7. Determine whether all required automated deployment systems are effectively used and properly managed, e.g. all components of IDS (Integrated Deployment System) (LOGMOD, MANPER-B, CMOS, and CALM) to achieve In-Transit Visibility.

A5.2.4.8. Determine if the Personnel Deployment Function (PDF) maintains accountability of people.

A5.2.4.9. Determine if they maintain and operate the Manpower and Personnel Module-B (MANPER-B) systems to meet all reporting requirements.

### **A5.3. Employment.**

#### **A5.3.1. Command and Control.**

A5.3.1.1. Determine whether units are capable of performing wartime/contingency taskings within timeline provided by orders or similar authority.

A5.3.1.2. Assess the unit's ability to successfully meet unified commander taskings by maintaining the capability as outlined in the unit's designed operational capability (DOC)/Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs).

A5.3.1.3. Check adequacy and security of command, control, communications, and computer procedures with other services, commands, and users.

A5.3.1.4. Accurately interpret and execute mission in accordance with higher headquarters taskings.

#### **A5.3.2. Operations.**

A5.3.2.1. Evaluate unit's ability to integrate deployed location procedures and requirements into unit's plans.

A5.3.2.2. Review application of unified commander's rules of engagement (ROE) for clarity and understanding within exercise constraints.

A5.3.2.3. Evaluate established search-and-rescue (SAR) procedures within exercise constraints (flying units).

A5.3.2.4. Evaluate whether operations, equipment, and training can adequately sustain wartime or contingency requirements.

A5.3.2.5. Evaluate weapon systems proficiency against required standards/taskings.

A5.3.2.6. Validate ability to efficiently manage the crew force.

A5.3.2.7. Evaluate efforts to meet air tasking order (ATO), space tasking order (STO), or sortie generation on a daily basis.

#### **A5.3.3. Maintenance.**

A5.3.3.1. Evaluate sortie generation efforts to meet the ATO.

A5.3.3.2. Evaluate the Combat Munitions Plan.

#### **A5.3.4. Intelligence.**

A5.3.4.1. Evaluate the following Air Force Intelligence Prioritized Tasks:

A5.3.4.1.1. Provide situational awareness, threat status, to include potential adversary Information Operations (IO) threats, terrorist threat in coordination with AFOSI, and target status.

A5.3.4.1.2. Assist in development of air operations tasking order/space tasking order/security forces missions.

A5.3.4.1.3. Consolidate, prioritize, and validate production and collection requirements.

A5.3.4.1.4. Assess the timely transmission of intelligence/threat information from mission debriefing and reporting (all levels).

A5.3.4.1.5. Consolidate and report battle damage assessments and security forces spot reports (e.g., SALUTE reports).

A5.3.4.1.6. Define requirements and manage inventory for targeting and geospatial information and services (GI&S).

A5.3.4.1.7. Evaluate that national, theater, force, and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution, and included in mission effectiveness and vulnerability assessments.

A5.3.4.1.8. Evaluate threat assessment analysis (procedures/processes to collect, analyze, produce and disseminate threat information) for both air and ground forces, to include in garrison, in transit, and deployed units. This process will address the analysis of all-source intelligence fusion including counterintelligence (CI) and Law Enforcement (LE) information provided by AFOSI and SF.

A5.3.4.1.9. Evaluate support to Threat/Force Protection Working Groups, integrated base defense and Tactical Deception Planning.

A5.3.4.1.10. Evaluate support and participation in Mission Planning (air and ground movements), Threat Penetration and Target Engagement Processes.

**A5.3.5. Weather.**

A5.3.5.1. Evaluate the timeliness, accuracy, and meaningfulness of weather support to users.

A5.3.5.2. Evaluate the integration of strategic, operational and tactical weather information into unit's weather products.

A5.3.5.3. Assess ability to prepare weather products with limited data.

A5.3.5.4. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit tactical-level weather information in a timely manner.

**A5.3.6. Airfield Operations (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management).**

A5.3.6.1. Evaluate the ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft during wartime/contingency taskings while adhering to USAF, FAA, DOD, and ICAO procedures.

A5.3.6.2. Evaluate the ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities (pavements, signs, markings, etc.) during wartime/contingency taskings.

A5.3.6.3. Evaluate Airfield Operations emergency actions procedures and checklists.

**A5.3.7. Aircrew Life Support.**

A5.3.7.1. Evaluate the ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival, and rescue equipment.

A5.3.7.2. Evaluate the ability to provide deployment packages supporting 60 days of surge flying operations.

A5.3.7.3. Evaluate the ability to support aircrew chemical defense operations.

A5.3.7.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of aircrew and technician training programs.

**A5.3.8. Information Operations (IO)**

A5.3.8.1. Evaluate integration of all applicable IO activities IAW Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, *Information Operations*.

A5.3.8.2. Determine if IO is adequately represented on all applicable working groups.

A5.3.8.3. Evaluate whether IO planning processes are occurring in a timely manner.

A5.3.8.4. Evaluate tactics conducted under military deception plans IAW AFI 10-704, *Military Deception Program*.

**A5.4. Mission Support.** Support areas assessed will consist of the following but may be modified by MAJCOMs to properly assess the broad wartime and contingency mission of their units.

A5.4.1. **Command and Control.** Do unit control centers ensure forces under their control collect, display, report and disseminate information which in turn initiates the appropriate plans, procedures, and implementing instructions to accomplish support taskings?

**A5.4.2. Communications and Information Systems Operations.**

A5.4.2.1. Evaluate measures to protect critical information and information systems IAW AFI 33-112, Computer Systems Management; AFI 33-113, Official Messaging; AFI 33-115v1, Network Management; AFI 33-115v2, Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network Professionals; AFI 33-119, Electronic Mail; AFI 33-129, Transmission of Information Via the Internet; AFI 33-202, Computer Security; AFI 33-204, Information Assurance (IA) Awareness Program; AFSSI 5021, Time Compliance Network Order (TCNO) Management And Vulnerability And Incident Reporting; and AFSSI 5027, Computer Security.

A5.4.2.2. Evaluate actions to prevent exploitation of information by potential adversaries IAW AFI 10-1101, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

A5.4.2.3. Evaluate Public Affairs tactics conducted in support of Information Operations (IO) objectives IAW Chapter 12 of AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*.

**A5.4.3. Personnel.**

A5.4.3.1. Personnel Readiness Element (PRE): Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of all MANPER-B reports and support documents (e.g., orders).

A5.4.3.2. Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO): Determine whether the PERSCO maintains accountability of deployed personnel. Assess the accuracy and timeliness of the MANPER-B system reports (e.g., personnel, casualty, and force management reports).

**A5.4.4. Civil Engineer.**

A5.4.4.1. In-Place Civil Engineer Forces: Assess capability to meet in-place wartime requirements and, if required, maintain a capability to deploy to another area.

A5.4.4.2. Prime BEEF Mobile Forces: Evaluate forces' ability to perform tasks as outlined in AFPAM 10-219V10, Contingency Training Guide and Task Standard. Emphasis should be given to the following: Damage Assessment, Expedient Repairs, Beddown, Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) selection and marking, Airfield Damage Repair (ADR)/Rapid Runway Repair (RRR), Force Protection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Fire Protection, and CE Readiness.

**A5.4.5. Services.**

A5.4.5.1. Prime Readiness in Base Support (RIBS): Evaluate unit's ability to deploy and perform wartime duties specified in the UTC mission capability statement and should include: mortuary, lodging, food service, community programs and fitness programs.

A5.4.5.2. Determine if unit emergency action procedures are comprehensive and responsive to major accident response exercises and real world operational plans. Support planning must include emergency response and critical mission support.

**A5.4.6. Base Defense.**

A5.4.6.1. Assess the ability of base defense forces to plan and conduct defense operations according to the designed operational capability statement, mission capability statement, and time-phased force and deployment data tasking.

A5.4.6.2. Check individual and team proficiency to tactically employ assigned weapons, vehicles, communications, and equipment.

A5.4.6.3. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communication systems with other units, commands, services and national or theater assets.

A5.4.6.4. Assess police services and resource protection activities and responses.

A5.4.6.5. Assess security of protection level 1 - 4 resources and responses.

A5.4.6.6. Evaluate base defense forces on their ability to defeat Level I threats and disrupt or delay Level II threats.

**A5.4.7. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4).**

A5.4.7.1. Evaluate that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks are established and available.

A5.4.7.2. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands, and services, as well as national or theater compatibility.

A5.4.7.3. Evaluate all back-up communications and computer systems to ensure adequate support to primary mission and/or command and control.

A5.4.7.4. Evaluate the C<sup>4</sup> restoral plan and the unit's ability to execute the plan.

A5.4.7.5. Review the unit's emergency action procedures and ability to execute.

A5.4.7.6. Evaluate that deployed communications-computer capabilities and support equipment meet mission requirements.

**A5.4.8. Logistics Readiness.**

- A5.4.8.1. Evaluate the adequacy of material management to meet user asset requirements.
- A5.4.8.2. Check on-hand ammunition and spare assets against prescribed or authorized levels.
- A5.4.8.3. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of supplies and equipment.
- A5.4.8.4. Evaluate ability to properly sample, analyze, detect, and document suspected fuel/cryogenics contamination.
- A5.4.8.5. Evaluate compliance with all safety procedures and technical data during refueling and cryogenics operations.
- A5.4.8.6. Assess proper fueling and loading procedures at all times.
- A5.4.8.7. Check vehicle maintenance and supply procedures.
- A5.4.8.8. Evaluate the ability to meet vehicle user requirements.

**A5.4.9. Medical.**

- A5.4.9.1. General Health Care Support: Evaluate triage discipline and direct emergency and primary medical and dental activities toward reducing morbidity and mortality for the greatest number and/or returning the greatest number of airmen to duty.
- A5.4.9.2. Medical Treatment and Staging Facilities: Assess the ability to receive, re-triage, decontaminate, stabilize, transport, and prepare for aeromedical evacuation as required, to ensure timely, quality care under a variety of contingency conditions.
- A5.4.9.3. Deployable Medical Elements: Evaluate ability to provide medical support to deployed personnel to include emergency, outpatient-inpatient medical care, aeromedical evacuation, food and water safety, and disease surveillance.
- A5.4.9.4. Preventive Medicine: Assess the employment and implementation of preventive medicine initiatives (including predeployment medical screening, immunization, prophylaxis, education, environmental and epidemiological surveillance, risk assessment and abatement, and post deployment medical screening) to maintain force readiness of all unit personnel.
- A5.4.9.5. In-place medical support: Assess ability of the medical unit or units to provide effective medical support to the commander. This medical support should provide for effective resource protection while ensuring rapid and effective response to all contingencies including hazardous material exposures, mass casualty situations, terrorist threats/incidents, chemical/biological threats, air base survival and recovery, FPCONS, natural disasters, and any other contingency requiring medical support.
- A5.4.9.6. Aeromedical Evacuation: Evaluate ability to respond to the total spectrum of aeromedical evacuation to include inflight care and mission support that is safe and responsive to customer requirements. Whenever ground medical units are present, the interface between them and the AE system will be evaluated.

**A5.4.10. Legal Support.**

- A5.4.10.1. Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Determine whether all personnel have received LOAC train-

ing. Determine if specialized training is provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and security forces. Assess timeliness and accuracy of advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues.

A5.4.10.2. Evaluate unit rules of engagement. Determine if they satisfy the requirements of US law, policy, and international law.

A5.4.10.3. Determine if legal support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A5.4.10.4. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel.

#### A5.4.11. **Manpower and Organization .**

A5.4.11.1. Manpower Readiness Element: Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of MANPER-B support files, reports, analysis, and documents (e.g., operation plans, MANFOR).

A5.4.11.2. Deployed Manpower Element: Evaluate the ability to assess, account for, and manage the organization and adequacy of forces.

#### A5.4.12. **Financial Management and Comptroller Support**

A5.4.12.1. Determine if comptroller support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A5.4.12.1.1. Evaluate the establishment of agent operations for all funding, accounting, and financial service requirements.

A5.4.12.1.2. Ensure the establishment of a reliable source of sufficient US and local currencies.

A5.4.12.1.3. Assess the quality of customer service operations for deployed personnel.

A5.4.12.1.4. Evaluate the quality of financial services to include: voucher payment procedures, document maintenance, agent accountability, and turn-in operations, and financial analysis.

A5.4.12.1.5. Evaluate the propriety of fund expenditures and ability to track contingency operation expenditures.

A5.4.12.1.6. Assess the adequacy of logistics detail package (LOGDET). [ref: AFPAM 65-110, Attachment 20-22]

A5.4.12.2. Ensure financial management personnel are properly trained to provide services while deployed during contingencies.

**A5.5. Ability To Survive And Operate.** Evaluate the unit's ability to meet Air Force standards for mission sustainment and mission capability restoration in mature theaters or austere regions following a chemical, biological, or conventional attack (AFMAN 10-2602, paragraph 1.6). The installation, unit or activity shall demonstrate the tasks and/or technical operations required to accomplish its mission in the expected threat environment at each level of responsibility. Table 1.1 of AFMAN 10-2602 lists the NBCC Defense Enabling Tasks subject to evaluation during the ATSO portions of Readiness Inspections. These enabling tasks shall be used by IG teams as common core criteria to determine if the integration of senior leadership, individual, functional, cross-functional tasks support response to attacks and assures mission restoration and sustainment. AFMAN 10-2602 and functional guidance provide the details that installations, senior leadership, units and expeditionary airman should use to plan for and respond to an NBCC attack.

A5.5.1. Command and Control. Table 4.2 of AFMAN 10-2602 lists the NBCC Defense Enabling Tasks subject to evaluation.

A5.5.1.1. Wing Operations Center (WOC). Wing Operations Center (WOC). Determine whether WOC NBCC efforts are IAW AFMAN 10-2602, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2, and Table 4.2.

A5.5.1.2. Survival Recovery Center (SRC). Determine if the unit's SRC complies with AFMAN 10-2602, paragraphs 4.1.2 and 4.2 and Table 4.2.

A5.5.1.3. Unit Control Center. Ensure the UCC complies with AFMAN 10-2602 paragraph 4.4 and Table 4.2.

A5.5.2. Planning.

A5.5.2.1. Determine if the installation NBCC defense plan (e.g., FISTR 10-2; base support, joint support or expeditionary site plan) identifies integrated tasks and assigns responsibilities to implement pre-, trans-, and post-attack response and sustainment actions. Determine if the installation plan includes support provided to or received from joint service or host nation forces.

A5.5.2.1.1. For units in significant or high threat areas (reference AFMAN 10-2602, Table 2.2) or where a geographically specific Terrorism Threat Warning Report is in effect, determine if contingency plans are developed and training (and exercises) conducted for both the home and deployment location(s) IAW AFMAN 10-2602, paragraph 1.5.2, if applicable.

A5.5.2.2. Evaluate the ability of the installation to implement NBCC defense plan actions to save lives, protect resources, recover from attacks, and restore mission capability.

A5.5.3. Protection. Determine the ability of the responsible organization to prepare for and implement actions to protect personnel and resources from NBCC weapons effects.

A5.5.3.1. Individual Protection. Determine if required individual protective equipment (IPE) is on-hand and serviceable. Determine if individuals have completed Protective Mask Fit Training with their personal mask. Evaluate the individual's knowledge of MOPP levels (Fig. 5.2), ability to inspect and don their IPE within specified time criteria (Table 5.1), ability to remove their IPE by processing through a contamination control area (CCA), and demonstrate the use of issued chemical decontamination kits, detection equipment, and chemical agent antidotes. Evaluate at least 10 percent of the unit personnel over the course of the inspection period.

A5.5.3.2. Collective Protection. Determine the ability to provide adequate collective protection for assigned and deployed forces and contamination control area capability for 20% of those forces during a 24 hour period. AFMAN 10-2602, Tables A3.2 - A3.4, lists the actions subject to evaluation.

A5.5.3.3. Protective Hardening. Determine the ability to provide permanent and expedient hardening protection for assigned and deployed forces. AFMAN 10-2602, Table A3.5 lists the actions subject to evaluation.

A5.5.3.4. Dispersal. Evaluate the ability to disperse and protect critical assets. AFMAN 10-2602, Table A3.6 lists the actions subject to evaluation.

A5.5.3.5. Blackout. Evaluate the ability to conduct operations under blackout conditions, as appropriate for the threat. AFMAN 10-2602, Table A6.1.

A5.5.4. Contamination Avoidance and Control.

A5.5.4.1. Evaluate the ability to receive and disseminate information through the installation and theater NBC defense warning and reporting system.

A5.5.4.2. Determine the adequacy, serviceability, and sustainment capability of available NBC detection and monitoring equipment. Evaluate the ability to deploy, operate, and maintain the NBC detection and reporting system.

A5.5.4.3. Determine the adequacy of contamination avoidance plans and material (e.g., plastic sheet, covers, tarps) stocks, based on the NBCC threat. Evaluate the ability to implement pre- and post-attack contamination avoidance measures. AFMAN 10-2602, Table A3.6, lists the actions subject to evaluation.

A5.5.4.4. Determine the adequacy of contaminated waste collection, control, and disposal capability. Evaluate the ability to implement contaminated waste collection actions at the unit and installation level.

A5.5.4.5. Evaluate the ability to identify and mark NBC hazard and hazard areas, conduct post-attack risk assessment, and implement management actions (e.g., sector/zone operations, marking) to reduce mission degradation.

#### A5.5.5. Response.

A5.5.5.1. Base Population. Evaluate the ability of the base population to react to FPCON, MOPP, and alarm condition changes and respond to attacks without prior warning. Evaluate the ability of the base population to identify, mark, report, and avoid post-attack hazards. Evaluate the ability of individuals to perform self-aid/buddy care.

A5.5.5.2. Unit. Evaluate the ability of the unit to implement pre-, trans-, and post-attack actions. Evaluate the ability of unit post-attack reconnaissance teams and other assigned specialized teams to conduct operations. Evaluate the ability of the unit to manage the movement of casualties to the appropriate medical treatment facility.

A5.5.5.3. Joint Service or Host Nation. Evaluate the ability to integrate with assigned or attached joint service or host nation NBCC defense forces and support installation or theater missions.

A5.5.5.4. Enemy Prisoners of War, DOD Civilian and Contract Personnel. Evaluate the ability to protect (e.g., IPE, collective protection, hardening, evacuation) DOD civilian and contract personnel not designated as emergency essential. Evaluate the ability to protect (e.g., IPE, collective protection, hardening, evacuation) enemy prisoners of war, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees in Air Force custody.

#### A5.5.6. Mission Continuation/Restoration and Sustainment. Refer to AFMAN 10-2602, Paragraph 1.6. and Attachment 3, for operational standards subject to evaluation.

A5.5.6.1. Evaluate the ability to conduct integrated response operations, restore mission capability, and sustain operations. (AFMAN 10-2602, para. 1.6.)

A5.5.6.2. Determine the adequacy of personnel accountability and replacement actions.

A5.5.6.3. Determine the adequacy of NBCC defense individual and team equipment stock levels to support sustained operations.

A5.5.6.4. Evaluate actions to initiate re-supply of critical NBCC defense equipment.

## Attachment 6

### COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS

**A6.1. Common Core Compliance Area (CCCA) Application.** The following Air Force-level CCCAs represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, and Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable Air National Guard Instructions. MAJCOMs should supplement Air Force-level CCCAs, as required.

#### **A6.2. By-Law Requirements, Executive Orders, DOD Directives.**

A6.2.1. **Intelligence Oversight** (Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*; DOD Directive 5240.1, *DOD Intelligence Activities*; AFD 14-1, *Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning*; AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*).

A6.2.1.1. Assess the intelligence unit's and staff's compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons (reference the checklist in AFI 14-104).

A6.2.1.2. Forward a consolidated report of all inspections of IO to SAF/IGI NLT the 5<sup>th</sup> day following the end of each calendar year quarter (i.e. Apr, Jul, Oct, Jan). The end of year report (Jan) must also include a list of self-inspections conducted for that year (see AFI 14-104 for specifics).

A6.2.2. Transition Assistance Programs (TAP) (DoD Directive 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel*). Applies to all active duty personnel with more than 180 days of active service, all active duty personnel separated for disability regardless of length of active service, and all reserve component members demobilized after 180 days or more of active duty in support of a contingency. MPFs refer members to active duty Family Support Centers or reserve component Family Readiness Offices for DD Form 2648, Preseparation Counseling Checklist for Active Component Members, or DD Form 2648-1, Preseparation Counseling Checklist for Reserve Component Service Members Released From Active Duty, counseling.

A6.2.2.1. Assess Military Personnel Flight (Personnel Relocations Element) inclusion of a DD Form 2648 or DD Form 2648-1 as a permanent document for the Unit Personnel Record Group (UPRG) of each separating or retiring member.

A6.2.2.2. Assess the Transition Assistance Program counseling and service delivery at the Family Support Centers on active duty military installations with more than 500 members assigned or serving.

A6.2.2.3. Evaluate the allocation/availability of resources in Family Support Centers necessary to provide a quality TAP.

A6.2.2.4. DELETED.

A6.2.2.5. Assess Military Personnel Flight (Personnel Relocations Element) completion of DD Form 2648, Preseparation Counseling Checklist, as a permanent document for the Unit Personnel Record Group (UPRG) of each separating or retiring member 90 days prior to separation. (Ref: AFI 36-3022, Para 2.7.5).

A6.2.2.6. Determine if all members retired under the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) are documented as confirmed registrants for Public and Community Service (PACS) prior to out-processing.

A6.2.2.7. Assess the transition counseling and employment preparation program at military installations with more than 500 members assigned or serving.

A6.2.2.8. Evaluate the allocation/availability of resources necessary to provide quality TAPs.

A6.2.3. Voting Assistance Program (DoD Directive 1000.4, *Federal Voting Assistance Program* (FVAP), National Defense Authorization Act of FY05 (NDAA FY05), and DEPSECDEF Memo 2 May 2002, *Command Support for the Federal Voting Assistance Program*). (Applicable to ANG units when mobilized)

A6.2.3.1. Assess the unit's compliance with rules and procedures outlined in the Air Force Voting Plan.

A6.2.3.2. Forward a consolidated report of all inspections of Voting Assistance Program to SAF/IGI NLT the 5<sup>th</sup> day following the end of each calendar year quarter (i.e. Apr, Jul, Oct, Jan). The annual report (Jan) must also include an assessment of the entire program. DoD/IG will provide format and criteria prior to each year.

A6.2.3.3. DELETED.

A6.2.3.4. DELETED.

A6.2.3.5. DELETED.

A6.2.3.6. DELETED.

A6.2.3.7. Determine if all Voting Assistance Officers are trained and equipped to provide assistance to Armed Forces members.

A6.2.3.8. Determine if commanders ensure timely, in-hand delivery of Standard Form (SF) 76, Federal Post Card Registration and Absentee Ballot Request, to all Armed Forces members and their eligible family members.

A6.2.3.9. Determine if there is one senior Voting Assistance Officer at each installation and at every level of command to coordinate subordinate unit and tenant command Voting Assistance Officer activities.

A6.2.3.10. Determine if Voting Assistance Officers at overseas installations ensure timely dissemination of the SF 186, Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot, to all locations.

A6.2.3.11. Determine if performance evaluation reports for Voting Assistance Officers comment on that individual's performance as a Voting Assistance Officer.

A6.2.3.12. Forward a consolidated report of Voting Assistance Program inspection results to SAF/IGI by the 10<sup>th</sup> of January each year addressing the DOD-mandated questions below. SAF/IGI will submit a report to DOD IG by 31 January.

A6.2.3.12.1. What is your assessment of your MAJCOM's overall compliance with DOD Directive 1000.4, AFI 36-3107, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act?

A6.2.3.12.2. What was the scope of your Voting Assistance Program inspections?

A6.2.3.12.3. What procedures are used to ensure that all Unit Voting Assistance Officers received adequate training on the Federal Voting Assistance Program?

A6.2.3.12.4. What was the maximum number of voters represented by Unit Voting Assistance Officers in your command?

A6.2.3.12.5. How did you ensure command support, at all levels, for the Federal Voting Assistance Program?

A6.2.3.12.6. How did your command ensure adequate levels of voting materials were delivered to Unit Voting Assistance Officers?

A6.2.4. **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.** (*Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Essential Training Tasks for a Sexual Assault Response Capability (JTF-SAPR-013)," April 26, 2005*)

A6.2.4.1. Evaluate if essential training tasks, including the frequency and content of periodic refresher training is conducted for victim Victim Advocates (VA), Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), healthcare, law enforcement and criminal investigators, judge advocates, and chaplains.

A6.2.4.2. DELETED.

A6.2.4.3. DELETED.

A6.2.4.4. DELETED.

A6.2.4.5. Evaluate sexual harassment education and training.

A6.2.4.6. Evaluate whether military and civilian leaders are personally involved in training.

A6.2.4.7. Assess whether training includes instruction in understanding accountability and responsibility; characteristics of and prevention of hostile work environments; quid pro quo harassment; reprisal prevention; and the relationship between leadership and a professional organizational climate. Training should be provided to military members, civilian employees, and local national employees at overseas locations when practicable.

A6.2.4.8. Evaluate whether instructors are provided with skills and competencies necessary to deliver credible training.

A6.2.5. **Homosexual Conduct Policy** (*Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness Memorandum on Implementation of Recommendations Concerning Homosexual Policy, 12 Aug 99; CSAF Memorandum on Homosexual Policy Guidance, 10 Mar 00*).

A6.2.5.1. Assess the training of all those charged with implementing the homosexual conduct policy (i.e., commanders, judge advocates, supervisors and investigators). Ensure that initial and annual training is conducted IAW the CSAF policy guidance cited above and documented by unit training monitors.

A6.2.6. **Technology Protection.** (*Memorandum of Understanding -- between Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences, Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Inspector General Department of the Army, Naval Inspector General, Inspector General Department of the Air Force, Director Internal Assessments, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization -- on Security, Technology Protection, and Counterintelligence Inspections*)

A6.2.6.1. Affected MAJCOM IGs (i.e., ACC, AFMC, and AFSPC) will assess the security, technology protection, and counterintelligence practices at designated USAF research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities (reference the DOD/IG *Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines*).

A6.2.6.2. Forward a consolidated report IAW the inspection guidelines of all significant discrepancies from inspections of Technology Protection to SAF/IGI NLT the 5<sup>th</sup> day following the end of each calendar year.

A6.2.6.3. Affected MAJCOM IGs (i.e., ACC, AFMC, and AFSPC) will assess the security, technology protection, and counterintelligence practices at designated USAF research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities (reference the DOD/IG *Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines*, as supplemented by SAF/IG).

A6.2.7. DELETED.

A6.2.7.1. DELETED.

A6.2.7.1.1. DELETED.

A6.2.7.2. DELETED.

A6.2.7.3. DELETED.

A6.2.8. **Trafficking In Persons (TIP).** Legislation regarding human trafficking was signed into law under the *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000*. Deputy Secretary of Defense, released a policy memorandum in Oct 04 that declared a "zero tolerance" policy toward trafficking, instructed the UCMJ to be changed to include prostitution as a crime, and directed all DoD personnel to receive Anti-Trafficking in Persons training prior to deploying overseas.

A6.2.8.1. Assess that the unit has complied with the training requirement, which applies to all DoD military and civilian personnel, and for DoD contract personnel subject to overseas deployment.

A6.2.8.2. Evaluate the units entire TIP awareness program, to include display of hotline posters and mandatory training.

A6.2.9. **Post Competition Accountability (PCA)** (Public Law 108-375, *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005* (Sections 328). Title 10 United States Code 2461. Title 10 United States Code Subtitle D Part 1 Chapter 803 Sec 8014. National Defense Act Fiscal Year 2005 (Section 326). Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, *Performance of Commercial Activities* (29 May 2003). DOD A-76 Costing Manual (14 March 2001). Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (1 January 2001).

A6.2.9.1. Does the Most Efficient Organization (MEO) resulting from an OMB Circular A-76 competition have a current Performance Work Statement (PWS)?

A6.2.9.2. Does the MEO have supporting documentation for any changes to the PWS?

A6.2.9.3. Does the MEO have a current Agency Tender (AT)/Management Plan?

A6.2.9.4. Does the MEO have supporting documentation for any changes to the AT/ Management Plan?

A6.2.9.5. Is the MEO operating within bid costs, plus or minus any qualified cost adjustments?

A6.2.9.6. Is the MEO performing within the requirements of the PWS and Performance Plan (a.k.a: Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan)?

A6.2.9.7. Have changes to the MEO's workload exceeded 30% or more in operating costs or total capital investment? If so, has another Streamlined or Standard Competition been initiated?

### **A6.3. Mission Areas.**

#### **A6.3.1. Logistics Readiness.**

A6.3.1.1. Evaluate wing personnel deployment training (aircraft load planning, cargo processing/handling/loading, passenger processing, and other applicable deployment training).

A6.3.1.2. Assess the maintenance and management of vehicle assets.

A6.3.1.3. Evaluate HAZMAT management procedures, processes, and safeguards (Vehicle Maintenance, Aerial Port, Shipment/Receipt).

A6.3.1.4. Assess personal property and passenger movements for compliance with entitlements.

A6.3.1.5. Evaluate Stock Control management processes (to include the Regional Supply Squadron, if applicable) used to support weapon system spares and the base missions.

A6.3.1.6. Assess Repair Cycle Management to ensure tracking, status accuracy, and turn-in methods for all unserviceable assets in maintenance, including the execution of Air Force weapon system warranty processing.

A6.3.1.7. Evaluate management of mission capable (MICAP) requisitions and reporting system processes (to include the Regional Supply Squadron if applicable).

A6.3.1.8. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of the Readiness Spares Packages (MRSP/IRSP) and Mission Support Kits (e.g. MSK/HPMSK).

A6.3.1.9. Assess the control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of mobility assets to include assets decentralized throughout the wing (i.e., mobility bags and weapons).

A6.3.1.10. Assess facility and equipment inspection and preventative maintenance programs.

A6.3.1.11. Assess confined space, hazardous communication training/awareness, environmental compliance practices pertaining to fuel servicing operations, receipts, transfers, and inventory management.

A6.3.1.12. Evaluate Fuels Management ability to train, maintain, receive, store, issue, and account for quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants in a safe and timely manner.

A6.3.1.13. Assess WRM management.

A6.3.1.14. Assess the Base Support Plan process adequacy for meeting OPLAN tasking (Part II).

A6.3.1.15. Assess the base's deployment planning process for all host and associate unit OPLAN taskings to include UTC management.

#### **A6.3.2. Contracting.**

A6.3.2.1. Evaluate if acquisition planning, contract award, and contract management procedures are conducted according to applicable laws, executive orders, Federal Acquisition Regulations,

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement, Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, directives, instructions, and applicable MAJCOM, Army and National Guard FAR Supplements.

A6.3.2.2. Assess whether units plan for continuation of contractor services during crises as required by DoDI 3020.37, AFI 63-124, and AFPD 10-4, paragraph 3.5

A6.3.2.3. Evaluate the Government Purchase Card (GPC) program, management, and administration across all functional areas IAW AFI 64-117.

A6.3.2.4. Evaluate the Quality Assurance program across all functional areas IAW AFI 63-124 and AFPD 63-5.

A6.3.2.4.1. Assess effectiveness of Quality Assurance Personnel contract oversight, performance assessment techniques, and adequacy of quality assurance training.

#### A6.3.3. **Munitions (Non-Nuclear).**

A6.3.3.1. Assess available Munitions Maintenance Handling Equipment and tools to meet mission requirements.

A6.3.3.2. Assess munitions inspection procedures.

A6.3.3.3. Assess the operations, control, and security of munitions, to include ordering, storage, and issuing procedures.

#### A6.3.4. **Civil Engineer.**

A6.3.4.1. Assess whether Civil Engineers are meeting present and future facility and infrastructure requirements in accordance with the Civil Engineer Strategic Plan in the following areas:

A6.3.4.1.1. Real Property Maintenance Activities: Real Property Maintenance (Restoration and Modernization, Facilities Sustainment Model), Real Property Services, and Demolition/Consolidation.

A6.3.4.1.2. Work Information Management System (WIMS)/Automated Civil Engineering System (ACES).

A6.3.4.1.3. Real Property Accountability.

A6.3.4.1.4. Housing.

A6.3.4.2. Assess Prime BEEF/REDHORSE training and Air Force Specialty Certifications.

A6.3.4.3. Assess compliance with deployment requirements and other readiness programs.

#### A6.3.5. **Communications and Information.**

A6.3.5.1. Evaluate training to support mission critical communication systems.

A6.3.5.2. Assess the planning, configuration control, physical infrastructure/medium, management and maintenance of the base's communication infrastructure.

A6.3.5.3. Evaluate an installation's Spectrum Management program.

A6.3.5.4. Evaluate command and control systems maintenance.

#### A6.3.6. **Full-Spectrum Threat Response (Installation Commander, Group and Squadron Commanders, Detachment Commanders, and staff agency chiefs).**

A6.3.6.1. Evaluate whether the base exercise program complies with AFI 10-2501. The installation, unit or activity shall demonstrate the tasks and/or technical operations required to comply with exercise and evaluation program by conducting a basewide exercise.

A6.3.6.2. Assess assigned unit's adherence to FSTR training requirements listed in AFI 10-2501, table 9.3.

A6.3.6.3. Assess installation's ability to meet specialized teams' personnel, equipment and training requirements, as applicable, listed in AFI 10-2501 and the base FSTR Plan 10.2. Specialized teams include Disaster Control Group (DCG), Unit Control Center (UCC), Survival Recovery Center (SRC), Contamination Control Teams (CCT), Shelter Management Teams (SMT) and Readiness Support Team (RST).

A6.3.6.4. Assess installation's FSTR planning, implementation/execution of FSTR Plan 10-2 as required by AFI 10-2501, including checklists supporting FSTR Plan 10-2 created by all assigned installation units.

A6.3.6.5. Assess installation warning system for peacetime response capability.

A6.3.6.6. Assess Nuclear Chemical Biological Defense Report (CBDRT) reporting for the installation, per AFI 10-201.

#### A6.3.7. **Safety.**

A6.3.7.1. Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include applicable OSHA and explosives safety standards.

#### A6.3.8. **Occupational Health**

A6.3.8.1. Assess how the organization adheres to occupational health guidelines and procedures to include applicable OSHA standards not covered by the Health Services Inspection.

#### A6.3.9. **Installation Security.**

A6.3.9.1. Assess installation security at home stations. Installation security is comprised of physical security (Protection Level 1-3 resources), resource protection (Protection Level 4 resources), antiterrorism/force protection (to include intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement information), police services, entry control, and base defense.

A6.3.9.2. Assess key SF support program areas to include training and standardization evaluation, intelligence/counterintelligence/law enforcement in coordination with AFOSI, military working dog program, intrusion detection systems and the armory.

A6.3.9.3. Assess information, personnel, and industrial security programs.

A6.3.9.4. Assess the confinement program.

A6.3.9.5. Assess wing augmentation forces program support for SF, and the effectiveness of SF training/use.

A6.3.9.6. Assess combat arms support to wing personnel.

A6.3.9.7. Assess the unit antiterrorism program.

#### A6.3.10. **Services.**

A6.3.10.1. Assess unit mortuary affairs planning and support (to include plans, memorandum of understanding, support agreements, and case files).

A6.3.10.2. Assess appropriated fund food service operations (to include cash control, contract management, subsistence accountability, and adherence to sanitation standards).

A6.3.10.3. Assess lodging operations (to include cash control; financial management; adherence to Air Force furnishing, amenities, and service standards; and quarters utilization).

A6.3.10.4. Assess fitness facility operations (to include cash control, adherence to equipment and operation standards, and evaluation of programs)

A6.3.10.5. Assess Dram Shop training in Services activities.

#### **A6.3.11. Financial Management and Comptroller**

A6.3.11.1. Evaluate leadership, quality assurance, Non-Appropriated Funds oversight, systems access controls, Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and audit liaison responsibilities in accordance with applicable laws, directives, and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A6.3.11.2. Evaluate pay, travel, accounting, and disbursing functions in accordance with applicable laws, directives, and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A6.3.11.3. Evaluate planning, programming, budgeting, and analysis functions in accordance with applicable laws, directives and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A6.3.11.4. Evaluate organization capability and training to conduct Independent Review Official and Economic Analysis duties in accordance with published guidance (AFPD 65-5, AFI 65-501, AFI 65-504 and AFMAN 65-506, AFI 65-502, AFI 65-503).

A6.3.11.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of training in accordance with applicable instructions and self-inspection checklists (including financial management specific enlisted upgrade training)

#### **A6.3.12. Personnel.**

A6.3.12.1. Assess MPF to include: Personnel Relocation and Employment (includes personnel relocations, personnel employment and base training), Personnel Systems, Personnel Readiness, and Customer Support (includes customer service and career enhancement).

A6.3.12.2. Assess the commander's Support Staff.

#### **A6.3.13. Aircrew Protection (AFI 11-301, AFI 16-1301).**

A6.3.13.1. Evaluate the wing/unit's Aircrew Life Support (ALS) training program. Assess the unit's accomplishment of performance-based evaluations to ensure each aircrew member's capability to fully utilize their ALS and survival equipment in realistic scenarios they are likely to encounter.

A6.3.13.2. Assess ALS equipment availability, serviceability, configuration, unit funding, accountability, and management. Assess whether ALS unit and supporting agency equipment inspection and preventative maintenance practices are compliant with applicable technical orders

and higher headquarters instructions/directives in accordance with published guidance (AFI 11-301).

A6.3.13.3. Evaluate the unit's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program for compliance with applicable directives (AFI 16-1301).

A6.3.14. **Intelligence**

A6.3.14.1. Ensure personnel have been designated to support security forces and base defense, to include possessing appropriate security clearances and accesses. If the base/unit does not have an organic intelligence capability, ensure processes/procedures are in place to meet the commander's, Antiterrorism Officer's and security forces' intelligence requirements.

A6.3.14.2. Evaluate unit personnel training to support security forces and base defense.

A6.3.14.3. Evaluate intelligence support to security forces and base defense is conducted according to applicable executive orders, DoD directives, Air Force directives, instructions, and applicable MAJCOM supplements.

A6.3.14.4. Assess installation processes/procedures for collecting, analyzing and disseminating threat information/warnings.

**Attachment 7****AIR FORCE BEST PRACTICE REPORTING FORMAT**

1. POC's Name<sup>1</sup>:
2. POC's Phone Number:
3. Name of the Process<sup>2</sup>:
4. Name of Best Practice<sup>3</sup>:
5. Date Best Practice was Implemented:
6. Process Owner<sup>4</sup>:
7. Process Owner's (or Representative's) Phone Number:
8. Organization & Address (include zip code):
9. Unit Email Address of Process Owner:
10. Summarize the Best Practice (*how* it works; how you *measure* it)<sup>5</sup>:
11. Describe the *impact* on process/organizational performance (*results!*)<sup>6</sup>:
12. Describe how this practice was qualified as being a "best" practice<sup>7</sup>:

**Validated by<sup>8</sup>:**

13. Name:
14. Phone:
15. Organization:

**NOTES:**

1. This point of contact (POC) may be a supervisor, IG member, award team member or anyone knowledgeable of a best practice and permitted to share it outside the user's organization.
2. Identify the general activity where the best practice is found, for example, "...maintain equipment." (verb and noun).
3. A "Best Practice" is defined as a superior method or innovative practice that contributes to improved performance of the process.
4. "Process Owner" is defined as the person who coordinates the various functions and work activities at all levels of a process, has the authority or ability to make changes in the process as required, and manages the process end-to-end so as to ensure optimal overall performance. The process owner may designate the POC as his/her representative.
5. Include the governing directives (AF Instructions, AF Manual, Tech Order, or applicable publication, etc.) that cover your best practice or process that your best practice improves. If there is no governing directive, please state so. Submit completed records and, if necessary, additional materials (electronic version preferred) to: Email: <mailto:bestpractice@randolph.af.mil> or mail to AFMA/MAPI, Best Practices Team, 550 E Street East, Randolph AFB TX 78150-4451.

6. Describe in quantitative terms--may include reduction in costs, improvement in quality, or decrease in cycle time.
7. "Best" may be based on several factors to include but not limited to: a. expert review (for example, assessment, award, AF functional office, or auditing team); b. results are clearly superior to those of comparative organizations; c. results are "breakthrough" in efficiency/effectiveness (high return on investment); d. multiple sources agree the practice is superior; e. use of the latest technology; or f. high number of satisfied repeat customers.
8. Identify the individual (or group) who validated or designated the practice to be a Best Practice. The IG team chief will make the decision based on coordination with appropriate MAJCOM functional experts.

**Attachment 8****EAGLE LOOK TOPIC PROPOSAL FORMAT**

**Topic Title:** Title, process, or program to be assessed.

**Purpose:** State specific result(s) the effort should address, what question(s) does the process/program owner want answered?

**Background:** Give a brief history of the issue and the Air Force leadership's interest in AFIA conducting this review. Include the results of initial research (if any), other staff work, and any metrics or other indicators that help describe the background and frame the issue. If the issue has been assessed previously by AFIA, AFAA, GAO, or any other agency, please identify the agency and the date of the assessment.

**Scope:** The parameters of the area to be assessed.

**Focus:** Where should the review focus its look?

**Breadth:** Describe the breadth of the problem in terms of how far across the Air Force the topic applies. To what depth should the review go? Is the topic DOD/AF wide or MAJCOM specific? Is it cross functional or functionally specific? Be specific.

**Methodology:** Is there a specific methodology recommended for gathering topic information? Are there specific boundaries that should apply when conducting the review?

**Rationale:**

**Significance:** Describe the seriousness of the problem or the size of the issue. Does it have an impact on AF core competencies (i.e., information dominance, air and space superiority, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, readiness and sustainment, agile combat support, global attack), essential support services, or Air Force key processes? If possible, quantify in terms of dollars, personnel, work hours, percentages, etc. Be specific.

**Timing:** State when the final report is needed and the associated rationale.

**Point of Contact:** Provide action officer's name, symbol, DSN number, and E-mail address.

**Process Owners** (If known, include 2, 3 and 4 digit): Provide process owner's name, office symbol, DSN number, and E-mail address.

## Attachment 9

### AOC READINESS INSPECTIONS

**A9.1. Major Graded Areas and Sub areas.** Units with an AOC mission will be evaluated in four major areas: Initial Response, Employment, Agile Combat Support, and the Ability to Survive and Operate in a hostile environment. The AOC will be evaluated on its ability to produce, publish and execute the ATO. IGs will apply the common core readiness criteria (described in paragraph 2.2.4.) to each of the applicable major graded areas and sub areas. Major graded areas can be evaluated at either home-station or a deployed location. Evaluate processes and systems IAW AFI 13-1AOC Vol 1-3 and AFOTTP 2-3.2 for conducting coalition and collaborative ATO planning and execution to include multi-level information classification and security, information sharing and distribution, collaborative procedures and tools. (No training or documentation available for AFFOR at this time.). Grading AFFOR participation is at the discretion of the MAJCOM commander.

#### **A9.2. Initial Response.**

##### **A9.2.1. Deployment Processing.**

A9.2.1.1. Evaluate effectiveness of those initial response actions performed by the AOC which effects the units ability to respond to deployment taskings.

A9.2.1.2. Determine if deployment planning is comprehensive, timely, and responsive to taskings.

A9.2.1.3. Evaluate whether the right people process with the required equipment, training, medical clearance, and documents at the right time.

A9.2.1.4. Determine if transportation is used efficiently, e.g., the minimum number of vehicles/ aircraft to deploy the required people and equipment.

A9.2.1.5. Determine if the deployment process is efficiently, effectively, and safely executed.

A9.2.1.6. Determine if reports are accomplished correctly and meet timing requirements.

A9.2.1.7. Determine whether all required automated deployment systems are effectively used and properly managed, (e.g. all components of IDS (Integrated Deployment System) (LOGMOD, MANPER-B, CMOS, and CALM)) to achieve In-Transit Visibility.

A9.2.1.8. Determine if the Personnel Deployment Function (PDF) maintains accountability of people.

A9.2.1.9. Determine if the PDF maintains and operates the Manpower and Personnel Module-B (MANPER-B) systems to meet all reporting requirements.

##### **A9.2.2. Readiness Management Reporting.**

A9.2.2.1. Determine if the GSORTS and ART reporting are timely, accurate, and properly classified.

A9.2.2.1.1. SORTS reporting will be validated using unit DOC statement.

A9.2.2.1.2. Evaluate unit shortfalls and remarks identified in ART.

A9.2.2.2. Evaluate Unit Manning Document and Deployed Requirements Manning Document for accuracy.

A9.2.3. **Crisis Action Planning (CAP).** Evaluate AOC ability to complete crisis action planning as per AFI 13-1, AOC Volume 3 and applicable supplements. Areas that will be evaluated are:

A9.2.3.1. Strategy. Evaluate processes to develop and assess air and space strategy to include: clear, measurable, and attainable objectives; a coherent Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP); and a prioritized, effects-based targeting scheme. Conduct a mission analysis of national, combatant commander (COCOM), and Joint Forces Commander (JFC) strategic guidance and objectives to develop Joint Forces Component Command (JFACC) objectives.

A9.2.3.1.1. Examine detailed information on operational environment, adversary capabilities, current situation, and probable enemy course of action (COA).

A9.2.3.1.2. Develop Objectives, Tasks, and Measures of Effectiveness. Evaluate identified air and space Objectives/Tasks/Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in accordance with JFC objectives. Validate the desired effects and focus of effort for each task.

A9.2.3.1.2.1. Evaluate air objectives in support of JFC objectives. Examine achievability through available resources for a desired end state.

A9.2.3.1.2.2. Develop Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) based on objectives, MOE and desired effects.

A9.2.3.1.2.3. Develop ROE to meet JFC objectives and minimize collateral damage and fratricide.

A9.2.3.2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning. Evaluate ISR support to crisis action planning. Assess the timeliness and accuracy of ISR collection deck and Intelligence Preparation of the Battle-space (IPB).

A9.2.3.2.1. Evaluate intelligence support to JFACC planning and decision making by identifying, assessing, and estimating adversary centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, most likely COA, and COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.

A9.2.3.2.2. Evaluate intelligence processes and coordination necessary to support intelligence requirements during crisis action planning, deployment, and employment.

A9.2.3.3. Information Warfare (IW)/Special Technical Operations (STO)/Space. Evaluate plans, integration and coordination in support of JFACC objectives.

A9.2.3.3.1. Evaluate IW plans and options supporting JFACC strategy.

### **A9.3. Employment.**

A9.3.1. **Strategy Division (SD).** Assess how the strategy division personnel support the achievement of theater objectives by developing, refining, disseminating, and assessing the JFACC air and space strategy.

A9.3.1.1. Evaluate processes which results in, but not limited to the JAOP, Air Operations Directive (AOD), ATO, ACO, Special Instructions (SPINS) inputs, JFACC apportionment recommen-

dation for the JFC, and operational assessment summaries. In addition, SD branch plans and sequels as required.

A9.3.1.2. Evaluate the ability of the Strategy Plans Team (SPT) to lead the AOC in the Joint Air Estimate process and the associate development of the JAOP to include prioritized effects based targeting team.

A9.3.1.3. Assess the ability of the Strategy Guidance Team (SGT) to assist in the AOC transition from operational level to tactical level planning.

A9.3.1.4. Evaluate the Operational Assessment Team's (OAT) ability to operate within all aspects of strategy development and execution, focusing on evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, and information operations.

A9.3.2. **Combat Plans Division (CPD).** Evaluate the processes which results in the following outputs to include, but not limited to, data inputs to the SD for the daily air apportionment recommendation; the JIPTL with selected Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) for attack and collection requirements; Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP); ATO with SPINS; Airspace Control Order (ACO); Airspace Defense Plan (ADP); Airspace Control Plan (ACP); Tactical Operations Data (TACOP-DAT); Operational Tasking Data Link (OPTASK LINK); C2 Communications Plan; C2 Architecture Plan; Close Air Support Plan; and ISR Synchronization Matrix.

A9.3.2.1. Evaluate the Target Effects Team's (TET) ability to establish linkage between the JFACC's vision and its practical application through the use of JFACC assets to achieve desired kinetic and non-kinetic effects on adversary capabilities.

A9.3.2.2. Evaluate MAAP teams ability to synthesize AOD, JIPTL, threat situation, review forecast weather, weapon system availability, and weapon employment options to produce a synchronized MAAP.

A9.3.2.3. Assess the ATO Production Team's ability to construct, publish and disseminate the daily ATO and applicable SPINS to appropriate JTF forces, which tasks air and space capabilities and assets in accordance with the MAAP.

A9.3.2.4. Evaluate the C2 Planning Team's ability to compose Airspace Management air defense, C2 architecture, and C2 communications planning cells.

A9.3.3. **Combat Operations Division (COD).** Evaluate the ability to control and adapt ATO tasked missions in support of JFACC objectives. Assess ability to quickly execute dynamic and time-sensitive targets as well as, convey ATO/ACO changes and other subsequent orders to subordinate C2 agencies and Wing Operations Centers (WOC).

A9.3.3.1. Evaluate Offensive Operations Team's ability to monitor and adjust force application and support sorties/missions during ATO execution

A9.3.3.2. Evaluate Defensive Operations Team's ability to provide management oversight of theater air defense operations by coordinating, monitoring, and commanding TACS elements and air defense assets.

A9.3.3.3. Evaluate Senior Intelligence Duty Officer Team ability to provide situational awareness and predictive battle space analysis, targeting support, and monitor/adjust ISR employment in support of the CODs ATO execution process.

A9.3.3.4. Assess the ability of the Interface Control Team to determine data link participants, their equipment capabilities and limitations and respective needs, design of the data link architecture and production of the OPTASK LINK.

A9.3.4. **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD).** Evaluate intelligence products and services that support the entire AOC, JFACC, air component operational units, other components and joint/coalition forces.

A9.3.4.1. Evaluate Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team ability to organize Evaluate ISR targeting processes to include integration into objective development, strategy development, target systems analysis, target development, target nomination, targeting assistance to combat operations/time sensitive targeting (TST) and bomb damage assessment (BDA)/combat assessment activities that support ATO production and execution.

A9.3.4.2. Evaluate Targets/Combat Assessment (CA) Team ability to coordinate and conduct the targeting process, as well as apply ROE and JFACC objectives, operations plans, sortie allocation, target status, and attack results.

A9.3.4.3. Evaluate ISR Operations Team ability to develop ISR strategy and plans and executing those plans to satisfy theater intelligence requirements.

A9.3.4.4. Evaluate Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) team's ability to implement, coordinate, and maintain PED support from units/agencies outside the AOC.

A9.3.4.5. Evaluate ISR ability to assign and support the strategy and combat, and AMD divisions.

A9.3.5. **Air Mobility Division.** Evaluate the ability to plan, coordinate, task, and execute the intra-theater air mobility mission and integrate the inter-theater air mobility mission supporting JFC objectives through coordination with the Tanker Air Control Center (TACC). Assess ability to interface with the JFC's AOR movement validation authority.

A9.3.5.1. Evaluate Airlift Control Team (ALCT) ability to plan intra-theater and coordinate inter-theater airlift operations in the AOR/joint operations area (JOA) for the JFACC.

A9.3.5.2. Evaluate Air mobility control (AMCT) ability to execute intra-theater and monitor inter-theater airlift missions.

A9.3.5.3. Evaluate Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT) ability to coordinate inter-theater and plan and execute intra-theater air refueling missions.

A9.3.5.4. Evaluate Aeromedical Evaluation Control Team (AECT) ability to coordinate inter-theater and plan and execute intra-theater aeromedical evacuation missions.

A9.3.6. **Special/Support Functions.** Evaluate the ability of specialty/support functions to provide the AOC with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate theater air and space power.

A9.3.6.1. Evaluate Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) ability to coordinate, integrate, and engage all Air Force Special Operations (SOF) activities for the JFACC in the entire AOR.

A9.3.6.2. Evaluate Information Operations (IO) Team ability to plan, coordinate, task, monitor, and assessment of IO capabilities to support the JFACC objectives and air and space operations. Specific IO team responsibility areas include Planning, Rules of Engagement, Target Development, Network Warfare Operations, Information Assurance, Special Information Operations,

Operational Military Deception, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations, Counterpropaganda, Counterintelligence, and Public Affairs.

A9.3.6.3. Evaluate JAG's ability to employ legal expertise and resources to control and exploit the legal environment across the full spectrum of operational missions in the AOC.

A9.3.6.3.1. Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Determine whether all personnel have received LOAC training. Determine if specialized training is provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and security forces. Assess timeliness and accuracy of advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues.

A9.3.6.3.2. Evaluate unit rules of engagement. Determine if they satisfy the requirements of US law, policy, and international law.

A9.3.6.3.3. Determine if legal support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A9.3.6.3.4. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel.

A9.3.6.3.5. Evaluate JFACC use of applicable LOAC and ROEs for target recommendations to JFC restricted and/or no-strike lists for the AOR.

A9.3.6.4. Evaluate Weather Support Team to collect, tailor, and report weather information to meet short, medium, and long-range mission needs for each AOC division, specialty/support functions, and JFACC staff.

A9.3.6.5. Evaluate Combat Support Team ability to provide logistical support and logistical systems for AOC requirements; and maintain the most current information for changes in force structure in the movement of critical combat material in the AOR

A9.3.6.6. Evaluate Information Management Team to design/execute Air Component's information flow strategy plan and the use of the information infrastructure to support the commander's needs for relevant and timely information.

A9.3.6.7. Evaluate Rescue Coordination Center ability to coordinate personnel recovery tasks in the areas report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate in support of the Chief Combat Operations.

A9.3.6.8. Evaluate Special Technical Operations (STO) cell ability to develop integrated conventional operations that produce synergistic effects in the overall battle plan based on JFACC objectives.

A9.3.6.9. Evaluate DIRSPACEFOR ability in establishing and prioritizing military space requirements required by the JFACC and the policies for employing space capabilities in the AOR.

A9.3.6.10. Evaluate DIRMOBFOR ability to facilitate integration of inter-theater missions with intra-theater missions, coordinate with theater movement validation authority as required, and coordinate with AOC Director to integrate and deconflict air mobility operations into the air and space assessment, planning, and execution processes.

#### **A9.4. Agile Combat Support.**

##### **A9.4.1. Communications and Information Systems Operations.**

A9.4.2. Evaluate the use of approved AOC baseline and extensions. Any exceptions to the approved baseline are approved only by the MAJCOM staff on a case-by-case basis.

A9.4.2.1. Evaluate measures to protect critical information and information systems IAW AFI 33-112, Computer Systems Management; AFI 33-113, Official Messaging; AFI 33-115v1, Network Management; AFI 33-115v2, Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network Professionals; AFI 33-119, Electronic Mail; AFI 33-129, Transmission of Information Via the Internet; AFI 33-202, Computer Security; AFI 33-204, Information Assurance (IA) Awareness Program; AFSSI 5021, Time Compliance Network Order (TCNO) Management And Vulnerability And Incident Reporting; and AFSSI 5027, Computer Security.

##### **A9.4.3. Personnel.**

A9.4.3.1. Personnel Readiness Element (PRE): Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of all MANPER-B reports and support documents (e.g., orders).

A9.4.3.2. Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO): Determine whether the PERSCO maintains accountability of deployed personnel. Assess the accuracy and timeliness of the MANPER-B system reports (e.g., personnel, casualty, and force management reports).

##### **A9.4.4. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4).**

A9.4.4.1. Evaluate that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks are established and available.

A9.4.4.2. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands, and services, as well as national or theater compatibility.

A9.4.4.3. Evaluate all back-up communications and computer systems to ensure adequate support to primary mission and/or command and control.

A9.4.4.4. Evaluate the C<sup>4</sup> restoration plan and the unit's ability to execute the plan.

A9.4.4.5. Review the unit's emergency action procedures and ability to execute.

A9.4.4.6. Evaluate that deployed communications-computer capabilities and support equipment meet mission requirements.

A9.4.4.7. Evaluate the unit's mediation plans for resolving CIP-related problems affecting their mission assurance.

A9.4.5. **Contingency Contracting.** Determine if contracting support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A9.4.5.1. Evaluate the ability to execute expedited contracting procedures in a contingency environment in accordance with Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix CC – Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program (COCSP).

A9.4.5.2. Evaluate the ability of Contingency Contracting Officers to respond, survive and operate in a contingency (hostile) environment while accomplishing contracting tasks in support of the deployed wartime/contingency mission.

**A9.5. Ability To Survive And Operate.** Evaluate the AOC ability to survive and operate from deployment to full wartime contingency operations. Events may range from evaluation of INFOCON/FPCON change response actions to direct attack. All situations are evaluated, but consideration is given for actions taken at AOC level to resolve or work around existing shortfalls when full response control is not within AOC purview. Inspection focus is based on doctrinal location and combat situation of the AOC as the contingency develops. Command and Control, Passive Defense Measures, Passive Defense Response, Casualty Care, Force Protection, and Defensive Counterinformation; will be rated:

A9.5.1. **Command and Control.** Evaluate actions taken by command and leadership to sustain, defend, survive, and recover.

A9.5.2. **Passive Defense Measures.** Evaluate the ability of the AOC facility to run on alternative power source.

A9.5.3. **Casualty Care (Self-Aid/Buddy Care) SABC.** Personnel shall demonstrate planning for post-attack casualty searches, administration of SA/BC treatment, and transportation of victims to a deployed medical facility (DMF) or other designated location. Evaluations will be conducted IAW guidance described in AFI 36-2238, *Self-Aid and Buddy Care Training*; AFH 36-2218V1, *Self-Aid and Buddy Care Instructor Handbook*.

A9.5.4. **Force Protection.** Evaluate AOC measures to mitigate risks and to protect personnel and resources during contingency operations. AOC personnel must be prepared to identify, report, and counter any threat activity that occurs within their area of operations, support, or control centers.

A9.5.5. **Defensive Counterinformation.** Evaluate the IW element coordination with NOSC-D to ensure protection of coalition forces' information infrastructure from attacks (i.e. introduction of computer viruses to computer networks, attempts by unauthorized users to gain access to systems, OPSEC violations, counterintelligence threats, etc).

A9.5.6. Evaluate coordination of OPSEC activities including telephone, cell phone, internet, and e-mail monitoring.