



**Assembly of Western European Union  
The interim European Security and Defence Assembly**

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**Replies of the Council to Recommendations 684-692**

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## Replies of the Council to Recommendations 684-692

### RECOMMENDATION 684<sup>1</sup>

#### *on the follow-up to the Nice decisions on the ESDP and the completion of the project for European defence<sup>2</sup>*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the Council continues to have an obligation under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to make an annual report to the WEU Assembly and reiterating that this report should cover all the relevant treaty areas and reach the Assembly early enough to be examined by its committees, thereby supporting the Assembly's function as a broad forum for discussion of security and defence matters, and therefore deeply regretting that the second part of the 46<sup>th</sup> annual report of the Council did not reach the Assembly on time;
- (ii) Welcoming the progress the European Union has made in order to become a credible, autonomous actor in crisis-management matters;
- (iii) Regretting, however, that the Treaty of Nice was unable to complete the project whose purpose is to provide the European Union with a fully-fledged defence dimension;
- (iv) Deploring that, as a consequence, responsibility for crisis management and collective defence now formally lies with different European organisations with different memberships and that different treaties form the basis for these tasks;
- (v) Noting that under the present wording of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, WEU is no longer an integral part of the development of the European Union;
- (vi) Deeply concerned about the consequences this will have for defining how WEU's remaining functions are to fit into the European framework in the future, these being:
- collective defence based on Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
  - armaments cooperation;
  - the parliamentary dimension of European defence;
  - WEU's role as an enlarged forum for general strategic reflection;
- (vii) Welcoming the EU's determination to be capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- (viii) Aware, however, that it may well be a long time before member states make all the improvements as regards munitions, weapons, force protection, medical services, intelligence, command and control and air and sea lift that are necessary if they are to be able to act autonomously even in peacemaking operations;
- (ix) Recognising the complexity inherent in the EU's policy of moving towards the development of a common European defence, which is mentioned as a possible objective in the Treaty on European Union, while maintaining it as a fundamental commitment in the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (x) Considering that European armaments cooperation, which will continue to take place in WEAG – one of the residual functions of WEU – will be more important than ever now that the EU has decided to develop an autonomous European military capability because, if implemented properly,

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 18 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (second sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Liapis on behalf of the Political Committee (Document A/1733).

it will lead to the harmonisation of armaments and equipment and will make defence budgets, which are not likely to increase, more cost-effective;

(xi) Repeating that it is of great importance to keep both WEU's associate members and partners closely involved in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy;

(xii) Convinced that there is still a fundamental interest in increasing the number of signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty, including Article V thereof, even if the European Union continues to pursue the objective of achieving a common defence as enshrined in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Concentrate its efforts on armaments cooperation in WEAG and WEAO in order to help the member states find ways of offsetting the qualitative shortfalls and deficiencies, in terms of collective capabilities, that were recently identified in the Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, taking into account the proposal to create a European Armaments Agency;
2. Place stronger emphasis in its deliberations on supporting the Assembly's function as a broad forum for discussion of security and defence matters by providing it in good time and as appropriate with all the information it needs to carry out this function;
3. Play an active role in the custodianship of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and endeavour to increase the number of signatories in order to ensure that common defence remains a central issue for conceptual thinking in a European framework, in total harmony with the responsibilities of the Atlantic Alliance;
4. Draw up for that purpose a number of options which could help to overcome the difficulties that persist as regards including a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty on European Union;
5. Ask the Council of the European Union to take the necessary steps to enable it to undertake peace-enforcement missions in the near future.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 684***

1. The Council wishes to thank the Assembly for its recommendations, and reiterates its commitment and readiness to provide an agreed annual report under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It recalls that, following the decisions taken in Marseilles, a restructured Secretariat-General has been in place since 2 July 2001 to assist Member States in fulfilling the commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Secretariat-General continues to play an active role in support of both the Western European Armaments Group and the Research Cell of the Western European Armaments Organisation, which continued to carry out their mandated tasks throughout the final phase of the transition period in the first half of 2001.

2. The Council has constantly paid tribute to the work of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, its Presidents and its committees, and has acknowledged their substantial contribution to the debate on European security and defence.

3. As stated in its reply to Recommendation 678, the Council can but reiterate that:

(a) The custodianship of Article V will remain WEU's main political function in the future as long as the European Union is not in a position to take over the mutual defence commitment it entails. Should circumstances call for it, the implementation of this commitment will be NATO's responsibility.

(b) The Maastricht Declaration has provided clear guidelines with regard to eventual membership of WEU. States which are members of the EU are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become Observers if they so wish. At the same time, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become Associate Members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of the Organisation.

4. The Council does not wish to interfere in any arrangements being considered and negotiated within the various competent bodies of the European Union, as they will serve the interests of all WEU nations.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 685<sup>1</sup>**

***on revising the European security concept – responding to new risks<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the prerequisite for securing peace and freedom for WEU nations and for Europe as a whole is the further c
- (ii) consolidation of democracy and the rule of law;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that the values defended by WEU as a whole and its Parliamentary Assembly in particular are becoming increasingly broadly and deeply shared by all peoples and states on the continent of Europe;
- (iv) Concerned about as yet unresolved ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts, not only in Europe itself but also in other regions of the world, both close to Europe and further afield;
- (v) Disturbed by conflicts born out of poverty, disease, the competition for resources, greed and the thirst for power;
- (vi) Aware of the threat posed by an increase in the activities of organised international criminal groups benefiting from modern technology and more open borders;
- (vii) Concerned about the potential dangers inherent in the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and in particular the risk of them being used by states of concern;
- (viii) Concerned also about the uncontrolled proliferation and circulation of small and light arms, to a large extent in connection with organised crime and terrorism;
- (ix) Noting therefore with satisfaction that the process of integration and cooperation in Europe has sustained its momentum, which will enhance security;
- (x) Convinced of the fundamental importance of the decisions taken by the WEU full member states to transfer WEU's crisis-management functions to the EU, to develop the EU's military capability and to link it with the EU's civilian and economic resources;
- (xi) Noting that the mutual defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty and armaments cooperation issues have not been transferred to the EU, and regretting that, furthermore, no satisfactory solution has been found, either at governmental or parliamentary level, for cooperation between the EU and the WEU associate members and associate partners;
- (xii) Stressing therefore that it is indispensable for WEU as a whole, and its Assembly in particular in its capacity as the interim European Security and Defence Assembly, to continue to make the contribution to common security which arises out of its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, while involving to the greatest possible extent the governments and parliaments of all interested states of Europe;
- (xiii) Convinced that in taking over WEU's crisis-management functions, the European Union's stated resolve of becoming a credible and independent actor in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) must be underpinned by a common security concept forming the practical basis for political and military decision-making and action;
- (xiv) Convinced that one of the fundamental tasks of such a common security concept must be to redefine security in a broad sense, with a view to defending the values of a democratic society based

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (third sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Hornhues on behalf of the Political Committee (Document A/1741).

on the rule of law and the interests of its citizens, leading to a wider European system of comprehensive, cooperative and undivided security;

(*xv*) Convinced, furthermore, that the future role and function of collective defence in such a broad security system need to be redefined;

(*xvi*) Recalling that the November 1995 concept on European security interests drawn up by the then 27 WEU full members, observers, associate members and associate partners has in some respects become outdated, since:

- it could not anticipate the lessons learned from the Kosovo conflict and the important decisions leading to the Nice Treaty;
- a number of security threats have since been reassessed and the appropriate responses reconsidered;

(*xvii*) Aware of the difficulties of reconciling what in some cases are widely divergent assessments by European countries of the new risks and threats, which explains the absence of a common European position, for example on the United States' missile defence programme;

(*xviii*) Noting that however important that programme may be for guaranteeing world peace and security in Europe, Russia has drawn up counter-proposals, talks are currently under way between the United States and Russia and the United States has said it will consult its European allies;

(*xix*) Concerned nevertheless that the European allies may find themselves presented with a bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia which could lead to a new security framework that may not take fully into account the interests and convictions of all the allies;

(*xx*) Convinced in that respect of the need to define forthwith who is to act and speak for Europe in that area, and for the European countries to agree on which forum and in which configuration they wish to adopt a common position on this issue;

(*xxi*) Recalling that any real or imagined threats or any new defence projects as well as any initiative aimed at revising the doctrine of deterrence fall directly within the purview of Articles V and VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty for which the WEU Council remains fully responsible;

(*xxii*) Underlining that the necessary revision of the common European security concept must be the result of an inclusive approach fully involving the WEU associate members, observers and associate partners as well as other candidate countries for EU and NATO accession, and taking into account the interests of all other European countries;

(*xxiii*) Convinced therefore that it is WEU's duty as an enlarged forum for strategic reflection to forge ahead with the necessary revision of the 1995 common security concept in dialogue with all interested European states,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw up, with the participation of all associate member, observer and associate partner countries, and with appropriate involvement of all other European states, a common European security concept called for by the emergence of a broader perception of security, and including the following elements:

- (*a*) a redefinition of "security" in a broad sense;
- (*b*) an explanation of the relationship between the concept of cooperative, undivided and comprehensive security and that of security guaranteed by collective defence;
- (*c*) a comprehensive analysis of the different types and location of risks and threats likely to affect European security in the near, medium- and long-term future;
- (*d*) formulation of appropriate responses to the relevant risks and challenges, in particular identification of the measures needed to contribute to conflict prevention;

- (e) drawing-up of criteria for a reasonable division of tasks between the relevant international organisations responsible for security and defence matters;
  - (f) drawing-up of criteria which could be used as practical guidelines for developing a European operational component for crisis management within and outside Europe, for the prevention of non-military risks and for decisions on intervention by military means both within and outside Europe;
  - (g) determination of the possible right or obligation to intervene in crisis situations, in particular on humanitarian grounds;
  - (h) establishment of guidelines to determine to what extent the EU should be prepared to enter into a commitment vis-à-vis the United Nations and OSCE to intervene at their request in crisis situations and how far such intervention should depend on a specific mandate from either of those two bodies;
  - (i) determination of the consequences in terms of the size of the capabilities that are required ;
  - (j) definition of the consequences in terms of improving European armaments cooperation and enhancing the European defence industrial base;
  - (k) definition of the consequences in terms of adjusting defence budgets;
  - (l) provision of guidelines to make the EU's concept involving the use of political, civil, economic and military means ("holistic approach") for conflict prevention and crisis management workable;
  - (m) delimitation of competences not only within the EU between civil and military decision-making bodies, but also between the EU, WEU and NATO and other relevant international organisations;
  - (n) reassessment of the fundamental importance of the transatlantic link and of the question of whether and how future cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance needs to be reformed;
  - (o) evaluation of whether and how Russia, as well as other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), might be included in the transatlantic security community and in the relevant existing European structures which are to be further developed, and of the practical consequences such an approach might have;
  - (p) study of the question of whether the European Union, in the context of a revised European security concept, requires its own strategic concept to implement the ESDP and make use of its autonomous crisis-reaction capability;
  - (q) reassessment of sanctions policy as a tool for crisis management, in particular its aims, the targets and the types and effectiveness of sanctions;
  - (r) drawing-up of a strategy for the development of relations between a transatlantic security community including Russia, and emerging world powers outside that community, in particular China;
  - (s) drawing-up of a strategy for the development of relations with Europe's neighbouring regions, in particular to the south of the Mediterranean;
2. Start a process of revision of those parts of WEU's 1987 The Hague Platform and 1995 common security concept which concern the accepted doctrine at that time of a credible and effective strategy for deterrence and defence;
3. Follow closely the US missile defence project, since it could offer an opportunity to contribute to the creation of a broad network of security agreements which will lead to further nuclear arms reductions and promote disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation;

4. Ensure that the European allies are consulted on any new security arrangement between the United States and Russia;
5. Continue, as in the past, to keep the Assembly informed of all activities conducted by NATO with a view to the military implementation of Article V obligations on the basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular in the area of missile defence;
6. Convey this recommendation and report to the members of the European Council, Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Commission and NATO Council, as well as to the OSCE member countries.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 685***

1 to 4. The Council notes with interest the Assembly's Recommendations regarding the drawing up of a common European Security Concept taking into account both the 1987 Hague Platform and the 1995 Madrid document on European Security: "A common concept of the 27 WEU Countries".

It can only reiterate, however, that any decision to be taken on such a task would be best appraised within the European Union in the context of the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), provided that the Union deems it useful for the definition of its own requirements in the exercise of its developing crisis management functions.

5. The Council will ensure that the Assembly is kept informed of any future activities involving WEU and NATO which would be related to Article V obligations. The Assembly is reminded that regular consultations between WEU and NATO, based on inter-institutional arrangements, have been suspended in accordance with the decision of the WEU Council of Ministers as set out in the Marseilles Declaration of 13 November 2000.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 686<sup>1</sup>*****on the implementation of the Nice Summit decisions in the operational area of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the European Union member states are determined “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction that many non-EU countries, and in particular the WEU associate members and associate partners, are resolved to play an active part in the EU’s crisis-management capability;
- (iii) Stressing the importance of the decisions taken by the Nice European Council on the operational aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy with a view to forming an autonomous rapid reaction force through the deployment of 60 000 troops within two months, in accordance with the Helsinki headline goal;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress made in work to develop relations between the EU and NATO;
- (v) Welcoming also the efforts the European Union member states have made to place at the EU’s disposal the forces necessary for achieving the Helsinki headline goal;
- (vi) Taking note of the commitments given by non-EU European members of NATO and EU applicant countries to contribute to the establishment of the European Union’s rapid reaction capabilities,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that, in accordance with their status, the 28 WEU member, associate member, associate partner and observer states are involved in the best possible way in EU-led crisis-management operations at both the governmental and parliamentary levels;
2. Urge the EU governments to:
  - finalise arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the European Union and NATO;
  - conclude, within a reasonable period of time, suitable arrangements for giving the European Union assured access in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements to Alliance assets and capabilities;
  - ensure that the EU is able, as soon as possible, to conduct a military operation in the framework of the Petersberg tasks, in view of its commitment to have an operational capability by the end of 2001;
  - give the Headline Goal Task Force their strong support for the work it is doing to evaluate the military capabilities available for EU-led crisis-management operations;
  - engage in preparations for a “programmes commitment conference” to ensure that Europeans make a commitment, including a financial commitment, to joint

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (fourth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Bakoyianni on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document A/1734).

equipment programmes with a view to making good existing shortcomings, in particular by acquiring the intelligence necessary for strategic assessment, interoperable command systems and a strategic lift capability;

- continue to enhance Europe's capability for civilian crisis management;
- envisage the possibility of eventually establishing a genuine multinational, permanent strategic operation command HQ for the European Union;
- draw up a proactive exercise policy to test the operation of the politico-military structures and the military chain of command, in liaison with NATO or otherwise.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 686***

The Council wishes to thank the Assembly for its recommendations. However, it is not in a position to do otherwise than to repeat the terms of its reply to Recommendation 674: “It is up to the European Union to further arrangements relating to the CESDP”.

The Council is fully satisfied that the European Security and Defence Policy as it is currently developed by the EU serves the interests of all WEU nations in all its aspects.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 687<sup>1</sup>**

***on the contribution of European non-EU countries to military crisis management in Europe<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the increasingly multinational nature of civilian and military crisis-management activities this past decade, particularly in south-eastern Europe;
- (ii) Considering the resolve of all European Union member states to give the EU a civil-military crisis-management capability enabling it to intervene “where NATO as a whole is not engaged”;
- (iii) Noting the decisions taken by the Nice European Council on the practical implementation of that capability;
- (iv) Considering that the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) must be a catalyst for more effective civil-military crisis management in which participation is extended to include all European countries wishing to contribute to that effort;
- (v) Welcoming the desire of those WEU nations which are not members of the EU to make a practical contribution to the military capabilities that are to be put in place in the framework of the Helsinki headline goal;
- (vi) Aware of the proposals for institutional arrangements that have been put forward by the EU with a view to organising cooperation between the EU and non-EU states in the field of civil and military crisis management;
- (vii) Noting the resolve of the EU to cooperate with NATO in a spirit of transparency;
- (viii) Stressing the need to take account of the legitimate interests of the non-EU European NATO member countries, as well as those of the United States and Canada, in the decision-making process within the new politico-military bodies of the EU;
- (ix) Emphasising the need for interoperability among the forces engaged in multinational crisis management;
- (x) Bearing in mind the fundamental characteristics of availability, mobility and deployability required of the forces used for peace-support missions;
- (xi) Welcoming the effectiveness of the NATO Partnership for Peace programme for developing interoperability and meeting those requirements;
- (xii) Aware that the new EU crisis-management policy must include the complete range of capabilities for conducting the military operations defined in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration;
- (xiii) Recalling the work done by WEU in conjunction with NATO in order to draw up consultation procedures involving the observers, associate members and associate partners,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Encourage those WEU states which are also members of the EU to strive to ensure that the new EU politico-military crisis-management structures remain open to participation by other WEU nations which are not members of the EU, in order to take into account factors of geography, historic interests and practical experience;

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (fourth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Wilkinson and Mr Bársony on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document A/1735).

2. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU and NATO to ensure that the interests of the NATO members within WEU, as well as those of the United States and Canada, are taken into account by the decision-making process within the EU politico-military structures, while preserving the degree of autonomy they deem necessary;
3. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU to promote within the EU political and military exercises involving the associate members and associate partners of WEU;
4. Promote the organisation of EU-NATO joint exercises, extending participation to include countries which are part of the Partnership for Peace;
5. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU to keep the Council regularly informed about the activities of the EU politico-military bodies, in particular as regards the participation of the associate members and associate partners;
6. Keep the Assembly informed of developments in that field;
7. Preserve the participation and dialogue among the 28 nations within WEU as regards those issues of European security and defence that fall within its remit under the modified Brussels Treaty.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
***to Recommendation 687***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its recommendations. It can but reiterate that it is up to the European Union to draw up the relevant arrangements regarding its Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as its Common European Security and Defence Policy as far as European countries associated with the European Union, EU applicants and third countries are concerned.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 688<sup>1</sup>*****on conventional arms control – the CFE Treaty  
and its implications for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the important contribution made by the CFE Treaty to peace and security in Europe;
- (ii) Aware of the geopolitical and strategic changes that have taken place in Europe since its entry into force;
- (iii) Considering the need to preserve and develop the CFE Treaty *acquis* whilst taking account of such changes;
- (iv) Desirous that the ratification procedure for the adapted CFE Treaty be brought to completion as soon as possible;
- (v) Stressing the importance of opening up the adapted CFE Treaty to new signatories in order to strengthen security in Europe and in particular in the Baltic Sea area and south-eastern Europe;
- (vi) Aware of the persistence of problems linked to the application and interpretation of the Treaty provisions;
- (vii) Stressing the sustained commitment on the part of the Atlantic Alliance in applying the Treaty and its constructive role in searching for solutions acceptable to all States Parties, to the problems encountered in implementing the Treaty;
- (viii) Considering it essential for the Russian Federation to comply with all commitments it has undertaken within the Treaty framework, in particular as regards force levels in the Caucasus, and to withdraw the armed forces it has stationed in the territories of Georgia and Moldova within the agreed timeframe;
- (ix) Stressing the need to pursue the process of controlling conventional arms in Europe, combined with confidence-building measures covering air and naval equipment in accordance with arrangements to be defined between the States concerned;
- (x) Expressing the wish that European machinery to control trafficking in light and small-calibre weapons used in conflicts in Europe should be established as soon as possible, with the involvement of WEU, the OSCE, NATO and the EU,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Encourage WEU states not parties to the CFE Treaty to accede to the adapted CFE Treaty as soon as it comes into force;
2. Encourage exchange of information and cooperation between WEU countries on matters concerning control over conventional armaments, light and small-calibre weapons and confidence-building measures with reference to air and naval forces;
3. Systematically place on the agenda of its future meetings the question of armaments control in Europe and how this should evolve;
4. Encourage those WEU states which are also members of the OSCE, NATO and the EU to put forward proposals for joint action in this area;

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (fifth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Schlöten on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document A/1731).

5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of its activities as regards armaments control and of the activities of those WEU states which are parties to the Open Skies Treaty

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 688***

The Council wishes to thank the Assembly for its recommendations and to recall that at their Marseilles meeting on 13 November 2000, Ministers acknowledged the importance of continuing cooperation between the members of the WEU Group of States parties to the Open Skies Treaty. As mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration, the Council of Ministers decided that this cooperation “for the foreseeable future would be coordinated directly between its members, as appropriate, from capitals and from their missions in Vienna”.

Other aspects of conventional arms control are not on the Council’s agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 16 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 689<sup>1</sup>**

***on the prospects for the participation of the associate partner countries  
in European armaments cooperation<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that a Europe which defines itself as a “community with a shared destiny” should be sufficiently powerful as regards its security and defence to play an international role in keeping with the size of its population and with its economic and cultural weight, alongside Russia and the United States in particular;
- (ii) Welcoming the current historic period of European reunification and the major progress achieved in the construction of Europe, particularly in the field of security and defence;
- (iii) Emphasising the political and economic progress resulting from the process of European integration and the need to guarantee the political stability of Europe as a whole;
- (iv) Recalling that the associate partner countries are all candidates for accession to the EU and NATO and that it is in the interests of all European countries to increase their participation in European armaments cooperation;
- (v) Reiterating that an important *acquis* of WEU is its precursor role in the creation of a European security and defence community involving 28 European countries;
- (vi) Aware, therefore, of the justification for adopting an “inclusive approach” in the field of armaments cooperation, as well as in other areas, with a view to successfully building not only defence Europe, but Europe as a whole;
- (vii) Noting the growing number of multinational peacekeeping operations involving participation by all European countries and the importance of military interoperability;
- (viii) Recognising the diversity of efforts and capabilities among European countries in the field of armaments and the need to define a minimum budget share that each European state should spend on basic research and on the development and production of defence equipment;
- (ix) Considering that armaments Europe is being built by bringing about a convergence of demand among the different states, which should lead to economies of scale in the production of defence equipment, and by consolidating supply, through industrial restructuring;
- (x) Noting that an indispensable prerequisite for rationalising demand among the largest possible number of European countries is to harmonise the requirements of their armed forces;
- (xi) Recalling the decisions taken at Erfurt with a view to establishing a *European Armaments Partnership* in the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
- (xii) Desirous of increasing the possibilities for the participation of the associate partner countries as full members in armaments cooperation activities within the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO);
- (xiii) Regretting, moreover, that most European armaments structures are still not open to the associate partner countries;
- (xiv) Desirous of greater and more rapid integration of all European countries in all European armaments cooperation structures;

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001, during the first part of the forty-seventh session (fifth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Hauptert and Mr Medalinskas on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document A/1736).

(xv) Regretting that the second part of the 46th annual report of the Council to the Assembly did not arrive early enough for the Technological and Aerospace Committee to study the parts concerning armaments cooperation,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Submit future annual reports to the Assembly early enough for its committees to have time to study them;
2. Devote a larger part of its future annual reports to the activities of WEAG and the WEAO Research Cell;
3. More firmly assert the political will of the WEU nations to strengthen WEAG and WEAO armaments cooperation activities with a view to developing a European armaments policy;
4. Promote an “inclusive” approach to European armaments cooperation activities, encouraging the broadest possible participation by all European countries – particularly EU and NATO candidate countries – with a view to building a Europe that has been defined as a “community with a shared destiny”;
5. Reaffirm the principle of continuity in the political consultations at the highest level within WEAG and schedule the dates for the next WEAG Ministerial in autumn 2001;
6. Encourage the Defence Ministers and National Armaments Directors of the 19 WEAG member states to enlarge the European Armaments Partnership and to invite forthwith their counterparts from the associate partner countries to participate in their meetings;
7. Inform the Assembly about the plan for strengthening the European Armaments Partnership;
8. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to study the possibility of proposing to the associate partners that they join WEAG as full members;
9. Invite the WEU associate partner countries to clearly express, through an official exchange of letters between their Defence Ministers and the WEAG Presidency, their desire to participate in armaments cooperation activities within WEAG and WEAO;
10. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to propose that the associate partner countries immediately sign the SOCRATE Memorandum of Understanding which would enable them, without yet being full members of WEAG, to participate in WEAG’s R&T activities;
11. Call on the WEAG Defence Ministers to make it possible for the associate partner countries to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Mutual Use of Government Test Facilities;
12. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to propose that the associate partner countries sign, as soon as possible, the EUROPA Memorandum of Understanding which could in the near future provide the umbrella structure for all R&T activities managed by the WEAO Research Cell;
13. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers, for the purpose of cooperative R&T projects, to make provision for a flexible cost-sharing system allowing the associate partner countries to participate in such projects according to their possibilities;
14. Encourage the WEU associate partners to participate extensively and actively in the activities of the Eurolongterm and Eurocom groups, as well as those of the Western European Logistics Group (WELG), and to invite those associate partners which so wish to join those groups as full members;
15. Take the necessary measures to ensure that full use is made within the EU of the acquis constituted by the WEAG and WEAO armaments cooperation activities and the work of Eurolongterm, Eurocom and WELG;
16. Endeavour to harmonise the WEAG and WEU Presidencies;

17. Invite the WEAG countries which are also NATO members to ensure that there is better coordination of armaments cooperation activities open to the associate partners at European level, within WEAG, and at transatlantic level, within NATO;
18. Encourage the members of OCCAR, as a first step, to make full use of the arrangements allowing the participation of other WEU nations that are not members of OCCAR in specific programmes on a case-by-case basis, and in the longer term to fully open up OCCAR to other European countries, including the associate partners;
19. Urge the countries party to the Letter of Intent (LoI) to extend forthwith the LoI process to include those other WEU countries which are prepared to adopt the principles already defined in that framework and have expressed the wish to contribute actively to the ongoing negotiations;
20. Encourage the EU member countries to conduct a further, more exhaustive study of the defence industrial capabilities of all EU candidate countries;
21. Encourage the EU member states to invite forthwith the EU candidates to participate, on the basis of a status which remains to be defined, in the work of the EU's POLARM and COARM Groups;
22. Encourage the EU member states to develop, in the framework of the successive EU technological research and development programmes, dual-use research projects and to promote the participation of the EU candidate countries in such projects;
23. Invite the WEAG countries to allow the associate partner states to participate, as of now, in the WEAG Group of National Experts on the European Armaments Agency (EAA) and to steer the work of that group in such a way as to promote maximum participation by the associate partners in the activities of the future EAA;
24. Promote the participation of the associate partner countries in those cooperative defence equipment production programmes conducive to shaping the future structure of the European defence industry and which will be useful for strengthening the credibility of the European Security and Defence Policy;
25. Urge the WEAG member states to organise a programmes commitment conference, with a view to remedying the shortfalls the European Union identified in the framework of the Forces Headline Goal following the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, and in that context make arrangements for more intensive consultations with the associate partner countries.

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 689***

The Council wishes to thank the Assembly for its pertinent recommendations on which it can offer the following comments.

1. The definition of the WEU residual functions by Ministers at Marseilles will, *de facto*, impact on the structure of the Council's report to the Assembly. Since, as far as their tasking and the substance of their works is concerned, WEAG and WEAO were not affected by WEU's transition period, the report will continue to reflect their activities in accordance with the wishes of the participating nations and the presidencies.

2. At their Meeting in Luxembourg in November 1999, WEAG Defence Ministers confirmed: "*their commitment to WEAG and agreed to retain it under their political direction*". Later, at their Porto meeting they confirmed: "*that WEAG and WEAO have a role to play in the evolution of European armaments policy*" and tasked the NADs to conduct a study on the future of WEAG and WEAO.

Finally at their Marseilles meeting they: "*had a fruitful exchange of views on the initial report presented by NADs and provided guidance for the continuation of the work towards a final report to be presented at their 2001 Autumn meeting*".

Nevertheless, the practical difficulties arising from the fact that no WEU Council of Ministers will be held in Autumn 2001 led the WEAG Chair to postpone the next WEAG Ministerial meeting to Spring 2002.

3. The WEAG Chair and the representatives of the 19 WEAG member nations have noted with special attention the WEU Assembly Recommendations related to the participation of WEU Associate Partners in WEAG activities.

They wish to confirm their firm commitment, once the future evolution of WEAG has been decided, to continue the gradual opening up of their armaments cooperation activities to other European nations participating in the development and implementation of the ESDP. This process will be taken forward within the framework of the European Armaments Partnership.

The achievements to date are encouraging. Since the Marseilles WEAG Ministerial meeting in November 2000, WEAG's complement of full members has risen to 19 nations, which are participating fully in its activities through the various MoUs quoted in the Assembly Report.

Those 19 nations are making use of the services offered by WEAO and participating actively in the studies aimed at defining and establishing, if so decided, a European Armaments Agency.

These measures are considered only as intermediate steps. Additional opportunities to further open up WEAG activities to other European nations, and particularly to WEU Associate Partners, need to be studied.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 16 October 2001.

In that regard, it is worth noting that the WEAG Chair intends to raise the question at the next WEAG NADs meeting with the aim of obtaining a consensus on a study mandate, although it should be noted that the study on “The Future of WEAG and WEAO” is the immediate priority.

The WEU Assembly recommendations will be followed on that occasion. A clear expression by the WEU Associate Partner nations of their expectation and desire to participate in WEAG activities would constitute valuable input to the NADs debate.

**RECOMMENDATION 690<sup>1</sup>*****on European anti-missile defence: a role for Russia<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the issue of anti-missile defence falls within Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty for which the Council of WEU retains full responsibility;
- (ii) Recalling the reply of the Council to Assembly Resolution 103 on the United States National Missile Defence programme whereby the Council, whilst agreeing with the Assembly on the importance of this subject, informed the Assembly that it was not, nor foreseen to be, on the agenda of any of its forthcoming meetings;
- (iii) Judging unacceptable an identical reply from the Council to Recommendation 680 on transatlantic cooperation on anti-missile defence, supplemented by a statement confirming the lesser importance of the subject given that the results of the WEU Marseilles ministerial meeting drew the consequences of ESDP developments for WEU and its future structure, as from 1 July 2001 at the latest;
- (iv) Taking account of the speech made by President Bush on 1 May 2001 explaining the American position on missile defence;
- (v) Considering the proposal made by the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Sergeev, to NATO on the subject of a pan-European non-strategic anti-missile defence system which could serve as a framework for global cooperation between the Alliance and Russia and also between Russia and Europeans;
- (vi) Noting that the proposal seeks to marry technical and military cooperation with a form of political association, thus making it deserving of particular attention by both NATO and WEU;
- (vii) Considering that the classic trade-off between offensive deterrence and mutual vulnerability among responsible nuclear powers has been seriously modified and that the emergence of new nuclear players and the proliferation of ballistic missile systems that goes with it raises new difficulties that are in the first instance military and then political;
- (viii) Deeming that in the United States such proliferation has gone hand in hand with a complete rethink of defence doctrines in that the concept of shared vulnerability has given way to one of global protection;
- (ix) Noting that the coexistence of these two factors suggests that the present state of affairs as regards deterrence may in essence be defined as transitory and that we are heading towards a mixed arrangement combining offensive and defensive systems;
- (x) Noting that Europe has not yet gone far enough in making the full doctrinal adjustment required to take these new circumstances on board;
- (xi) Taking the view that Europe perceives its security being maintained by the presence of nuclear arsenals as a potential recourse against any nuclear or chemical strike and through the perpetuation of disarmament and control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty;
- (xii) Considering that Europe should be aware of the need to work towards increased protection from ballistic threats, without restricting itself to *ad hoc* anti-missile capabilities, explicitly directed against air-breathing launchers, very short-range missiles or antiquated Scud family ballistic systems;

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (sixth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Kestelijn-Sierens and Mr Martínez Casañ, on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document A/1737).

- (xiii) Stressing that the launch of such programmes is a major political decision that implies an assessment of the threat and above all public identification of potential enemies, a process that has been avoided to date as most European governments are unwilling to name their adversaries and take preventive measures;
- (xiv) Noting that the partial reform of the ABM Treaty has meant giving greater latitude to tactical anti-missile weapons deployments and to the alleviation of constraints on the development of strategic anti-missile weapons;
- (xv) Noting furthermore that the majority of ATBM systems based on the coordinated operation of a series of mobile launchers/interceptors, radar surveillance and launch control units and associated C3I<sup>3</sup> network, and that optimisation of the performance of such systems requires early warning and trajectory satellites, together with communications and data management systems;
- (xvi) Highlighting the importance of this last question as regards early warning satellites, if one considers that transatlantic cooperation, especially within NATO, has up until now excluded Europe from the field of military space-based detection;
- (xvii) Bearing in mind that Mr Sergeyev's proposal to NATO envisages in detail the possibility of cooperating in the satellite field, referring to the creation of a joint space centre initially to identify and track ballistic missiles and ultimately to intercept non-strategic missiles;
- (xviii) Considering that the essentially political nature of the Russian Defence Minister's proposal suggests that Russia is legitimately laying claim to a major role in developing the continent's security policy;
- (xix) Emphasising the fact that the proposal tacitly acknowledges this and stresses the need for a definition and joint assessment of ballistic threats, possible areas of intervention for the Euro-ABM and the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept;
- (xx) Recalling the fundamental importance of compliance with the different control and non-proliferation regimes;
- (xxi) Stressing, finally, that non-militarisation of space should continue to be a paramount aim of all nations;
- (xxii) Recalling that the lack of a European position in regard to US and Russian plans could lead to a situation where the United States and Russia reached a bilateral agreement and Europe was faced with a *fait accompli*,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop in the broad forum of strategic reflection involving the 28 countries a common position on European anti-missile defence, based on a joint assessment and definition of ballistic threats and on the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept that harmonises the American anti-missile programme, the Russian proposal on a Euro-ABM and European interests in that area, and that it submit that position to the Alliance;
2. Use the WEAG framework to evaluate the impact of an anti-missile defence on European industry, taking into account:
  - that European technological and industrial capabilities will be duly incorporated into any joint system;
  - that Europe must have an autonomous early warning system as envisaged in WEU's Noordwijk Declaration;
3. Inform the Assembly, on the basis of Articles IV and V of the modified Brussels Treaty, of any NATO activities in relation to:

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<sup>3</sup> Command, control, communication and intelligence.

- undertaking a study on the risks and threats of proliferation to European security;
- efforts to improve instruments used in the fight against proliferation;
- debate(s) on the American anti-missile programme;
- possible involvement of Europeans in such a programme from a technological, industrial and financial angle;
- evaluation of the proposal made to NATO by the Russian authorities for the creation of a pan-European non-strategic anti-missile defence;
- evaluation of the Russian offer to create a joint space centre for the purposes of identifying and monitoring ballistic launches and intercepting non-strategic launches;

4. Urge, through a joint approach by all WEU member countries in NATO to both the United States and Russia, that no arrangement in this connection discussed between them on a bilateral basis which affects currently accepted strategic doctrine will be concluded without consultation and the involvement of those European allies that so wish.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 690***

The Council notes with interest the Assembly's deliberations and its recommendations with regard to Russia's role in the context of on-going reflections on a possible European Anti-Missile Defence. It also welcomes the Assembly's readiness to engage in a regular dialogue with the Russian State Duma on this important matter.

However, it can only reiterate the substance of its previous replies to Assembly Resolution 103 and Recommendation 680. Since the restructuring of WEU around the commitments and provisions contained in the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Member States have not deemed it necessary to put this subject on the agenda of the Council, as they have ample opportunity to address all the issues involved within the Alliance and in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 691<sup>1</sup>*****on a joint European space strategy: security and defence aspects<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the European space sector today has technical expertise, a large scientific community and an efficient space industry but that there is no common political will to make the most of these assets;
- (ii) Stressing that it is imperative for Europe to have a space component and to consolidate its status as a world power by acquiring an autonomous capability in this area;
- (iii) Noting that the European space endeavour is based on a series of different choices and national programmes rather than on any European policy as such;
- (iv) Recalling the huge amount of productive work done over many years by the European Space Agency and also by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre more recently;
- (v) Recalling also WEU's endeavours in the form of studies on the development of a European space-based observation system;
- (vi) Commending the WEU Satellite Centre on the sterling work it has done not only in terms of its operational efficiency but also as regards the constant improvements it has made in its techniques and procedures notwithstanding budget constraints;
- (vii) Considering that the European Union's resolve to deploy a rapid reaction force able to carry out Petersberg missions under the command of a joint Military Staff requires, among other things, a thorough overhaul of Europe's intelligence assets;
- (viii) Recalling that in this new framework the WEU Satellite Centre, which is to be transferred to the European Union on 1 January 2002, will have to carry out new tasks;
- (ix) Stressing that the Centre's current status as a service provider is compatible with the future missions it may be assigned and that it would be eminently sensible for it also to acquire communications, navigation, real-time data transmission and, in the longer term, early warning and electronic surveillance capabilities;
- (x) Considering nonetheless that it is imperative for the Centre to maintain the dual nature of its missions and preserve its capacity to provide services for the civilian sector;
- (xi) Welcoming the document on a European strategy for space drawn up jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency;
- (xii) Noting with satisfaction that ESA intends to share the EU's growing interest in a Common European Security and Defence Policy;
- (xiii) Observing that, with the sole exception of Helios I, European military satellite programmes have so far been confined to the national framework;
- (xiv) Recalling the studies carried out by the WEU Space Group on the development of a European space-based observation system and the possibility of WEU's participation in such a system at a multilateral European level;
- (xv) Welcoming the decision of the EU Council of transport ministers to go ahead with the Galileo navigation satellite programme,

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (sixth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Maass on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document A/1738).

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request the WEU member and observer countries, in their capacity as EU member states, to ensure that the European Union acts as coordinator for Europe's space activities (in terms of observation, communications, navigation and early warning satellite systems) including the military component, taking into account the following factors:

- (a) in the modern world the use of space in economic, industrial, political and military terms has become an indispensable strategic necessity;
- (b) in the context of the Common European Security and Defence Policy a proven space capability is of crucial importance;
- (c) the EU must lose no time in defining Europe's operational requirements;
- (d) the EU must have independent decision-making procedures;
- (e) the EU must decide whether to participate in a multilateral European space-based observation system under development;
- (f) the European countries have so far been unable to reach agreement on a joint military satellite communications system;
- (g) Europe must achieve interoperability with its transatlantic allies;
- (h) the need to study Russia's offer of cooperation on satellite programmes and more specifically the proposal it submitted to NATO regarding a joint space centre initially for the purpose of identifying and monitoring ballistic launches and, in the longer term, intercepting non-strategic launches;
- (i) the need for a study of European requirements with a view to the possible creation of a body able to manage information provided by satellites, including the acquisition, management and retransmission of data;
- (j) the creation of a space group should be envisaged, similar to the group which used to exist in WEU; it would be answerable to the Political and Security Committee and responsible for coordinating those aspects of European security and defence that concern the use of space;
- (k) care must be taken to avoid an excessive time lag between a declaration of intent to carry out a space programme and its actual completion, as this does nothing to promote industrial competitiveness and also makes it difficult to match projects to actual needs;
- (l) greater coordination should be sought with the defence aerospace industry which should be more involved in analysing the environment;

2. Further request the WEU member and observer countries, in their capacity as EU member states, to ensure that once the Satellite Centre has been transferred to the European Union, it is given a status enabling it to adjust its work to the requirements of the Common European Security and Defence Policy by pursuing the following objectives:

- (a) a redefinition of the Satellite Centre's mission that both confirms the dual nature of its tasks and the importance of the civilian market in European space strategy, and also makes provision for the establishment of a military unit within the Centre's organisational structure given that intelligence and battlefield management missions require special equipment and appropriately trained staff;
- (b) giving the Centre with the resources it needs to provide both commercial services and markets for satellite operators and European space companies, and to optimise the use of commercial systems;

- (c) greater independence for the Centre so that it can take autonomous decisions regarding certain missions and priorities;
- (d) widening the range of the Centre's tasks so that it can begin to develop a battlefield management capability which requires:
  - the use of remote-sensing, meteorological and communications tools, as well as electronic surveillance and, in the longer term, early-warning capabilities;
  - the creation of an intelligence capability with a long-term view to setting up a European intelligence service;
  - authorisation to programme a satellite observation system, recourse to all commercial satellites available on the market and occasional access to designated military satellites;
  - a substantial increase in funding and both civil and military staff;
  - institutionalising cooperation between the Centre, the Joint Research Centre, ESA and the space industry;
- (e) guaranteed access to the Centre for WEU's associate members and associate partners subject to conditions to be decided jointly;
- (f) strengthening cooperation with NATO, in particular at the level of the information transmission chain, the command chain, and utilisation and equipment standards, and also with other organisations such as the United Nations, OSCE, etc;
- (g) ensuring that the Centre comes under the direct command of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in close cooperation with the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Staff;
- (h) safeguarding the rights of Satellite Centre staff.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 691***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its considerations and recommendations regarding a “joint European Space Strategy” as well as the future of the Satellite Centre.

On the latter, the Council wishes to inform the Assembly that, on 20 July 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted a Council Joint Action on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) which shall be operational as from 1 January 2002. The Council Joint Action was published in the *Official Journal of the European Communities* on 25 July 2001.

For the WEU Satellite Centre this decision has opened a final decisive transitional phase. The establishment of the EUSC is essential for strengthening early-warning and crisis-monitoring functions within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in particular of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Coherence with the European Strategy for Space, endorsed by the Council on 16 November 2000, will be sought. The initial infrastructure of the Centre will be provided by WEU.

The Board of the EUSC met for the first time on 26 July 2001. It appointed the Director of the Satellite Centre with responsibility for facilitating the transformation of the WEU subsidiary body into the new EU entity by 31 December 2001. Detailed transfer arrangements have yet to be agreed.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.

**RECOMMENDATION 692<sup>1</sup>**  
*on the Middle East and security in Europe*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the many ties binding Europe indissolubly with the Middle East, which is both the cradle of European civilisation and the main source of its energy supply, as well as an important trading partner;
- (ii) Considering, therefore, that Europe has a vital interest in the peace, stability and prosperity of all the states and peoples of the Middle East region;
- (iii) Aware, however, that the Middle East is riddled with tension, simmering disputes and violent conflict between opposing parties;
- (iv) Taking the view that settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a determining factor for security throughout the entire region, while its continuance is having a negative impact both on respect for human rights and on the economic and social development so essential to all the countries concerned;
- (v) Aware that one of the main reasons for the present stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the almost total lack of confidence, on the part of Palestinians, who believe that the Oslo peace process will never be implemented, and Israelis, convinced they will forever have to live under the threat of Arab violence and terrorism;
- (vi) Noting that the present stand-off between Israel and the Palestinians is giving rise to mounting tension between the two peoples and strangling the economy of the Palestinian-controlled territories, where two-thirds of the 3 million inhabitants now live below the poverty line and where the unemployment rate has reached 60% in Gaza and 40% on the West Bank since the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada;
- (vii) Considering that the Palestinian Authority has an obligation to control armed anti-Israeli violence in the territories under its jurisdiction, but aware that growing disillusion among Palestinians with both the implementation of the Oslo peace process and the policies of its own political leadership are making it difficult for the Palestinian Authority to secure effective control over radical elements in its own population;
- (viii) Noting that many Palestinians are disgusted with the blatant corruption and unaccountable disappearance of public money that is taking place in the areas under Palestinian rule, which only the Palestinian Authority can put a stop to;
- (ix) Recalling that, on 9 April 2001, the EU Presidency called upon Israel to abandon plans to expand existing settlements and build new ones, adding that such settlements affect the physiognomy and demographic composition of the occupied territories and that all settlement activities are illegal and represent a major obstacle to peace;
- (x) Convinced that the present spiral of violence must be halted and that no solution is possible other than a negotiated statute, based on international law, and in particular on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the land for peace principle, as was agreed earlier;
- (xi) Welcoming the Jordanian-Egyptian peace plan which calls for a series of confidence-building measures, including the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation and the lifting of the siege in the West Bank and Gaza, thus paving the way for political negotiations;

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 during the first part of the forty-seventh session (sixth sitting) and communicated to the Council on 27 June 2001.

<sup>1</sup> Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Baumel and Mr Akçali on behalf of the Political Committee (Document A/1732).

- (xii) Afraid that through the emphasis it places on military power and superiority, the Israeli Government under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is raising the stakes in the Arab-Israeli confrontation thus conjuring up the spectre of wider regional conflict;
- (xiii) Aware that Syria will try to avoid any direct military confrontation with Israel's far superior armed forces but that it supports violent operations on the part of Hezbollah guerrillas as a reminder to Israel that it will not have peace until it withdraws from Syria's Golan Heights;
- (xiv) Regretting the fact that despite some hopeful signs following the accession of President Bashar al-Assad last year, the Syrian Government is still resisting political reform, and that economic reform is far too slow and insufficiently thoroughgoing to bring about a revival in the country's economy, which has stagnated for over 20 years;
- (xv) Aware that the EU is negotiating a Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Syria in order to integrate it into the association agreements concluded with other Mediterranean countries and help the country reform its economy and administrative structures, but nonetheless regretting that insufficient progress is being made in these negotiations because of Syria's mistrust of Europe's intentions;
- (xvi) Aware that since the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon in May 2000, Lebanese tolerance of Syria's presence in Lebanon, and its control over the country, is waning due to the disruption caused to its economy and labour market by an unimpeded flow of cheap Syrian imports and the influx of some 250 000 Syrian workers – coupled with pervasive corruption and the activities of Hezbollah, both of which Syria is being held responsible for and which are preventing much-needed foreign investors taking a stake in the Lebanese economy;
- (xvii) Aware, on the other hand, that, for the time being, the Syrian presence has put a lid on the earlier sectarian schisms that plunged Lebanon into a devastating fifteen-year civil war;
- (xviii) Noting that one source of persistent instability in the Middle East is the distinct lack of unity among Arab nations, recently demonstrated once again at the Arab League summit in Amman on 27-28 March 2001;
- (xix) Aware that any durable and comprehensive future peace agreement must include a solution to take account of the Israeli settlements in occupied territories, the possible return of refugees and the future status of Jerusalem;
- (xx) Considering that the building and expansion of settlements while the Oslo peace process has been going on has in large measure undermined Palestinian confidence in that process, and that a total and immediate freeze of all settlement activity is therefore a necessary and vital confidence-building measure to get peace negotiations restarted;
- (xxi) Aware that Israel will not be prepared to give up all its settlements in the occupied territories but taking the view that the present settlements and system of access roads prevent the establishment of a viable social-economic framework for a future Palestinian state;
- (xxii) Considering, therefore, that there should be a thorough re-evaluation of the viability of the existing settlements, the result of which would provide the basis for negotiations on rationalising the current patchwork of settlements and access roads, leading to some being annexed by Israel and others dismantled, with financial and other support provided for relocation of their inhabitants;
- (xxiii) Noting that a less ideological and more realistic approach to the refugee problem might lead to the conclusion that many refugees – some of whom are second or even third generation – having succeeded in building a new life elsewhere, would prefer not to return to their home country, while those who do would probably prefer to live in the Palestinian territories;
- (xxiv) Considering, therefore, that refugees should in principle return to the territory of the future Palestinian state and that their return should be accompanied by a large-scale programme for their social integration in their new surroundings and for economic development of a region which, up until now, has suffered chronic poverty and economic decay;
- (xxv) Noting that the historic importance of Jerusalem as the holy place of three religions, as such lends it an ecumenical vocation that entitles it to a special status under international mandate, a factor

not necessarily an obstacle to West Jerusalem being the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem that of a future Palestinian state;

(xxvi) Convinced that the European Union, on the basis of its specific approach, should play a more active political role in the Middle East peace process, in accordance with its own foreign policy guidelines and as befits the urgency of the situation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL REQUEST THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. To develop a more coherent common policy for the Middle East, with a view to actively helping the countries of the region to establish a climate where democracy, peace, stability, security, respect for human rights and economic and social development can all flourish;
2. To become more actively involved in re-establishing the Middle East peace process, as the key to furthering peaceful economic and social development of the entire region, and use every endeavour to establish a climate of mutual trust between Israel and its neighbours as a basis for renewed peace negotiations;
3. To make a serious effort, together with all the parties involved, to pave the way towards creative and acceptable solutions to the problem of the settlements, the possible return of refugees and the future status of Jerusalem, including developing a programme of economic and financial support to the implementation of a peace agreement.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 692***

The Council notes with interest the Assembly considerations and recommendations. It wishes to recall that, regarding the dialogue and cooperation developed with third countries, including the Mediterranean dialogue, the Council decided in Marseilles that: “WEU will cease to carry out these responsibilities, which it is intended will be taken up within the existing framework of political dialogue between the EU and the countries concerned”.

Moreover, within the framework of the definition of its residual functions approved by Ministers in Marseilles, the Council has not been given a mandate to consider such important issues, which will therefore not be on its agenda for the foreseeable future.

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<sup>1</sup> Communicated to the Assembly on 3 October 2001.