Non-paper on the Draft Conclusions of the German EU-Presidency
on the Union’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy Reinhardtshausen
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Strengthening of a Common European Policy on Security and Defence |
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I. Introduction
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which is expected to enter into force this spring, foresees the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the development of a Common European Defence Policy (CEDP). The Treaty also provides for the possibility of integration of WEU into EU, should the European Council so decide. The European Council in Vienna welcomed the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defence. It considered that in order for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities. Furthermore, it welcomed the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in St. Malo. The initiative and work in hand for the NATO Washington Summit will also strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, enabling the European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The European Council invited the German Presidency to further this debate and agreed to examine the question again at the European Council in Cologne. The WEU Ministerial Council in Bremen will also present an appropriate opportunity to disuss this question on the basis of the informal reflection which was initiated at the Rome Ministerial Council. II. Guiding principles 1. The aim is to strengthen CFSP and complement it by the development of a common European policy on security and defence. This requires a capacity for action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. Decisions to act would be taken within the institutional framework of the European Union. The European Council would thus be able to take decisions on the whole range of activities in the external relations of the Union (Trade, CFSP, Defence). The Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg tasks (“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”) into the treaty. The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that Europe possesses appropriate capabilities (including military capabilities) and structures to conduct crisis management in the scope of the Petersberg tasks. This is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently. 2. The efforts to strengthen European
defence and security contribute to the vitality and effectiveness of the
Atlantic Alliance by strengthening its European pillar. This shall lead
to more complementarity, co-operation and synergy.
The alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members. The commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty will be preserved although there will be a need to review the institutional basis for the latter, in the understanding that whatever happens to the modified Brussels Treaty Article V, the collective security guarantee will continue to apply only to those who are NATO allies. 3. The requirements for the successful
creation of a European defence capability will include
4. For the effective implementation
of its operations, the European Union will be able to choose, according
to the requirements of the case, either:
This requires in particular:
As regards EU decision making in
the field of security and defence policy, necessary arrangements have to
be made which will also ensure political control and strategic direction
of EU-led operations.
This may require in particular:
As regards military capabilities,
nations need to develop further forces (including military headquarters)
that are suited also for cirisis managemant operations. The main characteristics
include: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and
mobility.
Any unnecessary duplication with regard to existing capabilities within NATO has to be avoided. 5. For autonomous European led operations, the EU could use either European capabilities preidentified within NATO’s European pillar or multinational or national European means outside the NATO framework. In the case of the EU having recourse
to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements,
the main focus should be on the following aspects:
III. The way ahead After discussion at ministerial level the Presidency will prepare its report for the European Council in Cologne which should reflect common principles on the future of European security and defence. The Presidency will also reflect on possible conclusions for the European Council in Cologne. In drawing up such conclusions, the Presideny will try to answer the following questions: 1. How can we create the conditions for a European policy on security and defence providing for homogenous action in European crisis management within the EU? 2. What will be the consequences for the future of WEU taking into account Article 17 of the EU Treaty which provides for the possibility of integrating WEU into the EU? 3. How can European military capabilities be developed further with regard to Petersberg tasks and in accordance with the decisions of the NATO summit in Washington in April? 4. Does this also require harmonisation of the requirements, development and procurement as well as further enhancement of cooperation of European defence industries? |