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### **EUROPEAN SECURITY BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11**

Paper #1

European Forum Working Paper Series 2002

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**FEBRUARY 2002**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **EUROPEAN SECURITY BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11**

Many of today's most serious threats are global in scale. The traditional military force is far from adequate to confront these new challenges (e.g. terrorism). Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense toward this type of activity. Both members of the EU in the framework of the „Petersberg Tasks“ and members of NATO or PfP will participate in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and peace-making/peace-enforcement operations. The terror attacks of September 11 accelerated the transformation process of the European security system. It had in particular an influence on NATO's role. Despite institutional differences, the activities of NATO and the EU complement each other to strengthen the economic, political, and military dimensions of regional security and stability. Founded as a defensive alliance, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats—those ranging from traditional cases of cross-border aggression to interethnic conflicts and acts of terrorism. Even though NATO invoked its Article 5 mutual protection clause the US chose not to act militarily through the alliance, however. Few European countries have the resources to conduct a war far from home.

There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. Especially the campaign in Afghanistan has emphasised a trend with profound ramifications far beyond Afghanistan: growing U.S. military predominance. The gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war-fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end Peace Support Operations. They should not be reduced to war-fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. A small presence is different from no presence at all and the Pentagon should train at least some peacekeepers. Peace-enforcement and peace-implementation operations should preferably be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or Petersberg.

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# **EUROPEAN SECURITY BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11**

*Heinz Gärtner*

## **Introduction**

Terrorism is a good example of the new security threats that seriously challenge what is still a largely Cold War based security system. Many of today's most serious threats are global in scale. The traditional military force is far from adequate to confront these new challenges. It is crucial that the military effort will be coupled with other measures, such as international police co-operation, financial investigation and cooperation and diplomacy. Therefore a crucial task for the international community is to continue improving the civilian preparedness in crisis management. The terror attacks of September 11 accelerated the transformation process of the European security system. It had in particular an influence on NATO's role. Even though NATO invoked its Article 5 mutual protection clause the U.S. chose not to act militarily through the alliance.

NATO and the EU have responded to Europe's evolving post-Cold War order by redefining and expanding their roles and objectives. Despite institutional differences, the activities of NATO and the EU complement each other to strengthen the economic, political, and military dimensions of regional security and stability. Founded as a defensive alliance, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats now facing greater Europe—those ranging from traditional cases of cross-border aggression to interethnic conflicts and acts of terrorism. Furthermore, NATO is facilitating the integration and eventual membership of Central and Eastern European nations in the transatlantic security community. The EU has likewise emphasized regional integration as being key to a safe and stable Europe, particularly through the deepening of political and economic ties among current members and through extending EU membership to CEE countries.<sup>1</sup>

Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted toward this type of activity. Both members of the EU in the framework of the „Petersberg Tasks“ and members of NATO or Partnership for Peace (PfP) participate in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and peace-making/peace-enforcement operations. The tasks of members of NATO and the EU are be blurring in the field of crisis management.

But there must be appropriate division of labor. The overwhelming U.S. contribution is war fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. It also implies political capability in the sense of foresight, intelligence, planning, creativity, vision and conflict prevention. Europeans are more designed for peace-keeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> GAO United States General Accounting Office Report to the Congressional Committees, European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe, November 2001, 45.

European states should not want more than they can control. They are not able to prepare for everything: war fighting, high-intensity combat, enforcing and making peace, peace-keeping, resolving conflicts and participating in humanitarian and rescue operations. High technology equipment forces are not only not essential for soft-security and peace-keeping missions but also not very helpful. Most highly developed military technologies are poorly designed to be used in crisis response operations.

European peace-keeping forces are among those with the best training, skills and equipment for international missions. Here European states can play a special role. European States could also supply experts on organized crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering, as well as civil and riot police and border guards.

Selective participation in international peace operations is inevitable for European states. In principal, a European State would be able to take part in all operations. In practice, European states should concentrate on the less demanding “soft security” operations. For the involvement in international operations Europeans should define conditions. Among others a participation in military operations is contingent on the European State’s interests and/or on the promotion of international law and international principles. Peace-enforcement and peace-implementation operations must be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or Petersberg. In such circumstances the use of force requires strict impartiality. Limited force against any party that violates the mandate and impartiality will not be mutually exclusive. The mandate has to have clear political and military objectives that are both reasonable and attainable. Unclear Security Council mandates have been one of the primary causes of poor civil-military relations in the field. Rules of engagement have to be formulated unambiguously. The conditions governing when and how troops may use force must be clear. The level of risk must be reasonable.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the new post-cold war security agenda and to examine future security challenges facing Europe and the wider international system. It will also assess the relevance and utility of different actors and instruments for tackling these new security challenges, and examine options for the future institutional development of European security.

## **NATO**

At the Washington summit 1999, allied leaders set out their vision of an alliance with new missions, new members, new partnerships, and a commitment to strengthen its defence capabilities. The Washington Summit Communiqué of April 1999<sup>2</sup> and NATO’s new Strategic Concept<sup>3</sup> stress that NATO will be larger, more capable and more flexible. On the one hand NATO still will be committed to collective defence, on the other hand it will be able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management and crisis response operations. In addition to territorial defence (covered by Articles V and VI of the Washington Treaty),

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<sup>2</sup> „An Alliance for the 21st Century,“ Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999.

<sup>3</sup> The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.

the Alliance security must also take into account the global context. Alliance security interests could be effected by risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources (arrangements and consultations as responses to risks of this kind can be made under Article IV).

The Communiqué acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have “the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;” Europeans (EU members and other Allies) should strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication. The Strategic Concept wants the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) to be developed within NATO. The objective of the Washington summit launched Defence Capabilities Initiative<sup>4</sup> is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations of Alliance missions. This includes non-Article V crisis response operations with a special focus on the interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable, also between Alliance and Partner forces.

In the plenary resolution “NATO and Humanitarian Intervention” adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam, 15 November 1999 NATO emphasized that any intervention with the purpose of preventing or ending massive human rights violations can only be the last resort, and that any intervention has to respect the principle of proportionality. NATO stressed its preparedness, according to the 1999 Alliance's Strategic Concept, to “contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article V crisis response operations” in the Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>5</sup>

The French Ministry of Defence commented on lessons learned of Kosovo<sup>6</sup>

“NATO's procedures, essentially devised for scenarios implementing Article 5 ... were again shown to be inappropriate for the management of non-Article 5 crisis. A highly reactive decision-making process is necessary and, at the same time, there needs to be a guaranteed consensus between the members of the Alliance. *Ad hoc* procedures were therefore established.”

If NATO is to meet the challenges of future crises—particularly in response to asymmetric threats—it must improve its performance in a number of planning aspects. A report by the British House of Commons concludes that: First, NATO must streamline its own crisis management planning system. It must develop the ability to become truly proactive in its planning and crisis management techniques, outlining clearly a set of political scenarios from which military contingencies can be derived at an early stage. Second, the mechanisms of crisis management will always be challenging for a multinational organisation, but the Alliance must ensure that differences between the members are not created by

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<sup>4</sup> Defence Capabilities Initiative, 25th April 1999.

<sup>5</sup> NATO-PA 1999 Annual Session Plenary Resolution “NATO and Humanitarian Intervention” adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam, 15 November 1999 NATO.

<sup>6</sup> “Defence - Fourteenth Report” for the House of Commons to be printed 23 October 2000, pt. 205.

NATO processes themselves: the way information is handled, the bureaucratic pace of dealing with events, or the failure to gather the relevant information at the appropriate time.<sup>7</sup>

The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners based. NATO intends to support on a case-by-case basis peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.<sup>8</sup>

As a measure of the success of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the updated Strategic Concept agreed at the Washington summit to include partnership among NATO's fundamental security tasks, along with security, consultation, deterrence and defence, and crisis management. Moreover, nearly all the summit initiatives had a Partnership dimension, be it the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the South East Europe Initiative, the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations, or the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership. This strategy was applied during the Kosovo crisis. Partner countries exhibited a common purpose and shared values in their approach to the conflict and their political support for NATO's operation reinforced its legitimacy. Countries neighboring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also lent practical support to the allies, including access to their air space. The troop contributions from Partner countries are vital to sustain the long-term deployment of forces in the simultaneous, multinational SFOR and KFOR operations.<sup>9</sup>

The Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations adopted in Washington responded by setting out the principles and methods for involving Partner countries in political consultation and decision-making, as well as in operational planning and command arrangements. In moving beyond the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Euroatlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) represented a commitment on the part of NATO to involve Partners ever more closely in Alliance decision-making processes. It would also provide a framework for involving Partners more closely in consultations for the planning, execution and political oversight of what are now known as NATO-led PfP Operations. As the multilateral body pulling the threads of the Partnership together, the EAPC retained the NACC's focus on practical political and security-related consultations. But it expanded the scope of these consultations to include crisis management, regional issues, arms-control issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, as well as defence issues, such as defence planning and budgets, including defence policy and strategy. Civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and defence-related environmental operations made up an impressive list.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> "Defence - Fourteenth Report" for the House of Commons to be printed 23 October 2000, pt. 205, 206.

<sup>8</sup> "An Alliance for the 21st Century," Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999 (31).

<sup>9</sup> Isabelle François, Partnership: One of NATO's fundamental security tasks: NATO's Defence Planning and Operations Division, NATO review Spring/Summer 2000, 27-30.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Weaver, NATO's evolving partnerships Building security through partnership, in NATO-review, Autumn 2001, No.3, 6-9.

EAPC consultations<sup>11</sup> should contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including civil emergency planning and scientific and environmental affairs. Although NATO pledges that it is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational, the implementation of this promise still has not been put into practice. There has been no involvement of the partners in the planning and decision making of a peace-keeping force in Kosovo.

The Basic Document<sup>12</sup> of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of May 30 1997 states:

“In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate. Unclear, then and now, is the meaning of "to the maximum extent possible". Giving the EAPC true decision-making powers, beyond the capacity to help shape decisions of the North Atlantic Council, is not currently on the Alliance agenda. However, as Partners demonstrate their capacity to take on additional responsibilities, this should be reviewed.”

The updated Strategic Concept – NATO's mission statement at the start of the new century – reflects the profound changes of the last decade and recognizes the increased importance of NATO's Partners in facing future security challenges. In June 2001 NATO's Secretary General, George Robertson, described In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the security environment which sounds prophetic not only with respect of the terror attacks in the following September:

“We know that the Cold War is over. That there is no prospect of a Soviet ground invasion. That we are more likely to be faced with regional conflicts such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. And we know that this means our Cold War forces and structures are out-of-date. ... We need forces that are able to get to the scene of a crisis quickly, use effective force from the time they arrive, and stay in the field as long as necessary to get the job done. This means a great deal of defence restructuring for NATO nations - and, in many cases, it means spending more money, but spending it on the right things. ... Until now, it has been our approach to apply a heavy penalty for any military attack against a NATO member. That is what Article 5 is all about. We reserve even higher penalties - nuclear retaliation - for any use of nuclear weapons against us. But with the new kind of challenges we face, there may never be a clear, state-to-state attack. Many non-state actors are involved. And if there is an attack - say a biological weapon in a suitcase - we may not be sure who is responsible. And we are

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11 See also Chairman's Summary of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Summit Level, Washington D.C., 25 April 1999.

12 Robert E. Hunter NATO's evolving partnerships: Getting Cinderella to the ball, in NATO-review, Autumn 2001, No.3, 10-12.



less and less satisfied with the notion that a single terrorist or rogue state could hold one of our cities hostage.”<sup>13</sup>

He recognized<sup>14</sup>:

“On the military side, we are learning our lessons. The forces we developed to protect ourselves during the Cold War are scarcely relevant to the actual situations requiring the use of military force today. We no longer need heavy armoured forces designed for a massive tank battle in Germany. Today, such forces are largely a waste of money. If we can't use them for the crises we actually face today then, despite their firepower, they are important only on paper -- and paper armies don't stop trouble. Many NATO governments have therefore launched far-reaching changes to their military establishments - and those which have not are under constant pressure by me to do so. To manage 21st Century crises, NATO needs 21st Century forces. We need forces that can move quickly to a conflict area, and that can arrive in enough force to have an immediate effect. We need forces that are high-tech enough to dominate the situation, to accomplish their mission as quickly as possible, and with the lowest possible risk to them and to innocent civilians. We need forces that are able to stay in the field for as long as it takes to accomplish their mission. And, once we move from the more aggressive posture of stopping a fight to the peacekeeping posture of supporting civil administration, we need at least some forces which are able to work flexibly in a wide-range of peacekeeping tasks. De-mining, distribution of humanitarian relief, border control, and providing area security for more focused international and local police activity, to name a few.

During the Cold War, we invested heavily in the right things because we had to. Today, we need to make the same level of commitment to addressing the existing and emerging security challenges we now face - and this means through both military and non-military means. In the 21st century, military success for many peacekeeping missions depends critically on civilian success - and vice versa. To quote Harry Truman out of context, they are ‘two halves of the same walnut’.”<sup>15</sup>

The NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Budapest 29-30 May 2001<sup>16</sup> stressed that the European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This should enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to

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<sup>13</sup> The Rt. Hon. George Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, NATO -- Managing the Challenges of Today, and Tomorrow, The Mayflower Hotel, 20 June 2001.

<sup>14</sup> George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, "International Security and Law Enforcement -A Look Ahead," Law Enforcement and National Security Global Forum, Edinburgh International Conference Centre, 19 June 2001.

<sup>15</sup> The Rt. Hon. George Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, NATO -- Managing the Challenges of Today, and Tomorrow, The Mayflower Hotel, 20 June 2001. One other conclusion for NATO's Secretary General is that NATO should also move towards defensive strategies which includes also missile defense: "To address these different kinds of challenges, we must think again about defensive measures. And we need to raise the penalties, raise the threshold, against this kind of attack on our societies, by whatever source."

<sup>16</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Held in Budapest, On 29 May 2001, Final Communiqué, especially § 44-49.

EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. The ministers noted that this process does not imply the creation of a European army and that the commitment of national resources for EU-led operations will be based on sovereign decisions.

The meeting reinforced arrangements for:

- assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- the identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and
- the further adaptation of the Alliance's defence planning system.

In the opening statement<sup>17</sup> the Secretary General underlined that there are important synergies when NATO and the EU combine their efforts and that on questions of common concern relating to security, defense and crisis management.

He insisted on four points:

- NATO and EU work on an equal footing
- Coherence in defense planning - no unnecessary duplication
- Participation of non-EU European allies
- Capabilities

Objectives arising from the Alliance's DCI and the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing. Each nation has only one set of forces. Therefore, it would be essential to find processes and arrangements that ensure the coherent development of capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication. For each of the nations concerned, both NATO and EU requirements should have to be met from a single set of forces. This would be necessary especially with respect to the forces and capabilities that Allies could make available for EU-led operations.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Opening Statement By The Secretary General, Nato-Eu Ministerial Meeting, Budapest, Wednesday 30 May 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Ministerial Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee And The Nuclear Planning Group Held In Brussels On 18 December 2001, Final Communique, Para. 5.

## Case Macedonia

The alliance's mission in Macedonia involved small numbers (3,500 soldiers) and a limited objective. Many people in the Slav majority feared that the Western troops will help the Albanian minority gain a grip on power in the country's northern mountains and establish what amounts to a partition. Therefore, NATO officials have insisted on the force's limited goal. The soldiers spent just 30 days picking up weapons relinquished by ethnic Albanian guerrillas and dropped at designated checkpoints to be taken out of the country for destruction. There had been considerable skepticism among Western officials and defense specialists about the chances that NATO would complete its mission and withdraw from Macedonia by the target date in late September 2001. Critics also were concerned that the Albanian guerrillas would avoid surrendering their complete stock of arms and instead cache their best weaponry. But NATO officials, while acknowledging these risks, insisted that even partial disarmament would be a step away from armed insurrection and toward broader political dialogue in Macedonia. The undertaking, dubbed "Operation Essential Harvest" by NATO planners, was essentially a peacekeeping operation of the sort that would once have been executed by blue-helmeted soldiers functioning under the authority of the United Nations. The allied military presence was aimed at supporting a deal already set between the warring factions in Macedonia. Basically, the Albanian guerrillas were supposed to disarm in exchange for greater political power in Macedonia, including more openings for Albanians in the police force and wider use of the Albanian language. Western governments acted on the assumption that the two factions each have an overriding interest in striking a deal.

The NATO forces come from European countries, mainly Britain, with the United States staying out of the front lines for first time in the alliance's history and supplying only indirect help, mainly electronic intelligence. The U.S. administration under Bush did not want to take part in a NATO military mission that the Macedonian government has requested for the disarming of ethnic Albanian insurgents. One of Washington's fears was that American troops involved in disarming the rebels would get caught up in other tasks, which could lead to deeper involvement, including long-term peacekeeping. With no U.S. troops on the ground, the NATO task force had dispensed with tanks and other heavy firepower of the sort normally required by the Pentagon to protect U.S. peacekeepers. British paratroopers made up the core of the force, which also included French Foreign Legion units and small elite units from other European countries. The U.S. decision to let the Europeans take the lead provides "evidence of progress for Europe's ambitions to play a larger defense role, and ensures that we can intervene with the small force that is appropriate," according to Francois Heisbourg.<sup>19</sup>

Following approval of the Operational Plan on 26 September, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to issue the Execution Directive authorising the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joseph Ralston, to release the Activation Order for "Operation Amber Fox." This activation order enables the NATO force for this mission to be deployed. The adoption of this decision is in response to a request by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted by Joseph Fitchett, NEWS ANALYSIS: NATO Stresses Limited Objectives in Macedonia, International Herald Tribune Friday, August 24, 2001

“Operation Amber Fox” has the specific mandate to contribute to the protection of international monitors who will oversee the implementation of the peace plan in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mission is conducted under German leadership with the participation of other NATO nations and will consist of some 700 troops, if necessary together with 300 troops already in the country. In December 2001 NATO extended Operation Amber Fox until March 2002.

The European Union has agreed in principle to take over command of the multinational force deployed in Macedonia from Nato as part of its new regional strategy for the Balkans. The Macedonia operation would be the first full-fledged joint military action under the command of European officers when European forces take charge of peacekeeping in Macedonia summer 2002. Nato sources have expressed concerns that it made no sense for the EU to take over “Amber Fox” since all the alliance's planning, logistics, and command and control structures were already in place. It could remain under North Atlantic Treaty Organization auspices such as access to U.S. satellite intelligence and NATO backup forces in a crisis, however. Yet the European Force will have a very close relationship with NATO that would involve having access to its assets on a case-by-case basis.

### **NATO and Terrorism**

On 12 September, NATO decided that, if it is determined that the attack against the United States was directed from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On September 14 2001 parliamentary leaders from all 19 NATO countries endorsed the action of the North Atlantic Council to declare that the terrorist attack on the United States constitutes an attack on the entire Alliance. They pledged to support NATO governments “in providing the United States any and all the diplomatic, political, and, if required, military means at their disposal in order to deal with the perpetrators of this outrage.” In the statement, the parliamentary leaders supported the declaration by NATO’s governing council that if it is determined that the attack came from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which pledges all Alliance members to collective defence.<sup>20</sup>

For the first time, NATO invoked Article 5<sup>21</sup> of its charter to declare the attacks on Washington and New York as an attack on the 19-member alliance. Article 5 has thus been invoked given that the attack against the United States was directed from abroad. Any collective action by NATO has to be decided by the North Atlantic Council. In practice, this means that there are consultations among the Allies.

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<sup>20</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly, PRESS COMMUNIQUE, 14 September 2001.

<sup>21</sup> In Article 5 of the Washington Treaty:  
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to the situation. This assistance is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each country. Each individual member determines how it will contribute and will consult with the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The Alliance determined that the U.S. had been the object of an armed attack. The Alliance therefore agreed that if it was determined that this attack was directed from abroad, it would be regarded as covered by Article 5. NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

On October 2, 2001 NATO determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.<sup>22</sup>

NATO approved specific military contributions in the campaign against terrorism on October 4. U.S. Requests to NATO include access to alliance members' ports, airspace and airports and the ordering up of naval forces in the Mediterranean. NATO members made available alliance radar aircraft and provide financial aid to Pakistan and other countries involved in the campaign. The aid was essentially a compilation of the kinds of support the United States already has obtained from member states on a bilateral basis, however. France, for example, has agreed to open its airspace and has offered naval and logistics support in the Indian Ocean. Germany said the U.S. request included cooperation on intelligence, protection of U.S. installations in NATO countries, unlimited overflight rights and air space surveillance.<sup>23</sup> The allies also agreed that five NATO AWACS aircraft, together with their crews, will deploy to the United States to assist with counter-terrorism operations.<sup>24</sup> About 3,000 military personnel from 11 NATO nations are assigned to the alliance's multinational airborne warning and control units. The move of NATO AWACS airborne early warning aircraft from their base in Europe to replace U.S. aircraft subsequently being transferred to Asia was more symbolic than militarily significant. This was NATO's first operational deployment in the United States, however. The use of NATO surveillance planes to help guard the skies over the United States was perhaps as important politically as militarily. Some NATO nations wanted to contribute to the war on terrorism, but recognized that it may not be easy or appropriate for their forces to join in attacks on Afghanistan.

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<sup>22</sup> Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, NATO Headquarters, 2 October 2001.

<sup>23</sup> New York Times, Oct. 4, 2001.

<sup>24</sup> Statement By The Secretary General Of Nato George Robertson, Press Release (2001) 138, 8 October 2001. Saceur Statement To Media 9 Oct 01

*SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY FOLLOWING THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 4 OCTOBER 2001*

Following its decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the wake of the 11 September attacks against the United States, the NATO Allies agreed today -- at the request of the United States -- to take eight measures, individually and collectively, to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. Specifically, they agreed to:

- enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures.

The North Atlantic Council also agreed:

- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.

Today's collective actions operationalise Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. These measures were requested by the United States<sup>25</sup> following the determination that the 11 September attack was directed from abroad.

These decisions clearly demonstrate the Allies' resolve and commitment to support and contribute to the U.S.-led fight against terrorism.

NATO's Strategic Concept recognizes the risks to the Alliance posed by terrorism. In para. 24 it poses it in the context of Art. 4 and not Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, however:

“Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider

nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.”

NATO's practical role in this crisis was to be “the principal forum for discussion, consultation and thinking.”<sup>26</sup> So NATO's Article 5 turned into appendix of Article 4 which requires the consultations among allies in the case of crisis. In fact, what NATO did, easily could have been done under Article 4. In this war in Afghanistan not only Article 5 has been transformed, NATO's role definitively became global. After NATO's missions on the Balkans Article 6 of the Washington Treaty that prescribes the territorial limits of NATO operations once more has been broadly interpreted. Although the terror attacks have been carried out on the soil of a member state NATO did not defend its very territory as originally intended for Article 5 operations.

As recruiting new allies from Tunisia to Tajikistan at the beginning of the campaign, the U.S. has shown little interest in making use of NATO, either for its decision-taking capacity or for its military structure.<sup>27</sup> In fact, the U.S. made a much bigger effort to court frontline partners like Saudi Arabia and even Uzbekistan.<sup>28</sup> On October 13 the United States and Uzbekistan announced an agreement that gave the American military flexibility in operating from bases in the former Soviet republic in return for Washington's assurance to protect Uzbekistan's security. The new assurances to Uzbekistan stopped short of the sort of the security guarantee NATO members provide to each other.<sup>29</sup> The commitment to defend a former Soviet republic signaled another major shift in the post-cold war landscape of the former Soviet Union and an expansion of American commitments into Central Asia. NATO was merely one among many choices open to America, which is fully entitled to act alone or to build a new coalition of its own outside NATO.

NATO's 27 Partner countries, ranging from Europe to Central Asia, quickly joined the 19 Allies in a statement similar to that of the NATO-members condemning the events and offering their solidarity with the United States. „We have not seen such a coalition since the struggle against slavery and the defeat of fascism.“ NATO's Secretary General said. This means that the coalition goes ways beyond

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<sup>25</sup> In a speech on 31 January 2002, NATO After September 11, New York, George Robertson, NATO Secretary General spoke one time of an American request (“the US asked for a range of specific measures ...” and one time of an “offer” (“... in the offers made to the United States for its military campaign in Afghanistan.”

<sup>26</sup> George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, quoted in *The Economist*, Oct. 6th, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, the defense secretary did not attend the meeting of NATO's defense ministers on September 26th, 2001.

<sup>28</sup> *The Economist*, Oct. 6th, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 2001.

the members of the alliance.<sup>30</sup> But this broad coalition also has a dark side for NATO. It is not the first and only partner for the U.S. U.S. military might bypass NATO. Paul Wolfowitz,<sup>31</sup> the deputy secretary of defense, said that the Bush administration had decided that "there will not be a single coalition but rather different coalitions for different missions" in which U.S. units will hope to work with local forces against terrorists or regimes that back terror. Altogether there were 50 states involved in the war.

Even though NATO invoked its Article 5 mutual protection clause the United States chose not to act militarily through the alliance. Few European countries have the resources to conduct a war far from home. Few have special forces trained to do surgical missions against targets like terrorist training camps on other continents. NATO members actually had very little to offer the United States, particularly because they largely lack the equipment and resources to fight a war far from home. Instead, the United States called on only a few European allies, finding enough partners to build an international coalition, but avoiding the sometimes clumsy mechanics of the 19-member alliance. At first, the Pentagon was even unwilling to have NATO invoke the alliance's mutual defense clause requiring members to defend one other against an armed attack. As a senior administration official put it: "The fewer people you have to rely on, the fewer permissions you have to get."<sup>32</sup> One reason is that the U.S. was determined to avoid the limitations on its targets that were imposed by NATO allies during the 1999 war in Kosovo, or the hesitance to topple the Iraqi regime that members of the Persian Gulf war coalition felt in 1991. Its use of NATO in a new anti-terrorist configuration to confirmed this American determination to combine maximal allied political support with the greatest possible U.S. freedom of action.<sup>33</sup>

Canada ordered six ships, six aircraft and a special commando unit to join the antiterror coalition. NATO also took the burden off of United States warships in the Mediterranean Sea by proposing to authorize ships in the NATO Standing Naval Force, which consists of frigates and destroyers, to help in force protection and other patrols.<sup>34</sup> Germany pledged 3,900 troops, including Fuchs reconnaissance vehicles, which can detect nuclear, biological and chemical contamination, naval units, flying hospitals and special forces. Despite differing reports in German media there was no official request by the U.S. for these troops.<sup>35</sup> France said it had some 2,000 French troops in the region near Afghanistan anyway. Italy pledged to provide almost 3,000 troops, an aircraft carrier to back up the U.S. fleet off Afghanistan as well as planes, helicopters and land forces with limited combat capabilities. Poland offered Washington special forces, and the Czech Republic proposed

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<sup>30</sup> NATO Secretary General George Robertson's, An Attack on Us All: NATO's Response to Terrorism, Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States, National Press Club, Washington, 10 October 2001.

<sup>31</sup> International Herald Tribune, February 3, 2002.

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in New York Times, Oct. 7, 2001.

<sup>33</sup> Nicole Gnesotto, Preface, in William Hopkins, Enlargement: A New NATO, Chillot Papers 49, Paris, October 2001, vi.

<sup>34</sup> New York Times, Oct. 9 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State, Press Briefing, Nov. 6, 2001.



deploying a chemical warfare unit of some 300 troops. NATO considered also to transport food into Afghanistan in order to find a broader military role while it avoided the complications that come with a multinational military operation.<sup>36</sup>

The participation of German, Italian and other European forces in the Afghan military campaign triggered an intense debate on both sides of the Atlantic about what should happen to the NATO alliance and on the future of trans-Atlantic military relations. But the reality remains that most of the European forces don't have the training or equipment to play more than a symbolic role and the United States was not eager to use either NATO's assets or its formal command structure.<sup>37</sup>

Dominique Moïsi observed that

“NATO looks increasingly like an unlikely casualty of September 11. Its geographic mission and essential purpose were ill-suited to the requirements of the Afghan war. After a gallant start and a theatrical demonstration of European support for the U.S., the alliance was conspicuously ignored by Washington. Out of sheer bureaucratic inertia, Nato will survive. But it seems being transformed into an upgraded type of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with Russian participation.”<sup>38</sup>

In another article Moïsi<sup>39</sup> asked whether the America of Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. defence secretary, the modern equivalent of De Gaulle's France in 1966? His answer is “no”. De Gaulle wanted to maximise France's diplomatic influence and told Nato: "Do it without me". The US, trusting only itself, is telling the alliance: "I can do it without you. Don't call us, we'll call you."

NATO Assembly's President Rafael Estrella pointed out two consequences for NATO.

First, for the force structure:

“We need a security system that is adapted to the actual threats facing us, not the Cold War, and weaponry and armies that are compatible with each other.”

Second, for collective defense:

“We also need, not now, but in the fairly near future, to discuss the assumed and well as the established terms of reference in Article 5 define exactly what we mean from now on by Article

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<sup>36</sup> New York Times, Nov 7, 2001.

<sup>37</sup> New York Times, Nov 7, 2001.

<sup>37</sup> Jackson Diehl, Big Plans for a Fraying Atlantic Alliance in Need of a Mission, The Washington Post, Tuesday, November 13, 2001.

<sup>38</sup> Dominique Moïsi, Early winners and losers in a time of war, Financial Times, November 19, 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Dominique Moïsi, Towards harmonious transatlantic relations, Financial Times, February 10, 2002.

5. That discussion is also a symptom of the profound change in the character of the Alliance which is now upon us.”<sup>40</sup>

And on NATO itself:

“The Alliance itself must assess carefully what role NATO can play. ... NATO is already undergoing a fundamental transition that affects its very nature. The events of September 11 represent a further challenge. As is evident from current developments, the Alliance has experience, expertise and mechanisms that can be brought to bear. But the relevance of terrorism to the existence, workings and missions of the Alliance has to be thought through carefully.”<sup>41</sup>

At the NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels on 18 December 2001 U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld warned that not only the U.S. but also the Europeans could become targets of terrorist attacks:<sup>42</sup>

“As we look at the devastation they unleashed in the U.S., contemplate the destruction they could wreak in New York or London or Paris or Berlin with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. ...But let there be no doubt: In the wake of Sept. 11, we face two equally important challenges. ... First, to prosecute the war on terrorism to its full and successful conclusion, pressing on until terrorists with global reach have been stopped. And second, to prepare now for the next war, a war which could be very different from the war on terrorism we fight today.”

He also said that the cold war's twilight over whether to assign itself missions outside the boundaries of its member nations had been overtaken: "I think the definition of what is in or out of area has really been changed."

NATO Secretary General, George Robertson<sup>43</sup> promised that he will try to meet these requirements:

“What Secretary Rumsfeld has said in warning us that the events of 11 September could as easily happen in other capitals is a lesson that has been taken well on board. And of course we have already declared that an attack on New York and Washington was an attack on every one of the other 18 NATO countries. What are we doing about it? Well, there are a number of areas where we have to address the new capabilities that will be required. Greater intelligence collection and sharing is going to be required if we are going to avoid these things happening again. A whole series of political, legal and economic measures need to be taken

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<sup>40</sup> Interview with President Rafael Estrella, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Press Communiqué, 6 October 2001, Nato Allies "Must Face New World Order."

<sup>41</sup> Rafael Estrella, Speech, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Ottawa, 9 October 2001

<sup>42</sup> New York Times, December 19, 2001.

<sup>43</sup> NATO Secretary General, Lord,Robertson, Transcript of NATO Press Conference, Brussels - 18 December 2001

to make sure that terrorist networks do not get to that level of capability where they can make that threat. We need to invest more in chemical and biological warfare capabilities for our armed forces, but also for our civilian populations. These are some of the areas where NATO will be focussing in the coming months, and these are the areas where people will expect us to make an investment and to make reinforcements so that people can feel as safe now as they did on 10 September.”

And concerning the limitations of NATO territory Robertson said that if evidence that Al-Qeda is operating in, or being supported by, other countries then obviously members of the Alliance would want to look at that evidence and then decide what needed to be done about it.

As a consequence the defense ministers proposed at the meeting new defense postures and plans for improving the Alliance's preparedness against terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. In reviewing NATO's defence plans they agreed to increase the proportion of forces that can be deployed and sustained in operations far beyond Alliance territory.<sup>44</sup> In the State of the Union Address U.S. President, George Bush,<sup>45</sup> named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of "an axis of evil" that threatens America, and he put those countries on notice that the United States will not stand by and let them develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Some observers<sup>46</sup> see these states as possible further targets of the U.S. as the next step in the battle against terrorism overseas. One interpretation of Art. 5 is that it can be carried over to another U.S.-led military operation outside Afghanistan if Washington has compelling evidence to show that the attack also came from another country. NATO's Secretary General, George Robertson,<sup>47</sup> said at the World Economic Forum in New York in February 2002, NATO would not automatically support U.S. efforts to expand the war on terrorism to Iraq, Iran or North Korea, in the absence of "convincing evidence" linking those countries to the September 11 attacks. He also said if there were new attacks the alliance had to take a new decision. His words also can be seen as NATO's continuing commitment to support further operations of the U.S. if there is evidence of the involvement of one of those countries in the September 11 attacks.

### **New NATO-Russia Relationship**

Since the foundation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997 to provide "a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action" NATO-Russia relations have seen many highs and lows. This concerns including the Balkan conflicts, the first Chechen War, NATO's Kosovo campaign, the second Chechen War and now the international coalition's war on terrorism. Despite early optimism, however, it rapidly became clear

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<sup>44</sup> Ministerial Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee And The Nuclear Planning Group Held In Brussels On 18 December 2001, Final Communiqué, Para. 3.

<sup>45</sup> George Bush, State of the Union Address, New York Times, January 30, 2002.

<sup>46</sup> E.g. David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. Is Top Priority, New York Times, January 30, 2002.

<sup>47</sup> George Robertson, NATO's Secretary General, in New York Times, February 2, 2002.

that the PJC was not functioning as intended. For example, the PJC ceased meeting early in 1999, when Russia walked out in protest over NATO's decision to wage an air campaign to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The roots of a better relationship NATO-Russian pre-date 11 September. Already at the beginning of 2000, the appointment of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia paved the way for a new and more constructive relationship and in May of that year the PJC resumed its activities. Since then, despite Western unease with Russia's operations in Chechnya, NATO and Russia have been able steadily to increase the range and number of joint activities. By spring 2001, the PJC's work agenda had expanded to cover a wide range of issues of mutual interest, including ongoing cooperation in and consultation on peacekeeping in the Balkans, discussions of strategy and doctrine, and cooperation in arms control, proliferation, military infrastructure, nuclear issues and theatre missile defences, as well as the retraining of discharged military personnel and search and rescue at sea. Indeed, the programme was almost as broad as the one that existed at the end of 1998. In February 2001, after a year of negotiations, NATO Secretary General George Robertson was able to inaugurate a NATO Information Office in Moscow. It was in this, more congenial atmosphere, therefore, that George Robertson and Russian President Putin had two constructive meetings during the latter part of 2001.<sup>48</sup> In fact, a broad agreement between the United States and Russia on the fight on terrorism was already visible at the OSCE seminar on military doctrines in Vienna in June 2001. There was no concrete proposal for practical cooperation yet, however. At the seminar the Russian delegates still depicted NATO as an purely military alliance. When speaking about 'terrorists' the U.S. delegation thought of Bin Laden and the Russian delegation of Chechnians.

The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and Moscow's subsequent partnership with Washington in fighting terror have given the NATO-Russia relationship additional momentum and urgency. After September 11 NATO does not see Russia as a threat to Europe. Art. 5 was invoked in circumstances that Russia could agree with because the following day, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council issued an equally strong statement along the lines of NATO's Art. 5 Statement, saying that the attack in New York and Washington had been attack on all of us, on civilization, on the democratic values that are now common between Russia and the Western countries as a whole.

NATO secretary general, George Robertson, proposed in November 2001 to give Russia equal status with the alliance's 19 permanent members in devising and executing some policies, a change that probably would bring Moscow into the center of NATO deliberations on terrorism and other issues.

“And, above all, they oblige us to think afresh about the relationship between NATO and Russia. Because one thing should be clear: if we want to come up with any meaningful response to the terrorist menace, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and

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<sup>48</sup> Willem Matser, Towards a new strategic partnership, in: NATO-review, No. 4, Winter 2001, p. 19-21.

other new and emerging threats, we need a solid NATO-Russia relationship.<sup>49</sup> ...We are not talking about Russia joining NATO. And President Putin made it very clear to me in Brussels that Russia does not intend to stand in a queue, applying for NATO membership.”<sup>50</sup>

In December 7, 2001 the NATO-Foreign Ministers decided to create a new “North Atlantic – Russia Council.”<sup>51</sup> The new NATO-Russia body should allow NATO to work “at 20” on issues where there are common interest. It would include Russia as an equal with officials from the alliance’s 19 members in setting some policies which include terrorism, arms proliferation, drug trafficking and peacekeeping seemed likely candidates. To ease concerns that the plan might give Russia a free hand to block NATO actions, the secretary general, George Robertson, stressed once more that Mr. Putin was not seeking either full NATO membership for Russia or a veto over major decisions.<sup>52</sup> The defense ministers of NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council reinforced the formula “joint action at 20.” At their meeting on December 18, 2001.<sup>53</sup>

Since then NATO and Russia have launched a broad range of initiatives in this area. These include, inter alia, regular exchange of information and in-depth consultation on issues relating to terrorist threats, the prevention of the use by terrorists of ballistic missile technology and nuclear, biological and chemical agents, civil emergency planning, and the exploration of the role of the military in combating terrorism. NATO and Russia committed themselves to the further intensification of their co-operative efforts to defeat the terrorist threat.

### **The European Union (EU)**

At the meeting on Petersberg in June 1992 (Germany) the 10 member states of the Western European Union declared their preparedness to „make available units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.” These “Petersberg Tasks” were defined as: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The Petersberg Tasks were subsequently included in the Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union of June 1997 (put into force on May 1, 1999). It states in Art. 17 that „the Union can avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the tasks referred to ....“ These are „humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.“ The Treaty did not merge the WEU and EU. It simply states

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<sup>49</sup> George Robertson, Secretary General, A New Quality in the NATO-Russia Relationship, Speech In Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, 22 November 2001.

<sup>50</sup> George Robertson, Secretary General, Press Conference with NATO, Izvestia Media Center, 18:05, November 22, 2001.

<sup>51</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001, Pa. 2

<sup>52</sup> One day before the meeting U.S. Secretary of defense made an attempt to have “NATO at 20” removed from the draft communique that the 19 foreign ministers (including U.S. Secretary of State Powell) were preparing. The dispute was resolved in favor of the foreign ministers. New York Times December 8, 2001.

that „the WEU is an integral part of the development of the EU ... The EU shall ... foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union ....“ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU shall, according to the treaty, “include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy ... which might in time lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.” Such a decision has to be “in accordance with [the Member States’] respective constitutional requirements.”

Based originally on a Swedish-Finish proposal, the Treaty allows „all (EU) Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.“ Membership in the WEU, therefore, was not necessary to participate in the „Petersberg“ tasks. The EU limited their defence ambitions to crisis management and started to build up separate force structures for this. The federal approach still aims to merge the EU and WEU, and Art. V (collective defence and binding security guarantees of the WEU treaty) should be incorporated into the EU. This would lead to the creation of a new military alliance.<sup>54</sup> Such a radical development is very unlikely and not an option for a very long time.

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced majority voting for decisions concerning the implementation of agreed policies; a procedure for „constructive abstention“; a central policy planning unit to enable EU foreign ministers to develop common analyses; and the post of „High Representative for CFSP“ to act as EU spokesman and interlocutor in foreign and security policy.

The EU after Amsterdam focused on the “Petersberg missions,” including crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action, and peace-enforcement, rather than Art. V operations of the WEU Treaty (collective defence and security guarantees). The following options have been discussed after the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty:

The European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 adopted the two Presidency progress reports on developing the Union’s military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence. The Finish presidency<sup>55</sup> of the EU has set priority to the mandate given by the Cologne European Council to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence by taking the work forward in military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The document stresses that the Atlantic Alliance remains the foundations of the collective defence of its members. The common European Headline Goal has been adopted for deployable military capabilities based on a British and French proposal that called for a European rapid reaction force up to 60,000 troops capable of deployment within 60 days that should

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<sup>53</sup> NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting at the Level of the Defence Ministers, Brussels, 18 December 2001.

<sup>54</sup> The WEU-Treaty prohibits such a development, however. Art. IV states that „recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.“

<sup>55</sup> The Finish Presidency, Presidency Report to the Helsinki European Council Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence: Crisis Management, Helsinki, Dec. 11-12, 1999.

tackle military crises without outside help. The European Council underlined its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO “as a whole is not engaged,” to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. There is some ambiguity on whether the EU first has to ask NATO before it conducts an EU-led operation, however. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. The new defence structure still is strictly intergovernmental, with no role for the European Commission or the European Parliament. Any decision to deploy troops would in practice require the consent of all 15 member states.

A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been established that deals with all aspects of the CFSP including the common European security and defence policy. The Military Committee (MC) will provide for consultation and cooperation between the Member States and give advice and make recommendations through the PSC. The report stresses that the European Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Also, a non-military crisis management mechanism has been established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.

On 20 November 2000 in Brussels the Member States took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. The conference also made it possible to identify a number of areas in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action. The Member States announced their initial commitments in this respect.

This conference constituted the first stage of a demanding process of reinforcing military capabilities for crisis management by the EU with the purpose being to achieve the overall goal set by 2003 but continuing beyond that date in order to achieve the collective capability goals. At the Helsinki European Council the member states had also decided rapidly to identify the collective capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, and had welcomed decisions of that nature already announced by certain member states: \_ to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; \_ to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other member states; \_ to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; \_ to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; \_ to increase the number of readily deployable troops; \_ and to enhance strategic sea lift capacity. This effort will continue. The member states stressed that it remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the European security and defence policy that the European Union's military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the EU is in a position to intervene with or

without recourse to NATO assets.<sup>56</sup> Access to NATO assets is considered vital to the force, which is intended to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo-like trouble spots.<sup>57</sup>

Europe's Headline Goal is to create an autonomous military force under its own command by 2003. This force is to have the necessary equipment, such as command and control, air and sea transport, intelligence availability and logistic and combat support. Such equipment is also required by its members for NATO, which will therefore benefit. But a force of this size could only take on a limited peace-enforcement operation. It would not be able, unaided, to undertake a Kosovo-size intervention, let alone supplant NATO in defending its members. The member states will examine, on a case by case basis, whether the EU actually has the military capacity at the time to undertake this or that operation.

The EU has specifically limited its security aims to peacekeeping, rising at most to peace-enforcement with combat troops if necessary. It has continually stressed NATO's primacy in defence. This is essential for the Union in any case, as no mutual security guarantee is written into the European treaty, nor can one be obtained in the near future. Nor will a force capability be available for such a defence anytime soon.

NATO Secretary General, George Robertson,<sup>58</sup> is very clear in this issue:

“There is, and will be, no single European army. There will be no standing European force. National armed forces will remain just that: national forces, under the command of national governments. Any decision to deploy national forces, on any mission, will remain exclusively the decision of the state concerned: for national, UN or NATO operations. What is being created is a fourth option: EU-led operations, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. It will add another tool to our toolbox of crisis management. A win-win situation for Europe, for NATO and for the transatlantic relationship we all value so highly.”

The Capabilities Improvement Conference on 19 November, 2001<sup>59</sup> constituted a further step in the development of the EU Defence and Security Policy. The Member States agreed on a “European Capability Action Plan” incorporating all the efforts, investments, developments and coordination

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<sup>56</sup> European Union, Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, issued Nov. 20, 2000.

<sup>57</sup> For months, Turkey -- a NATO member and a laggard EU candidate -- has been at odds with the pan-European bloc over its plans to establish a rapid reaction force with guaranteed access to NATO assets in crisis situations. Turkey said EU access to NATO assets should be decided on a case-by-case basis and not permanent as the EU wants, and wants guarantees that it will not be sidelined when the EU deploys the planned force in hotspots in its vicinity. In December, 2001 Turkey officially lifted its veto of an EU-NATO pact that would give the EU assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities. The compromise involves a written promise from the Europeans that they will not intervene in conflicts between NATO allies, diplomatic sources say. A similar pledge was contained in the texts of the now-defunct Western European Union in 1992, when Greece joined the security forum and Turkey was an associate member. Subsequently Greece blocked a NATO decision which wants NATO protection against Turkey.

<sup>58</sup> General George Robertson, Speech by NATO Secretary, at the presentation of the Chesney Gold Medal to Baroness Thatcher, Royal United Services Institute, London, 1 March 2001.



measures executed or planned at both national and multinational level with a view to improving existing resources and gradually developing the capabilities necessary for the Union's activities. In quantitative terms, member states' voluntary contributions confirm the existence of a body of resources consisting of a pool of more than 100 000 troops, around 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships, fully satisfying the requirements defined by the Headline Goal to conduct different types of crisis-management operations. Ground element contributions meet the basic requirements for forces and support and backup resources. Maritime requirements are well catered for. The air capabilities offered meet the quantitative requirements for air defence and ground troop support.

The member states stressed that additional efforts must be made with regard to protecting forces deployed, commitment capability and logistics. The degree of availability of ground elements, operational mobility and the flexibility of the force deployed should also be improved. With regard to command, control, communications and intelligence resources (C3I), Member States are offering a sufficient number of headquarters at the levels of operation, force and component, as well as deployable communications units. In keeping with decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council and subsequent Councils, at this conference Member States have undertaken, on a voluntary basis, to continue improving their military capabilities with a view to boosting development of European crisis-management capabilities.

At the Laeken summit in December 2001, the EU officially declared its 60,000-strong rapid reaction force "capable of conducting crisis-management operations."<sup>60</sup> The "Laeken Declaration" explicitly asks whether the Petersberg tasks should be updated<sup>61</sup> and include for example the fight against terrorism. The heads of states and governments underlined that there is no intention to create a "European Army." Referring to continuing efforts to reach a deal with NATO, the summit statement added: "The Union is determined to finalize swiftly arrangements with NATO in order to enhance its capabilities... Development of the means and capabilities at its disposal will enable the Union progressively to take on more and more complex operations."

The EU leaders in the summit underscored their defense ambitions when they expressed their support of a multinational security force that could deploy in Afghanistan. There was some confusion at the summit whether the EU countries agreed to participate in a multinational force as individuals or as EU members.<sup>62</sup> The contingent of the Europeans to the international force would be 3,000-4,000 troops,

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<sup>59</sup> Statement On Improving European Military Capabilities (issued by the European Union's General Affairs Council with the participation of the Ministers for Defence of the European Union) European Union ; issued Nov. 19, 2001, Brussels, 19 November 2001.

<sup>60</sup> At Laeken the EU failed to agree on an accord on NATO support because of Greece's objections over the relationship the force will have with NATO.

<sup>61</sup> The Laeken Declaration, in The Financial Times, December 15, 2001.

<sup>62</sup> Belgium backed down from the initial announcement that the EU itself would create the force. It was not clear whether it was actually a force of the European Union or just an EU flag put on a multinational force in Afghanistan.

probably headed by Britain. In their final statement<sup>63</sup> the leaders agreed on 'member states of the Union': "Participation of member states of the Union will constitute a strong signal of their willingness to assume their responsibilities in crisis management and thus contribute to the stability of Afghanistan."

The use of European military force will depend on internal and external factors: first, the emergence of new crises in the European region, such as the existence of an authoritarian regime that encourages internal oppression and is responsible for serious destabilisation or aggression; second, the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe in other regions, such as occurred in Afghanistan, Rwanda, East Timor or Sierra Leone; third, the development of the principles of collective intervention and limited intervention, in other words continued Security Council action as an essential peacekeeping instrument.<sup>64</sup>

In October 2001 the Council of the European Union submitted a paper<sup>65</sup> with suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management. It sets down the aim of a crisis management concept (CMC), highlights the broad options, and specifies what action and in what timeframe the PSC is recommended to take to enable the CMC to be developed. In the case where the CMC envisages an EU military role, the CMC provides the framework including political-military objectives for subsequent crisis response military strategic planning. It also sets down the relevant facts of the crisis relating to the development of options. These facts could include the main dynamics of the crisis itself, with reference to conflict prevention indicators as relevant, and the positions taken towards the crisis by the local parties, neighbouring countries, relevant organisations such as NATO and the UN, the OSCE, and by the 15, the 6 and other close partners of the EU as appropriate. It sets down a summary of the key elements of discussions to-date, of the decisions that have been taken and of the first measures that have been initiated, including new or adjusted Community measures. This may include Council and PSC conclusions on the causes and consequences of the crisis, an assessment on the impact and possible future threats to EU nationals and to EU political and material interests and any conclusions that may set general aims or orientation with regard to possible EU action. The Commission will contribute, notably with input from the relevant Commission delegations, to the definition of the political context.

In spite of the achievements and efforts the initial outcome in Afghanistan points up the widening gap in military technology between the United States and European armies, which have not matched investments in high-precision arms and other equipment designed to provide enough mobility to fight in remote theaters such as Afghanistan, including the ability to "suppress enemy air defences" and the provision of heavy-lift aircraft. Dominique Moisi observed, that "now that

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<sup>63</sup> Europäischer Rat Laeken, 14. und 15. Dezember 2001, Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Bulletin 17. 12. 2001.

<sup>64</sup> Martin Ortega, Military intervention and the European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, March 2001, 116.

<sup>65</sup> Council of the European Union, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, October 2001.

Washington has demonstrated the efficiency of its air power, it is the turn of Europe's nations - working together, but not as a single European force - to play the humanitarian role of policeman."<sup>66</sup>

The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London has raised questions as to whether "the relatively low level of defense spending" planned by EU member states is enough for high-level Petersberg tasks by the 2003 deadline to be met. "EU member states currently lack the capabilities necessary to organize, deploy and sustain the rapid reaction force on a long-term, high-level Petersberg task."<sup>67</sup>

### **European shortcomings**

There is a strong argument that European NATO-members should spend far more money on modern arms and equipment to carry their share of responsibility in war. The wars against Iraq, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan had demonstrated the huge disparities between American and European forces and the growing gap between the two forces and its effect on even the most sophisticated armies to react quickly in war.<sup>68</sup> European NATO countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the United States does and they get about 10 percent of the capability.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies<sup>69</sup> reported that European military shortcomings highlighted in Kosovo included "command-and-control, in particular airspace management, secure data and voice communications, targeting procedures and the proper integration of the collection and analysis of intelligence....A major lesson of the campaign was that all participants, particularly the Europeans, held insufficient stocks of all types of precision-guided munitions." 34% of weapons dropped during *Allied Force* – and that 43% refers to actual weapons rather than sorties – were precision guided. 8.160 precision weapons dropped in all, France accounted for 7% (582), Canada 4% (360), Netherlands 3% (280), UK 3% (242), and Spain a little under 2% (149).<sup>70</sup> In Operation "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan 10.000 of the 18.000 bombs, missiles and other ordinance used in the war were precision-guided munitions. Of those 10.000 munitions, about half were laser-guided bombs and half were bombs steered to preprogrammed coordinates by orbiting satellites. In the Gulf war ten aircrafts were necessary for one target, in Afghanistan one aircraft could do targets.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Dominique Moïsi, Early Winners and losers in a time of war, Financial Times , November 19 2001.

<sup>67</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, London, 2001-2001.

<sup>68</sup> E.g. George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Reuters, Aug. 4, 1999.

<sup>69</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, London, 1999-2000.

<sup>70</sup> Andrew Brookes, Hard European Lesson from the Kosovo air campaign, Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, IFS Info 2/2000, 6-7.

<sup>71</sup> General Tommy R. Franks, Armed Services Commitee, New York Times, February 8, 2002.

Figures produced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, at the request of British Foreign Secretary indicated that the European rapid reaction force would not be able to undertake combat operations for at least 10 years.<sup>72</sup>

The WEU recommendations for “Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management” of November 1999<sup>73</sup> already had concluded that the Europeans have available the force levels and resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg Tasks. But it also identified a number of gaps and deficiencies:

- with regard to collective capabilities: gathering and management of information and intelligence including space based imagery, and the analysis of crisis situations; preparation, planning and political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations;
- with regard to forces and operational capabilities: availability, deployability, strategic mobility, sustainability, survivability and interoperability and operational effectiveness; multinational, joint Operation and Force Headquarters, with particular reference to airborne C<sup>4</sup> (command, control and communications) and deployability of Force Headquarters.

Francois Heisbourg<sup>74</sup> proposed a long list of remedies that the Europeans should acquire: professional armed forces, satellite surveillance, military electronics, heavy airlift, precision-guided weapons, and more versatile aircraft.

The NATO Statement on the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in Brussels on 7 June 2001 found that number of particularly critical and long-standing deficiencies exist in the areas of effective engagement and survivability of Alliance forces such as in the areas of suppression of enemy air defence and support jamming; combat identification; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (including the Alliance Ground Surveillance system); air weapons systems for day/night and all weather operations; air defence in all its aspects, including against theatre ballistic missiles and cruise missiles; capabilities against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, and NBC detection and protection; strategic air and sealift, air-to-air refuelling, precision guided ammunition, tactical communication, combat identification, mine countermeasures and cooperative acquisition of logistics stocks.<sup>75</sup>

NATO Secretary General<sup>76</sup> moaned that “mighty Europe remains a military pygmy.” And he goes on:

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<sup>72</sup> AFP 12 January, 2002.

<sup>73</sup> Western European Union (WEU) recommendations for “Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management” of November 1999.

<sup>74</sup> Francois Heisbourg, „L'Europe de la defense dans l'Alliance atlantique,“ *Politique Etrangere* no.2 (Summer 1999).

<sup>75</sup> Statement on the Defence Capabilities Initiative, Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session held in Brussels on 7 June 2001.

<sup>76</sup> George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, speech at the First Magazine Dinner - Claridge's Hotel, London, 24 January 2002.

“(i)f Europe is to play its proper part in NATO and more widely, and if we are to ensure that the US moves neither towards unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities. ... Many have the right skills. But hardly any European countries can deploy usable and effective forces in significant numbers outside their borders, and sustain them for months or even years as we all need to do in today's complex international environment. For all Europe's rhetoric and an annual investment in defence of over \$ 140 Billion by the European members of NATO, we still need US assistance to move, command and provision a major operation.”

### **The technological gap**

As a legacy of the Cold War, the United States can deploy its military forces to distant trouble spots, for example to defend the Persian Gulf. Europe is not in a similar position to project its power. If common vital interests are to be defended jointly, as a 1997 Gombert and Larrabee RAND study<sup>77</sup> suggests, then the U.S. and Europe will have to reorient their military forces from the old mission of territorial defence to the new one of power projection.

John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft ask whether a European strategy of developing technologies internally ever could compete with the United States. Their answer is no.<sup>78</sup> Expert analysis of Europe's security deficiencies has focused almost exclusively on the need to buy high-tech equipment to match U.S. capabilities, or on the need for European intelligence gathering, a corps headquarters, improved command, control and communications, and large transport aircraft.<sup>79</sup> With financial difficulties for many European governments and the absence of a direct threat it is questionable whether Europeans should copy American capabilities, however. Besides, the U.S. wishes to share with its European allies the burden stemming from its own commitments, new security problems and regional crisis-management needs. The US national security establishment's idea of strengthening the European pillar is, as always, simply to place more men and materiel at the disposal of US commanders. Its idea of burden-sharing is to get its allies to take up more of the burden so that it can tell them where to carry it.<sup>80</sup>

The U.S. has become so much more technologically advanced than any of its NATO allies that America increasingly doesn't need them to fight a distant war, as it demonstrated in Kosovo and especially in Afghanistan, where it basically won alone, except for small but important contributions from Britain, Canada and Australia.

Observers ask whether NATO can survive at all:

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<sup>77</sup> David Gombert/Stephan Larrabee (ed.), *America and Europe, A partnership for a New Era*, Cambridge-New York, 1997.

<sup>78</sup> John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, *Saving NATO's Foundation*, *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1999), 55-67.

<sup>79</sup> That the Europeans should be spending more on defense for many Americans imply that much of the spending would be with U.S. firms. But the answer also cannot primarily be “buy American.”

<sup>80</sup> Gerard Baker, *Nato's welcome imbalance in military might*, *Financial Times*, February 6, 2002.

“And when you add to that the unilateralist impulses of the Bush team — which instinctively doesn't want to fight with aid from allies who might get in the way or limit America's room for maneuvers — you have many, many people in Brussels asking whether NATO nations can ever fight together again.”<sup>81</sup>

On the surface, Gerard Baker writes in the *Financial Times*, “the latest spats have centred on European concern at America's gung-ho approach to the war on terrorism. But at their heart they reflect a fundamental and age-old structural flaw in the US-European relationship: the asymmetry of military power within the alliance.” The gap between US and European military capabilities is growing vaster.<sup>82</sup> Defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which measures the share of a country's national income devoted to defense, is a widely cited measure of defense burdensharing. Throughout NATO's 50-year history, the United States has spent a larger share of its GDP on defense than have most of its allies. In 1985, at the height of the Cold War arms buildup, the United States spent 6.7 percent of its GDP on defense, compared with the European allies' 3.5 percent of their collective GDP spent on defense. By 1999, those figures declined to 3.0 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. Two conclusions can be drawn from those figures. First, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, Europeans on the whole spend considerably less on defense than does the United States. Second, the spending gap has narrowed since 1985. The gap between U.S. and European levels of defence spending has narrowed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Yet the U.S. continues to spend 3% of its GDP on defence: 50% more than the average of the five largest EU member states.<sup>83</sup> Germany and Spain, by contrast, spent only 1.5% and 1.3% of their GDP's on defence in 2000: half the U.S. level. All of the NATO allies came closer to matching the U.S. defense commitment in 1999 than they did in 1985.<sup>84</sup>

The United States also spends more per capita on defense than do any of its allies. In 1999, the United States spent \$947 per person on defense (measured in 1995 dollars), more than twice the average of the European allies. Among the major allies, France spent \$780 per person on defense that year, whereas Britain spent \$534, Italy spent \$350, and Germany spent \$490. That gap may reflect both the global nature of American security interests and the United States' leadership role in European security.

U.S. President Bush wants a \$48 billion increase of American military spending in 2003. A Pentagon study of January 2002 forecasts an increase of military spending up to \$450 billion until 2007. U.S. defense spending will equal the defense budgets of the next 15 highest countries — combined. More and more, NATO is being regarded as a political organization, capable of providing military insurance, deterrence and peacekeeping, but not capable, without Washington, of waging a modern war.

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<sup>81</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The End Of NATO*, in *The New York Times*, February 3, 2002.

<sup>82</sup> Gerard Baker, *Nato's welcome imbalance in military might*, *Financial Times*, February 6, 2002.

<sup>83</sup> NATO Press Release, December 2000. In 1985-89, the five largest EU states (West Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) spent an average of 3.1% of their GDP on defence, compared with the U.S.'s 6.0%: a 'gap' equivalent to almost 3% of GDP. By 2000, however, defence spending in the largest EU states had fallen to 2.0% of GDP, compared to U.S. spending of 3.0%.

<sup>84</sup> Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *Nato Burdensharing After Enlargement*, August 2001.

Transporting troops and equipment and a lack of precision-guided munitions were the main European short-comings as the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars demonstrated. The technological gap became first evident during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. European military equipment was significantly inferior to that of the United States in strategic transport and logistics, intelligence, and high-tech weaponry. Problems with compatibility are growing worse as U.S. technology advances. The difference between the U.S. and the European capability to transport an army at will, perhaps the key component for fighting a war in the post-Cold War era, is drastic. The United States is the only NATO country in a position to deploy large numbers of forces well beyond its national borders and sustain them for an extended time. Europeans depend heavily on the United States for force projection, even in places as close as the Balkans. In Kosovo, U.S. intelligence assets identified almost all of the bombing targets, and U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions and launched nearly every precision-guided missile. European forces lacked computerized weapons, night-vision equipment, and advanced communications resources, making it risky to use European aircraft in the campaign.

The campaign in Afghanistan has emphasised a trend with profound ramifications far beyond Afghanistan: growing U.S. military predominance. The gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. The U.S. did 98 percent of the fighting, the British 2 per cent. The campaign had shown the ability of the United States to project power at great distances with relatively small numbers of troops. To attack Afghanistan, a country as far away as it is possible to go without changing hemisphere, the United States deployed aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and various other assets. The precision-bombing campaign conducted by strategic bombers brought the victory over the Taliban.<sup>85</sup> Some 95 per cent of the bombs dropped by the U.S. in Afghanistan were precision weapons, compared with about 6 per cent in Desert Storm in 1991. Moreover, U.S. officials say the Afghanistan war represents a technological leap in precision weaponry even compared with the Kosovo in 1999.<sup>86</sup> But that cannot mean that the U.S. must always take lead for the rest of time.

There is one solution to reduce the tension between the capability gap on the one hand and the European desire for autonomous crisis management: appropriate division of labor. The overwhelming U.S. contribution is war fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. It also implies political capability in the sense of foresight, intelligence, planning, creativity, vision<sup>87</sup> and conflict prevention. Europeans are more designed for peace-keeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. Rather than emphasizing the need to deploy overwhelming force, a key tenet of U.S. military operations European militaries also could concentrate on a policing role in

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<sup>85</sup> Giovanni de Brigant, 2001: The End of Tactical Airpower? December 2001, [www.defense-aerospace.com](http://www.defense-aerospace.com)

<sup>86</sup> Financial Times 8 Dec 2001.

<sup>87</sup> Dieter Mahncke, The Role of the U.S.A in Europe: Successful Past but Uncertain Future? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, Issue 3 (Autumn 1999), 353-370.

which they remain neutral, encourage reconciliation, work with and listen to local leaders and apply military expertise to maximize the impact of civilian authorities and NGOs.<sup>88</sup>

This division of labor already takes place. The European allies are doing their share. While the United States provided more than two-thirds of the aircraft in the campaign over Kosovo and Serbia, in the peacetime aftermath the EU provides five times as many peace-keeping forces as the United States.<sup>89</sup> The United States provided most of the tactical air combat capabilities to end hostilities in the region, while the European allies provided most of the peacekeeping troops. During Operation Allied Force, the spring 1999 NATO air operation in Kosovo, the United States provided 70 percent of the total aircraft and performed more than 60 percent of the total sorties flown, the European nations, EU and non-EU together provided 80 percent of the KFOR forces.<sup>90</sup>

NATO Secretary General<sup>91</sup> recognizes this division of labor what he calls “burdensharing:”

“A key element is the question of greater burdensharing and the Balkans show the way ahead. ... (W)e must encourage the NATO-EU relationship so that the Europeans can take a greater share of the political burden in building peace throughout the Balkan region. The Americans are fully engaged. But the bulk of forces in SFOR, KFOR and Task Force Fox in Macedonia are European. Civil assistance and financial support is also overwhelmingly European.”

Some NATO officials and observers complain that Germany would not fulfil its commitments to NATO and express disappointment about the Bundeswehrs small combat role in Kosovo, or its lacking ability to project force.<sup>92</sup> It is true that Germany avoided major participation in the combat portions of operations in the 1990s. Its contribution to the Kosovo campaign – 14 Tornados – was the smallest of the major Allies, while its opposition to a ground invasion was the strongest. Conversely, Germany has been willing to participate in peace-keeping operations, and has made one of the largest contributions of the major Allies to KFOR.<sup>93</sup> And nearly 90 percent of all such costs in Kosovo are covered by European taxpayers.<sup>94</sup> The repeated complaint that the United States does more than its fair share in global peacekeeping operations is untrue.

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<sup>88</sup> Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 1998, 55.

<sup>89</sup> See Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The U.S. and Europe: continental drift?* *International Affairs* 76, No.1, 2000, 51-59

<sup>90</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

<sup>91</sup> George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, speech at the First Magazine Dinner - Claridge's Hotel, London, 24 January 2002.

<sup>92</sup> Mary Elise Sarotte, *German Military Reform and European Security*, Adelphi Paper 340, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 2001, especially 59, 62 and 66.

<sup>93</sup> James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 333, New York, 1999, 75-76.

<sup>94</sup> Overall, of the roughly 40,000 troops currently deployed in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, the United States deploys well under 1 percent.



As to the war in Afghanistan the United States sought to avoid military obligations in Afghanistan once its mission to defeat the Taliban government and destroy Al Qaeda's terrorist network was over. U.S. The United States was not part of the formal peacemaking and peacekeeping force after Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, his terrorist organization, were defeated. Britain took the lead of the security force of the U.S.A. and of foreign soldiers deployed in and around Kabul. Britain was favored because it is capable of deploying its troops quickly. At the European Union summit in Laeken, Belgium, December 14 the European Union announced it was willing to participate in a UN-mandated multinational force in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan force was crucial in bringing in relief supplies as winter set into Kabul.<sup>95</sup>

This examples demonstrate that there is a possibility to play a leading role in a peace-keeping operation and at the same time being limited involved in combat operations. EU-member states have neither the financial nor the organizational means to match U.S. efficiency and effectiveness. Instead, they should concentrate on aspects in which they have a comparative advantage. If Europeans want to copy the U.S.-capabilities it would divert attention from other external functions in which they undoubtedly excel. Europeans know to deal with the "softer" aspects of security, such as crisis prevention, development aid and disaster relief. The EU-members have all the resources – money, technical know-how and long-standing diplomatic and commercial links – to alleviate poverty and reduce ethnic and political tensions in those countries that are most in need. The United States, by contrast has neither the resources nor the know-how to perform such tasks. Europeans should not waste its energies on unrealistic defence capabilities. Their comparative advantages lie elsewhere. Smaller scale-operations can be conducted as autonomous European operation without deployment of NATO assets and capabilities.

The increased importance of crisis management operations not only has repercussions for the type of equipment procured for what is sometimes a wide diversity of operations, but also for the operating costs, as severe demands are placed on the equipment during the various deployment. European states should not want more than they can control. They are not able to prepare for all: war fighting, high-intensity combat, enforcing and making peace, peace-keeping, resolving conflicts and participating in humanitarian and rescue operations. While some militaries would like to get the equipment for this entire range of conflict contingencies, it is the involvement in low-intensity and soft security operational missions that are most appropriate for European states, rather than high-intensity conflicts against opponents using traditional forces and strategies. High technology equipment forces are not only not essential for soft-security and peace-keeping missions but also not very helpful. Most highly developed military technologies are poorly designed to be used in crisis response operations. Advanced technologies based on absolute information<sup>96</sup> to increase the ability to strike with precision

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<sup>95</sup> The "coalition of the willing" of the 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) include contingents of Sixteen countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.. Belgium and Bulgaria are planning to join the Force.

<sup>96</sup> Simulation centers like MITRE in Boston create virtual enemies and develop digital war fighting strategies based on the idea of absolute information. For them it is not important what capacities an enemy really has but what it might have. What counts is not what an enemy thinks but what it might think.

over great distances and with great accuracy are not relevant to these missions.<sup>97</sup> The Pentagon has been striving to reduce to a few minutes the gap between information being received and weapons being fired. The Afghan campaign reinforced this effort.

These technologies and correspondingly trained militaries are narrowly focused on high-end warfare - as used in the operation against the Republic of Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan- are incapable of intervening in conflicts that require militaries trained for humanitarian action and peace-keeping. The technological requirements of advanced technology, combined with the emphasis on sensing equipment, simply do not translate well into low intensity conflicts, and may even be counterproductive in some cases.

### **The United States and Peacekeeping**

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has underwritten large portions of peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, Cambodia, Mozambique and many other countries.

Already former U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen<sup>98</sup> admitted in mid-1999: "Peace-keeping is not (our) primary mission. Peace-keeping involves a different type of training and capabilities. There has been some gap ... the training for the peace-keeping mission which is not necessarily consistent with the war-fighting mission we've had in the past."

During the election campaign, in October 2000 presidential candidate George W. Bush proposed to tell NATO that the United States should no longer participate in peacekeeping in the Balkans, signaling a major new division of labor in the Western alliance. The new Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld<sup>99</sup> said in January 2001:

"Clear criteria for the use of U.S. military forces should be established prior to U.S. participation in specific peacekeeping operations. There should be clear objectives, a coherent strategy to achieve them, a reasonable chance of success, acceptable command-and-control arrangements, and an exit strategy. When the main burden of the U.S. presence shifts to infrastructure and nation-building, however, we are into missions that are not appropriate for the U.S. military."

Under this arrangement, peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo would become a European responsibility, as could peacekeeping in other conflicts. The United States, in contrast, would focus on deterring and fighting wars in the Persian Gulf, Asia and other distant trouble spots. The United States

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<sup>97</sup> Paul Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman, „Pursuing the real revolution in military affairs: Exploiting knowledge-based warfare,“ National Security Studies Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3 (Summer 1998), 4.

<sup>98</sup> Quoted in Peacekeeping Undermines U.S. Combat Readiness, Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 July 1999.

<sup>99</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, Written Answers to Questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee in conjunction with his Confirmation Hearing, January 11.


would concentrate on on fighting or deterring wars in the Gulf and Asia while turning peacekeeping duties over to European countries.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Rumsfeld's skepticism toward peacekeeping appeared to be part of a broader shift in thinking of Defense Department civilians that puts more emphasis on the planning for major wars, and the development of new high-technology weapons to fight them, and less emphasis on relations with allies and the use of American forces to maintain order in a tumultuous post-cold-war world.

Such a policy would lead to a clear cut division of labour (TABLE 1):

**TABLE 1: Division of Labour**



These remarks fed European anxieties that the Bush administration has a penchant for taking actions unilaterally without consulting its allies.<sup>101</sup>

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.<sup>102</sup> took a different stance, however:

“The choice before us is not between fulfilling our peacekeeping commitments or maintaining our military readiness. We can afford to do both. Promoting regional peace and stability -- including deployment of U.S. forces as peacekeepers -- is one of the best ways to ensure that our ability to fight and win a major war will not be tested. The key to retaining the finest military force in the world will be rigorously prioritizing where we allocate resources.”

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<sup>101</sup> Washington Post, May 24, 2001. See also New York Times and Washington Post, October 20 – 25, 2000. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said that United States forces would remain in the Balkans as long as NATO required. The secretary reassured the allies at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Budapest in May 2001 that the United States did not intend to pull its peacekeeping troops out of the Balkans, despite suggestions by Mr. Rumsfeld that the military work in Bosnia is over and that the Americans troops ought to go. “We went into this together and we’ll come out together.” New York Times, May 30, 2001.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph Biden, The Need For Bipartisanship In Foreign Policy, U.S Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Volume 6, No. 1, 22-24, here 23.

With 18,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia, including 3,100 U.S. soldiers, in December 2001 Rumsfeld proposed a reduction of about a third what would reduce the force by about 6,000 troops. There are a total of 57,000 peacekeepers in the Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, 8,800 of whom are Americans. "But for all the strain that peacekeeping is said to cause the military, the really striking thing is not how large the numbers are but how small."<sup>103</sup>

American complaints over unequal burden sharing also ignore Europe's far greater contribution to the United Nations budget 37 percent of the overall budget, and 39 percent of the peacekeeping budget. Also unmatched is European assistance to the economic reconstruction of central and eastern Europe, development assistance in Africa and Asia, and aid to Egypt and the Palestinian Authority for an Arab-Israeli peace process defined and controlled by the United States. For Europeans, shared burdens and shared responsibilities ought to go together. "An American stance that defines strategy in terms of American leadership but fails to pay for that privilege risks losing the respect and support of U.S. allies."<sup>104</sup>

Bush's little enthusiasm for rebuilding other nations plays into the debate within the administration over the American role in postwar Afghanistan. U.S. unwillingness to contribute troops for the security force reflects a broader disinclination to see its armed force involved in "constabulary" duties and "nation-building". This scepticism is augmented by concern that, as the proven military superpower, its troops would become choice targets. The cost of fighting the war in Afghanistan has cost the U.S. tens of billions of dollars. The United States<sup>105</sup> said it would help to shape the political and economic future of the country, but has no intention of participating in an international security force that would face the task of bringing stability to Afghanistan. The United States military task would be limited to prosecute the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In this case that once the Taliban was defeated and Al Qaeda rooted out, the American military role would end. The U.S. involvement did not end. It further provided airlifts, logistics, air cover, surveillance and intelligence.<sup>106</sup> After touring the shattered capital of Afghanistan and talking to its temporary leaders in January 2002, Joseph R. Biden Jr. said that the United States should take part in a multinational military force to restore order to this country.<sup>107</sup> In one way or the other the U.S. is being forced to consider a bigger American role allowing a power vacuum in a lawless Afghanistan, which eventually made it ripe for terrorists.

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<sup>103</sup> William Langewiesche, Peace is hell, The Atlantic Monthly, Boston, Oct 2001.

<sup>104</sup> William Wallace, Europe, The necessary partner, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001.

<sup>105</sup> Quoted in The New York Times, Nov. 28 2001.

<sup>106</sup> Though the administration officially is not willing to take part in in the multinational stabilization force in Aghanistan, the work of American Special Forces involves teaching military professionalism to tribal warriors, and helping establish a civilian security force. Soldiers of the Special Force are helping reconstruct a civic fabric. They patrol the marketplace in Kandahar, assist relief agencies setting up shop or train local security forces at a base camp near Kandahar. Special Forces teams are trained to find their way through a complicated social network of tribal loyalties and tensions, of religious restrictions and inspirations. Special Forces assess the city's health care, checking international relief efforts. Probably, the Special Forces are doing what United States troops abroad have regularly done: as a sort of diplomatic missions in the former combat zone imprinting images of America. - New York Times, January 13, 2002. - Also U.S. troops started to disarm civilians.

<sup>107</sup> New York Times, January 13, 2002.

Obviously the U.S. administration preferred "some sharing of the burden or division of labor," with other countries taking responsibility for security. For the U.S. president, the top priority of reconstruction is to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a terrorist haven. It means immediate assistance to demobilized soldiers, helping them return to the countryside as farmers and animal herders instead of reverting to lawlessness that would undermine the nascent Afghan interim government. Yet even as relief operations and reconstruction plans began, the administration continued to make the war effort its top priority. The U.S. wanted to keep the overall command of all foreign troops in Afghanistan, including the British led multinational peacekeeping force to avoid any interference in the continuing American military campaign.

The price, by World Bank estimated, could be more than \$10 billion for the first five years alone, to rebuild schools and roads and communications systems, create a health system, attack the narcotics problem and underwrite the new government, especially the police and justice system to ensure the rule of law. The United States contributes one-fourth of a peacekeeping mission's costs and contributes up to one-third of reconstruction costs with Europe paying one-third and the rest of the world, led by Japan, picking up the final third.<sup>108</sup>

#### **Qualified division of labor**

Civil conflicts over the past decade have brought a growing number of peace enforcement operations, increasingly varied in their nature and often needing more robust means than standard UN operations. In contrast to traditional UN forces - lightly armed and loosely knit, sent by agreement between two sides to guarantee ceasefires - these missions involve heavier protection, tighter command structures and greater military participation in the initial decision-making. The gap is growing between UN ceasefire-policing missions, in which the U.S. allies have had a relatively low profile, and the ad hoc coalitions formed for more dangerous environments, which it mostly dominates.

The European states are developing the reaction forces needed to carry out new missions. Modernizing their equipment that is generally less sophisticated than U.S. equipment is likely to strain current defense budgets. One solution is to increase defense budgets, but there appears to be little sentiment in Europe for such a step. Instead, the major European militaries could restructure existing forces to perform new out-of-area missions without substantial increases in defense spending. In addition they may signal a greater reliance on the U.S. to provide actual military capability while they focus on the "soft" aspects of security, such as foreign assistance and peacekeeping.<sup>109</sup>

Through the EU's Headline Goal for military forces, governments are also committed to developing capabilities for limited Europe-only military operations when the U.S. has chosen not to be involved. Yet these requirements will not require Europe to develop forces comparable, in overall capability, to those of the U.S.

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<sup>108</sup> New York Times, December 18, 2001. The UN estimates Afghanistan needs up to \$15 billion for emergency rehabilitation over the next two years. Financial Times Januar 14, 2002.

<sup>109</sup> Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Nato Burdensharing After Enlargement, August 2001.

At the American Enterprise Institute Washington on D.C. March 7, 2001 NATO Secretary General George Robertson<sup>110</sup> stopped short of proposing a division of labor. He just did not mention the term but he suggested that Europeans should engage in „minor European security problems“ and Europeans should handle „small-scale crisis;“ NATO would be for the bigger jobs.

“Building European military capabilities has to be matched with building the institutional role - distinct from, but closely linked to NATO - in order to create a European option for handling small-scale crises. That is why ESDI is focused on the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks.’”


There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. Of course, the Europeans and Americans will have to share burdens, risks and responsibilities in non-Art. 5 areas and European states will have to improve their ability to contribute militarily to the protection of common interests. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation.<sup>111</sup> As Europeans should keep and develop some war-fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end Peace Support Operations. They should not be reduced to war-fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations (TABLE 2). A small presence is different from no presence at all and the Pentagon can train at least some peacekeepers.

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<sup>110</sup> George Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, Trans-Atlantic Relations - Overcoming New Challenges, The American Enterprise Institute Washington, D.C. March 7, 2001. Robertson wants to avoid a division of labour within NATO, however: “We must ensure that the burdens, the costs and the risks are shared equally.” George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, Speech “New Security and Defence Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic Area, Centro Caixa - Barcelona, 10 May 2001. There is some contradiction since 11 of the European NATO-members contribute also to the „headline goal“ of the EU.

<sup>111</sup> This would meet the requirements of the Laeken statement of the European Union that the EU should be capable to carry out crisis management operations of the whole range of Petersberg tasks. Europäischer Rat Laeken, 14. und 15. Dezember 2001, Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Bulletin 17. 12. 2001.

**TABLE 2: Qualified Division of Labour**



Such a qualified division of labor would allow the U.S. on the one hand to concentrate resources on its core competences in long-range precision strike, rapid force projection and global surveillance and reconnaissance. Investment could focus on the capabilities needed for rapid deployment, offensive combat operations and force projection, to halt invasion, establish a presence in a peace-support operation or fight in a regional conflict. At the same time, the U.S. could reduce its investment in those capabilities needed to sustain peace-support operations, and would plan to withdraw the bulk of its forces shortly after the objectives of a combat operation had been met.

The Europeans on the other hand could choose to cancel costly modernization programs.<sup>112</sup> The Europeans would also have to keep up a force large and heavy enough to protect itself during peace-support operations, to control the escalation of violence and sustain and replenish itself during an operation that could last for several years. Force projection, tactical reconnaissance and ground surveillance, specialist units, rather than high-speed transport aircraft, could be planning units.

James Thomas applies a certain role specialization and division of labour not only to the transatlantic relations but it is a pattern that can be useful for the European countries themselves. Division of labor should be based on the unique political and military advantages and inclinations of each individual state. Although they cannot with any certainty predict the contingencies that they will face, the states can anticipate the roles that they would be most willing to play, and the phase of an operation for which they would be best suited. It is neither necessary nor affordable that each country maintains a

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<sup>112</sup> James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 333, New York, 1999, 68-82.



full range of capabilities for high- and low-intensity tasks. A certain division of labor would allow each country to narrow down their national planning priorities, while continuing to meet minimal defense requirements for combat capabilities. Countries could build forces and frame modernisation programmes to exploit their comparative advantages. Those better at spearheading the combat phase of a coalition operation, for example, would place greatest emphasis on air-power and special forces, air-mobile ground forces, information operations, stand off/precision strike, target acquisition, rapid strategic transport by air and aerial-refuelling capabilities. Countries with a comparative advantage peace-keeping operations would require a pool of differently trained and deployable personnel. They could provide specialists such as linguists, engineers, mine-clearers, military police, and civil-affairs and medical personnel; higher-capacity sealift rather than faster airlift; forces and equipment to prevent any escalation of violence or renewal of war.<sup>113</sup>

Looking at the special function and capabilities of European States, role specialization, differences in resources and different national politics on defense issues make complementarity a more desirable goal than similarity.<sup>114</sup> During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, for example, the United States provided significant air combat capabilities and equipment, while France provided specialty aircraft to assist in night-flight strike missions and search-and-rescue missions. Further, the United Kingdom played an important role in Bosnia to monitor checkpoints and cease-fire lines, and to lead nation-building activities involving joint civilian and military units. Italy's Carabinieri represent the preponderance of NATO's constabulary forces in the Balkans. For example, Italy provides about 75 percent of the almost 500 special constabulary forces used in Bosnia and more than 80 percent of the 320 used in Kosovo. In the war in Afghanistan the allied contribution was confined to providing air bases overflight rights and British and Australian special forces. Few NATO allies had the capacity to provide more sophisticated equipment, such as precision-guided munitions, in sufficient numbers or at all. Even France, one of the leading European contributors of precision munitions during Operation Allied Force, depleted its supply and spent about \$100 million to purchase additional ones from the United States.<sup>115</sup> The U.S. prefers spearhead high-intensity offensive operations anyway, and is more reluctant than its European partners to engage in long-term peace support operations.

The terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 reinforced this trend. The Europeans will have to find extra troops for the Balkans while the American troops concentrate on fighting elsewhere (e.g. in Afghanistan). The events supported the European aspirations of military self-sufficiency.

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<sup>113</sup> James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 333, New York, 1999, 72-82.

<sup>114</sup> As a general argument see Gordon Adams, „Convergence or Divergence?: The Future of the Transatlantic Defence Industry.“ Paper presented at the Colloquium „*Peace by Pieces or Pieces of Peace: The Future of European Security*,“ European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht (NL), 118-19 November 1999.

<sup>115</sup> GAO United States General Accounting Office Report to the Congressional Committees, *European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe*, November 2001, 56-57.

Division of labour does not necessarily mean that “Europeans do Europe, the U.S. do the world,” however. Nor does it mean the “Europeans make the peace and the U.S. make war.” And the Americans do not “do the cutting edge while the Europeans are stuck at the bleeding edge, if the Americans fight from the sky and the Europeans fight in the mud” as George Robertson<sup>116</sup> is afraid of. It is not even the case as Dominique Moïsi<sup>117</sup> argues that “ the U.S. fights ... and the European Union funds.”

It means that the EU members concentrate more on the smaller-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum and the U.S. participates in the more demanding crisis. Modern defense, organized in a multinational framework, implies that European countries provide for particular operations that fit into that multinational framework. However, if the Europeans take care of Europe the U.S. would be free to redirect its energies toward its ‘global campaign’ against terrorism.<sup>118</sup>

In contrast to the U.S.'s close relationships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, European powers retain no significant military commitments in East Asia. EU governments also tend to be less willing than the U.S. to spend more for the possibility of threats (including weapons of mass destruction and missiles) that may emerge from states such as Libya, Iraq and Iran. European governments may be willing to devote some additional military resources in response to humanitarian emergencies outside their immediate neighbourhood (as in East Timor and Sierra Leone), but such commitments are likely to remain relatively limited in scale.

Europeans also make disproportionate contributions to non-military aspects of security. European governments spend three times as much as the U.S. on development assistance, contribute about twice as much to the UN budget, and have a much better record in combating global warming. The European allies provided most of the development assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and to the states of the former Soviet Union, providing about \$47 billion of the \$71 billion disbursed from 1990 through 1999.<sup>119</sup>

Malcolm Chalmers argues that Europeans can best promote U.S. international engagement by themselves meeting more of the costs of international security. His report examines claims of ‘free-riding’ by providing the facts across burden-sharing regimes - from the U.S.'s unparalleled military might to Europe's contributions to peacekeeping, development aid, multilateral institutions and tackling global warming. Chalmers argues that Europe should seek to reshape the transatlantic debate by focusing less on U.S. shortcomings and more on meeting its own responsibilities. He sets out the constructive European agenda which - through concrete reform on European security, multilateral

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<sup>116</sup> International Herald Tribune, February 3, 2002.

<sup>117</sup> Dominique Moïsi, Towards harmonious transatlantic relations, Financial Times, February 10, 2002.

<sup>118</sup> Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 2001, 60.

<sup>119</sup> GAO United States General Accounting Office Report to the Congressional Committees, European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe, November 2001, 5.

reform and development - could reshape the transatlantic debate and create a more effective division of international labour.<sup>120</sup>

### **Requirements for the Armed Forces**

To understand the military requirements of the 21st century, it is important to examine the nature of the threat in Europe, and ways in which that threat can be met. The basic questions for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be: What are armed forces for? What will the threats in Europe be? What has to be done to meet these threats? What are the probabilities of the threats and risks, and what are the priorities? What is the soldier for? What are his duties and how should he be trained so that he can perform them? How can the basic need to prepare for major conflict (which is always possible but not immediately probable) with the requirements of today's security tasks reconciled? What sort of an army will be needed to meet the new security demands? Is that what is needed a regular, fully professional army?

The wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan definitely indicated the new requirements for future armies: a smaller force with high-technology weapons, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and battlefield awareness and communications equipment based on internet technologies. Most of the new weapons involve the use of sensing satellites that are linked to long-range, pilotless missiles or drones, and highly sophisticated reconnaissance systems. While the proposals and technologies vary, the aim is to obliterate targets from afar, and with little risk to military personnel.

The U.S. war in Afghanistan highlighted the shift in the way modern wars are being fought, with sophisticated arms technologies overtaking tanks and helicopters as the U.S. military's weapons of choice. Efforts to avoid civilian casualties and U.S. troop deaths have forced military commanders to rely increasingly on precision-guided bombs, sensitive communications equipment and other high-technology weapons. Afghanistan highlighted not only the need for pilotless aircraft but also for long-range bombers that did not depend on the availability of nearby American air bases. It underscored the importance of light, mobile ground forces, special operations teams and Navy surface ships and submarines that can launch planes and cruise missiles. Future phases of the war on terrorism, whether in the Middle East, Africa or Southeast Asia, are likely to bear a closer resemblance to the conflict in Afghanistan than to the cold-war clashes for which the latest generation of weapons systems were designed.

The Afghanistan campaign underlined American supremacy over the rest of the world. In December 2001 U.S. President Bush<sup>121</sup> outlined a sweeping agenda for the transformation of U.S. forces and also intelligence agencies arguing that the war in Afghanistan provided "the new first glimpse of a new American military."

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<sup>120</sup> Malcolm Chalmers A Transatlantic New Deal, What Europe should pay to promote U.S. engagement, Policy Brief, No 2. Europe and the Bush Presidency, The Foreign Policy Centre, January 2001. Malcolm Chalmers, Sharing the burdens and priorities, in *International Affairs*, Volume 77, No. 3, July, 569-586.

<sup>121</sup> Bush's Speech at The Citadel, Full Text New York Times (online), December 11, 2001.

“This revolution in our military is only beginning, and it promises to change the face of battle. Afghanistan has been a proving ground for this new approach. These past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine in high- tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict. The brave men and women of our military are rewriting the rules of war with new technologies and old values, like courage and honor. ... Our commanders are gaining a real-time picture of the entire battlefield, and are able to get targeting information from sensor to shooter almost instantly. Our intelligence professionals and Special Forces have cooperated in battle-friendly Afghan -- with battle- friendly Afghan forces, fighters who know the terrain, who know the Taliban, and who understand the local culture. And our Special Forces have the technology to call in precision airstrikes, along with the flexibility to direct those strikes from horseback in the first cavalry charge of the 21st century.”

President Bush lauded the role unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator and precision-guided bombs have played in the war. In fact, the war in Afghanistan will be remembered as the breakthrough towards a “smart-bomb war.”

In January 2002 US-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld<sup>122</sup> urged

“new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting.” The challenge in this new century is “to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand will be the unexpected. ... We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us.”

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was about was “more than building new high-tech weapons,” he said, it was about the creative use of existing weapons and personnel, like the Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan who, riding horseback, called in precision missile strikes from Air Force, Marine and Navy jets. He added that the Pentagon does not have enough manned reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, command-and- control aircraft, air-defense capabilities, chemical and biological defense units, as well as certain types of Special Operations forces.

The war in Afghanistan accelerated only a process already in place. On September 8, 1999 George Bush had articulated in a speech during the presidential campaign a need for the American armed forces that abandoned cold-war rethoric about traditional military might. Bush called for greater emphasis on stealth technology, precision strike weapons and defense against cyberwarfare.

In a speech on February 13, 2001 President Bush<sup>123</sup> said that he planned to break with Pentagon orthodoxy and create “a new architecture for the defense of America and our allies,” investing in new technologies and weapons systems rather than making “marginal improvements” for systems in which America’s arms industry has invested billions of dollars. He said:

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<sup>122</sup> US Department of Defense, issued Jan. 31, 2002 and The New York Times, 31 January, 2002.

<sup>123</sup> New York Times February 13, 2001.

“We do not know yet the exact shape of our future military, but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain. In the air, we'll be able to strike across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems.”

In the 1999 Kosovo war, targets could be bombed precisely almost every time, but there was nobody on the ground to identify moving targets for aircraft overhead. As a result, only buildings and infrastructure could be destroyed, not the Serbian forces terrorizing Kosovo's Albanians into flight. There were local allies--the loose bands of the Kosovo Liberation Army--but there were no advisor teams to channel supplies, to motivate and coordinate and to ensure close air support. Edward Luttwak observes that “with or without local allies, the new synergy of elite forces with air power has become the essential military instrument of today.”<sup>124</sup>

In 1999 David Robertson<sup>125</sup> collected together the requirements of the future soldier based on the changing conditions of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA):

1. Be fully competent with high tech weaponry.
2. Be capable of extremely sophisticated intervention operations where an absolute minimum of violence will be permitted and enormous restraint will be required against an opponent who will not be so restricted.
3. Be capable of commanding small units in isolation.
4. Be prepared for lengthy deployments not only away from home but also from central well equipped bases.
5. Be prepared to do all this under intense and critical media attention for what may seem like small and undramatic successes.
6. Maintain throughout this a warrior orientation allowing where necessary maximum and rapid use of violence.
7. In general accept a continual civil-political control at a detailed, even routine level of activity.

Andrew Richter<sup>126</sup> summarized the requirements of both defence and security which future armed forces are likely to face:

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<sup>124</sup> Edward Luttwak, A Military's Power Isn't in the Numbers, Los Angeles Times January 10, 2002. Luttwak argues that precision munitions and elite forces are cheap because fewer are needed. Therefore the Europeans could afford them if they gave up their large numbers of soldiers. Luttwak is right saying that European armies need restructuring. To catch up with the Americans by buying precision munitions and training elite units would not be enough. Expensive is the intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and Control and Communication that you need for their use. It is like to use a fighter jet without its electronic.

<sup>125</sup> Robertson, David, Modern Technology and The Future of the Soldier, in Heinz Gärtner/Adrian Hyde Price/Erich Reiter, European New Security Challenges, Boulder 2001.

- The capacity for mobilization to meet unforeseen threats and to provide a reserve, but with a long warning time (more important for some countries than for others).
- The ability to deploy rapidly out-of-area and to operate there for sustained periods (necessitating a greater proportion of defence effort put on logistical and support functions).
- Interoperability of the participating forces at both the highest political-military levels of decision-making and at military operational and tactical levels (including English language capability).
- A high standard of education and training for both officers and soldiers.
- The ability to call on a wide range of administrative skills (eg, running hospitals, transport systems, etc.).
- Acting as a policing force.
- Maintaining a new basis for motivation and morale to support the above - different from and more demanding than defending the homeland.

The battlefields of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are almost certain to be in countries without large standing armies, air forces or navies, where overwhelming force will be less essential than swiftness and maneuverability and where austere conditions or inaccessible, rugged terrain will require self-sustaining units. Maximum military effort is no longer achieved through huge formations of conscripted soldiers operating mass-produced weaponry. Instead it increasingly requires a small elite of highly skilled professionals operating extremely sophisticated technology.<sup>127</sup>

The result is a requirement for three new sorts of military professional:

- For high-intensity warfare there is a need for highly skilled technosoldiers, operating the sophisticated information technology and standoff weapons systems being developed in the RMA.
- Secondly for the complementary ground combatants capable of direct high-intensity combat on the ground, defeating remaining enemy ground forces and taking and controlling terrain in short but possibly intense and violent campaigns.
- Finally peacekeeping operations require a third type of soldier, also consisting of infantry, but in trained and equipped for the very different policing missions. This type of police-soldier needs to become part of the community, deal with the complex local human relations and endure in this role for a long time. In both of the last two cases there is a need for relatively small (compared to earlier national defence forces) professional infantry forces. But in the first case primarily for disciplined killers and in the second case primarily for policemen.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Andrew Richter, *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Impact on Canada; The Challenge and the Consequences*, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia (Working Paper No. 28), March 1999, 36-50.

<sup>127</sup> Chris Donnelly, *Shaping soldiers for the 21st century*, in: *NATO review*, Vol. 48 - No. 2, Summer - Autumn 2000, 28-31.

<sup>128</sup> Thomas Ries, *Future Military Doctrines and Foreseeable Challenges*, Paper prepared for the Seminar on Military Doctrines and Defense Policies in the OSCE Area, Vienna 12 June 2001.

There is not only a contradiction between the traditional armies and the RMA but also between peace-keeping missions and the use of advanced technologies that are intended to reduce the need for forces on the ground. Such technologies are generally ill-suited to these missions. Heavy airlift, precision targeting, absolute battlefield information, an advanced command and control system do not have much relevance in environments where there is no war against an enemy with mass armies and heavy weapons.<sup>129</sup> The RMA primarily has an impact on high-intensity warfare. But the impact of the RMA at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict is far less. The RMA is not sufficient in itself to conduct peacekeeping operations, where the emphasis again is upon ground forces closely interacting with the local populations. The RMA as yet provides neither contact with local inhabitants nor endurance. In fact in many ways it is the very antithesis of these qualities. Devoting large sums of money to this advanced military technology would undermine commitments to peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. TABLE 3 shows that advanced technology is less relevant in low-intensity conflict and soft-security missions.

**TABLE 3: Military Technology and Peace Operations**

Low	MILITARY TECHNOLOGY	high
Soft security, humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping	Peace-implementation, Peace-enforcement	Conventional War

Source: Heinz Gärtner

Whereas ten years ago, national security was chiefly measured in military might, today that is only one of several units of measurement and, for most countries, one of the least immediate. Most of the threats do not call for a traditional military response but require investment in crisis management facilities. The pressure on defence budgets can in some cases be counter-productive to urge countries to spend more on traditional weaponry, if what they really need is a police-soldier, both for their own security and to contribute to international security operations.

Chris Donnelly concludes in the “NATO-review” that tomorrow’s soldiers will have to be more flexible, better trained and better educated than its predecessors, and forces will have to be capable of rapid, decisive, and sustained deployment abroad. This requires changes in security thinking and it implies changes in overall security investment. European military capabilities are not just an issue of new equipment, new command, control and communication structures or logistics mechanisms. It is also a question of the skills and abilities of the soldiers, sailors and airmen themselves.<sup>130</sup>

NATO-Secretary George Robertson<sup>131</sup> recognizes this trend:

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<sup>129</sup> This does not mean that some advanced technologies are not helpful for soft security operations, e.g. mine-sweeping, counter mortar capabilities, technologies that can demobilize individuals without casualties, peace-keeping simulation.

<sup>130</sup> Chris Donnelly, Shaping soldiers for the 21st century, in: NATO review, Vol. 48 - No. 2, Summer - Autumn 2000, 28-31.

<sup>131</sup> George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, Speech "New Security and Defence Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic Area, Centro Caixa - Barcelona, 10 May 2001.

“The new security environment, therefore, will put entirely new demands on our military men and women. In addition to a high level of military competence, we will require keen political instincts and considerable diplomatic skills. More than ever, we will require a military gifted with the talent of improvisation, able to communicate in several languages, able to adapt to rapidly shifting situations. And more than ever, we will require a military geared to cooperation with soldiers from many countries, NATO members and Partner countries. Because today, our operations will include many countries from all over the continent, and indeed even from outside of Europe. In short, to manage the challenge of the next century we do not only require military-technical interoperability. We also require ‘human interoperability’ - officers and soldiers who think alike, officers who share the same ideas, who can devise new approaches to new problems – and who can start working with each other very quickly.”

In another speech he acknowledges that „these trends - in which the lines between military security and police work become blurred - will continue to grow.”<sup>132</sup>

“Building a self-sustaining civil society requires civilian architects. Human rights and development agencies, to help the most needy Government experts, to help build the necessary institutions. Engineers, to help reconstruct shattered infrastructure. And police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, and wardens to create a system of justice, which can allow people to trust in their own society and government again.”

He suggests<sup>133</sup> “smart investments:”

“Smart investment is the only way to share the transatlantic burden, and deal effectively with our common risks and challenges. Investment on soldiers that have the right training and can be used to maintain peace in the Balkans, bring stability to Afghanistan, or fight terrorism at home and abroad. Smart investment on modern precision weapons that can bring conflicts quickly to a successful conclusion, with the minimum loss of life. Smart investment on strategic transport, ships as well as aircraft, civil as well as military. ... And smart investment goes beyond defence budgets. To deal with today’s crises, we need better homeland defence, better intelligence, more deployable civil police, and more effective monitoring of money laundering.”

Peace-support and humanitarian operations are likely to be a principal task of armed forces for the next generation. Indeed, past experience of post-conflict peacebuilding suggests that it will take at least a generation to create a sustainable end-state in Kosovo, Afghanistan and other places. The NATO-led force in Kosovo, for example, has certainly worked hard to maintain law and order. KFOR soldiers patrol the streets, they investigate crimes, and they make arrests.

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<sup>132</sup> George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, "International Security and Law Enforcement -A Look Ahead," Law Enforcement and National Security Global Forum, Edinburgh International Conference Centre, 19 June 2001.

<sup>133</sup> George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, speech at the First Magazine Dinner - Claridge's Hotel, London, 24 January 2002.



## Peace-Keeping

To ensure the success of existing peace-support operations war-fighting soldiers have to be retrained. Studies have shown that soldiers get the necessary respect from local people. The U.S. forces, with their strong emphasis on force protection and intimidating appearance sometimes appear to go too far the other way, and their remoteness from the locals may reduce their effectiveness in the peacekeeping role.<sup>134</sup>

A special trained military is needed, one whose primary purpose is peacekeeping, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response, not war-making. These are all missions the military already performs to varying degrees, but the focus of most of the militaries still remains on preparation for war. The military of the past was to fight wars only. Any other mission was considered secondary. Experience demonstrates that when soldiers are called on to meet a security challenge nowadays they have to be able to do more than merely fight. The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown that, in addition to the ability to fight, soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of stressful and demanding roles, from diplomat through policeman and arbitrator to first-aid worker, hospital manager and city administrator.

A transformed military designed primarily for peacekeeping, nationbuilding, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response would be one with characteristics almost the opposite of the military at present: smaller, less expensive, much lighter, less lethal, human-centered, multilaterally oriented, and regionally tailored. Ground forces would take clear precedence over air and naval forces; support personnel would predominate over combat arms; and erstwhile combat functions would give way to policing, conflict mediation, and advisory-assistance functions.

Such a military would presumably require a different constellation of skills-and thus a different demographic profile, possibly even a different caliber of personnel-- than the current military possesses: more linguists and regional specialists, higher levels of education, greater levels of maturity and experience, perhaps a complete reconfiguration by gender, ethnicity, and age. This new military would also seem to call for different organizational arrangements, incentive systems, and command approaches: less hierarchy, wider spans of control, and compressed rank; less emphasis on authoritarian command; more emphasis on intellectual leadership, collegiality, and democratic decision-making; less emphasis on coercive discipline and obedience, more on self-discipline, competence, and socially responsible professionalism.<sup>135</sup> People who are trained to be peace-keepers have to be re-trained for the new role of the mandate. The mandate defines in what way soldiers have to be trained and re-trained. Each unit sent on a peace operation must be trained for a number of months.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Christopher Bellamy, Combining combat readiness and compassion, in: NATO review, Summer 2001, 9-11.

<sup>135</sup> Gregory D Foster, The postmodern military: The irony of "strengthening" defense, Harvard International Review; Cambridge; Summer 2001.

<sup>136</sup> This reaffirmed also former U.S. Secretary of State, Les Aspin, „Challenges to Value-Based Military Intervention,‘ Address to the Managing Chaos Conferences, United States Institute of Peace, *Peaceworks*, no. 3 (February 1995).

Peace-keepers have to be physically present, visible and supportive to the population through mediation and advise. A good soldier is not necessarily a good peace-keeper.<sup>137</sup> A peace-keeper is a certain type of soldier. He should be qualified to perform police tasks, civil-affairs operations, speak multiple languages and should be trained in some psychology. Officers are expected to broker diplomatic deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, guarding surrendered weapons, interacting extensively with local people, ensuring the safe delivery of food supplies, organize and monitor elections, Helping rebuild government agencies or police forces and support civil reconstruction.<sup>138</sup>

The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) is there to assist the Afghan Interim Administration. The Military Technical Agreement (MTA)<sup>139</sup> sets out what this might mean in practice. In addition to taking part in joint patrols with the Afghan police, the ISAF may:

- Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures;
- Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction;
- And identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.

The British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon<sup>140</sup>, who spoke for the lead nation United Kingdom, said, however:

“Many nations offered infantry. But the ISAF needs logistics support. It needed Explosive Ordnance Disposal troops. It needs signallers. It needs engineers. It needs medical units. It needs helicopters. And, given that it will deploy and be supplied by air, it needs air transport.”

The ISAF consists of only some 5.000 soldiers - compared with the 60,000 earmarked for much smaller Bosnia to preserve peace there, or the 40,000 for Kosovo. The ISAF operates only in the capital, Kabul. If it were to be extended to the five or six next-largest cities, a force of perhaps 25.000 men would be needed. Since all parties have signed up to the new constitutional arrangements it would be an ideal peacekeeping operation although according to the UN mandate the troops are entitled to use force.

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<sup>137</sup> American commanders are still uncomfortable in the peace-keeping role. While soldiers from contingents from nations with peace-keeping experience often wear light berets and T-shirts, Americans are always found in „full battle rattle“ – helmets, body armor, and weapons. David L. Bosco, *The Next Test in Kosovo*, *The American Prospect*, November 23, 1999, 26-31.

<sup>138</sup> Michael C. Williams, “Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping,” *Adelphi Paper 321*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 1998, 4. Congressional Budget Office, *CBO Paper*, December 1999, xii.

<sup>139</sup> the Military Technical Agreement was signed on 4 January by the Commander of the ISAF, Major General McColl, and the Afghan Interim Administration.

<sup>140</sup> Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, statement to the House of Commons, 10 January 2002 (10 Downing Street Newsroom).

The former commander of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, retired Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, said that soldiers must be better trained as they undertake "non-traditional" roles of peacekeeping rather than fighting wars. Modern conflicts -- especially those where troops had to be mediators rather than combatants -- required different, more refined skills. Peacekeeping, he said, required that "every corporal has to know what is going on -- there is no room for blue collar soldiers any more." The situations peacekeepers, as opposed to traditional war-fighting soldiers, now found themselves confronting were far more complex and required special training. Given the complexity and geographical scope of international peacekeeping missions, Dallaire said he believed a peacekeeping officer corps should be trilingual: fluent in English, French and Spanish.<sup>141</sup>

The Pentagon increasingly sees peacekeeping as an obstacle to war-fighting. The Army, for example, had downgraded one of its 10 active duty divisions to the second-lowest rating for wartime readiness, citing a lack of training and personnel caused by peacekeeping work in the Balkans, Pentagon and Congressional officials said. Nearly 4000 of the Third Infantry Division's (3<sup>rd</sup> ID) soldiers had been unavailable for the training needed to keep soldiers ready for battle because they have been in Bosnia since October, Pentagon officials said. In the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> ID, its commander determined that although "the 3<sup>rd</sup> ID is fully resourced and ready to accomplish its current operation mission in the Balkans," it was not fully prepared for "high intensity combat operations" because of training concerns, a Pentagon report said. Those training concerns stemmed from the fact that 3<sup>rd</sup> ID units in Bosnia had been unable to participate in "command and control" exercises at Fort Irwin, Calif., that simulated large-scale battle conditions. Pentagon officials said that until those units returned from the Balkans and underwent training to reorient them toward combat and away from peacekeeping, the division would remain at a lower state of readiness. "Any unit coming out of the Balkans is going to face special challenges as far as their war-fighting skills are concerned," a Pentagon official said. "Not that they wouldn't be survivable, they just wouldn't be as proficient."<sup>142</sup>

That reports are conflicting with the fact that only a fifth of the soldiers the Second Brigade of the mechanized 3rd Infantry Division, an armor-heavy combat force out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, that had assumed the Bosnia mission for two consecutive tours were needed in Bosnia at any one time. The rest remained at Fort Stewart, where, even as units prepared for peacekeeping runs, or reorganized following completed ones, the majority of the soldiers continued to train for what everyone agreed was the division's primary purpose: fighting high-intensity battles against conventional foes, presumably in defense of the nation. At its full stateside complement the 3rd ID consists of something over 20,000 full-time soldiers and easily twice that number in dependent families and civilian employees.<sup>143</sup> The

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<sup>141</sup> Dallaire suffered a nervous breakdown following his experiences in Rwanda. AFP, May 10.

<sup>142</sup> New York Times, March 29, 2001.

<sup>143</sup> William Langewiesche, Peace is hell, The Atlantic Monthly; Boston; Oct 2001.

Pentagon's argument is countered by troops and their officers, who have said that peacekeeping duty in the Balkans sharpened their proficiency.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> New York Times, March 29, 2001.

*A report by the leading military sociologist Charles Moskos<sup>145</sup> examines the experience of U.S. troops deployed in Kosovo, illustrating the complex challenges soldiers face in contemporary peace operations. This report on Task Force Falcon is based on field research conducted in FYROM and Kosovo, 30 August to 6 September, 2000. The report is based on a variety of methods: field observations, in-depth interviews, and a survey of 320 soldiers. The research sites included in FYROM, Camp Able Sentry; in Kosovo, Camp Bondsteel, Camp Monteith, Eagles Nest, and OP Sapper. In addition, at the invitation of Maj. Gen. (ret.) William Nash, I spent a day and a half in Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, a city divided into ethnic Albanian and Serb sections.*

„There has been concern recently that peacekeeping operations may undermine combat capabilities. Although I cannot give a final answer to this question, this is not a view shared by the soldiers of Task Force Falcon. The overwhelming consensus is that what is lost in weapons practice and field exercises is more than compensated for by real-life experience in small-unit operations. Soldiers and their leaders gain invaluable training at the squad, platoon, and company level. (Not to be overlooked, small weapons and grenade training is done at local ranges in Kosovo.) Only 14 percent of the soldiers reported that they thought their peacekeeping mission in Kosovo would make them less prepared for a future combat experience compared to 76 percent who said it would make them better prepared or would have no effect (10 percent were unsure). As a senior commander put it, if soldiers after a peacekeeping deployment need months of combat retraining when they return to their home station, "they weren't well trained to begin with."

The opposite question may be more germane. Do combat soldiers require additional training for peacekeeping operations? The general view was that some, but not a lot, of additional training would be useful. The most frequently mentioned items concerning the need for more training dealt with crowd control, general police skills in handling civilians, weapons safety, and more familiarity with local customs. A sizable number wrote on their questionnaire on the need for language training.

There was also criticism that the kind of peacekeeping training given prior to arrival in Kosovo was not well designed or appropriate to the mission. Specifically, it dealt too much with theory and not enough with practical matters, e.g. body searches, arresting people, how to deal with children surrounding one's vehicle, etc. Also, what was actually happening on the ground in Kosovo was not adequately covered in the training prior to deployment. Some stated that the prior peacekeeping training was Bosnia rather than Kosovo based.

In terms of behaviour toward the locals, Task Force Falcon soldiers displayed a degree of neutrality that was impressive. The general attitude was that there was enough blame to go around for both sides, but that the locals should be given the benefit of doubt. Or as one sergeant succinctly put it: "There are no bad guys here. But there no innocents either." If there was a trend over time, it was toward seeing the Serbs more as victims than aggressors; this in contrast to the opposite early on in the KFOR intervention."

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<sup>145</sup> Economic & Social Research Council, Civil-military relations and security sector reform in the 21st Century, Issue Two, June 2001.

## **What is Crisis Management?**

TABLE 4 shows the whole range of Crisis Response Operations and Petersberg Tasks. The lower level covers all operations that are based on the consens of the conflicting parties (line x). The higher level (peace enforcement, peace implementation) ends short of war (line y). These two areas roughly are identical with missions according Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN-Charta.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> There are important exceptions, however. The KFOR-troops in Kosovo are allowed to act under Chapter VII but operate mainly on the lower level.

**TABLE 4: Crisis Response Operations – Petersberg Tasks**

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CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS – PETERSBERG TASKS			
HUMANITARIAN ACTION	PEACE OPERATIONS (PSO)		WAR
RESCUE OPERATIONS	PEACE KEEPING	PEACE ENFORCEMENT Desert Endur.	Storm Freedom
REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS ASSISTANCE	PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT MONITORING	PEACE IMPLEMENTATION RING (Verification)	Kosovo (Operation Allied Force)
CONSENT (Chapter VI)		Usually NO CONSENT but consensual Chapter VII possible (Dayton, Kosovo UN resolution) Afghanistan Force AGAINST CONFLICTING PARTY BUT IMPARTIALITY (Chapter VII)	Designated Enemy
Use of force for self defense		Use of force for the implementation of a mandate (agreement)	Use of force for defeat
e.g.: EARLY WARNING, PIONEER-, MINE SWEEPING-, RESCUE-, TRANSPORT-, DISASTER RELIEF- UNITS		COMBAT TROOPS Prepared for Combat      Combat	

x

Source: Heinz Gärtner. The author received important suggestions from Johann Pucher and Karl Schmidseider.

Therefore, one important dividing line in TABLE 4 falls between the extended peace-keeping and enforcement models. The area between x and y does not presuppose the consent of the parties to the conflict or potential conflict. The relationship between consent and the use of force is a complex arrangement between mandate and clear rules of engagement. In some cases, there could be a type of consensual Chapter VII, such as the Dayton and the Kosovo peace agreement. In these cases the conflicting parties agreed to peace implementation by force.

The other dividing line is the one between peace-enforcement and war (line y). A *war* describes a state when force is used between two or among more conflicting parties on the basis of partiality and clearly designated enemies absent any mandate from an international organization. Conversely, UN peace operations are based on the three basic principles, namely consent, impartiality and the use of

force only in self-defence.<sup>147</sup> These principles have occasionally been jeopardized by the use of humanitarian action as a pretence for political intervention with ambiguous and ill-defined objectives, as in Somalia.<sup>148</sup>

The participation of a European force in a war with a designated enemy and no mandate from an international organization is unlikely, but not excluded, however. The EU "will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter" (Cologne, Amsterdam) or recognizes the priority of the Charter (Helsinki). In political terms the lack of an UN mandate or authorization would make it for the EU extremely difficult to conduct a peace enforcement operation. Many member states would have difficulties to participate. It could tear apart the juvenile European defense policy.

Therefore, crisis-management actions by the European force will in the foreseeable future be operations that are undertaken with the consent of the states concerned and carried out in pursuance of UN Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless, EU military intervention in the absence of a Security Council mandate are possible but very unlikely. On the other hand, the institutional framework in which legitimate interventions without a mandate, in cases of extreme necessity, seem more likely to be made is that of NATO.<sup>149</sup>

However, there is some room for interpretation about a clear distinction between peace-enforcement operations and war, however. Legally, one could argue that peace-enforcement operations which are authorized by the UN are not wars. Yet the differences are blurring, as the example of the second Gulf War between the U.S.-led coalition and Iraq on the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 shows. The anti-Iraq coalition was authorized by a mandate of the Security Council; the liberation of Kuwait could also, however, have taken place on the basis of self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter), which then would have counted as a war under the above definition.<sup>150</sup>

In the case of the war of the U.S. in Afghanistan Enduring Freedom the UN Security Council was "recognising the inherent right of individual and self-defence in accordance with the Charter" in Resolution 1368 of September 12. It also regarded the terror acts as a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the resolution stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. Toward the end it expresses that the Security Council is ready "to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks..."

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<sup>147</sup> Boutros-Ghali, „Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,‘ 3 January 1995, paras. 33, 80, 85-87.

<sup>148</sup> Michèle Griffin, retrenchment, Reform and Regionalization: Trends in UN Peace Support Operations, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, no.1 (Spring 1999), 1-31, here 11.

<sup>149</sup> Martin Ortega, Military intervention and the European Union, Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2001, March 2001, 51.

<sup>150</sup> U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, during the war against Iraq admitted in a talk in November 2001 that the U.S. would not have asked the United Nations for a mandate if it were unlikely to get it.



The Security Council Resolution did not refer explicitly to Article 51<sup>151</sup> which states that nothing shall impair the right to self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, however. It leaves open, what the right to self-defence constitutes and thus whether this can be defined as war.

This assessment has made it much easier for the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1373. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the American sponsored resolution on September 29 that would oblige all 189 member states to crack down on financing, training and movement of terrorists, and cooperate in any campaign against them, including one that involves force. The resolution puts the commitments in a form immediately binding on all member states by invoking Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which gives the Security Council authority to take action up and including force, and obliges all United Nations members to cooperate. The resolution opened the way for the use of force “deny safe haven” to terrorist groups.<sup>152</sup>

The international peace-keeping for Afghanistan after the capitulation of the Taliban-Regime operated under a United Nations mandate<sup>153</sup> on the basis Chapter VII, in which troops would be able to use military force to carry out their mission.

### **Impartiality or War**

A clear, appropriate and realistic mandate has to be implemented in an impartial manner. Impartiality is not identical with consent and it is not neutrality or passivity. Activities to implement mandates, including the use of force, does not mean equal taking sides and it can be to one of the parties.<sup>154</sup> In order to ensure their impartiality, the ideal is the complete disinterestedness of the intervening state(s), that is, the absence of self-interest. Since states may need more than humanitarian motives to be willing to intervene the UN or its regional organizations are better able to demonstrate impartiality. The overriding purpose of an intervention must be humanitarian.<sup>155</sup> In fact, NATO was handing Washington a “a blank check” when the alliance activated its collective defense agreement.

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000 recommends that peace operations must have “clear, credible and achievable mandates.” Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to

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<sup>151</sup> Under Article 51 of the UN Charter the United States as the victim of aggression were legally entitled to use all necessary means to defend itself.

<sup>152</sup> UN-Resolution is printed in New York Times, Sept 29, 2001.

<sup>153</sup> Security Council SC/7248, 4443rd Meeting (PM), 20 December 2001, Resolution 1386 (2001) (Adopted Unanimously).

<sup>154</sup> Winrich Kühne, „Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed,“ International Politics and Society 4/1999, 368-379, here 363.

the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil.<sup>156</sup>

In principal, a European force would be able to take part in all operations. Also for this reason operations between lines x and y should be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or Petersberg. In such circumstances the use of force requires strict impartiality. Limited force against any party that violates the mandate and impartiality will not be mutually exclusive.

A European force should be capable to participate in all Petersberg or Crisis Response Operations. Participation in war – without a mandate or authorization of the UN – should be avoided. Europeans also should share the the burden and the risks with the Americans. In practice, Europeans should concentrate on the lower level of crisis-response operations (left of line x in TABLE 2), however. On the one hand, the resources of European states are limited; on the other hand, European states have useful experiences in humanitarian action, rescue operations and peace-keeping. Their activities can range from infrastructure restoration to basic police, medical, and veterinary services.

### **Non-Military Crisis Management**

Militaries do fill only some of the gap. The United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the United States are all working in various ways to the capacity to deploy units of civilian police on short notice. They are developing the necessary training to ensure that these officers can make an instant contribution to law enforcement when they hit the ground. The law enforcement training in Kosovo is already paying off, as more and more new police officers are taking up their duties and conducting joint, multi-ethnic patrols. Less than 24 months after the conflict 4000 police officers have graduated from the OSCE organized Kosovo Police Service school.

The European Council at Helsinki in December 1999<sup>157</sup> decided to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a

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<sup>155</sup> Danish Institute of International Affairs, *Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects*, Copenhagen 1999, 110-111.

<sup>156</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 2000, para. 48-64.

<sup>157</sup> Presidency Progress Report To The Helsinki European Council, *On Strengthening The Common European Policy, On Security And Defence: Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union*, 11-12 December 1999.

contribution to civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours).

The OSCE "Charter for European Security" of Istanbul in November 1999 stresses that the OSCE will work to enhance its role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the Organization's efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such activities may comprise police monitoring and police training.<sup>158</sup>

European police forces are among those with the best training, skills and equipment for international missions, including training and monitoring as well as active service. European States can play a special role. European States could supply experts on organized crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering, as well as civil and riot police and border guards.

The contribution of nonmilitary personnel to assist multilateral organizations is considered another critical contribution to regional security. Collectively, European allies provided more non-military personnel to multilateral organizations that promote peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation in the Balkans than did the United States. For example, as of April 2001, European allies provided about one-third of U.N. civilian police and almost 60 percent of the specialists to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. European allies also provided 139 persons to support the EU Monitoring Mission in the Balkans. The United States, however, was the single largest contributor of civilian police and personnel to support OSCE programs in the region, providing 12 percent of civilian police and 16 percent of personnel. To support a critical element of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict interventions in the Balkans region, the United Nations has relied on civilian police provided by its member countries. Civilian police play a critical role in post-conflict interventions by helping war-torn societies restore the conditions necessary for social, economic, and political stability. The traditional role for U.N. civilian police through the mid-1990s was to advise, train, and monitor local police. In Kosovo, however, the United Nations refocused its role to restore and maintain law and order, and to help establish judicial reforms and rule of law. As of January 2001, the international community provided more than 6,300 civilian police to support U.N. missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. European allies provided more than 2,000 civilian police, while the United States provided about 764 civilian police. Other member countries, such as India, Jordan, and Pakistan, provided the remaining civilian police.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> OSCE Istanbul Summit, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, paragraph 44.

<sup>159</sup> GAO United States General Accounting Office Report to the Congressional Committees, European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe, November 2001, 11, 64.

## Summary and Conclusion

- Mass invasion and total war have ceased to be a threat in Europe. The possibility of a regional war remains, as in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Most threats to national security in Europe today are not directly military and are global in scale. They may evolve out of economic problems, ethnic hostility, or insecure and inefficient borders, which allow illegal migration and smuggling or they may be related to organized crime and corruption. The proliferation weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological as well as nuclear – and their means of delivery, and the revolution in information technology present special challenges. Terrorism is a good example of the new security threats that seriously challenge what is still a largely Cold War based security system. The traditional military force is not adequate to confront these new challenges. It is crucial that the military effort will be coupled with other measures, such as international police co-operation, financial investigation and cooperation and diplomacy.
- Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted toward this type of activity. Both members of the EU in the framework of the „Petersberg Tasks“ and members of NATO or PfP will have to participate in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and peace-making/peace-enforcement operations. The tasks of members of NATO and the EU are be blurring in the field of crisis management. Threats have become flexible, and to meet the new challenges responses and security institutions eventually have to become flexible as well.
- For the first time, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter to declare the attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, 2001 as an attack on the 19-member alliance. NATO easily could have acted under Article 4. Even though NATO invoked its Article 5 mutual security commitment the United States chose not to act militarily through the alliance. Few European countries have the resources to conduct a war far from home. NATO was merely one among many choices open to the U.S., which acted alone built a new coalition of its own outside NATO. Before September 11 2001 there was a bifurcation within NATO and EU (WEU). There was collective defence on the one hand and crisis management on the other. By invoking Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty NATO also transformed the meaning of collective defense.
- There also is a duplication of missions. We have the EU with the inclusion of the „Petersberg“ tasks here and the NATO's new missions there. We have crisis management here and crisis management there. Clearly, there is a great deal of overlapping.
- Coordination and consultation arrangements with other relevant organizations have to be established and improved, including non-military elements, notably the UN and the OSCE. The EU and NATO can offer support to conflict prevention, peace-keeping operations, and crisis management tasks undertaken under OSCE or UN aegis (e.g. logistics and personnel).

- The campaign in Afghanistan has emphasised a trend with profound ramifications far beyond Afghanistan: growing U.S. military predominance. The gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. With financial difficulties for many European governments and the absence of a direct threat it is questionable whether Europeans should copy American capabilities.
- Weaknesses in European defense capabilities mean that European states will depend on the United States to provide key combat capabilities. Given this situation, the United States will need to continue playing an important role in the European region, particularly in the area of military capabilities.
- New trends in the military and non-military contributions made by the United States and its European allies have emerged. Militarily, the United States leads its allies in providing combat capabilities to restore peace, as it did in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. European states provide most of the peacekeeping forces and the preponderance of non-military aid to the Balkans. The European allies provided for example most of the development assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and to the states of the former Soviet Union. NATO's focus on a wider set of threats and on the expansion of its membership to integrate former Warsaw Pact nations complements the role of the European Union, the leading source of non-military assistance in the region.
- There should and will be a qualified division of labor. European States are not able to prepare for all: war fighting, high-intensity combat, enforcing and making peace, peace-keeping, resolving conflicts and participating in humanitarian and rescue operations. Europeans are more designed for peace-keeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. Rather than emphasizing the need to deploy overwhelming force, a key tenet of U.S. military operations European militaries also could concentrate on a peacekeeping role.
- This division of labor already takes place. The European allies are doing their share. While the United States provided more than two-thirds of the aircraft in the campaign over Kosovo and Serbia, in the peacetime aftermath the EU provides five times as many peace-keeping forces as the United States. As to the war in Afghanistan the United States sought to avoid military obligations in Afghanistan once its mission to defeat the Taliban government and destroy Al Qaeda's terrorist network was over. The United States did not intend to be part of the formal peacemaking and peacekeeping force after the defeat. The European states announced it was willing to participate in a UN-mandated multinational force in Afghanistan.
- It means that the EU members concentrate more on the smaller-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum and the U.S. participates in the more demanding crisis. Modern defense, organized in a multinational framework, implies that European countries provide for particular operations that fit into that multinational framework. The U.S. prefers spearhead high-intensity offensive operations anyway, and is more reluctant than its European partners to engage

in long-term peace support operations. The Pentagon increasingly sees peacekeeping as an obstacle to war-fighting.

- In a qualified division of labor there should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. Europeans should develop some war-fighting capability. U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end Peace Support Operations. They should not be reduced to war-fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations.
- Selective participation in international peace operations is inevitable not only for the United States but also for European states. In principal, European states would be able to take part in all operations. In practice, they should concentrate on the “soft security” operations. Its participation in high-intensity combat is unlikely to be decisive.
- The wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan definitely indicated the new requirements for future armies: a smaller force with high-technology weapons, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and battlefield awareness and communications equipment based on internet technologies. The U.S. war in Afghanistan highlighted a dramatic shift in the way modern wars are being fought, with sophisticated arms technologies overtaking tanks and helicopters as the U.S. military's weapons of choice.
- High technology equipment forces are not only not essential for soft-security and peace-keeping missions but also not very helpful, however. Most highly developed military technologies are poorly designed to be used in crisis response operations.
- A special trained military is needed, one whose primary purpose is peacekeeping, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response, not war-making. A peace-keeper is a certain type of soldier. He should be qualified to perform police tasks, civil-affairs operations, speak multiple languages and should be trained in some psychology.
- Peace-enforcement and peace-implementation operations must be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or “Petersberg.” In such circumstances the use of force requires strict impartiality. Limited force against any party that violates the mandate and impartiality will not be mutually exclusive. The mandate has to have clear political and military objectives that are both reasonable and attainable. In most of the cases the UN will be the authorizing agent. Rules of engagement have to be formulated unambiguously.
- The development of civil aspects of crisis management arrangements is a further important step to meet the new challenges. The EU decided to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism. The OSCE stresses that it will work to enhance its role in civilian police-related activities.